Are Mitzvos Always Good?

Matt Schneeweiss

The most fundamental idea about mitzvos is that they are for our benefit - not for God's benefit. The Ramban elaborates on this at length in this week's parashah (Commentary on Devarim 22:6): 

In the past the Sages arranged for us these words in the prayer of Yom Kippur: "You set man apart from the beginning and You considered him worthy to stand before You, for who can tell You what to do, and if he is righteous what can he give You?" And so it is stated in the Torah: "[Now, O Israel, what does Hashem, your God, ask of you? . . .] To observe the commandments of Hashem and His decrees, which I command you today, for your benefit" (Devarim 10:13); so too, "Hashem commanded us to perform all these decrees, to fear Hashem, our God, for our good, all the days" (ibid. 6:4). 

The Rambam, after presenting and explaining the same idea in the Guide for the Perplexed (3:31), divides the benefits of the mitzvos into three categories: 

The sole object of the Torah is to benefit us . . . every one of the 613 mitzvos serves (a) to inculcate some good idea or to remove some bad idea, (b) to establish a just principle or to remove injustice, (c) to guide in accordance with a good trait or to warn against a bad trait. Everything depends on three things: ideas, morals, and social conduct . . . These three principles suffice for assigning a reason for every one of the Divine commandments.

In last week's parashah (Shoftim) we read: "A prophet from your midst, from your brethren like me, shall Hashem, your God, establish for you - to him shall you hearken" (18:15). The Rambam explains the halachic ramifications of this injunction (Sefer ha'Mitzvos: Mitzvos Aseh #172): 

The 172nd mitzvah is the commandment to obey every one of the prophets and to fulfill everything he commands us in, even if he commands us to transgress one or several of the mitzvos (except for avodah zarah) - provided that this is temporary, and that he doesn't permanently institute an addition or subtraction.

According to the Rambam's statement in the Guide for the Perplexed, every mitzvah has a reason or a benefit, either in our ideas, our moral character, or in our relations with our fellow Jews. The question is: What is the benefit of the mitzvah to obey a prophet? Moreover, if mitzvos are beneficial, then how can it be beneficial to obey a prophet who tells us to violate mitzvos?

The Ralbag states two benefits of the mitzvah to obey a prophet. (Commentary on Devarim 18-19, ha'toeles ha'shishi). His second answer provides a fascinating insight into the nature of mitzvos: 

There is another benefit in this mitzvah, specifically regarding cases in which the prophet commands us to transgress certain mitzvos at certain times. Even though the Torah generally guides the nation toward the Good, it is possible that in certain cases it would be better to deviate from some of its mitzvos. Since Hashem (may He be exalted) desired the greatest good at all times for His nation . . . He identified for Israel, through his prophets, that which needs to be changed from time to time - something which was impossible to do within the Torah itself. 

This idea is similar to the idea of miracles which Hashem brings about through his prophets, namely, that Hashem set up nature in such a manner as to achieve the general good through each of the natural laws. But since, in certain cases, it would be better to deviate somewhat from this natural order, Hashem - may He be exalted - saw fit that this should be done through His prophets at a time of need. 

According to the Ralbag, the mitzvah to obey a prophet is built upon the premise that the mitzvos are not inherently good, but generally good. It is inevitable that there will be cases in which the mitzvos do not bring about good, either for an individual or for the nation. Therefore, Hashem granted His prophets the ability to temporarily suspend mitzvos in situations where keeping them would be ineffective or detrimental [1].

The Ralbag's answer to our question is that the mitzvah to obey the prophet does not have a benefit in its own right. Rather, this mitzvah makes it possible to achieve the maximum benefit from the Torah as a whole by permitting the violation of the Torah in those cases where violation would be better than observance.

The Rambam elaborates on this idea at length in the Guide for the Perplexed (3:34): 

It is also important to note that the Torah does not take into account exceptional circumstances, and commandments are not based on minority conditions. Whatever the Torah teaches, whether it be of an intellectual, a moral, or a practical character, is founded on that which is the rule and not on that which is the exception; it ignores the injury that might be caused to a single person through a certain Torah decree or precept. For the Torah is a divine institution, and [in order to understand its operation] we must consider how in nature the various forces produce benefits which are general, but in some solitary cases they cause also injury . . . 

We must consequently not be surprised when we find that the objectives of the Torah do not fully appear in every individual. There must, of absolute necessity, be people who are not perfected by the instruction of the Torah, just as there are beings which do not receive from the specific forms in nature all that they require, for all this comes from one God, and is the result of one act: "They are all given from one Shepherd" (Koheles 7:2). It is impossible to be otherwise, and we have already explained that that which is impossible always remains impossible and never changes. 

From this consideration it also follows that the laws cannot, like medicine, vary according to the different conditions of persons and times. Whilst the cure of a person depends on his particular constitution at the particular time, the divine guidance contained in the Torah must be certain and general, although it may be effective in some cases and ineffective in others. If the Torah depended on the varying conditions of man, it would be imperfect in its totality, each precept being left indefinite. For this reason it would not be right to make the fundamental principles of the Torah dependent on a certain time or a certain place; on the contrary, the statutes and the judgments must be definite, unconditional, and general. 

To summarize: Hashem created two systems: the Laws of Torah and the Laws of Nature. Both systems are designed for the benefit of His creatures: the Torah for Jews, and the Laws of Nature for all living things. However, it is impossible for any system to achieve its objective for every individual in every particular case [2]. For this reason, Hashem enabled His prophets to "correct" the Laws of the Torah and the Laws of Nature in those cases in which they would not have otherwise achieved their purpose.

[1] Needless to say, we non-prophets have neither the knowledge nor the authority to suspend even one iota of halacha. Even if we knew with 100% certainty that keeping a particular mitzvah would be ineffective or detrimental for us in a particular case, we do not have Hashem's authorization to tamper with His system. We have no choice but to keep all of halacha under all circumstances.

[2] The idea that mitzvos are not inherently beneficial, but only generally beneficial, clashes with certain Kabbalistic notions - those which, as stated by Rav Hirsch, reduce each mitzvah to "a magic mechanism, an operation or rejection of theosophic worlds and anti-worlds" (Nineteen Letters on Judaism, Letter 18). As the Rambam stated, it is impossible for anyone to design a system which is effective for every individual in every case. Even Hashem cannot create such a system, for Hashem cannot the impossible. Thus, any idea which asserts that mitzvos achieve their purpose for every individual in every case must be false.