"Guide For the
Perplexed"
Moses Maimonides
Translated by
Michael Friedlander, Ph.D.
Second edition revised throughout 1904
Note: This book was scanned and ocr'ed by Andrew Meit and David Reed.
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PART I.
II
On Genesis iii.5 III
On tabnit and temunah IV
On raah, hibbit and hamb V
On Exod. xxiv.10 VI
On ish and ishihah, ah and ahot VII
On yalad VIII
On makom IX
On kisse X
On 'alah, yarad XI
On yashah XII
On kam XIII
On 'amad XIV
On adam XVI
On Zur XVII
On Mishnah Hagigah ii.1 XVIII
On karab, naga', niggash, XIX
On male XX
On ram, nissa XXI
On 'abar XXII
On ba XXIII
On Yaza, sbub XXIV
On halak XXV
On shaken XXVI
On "The Torah speaketh the language of man" XXVII
On Targurn of Gen. xivi. 4 XXVIII
On regel XXIX
On 'azeb XXX
On akal XXXI,
XXXII On the Limit of Man's Intellect XXXIII
to XXXVI On the Study and the Teaching of Metaphysics XXXVII
On panim XXXVIII
On ahor XXXIX
On leb XL
On ruah XLI
On nefesh XLII
On hayyim-mavet XLIII
On kanaf XLIV
On 'ayin XLY
On shama' XLVI,
XLVII On the Attribution of Senses and Sensation, to God XLVIII
The Targum of shama' and raah XLIX
Figurative Expressions applied to Angels L
On Faith LI-LX
On Attributes LI
On the Necessity of Proving the Inadmissibility of Attributes in reference to
God LII
Classification of Attributes LIII
The Arguments of the Attrilltists LIV
On Exod. xxxiii. 13; xxxiv. 7. LV
On Attributes implying Corporeality, Emotion, Non-existence and Comparison LVI
On Attributes denoting Existence, Life, Power, Wisdom and Will LVII
On the Identity of the Essence of God and His Attributes LVIII
On the Negative Sense of the True Attributes of God LIX
On the Character of the Knowledge of God Consisting of Negations LX
On the Difference between Positive and Negative Attributes LXI
On the Names of God LXII
On the Divine Namea composed of Four, Twelve and Forty-two Letters LXIII
On Ehyeh, Yab, and Shaddai LXIV
On "The Name of the Lord," and" The Glory of God" LXV
On the phrase "God spake" LXVI
On Exod. xxxii. 16 LXVII
On shabat and nab LXVIII
On the Terms : The Intellectus, the Intelligens and the Intelligibile LXIX
On the Primal Cause LXX
On the attribute rokeb ba'arabor LXXI
The Origin of the Kalam LXXII
A Parallel between the Universe and Man. LXXIII
Twelve Propositions of the Kaldm LXXIV
Proofs of the Kalkm for the creatio ex nihilo LXXV
Proofs of the Kaldm for the Unity of God LXXVI
Proofs of the Kaldm for the Incorporeality of God |
PART II. I Philosophical proofs for
the Existence, Incorporeality, and Unity of the First Cause II On the Existence of
Intelligences or purely Spiritual Beings III The Author adopts the
Theory of Aristotle as least open to Objections IV The Spheres and the
Causes of their Motion V Agreement of the
Aristotelian Theory with the Teaching of Scripture VI What is meant by the
Scriptural Term "Angels" VII The Homonymity of the
term "Angel" VIII On the Music of the
Spheres IX On the Number of the
Heavenly Spheres X The Influence of the
Spheres upon the Earth manifesto itself in four different ways XI The Theory of
Eccentricity Preferable to that of Epicycles. XII On the Nature of the
Divine Influence and that of the Spheres XIII Three Different
Theories about the Beginning of the Universe XIV Seven Methods by which
the Philosophers sought to prove the Eternity of the Universe XV Aristotle does not
scientifically demonstrate his Theory XVI The Author refutes all
Objections to Creatio ex nihilo XVII The Laws of Nature
apply to Things Created, but do not regulate the Creative Act which produces
them XVIII Examinations of the
Proofs of Philosophers for the Eternity of the Universe XIX Design in Nature XX The Opinion of Aristotle
as regards Design in Nature XXI Explanation of the
Aristotelian Theory that the Universe is the necessary Result of the First
Cause XXII Objections to the Theory
of the Eternity of the Universe XXIII The Theory of Creatio
ex nihilo is preferable to that of the Eternity of the Universe XXIV Difficulty of
Comprehending the Nature and the Motion of the Spheres according to the
Theory of Aristotle XXV The Theory of Creation
is adopted because of its own XXVI Examination of a
passage from Pirke di-Rabbi Eliezer in reference to Creation XXVII The Theory of a
Future Destruction of the Universe is not part of the Religious Belief taught
in the Bible XXVIII Scriptural Teaching
is in favour of the Indestructibility of the Universe XXIX Explanation of
Scriptural Phrases implying the Destruction of Heaven and Earth XXX Philosophical
Interpretation of Genesis i.-iv. XXXI The Institution of the
Sabbath serves (1) to Teach the Theory of Creation, and (2) to promote Man's
Welfare XXXII Three Theories
concerning Prophecy XXXIII The Difference
between Moses and the other Israelites as regards the Revelation on Mount
Sinai XXXIV Explanation of Exodus
xxiii. 20 XXXV The Difference between
Moses and the other Prophets as regards the Miracles wrought by them XXXVI On the Mental,
Physical and Moral Faculties of the XXXVII On the Divine
Influence upon Man's Imaginative and Mental Faculties through the Active
Intellect XXXVIII Courage and
Intuition reach the highest degree of XXXIX Moses was the fittest
Prophet to Receive and Promulgate the Immutable Law, which succeeding Prophets
merely Taught and Expounded XL The Test of True
Prophecy XLI What is Meant by
"Vision" XLII Prophets Received
Direct Communication only in Dreams or Visions XLIII On the Allegories of
the Prophets XLIV On the Different Modes
in which Prophets Receive Divine Messages. XLV The Various Classes of
Prophets XLVI The Allegorical Acts
of Prophets formed Parts of Prophetic Visions. XLVII On the Figurative
Style of the Prophetic Writings XLVIII Scripture ascribes Phenomena directly produced by Natural Causes to God as the First Cause of all things |
PART III. I The "Four
Faces" are Human Faces with four different II The Hayyot and the
Ofannim Further Explanation of the
Hayyot and the Ofannim derived from Ezek. x. IV The rendering of Ofan by
Gilgal in the Targum of Jonathan . V The Vision of Ezekiel is
divided into three stages : (1) Hayyot (=the Spheres); (2) Ofannim (=Earthly
elements); and (3) the man above the Hayyot (=Intelligences) VI On the Difference
between the Vision of Ezekiel and that of Isaiah (vi.) VII The Different Ways in
which the Prophet perceived the Three Parts of the Mereabah (Chariot) VIII Man has the Power to
Control his Bodily Wants and Earthly Desires IX The Material Element in
Man Prevents him from Attaining Perfection X God is not the Creator of
Evil XI Man is the Cause of his
own Misfortunes XII Three Kinds of Evil :
(1) That caused by the Nature of Man; (2) Caused by Man to Man; (3) Caused by
Man to himself XIII The Universe has No
other Purpose than its own Existence XIV It is the Will of the
Creator that the Spheres regulate the Affairs of Mankind XV Impossible Things are
not ascribed to the Creator, but it in difficult to Prove the Impossibility
in each Individual Case XVI On God's Omniscience XVII Five Theories
concerning Providence XVIII Every Individual
Member of Mankind enjoys the Influence of Divine Providence in proportion to
his Intellectual Perfection XIX It is an ancient Error
to Assume that God takes no Notice of Man XX God's Knowledge is
Different from Man's Knowledge XXI The Creator's knowledge
of His Production is Perfect XXII Object of the Book of
job, and Explanation of the First Two XXIII Job and his Friends
Discuss the various Theories concerning Providence XXIV On Trials and
Temptations XXV The Actions of God are
Not Purposeless XXVI The Divine Precepts
Serve a certain Purpose XXVII The Object of the
Divine Precepts is to Secure the XXVIII This Object is
easily seen in some Precepts whilst in others it is only known after due
Reflection XXIX On the Sabeans or
Star-worshippers XXX It is one of the
Objects of the Law of Moses to Oppose Idolatry XXXI The Law Promotes the
Well-being of Man by teaching Truth, Morality and Social Conduct XXXII Why did God give Laws
to Oppose Idolatry instead of Uprooting it directly? XXXIII Another chief Object
of the Law is to Train Man in Mastering his Appetites and Desires XXXIV The Law is based on
the ordinary condition of man XXXV Division of the
Precepts into Fourteen Classes XXXVI First Class of
Precepts, to Know, Love and Fear God XXXVII Second Class, Laws
concerning Idolatry XXXVIII Third Class, Moral
Precepts XXXIX Fourth Class, Laws
relating to Charity XL Fifth Class,
Compensation for Injury and the Duty of XLI Sixth Class, Punishment
of the Sinner XLII Seventh Class, Equity
and Honesty XLIII Eighth Class, Sabbath
and Festivals XLIV Ninth Class, Prayer,
Ttejfllin, Zizit and Meenzah XLV Tenth Class, The
Temple, its Vessels and its Ministers XLVI Eleventh Class,
Sacrifices XLVII Twelfth Class,
Distinction between Clean and Unclean and on Purification XLVIII Thirteenth Class,
Dietary Laws XLIX Fourteenth Class,
Marriage Laws L On Scriptural Passages
with seemingly Purposeless Contents LI How God is worshipped by
a Perfect Man LII On the Fear of God LIII Explanation of Hesed
(Love), Mishpat (Judgment), and Zedakah (Righteousness) LIV On True Wisdom |
The first Edition of the English Translation of Maimonides Dainlat al-Hairin being exhausted without having fully supplied the demand, I prepared a second, revised edition of the Translation. In the new edition the three volumes of the first edition have been reduced to one volume by the elimination of the notes; besides Hebrew words and phrases have been eliminated or transliterated. By these changes the translator sought to produce a cheap edition in order to bring the work of Maimonides within the reach of all studcnts of Theology and Jewish Literature.
M. FRIEDLANDER. Jews College, July 1904.
PREFACE TO VOLUME ONE OF THE FIRST EDITION
IN compliance with a desire repeatedly expressed by the Committee of the Hebrew Literature Society, I have undertaken to translate Maimonides Dalalat al-Hairin, better known by the Hebrew title Moreh Nebuchim, and I offer the first instalment of my labours in the present volume. This contains--(1) A short Life of Maimonides, in which special attention is given to his alleged apostasy. (2) An analysis of the whole of the Moreh Nebuchim. (3) A translation of the First Part of this work from the Arabic, with explanatory and critical notes.
Parts of the Translation have been contributed by Mr. Joseph Abrahams, B.A., Ph.D., and Rev. H. Gollancz -- the Introduction by the former, and the first twenty--five chapters by the latter.
In conclusion I beg to tender my thanks to Rev. A. Loewy, Editor of the Publications of the Hebrew Literature Society, for his careful revision of my manuscript and proofs, and to Mr. A. Neubauer, M.A., for his kindness in supplying me with such information as I required.
M. FRIEDLANDER. ----------------------- THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES
"BEFORE the sun of Eli had set the son of Samuel had risen." Before the voice of the prophets had ceased to guide the people, the Interpreters of the Law, the Doctors of the Talmud, had commenced their labours, and before the Academies of Sura and of Pumbadita were closed, centres of Jewish thought and learning were already flourishing in the far West. The circumstances which led to the transference of the head-quarters of Jewish learning from the East to the West in the tenth century are thus narrated in the Sefer ha-kabbalah of Rabbi Abraham ben David:
"After the death of Hezekiah, the head of the Academy and Prince of the Exile, the academies were closed and no new Geonim were appointed. But long before that time Heaven had willed that there should be a discontinuance of the pecuniary gifts which used to be sent from Palestine, North Africa and Europe. Heaven had also decreed that a ship sailing from Bari should be captured by Ibn Romahis, commander of the naval forces of Abd-er-rahman al-nasr. Four distinguished Rabbis were thus made prisoners -- Rabbi Hushiel, father of Rabbi Hananel, Rabbi Moses, father of Rabbi Hanok, Rabbi Shemarjahu, son of Rabbi Ellisanan, and a fourth whose name has not been recorded. They were engaged in a mission to collect subsidies in aid of the Academy in Sura. The captor sold them as slaves; Rabbi Tiushiel was carried to Kairuan, R. Shemarjahu was left in Alexandria, and R. Moses was brought to Cordova. These slaves were ransomed by their brethren and were soon placed in important positions. When Rabbi Moses was brought to Cordova, it was supposed that he was uneducated. In that city there was a synagogue known at that time by the name of Keneseet ha-midrash, and Rabbi Nathan, renowned for his great piety, was the head of the congregation. The members of the community used to hold meetings at which the Talmud was read and discussed. One day when Rabbi Nathan was expounding the Talmud and was unable to give a satisfactory explanation of the passage under discussion, Rabbi Moses promptly removed the difficulty and at the same time answered several questions whch were submitted to him. Thereupon R. Nathan thus addressed the assembly :--'I am no longer your leader; that stranger in sackcloth shall henceforth be my teacher, and you shall appoint him to be your chief.' The admiral, on hearing of the high attainments of his prisoner, desired to revoke the sale, but the king would not permit this retraction, being pleased to learn that his Jewish subjects were no longer dependent for their religious instruction on the schools in the East?
Henceforth the schools in the West asserted their independence, and even surpassed the parent institutions. The Caliphs, mostly opulent, gave every encouragement to philosophy and poetry; and, being generally liberal in sentiment, they enrertained kindly feelings towards their Jewish subjects. These were allowed to compete for the acquisition of wealth and honour on equal terms with their Mohammedan fellow-citizens. Philosophy and poetry were consequently cultivated by the Jews with the same zest as by the Arabs. Ibn Gabirol, Ibn Hasdai, Judah ha-levi, Hananel, Alfasi, the Ibn Ezras, and others who flourished in that period were the ornament of their age, and the pride of the Jews at all times. The same favourable condition was maintained during the reign of the Omeyades; but when the Moravides and the Almohades came into power, the horizon darkened once more, and misfortunes threatened to destroy the fruit of several centuries. Amidst this gloom there appeared a brilliant luminary which sent forth rays of light and comfort: this was Moses Maimonides.
Moses, the son of Maimon, was born at Cordova, on the 14th of Nisan, 4895 (March 30, 1135). Although the date of his birth has been recorded with the utmost accuracy, no trustworthy notice has been preserved concerning the early period of his life. But his entire career is a proof that he did not pass his youth in idleness; his education must have been in harmony with the hope of his parents, that one day he would, like his father and forefathers, hold the honourable office of Dayyan or Rabbi, and distinguish himself in theological learning. It is probable that the Bible and the Talmud formed the chief subjects of his study; but he unquestionably made the best use of the opportunities which Mohammedan Spain, and especially Cordova, afforded him for the acquisition of general knowledge. It is not mentioned in any of his writings who were his teachers ; his father, as it seems, was his principal guide and instructor in many branches of knowledge. David Conforte, in his historical work, Kore ha-dorot, states that Maimonides was the pupil of two eminent men, namely, Rabbi Joseph Ibn Migash and Ibn Roshd (Averroes); that by the former he was instructed in the Talmud, and by the latter in philosophy. This statement seems to be erroneous, as Maimonides was only a child at the time when Rabbi Joseph died, and already far advanced in years when he became acquainted with the writings of Ibn Roshd. The origin of this mistake, as regards Rabbi Joseph, can easily be traced. Maimonides in his Mishneh Tora, employs, in reference to R. Isaac Alfasi and R. Joseph, the expression "my teachers" (rabbotai), and this expression, by which he merely describes his indebtedness to their writings, has been taken in its literal meaning.
Whoever his teachers may have been, it is evident that he was well prepared by them for his future mission. At the age of twenty-three he entered upon his literary career with a treatise on the Jewish Calendar. It is unknown where this work was composed, whether in Spain or in Africa. The author merely states that he wrote it at the request of a friend, whom he, however, leaves unnamed. The subject was generally considered to be very abstruse, and to involve a thorough knowledge of mathematics. Maimonides must, therefore, even at this early period, have been regarded as a profound scholar by those who knew him. The treatise is of an elementary character.--It was probably about the same time that he wrote, in Arabic, an explanation of Logical terms, Millot higgayon, which Moses Ibn Tibbon translated into Hebrew.
The earlier period of his life does not seem to have been marked by any incident worth noticing. It may, however, be easily conceived that the later period of his life, which was replete with interesting incidents, engaged the exclusive attention of his biographers. So much is certain, that his youth was beset with trouble and anxiety ; the peaceful development of science and philosophy was disturbed by wars raging between Mohammedans and Christians, and also between the several Mohammedan sects. The Moravides, who had succeeded the Omeyades, were opposed to liberality and toleration ; but they were surpassed in cruelty and fanaticism by their successors. Cordova was taken by the Almohades in the year 1148, when Maimonides was about thirteen years old. The victories of the Almohades, first under the leadership of the Mahadi Ibn Tamurt, and then under Abd-almumen, were, according to all testimonies, attended by acts of excessive intolerance. Abd-al-mumen would not suffer in his dominions any other faith but the one which he himself confessed. Jews and Christians had the choice between Islam and emigration or a martyr's death. The Sefer kabbalah contains the following description of one of the persecutions which then occurred:
"After the death of R. Joseph ha-levi the study of the Torah was interrupted, although he left a son and a nephew, both of whom had under his tuition become profound scholars. 'The righteous man (R. Joseph) was taken away on account of the approaching evils. After the death of R. Joseph there came for the Jews a time of oppression and distress. They quitted their homes, ' Such as were for death, to death, and such as were for the sword, to the sword ; and such as were for the famine, to the famine, and such as were for the captivity, to the captivity' ; and--it might be added to the words of Jeremiah (xv. 2)-- 'such as were for apostasy, to apostasy.' All this happened through the sword of Ibn Tamurt, who, in 4902 (1142), determined to blot out the name of Israel, and actually left no trace of the Jews in any part of his empire."
Ibn Verga in his work on Jewish martyrdom, in Shebet Jehudah, gives the following account of events then happening:-- "In the year 4902 the armies of Ibn Tamurt made their appearance. A proclamation was issued that any one who refused to adopt Islam would be put to death, and his property would be confiscated. Thereupon the Jews assembled at the gate of the royal palace and implored the king for mercy. He answered -- 'It is because I have compassion on you, that I command you to become Muslemim; for I desire to save you from eternal punishment.' The Jews replied -- 'Our salvation depends on our observance of the Divine Law; you are the master of our bodies and of our property, but our souls will be judged by the King who gave them to us, and to whom they will return; whatever be our future fate, you, O king, will not be held responsible for it.' 'I do not desire to argue with you,' said the king; 'for I know you will argue according to your own religion. It is my absolute will that you either adopt my religion or be put to death. The Jews then proposed to emigrate, but the king would not allow his subjects to serve another king. In vain did the Jews implore the nobles to intercede in their behalf; the king remained inexorable. Thus many congregations forsook their religion; but within a month the king came to a sudden death ; the son, believing that his father had met with an untimely end as a punishment for his cruelty to the Jews, assured the involuntary converts that it would be indifferent to him what religion they professed. Hence many Jews returned at once to the religion of their fathers, while others hesitated for some time, from fear that the king meant to entrap the apparent converts." From such records it appears that during these calamities some of the Jews fled to foreign countries, some died as martyrs, and many others submitted for a time to outward conversion. Which course was followed by the family of Maimon ? Did they sacrifice personal comfort and safety to their religious conviction, or did they, on the contrary, for the sake of mere worldly considerations dissemble their faith and pretend that they completely submitted to the dictates of the tyrant ? An answer to this question presents itself in the following note which Maimonides has appended to his commentary on the Mishnah: "I have now finished this work in accordance with my promise, and I fervently beseech the Almighty to save us from error. If there be one who shall discover an inaccuracy in this Commentary or shall have a better explanation to offer, let my attention be directed unto it; and let me be exonerated by the fact that I have worked with far greater application than any one who writes for the sake of pay and profit, and that I have worked under the most trying circumstances. For Heaven had ordained that we be exiled, and we were therefore driven about from place to place; I was thus compelled to work at the Commentary while travelling by land, or crossing the sea. It might have sufficed to mention that during that time I, in addition, was engaged in other studies, but I preferred to give the above explanation in order to encourage those who wish to criticise or annotate the Commentary, and at the same time to account for the slow progress of this work. I, Moses, the son of Maimon, commenced it when I was twenty-three years old, and finished it in Egypt, at the age of thirty[-three] years, in the year 1479 Sel.(1168)."
The Sefer Haredim of R. Eleazar Askari of Safed contains the following statement of Maimonides:-- "On Sabbath evening, the 4th of Iyyar, 4925 (1165), I went on board; on the following Sabbath the waves threatened to destroy our lives. . . . On the 3rd of Sivan, I arrived safely at Acco, and was thus rescued from apostasy. . . . On Tuesday, the 4th of Marheshvan, 4926, I left Acco, arrived at Jerusalem after a journey beset with difficulties and with dangers, and prayed on the spot of the great and holy house on the 4th, 5th, and 6th of Marbeshvan. On Sunday, the 9th of that month, I left Jerusalem and visited the cave of Machpelah, in Hebron."
From these two statements it may be inferred that in times of persecution Maimonides and his family did not seek to protect their lives and property by dissimulation. They submitted to the troubles of exile in order that they might remain faithful to their religion. Carmoly, Geiger, Munk, and others are of opinion that the treatise of Maimonides on involuntary apostasy, as well as the accounts of some Mohammedan authors, contain strong evidence to show that there was a time when the family of Maimon publicly professed their belief in Mohammed. A critical examination of these documents compels us to reject their evidence as inadmissible. -- After a long period of trouble and anxiety, the family of Maimon arrived at Fostat, in Egypt, and settled there. David, the brother of Moses Maimonides, carried on a trade in precious stones, while Moses occupied himself with his studies and interested himself in the communal affairs of the Jews.
It appears that for some time Moses was supported by his brother, and when this brother died, he earned a living by practising as a physician; but he never sought or derived any benefit from his services to his community, or from his correspondence or from the works he wrote for the instruction of his brethren; the satisfaction of being of service to his fellow-creatures was for him a sufficient reward.
The first public act in which Maimonides appears to have taken a leading part was a decree promulgated by the Rabbinical authorities in Cairo in the year 1167. The decree begins as follows -- "In times gone by, when storms and tempests threatened us, we used to wander about from place to place but by the mercy of the Almighty we have now been enabled to find here a resting-place. On our arrival, we noticed to our great dismay that the learned were disunited; that none of them turned his attention to the needs of the congregation. We therefore felt it our duty to undertake the task of guiding the holy flock, of inquiring into the condition of the community, of "reconciling the hearts of the fathers to their children," and of correcting their corrupt ways. The injuries are great, but we may succeed in effecting a cure, and--in accordance with the words of the prophet-- I will seek the lost one, and that which has been cast out I will bring back, and the broken one I will cure' (Micah iv. 6). When we therefore resolved to take the management of the communal affairs into our hands, we discovered the existence of a serious evil in the midst of the community," etc.
lt was probably about that time that Maimon died. Letters of condolence were sent to his son Moses from all sides, both from Mohammedan and from Christian countries ; in some instances the letters were several months on their way before they reached their destination.
The interest which Maimonides now took in communal affairs did not prevent him from completing the great and arduous work, the Commentary on the Mishnah, which he had begun in Spain and continued during his wanderings in Africa. In this Commentary he proposed to give the quintessence of the Gemara, to expound the meaning of each dictum in the Mishnah, and to state which of the several opinions had received the sanction of the Talmudical authorities. His object in writing this work was to enable those who are not disposed to study the Gemara, to understand the Mishnah, and to facilitate the study of the Gemara for those who are willing to engage in it. The commentator generally adheres to the explanations given in the Gemara, and it is only in cases where the halakah, or practical law, is not affected, that he ventures to dissent. He acknowledges the benefit he derived from such works of his predecessors as the Halakot of Alfasi, and the writings of the Geonim, but afterwards he asserted that errors which were discovered in his works arose from his implicit reliance on those authorities. His originality is conspicuous in the Introduction and in the treatment of general principles, which in some instances precedes the exposition of an entire section or chapter, in others that of a single rule. The commentator is generally concise, except when occasion is afforded to treat of ethical and theological principles, or of a scientific subject, such as weights and measures, or mathematical and astronomical problems. Although exhortations to virtue and warnings against vice are found in all parts of his work, they are especially abundant in the Commentary on Abot, which is prefaced by a separate psychological treatise, called The Eight Chapters. The dictum "He who speaketh much commits a sin," elicited a lesson on the economy of speech; the explanation of 'olam ha-ba in the treatise Sanhedrin (xi. 1) led him to discuss the principles of faith, and to lay down the thirteen articles of the Jewish creed. The Commentary was written in Arabic, and was subsequently translated into Hebrew and into other languages. The estimation in which the Commentary was held may be inferred from the following fact: When the Jews in Italy became acquainted with its method and spirit, through a Hebrew translation of one of its parts, they sent to Spain in search of a complete Hebrew version of the Commentary. R. Simbah, who had been entrusted with the mission, found no copy extant, but he succeeded, through the influence of Rabbi Shelomoh ben Aderet, in causing a Hebrew translation of this important work to be prepared.-- In the Introduction, the author states that he has written a Commentary on the Babylonian Talmud treatise Hullin and on nearly three entire sections, viz., Moed, Nashim, and Nezikin. Of all these Commentaries only the one on Rosh ha-shanah is known.
In the year 1572 Maimonides wrote the Iggeret Teman, or Petab-tikvab ("Letter to the Jews in Yemen," or "Opening of hope") in response to a letter addressed to him by Rabbi Jacob al-Fayumi on the critical condition of the Jews in Yemen. Some of these Jews had been forced into apostasy others were made to believe that certain passages in the Bible alluded to the mission of Mohammed; others again had been misled by an impostor who pretended to be the Messiah. The character and style of Maimonides reply appear to have been adapted to the intellectual condition of the Jews in Yemen, for whom it was written. These probably read the Bible with Midrashic commentaries, and preferred the easy and attractive Agadah to the more earnest study of the Halakah. It is therefore not surprising that the letter contains remarks and interpretations which cannot be reconciled with the philosophical and logical method by which all the other works of Maimonides are distinguished. After a few complimentary words, in which the author modestly disputes the justice of the praises lavished upon him, he attempts to prove that the present sufferings of the Jews, together with the numerous instances of apostasy, were foretold by the prophets, especially by Daniel, and must not perplex the faithful. It must be borne in mind, he continues, that the attempts made in past times to do away with the Jewish religion, had invariably failed ; the same would be the fate of the present attempts ; for " religious persecutions are of but short duration." The arguments which profess to demonstrate that in certain Biblical passages allusion is made to Mohammed, are based on interpretations which are totally opposed to common sense. He urges that the Jews, faithfully adhering to their religion, should impress their children with the greatness of the Revelation on Mount Sinai, and of the miracles wrought through Moses; they also should remain firm in the belief that God will send the Messiah to deliver their nation, but they must abandon futile calculations of the Messianic period, and beware of impostors. Although there be signs which indicate the approach of the promised deliverance, and the times seem to be the period of the last and most cruel persecution mentioned in the visions of Daniel (xi. and xii.), the person in Yemen who pretends to be the Messiah is an impostor, and if care be not taken, he is sure to do mischief. Similar impostors in Cordova, France, and Africa, have deceived the multitude and brought great troubles upon the Jews.-- Yet, inconsistently with this sound advice the author gives a positive date of the Messianic time, on the basis of an old tradition; the inconsistency is so obvious that it is impossible to attribute this passage to Maimonides himself. It is probably spurious, and has, perhaps, been added by the translator. With the exception of the rhymed introduction, the letter was written in Arabic, "in order that all should be able to read and understand it"; for that purpose the author desires that copies should be made of it, and circulated among the Jews. Rabbi Nahum, of the Maghreb, translated the letter into Hebrew.
The success in the first great undertaking of explaining the Mishnah encouraged Maimonides to propose to himself another task of a still more ambitious character. In the Commentary on the Mishnah, it was his object that those who were unable to read the Gemara should be made acquainted with the results obtained by the Amoraim in the course of their discussions on the Mishnah. But the Mishnah, with the Commentary, was not such a code of laws as might easily be consulted in cases of emergency; only the initiated would be able to find the section, the chapter, and the paragraph in which the desired information could be found. The halakab had, besides, been further developed since the time when the Talmud was compiled. The changed state of things had suggested new questions ; these were discussed and settled by the Geonim, whose decisions, being contained in special letters or treatises, were not generally accessible. Maimonides therefore undertook to compile a complete code, which would contain, in the language and style of the Mishnah, and without discussion, the whole of the Written and the Oral Law, all the precepts recorded in the Talmud, Sifra, Sifre and Tosefta, and the decisions of the Geonim. According to the plan of the author, this work was to present a solution of every question touching the religious, moral, or social duties of the Jews. It was not in any way his object to discourage the study of the Talmud and the Midrash; he only sought to diffuse a knowledge of the Law amongst those who, through incapacity or other circumstances, were precluded from that study. In order to ensure the completeness of the code, the author drew up a list of the six hundred and thirteen precepts of the Pentateuch, divided them into fourteen groups, these again he subdivided, and thus showed how many positive and negative precepts were contained in each section of the Mishneh torah. The principles by which he was guided in this arrangement were laid down in a separate treatise, called Sefer ha-mizvot. Works of a similar kind, written by his predecessors, as the Halakot gedolot of R. Shimon Kahira, and the several Azbarot were, according to Maimonides, full of errors, because their authors had not adopted any proper method. But an examination of the rules laid down by Maimonides and of their application leads to the conclusion that his results were not less arbitrary; as has, in fact, been shown by the criticisms of Nahmanides. The Sefer ha-mizvot was written in Arabic, and thrice translated into Hebrew, namely, by Rabbi Abraham ben Hisdai, Rabbi Shelomoh ben Joseph ben Job, and Rabbi Moses Ibn Tibbon. Maimonides himself desired to translate the book into Hebrew, but to his disappointment he found no time.
This Sefer ha-mizvot was executed as a preparation for his principal work, the Mishneh Torah, or Yad ha-hazakah, which consists of an Introduction and fourteen Books. In the Introduction the author first describes the chain of tradition from Moses to the close of the Talmud, and then he explains his method in compiling the work. He distinguishes between the dicta found in the Talmud, Sifre, Sifra, or Tosefta, on the one hand, and the dicta of the Geonim on the other; the former were binding on all Jews, the latter only as far as their necessity and their utility or the authority of their propounders was recognized. Having once for all stated the sources from which he compiled his work, he did not deem it necessary to name in each case the authority for his opinion or the particular passage from which he derived his dictum. Any addition of references to each paragraph he probably considered useless to the uninformed and superfluous to the learned. At a later time he discovered his error, he being himself unable to find again the sources of some of his decisions. Rabbi Joseph Caro, in his commentary on the Mishneh Torah, termed Keseph Mishneb, remedied this deficiency. The Introduction is followed by the enumeration of the six hundred and thirteen precepts and a description of the plan of the work, its division into fourteen books, and the division of the latter into sections, chapters, and paragraphs.
According to the author, the Mishneh Torah is a mere compendium of the Talmud; but he found sufficient opportunities to display his real genius, his philosophical mind, and his ethical doctrines. For in stating what the traditional Law enjoined he had to exercise his own judgment, and to decide whether a certain dictum was meant to be taken literally or figuratively whether it was the final decision of a majority or the rejected opinion of a minority; whether it was part of the Oral Law or a precept founded on the scientific views of a particular author; and whether it was of universal application or was only intended for a special period or a special locality. The first Book, Sefer ha-madda', is the embodiment of his own ethical and theological theories, although he frequently refers to the Sayings of our Sages, and employs the phraseology of the Talmud. Similarly, the section on the Jewish Calendar, Hilkot ha-'ibur, may be considered as his original work. In each group of the halakot, its source, a certain passage of the Pentateuch, is first quoted, with its traditional interpretation, and then the detailed rules follow in systematic order. The Mishneh Torah was written by the author in pure Hebrew; when subsequently a friend asked him to translate it into Arabic, he said he would prefer to have his Arabic writings translated into Hebrew instead of the reverse. The style is an imitation of the Mishnah he did not choose, the author says, the philosophical style, because that would be unintelligible to the common reader; nor did he select the prophetic style, because that would not harmonize with the subject.
Ten years of hard work by day and by night were spent in the compilation of this code, which had originally been undertaken for "his own benefit, to save him in his advanced age the trouble and the necessity of consulting the Talmud on every occasion." Maimonides knew very well that his work would meet with the opposition of those whose ignorance it would expose, also of those who were incapable of comprehending it, and of those who were inclined to condemn every deviation from their own preconceived notions. But he had the satisfaction to learn that it was well received in most of the congregations of Israel, and that there was a general desire to possess and study it. This success confirmed him in his hope that at a later time, when all cause for jealousy would have disappeared, the Mishneh Torah would be received by all Jews as an authoritative code. This hope has not been realized. The genius, earnestness, and zeal of Maimonides are generally recognized; but there is no absolute acceptance of his dicta. The more he insisted on his infallibility, the more did the Rabbinical authorities examine his words and point out errors wherever they believed that they could discover any. It was not always from base motives, as contended by Maimonides and his followers, that his opinions were criticised and rejected. The language used by Rabbi Abraham ben David in his notes (hasagot) on the Mishneh Torah appears harsh and disrespectful, if read together with the text of the criticised passage, but it seems tame and mild if compared with expressions used now and then by Maimonides about men who happened to hold opinions differing from his own.
Maimonides received many complimentary letters, congratulating him upon his success; but likewise letters with criticisms and questions respecting individual balakot. In most cases he had no difficulty in defending his position. From the replies it must, however, be inferred that Maimonides made some corrections and additions, which were subsequently embodied in his work. The letters addressed to him on the Mishneh Torah and on other subjects were so numerous that he frequently complained of the time he had to spend in their perusal, and of the annoyance they caused him; but "he bore all this patiently, as he had learned in his youth to bear the yoke." He was not surprised that many misunderstood his words, for even the simple words of the Pentateuch, "the Lord is one," had met with the same fate. Some inferred from the fact that he treated fully of 'Olam ha-ba, "the future state of the soul," and neglected to expatiate on the resurrection of the dead, that he altogether rejected that principle of faith. They therefore asked Rabbi Samuel ha-levi of Bagdad to state his opinion; the Rabbi accordingly discussed the subject; but, according to Maimonides, he attempted to solve the problem in a very unsatisfactory manner. The latter thereupon likewise wrote a treatise "On the Resurrection of the Dead," in which he protested his adherence to this article of faith. He repeated the opinion he had stated in the Commentary on the Mishnah and in the Mishneh Torah, but "in more words; the same idea being reiterated in various forms, as the treatise was only intended for women and for the common multitude."
These theological studies engrossed his attention to a great extent, but it did not occupy him exclusively. In a letter addressed to R. Jonathan, of Lunel, he says: "Although from my birth the Torah was betrothed to me, and continues to be loved by me as the wife of my youth, in whose love I find a constant delight, strange women whom I at first took into my house as her handmaids have become her rivals and absorb a portion of my time." He devoted himself especially to the study of medicine, in which he distinguished himself to such a degree, according to Alkifti, that " the King of the Franks in Ascalon wanted to appoint him as his physician." Maimonides declined the honour. Alfadhel, the Vizier of Saladin king of Egypt, admired the genius of Maimonides, and bestowed upon him many distinctions. The name of Maimonides was entered on the roll of physicians, he received a pension, and was introduced to the court of Saladin. The method adopted in his professional practice he describes in a letter to his pupil, Ibn Aknin, as follows: "You know how difficult this profession is for a conscientious and exact person who only states what he can support by argument or authority." This method is more fully described in a treatise on hygiene, composed for Alfadhel, son of Saladin, who was suffering from a severe illness and had applied to Maimonides for advice. In a letter to Rabbi Samuel Ibn Tibbon he alludes to the amount of time spent in his medical practice, and says I reside in Egypt (or Fostat) ; the king resides in Cairo, which lies about two Sabbath-day journeys from the first-named place. My duties to the king are very heavy. I am obliged to visit him every day, early in the morning; and when he or any of his children or the inmates of his harem are indisposed, I dare not quit Cairo, but must stay during the greater part of the day in the palace. It also frequently happens that one or two of the royal officers fall sick, and then I have to attend them. As a rule, I go to Cairo very early in the day, and even if nothing unusual happens I do not return before the afternoon, when I am almost dying with hunger; but I find the antechambers filled with Jews and Gentiles, with nobles and common people, awaiting my return," etc.
Notwithstanding these heavy professional duties of court physician, Maimonides continued his theological studies. After having compiled a religious guide -- Mishneh Torah -- based on Revelation and Tradition, he found it necessary to prove that the principles there set forth were confirmed by philosophy. This task he accomplished in his Dalalat al-hairin, "The Guide for the Perplexed," of which an analysis will be given below. It was composed in Arabic, and written in Hebrew characters. Subsequently it was translated into Hebrew by Rabbi Samuel Ibn Tibbon, in the lifetime of Maimonides, who was consulted by the translator on all difficult passages. The congregation in Lunel, ignorant of Ibn Tibbon's undertaking, or desirous to possess the most correct translation of the Guide, addressed a very flattering letter to Maimonides, requesting him to translate the work into Hebrew. Maimonides replied that he could not do so, as he had not sufficient leisure for even more pressing work, and that a translation was being prepared by the ablest and fittest man, Rabbi Samuel Ibn Tibbon. A second translation was made later on by Jehudah Alharizi. The Guide delighted many, but it also met with much adverse criticism on account of the peculiar views held by Maimonides concerning angels, prophecy, and miracles, especially on account of his assertion that if the Aristotelian proof for the Eternity of the Universe had satisfied him, he would have found no difficulty in reconciling the Biblical account of the Creation with that doctrine. The controversy on the Guide continued long after the death of Maimonides to divide the community, and it is difficult to say how far the author's hope to effect a reconciliation between reason and revelation was realized. His disciple, Joseph Ibn Aknin, to whom the work was dedicated, and who was expected to derive from it the greatest benefit, appears to have been disappointed. His inability to reconcile the two antagonistsic elements of faith and science, he describes allegorically in the form of a letter addressed to Maimonides, in which the following passage occurs: "Speak, for I desire that you be justifled; if you can, answer me. Some time ago your beloved daughter, the beautiful and charming Kimah, obtained grace and favour in my sight, and I betrothed her unto me in faithfulness, and married her in accordance with the Law, in the presence of two trustworthy witnesses, viz., our master, Abd-allah and Ibn Roshd. But she soon became faithless to me; she could not have found fault with me, yet she left me and departed from my tent. She does no longer let me behold her pleasant countenance or hear her melodious voice. You have not rebuked or punished her, and perhaps you are the cause of this misconduct. Now, 'send the wife back to the man, for he is' -- or might become -- 'a prophet; he will pray for you that you may live, and also for her that she may be firm and steadfast. If, however, you do not send her back, the Lord will punish you. Therefore seek peace and pursue it; listen to what our Sages said: 'Blessed be he who restores to the owner his lost property'; for this blessing applies in a higher degree to him who restores to a man his virtuous wife, the crown of her husband." Maimonides replied in the same strain, and reproached his "son-in-law " that he falsely accused his wife of faithlessness after he had neglected her; but he restored him is wife with the advice to be more cautious in future. In another letter Maimonides exhorts Ibn Aknin to study his works, adding, "apply yourself to the study of the Law of Moses; do not neglect it, but, on the contrary, devote to it the best and the most of your time, and if you tell me that you do so, I am satisfied that you are on the right way to eternal bliss."
Of the letters written after the completion of the "Guide," the one addressed to the wise men of Marseilles (1194) is especially noteworthy. Maimonides was asked to give his opinion on astrology. He regretted in his reply that they were not yet in the possession of his Mishneh Torah; they would have found in it the answer to their question. According to his opinion, man should only believe what he can grasp with his intellectual faculties, or perceive by his senses, or what he can accept on trustworthy authority. Beyond this nothing should be believed. Astrological statements, not being founded on any of these three sources of knowledge, must be rejected. He had himself studied astrology, and was convinced that it was no science at all. If some dicta be found in the Talmud which appear to represent astrology as a true source of knowledge, these may either be referred to the rejected opinion of a small minority, or may have an allegorical meaning, but they are by no means forcible enough to set aside principles based on logical proof.
The debility of which Maimonidcs so frequently complained in his correspondence, gradually increased, and he died, in his seventieth year, on the 20th Tebeth, 4965 (1204). His death was the cause of great mourning to all Jews. In Fostat a mourning of three days was kept; in Jerusalem a fast was appointed; a portion of the tochahah (Lev. xxvi. or Deut. xxix.) was read, and also the history oI the capture of the Ark by the Phiistines (i Sam. iv.). His remains were brought to Tiberias. The general regard in which Maimonides was held, both by his contemporaries and by succeeding generations, has been expressed in the popular saying: "From Moses to Moses there was none like Moses."
THE MOREH NEBUCHIM LITERATURE
I.The Arabic Text.--The editio princeps, the only edition of the original text of the Guide (in Arabic, De1i1, or Dalalat a1-hatrin), was undertaken and executed by the late S. Munk. Its title is: Le Guide des Egaris, traite de Theologie et de Philosophic par Moite ben Maimon, publie pour la premiere fois dans l'original Arabe, et accompagne d'une traduction Francaise et di note: critiques, litteraires et explicatives, par S. Munk (Paris, 1850-1866). The plan was published, 1833, in Reflexions cur le culte des anciens Hebreux (La Bible, par S. Cahen, vol. iv.), with a specimen of two chapters of the Third Part. The text adopted has been selected from the several MSS. at his disposal with great care and judgment. Two Leyden MSS. (cod. 18 and 221), various MSS. of the Bibliothique Nationale (No. 760, very old; 761 and 758, written by R. Saadia Ibn Danan), and some MSS. of the Bodleian Library were consulted. In the notes which accompany the French translation, the various readings of the different MSS. are fully discussed. At the end of the third volume a list is added of "Variantes des Manuscrits Arabes et des deux Versions HebraIques."
The library of the British Museum possesses two copies of the Arabic text; the one Or. 5423 is complete, beautifully written, with explanatory notes in the margin and between the lines. The name of the copyist is not mentioned, nor the date when it has been written. The volume has in the beginning an incomplete index to the Scriptural passages referred to in the Guide, and at the end fragments of Psalm cxli. in Arabic and of astronomical tables.
The second copy of the Dalalat al-halirin is contained in the MS. Or. 2423, written in large Yemen Rabbinic characters. It is very fragmentary. The first fragment begins with the last paragraph of the introduction; there are a few marginal notes in Hebrew. In the Bodleian Library there are the following copies of the Dalalat alhalirin according to the Catal, of Hebr. MSS. by Dr. A. Neubauer:--
No. 1236. The text is preceded by Jehudah al-Charizi's index of the contents of the chapters, and by an index of Biblical quotstions. In the margin there are notes, containing omissions, by different hands, two in Arabic characters. The volume was written 1473.
No. 1237. The Arabic text, with a few marginal notes containing various readings the text is preceded by three Hebrew poems, beginning, De'i holek, Bi-sedeh tebunot; and Binu be-dat Mosheh. Fol. 212 contains a fragment of the book (III., xxix.).
No. 1238. Text with a few marginal notes.
No. 1239. The end of the work is wanting in this copy. The second part has forty-nine chapters, as the introduction to Part II. is counted as chapter i.; Part III. has fifty-six chapters, the introduction being counted as chapter i., and chapter xxiv. being divided into two chapters. The index of passages from the Pentatcuch follows the ordinary mode of counting the chapters of the Guide.
No. 1240. Arabic text transcribed in Arabic characters by Saadiah b. Levi Azankot for Prof. Golius in 1645.
No. 1245. First part of the Datalas al-hairis, written by Saadiah b. Mordecai b. Mosheh in the year 1431.
No. 1242 contains the same Part, but incomplete. Nos. 1243, 1244, 1245, and 1246 contain Part II. of the Arabic text, incomplete in No,. 1245 and 1246.
Nos. 1247, 1248, and 1249 have Part III.; it is incomplete in Nos. 1248 and 1249. No. 1249 was written 1291, and begins with III, viii. A fragment of the Arabic text, the end of Part III., is contained in No. 407, 2.
No. 2508 includes s fragment of the original (I. ii.-xxxii.), with a Hebrew interlinrary translation of some words and a few marginal notes. It is written in Yemen square characters, and is marked as "holy property of the Synagogue of Alsiani."
A fragment (I. i.) of a different recension from the printed is contained in 2422, 16. On the margin the Commentaries of Shein-tob and Ephodi are added in Arabic.
A copy of the Datalat is also contained in the Berlin Royal Library MS. Or. Qu., 579 (so; Cat. Steinschneider) ; it is defective in the beginning and at the end.
The Cairo Genizah at Cambridge contains two fragments (a) I.lxiv. and beginning of lxv ; (b) II. end of xxxii. and xxxiii. According to Dr. H. Hirschfeld, Jewish Quarterly Review (vol. xv. p. 677), they are in the handwriting of Maimonides.
The valuable collection of MSS. in the possession of Dr. M. Gaster includes a fragment of the Dalalat-al-hairin (Codcx 6o5). II. xiii--xv., beginning and end defective.
II. Translations, a. Hebrew.--As soon as European Jews heard of the existence of this work, they procured its translation into Hebrew. Two scholars, independently of each other, undertook the task: Samuel Ibn Tibbon and Jehudah al-Harizi. There is, besides, in the Moreh ha-moreh of Shemtob Paiquera an original translation of some portions of the Moreh. In the Sifte yeshenim (No. 112) a rhymed translation of the Dalalat by Rabbi Mattityahu Kartin is mentioned. Ibn Tibbon s version is very accurate; he sacrificed elegance of style to the desire of conscientiously reproducing the author's work, and did not even neglect a particle, however unimportant it may appear. Ibn Tibbon went in his anxiety to retain peculiarities of the original so far as to imitate its ambiguities, e.g., meziut (I. lviii.) is treated as a masculine noun, only in order to leave it doubtful whether a pronoun which follows agrees with meziut, "existence," or with nimza, "existing being," both occurring in the same sentence (Br. Mus. MS. Harl. 7586, marg. note by Ibn Tibbon). When he met with passages that offered any difficulty he consulted Maimonides. Harizi, on the other hand, was less conscientious aboot words and particles, but wrote in a superior style. Vox populi, however, decided in favour of the version of Ibn Tibbon, the rival of which became almost forgotten. Also Abraham, the son of Moses Maimooides, in Milbamoth ha-shem, describes Harizi's version as being inaccurate. Most of the modern translations were made from Ibn Tibbon's version. There are, therefore, MSS. of this version almost in every library containing collections of Hebrew books and MSS. It has the title Moreh-nebuchim. The British Museum has the following eight copies of Ibn Tibbon's version.:--
Harl. 7586 A. This codex was written in tlse year 1284, for Rabbi Shabbatai ben Rabbi Mattityshu. In the year 1340 it came into the possession of Jacob b. Shelomoh; his son Menabem sold it in the year 1378 to R. Mattityaho, son of R. Shabbatai, for fifty gold florins. It was again sold in the year 1461 by Yehiel ben Joab. There is, this peculiarity in the writing, that long words at the end of a line are divided, and written half on the one line, half on the next ; in words which are vocalized, patah is frequently found for kamez. There are numerous various readings in the margin. The text is preceded by a poem, written by Joseph Ibn Aknin, pupil of Maimonides, in praise of his master, and beginning Adon yizro. This poem is attributed to R. Yehudah ha-Levi (Luzzatto, in his Divan, Betulat-bat-Yehudah, p. 104). At the end the copyist adds an epigram, the translation of which is as follows:-- "The Moreh is finished--Praise to Him who formed and created everything--written for the instruction and benefit of the few whom the Lord calleth. Those who oppose the Moreh ought to be put to death ; but those who study and understand it deserve that Divine Glory rest upon them, and inspire them with a spirit from above."
Harl. 7586 B. This codex, much damaged in the beginning and at the end, contains the version of Ibn Tibbon, with marginal notes, consisting of words omitted in the text, and other corrections. The version is followed by the poems Karob meod, etc., and De'i bolek, etc.
Harl. 5507 contains the Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon, with the translator's preface and marginal notes, consisting of various readings and omissions from the text. The work of Maimonides is followed by Ibn Tibbon's Vocabulary (millot-zarot), Mesharet-masheb, 'Arugot ba-mezimmab, Millot biggayon, Ruah-hen, Alfarabi's Hatbalor, a Hebrew-Italian vocabulary of logical terms, and an explanation of koreh. The passage in Part I., chap. lxxi., which refers to Christianity, has been erased.
Harl. 5525 was the property of Shimshon Kohen Modon. The MS. begins with Harizi's Kavvanat ha-perakim ; then follows the text, with a few marginal notes of a later hand, mostly adverse criticisms and references to 'Arama's 'Akedab and the Biblical commentaries of Abarbanel. There is also a note in Latin. The text is followed by Ibn Tibbon's Vocabulary (Millor-zarot) and Masoret ba-pesukim (Index to the Biblical quotations in the Moreh). In a poem, beginning Moreh asben mennu derakav gabehu, the Moreh's compared to a musical instrument, which delights when played by one that understands music, but is spoiled when touched by an ignorant person.
Add. 27068 (Almanzi coil.). At the end the following remark is added : I, Samuel Ibn Tibbon, finished the translation of this work in the month of Tebet 4965 (1205). The text is preceded by the well-known epigrams, De'i bolek and Moreh -- nebuchim sa shelomi; the last page contains the epigram Karob meod. There are some notes in the margin, mostly referring to various readings.
Add. 14763. This codex, written 1273 at Viterbo, contains the preface of Harizi to isis translation of the Moreh and his index of contents, Ibn Tibbon's version with a few marginal notes of different hands, including some remarks of the translator, and the contents of the chapters. The codex contains besides the following treatises: Commentary of Maimonides on Abot ; Comm. of Maini. on Mishnah Sanhedrin x. i ; Letter of Maimonides on the Resurrection of the Dead ; Vocabulary of difficult words by Samuel Ibn Tibbon ; Maimonides' Letter to the wise men ot Marseilles ; his Letter to Rabbi Jonathan ; Keter-malkut, Mesbaret-mosheh, Ruah-hen, Otot ha-shamayim, translated from the Arabic by Samuel Ibn Tibbon ; Hathalot ha-nimzaot, of Alfarabi; Sefer ha-happuah, Mishle hamisbim ha-talmidim ; on the seven zones of the earth ; a fragment of a chronicle from the exile of Babylon down to the fourth year of the Emperor Nicepheros of Constantinople, and a poem, which begins asher yishal, and has the following sense:-- " If one asks the old and experienced for advice, you may expect his success in all he undertakes but if one consults the young, remember the fate of Rehoboam, son of Solomon."
Add. 4764. In addition to the Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon (from end of I. xxvii.) with a few marginal notes and index, the codex contains at the end of Part I. an Index of references made by the author to explanations given in preceding or succeeding chapters. At the end of the text the statement is added, that the translation was finished in the month of Tebet 968 (1208). The Moreh is followed by Ruah-hen, and Ibn Tibbon's Vocabulary of millot-zarot (incomplete), and is preceded by four poems in praise of the Moreh, beginning Shim'u nebone leb, Moreh nebucbim sa shelomi, De'il bolek and Nofet mahkim.
Bibl. Reg. 16 A, xi. This codex, written in Prov. curs, characters in the year 308, has in front a fragment of iii. i., then follows the poem of Meshullam, beginning Yehgs mezimmotai (Gratz Leket -- shoshannim, p. 1511), and other poems.
The following MS. copies of Ibn Tibbon's version are included in the Oxford Bodleian Library; the numbers refer to Dr. Neubauer's catalogue of the MSS. :--
1250. An index of the passages from the Bible referred to in the work, and an index of the contents precede the version. The marginal note, contain chiefly omissions.
1251. This codex was written in 1675. The marginal notes contain omissions and explanations.
1252. The marginal notes contain the translator's remarks on I. lxxiv. 4, and III. xlvii. The version is followed by Ibn Tibbon a vocabulary, and his additional remarks on the reasons for the commandments. The MS. was bought by Samuel ben Moses from a Christian after the pillage of Padua, where it had belonged to a Synagogue of foreigners (lo' azim) ; he gave it to a Synagogue of the same character at Mantua.
1253. The marginal notes include that of the translator on III. xlvii.
1254, I. Text with marginal note, containing omissions.
1255. The marginal notes include those of the translator on I. xlvi. and lxxiv. 5.
1256. The marginal notes contain various reading, notes relating to Harizi's, translation and the Arabic text; on fol. 80 there is a note in Latin. There are in this codex six epigrams concerning the Moreh.
1257. Text incomplete; with marginal notes.
Fragments of the Version are contained in the following codices: 2047,3, p.65; 2283, 8; 2309, 2, and 2336.
Among the MS. copies of the Moreh in the Bibl. Nat. in Paris, there is one that has been the property of R. Eliah Mizrahi, and another that had been in the hands of Azariah de Rossi (No. 685 and No. 69!); the Gunzburg Library (Paris) possesses a copy (No. 775), that was written 1452 by Samuel son of Isaac for Rabbi Moses de Leon, and Eliah del Medigo's copy of the Moreh is in the possession of Dr. Ginsburg (London); it contains six poems, beginning Moreh nebucbim sa; Emet marcb emet; Bi-lesbon esb; Mabba'aru; Kamu more shav.
The editio princeps of this version has no statement as to where and when it was printed, and is without pagination. According to Furst (Bibliogr.) it is printed before 1480. The copy in the British Museum has some MS. notes. Subsequent editions contain besides the Hebrew text the Commentaries of Shem-tob and Efodi, and the index of contents by Harizi (Venice, 1551, fol.) ; also the Comm. of Crescas and Vocabulary of Ibn Tibbon (Sabionetta, 1553, fol. ; Jessnitz, 1742, fol. etc.) ; the Commentaries of Narboni and S. Mairnon (Berlin, 1791) ; the commentaries of Efodi, Shem-tob, Crescas and Abarbanel (Warsaw, 1872, 4to); German translation and Hebrew Commentary (Biur) Part I. (Krotoschin, 1839, 8vo); German translation and notes, Part II. (Wien. 1864), Part III. (Frankfort-a-M., 1838).
The Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon (Part I. to ch. lxxii.) has been translated into Mishnaic Hebrew by M. Levin (Zolkiew, 1829, 4to).
There is only one MS. known of Harizi's version, viz., No. 682 of the Bibliothbque Nationale at Paris. It has been edited by L. Schlosberg, with notes. London, 1851 (Part I.), 1876 (II.), and 1879 (III.). The notes on Part I. were supplied by S. Scheyer.
The first Latin translation of the Moreh has been discovered by Dr. J. Perles among the Latin MSS. of the Munic Library, Catal. Cod. latinorum bibl. regiae Monacensis, tom. i, pars iii. pag. 208 (Kaish. 36 b), 1700 (7936 b). This version is almost identical with that edited by Augustinus Justinianus, Paris, 1520, and is based on Harizi's Hebrew version of the Moreh. The name of the translator is not mentioned. In the Commentary of Moses, son of Solomon, of Salerno, on the Moreh, a Latin translation is quoted, and the quotations agree with this version. It is called by this commentator ha 'atakat ha-nozrit ("the Christian translation"), and its author, ha-ma 'atik ha-nozer (lit. "the Christian translator"). Dr. Perles is, however, of opinion that these terms do not necessarily imply that a Christian has made this translation, as the word nozer may have been used here for "Latin." He thinks that it is the result of the combined efforts of Jewish and Christian scholars connected with the court of the German Emperor Frederic II., especially as in the thirteenth century several Jewish scholars distinguished themselves by translating Oriental works into Latin. See Gratz Monatschrift, 1875, Jan.-June, "Die in einer Munchener Handschrift aufgefundene erste lateinische Uebersetzung," etc., von Dr. J. Perles. The title has been variously rendered into Latin: Director neutrorum, directorium dubitantium, director neutrorum, nutantium or dubitantium; doctor perplexorum.
Gedaliah ibn Yahyah, in Shalshelet ba-kabbalah, mentions a Latin translation of the Moreh by Jacob Monteno: but nothing is known of it, unless it be the anonymous translation of the Munich MS., mentioned above. Augustinus Justinianus edited this version (Paris, 1520), with slight alterations and a great number of mistakes. Joseph Scaliger's opinion of this version is expressed in a letter to Casaubonus, as follows : Qui latine vertit, Hebraica, non Arabica, convertit, et quidem saepe hallucinatur, neque mentem Authoris assequitur. Magna seges mendorum est in Latino. Praeter illa quae ab inertia Interpretis peccata sunt accessit et inertia Librariorum aut Typographorum, e.g., prophethae pro philosophiae altitudo pro aptitudo; bonitatem pro brevitatem. (Buxtorf, Doctor Perplexorum, Praef.)
Johannes Buxtorfius, Fil., translated the Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon into Latin (Basilem, 1629, 4to). In the Praeefatio ad Lectorem, the translator discusses the life and the works of Maimonides, and dwells especially on the merits and the fate of the Moreh-nebucbim. The preface is followed by a Hebrew poem of Rabbi Raphael Joseph of Treves, in praise of an edition of the Moreh containing the Commentaries of Efodi, Shem-tob, and Crescas.
Italian was the first living language into which the Moreh has been translated. This translation was made by Yedidyah ben Moses (Amadeo de Molse di Recanati), and dedicated by him to "divotissimo e divinissimo Signor mio il Signor Immanuel da Fano" (i.e., the Kabbalist Menahem Azarriah). The translator dictated it to his brother Eliah, who wrote it in Hebrew characters ; it was finished the 8th of February, 1583. The MS. copy is contained in the Royal Library at Berlin, MS. Or. Qu. 487 (M. Steinschneider Catal., etc.)--The Moreh has been translated into Italian a second time, and annotated by D. J. Maroni: Guida degli Smarriti, Firenze, 1870, fol.
The Moreh has been translated into German by R. Furstenthal (Part I,, Krotoschin, 1839), M. Stern (Part II., Wien, 1864), and S. Scheyer (Part III.. Frankfort-a.-M., 1838). The translation is based on Ibn Tibbon's Hebrew version. The chapters on the Divine Attributes have been translated into German, and fully discussed, by Dr. Kaufmann in his Geschichte der Attributenlehre (Gotha, 1877).
An excellent French translation, based on the Arabic original, has been supplied by the regenerator of the Guide, S. Munk. It was published together with the Arabic text (Paris, 1850-1866).
The Moreh has also been translated into the Hungarian language by Dr. Klein. The translation is accompanied by notes (Budapest, 1878-80).
The portion containing the reasons of the Commandments (Part III. ch. xxvi.--xlix.) has been translated into English by James Townley (London, 1827). The translation is preceded by an account on the life and works of Maimonides, and dissertations on various subjects ; among others, Talmudical and Rabbinical writings, the Originality of the Institutions of Moses, and Judicial astrology.
III. Commentaries.--It is but natural that in a philosophical work like the Moreh, the reader will meet with passages that at first thought seem unintelligible, and require further explanation, and this want has been supplied by the numerous commentators that devoted their attention to the study of the Moreh. Joseph Solomon del Medigo (1597) saw eighteen Commentaries. The four principal ones he characterizes thus (in imitation of the Hagadah for Passover) : Moses Narboni is rasha', has no piety, and reveals all the secrets of the Moreh. Shem-tob is hakam, wise," expounds and criticises ; Crescas is tam, "simple," explains the book in the style of the Rabbis; Epodi is sbe-eno yode'a lisbol, " does not understand to ask," he simply explains in short notes without criticism Miktababuz; ed. A. Geiger, Berlin, 1840, p. i8). The earliest annotations were made by the author himself on those passages, which the first translator of the Moreh was unable to comprehend. They are contained in a letter addressed to Samuel Ibn Tibbon, beginning, lefi siklo ycbuilal isb (Bodl Library, No. 2218, s. ; comp. The Guide, etc., I. 21, 343 ; II. 8, 99). Ibn Tibbon, the translator, likewise added a few notes, which are found in the margin of MSS. of the Hebrew version of the Moreh (on I. xlv. lxxiv. ; II. xxiv. ; and III. xlvii.--MSS. BodI. 1252, 1; 1253, 1255, 1257; Brit. Mus. Add. 14,763 and 27,068).
Both translators wrote explanations of the philosophical terms employed in the versions. Harizi wrote his vocabulary first, and Ibn Tibbon, in the introductory remarks, to Perush millot zarot ("Explanation of difficult words"), describes his rival's vocabulary as full of blunders. Ibn Tibbon's Perush is found almost in every copy of his version, both MS. and print; so also Harizi's index of the contents of the chapters of the Moreh (Kavvanat ha-perakim).
The following is an alphabetical list of Commentaries on the Moreh :--
Abarbanel (Don Isaak) wrote a Commentary on I. i.--lv.; II. xxxi.--xlv., and a separate book Shamayim-badasbim, "New Heavens," on II. xix., in which he fully discusses the question concerning Creatio ex nibilo. The opinion of Maimonides is not always accepted. Thus twenty-seven objections are raised against his interpretation of the first chapter of Ezekiel. These objections he wrote at Molin, in the house of R. Abraham Treves Zarfati. The Commentary is followed by a short essay (maamar) on the plan of the Moreh. The method adopted by Abarbanel in all his Commentaries, is also employed in this essay. A series of questions is put forth on the subject, and then the author sets about to answer them. M. J. Landau edited the Commentary without text, with a Preface, and with explanatory notes, called Moreh li-zealdakah (Prag. 1831; MS. BodI. 2385). In addition to these the same author wrote Tesbubat " Answers" to several questions asked by Rabbi Shsol ha-Cohen on topics discussed in the Moreh (Venice, 1754).
Abraham Abulajia wrote "Sodot ha-moreh," or Sitre-torah, a kabbalistic Commentary on the Moreh. He gives the expreaaion, [hebrew] (Paradise), for the number (177) of the chapters of the Moreh. MS. Nat. Bibi. 226, 3. Leipsic Libr. 232,4. MS. Bodl. 2360, contains a portion of Part III.
Buchner A. Ha-march li-zedakab (Warsaw, 1838). Commentary on "The Reasons of the Laws," March III. xxix.--xlix. The Commentary is preceded by an account of the life of Maimonides.
Comtino, Mordecai b. Eliezer, wrote a shart commentary on the Moreh (Dr. Ginsburg's collection of MSS. No. 1o). Narboni, who "spread light on dark passages in the Guide," is frequently quoted. Reference is also made to his own commentary on Ibn Ezra's Yesod--mara.
Creacas (Aaher b. Abraham), expresses in the Preface to his Commentary the conviction that he could not always comprehend the right sense of the words of Maimonides, for "there is no searching to his underatanding." He nevertheless thinks that his, explanations will help "the young" to study the Moreh with profit. A long poem in praise of Maimonides and his work precedes the Preface. His notes are short and clear, and in spite of his great respect of Maimonides, he now and then criticises and corrects him.
David Yailya is named by Joseph Del Medigo (Miktab-abaz ed. A. Geiger, Berlin, 1840; p. 18 , and note 76), as having written a Commentary on the Moreh.
David ben Yebudab Leon Rabbins wrote 'En ba-kore, MS. Bodl. 1263. He quotes in his Commentary among others 'Arama's 'Akedar yizhak. The Preface is written by Immanuel ben Raphael Ibn Meir, after the death of the author.
Efadi is the name of the Commentary written by Isaac ben Moses, who during the persecution of 1391 had passed as Christian under the name of Profiat Doran. He returned to Judaism, and wrote against Christianity the famous satire " Al tehee kaaboteka" ("Be not like your Fathers"), which misled Christizns to cite it as written in favour of Christianity. It is addressed to the apostate En Bonet Bon Giorno. The same author also wrote a grammatical work, Ma' aseb-efod. The name Efod (Hebrew), is explained as composed of the initials Amar Profiat Duran. His Commentary consists of short notes, esplanatory of the text. The brginning of this Commentary is contained in an Arabic translation in MS. Bodl. 2422, 16.
Epbraim Al-Naqavab in Sba'or Kebad ba-sbem (MS. BodI. 939,2 and 1258,2), answers some questions addressed to him concerning the Moreh. He quotes Hiadai's Or adonai.
Furstentbal, R., translator and commentator of the Mahzor, added a Biur, short explanatory notes, to his German translation of Part I. of the Morch (Krotoschin, 1839).
Gerahan, Mareb-derek, Commentary on Part 1. of the Moreh (MS. BodI. 1265).
Hillel b. Samuel b. Elazar of Verona explained the Introduction to Part II, (the 25 Propos.). S. H. Halberstam edited this Commentary together with Tagmute ha-nefemh of the same author, for the Society Mekize-nirdamim (Lyck, 1874).
Joseph ben Aba-mart b. Josepb, of Caspi (Argentiere), wrote three Commentaries on the Moreh. The first is contained in a Munich MS. (No. 263) ; and seems to have been recast by the author, and divided into two separate Commentaries: 'Ammude Kesef, and Maskiyot Keatf The former was to contain plain and ordinary explanation, whilst profound and mysterious matter was reserved for the second (Steinschn. Cat.). In II., chap. xlviii., Caspi finds fault with Maimonides that he dues not place the book of Job among the highest class of inspired writings, "its author being undoubtedly Moses." These Commentaries have been edited by T. Werblomer (Frankfort-a.-M., 1848). R. Kirchheim added a Hebrew introduction discussing the character of these commentaries, and describing the manuscripts from which these were copied ; a Biography of the author is added in German.
Josepb Giqatilia wrote notes on the Moreh, printed with "Questinnn of Shaul ha-kohen" (Venice, 1574. MS. Bodl.. 1911, 3).
Josepb b. Isaac ha-Levi's Gib'ar ha-Moreh is a short Commentary on portions of the Moreh, with notes by R. Yom-tub Heller, the author of Tosafar ram-sob (Prag., 1612).
Isaac Saranov wrote a commentary on Parts II. and IIII. of the Moreb (see Maimon Solomon p. xxi.).
Isaac ben Shem-tob ibn Shem-tob wrote a lengthy Commentary on the Moreh, Part I. (MS. Brit. Mus, Or. 1358). The object of the Commentary is to show that there is no contradiction between Maimonides and the Divine Law. He praises Maimonides as a true believer in Creatio ex nihilo, whilst Ibn Ezra and Gersonides assumed a prima materia, (Yozer, kadosb). Nachmanides is called ha-hasid ha-gadol, but is nevertheless blamed, together with Narboni and Zerahyals ba-Levi, for criticising Maimonides, instead of trying to explain startling utterances even in "a forced way" (bederek rabok) and Narboni, "in spite of his wisdom, frequently misunderstood the Moreh." At the end of each chapter a resume– (derush) of the contents of the chapter is given, and the lesson to be derived from it. The MS. is incomplete, chaps. xlvi.--xlviii. are missing.
Kauffmann, D, in his Geschichte der Atributenlebre, translated Part I. chap. L--lxiii. into German, and added critical and explanatory notes.
Kalonymos wrote a kind of introduction to the Moreh (Mesbaret Masbeb), in which he especially discusses the theory of Maimonides on Providence.
Leibnitz made extracts from Buxtorf's. Latin version of the Moreb, and added his own remarks, Observationes ad R. Mosen Maimoniden (Foucher de Careil, CA., La Philos opbie Fuive,1861).
Levin, M, wrote Allon-moreb as a kind of introduction to his retranslation of Tibbon's Hebrew version into the language of the Mishnah.
Maimon, Solomon, is the author of Gib' ha-moreb, a lengthy commentary on Book I. (Berlin, 1791). The author is fond of expatiating on topics of modern philosophy, to the introduction he gives a short history of philosophy. The commentary on Books II. and III. was written by Isaac Satanov.
Meir ben Jonah ha-mekunneb Ben-ibneor wrote a commentary on the Moreh in Fez 1560 (MS. Bodl. 1262).
Menahem Kara expounded the twenty-five propositions enumerated in the Introduction to Part II. of the Moreh (MS. BodI. 1649, 13).
Mordecai Yaffe, in his Or Yekarot or Pinnat Yikrat, one of his ten Lebushim, comments upon the theories contained in the Moreh.
Moses, son of Abraham Provencal, explains the passage in Part I. chap. lxxiii. Prop. 3, in which Maimonides refers to the difference between commensurable and incommensurable lines (MS. Bodl.. 2033, 8).
Moses, son of Febudab Nagari, made an index of the subjects treated 1n the Moreh, indicating in each case the chapters in which allusion is made to the subject. He did so, "in obedience to the advice of Maimonides, to consider the chapters in connected order" (Part I. p. 20). It has been printed together with the questions of Shaul ha-kohen (Venice, 1574).
Moses son of Solomon of Salerno, is one of the earliest expounders of the Moreh. He wrote his commentary on Parts I. and II., perhaps together with a Christian scholar. He quotes the opinion of "the Christian scholar with whom he worked together." Thus he names Petrus de Bernia and Nicolo di Giovenazzo. R. Jacob Anatoli, author of the Malmed ha-talmidim, is quoted as offering an explanation for the passage from Pirke di-rabbi Eliezer, which Mamnonides (II. chap. xxvi.) considers as strange and inexplicable (Part I., written 1439 ; MS. of Bet ha-midrash, London; Parts I.--II., MS. Bodl, 1261, written, 1547; MS. Petersburg, No. 82; Munich MS. 60 and 370).
Moses ha-kotan, son of Jebudab, son of Moses, wrote To'aliyoz pirke ha-maamar ("Lessons taught in the chapters of this work"). It is an index to the March (MS. Bodl. 1267).
Moses Leiden explained the 25 Prop. of the Introduction to Part II. (MS. Gunzburg, Paris).
Moses Narboni wrote a short commentary at Soria 1362. He freely criticizes Maimonides, and uses expressions like the following:-- "He went too far, may God pardon him" (II. viii.). Is. Euchel ed. Part I. (Berlin, 1791); J. Goldenthal, I. to III. (Wien, 1852). The Bodl. Libr. possesses several MS. copies of this commentary (Nos. 1260, 1264, 2, and 1266).
Munk, S., added to his French translation of the Moreh numerous critical and explanatory notes.
S.Sacb's (Ha-tehiyah, Berlin, 1850, p. 5) explains various passages of the Moreb, with a view of discovering the names of those who are attacked by Maimonides without being named.
Scheyer, S., added critical and explanatory notes to his German translation of the Moreh, Part 3, and to the Hebrew version of Harizi, Part I. He also wrote Das Psychologiscbe System des Maimonides, an Introduction to the Moreh (Frankf.-a-M., 1845).
Shem tab Ibn Palquera's Moreb ba-moreh consists of 3 parts :(1) a philosophical explanation of the Moreb, (2) a description of the contents of the chapters of the Moreb, Part I, i.--lvii. (Presburg, 1827) ; (3) Corrections of Ibn Tibbon's version. He wrote the book for himself, that in old age he might have a means of refreshing his memory. The study of science and philosophy is to be recommended, but only to those who have had a good training in "the fear of sin." Ibn Roshd (Averroes) is frequently quoted, and referred to as be-hakam ha-nizkar (the philosopher mentioned above).
Sbem-tob ben Joseph ben Sbem-tob had the commentary of Efodi before him, which he seems to have quoted frequently verbatim without naming him. In the preface he dwells on the merits of the Moreb as the just mediator between religion and philosophy. The commentary of Shem-tobh is profuse, and includes almost a paraphrase of the text. He apologises in conclusion for having written many superfluous notes and added explanation where no explanation was required ; his excuse is that he did not only intend to write a commentary (biur) but also a work complete in itself (hibbur). He often calls the reader's attention to things which are plain and clear.
Shem-tob Ibn Shem-tob, in Sefer ba-emunot (Ferrara, 1556), criticises some of the various theories discussed in the Moreh, and rejects them as heretic. His objections were examined by Moses Al-ashkar, and answered in Hasagot 'al mab sbe-katab Rabbi Sbem-tab neged ha-Rasnbam (Ferrara, 1556).
Salomon b. Febudab ha-nasi wrote in Germany Sitre-torah, a kabbalistic commentary on the Moreb, and dedicated it to his pupil Jacob b. Samuel (MS. Bet-ha-midrash, London).
Tabrizi. The twenty-five Propositions forming the introduction to Part 2, have been fully explained by Mohammed Abu-becr ben Mohammed al-tabrizi. His Arabic explanations have been translated by Isaac b. Nathan of Majorca into Hebrew (Ferraro, 1556). At the end the following eulogy is added :--The author of these Propositions is the chief whose sceptre is "wisdom" and whose throne is "understanding," the Israelite prince, that has benefited his nation and all those who love God, etc. Moses b. Maimon b. Ebed-elohim, the Israelite. . . . May God lead us to the truth. Amen !
Tishbi. In MS. Bodl. 2279, I, there are some marginal notes on Part III. which are signed Tishbi (Neub. Cat.).
Yahya Ibn Suleiman wrote in Arabic a Commentary on the Guide of the Perplexed. A fragment is contained in the Berlin MS. Or. Qu., 554, 2 (Steinschneider, Cat. No. 92).
Zerahyab is. Isaac ha-Levi. Commentary on the Moreh, I., i.--lxxi., and some other portions of the work. (See Maskir, 1861, p. 125).
MS. Bodl. 2360, 8, contains a letter of Jehudah b. Shelomoh on some passages of the Moreb, and Zerahyah's reply.
Anonymous Commentaries.--The MS. Brit. Mus. 1423 contains marginal and interlineary notes in Arabic. No author or date is given, nor is any other commentary referred to in the notes. The explanations given are mostly preceded by a question, and introduced by the phrase, "the answer is," in the same style as is employed in the Hebrew-Arabic Midrash, MS. Brit. Mus. Or. 2213. The Midrashic character is prominent in the notes. Thus the verse "Open, ye gates, that the righteous nation which keepeth the truth may enter in," is explained as meaning: Open, ye gates of wisdom, that human understanding that perceiveth truth may enter. The notes are numerous, especially in the first part, explaining almost every word; e.g., on "Rabbi": Why does Maimonides employ this title before the name of his pupil The answer is: either the word is not to be taken literally master"), but as a mere compliment, or it has been added by later copyisIs. Of a similar style seem to be the Arabic notes in the Berlin MS. Or. Oct. 258, 2, 8, so. (Cat. Steinschneider, No. 108.)--Anonymous marginal notes are met with almost in every MS. of the Moreh; e.g., Brit. Mos. Harl. 5525 ; Add. 14,763, 14,764; Bodl. 1264, I ; 2282, 10; 2423, 3 ; Munich MS., 239, 6.
The explanation of passages from the Pentateuch contained in the Moreh have been collected by D. Ottensoaaer, and given as an appendix (Morehderek) to Derek -sclulah (Pent. with Comm. etc., Furth, 1824).
IV. Controvercies.--The seemingly new ideas put forth by Maimonides in the Moreb and in the first section of his Mishneh-torah (Sefer ha-madda) soon produced a lively controversy as regards the merits of Maimonides theories. It was most perplexing to pious Talmudists to learn how Maimonides explained the anthropomorphisms employed in the Bible, the Midrashim and the Talmud, what he thought about the future state of our soul, and that he considered the study of philosophy as the highest degree of Divine worship, surpassing even the study of the Law and the practice of its precepts. The objections and attacks of Daniel of Damascus were easily silenced by a herem (excommunication) pronounced against him by the Rosh ha-golah Rabbi David. Stronger was the opposition that had its centre in Montpellier. Rabbi Solomon ben Abraham noticed with regret in his own community the fruit of the theories of Maimonides in the neglect of the study of the Law and of the practice of the Divine precepts. It happened to Moses Maimonides what in modern times happened to Moses Mendelssohn. Many so-called disciples and followers of the great master misunderstood or misinterpreted his teaching in support of their dereliction of Jewish law and Jewish practice, and thus brought disrepute on him in the eyes of their opponents. Thus it came that Rabbi Solomon and his disciples turned their wrath against the writings of Maimonides instead of combating the arguments of the pseudo-Maimonists. The latter even accused Solomon of having denounced the Moreh and the Sefer ha-madda to the Dominicans, who condemned these writings to the flames; when subsequently copies of the Talmud were burnt, and some of the followers of the Rabbi of Montpellier were subjected to cruel tortures, the Maimonists saw in this event a just punishment for offending Maimonides. (Letters of Hillel of Verona, Hemdab Genuzab, ed. H. Edelmann, p. 58 .sqq.).
Meir b. Todros ba-levi Abulafia wrote already during the lifetime of Maimonides to the wise men in Lunel about the heretic doctrines he discovered in the works of Maimonides. Ahron b. Meshullam and Shesheth Benvenisti defended Maimonides. About 1232 a correspondence opened between the Maimonists and the Anti-maimonists (Griitz, Gesch. d. J. vii. note I). The Grammarian David Kimhi wrote in defence of Maimonides three letters to Jehudah Alfachar, who answered each of them in the sense of Rabbi Solomon of Montpellier. Abraham b. Hisdai and Samuel b. Abraham Saportas on the side of the Maimonists, took part in the controversy. Meshullam b. Kalonymos b. Todros of Narbonne begged Alfachar to treat Kimhi with more consideration, whereupon Alfachar resolved to withdraw from the controversy. Nabmanides, though more on the side of Rabbi Solomon, wrote two letters of a conciliatory character, advising moderation on both sides. Representatives of the congregations of Saragossa, Huesca, Monzon, Kalatajud, and Lends signed declarations against R. Solomon. A herem was proclaimed from Lunel and Narbonne against the Anti-Maimonists. The son of Maimonides, Abraham, wrote a pamphlet Milbamot adonai, in defence of the writings of his father. The controversy raised about fifty years later by Abba Man Don Astruc and R. Solomon ben-Aderet of Barcelona, concerned the Moreh less directly. The question was of a more general character: Is the study of philosophy dangerous to the religious belief of young students? The letters written in this controversy are contained in Minbat-kenaot by Abba Mari Don Astruc (Presburg, 1838), and Kitab alrasail of Meir Abulafia ed. J. Brill (Paris, 1871). Yedaya Bedrasi took part in this controversy, and wrote Ketab hitnazlut in defence of the study of philosophy (Teshubot Rashba, Hanau, 1610, p. iii b.). The whole controversy ended in the victory of the Moreh and the other writings of Maimonides. Stray remarks are found in various works, some in praise and some in condemnation of Maimonides. A few instances may suffice. Rabbi Jacob Emden in his Mitpabat-sefarim (Lemberg, 1870, p. 56) believes that parts of the Moreh are spurious ; he even doubts whether any portion of it is the work of "Maimonides, the author of the Mishneh-torah, who was not capable of writing such heretic doctrines," S. D. Luzzato regards Maimonides with great reverence, but this does not prevent him from severely criticising his philosophical theories (Letters to S. Rappoport, No. 79, 83, 266, Iggeroth Shedal ed. E. Graber, Premys l, 1882), and from expressing his conviction that the saying "From Moses to Moses none rose like Moses," was as untrue as that suggested by Rappoport, "From Abraham to Abraham (Ibn-Ezra) none rose like Abraham." Rabbi Hirsch Chayyuth in Darke-Mosbeb (Zolkiew, 5840) examines the attacks made upon the writings of Maimonides, and tries to refute them, and to show that they can be reconciled with the teaching of the Talmud.
The Bodl. MS. 2240, 3a, contains a document signed by Josselman and other Rabbis, declaring that they accept the teaching of Maimonides as correct, with the exception of his theory about angels and sacrifices.
Numerous poems were written, both in admiration and in condemnation of the Moreh. Most of them precede or follow the Moreb in the printed editions and in the various MS. copies of the work. A few have been edited in Dibre-hakamim, pp. 75 and 86; in the Literaturblatt d. Or. I. 379, II. 26-27, IV. 748, and Leket-shoshannim by Dr. Gratz. In the Sammelband of the Mekize Nirdamim (1885) a collection of 69 of these poems is contained, edited and explained by Prof. Dr. A. Berliner. In imitation of the Moreh and with a view of displacing Maimonides work, the Karaite Ahron II. b. Eliah wrote a philosophical treatise, Ez-bayyim (Ed. F. Delitzseh. Leipzig, 1841).
Of the works that discuss the whole or part of the philosophical system of the Moreh the following are noteworthy:--
Bacher, W. Die Bibilexegese Moses Maimftni's, in the Jshreshericht der Landes Rabbinerschule zu Buda-Pest. 1896. Euler, M. Vorlesongen uber die judischen Philosophers des Mittelalters. Abtheil. II., Moses Maimonides (Wien, 1870).
Geiger, A. Das Judenthum u. seine Geschichte (Breslao, 1865), Zehnte Vorlesung Aben Ezra u. Maimonides.
Grltz, H. Geschichte d. Juden, VI. p. 363 sqq.
Joel, M. Religionsphilosophie des Moses b. Maimon (Breslau, 1859).
Joel,M. Albertus Magnus u. seim Vorhaltniss zu Maimonides (Bresisu, 1863).
Kaufmann, D. Geschichte der Attributenlehre, VII. Gotha, 1874.
Philippsohn, L. Die Philosophic des Maimonides. Predigt und Schul-Magazin, I. xviii.(Msgdeburg, 1834.)
Rosin, D. Die Ethik d. Maimonides (Breslsu, 1876).
Rubin, S. Spinoza u. Maimonides, ein Psychologisch-Philosophisches Antitheton (Wien, 1868).
Scheyer, S. Das psychologische System des Maimonides. Frankfort-a.-M., 1845.
Weiss, T. H. Beth-Talmud, I. x. p. 289.
David Yellin and Israel Abrahams, Mainsonides. ------------------- ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED
IT is the object of this work "to afford a guide for the perplexed," i.e. "to thinkers whose studies have brought them into collision with religion" p. 9), "who have studied philosophy and have acquired sound knowledge, and who, while firm in religions matters, are perplexed and bewildered on account of she ambiguous and figurative expressions employed in the holy writings (p. 5). Joseph, the son of Jehudah Ibn Aknio, a disciple of Maimonides, is addressed by his teacher as an example of this kind of students. It was "for him and for those like him" that the treatise was composed, and to him this work is inscribed in the dedicatory letter with which the Introduction begins. Maimonides, having discovered that his disciple was sufficiently advanced for an exposition of the esoteric ideas in the books of the Prophets, commenced to give him such expositions "by way of hints." His disciple then begged him to give him further explanations, to treat of metaphysical themes, and to expound the system and the method of the Kalam, or Mohammedan Theology.1 In compliance with this request, Maimonides composed the Guide of the Perplexed. The reader has, therefore, to expect that the subjects mentioned in the disciple's request indicate the design and arrangement of the present work, and that the Guide consists of the following parts :-- 1. An exposition of the esoteric ideas (sodot) in the books of the Prophets. 2. A treatment of certain metaphysical problems. 3. An examination of the system and method of the Kalam. This, in fact, is a correct account of the contents of the book ; but in the second part of the Introduction, in which the theme of this work is defined, the author mentions only the first-named subject. He observes "My primary object is to explain certain terms occurring in the prophetic book. Of these some are homonymous, some figurative, and some hybrid terms." "This work has also a second object. It is designed to explain certain obscure figures which occur in the Prophets, and are not distinctly characterised as being figures" (p. 2). Yet from this observation it must not be inferred that Maimonides abandoned his original purpose ; for he examines the Kalam in the last chapters of the First Part (ch. lxx.--lxxvi.), and treats of certain metaphysical themes in the beginning of the Second Part (Introd. and ch. i.--xxv.). But in the passage quoted above he confines himself to a delineation of the maie object of this treatise, and advisedly leaves unmentioned the other two subjects, which, however important they may be, are here of subordinate interest. Nor did he consider it necessary to expatiate on these subjects ; he only wrote for the student, for whom a mere reference to works on philosophy and science was sufficient. We therefore meet now and then with such phrases as the following "This is folly discussed in works on metaphysics." By references of this kind the authur may have intended so create a taste for the study of philosophical works. But our observation only holds good with regard to the Aristotelian philosophy.
1 See infra, page 4., note i.
The writings of the Mutakallemim are never commended by him ; he states their opinions, and tells his disciple that he would not find any additional argument, even if he were to read all their voluminous works (p. 133). Maimonides was a zealous disciple of Aristotle, although the theory of the Kalam might seem to have been more congenial to Jewish thought and belief. The Kalam upheld the theory of God's Existence, Incorporeality, and Unity, together with the creatio ex nihilo. Maimonides nevertheless opposed the Kalam, and, anticipating the question, why preference should be given to the system of Aristotle, which included the theory of the Eternity of the Universe, a theory contrary to the fundamental teaching of the Scriptures, he exposed the weakness of the Kalam and its fallacies.
The exposition of Scriptural texts is divided by the author into two parts the first part treats of homonymous, figurative, and hybrid terms,2 employed in reference to God ; the second part relates to Biblical figures and allegories. These two parts do not closely follow each other ; they are separated by the examination of the Kalam, and the discussion of metaphysical problems. It seems that the author adopted this arrangement for the following reason first of all, he intended to establish the fact that the Biblical anthropomorphisms do not imply corporeality, and that the Divine Being of whom the Bible speaks could therefore be regarded as identical with the Primal Cause of the philosophers. Having established this principle, he discusses from a purely metaphysical point of view the properties of the Primal Cause and its relation to the universe. A solid foundation is thus established for the esoteric exposition of Scriptural passages. Before discussing metaphysical problems, which he treats in accordance with Aristotelian philosophy, he disposes of the Kalam, and demonstrates that its arguments are illogical and illusory.
The "Guide for the Perplexed" contains, therefore, an Introduction and the following four parts :--1. On homonymous, figurative, and hybrid terms, 2. On else Supreme Being and His relation to the universe, according to the Kalam. 3. On the Primal Cause and its relation to the universe, according to the philosophers. 4. Esoteric exposition of some portions of the Bible (sodot) a. Maaseb bereshith, or the history of the Creation (Genesis, ch. i-iv .) ; b. on Prophecy ; c. Maaseb mercabhah, or the description of the divine chariot (Ezekiel, ch. i.).
According to this plan, the work ends with the seventh chapter of the Third Part. The chapters which follow may be considered as an appendix ; they treat of the following theological themes the Existence of Evil, Omniscience and Providence, Temptations, Design in Nature, in the Law, and in the Biblical Narratives, and finally the true Worship of God.
In the Introduction to the "Guide," Maimonides (1) describes the object ot the work and the method he has followed ; (2) treats of similes ; (3) gives "directions for the study of the work" ; and (4.) discusses the usual causes of inconsistencies in authors.
1 (pp. 2--3). Inquiring into the root of the evil which the Guide was intended to remove, viz., the conflict between science and religion, the author perceived that in most cases it originated in a misinterpretation of the anthropomorphisms in Holy Writ. 'Ihe main difficulty is found in the ambiguity of the words employed by the prophets when speaking of the Divine Being; the question arises whether they are applied to the Deity and to other things in one and the same sense or equivocally ; in the latter case the author distinguishes between homonyms pure and simple, figures, and hybrid terms. In order to show that the Biblical anthropomorphisms do not imply the corporeality of the Deity, he seeks in each instance to demonstrate that the expression under examination is a perfect homonym denoting things which are totally
2 See infra page 5, note 4
distinct from each other, and whenever such a demonstration is impossible, he assumes that the expression is a hybrid term, that is, being employed in one instance figuratively and in another homonymously. His explanation of "form" (zelem) may serve as an illustration. According to his opinion, it invariably denotes "form" in the philosophical aeceptation of the term, viz., the complex of the essential properties of a thing. But to obviate objections he proposes an alternative view, to take zelem as a hybrid term that may be explained as a class noun denoting only things of the same class, or as a homonym employed for totally different things, viz., "form" in the philosophical sense, and "form " in the ordinary meaning of the word. Maimonides seems to have refrained from explaining anthropomorphisms as figurative expressions, lest by such interpretation he might implicitly admit the existence of a certain relation aod comparison between the Creator and His creatures.
Jewish philosophers before Maimonides enunciated and demonstrated the Unity and the Incorporeality of the Divine Being, and interpreted Scriptural metaphors on the principle that "the Law speaks in the language of man" but our author adopted a new and altogether original method. The Commentators, when treating of enthropomorphisms, generally contented themselves with the statement that the term under consideration must not be taken in its literal sense, or they paraphrased the passage in expressions which implied a lesser degree of corporeality. The Talmud, the Midrashim, and the Targumim abound in paraphrases of this kind. Saadiah in "Emunot ve-de'ot," Bahya in his "Hobot ha-lebabot," and Jehudah ha-levi in the "Cutari," insist on the necessity and the appropriateness of such interpretations. Saadiah enumerates ten terms which primarily denote organs of the human body, and are figuratively applied to God. To establish this point of view he cites numerous instances in which the terms in question are used in a figurative sense without being applied to God. Saadiah further shows that the Divine attributes are either qualifications of such of God's actions as are perceived by man, or they imply a negation. The correctness of this method was held to be so obvious that some authors found it necessary to apologize to the reader for introducing such well-known topics. From R. Abraham ban David's strictures on the Yad habazakah it is, however, evident that in the days of Maimonides persons were not wanting who defended the literal interpretation of certain anthropomorphisms. Maimonides, therefore, did not conent himself with the vague and general rule, "The Law speaks in the language of man," but sought carefully to define the meaning of each term when applied to God, and to identify it with some transcendental and metaphysical term. In pursuing this course he is sometimes forced to venture upon an interpretation which is much too far-fetched to commend itself even to the supposed philosophical reader. In such instances he generally adds a simple amid plaims explanation, and leaves it to the option of the reader to choose the one which appears to him preferable. The enumeration of the different meanings of a word is often, from a philological point of view, incomplete ; he introduces only such significations as serve his object. When treating of an imperfect homonym, the several significations of which are derived from one primary signification, he apparently follows a certain system which he does not employ in the interpretation of perfect homonyms. The homonymity of the term is not proved ; the author confines himself to the remark, "It is employed homonymously," even when the various meanings of a word might easily be traced to a common source.
2 (pag. 4-8). In addition to the explanation of homonyms Maimonides undertakes to interpret similes and allegories. At first it had been his intention to write two distinct works--Sefer ha-nebuab, "A Book on Prophecy," and Sefer ha-nebuab, "A Book of Reconciliation." In the former work he had intended to explain difficult passages of the Bible, and in the latter to expound such passages in the Midrash and the Talmud as seemed to be in conflict with common sense. With respect to the "Book of Reconciliation," he abandoned his plan, because he apprehended that neither the learned nor the unlearned would profit by it the one would find it superfluous, the other tedious. The subject of the "Book on Prophecy" is treated in the present work, and also strange passages that occasiooally occur in the Talmud and the Midrash are explained.
The treatment of the simile must vary according as the simile is compound or simple. In the first case, each part represents a separate idea and demands a separate interpretation ; in the other case, only one idea is represented, and it is not necessary to assign to each part a separate metaphorical meaning. This division the author illustrates by citing the dream of Jacob (Gen. xxviii. x a sqq.), and the description of the adulteress (Prov. vii. 6 sqq.). He gives no rule by which it might be ascertained to which of the two categories a simile belongs, and, like other Commentators, he seems to treat as essential those details of a simile for which he can offer an adequate interpretation. As a general principle, he warns against the confusion and the errors which arise when an attempt is made to expound every single detail of a simile. His own explanations are not intended to be exhaustive ; on the contrary, they are to consist of brief allusions to the idea represented by the simile, of mere suggestions, which the reader is expected to develop and to complete. The author thus aspires to follow in the wake of the Creator, whose works can only be understood after a long and persevering study. Yet it is possible that he derived his preference for a reserved and mysterious style from the example of ancient philosophers, who discussed metaphysical problems in figurative and enigmatic language. Like Ibn Ezra, who frequently concludes his exposition of a Biblical passage with the phrase, "Here a profound idea (sod) is hidden," Maimonides somewhat mysteriously remarks at the end of different chapters, "Note this," "Consider it well." In such phrases some Commentators fancied that they found references to metaphysical theories which the author was not willing fully to discuss. Whether this was the case or not, in having recourse to that method he was not, as some have suggested, actuated by fear of being charged with heresy. He expresses his opinion on the principal theological questions without reserve, and does not dread the searching inquiries of opponents ; for he boldly announces that their displeasure would not deter him from teaching the truth and guiding those who are able and willing to follow him, however few these might be. When, however, we examine the work itself, we are at a loss to discover to which parts the professed enigmatic method was applied. His theories concerning the Deity, the Divine attributes, angels, creatio ex nihilo, prophecy, and other subjects, are treated as fully as might be expected. It is true that a cloud of mysterious phrases enshrouds the interpretation of Ma'aseh beresbit (Gen.i--iii.) and Ma'asch mercabah (Ez. i.). But the significant words occurring in these portions are explained in the First Part of this work, and a full exposition is found in the Second and Third Parts. Nevertheless the statement that the exposition was never intended to be explicit occurs over and over again. The treatment of the first three chapters of Genesis concludes thus : "These remarks, together with what we have already observed on the subject, and what we may have to add, must suffice both for the object and for the reader we have in view" (II.xxx.).
In like manner, he declares, after the explanation of the first chapter of Ezekiel "I have given you here as many suggestions as maybe of service to you, if you will give them a further development. . . . Do not expect to hear from me anything more on this subject, for I have, though with some hesitation, gone as far in my explanation as I possibly could go" (III. vii.).
3 (pag. 8--9), In the next paragraph, headed, "Directions for the Study of this Work," he implores the reader not to be hasty with his Criticism, and to bear in mind that every sentence, indeed every word, had been fully considered before it was written down. Yet it might easily happen that the reader could not reconcile his own view with that of the author, and in such a case he is asked to ignore the disapproved chapter or section altogether. Such disapproval Maimonides attributes to a mere misconception on the part of the reader, a fate which awaits every work composed in a mystical style. In adopting this peculiar style, he intended to reduce to a minimum the violation of the rule laid down in the Mishnah (Hagigah ii. i), that metaphysics should not be taught publicly. The violation of this rule he justifies by citing the following two Mishnaic maxims: "It is time to do something in honour of the Lord" (Berakot ix. 5), and "Let all thy acts be guided by pure intentions" (Abot ii. i 7). Maimonides increased the mysteriousness of the treatise, by expressing his wish that the reader should abstain from expounding the work, lest he might spread in the name of the author opinions which the latter never held. But it does not occur to him that the views he enunciates might in themselves be erroneous. He is positive that his own theory is unexceptionally correct, that his esoteric interpretations of Scriptural texts are sound, and that those who differed from him--viz., the Mutakallemim on the one hand, and the unphilosophical Rabbis on the other-- are indefensibly wrong. In this respect other Jewish philosophers--e.g. Saadiah and Balhya--were far less positive ; they were conscious of their own fallibility, and invited the reader to make such corrections as might appear needful. Owing to this strong self-reliance of Maimonides, it is not to be expected that opponents would receive a fair and impartial judgment at his hands.
4 (pag. 9--11). The same self-reliance is noticeable in the next and concluding paragraph of the Introduction. Here he treats of the contradictions which are to be found in literary works, and he divides them with regard to their origin into seven classes. The first four classes comprise the apparent contradictions, which can be traced back to the employment of elliptical speech the other three classes comprise the real contradictions, and are due to carelessness and oversight, or they are intended to serve some special purpose. The Scriptures, the Talmud, and the Midrash abound in instances of apparent contradictions ; later works contain real contradictions, which escaped the notice of the writers. In the present treatise, however, there occur only such contradictions as are the result of intention and design.
PART I.
The homonymous expressions which are discussed in the First Part include-- (1) nouns and verbs used in reference to God, ch. i. to ch. xlix. ; (2) attributes of the Deity, ch. 1. to lx. ; (3) expressions commonly regarded as names of God, ch. lxi. to lxx. In the first section the following groups can be distinguished-- (a) expressions which denote form and figure, cii. i. to ch. vi. ; (b) space or relations of space, ch. viii. to ch. xxv. ; (c) parts of the animal body and their functions, ch. xxviii. to ch. xlix. Each of these groups includes chapters not connected with the main subject, but which serve as a help for the better understanding of previous or succeeding interpretations. Every word selected for discussion bears upon some Scriptural text which, according to the opinion of the author, has been misinterpreted. But such phrases as "the mouth of the Lord," and "the hand of the Lord," are not introduced, because their figurative meaning is too obvious to be misunderstood.
The lengthy digressions which are here and there interposed appear like outbursts of feeling and passion which the author could not repress. Yet they are "words fitly spoken in the right place" , for they gradually unfold the author's theory, and acquaint the reader with those general principles on which he founds the interpretations in the succeeding chapters. Moral reflections are of frequent occurrence, and demonstrate the intimate connexion between a virtuous life and the attainment of higher knowledge, in accordance with the maxim current long before Maimonides, and expressed in the Biblical words, "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (Ps. cxi. 10). No opportunity is lost to inculcate this lesson, he it in a passing remark or in an elaborate essay.
The discussion of the term "zelem" (cii. i.) afforded the first occasion for reflections of this kind. Man, "the image of God," is defined as a living and rational being, as though the moral faculties of man were not an essential element of his existence, and his power to discern between good and evil were the result of the first sin. According to Maimonides, the moral faculty would, us fact, not have been required, if man had remained a purely rational being. It is only through the senses that "the knowledge of good and evil" has become indispensable. The narrative of Adam's fall is, according to Maimonidcs, an allegory representing the relation which exists between sensation, moral faculty, and intellect. In this early part (ch. ii.), however, the author does not yet mention this theory ; on the contrary, every allusion to it is for the present studiously avoided, its full exposition being reserved for the Second Part.
The treatment of hazah "he beheld " (ch. vi), is followed by the advice that the student should not approach metaphysics otherwise than after a sound and thorough preparation, because a rash attempt to solve abstruse problems brings nothing but injury upon the inexperienced investigator. The author points to the "nobles of the children of Israel" (Exod. xxiv. s i), who, according to his interpretation, fell into this error, and received their deserved punishment. He gives additional force to these exhortations by citing a dictum of Aristotle to the same effect. In a like way he refers to the allegorical use of certain terms by Plato (ch. xvii.) in support of his interpretation of "zur" (lit., "rock") as denoting "Primal Cause."
The theory that nothing but a sound moral and intellectual training would entitle a student to engage in metaphysical speculations is again discussed in the digression which precedes the third group of homonyms (xxxi.--xxxvi.). Man's intellectual faculties, he argues, have this in common with his physical forces, that their sphere of action is limited, and they become inefficient whenever they are overstrained. This happens when a student approaches metaphysics without due preparation. Maimonides goes on to argue that the non-success of metaphysical studies is attributable to the following causes : the transcendental character of this discipline, the imperfect state of the student's knowledge, the persistent efforts which have to be made even in the preliminary studies, and finally the waste of energy and time owing to the physical demands of man. For these reasons the majority of persons are debarred from pursuing the study of metaphysics. Nevertheless, there are certain metaphysical truths which have to be communicated to all men, e.g., that God is One, and that He is incorporeal ; for to assume that God is corporeal, or that He has any properties, or to ascribe to Him any attributes, is a sin bordering on idolatry.
Another digression occurs as an appendix to the second group of homonyms (ch. xxvi.--xxvii.). Maimonides found that only a limited number of terms are applied to God in a figurative sense; and again, that in the "Targum" of Onkelos some of the figures are paraphrased, while other figures received a literal rendering. He therefore seeks to discover the principle which was applied both in the Sacred Text and in the translation, and he found it in the Talmudical dictum, "The Law speaketh the language of man." For this reason all figures are eschewed which, in their literal sense, would appear to the multitude as implying debasement or a blemish. Onkelos, who rigorously guards himself against using any term that might suggest corporification, gives a literal rendering of figurative terms when there is no cause for entertaining such an apprehension. Maimonides illustsatcs this rule by the mode in which Onkelos renders "yarad" (" he went down,"), when used in reference to God. It is generally paraphrased, but in one exceptional instance, occurring in Jacob's "visions of the night" (Gen. xlvi. i), it is translated literally ; in this instance the literal rendering does not lead to corporification ; because visions and dreams were generally regarded as mental operations, devoid of objective reality. Simple and clear as this explanation may be, we do not consider that it really explains the method of Onkelos. On the contrary, the translator paraphrased anthropomorphic terms, even when he found them in passages relating to dreams or visions; and indeed it is doubtful whether Maimonides could produce a single instance, in favour of his view. He was equally unsuccessful in his explanation of "hazah" "he saw" (ch. xlviii.). He says that when the object of the vision was derogatory, it was not brought into direct relation with the Deity; in such instances the verb is paraphrased, while in other instances the rendering is literal. Although Maimonides grants that the force of this observation is weakened by three exceptions, he does not doubt its correctness.
The next Section (ch. I. to ch. lix.) "On the Divine Attributes" begins with the explanation that "faith" consists in thought, not in mere utterance ; in conviction, not in mere profession. This explanation forms the basis for the subsequent discussion. The several arguments advanced by Maimonides against the employment of attributes are intended to show that those who assume the real existence of Divine attributes may possibly utter with their lips the creed of the Unity and the Incorporeality of God, but they cannot truly believe it. A demonstration of this fact would be needless, if the Attributists had not put forth their false theses and defended them with the utmost tenacity, though with the most absurd arguments.
After this explanation the author proceeds to discuss the impropriety of assigning attributes to God. The Attributists admit that God is the Primal Cause, One, incorporeal, free from emotion and privation, and that He is not comparable to any of His creatures, Maimonides therefore contends that any attributes which, either directly or indirectly, are in contradiction to this creed, should not be applied to God. By this rule he rejects four classes of attributes viz., those which include a definition, a partial definition, a quality, or a relation. The definition of a thing includes its efficient Cause ; and since God is the Primal Cause, He cannot be defined, or described by a partial definition. A quality, whether psychical, physical, emotional, or quantitative, is always regarded as something distinct from its substratum ; a thing which possesses any quality, consists, therefore, of that quality and a substratum, and should not be called one. All relations of time and space imply corporeality ; all relations between two objects are, to a certain degree, a comparison between these two objects. To employ any of these attributes in referencc to God would be as much as to declare that God is not the Primal Cause, that He is not One, that He is corporeal, or that He is comparable to His creatures.
There is only one class of attributes to which Maimonidcs makes no objection, viz, such as describe actions, and to this class belong all the Divine attributes which occur in the Scriptures. The "Thirteen Attributes" (shelosh esreh middot, Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7) serve as an illustration. They were communicated to Moses when he, as the chief of the Israelites, wished to know the way in which God governs the universe, in order that he himself in ruling the nation might follow it, and thereby promote their real well-being. On the whole, the opponents of Maimonides admit the correctness of this theory. Only a small number of attributes are the subject of dispute. The Scriptures unquestionably ascribe to God Existence, Life, Power, Wisdom, Unity, Eternity, and Will. The Attributists regard these as properties distinct from, but co-existing with, the Essence of God. With great acumen, and with equally great acerbity, Maimonides shows that their theory is irreconcilable with their belief in the Unity and the Ineorpureahity of God. He points out three different ways of interpreting these attributes :--1. They may be regarded as descriptive of the works of God, and as declaring that these possess such properties as, in works of man, would appear to be the result of the will, the power, and the wisdom of a living being. 2. The term "existing," "one," "wise," etc., are applied to God and to His creatures homonymously ; as attributes of God they coincide with His Essence ; as attributes of anything beside God they are distinct from the essence of the thing. 3. These terms do not describe a positive quality, but express a negation of its opposite. This third interpretation appears to have been preferred by the author ; he discusses it more fully than the two others. He observes that the knowledge of the incomprehensible Being is solely of a negative character, and he shows by simple and appropriate examples that an approximate knowledge of a thing can be attained by mere negations, that such knowledge increases with the number of these negations, and that an error in positive assertions is more injurious than an error in negative assertions. In describing the evils which arise from the application of positive attributes to God, he unsparingly censures the hymnologists, because he found them profuse in attributing positive epithets to the Deity. On the basis of his own theory he could easily have interpreted these epithets in the same way as he explains the Scriptural attributes of God. His severity may, however, be accounted for by the fact that the frequent recurrence of positive attributes in the literary composition of the Jews was the cause that the Muhammedans charged the Jews with entertaining false notions of the Deity.
The inquiry into the attributes is followed by a treatment of the names of God. It seems to have been beyond the design of the author to elucidate the etymology of each name, or to establish methodically its signification ; for he does not support his explanations by any proof. His sole aim is to show that the Scriptural names of God in their true meaning strictly harmonize with the philosophical conception of the Primal Cause. There are two things which have so be distinguished in the treatment of the Primal Cause the Primal Cause per se, and its relation to the Universe. The first is expressed by the tetragrammaton and its cognates, the second by the several attributes, especially by rokeb ba'arabot, "He who rideth on the 'arabot" (Ps. lxviii. 4)
The tetragrammaton exclusively expresses the essence of God, and therefore it is employed as a nomen preprium. In the mystery of this name, and others mentioned in she Talmud, as consisting of twelve and of forty-two letters, Maimonides finds no other secret than the solution of some metaphysical problems. The subject of these problems is not actually known, but the author supposes that it referred to the "absolute existence of the Deity." He discovers the same idea in ehyeh (Exod. iii. 14), in accordance with the explanation added in the Sacred Text : asher ehyeh, "that is, I am." In the course of this discussion he exposes the folly or sinfulness of those who pretend to work miracles by the aid of these and similar names.
With a view of preparing the way for his peculiar interpretation of rokeb ba'arabot, he explains a variety of Scriptural passages, and treats of several philosophical terms relative to the Supreme Being. Such expressions as "the word of God," "the work of God," "the work of His fingers," "He made," "He spake," must be taken in a figurative sense ; they merely represent God as the cause that some work has been produced, and that some person has acquired a certain knowledge. The passage, "And He rested on the seventh day" (Exod. xx. ii) is interpreted as follows : On the seventh Day the forces and laws were complete, which during the previous six days were in the state of being established for the preservation of the Universe. They were not to be increased or modified.
It seems that Maimonides introduced this figurative explanation with a view of showing that the Scriptural "God" does not differ from the "Primal Cause" or "Ever-active Intellect" of the philosophers. On the other hand, the latter do not reject the Unity of God, although they assume that the Primal Cause comprises the causa efficiens, the agens, and the causafinalis (or, the cause, the means, and the end) ; and that the Ever-active Intellect comprises the intelligens, the intellectus, and the intellectum (or, the thinking subject, the act or thought, and the object thought of) ; because in this case these apparently different elements are, in fact, identical. The Biblical term corresponding to "Primal Cause " is rokeb ba'arabot, "riding on 'arabot." Maimonides is at pains to prove that 'arabot denotes "the highest sphere," which causes the motion of all other spheres, and which thus brings about the natural course of production and destruction. By "the highest sphere " he does not understand a material sphere, but the immaterial world of intelligences and angels, "the seat of justice and judgment, stores of life, peace, and blessings, the seat of the souls of the righteous," etc. Rokeb ba'arabot, therefore, means He presides over the immaterial beings, He is the source of their powers, by which they move the spheres and regulate the course of nature. This theory is more fully developed in the Second Part.
The next section (chap. lxxi.--lxxvi.) treats of the Kalam. According to the author, the method of the Kalam is copied from the Christian Fathers, who applied it in the defence of their religious doctrines. The latter examined in their writings the views of the philosophers, ostensibly in search of truth, in reality, however, with the object of supporting their own dogmas. Subsequently Mohammedan theologians found in these works arguments which seemed to confirm the truth of their own religion ; they blindly adopted these arguments, and made no inquiry whence these had been derived. Maimonides rejects a priori the theories of the Mutakallemim, because they explain the phenomena in the universe in conformity with preconceived notions, instead of following the scientific method of the philosophers. Among the Jews, especially in the East and in Africa, there were also some who adopted the method of the Kalam ; in doing so they followed the Mu'tazilah (dissenting Mohammedans), not because they found it more correct than the Kalam of the Ashariyah (orthodox Mohammedans), hut because at the time when the Jews became acquainted with the Kalam it was only cultivated by the Mu'taziiah. The Jews in Spain, however, remained faithful to the Aristotelian philosophy.
The four principal dogmas upheld by the dominant religions were the creatio ex nihilo, the Existence of God, His Incorporeality, and His Unity. By the philosophers the creatio ex nibilo was rejected, but the Mutakallemim defended it, and founded upon it their proofs for the other three dogmas. Maimonides adopts the philosophical proofs for the Existence, Incorporeality, and Unity of God, because they must be admitted even by those who deny the creatio ex nihilo, the proofs being independent of this dogma. In order to show that the Mutakallemim are mistaken in ignoring the organization of the existing order of things, the author gives a minute description of the analogy between the Universe, or Kosmos, and man, the mikrokosmos (ch. lxxii.). This analogy is merely asserted, and the reader is advised either to find the proof by his own studies, or to accept the fact on the authority of the learned. The Kalam does not admit the existence of law, organization, and unity in the universe. Its adherents have, accordingly, no trustworthy criterion to determine whether a thing is possible or impossible. Everything that is conceivable by imagination is by them held as possible. The several parts of the universe are in no relation to each other ; they all consist of equal elements ; they are not composed of substance and properties, but of atoms and accidents the law of causality is ignored ; man's actions are not the result of will and design, but are mere accidents. Maimonides in enumerating and discussing the twelve fundamental propositions of the Kalam (ch. lxiii,), which embody these theories, had apparently no intention to give a complete and impartial account of the Kalam ; he solely aimed at exposing the weakness of a system which he regarded as founded not on a sound basis of positive facts, but on mere fiction ; not on the evidences of the senses and of reason, but on the illusions of imagination.
After having shown that the twelve fundamental propositions of the Kalam are utterly untenable, Maimonides finds no difficulty in demonstrating the insufficiency of the proofs advanced by the Mutakallemim in support of the above-named dogmas. Seven arguments are cited which the Mutakallemim employ in support of the creatio ex nihilo.3 The first argument is based on the atomic theory, viz., that the universe consists of equal atoms without inherent properties all variety and elsange observed in nature must therefore be attributed to an external force. Three arguments are supplied by the proposition that finite things of an infinite number cannot exist (Propos. xi.). Three other arguments derive their support from the following proposition (x.) Everything that can be imagined can have an actual existence. The present order of things is only one out of the many forms wlsich are possible, and exist through the fiat of a determining power.
The Unity of God is demonstrated by the Mutakallemim as follows : Two Gods would have been unable to produce the world; one would have impeded the work of the other. Maimonides points out that this might have been avoided by a suitable division of labour. Another argument is as follows The two Beings would have one element in common, and would differ in another each would thus Consist of two elements, and would not be God. Maimonides might have suggested that the argument moves in a circle, the unity of God being proved by assuming His unity. The following argument is altogether unintelligible : Both Gods are moved to action by will ; the will, being without a substratum, could not act simultaneously in two separate beings. The fallacy of the following argument is clear : The existence of one God is proved ; the existence of a second God is not proved, it would be possible; and as possibility is inapplicable to God, there does not exist a second God. The possibility of ascertaining the existence of God is here confounded with potentiality of existence. Again, if one God suffices, the second God is superfluous ; if one God is not sufficient, he is not perfect, and cannot be a deity. Maimonides objects that it would not he an imperfection in either deity to act exclusively within their respective provinces. As in the criticism of the first argument, Maimonides seems here to forget that the existence of separate provinces would require a superior determining Power, and the two Beings would not properly be called Gods.
1 Saaiah proves the existence of the Creator in the following way :--1. The Universe is limited, and therefore cannot possess an unlimited force, 2. All things are compounds the composition must he owing to some external cause, 3. Changes observed in all beings are effected by some external cause, 4. If time were infinite, it would be impossible to conceive the progress of time from the present moment so the future, or from the past to the present moment. (Emunot vede'ot, ch. i.).--Bahys founds his arguments on three propositions: --1. A thing cannot be its own maker, 2. The series of successive causes is finite. 3. Compounds owe their existence to an external force. His arguments are :--1. The Universe, even the elements, are compounds consisting of substance and form. 2. In the Universe plan and unity is discernible. ( Hobot halehsbot, ch. i.)
The weakest of all arguments are, according to Maimonides, those by which the Mutakallemim sought to support the doctrine of God's Incorporeality. If God were corporeal, He would consist of atoms, and would not be one; or He would be comparable to other beings but a comparison implies the existence of similar and of dissisnilar elesoents, and God would thus not be one. A corporeal God would be finite, and an external power would be required to define those limits.
PART II.
The Second Part includes the following sections:--1. Introduction; 2. Philosophical Proof of the Existence of One Incorporeal Primal Cause (ch. i.) ; 3. On the Spheres and she Intelligences (ii.--xii.) ; 4. On the theory of the Eternity of the Universe (xiii.--xxix.) ; 5. Exposition of Gen. i.--iv. (xxx., xxxi.) ; 6. On Prophecy (xxxii.--xlviii.).
The enumeration of twenty-six propositions, by the aid of which the philosophers prove the Existence, the Unity, and the Incorporeality of the Primal Cause, forms the introduction so the Second Part of this work. The propositions treat of the properties of the finite and the infinite (i--iii., x.--xii., xvi.), of change and motion (iv.-ix., xiii.-xviii.), and of the possible and she absolute or necessary (xx.-xxv.) ; they are simply enumerated, but are not demonstrated. Whasever the value of these Propositions may be, they were inadequate for their purpose, and the author is compelled to introduce auxiliary propositions to prove the existence of an infinite, incorporeal, and uncompounded Primal Cause. (Arguments I. and III.)
The first and she fourth arguments may be termed cosmological proofs. They are based on the hypothesis that the series of causes for every change is finite, and terminates in the Primal Cause. There is no essential difference in the two arguments in the first are discussed the causes of the motion of a moving object ; the fourth treats of the causes which bring about the transition of a thing from potentiality to reality. To prove that neither the spheres nor a force residing in them constitute the Primal Cause, the philosophers employed two propositions, of which the one asserts that the revolutions of the spheres are infinite, and the other denies the possibility that an infinite force should reside in a finite object. The distinction between she finite in space and the finite in time appears to have been ignored ; for it is not shown why a force infinite in time could not reside in a body finite in space. Moreover, those who, like Maimonides, reject the eternity of the universe, necessarily reject this proof, while those who hold that the universe is eternal do not admit that the spheres have ever been only potential, and passed from potentiality to actuality. The second argument is supported by the following supplementary proposition If two elements coexist in a state of combination, and one of these elements is to be found as the same time separate, in a free state, is it certain that the second element is likewise to be found by itself. Now, since things exist which combine in themselves motive power and mass moved by that power, and since mass is found by itself, motive power must also be found by itself independens of mass.
The third argument has a logical character: The universe is either eternal or temporal, or partly eternal and partly temporal. It cannot be eternal in all its parts, as many parts undergo destruction ; it is isot altogether temporal, because, if so, the universe could not be reproduced after being destroyed. The continned existence of the universe leads, therefore, to the conclusion that there is an immortal force, the Primal Cause, besides the transient world.
These arguments have this in common, that while proving the existence of a Primal Cause, they at the same time demonstrate the Unity, the Incorporeality, and time Eternity of that Cause. Special proofs are nevertheless superadded for each of these postulates, and on the whole they differ very little from those advanced by the Mohamnmedan Theologians.
This philosophical theory of the Primal Cause was adapted by Jewish scholars to the Biblical theory of the Creator. The universe is a living, organized being, of which the earth is the centre. Any changes on this earth are due to the revolutions of the spheres ; the lowest or innermost sphere, viz., the one nearest tn the centre, is the sphere of the moon ; the outermost or uppermost is "the all-encompassing sphere." Numerous spheres are interposed but Maimonides divides all the spheres into four groups, corresponding to the moon, the sun, the planets, and the fixed stars. This division is claimed by the author as his own discovery ; he believes that it stands in relation to the four causes of their motions, the four elements of the sublunary world, and the four classes of beings, viz., the mineral, the vegetable, the animal, and the rational. The spheres have souls, and are endowed with intellect ; their souls enable them to move freely, and the impulse to the motion is given by the intellect in conceiving the idea of the Absolute Intellect. Each sphere has an intellect peculiar to itself; the intellect attached to the sphere of the moon is called "the active intellect" (Sekel ha-po'el). In support of this theory numerous passages are cited both from Holy Writ and from post-Biblical Jewish literature. The angels (elohim, malakim) mentioned in the Bible are assumed to be identical with the intellects of the spheres ; they are free agents, and their volition invariably tends to that which is good and noble they emanate from the Primal Cause, and form a descending series of beings, ending with the active intellect. The transmission of power from one element to the other is called "emanation" (shefa'). This transmission is performed without the utterance of a sound ; if any voice is supposed to be heard, it is oniy an illusion, originating in the human imagination, which is the source of all evils (ch. xii.).
In accordance with this doctrine, Maimonides explains that the three men who appeared to Abraham, the angels whom Jacob saw ascend and descend the ladder, and all other angels seen by man, are nothing but the intellects of the spheres, four in number, which emanate from the Primal Cause (ch.. x). In his description of the spheres he, as usual, follows Aristotle. The spheres do not contain any of the four elements of the sublunary world, but consist of a quintessence, an entirely different element. Whilst things on this earth are transient, the beings which inhabit the spheres above are eternal. According to Aristotle, these spheres, as well as their intellects, coexist with the Primal Cause. Maimonides, faithful to the teaching of the Scriptures, here departs from his master, and holds that the spheres and the intellects had a beginning, and were brought into existence by the will of the Creator. He does not attempt to give a positive proof of his doctrine all he contends is that the theory of the creatio ex nihilo is, froiri a philosoplsieah point of view, not inferior to the doctrine which asserts the eternity of the universe, and that he can refute all objections advanced against his theory (ch. xiii.-- xxviii.).
He next enumerates and criticises the various theories respecting the origin of the Universe, viz. : A. God created the Universe out of nothing. B. God formed the Universe from an eternal substance. C. The Universe originating in the eternal Primal Cause is co-eternal.----It is not held necessary by the author to discuss the view of those who do not assume a Primal Cause, since the existence of such a cause has already been proved (ch. xiii.).
The objections raised to a creastis ex nihilo by its opponents are founded partly on the properties of Nature, and partly on those of the Primal Cause, They infer from the properties of Nature the following arguments : (1) The first moving force is eternal ; for if it had a beginning, another motion must have produced it, and then it would not be the First moving force. (2) If the formless matter be not eternal, it must have been produced out of another substance ; it would then have a certain form by which it might be distinguished from the primary substance, and then it would not formless. (3) The circular motion of the spheres does not involve the necessity of termination ; and anything that is without an end, must be without a beginning. (4) Anything brought to existence existed previously in potentia; something must therefore have pre-existed of which potential existence could be predicated. Some support for the theory of the eternity of the heavens has been derived from the general belief in the eternity of the heavens.-- The properties of the Primal Cause furnished the following arguments :--If it were assumed that the Universe was created from nothing, it would imply that the First Cause had changed from the condition of a potential Creator to that of an actual Creator, or that His will had undergone a change, or that He must be imperfect, because He produced a perishable work, or that He had been inactive during a certain period. All these contingencies would be contrary so a true conception of the First Cause (ch.xiv.).
Maimonides is of opinion that the arguments based on the properties of things in Nature are inadmissible, because the laws by which the Universe is regulated need not have been in force before the Universe was in existence. This refutation is styled by our author "a strong wall built round the Law, able to resist all attacks" (ch. xvii.). In a similar manner the author proceeds against the objections founded on the properties of the First Cause. Purely intellectual beings, he says, are not subject to the same laws as material bodies ; that which necessitates a change in the latter or in the will of man need not produce a change in immaterial beings. As so the belief that the heavens are inhabited by angels and deities, it has not its origin in the real existence of these supernatural beings; it was suggested to man by meditation on the apparent grandeur of heavenly phenomena (ch. xviii.).
Maimonides next proceeds to explain how, independently of the authority or Scripture, he has been led to adopt the belief in the creatio ex nihilo. Admitting that the great variety of the things in the sublunary world can be traced to those immusable laws which regulate the influence of the spheres on the beings below -- the variety in the spheres can only be explained as the result of God's free will. According to Aristotle -- the principal authority for the eternity of the Universe -- it is impossible that a simple being should, according to the laws of nature, be the cause of various and compound beings. Another reason for the rejection of the Eternity of the Universe may be found in the fact that the astronomer Ptolemy has proved the incorrectness of the view which Aristotle had of celestial spheres, although the system of that astronomer is likewise far from being perfect and final (ch, xxiv.). It is impossible to obtain a correct notion of the properties of the heavenly spheres; "the heaven, even the heavens, are the Lord's, but the earth hath He given to the children of man" (Ps. cxv. 16). The author, observing that the arguments against the creatio ex nihilo are untenable, adheres to his theory, which was taught by such prophets as Abraham and Moses. Although each Scriptural quotation could, by a figurative interpretation, be made to agree with the opposite theory, Maimonides declines to ignore the literal sense of a term, unless it be in opposition so well-established truths, as is the case with anthropomorphic expressions ; for the latter, if taken literally, would be contrary to the demonstrated truth of God's incorporeality (ch. xxv.). He is therefore surprised that the author of Pirke-di Rabbi Eliezer ventured to assume the eternity of matter, and he thinks it possible that Rabbi Eliezer carried the license of figurative speech too far. (Ch. xxvi.).
The theory of the creatio ex nihilo does not involve the belief that the Universe will at a future time be destroyed ; the Bible distinctly teaches the creation, but not the destruction of the world except in passages which are undoubtedly conceived in a metaphorical sense. On the contrary, respecting certain parts of the Universe it is clearly stated "He established them for ever." (Ps.cxlviii. 5.) The destruction of the Universe would be, as the creation has been, a direct act of the Divine will, and not the result of those immutable laws which govern the Universe. The Divine will would in that case set aside those laws, both in the initial and the final stages of the Universe. Within this interval, however, the laws remain undisturbed (ch. xxvii.). Apparent exceptions, the miracles, originate in these laws, although man is unable to perceive the causal relation. The Biblical account of the creation concludes with the statement that God rested on the seventh day, that is to say, He declared that the work was complete ; no new act of creation was to take place, and no new law was to be introduced. It is true that the second and the third chapters of Genesis appear to describe a new creation, that of Eve, and a new law, viz., that of man's mortality, but these chapters are explained as containing an allegorical representation of man's psychical and intellectual faculties, or a supplemental detail of the Contents of the first chapter. Maimonides seems to prefer the allegorical explanation which, as it seems, he had in view without expressly stating it, in his treatment of Adams sin and punishment. (Part I. ch. ii.) It is certainly inconsistent on the one hand to admit that at the pleasure of the Almighty the laws of nature may become inoperative, and that the whole Universe may become annihilated, and on the other hand to deny, that during the existence of the Universe, any of the natural laws ever have been or ever will be suspended. It seems that Maimonides could not conceive the idea that the work of the All-wise should be, as the Mutakallemim taught--without plan and system, or that the laws Once laid down should not be sufficient for all emergencies.
The account of the Creation given in the book of Genesis is explained by the author according to the following two rules : First its language is allegorical; and, Secondly, the terms employed are homomsyms. The words erez, mayim, ruah, and hoshek in the second verse (ch. i.), are homonyms and denote the four elements : earth, water, air, and fire; in other instances erez is the terrestrial globe, mayim is water or vopour, noah denotes wind, and botbek darkness: According to Maimonides, a summary of the first chapter may be given thus; God created the Universe by producing first the reshit the "beginning" Gen. i. s), or hathalah, i.e., the intellects which give to the spheres both existence and motion, and thus become the source of the existence of the entire Universe. At first this Universe consisted of a chaos of elements, but its form was successively developed by the influence of the spheres, and more directly by the action of light and darkness, the properties of which were fixed on the first day of the Creation. In the subsequent five days minerals, plants, animals, and the intellectual beings came into existence. The seventh day, on which the Universe was for the first time ruled by the same natural laws which still continue in operation, was distinguished as a day blessed arid sanctified by the Creator, who designed it to proclaim the creatio ex nihilo (Exod. xx. xi). The Israelites were moreover commanded to keep this Sabbath in commemoration of their departure from Egypt (Deut. v. ii), because during the period of the Egyptian bondage, they had not been permitted to rest on that day. In the history of the first sin of man, Adam, Eve, and the serpent represent the intellect, the body, and the imagination. In order to complete the imagery, Samael or Satan, mentioned in the Midrash in connexion with this account, is added as representing man's appetitive faculties. Imagination, the source of error, is directly aided by the appetitive faculty, and the two are intimately connected with the body, so which man generally gives paramount attention, and for the sake of which he indulges in sins; in the end, however, they subdue the intellect and weaken its power. Instead of obtaining pure and real knowledge, man forms false conceptions; in consequence, the body is subject to suffering, whilst the imagination, instead of being guided by the intellect and atsaining a higher development becomes debased and depraved. In the three sons of Adam, Kain, Abel, and Seth, Maimonides finds an allusion to the three elements in man : the vegetable, the animal, and the intellectual. First, the animal element (Abel) becomes extinct ; then the vegetable elements (Kaiss) are dissolved ; only the third element, the intellect (Seth), survives, and forms the basis of mankind (ch. xxx., xxxi.).
Maimonides having so far stated his opinion in explicit terms, it is difficult to understand what he had in view by the avowal that he could not disclose everything. It is unquestionably no easy matter to adapt each verse in the first chapters of Genesis to the foregoing allegory; but such an adaptation is, according to the author's own view (Part I., Introd., p. 19), not only unnecessary, but actually objectionable.
In the next section (xxxii.-xlviii.) Maimonides treats of Prophecy. He mentions the following three opinions :--1. Any person, irrespective of his physical or moral qualifications, may be summoned by the Almighty to the mission of a prophet. 2. Prophecy is the highest degree of mental development, and can only be attained by training and study. 3. The gift of prophecy depends on physical, moral, and mental training, combined with inspiration. The author adopts the lass-mentioned opinion. He defines prophecy as an emanation (shefa), which through the will of the Almighty descends from the Active Intellect so the intellect and the imagination of thoroughly qualified persons. The prophet is thus distinguished both from wise men whose intellect alone received the necessary impulse from the Active Intellect, and from diviners or dreamers, whose imagination alone has been influenced by the Active Intellect. Although it is assumed that the attainment of this prophetic faculty depends on God's will, this dependence is nothing else but the relation which all things bear to the Primal Cause ; for the Active Intellect acts in conformity with the laws established by the will of God ; it gives an impulse to the intellect of man, and, bringing to light those mental powers which lay dormant, it merely turns potential faculty into real action. These faculties can be perfected to such a degree as to enable man to apprehend the highest truths intuitively, without passing through all the stages of research required by ordinary persons. The same fact is noticed wish respect to imagination ; man sometimes forms faithful images of objects and events which cannot be traced to the ordinary channel of information, viz., impressions made on the senses. Since prophecy is the result of a natural process, it may appear surprising that, of the numerous men excelling in wisdom, so few became prophets. Maimonides accounts for this fact by assuming that the moral faculties of such men had not been duly trained. None of them had, in the author's opinion, gone through the moral discipline indispensable for the vocation of a prophet. Besides this, everything which obstructs mental improvement, misdirects the imagination or impairs the physical strength, and precludes man from attaining to the rank of prophet. Hence no prophecy was vouchsafed to Jacob during the period of his anxieties on account of his separation from Joseph. Nor did Moses receive a Divine message during the years which the Israelites, under Divine punishment, spent in the desert. On the other hand, music and song awakened the prophetic power (comp. a Kings iii. si), and "The spirit of prophecy alights only on him who is wise, strong, and rich" (Babyl. Talm. Shabbat, 922). Although the preparation for a prophetic mission, the pursuit of earnest and persevering study, as also the execution of the Divine dictates, required physical strength, yet in the moment when the prophecy was received the functions of the bodily organs were suspended. The intellect then acquired true knowledge, which presented itself to the prophet's imagination in forms peculiar to that faculty. Pure ideals are almost incomprehensible; man must translate them into language which he is accustomed to use, and he must adapt them to his own mode of thinking. In receiving prophecies and communicating them to others the exercise of the prophet's imagination was therefore as essential as that of his intellect, and Maimonides seems to apply to this imagination the term "angel," which is so frequently mentioned in the Bible as the medium of communication between the Supreme Being and the prophet.
Only Moses held his bodily functions under such control that even without their temporary suspension he was able to receive prophetic inspiration the interposition of the imagination was in his case not needed "God spoke to him mouth to mouth" (Num. xii. I). Moses differed so completely from other prophets that the term "prophet" could only have been applied to him and other men by way of homonymy.
The impulses descending from the Active intellect so man's intellect and to his imagination produce various effects, according to his physical, moral, and intellectual condition. Some men are thus endowed with extraordinary courage and with an ambition to perform great deeds, or they feel themselves impelled to appeal mightily to their fellowmen by means of exalted and pure language. Such men are filled with "the spirit of the Lord," or, "with the spirit of holiness." To this distinguished class belonged Jephthah, Samson, David, Solomon, and the authors of the Hagiographa. Though above the standard of ordinary men, they were not included in the rank of prophets. Maimonides divides the prophets into two groups, viz., those who receive inspiration in a dream and those who receive it in a vision. The first group includes the following five classes :--1. Those who see symbolic figures ; 2. Those who hear a voice addressing them without perceiving the speaker ; 3. Those who see a man and hear him addressing them ; 4. Those who see an angel addressing them ; 5. Those who see God and hear His voice. The other group is divided in a similar manner, but contains only the first four classes, for Maimonides considered it impossible that a prophet should see God in a vision. This classification is based on the various expressions employed in the Scriptures to describe the several prophecies.
When the Israelites received the Law at Mount Sinai, they distinctly heard the first two commandments, which include the doctrines of the Existence and the Unity of God ; of the other eight commandments, which enunciate moral, not metaphysical truths, they heard the mere "sound of words" ; and it was through the mouth of Moses that the Divine instruction was revealed to them. Maimonides defends this opinion by quotations from the Talmud and the Midrashim.
The theory that imagination was an essential element in prophecy is supported by the fact that figurative speech predominates in the prophetical writings, which abound in figures, hyperbolical expressions and allegories. The symbolical acts which are described in connexion with the visions of the prophets, such as the translation of Ezekiel from Babylon to Jerusalem (Ez. viii. 3), Isaiah's walking about naked and barefoot (Isa. xx. a), Jacob's wrestling with the angel (Gen. xxxii. 17 sqq.), and the speaking of Balaam's ass (Num. xxii.28), had no positive reality. The prophets, employing an elliptical style, frequently omitted to state that a Certain event related by them was part of a vision or a dream. In consequence of such elliptical speech events are described in the Bible as coming directly from God, although they simply are the effect of the ordinary laws of nature, and as such depend on the will of God. Such passages cannot be misunderstood when it is borne in mind that every event and every natural phenomenon can for its origin be traced to the Primal Cause. In this sense the prophets employ such phrases as the following "And I will command the clouds that they rain no rain upon it" (Isa. v. 6); "I have also called my mighty men" (ibid. xi. 3).
PART III.
This part contains the following six sections :--1. Exposition of the ma'aseh mercabah (Ez. i.), ch. i. vii. ; 2. On the nature and the origin of evil, ch. viii. xii. 3. On the object of the creation, ch. xiii.,-xv. ; 4. On Providence and Omniscience, ch. xvi.-xxv. ; 5. On the object of the Divine precepts (ta'ame ha-mizvot) and the historical portions of the Bible, ch. xxv.-xl. ; 6. A guide to the proper worship of God.
With great caution Maimonides approaches the explanation of the ma'aseh mercabah, the chariot which Ezekiel beheld in a vision (Ez. i.). The mysteries included in the description of the Divine chariot had been orally trasmitted from generation to generation, but in consequence of the dispersion of the Jews the chain of tradition was broken, and the knowledge of these mysteries had vanished. Whatever he knew of those mysteries he owed exclusively to his own intellectual faculties; he therefore could not reconcile himself to the idea that his knowledge should die with him. He committed his exposition of the ma'aseh mercabah and the ma'aseh bereshit to writing, bus did not divest it of its original mysterious character ; so that the explanation was fully intelligible to the initiated--that is to say, to the philosopher --but to the ordinary reader it was a mere paraphrase of the Biblical text.-- (Introduction.)
The first seven chapters are devoted to the exposition of the Divine chariot. According to Maimonides three distinct parts are to be noticed, each of which begins with the phrase, "And I saw." These parts correspond to the three parts of the Universe, the sublunary world, the spheres and the intelligences. First of all the prophet is made to behold the material world which consists of the earth and the spheres, and of these the spheres, as the more important, are noticed first. In the Second Part, in which the nature of the spheres is discussed, the author dwells with pride on his discovery that they can be divided into four groups. This discovery he now employs to show that the four "hayyot" (animals) represent the four divisions of the spheres. He points out that the terms which the prophet uses in the description of the hayyot are identical with terms applied to the properties of the spheres. For the four hayyot or "angels," or cherubim, (1) have human form ; (2) have human faces ; (3)possess characteristics of other animals ; (4) have human hands ; (5) their feet are straight and round (cylindrical) ; (6) their bodies are closely joined so each other ; (7) only their faces and their wings are separate ; (8) their substance is transparent and refulgent; (9) they move uniformly ; (10) each moves in its own direction ; (11) they run ; (12) swift as lightning they return towards their starting point ; and (13) they move in consequence of an extraneous impulse (ruah). In a similar manner the spheres are described :--(1) they possess the characteristics of man, viz., life and intellect ; (2) they consist like man of body and soul ; (3.) they are strong, mighty and swift, like the ox, the lion, and the eagle , (4.) they perform all manner of work as though they had hands ; (5) they are round, and are not divided into parts ; (6) no vacuum intervenes between one sphere and the other ; (7) they may be considered as one being, but in respect to the intellects, which are the causes of their existence and motion, they appear as four different beings ; (8) they are transparent and refulgent; (9) each sphere moves uniformly, (10) and according to its special laws ; (11) they revolve with great velocity ; (12) each point returns again so its previous position ; (13) they are self-moving, yet the impulse emanates from an external power.
In the second part of the vision the prophet saw the ofannim. These represent the four elements of the sublunary world. For the ofannim (1) are connected with the bayyot and with the earth ; (2) they have four faces, and are four separate beings, but interpenetrate each other "as though it were a wheel in the midst of a wheel" (Ez. 1. 16) ; (3) they are covered with eyes ; (4.) they are not self-moving ; (5) they are set in motion by the hayyot; (6) their motion is not circular but rectilinear. The same may almost be said of the four elements (1) they are in close Contact with the spheres, being encompassed by the sphere of the moon ; earth occupies the centre, water surrounds earth, air has its position between water and fire ; (2) this order is not invariably maintained ; the respective portions change and they become intermixed and combined with each other (3) though they are only four elements they form an infinite number of things; (4.) not being animated they do not move of their own accord ; (5) they are set in motion by the action of the spheres ; (6) when a portion is displaced it returmss in a straight line to its original position.
In the third vision Ezekiel saw a human form above thse hayyot. The figure was divided in the middle ; in the upper portion the prophet only noticed that it was hashmal, (mysterious) ; from the loins downwards there was "the vision of the likeness of the Divine Glory," and "the likeness of the throne." The world of Intelligences was represented by the figure ; these can only be perceived in as far as they influence the spheres, but their relation to the Creator is beyond human comprehension. The Creator himself is not represented in this vision.
The key to the whole vision Maimonides finds in the introductory words, "And the heavens were opened," and in the minute description of the place and the time of the revelation. When pondering on the grandeur of the spheres and their influences, which vary according to time and place, man begins to think of the existence of the Creator. At the conclusion of this exposition Maimonides declares that he will, in the subsequent chapters, refrain from giving further explanation of the ma'aseh mercahah. The foregoing summary, however, shows that the opinion of the author on this subject is fully stated, and it is indeed difficult to conceive what additional disclosures he could still have made.
The task which the author has proposed to himself in the Preface he now regarded as accomplished. He has discussed the method of the Kalam, the system of the philosophers, and his own theory concerning the relation between the Primal Cause and the Universe: he has explained the Biblical account of the creation, the nature of prophecy, and the mysteries in Ezekiel's vision. In the remaining portion of the work the author attempts to solve certain theological problems, as though he wished to obviate the following objections, which might be raised to his theory that there is a design throughout the creation, and that the entire Universe is subject to the law of causation :--What is the purpose of the evils which attend human life? For what purpose was the world created? In how far does Providence interfere with the natural course of events? Does God know and foresee man's actions ? To what end was the Divine Law revealed These problems are treated seriatim.
All evils, Maimonides holds, originate in the material element of man's existence. Those who are able to emancipate themselves from the tyranny of the body, and unconditionally so submit to the dictates of reason, are protected from many evils. Man should disregard the cravings of the body, avoid them as topics of conversation, and keep his thoughts far away from them ; convivial and erotic songs debase man's noblest gifts -- thought and speech. Matter is the partition separating man from the pure Intellects ; it is "the thickness of rhe cloud" which true knowledge has so traverse before it reaches man. In reality, evil is the mere negative of good "God saw all that He had made, and behold it was very good" (Gen. i. 3 ). Evil does not exist at all. When evils are mentioned in the Scriptures as the work of God, the Scriptural expressions must not be taken in their literal sense, There are three kinds of evils :-- 1. Evils necessitated by those laws of production and destruction by which the species are perpetuated. 2. Evils which men inflict on each other ; they are comparatively few, especially among civilized men. 3. Evils which man brings upon himself, and which comprise the majority of existing evils. The consideration of these three classes of evils leads to the conclusion that "the Lord is good to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works" (Ps. cxlv. 9).
The question, What is the object of the creation?, must be left unanswered. The creation is the result of the will of God. Also those who believe that the Universe is eternal must admit that they are unable to discover the purpose of the Universe. It would, however, not be illogical to asaume that the spheres have been created for the sake of man, notwithstanding the great dimensions of the former and the smallness of the latter. Still it must be conceded that, even if mankind were the main and central object of creation, there is no absolute interdependence between them ; for it is a matter of course that, under altered conditions, man could exist without the spheres. All teleological theories must therefore be confined within the limits of the Universe as it now exists. They are only admissible in the relation in which the several parts of the Universe stand to each other; but the purpose of the Universe as a whole cannot be accounted for. It is simply an emanation from the will of God.
Regarding the belief in Providence, Maimonides enumerates the following five opinions :--1. There is no Providence; everything is subject to chance 2. Only a part of the Universe is governed by Providence, viz., the spheres, the species, and such individual beings as possess the power of perpetuating their existence (e.g., the start) ; the rest--that is, the sublunary world--is left to mere chance. 3. Everthing is predetermined ; according to this theory, revealed Law is inconceivable. 4. Providence assigns its blessings to all creatures, according to their merits ; accordingly, all beings, even the lowest animals, if innocently injored or killed, receive compensation in a future life. 5. According to the Jewish belief all living beings are endowed with free-will ; God is just, and the destiny of man depends on his merits. Maimonides denies the existence of trials inflicted by Divine love, i.e. afflictions which befall man, not as punishments of sin, but as means to procure for him a reward in times to come. Maimonides also rejects the notion that God ordains special temptation. The Biblical account, according to which God tempts men, "to know what is in their hearts," must not be taken in its literal sense ; it merely states that God made the virtues of certain people known to their fellowmen in order that their good example should be followed. Of all creatures man alone enjoys the especial care of Providence because the acts of Providence are identical with certain influences (shefa') which the Active Intellect brings to bear upon the human intellect; their eflcct upon man varies according to his physical, moral, and intellectual condition ; irrational beings, however, cannot be affected by these influences. If we cannot in each individual case see how these principles are applied, it must be borne in mind that God's wisdom is far above that of man. The author seems to have felt that his theory has its weak points, for he introduces it as follows :--" My theory is not established by demonstrative proof ; it is based on the authority of the Bible, and it is less subject to refutation than any of the theories previously mentioned."
Providence implies Omniscience, and men who deny this, eo ipso, have no belief in Providence. Some are unable to reconcile the fate of man with Divine Justice, and are therefore of opinion that God takes no notice whatever of the events which occur on earth. Others believe that God, being an absolute Unity, cannot possess a knowledge of a multitude of things, or of things that do not yet exist, or the number of which is infinite. These objections, which arc based nn the nature of man's perception, are illogical, for God's knowledge cannot be compared to that of man ; it is identical with His essence. Even the Attributists, who assume that God's knowledge is different from His essence, hold that it is distinguished from man's knowledge in the following five points :-- 1. It is one, although it embraces a plurality. 2. It includes even such things as do not yet exist. 3. It includes things which are infinite in number. 4. It does not change when new objects of perception present themselves. 5. It does not determine the course of events. -- However difficult this theory may appear to human comprehension, it is in accordance with the words of Isaiah (lv. 8) "Your thoughts are not My thoughts, and your ways are not My ways." According to Maimonides, the difficulty is to be explained by the fact that God is the Creator of all things, and His knowledge of the things is not dependent on their existence ; while the knowledge of man is solely dependent on the objects which come under his cognition.
According to Maimonides, the book of Job illustrates the several views which have been mentioned above. Satan, that is, the material element in human existence, is described as the cause of Job's sufferings. Job at first believed that man's happiness depends on riches, health, and children ; being deprived of these sources of happiness, he conceived the notion that Providence is indifferent to the fate of mortal beings. After a careful study of natural phenomena, he rejected this opinion. Eliphaz held that all misfortunes of man serve as punishments of past sins. Bildad, the second friend of Job, admitted the existence of those afflictions which Divine love decrees in order that the patient sufferer may be fitted to receive a bountiful reward. Zophar, the third friend of Job, declared that the ways of God are beyond human comprehension ; there is but one explanation assignable to all Divine acts, namely: Such is His Will. Elihu gives a fuller development to this idea ; he says that such evils as befell Job may be remedied once or twice, but the course of nature is not altogether reversed. It is true that by prophecy a clearer insight into the ways of God can be obtained, but there are only few who arrive at that exalted intellectual degree, whilst the majority of men must content themselves with acquiring a knowledge of God through the study of nature. Such a study leads man to the conviction that his understanding cannot fathom the secrets of nature and the wisdom of Divine Providence.
The concluding section of the Third Part treats of the purpose of the Divine precepts. In the Pentateuch they are described as the means of acquiring wisdom, enduring happiness, and also bodily comfort (ch. xxxi.). Generally a distinction is made between "hukkim" ("statutes") and mishpatim ("judgments"). The object of the latter is, on the whole, known, but the hukkim are considered as tests of mans obedience ; no reason is given why they have been enacted. Maimonides rejects this distinction ; he states that all precepts are the result of wisdom and design, that all contribute to the welfare of mankind, although with regard to the hukkim this is less obvious. The author draws another line of distinction between the general principles and the details of rules. For the selection and the introduction of the latter there is but one reason, viz. "Such is the will of God."
The laws are intended to promote man's perfection ; they improve both his mental and his physical condition ; the former in so far as they lead him to the acquisition of true knowledge, the latter through the training of his moral and social faculties. Each law thus imparts knowledge, improves the moral condition of man, or conduces to the well-being of society. Many revealed laws help to enlighten man, and to correct false opinions. This object is not always clearly announced. God in His wisdom sometimes withheld from the knowledge of man the purpose of commandments and actions. There are other precepts which tend to restrain man's passions and desires. If the same end is occasionally attainable by other means, it must be remembered that the Divine laws are adapted to the ordinary mental and emotional state of man, and not to exceptional circumstances. In this work, as in the Yad ha-hazakah, Maimonides divides the laws of the Pentateuch into fourteen groups, and in each group he discusses the principal and the special object of the laws included in it.
In addition to the legislative contents, the Bible includes historical information ; and Maimonides, in briefly reviewing the Biblical narratives, shows that these are likewise intended to improve man's physical, moral, and intellectual condition. "It is not a vain thing for you" (Deut. xxxii. 47) and when it proves vain to anyone, it is his own fault.
In the final chapters the author describes the several degrees of human perfection, from the sinners who have turned from the right path to the best of men, who in all their thoughts and acts cling to the Most Perfect Being, who aspire after the greatest possible knowledge of God, and strive to serve their Maker in the practice of "loving-kindness, righteousness, and justice." This degree of human perfection can only be attained by those who never forget the presence of the Almighty, and remain firm in their fear and love of God. These servants of the Most High inherit the choicest of human blessings they are endowed with wisdom they are godlike beings. -------------------- INTRODUCTION
[Letter of the Author to his Pupil, R. Joseph Ibn Aknin.]
In the name of GOD, Lord of the Universe.
To R. Joseph (may God protect him!), son of R. Jehudah (may his repose be in Paradise !) :
My dear pupil, ever since you resolved to come to me, from a distant country, and to study under my direction, I thought highly of your thirst for knowledge, and your fondness for speculative pursuits, which found expression in your poems. I refer to the time when I received your writings in prose and verse from Alexandria. I was then not yet able to test your powers of apprehension, and I thought that your desire might possibly exceed your capacity. But when you had gone with me through a course of astronomy, after having completed the [other] elementary studies which are indispensable for the understanding of that science, 1 was still more gratified by the acuteness and the quickness of your apprehension. Observing your great fondness for mathematics, I let you study them more deeply, for I felt sure of your ultimate success. Afterwards, when I took you through a course of logic, 1 found that my great expectations of you were confirmed, and I considered you fit to receive from me an exposition of the esoteric ideas contained in the prophetic books, that you might understand them as they are understood by men of culture. When I commenced by way of hints, 1 noticed that you desired additional explanation, urging me to expound some metaphysical problems; to teach you the system of the Mutakallemim; to tell you whether their arguments were based on logical proof; and if not, what their method was. I perceived that you had acquired some knowledge in those matters from others, and that you were perplexed and bewildered; yet you sought to find out a solution to your difficulty. I urged you to desist from this pursuit, and enjoined you to continue your studies systematically; for my object was that the truth should present itself in connected order, and that you should not hit upon it by mere chance. Whilst you studied with me I never refused to explain difficult verses in the Bible or passages in rabbinical literature which we happened to meet. When, by the will of God, we parted, and you went your way, our discussions aroused in me a resolution which had long been dormant. Your absence has prompted me to compose this treatise for you and for those who are like you, however few they may be. I have divided it into chapters, each of which shall be sent to you as soon as it is completed. Farewell!"
[Prefatory Remarks.]
Cause me to know the way wherein I should walk, for I lift up my soul unto Thee." (Psalm cxliii. S.)
Unto you, 0 men, 1 call, and my voice is to the sons of men." (Prov. viii. 4)
Bow down thine ear and hear the words of the wise, and apply thine heart unto my knowledge." (Prov. xxii. 17.)
My primary object in this work is to explain certain words occurring in the prophetic books. Of these some are homonyms, and of their several meanings the ignorant choose the wrong ones; other terms which are employed in a figurative sense are erroneously taken by such persons in their primary signification. There are also hybrid terms, denoting things which are of the same class from one point of view and of a different class from another. It is not here intended to explain all these expressions to the unlettered or to mere tyros, a previous knowledge of Logic and Natural Philosophy being indispensable, or to those who confine their attention to the study of our holy Law, I mean the study of the canonical law alone; for the true knowledge of the Torah is the special aim of this and similar works.
The object of this treatise is to enlighten a religious man who has been trained to believe in the truth of our holy Law, who conscientiously fulfils his moral and religious duties, and at the same time has been successful in his philosophical studies. Human reason has attracted him to abide within its sphere; and he finds it difficult to accept as correct the teaching based on the literal interpretation of the Law, and especially that which he himself or others derived from those homonymous, metaphorical, or hybrid expressions. Hence he is lost in perplexity and anxiety. If he be guided solely by reason, and renounce his previous views which are based on those expressions, he would consider that he had rejected the fundamental principles of the Law; and even if he retains the opinions which were derived from those expressions, and if, instead of following his reason, he abandon its guidance altogether, it would still appear that his religious convictions had suffered loss and injury. For he would then be left with those errors which give rise to fear and anxiety, constant grief and great perplexity.
This work has also a second object in view. It seeks to explain certain obscure figures which occur in the Prophets, and are not distinctly characterized as being figures. Ignorant and superficial readers take them in a literal, not in a figurative sense. Even well informed persons are bewildered if they understand these passages in their literal signification, but they are entirely relieved of their perplexity when we explain the figure, or merely suggest that the terms are figurative. For this reason I have called this book Guide for the Perplexed.
I do not presume to think that this treatise settles every doubt in the minds of those who understand it, but I maintain that it settles the greater part of their difficulties. No intelligent man will require and expect that on introducing any subject 1 shall completely exhaust it; or that on commencing the exposition of a figure I shall fully explain all its parts. Such a course could not be followed by a teacher in a viva vote exposition, much less by an author in writing a book, without becoming a target for every foolish conceited person to discharge the arrows of folly at him. Some general principles bearing upon this point have been fully discussed in our works on the Talmud, and we have there called the attention of the reader to many themes of this kind. We also stated (Mishneh torah, I. ii. 12, and iv. 10) that the expression Ma'ase Bereshit (Account of the Creation) signified" Natural Science," and Ma'aseh Mercabah (" Description of the Chariot" ) Metaphysics, and we explained the force of the Rabbinical dictum," The Ma'aseh Mercabak must not be fully expounded even in the presence of a single student, unless he be wise and able to reason for himself, and even then you should merely acquaint him with the heads of the different sections of the subject. (Babyl. Talm. Hagigah, fol. II b). You must, therefore, not expect from me more than such heads. And even these have not been methodically and systematically arranged in this work, but have been, on the contrary, scattered, and are interspersed with other topics which we shall have occasion to explain. My object in adopting this arrangement is that the truths should be at one time apparent, and at another time concealed. Thus we shall not be in opposition to the Divine Will (from which it is wrong to deviate) which has withheld from the multitude the truths required for the knowledge of God, according to the words," The secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him" (Ps. xxv. 14).
Know that also in Natural Science there are topics which are not to be fully explained. Our Sages laid down the rule," The Ma'aseb Bereshith must not be expounded in the presence of two." If an author were to explain these principles in writing, it would be equal to expounding them unto thousands of men. For this reason the prophets treat these subjects in figures, and our Sages, imitating the method of Scripture, speak of them in metaphors and allegories; because there is a close affinity between these subjects and metaphysics, and indeed they form part of its mysteries. Do not imagine that these most difficult problems can be thoroughly understood by any one of us. This is not the case. At times the truth shines so brilliantly that we perceive it as clear as day. Our nature and habit then draw a veil over our perception, and we return to a darkness almost as dense as before. We are like those who, though beholding frequent flashes of lightning, still find themselves in the thickest darkness of the night. On some the lightning flashes in rapid succession, and they seem to be in continuous light, and their night is as clear as the day. This was the degree of prophetic excellence attained by (Moses) the greatest of prophets, to whom God said," But as for thee, stand thou here by Me" (Deut. v. 31), and of whom it is written" the skin of his face shone," etc. (Exod. xxxiv. 29). [Some perceive the prophetic flash at long intervals; this is the degree of most prophets.] By others only once during the whole night is a flash of lightning perceived. This is the case with those of whom we are informed," They prophesied, and did not prophesy again" (Num. xi. 25). There are some to whom the flashes of lightning appear with varying intervals; others are in the condition of men, whose darkness is illumined not by lightning, but by some kind of crystal or similar stone, or other substances that possess the property of shining during the night; and to them even this small amount of light is not continuous, but now it shines and now it vanishes, as if it were" the flame of the rotating sword."
The degrees in the perfection of men vary according to these distinctions. Concerning those who never beheld the light even for one day, but walk in continual darkness, it is written," They know not, neither will they understand; they walk on in darkness" (Ps. lxxxii. 5). Truth, in spite of all its powerful manifestations, is completely withheld from them, and the following words of Scripture may be applied to them," And now men see not the light which is bright in the skies" (job xxxvii. 21). They are the multitude of ordinary men: there is no need to notice them in this treatise.
You must know that if a person, who has attained a certain degree of perfection, wishes to impart to others, either orally or in writing, any portion of the knowledge which he has acquired of these subjects, he is utterly unable to be as systematic and explicit as he could be in a science of which the method is well known. The same difficulties which he encountered when investigating the subject for himself will attend him when endeavouring to instruct others: viz., at one time the explanation will appear lucid, at another time, obscure: this property of the subject appears to remain the same both to the advanced scholar and to the beginner. For this reason, great theological scholars gave instruction in all such matters only by means of metaphors and allegories. They frequently employed them in forms varying more or less essentially. In most cases they placed the lesson to be illustrated at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end of the simile. When they could find no simile which from beginning to end corresponded to the idea which was to be illustrated, they divided the subject of the lesson, although in itself one whole, into different parts, and expressed each by a separate figure. Still more obscure are those instances in which one simile is employed to illustrate many subjects, the beginning of the simile representing one thing, the end another. Sometimes the whole metaphor may refer to two cognate subjects in the same branch of knowledge.
If we were to teach in these disciplines, without the use of parables and figures, we should be compelled to resort to expressions both profound and transcendental, and by no means more intelligible than metaphors and similes: as though the wise and learned were drawn into this course by the Divine Will, in the same way as they are compelled to follow the laws of nature in matters relating to the body. You are no doubt aware that the Almighty, desiring to lead us to perfection and to improve our state of society, has revealed to us laws which are to regulate our actions. These laws, however, presuppose an advanced state of intellectual culture. We must first form a conception of the Existence of the Creator according to our capabilities; that is, we must have a knowledge of Metaphysics. But this discipline can only be approached after the study of Physics: for the science of Physics borders on Metaphysics, and must even precede it in the course of our studies, as is clear to all who are familiar with these questions. Therefore the Almighty commenced Holy Writ with the description of the Creation, that is, with Physical Science; the subject being on the one hand most weighty and important, and on the other hand our means of fully comprehending those great problems being limited. He described those profound truths, which His Divine Wisdom found it necessary to communicate to us, in allegorical, figurative, and metaphorical language. Our Sages have said (Yemen Midrash on Gen. i. 1)," It is impossible to give a full account of the Creation to man. Therefore Scripture simply tells us, In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth" (Gen. i. 1). Thus they have suggested that this subject is a deep mystery, and in the words of Solomon," Far off and exceedingly deep, who can find it out ?" (Eccles. Vii. 24). It has been treated in metaphors in order that the uneducated may comprehend it according to the measure of their faculties and the feebleness of their apprehension, while educated persons may take it in a different sense. In our commentary on the Mishnah we stated our intention to explain difficult problems in the Book on Prophecy and in the Book of Harmony. In the latter we intended to examine all the passages in the Midrash which, if taken literally, appear to be inconsistent with truth and common sense, and must therefore be taken figuratively. Many years have elapsed since 1 first commenced those works. I had proceeded but a short way when 1 became dissatisfied with my original plan. For I observed that by expounding these passages by means of allegorical and mystical terms, we do not explain anything, but merely substitute one thing for another of the same nature, whilst in explaining them fully our efforts would displease most people; and my sole object in planning to write those books was to make the contents of Midrashirn and the exoteric lessons of the prophecies intelligible to everybody. We have further noticed that when an ill-informed Theologian reads these Midrashim, he will find no difficulty; for possessing no knowledge of the properties of things, he will not reject statements which involve impossibilities. When, however, a person who is both religious and well educated reads them, he cannot escape the following dilemma: either he takes them literally, and questions the abilities of the author and the soundness of his mind-doing thereby nothing which is opposed to the principles of our faith,-- or he will acquiesce in assuming that the passages in question have some secret meaning, and he will continue to hold the author in high estimation whether he understood the allegory or not. As regards prophecy in its various degrees and the different metaphors used in the prophetic books, we shall give in the present work an explanation, according to a different method. Guided by these considerations I have refrained from writing those two books as I had previously intended. In my larger work, the Mishnab Torah, I have contented myself with briefly stating the principles of our faith and its fundamental truths, together with such hints as approach a clear exposition. In this work, however, I address those who have studied philosophy and have acquired sound knowledge, and who while firm in religious matters are perplexed and bewildered on account of the ambiguous and figurative expressions employed in the holy writings. Some chapters may be found in this work which contain no reference whatever to homonyms. Such chapters will serve as an introduction to others: they will contain some reference to the signification of a homonym which 1 do not wish to mention in that place, or explain some figure: point out that a certain expression is a figure: treat of difficult passages generally misunderstood in consequence of the homonymy they include, or because the simile they contain is taken in place of that which it represents, and vice versa.
Having spoken of similes, I proceed to make the following remark :-The key to the understanding and to the full comprehension of all that the Prophets have said is found in the knowledge of the figures, their general ideas, and the meaning of each word they contain. You know the verse:
" I have also spoken in similes by the Prophets" (Hosea xii. 10): and also the verse," Put forth a riddle and speak a parable" (Ezek. xvii. 2). And because the Prophets continually employ figures, Ezekiel said," Does He not speak parables ?" (xxi. 5). Again, Solomon begins his book of Proverbs with the words," To understand a proverb and figurative speech, the words of the wise and their dark sayings" (Prov. i. 6): and we read in Midrash, Shir ha-shirim Rabba, i. 1):" To what were the words of the Law to be cornpared before the time of Solomon ? To a well the waters of which are at a great depth, and though cool and fresh, yet no man could drink of them. A clever man joined cord with cord, and rope with rope, and drew up and drank. So Solomon went from figure to figure, and from subject to subject, till he obtained the true sense of the Law." So far go the words of our Sages. I do not believe that any intelligent man thinks that" the words of the Law" mentioned here as requiring the application of figures in order to be understood, can refer to the rules for building tabernacles, for preparing the lulab, or for the four kinds of trustees. What is really meant is the apprehension of profound and difficult subjects, concerning which our Sages said," If a man loses in his house a sela, or a pearl, he can find it by lighting a taper worth only one issar. Thus the parables in themselves are of no great value, but through them the words of the holy Law are rendered intelligible." These likewise are the words of our Sages; consider well their statement, that the deeper sense of the words of the holy Law are pearls, and the literal acceptation of a figure is of no value in itself. They compare the hidden meaning included in the literal sense of the simile to a pearl lost in a dark room, which is full of furniture. It is certain that the pearl is in the room, but the man can neither see it nor know where it lies. It is just as if the pearl were no longer in his possession, for, as has been stated, it affords him no benefit whatever until he kindles a light. The same is the case with the comprehension of that which the simile represents. The wise king said," A word fitly spoken is like apples of gold in vessels of silver" (Prov. xxv. 11). Hear the explanation of what he said :-The word maskiyotb, the Hebrew equivalent for" vessels," denotes" filigree network" --i.e., things in which there are very small apertures, such as are frequently wrought by silversmiths. They are called in Hebrew maskiyyoth (lit." transpicuous," from the verb sakah," he saw," a root which occurs also in the Targum of Onkelos, Gen. xxvi. 8), because the eye penetrates through them. Thus Solomon meant to say," just as apples of gold in silver filigree with small apertures, so is a word fitly spoken."
See how beautifully the conditions of a good simile are described in this figure! It shows that in every word which has a double sense, a literal one and a figurative one, the plain meaning must be as valuable as silver, and the hidden meaning still more precious: so that the figurative meaning bears the same relation to the literal one as gold to silver. It is further necessary that the plain sense of the phrase shall give to those who consider it some notion of that which the figure represents. just as a golden apple overlaid with a network of silver, when seen at a distance, or looked at superficially, is mistaken for a silver apple, but when a keen-sighted person looks at the object well, he will find what is within, and see that the apple is gold. The same is the case with the figures employed by prophets. Taken literally, such expressions contain wisdom useful for many purposes, among others, for the amelioration of the condition of society; e.g., the Proverbs (of Solomon), and similar sayings in their literal sense. Their hidden meaning, however, is profound wisdom, conducive to the recognition of real truth.
Know that the figures employed by prophets are of two kinds : first, where every word which occurs in the simile represents a certain idea: and secondly, where the simile, as a whole, represents a general idea, but has a great many points which have no reference whatever to that idea: they are simply required to give to the simile its proper form and order, or better to conceal the idea: the simile is therefore continued as far as necessary, according to its literal sense. Consider this well.
An example of the first class of prophetic figures is to be found in Genesis:-"And, behold, a ladder set up on the earth, and the top of it reached to heaven; and, behold, the angels of God ascending and descending on it" (Gen. xxviii. 12). The word" ladder" refers to one idea:" set up on the earth" to another:" and the top of it reached to heaven" to a third: 4' angels of God" to a fourth:" ascending" to a fifth;" descending" to a sixth;" the Lord stood above it" (ver. 13) to a seventh. Every word in this figure introduces a fresh element into the idea represented by the figure.
An example of the second class of prophetic figures is found in Proverbs (vii. 6-26) :--" For at the window of my house I looked through my casement, and beheld among the simple ones; I discerned among the youths a young man void of understanding, passing through the street near her corner : and he went the way to her house, in the twilight, in the evening, in the black and dark night: and, behold, there met him a woman with the attire of a harlot, and subtil of heart. (She is loud and stubborn; her feet abide not in her house: now the is without, now in the streets, and lieth in wait in every corner.) So she caught him, and kissed him, and with an impudent face said unto him, I have peace offerings with me; this day have I paid my vows. Therefore came I forth to meet thee, diligently to seek thy face, and I have found thee. I have decked my bed with coverings of tapestry, with striped cloths of the yam of Egypt. I have perfumed my bed with myrrh, aloes, and cinnamon. Come, let us take our fill of love until the morning: let us solace ourselves with loves. For the goodman is not at home, he is gone a long journey: he hath taken a bag of money with him, and will come home at the day appointed. With her much fair speech she caused him to yield, with the flattering of her lips she forced him. He goeth after her straightway, as an ox goeth to the slaughter, or as fetters to the correction of a fool : till a dart strike through his liver: as a bird hasteth to the snare, and knoweth not that it is for his life. Hearken unto me now therefore, 0 ye children, and attend to the words of my mouth. Let not thine heart decline to her ways, go not astray in her paths. For she hath cast down many wounded: yea, many strong men have been slain by her."
The general principle expounded in all these verses is to abstain from excessive indulgence in bodily pleasures. The author compares the body, which is the source of all sensual pleasures, to a married woman who at the same time is a harlot. And this figure he has taken as the basis of his entire book. We shall hereafter show the wisdom of Solomon in comparing sensual pleasures to an adulterous harlot. We shall explain how aptly he concludes that work with the praises of a faithful wife who devotes herself to the welfare of her husband and of her household. All obstacles which prevent man from attaining his highest aim in life, all the deficiencies in the character of man, all his evil propensities, are to be traced to the body alone. This will be explained later on. The predominant idea running throughout the figure is, that man shall not be entirely guided by his animal, or material nature; for the material substance of man is identical with that of the brute creation.
An adequate explanation of the figure having been given, and its meaning having been shown, do not imagine that you will find in its application a corresponding element for each part of the figure; you must not ask what is meant by" I have peace offerings with me" (ver. 14): by" I have decked my bed with coverings of tapestry" (ver. 16): or what is added to the force of the figure by the observation" for the goodman is not at home" (ver. 19), and so on to the end of the chapter. For all this is merely to complete the illustration of the metaphor in its literal meaning. The circumstances described here are such as are common to adulterers. Such conversations take place between all adulterous persons. You must well understand what I have said, for it is a principle of the utmost importance with respect to those things which I intend to expound. If you observe in one of the chapters that I explained the meaning of a certain figure, and pointed out to you its general scope, do not trouble yourself further in order to find an interpretation of each separate portion, for that would lead you to one of the two following erroneous courses: either you will miss the sense included in the metaphor, or you will be induced to explain certain things which require no explanation, and which are not introduced for that purpose. Through this unnecessary trouble you may fall into the great error which besets most modern sects in their foolish writings and discussions: they all endeavour to find some hidden meaning in expressions which were never uttered by the author in that sense. Your object should be to discover inmost of the figures the general idea which the author wishes to express. In some instances it will be sufficient if you understand from my remarks that a certain expression contains a figure, although I may offer no further comment. For when you know that it is not to be taken literally, you will understand at once to what subject it refers. My statement that it is a figurative expression will, as it were, remove the screen from between the object and the observer.
Directions for the Study of this Work.
If you desire to grasp all that is contained in this book so that nothing shall escape your notice, consider the chapters in connected order. In studying each chapter, do not content yourself with comprehending its principal subject, but attend to every term mentioned therein, although it may seem to have no connection with the principal subject. For what I have written in this work was not the suggestion of the moment: it is the result of deep study and great application. Care has been taken that nothing that appeared doubtful should be left unexplained. Nothing of what is mentioned is out of place, every remark will be found to illustrate the subject-matter of the respective chapter. Do not read superficially, lest you do me an injury, and derive no benefit for yourself. You must study thoroughly and read continually; for you will then find the solution of those important problems of religion, which are a source of anxiety to all intelligent men. I adjure any reader of my book, in the name of the Most High, not to add any explanation even to a single word: nor to explain to another any portion of it except such passages as have been fully treated of by previous theological authorities: he must not teach others anything that he has learnt from my work alone, and that has not been hitherto discussed by any of our authorities. The reader must, moreover, beware of raising objections to any of my statements, because it is very probable that he may understand my words to mean the exact opposite to what 1 intended to say. He will injure me, while I endeavoured to benefit him." He will requite me evil for good." Let the reader make a careful study of this work; and if his doubt be removed on even one point, let him praise his Maker and rest contented with the knowledge he has acquired. But if he derive from it no benefit whatever, he may consider the book as if it had never been written. Should he notice any opinions with which he does not agree, let him endeavour to find a suitable explanation, even if it seem far-fetched, in order that he may judge me charitably. Such a duty we owe to every one. We owe it especially to our scholars and theologians, who endeavour to teach us what is the truth according to the best of their ability. I feel assured that those of my readers who have not studied philosophy, will still derive profit from many a chapter. But the thinker whose studies have brought him into collision with religion, will, as I have already mentioned, derive much benefit from every chapter. How greatly will he rejoice! How agreeably will my words strike his ears! Those, however, whose minds are confused with false notions and perverse methods, who regard their misleading studies as sciences, and imagine themselves philosophers, though they have no knowledge that could truly be termed science, will object to many chapters, and will find in them many insuperable difficulties, because they do not understand their meaning, and because I expose therein the absurdity of their perverse notions, which constitute their riches and peculiar treasure," stored up for their ruin." God knows that 1 hesitated very much before writing on the subjects contained in this work, since they are profound mysteries: they are topics which, since the time of our captivity have not been treated by any of our scholars as far as we possess their writings; how then shall I now make a beginning and discuss them ? But I rely on two precedents : first, to similar cases our Sages applied the verse," It is time to do something in honour of the Lord: for they have made void thy law" (Ps. cxix. 126). Secondly, they have said," Let all thy acts be guided by pure intentions." On these two principles I relied while composing some parts of this work. Lastly, when I have a difficult subject before me-when I find the road narrow, and can see no other way of teaching a well established truth except by pleasing one intelligent man and displeasing ten thousand fools-I prefer to address myself to the one man, and to take no notice whatever of the condemnation of the multitude; I prefer to extricate that intelligent man from his embarrassment and show him the cause of his perplexity, so that he may attain perfection and be at peace.
[ON METHOD]
THERE are seven causes of inconsistencies and contradictions to be met with in a literary work. The first cause arises from the fact that the author collects the opinions of various men, each differing from the other, but neglects to mention the name of the author of any particular opinion. In such a work contradictions or inconsistencies must occur, since any two statements may belong to two different authors. Second cause: The author holds at first one opinion which he subsequently rejects: in his work., however, both his original and altered views are retained. Third cause: The passages in question are not all to be taken literally: some only are to be understood in their literal sense, while in others figurative language is employed, which includes another meaning besides the literal one : or, in the apparently inconsistent passages, figurative language is employed which, if taken literally, would seem to be contradictories or contraries. Fourth cause : The premises are not identical in both statements, but for certain reasons they are not fully stated in these passages: or two propositions with different subjects which are expressed by the same term without having the difference in meaning pointed out, occur in two passages. The contradiction is therefore only apparent, but there is no contradiction in reality. The fifth cause is traceable to the use of a certain method adopted in teaching and expounding profound problems. Namely, a difficult and obscure theorem must sometimes be mentioned and assumed as known, for the illustration of some elementary and intelligible subject which must be taught beforehand the commencement being always made with the easier thing. The teacher must therefore facilitate, in any manner which he can devise, the explanation of those theorems, which have to be assumed as known, and he must content himself with giving a general though somewhat inaccurate notion on the subject. It is, for the present, explained according to the capacity of the students, that they may comprehend it as far as they are required to understand the subject. Later on, the same subject is thoroughly treated and fully developed in its right place. Sixth cause : The contradiction is not apparent, and only becomes evident through a series of premises. The larger the number of premises necessary to prove the contradiction between the two conclusions, the greater is the chance that it will escape detection, and that the author will not perceive his own inconsistency. Only when from each conclusion, by means of suitable premises, an inference is made, and from the enunciation thus inferred, by means of proper arguments, other conclusions are formed, and after that process has been repeated many times, then it becomes clear that the original conclusions are contradictories or contraries. Even able writers are liable to overlook such inconsistencies. If, however, the contradiction between the original statements can at once be discovered, and the author, while writing the second, does not think of the first, he evinces a greater deficiency, and his words deserve no notice whatever. Seventh cause: Itis sometimes necessary to introduce such metaphysical matter as may partly be disclosed, but must partly be concealed: while, therefore, on one occasion the object which the author has in view may demand that the metaphysical problem be treated as solved in one way, it may be convenient on another occasion to treat it as solved in the opposite way. The author must endeavour, by concealing the fact as much as possible, to prevent the uneducated reader from perceiving the contradiction.
Inconsistencies occurring in the Mishnah and Boraitot are traceable to the first cause. You meet frequently in the Gemara with passages like the following : --" Does not the beginning of the passage contradict the end ? No: the beginning is the dictum of a certain Rabbi: the end that of an other" : or" Rabbi (Jehudah ha-Nasi) approved of the opinion of a certain rabbi in one case and gave it therefore anonymously, and having accepted that of another rabbi in the other case he introduced that view without naming the authority" : or" Who is the author of this anonymous dictum ? Rabbi A."" Who is the author of that paragraph in the Mishnah? Rabbi B." Instances of this kind are innumerable.
Apparent contradictions or differences occurring in the Gemara may be traced to the first cause and to the second, as e.g.," In this particular case he agrees with this rabbi or" He agrees with him in one point, but differs from him in another" or" These two dicta are the opinions of two Amoraim, who differ as regards the statement made by a certain rabbi." These are examples of contradictions traceable to the first cause. The following are instances which may be traced to the second cause." Rabba altered his opinion on that point" : it then becomes necessary to consider which of the two opinions came second. Again," In the first recension of the Talmud by Rabbi Ashi, he made one assertion, and in the second a different one."
The inconsistencies and contradictions met with in some passages of the prophetic books, if taken literally, are all traceable to the third or fourth cause, and it is exclusively in reference to this subject that I wrote the present Introduction. You know that the following expression frequently occurs," One verse says this, another that," showing the contradiction, and explaining that either some premise is wanting or the subject is altered. Comp." Solomon, it is not sufficient that thy words contradict thy father: they are themselves inconsistent, etc." Many similar instances occur in the writings of our Sages. The passages in the prophetical books which our Sages have explained, mostly refer to religious or moral precepts. Our desire, however, is to discuss such passages as contain apparent contradictions in regard to the principles of our faith. I shall explain some of them in various chapters of the present work: for this subject also belongs to the secrets of the Torah. Contradictions traceable to the seventh cause occurring in the prophetical works require special investigation: and no one should express his opinion on that matter by reasoning and arguing without weighing the matter well in his mind.
Inconsistencies in the writings of true philosophers are traceable to the fifth cause. Contradictions occurring in the writings of most authors and commentators, such as are not included in the above-mentioned works, are due to the sixth cause. Many examples of this class of contradictions are found in the Midrash and the Agada: hence the saying," We must not raise questions concerning the contradictions met with in the Agada." You may also notice in them contradictions due to the seventh cause. Any inconsistency discovered in the present work will be found to arise in consequence of the fifth cause or the seventh. Notice this, consider its truth, and remember it well, lest you misunderstand some of the chapters in this book.
Having concluded these introductory remarks I proceed to examine those expressions, to the true meaning of which, as apparent from the context, it is necessary to direct your attention. This book will then be a key admitting to places the gates of which would otherwise be closed. When the gates are opened and men enter, their souls will enjoy repose, their eyes will be gratified, and even their bodies, after all toil and labour, will be refreshed.
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" Open ye the gates, that the righteous nation which keepeth the truth may enter in."-(Isa. xxvi. 2.)
PART ONE
CHAPTER I
Some have been of opinion that by the Hebrew zelem, the shape and figure of a thing is to be understood, and this explanation led men to believe in the corporeality [of the Divine Being]: for they thought that the words" Let us make man in our ,relem" (Gen.i. 26), implied that God had the form of a human being, i.e., that He had figure and shape, and that, consequently, He was corporeal. They adhered faithfully to this view, and thought that if they were to relinquish it they would eo ipso reject the truth of the Bible : and further, if they did not conceive God as having a body possessed of face and limbs, similar to their own in appearance, they would have to deny even the existence of God. The sole difference which they admitted, was that He excelled in greatness and splendour, and that His substance was not flesh and blood. Thus far went their conception of the greatness and glory of God. The incorporeality of the Divine Being, and His unity, in the true sense of the word-for there is no real unity without incorporeality-will be fully proved in the course of the present treatise. (Part ll., ch. i.) In this chapter it is our sole intention to explain the meaning of the words zelem and demut. 1 hold that the Hebrew equivalent of" form" in the ordinary acceptation of the word, viz., the figure and shape of a thing, is tor. Thus we find" [And Joseph was] beautiful in toar ('form'), and beautiful in appearance" (Gen. xxxix. 6):" What form (toar) is he of ?" (I Sam. xxviii. 14):" As the form (toar) of the children of a king" (judges viii. 18). It is also applied to form produced by human labour, as" He marketh its form (toar) with a line,"" and he marketh its form (toar) with the compass" (Isa. xliv. 13). This term is not at all applicable to God. The term zelem, on the other hand, signifies the specific form, viz., that which constitutes the essence of a thing, whereby the thing is what it is; the reality of a thing in so far as it is that particular being. In man the" form" is that constituent which gives him human perception: and on account of this intellectual perception the term zelem is employed in the sentences" In the :pelem of God he created him" (Gen. i. 27). It is therefore rightly said," Thou despisest their zelem" (PS. lxiii. 20): the" contempt 11 can only concern the soulthe specific form of man, not the properties and shape of his body. 1 am also of opinion that the reason why this term is used for" idols" may be found in the circumstance that they are worshipped on account of some idea represented by them, not on account of their figure and shape. For the same reason the term is used in the expression," the forms (zalme) of your emerods" (I Sam. vi. 5), for the chief object was the removal of the injury caused by the emerods, not a change of their shape. As, however, it must be admitted that the term zelem is employed in these two cases, viz." the images of the emerods" and" the idols" on account of the external shape, the term zelem is either a homonym or a hybrid term, and would denote both the specific form and the outward shape, and similar properties relating to the dimensions and the shape of material bodies; and in the phrase" Let us make man in our zelem" (Gen. i. 26), the term signifies" the specific form" of man, viz., his intellectual perception, and does not refer to his" figure" or" shape." Thus we have shown the difference between zelem and toar, and explained the meaning of zelem.
Demut is derived from the verb damah," he is like." This term likewise denotes agreement with regard to some abstract relation: comp." I am like a pelican of the wilderness" (Ps. cii. 7): the author does not compare himself to the pelican in point of wings and feathers, but in point of sadness." Nor any tree in the garden of God was like unto him in beauty" (Ezek. 8): the comparison refers to the idea of beauty." Their poison is like the poison of a serpent" (Ps. lviii. 5):" He is like unto a lion" (Ps. xvii. 12): the resemblance indicated in these passages does not refer to the figure and shape, but to some abstract idea. In the same manner is used" the likeness of the throne" (Ezek. i. 26); the comparison is made with regard to greatness and glory, not, as many believe, with regard to its square form, its breadth, or the length of its legs : this explanation applies also to the phrase" the likeness of the hayyot (" living creatures," Ezek. i. 13).
As man's distinction consists in a property which no other creature on earth possesses, viz., intellectual perception, in the exercise of which he does not employ his senses, nor move his hand or his foot, this perception has been compared-though only apparently, not in truth-to the Divine perception, which requires no corporeal organ. On this account, i.e., on account of the Divine intellect with which man has been endowed, he is said to have been made in the form and likeness of the Almighty, but far from it be the notion that the Supreme Being is corporeal, having a material form.
CHAPTER II
Some years ago a learned man asked me a question of great importance; the problem and the solution which we gave in our reply deserve the closest attention. Before, however, entering upon this problem and its solution I must premise that every Hebrew knows that the term Elohim is a homonym, and denotes God, angels, judges, and the rulers of countries, and that Onkelos the proselyte explained it in the true and correct manner by taking Elohim in the sentence," and ye shall be like Elohim" (Gen. iii. 5) in the lastmentioned meaning, and rendering the sentence" and ye shall be like princes." Having pointed out the homonymity of the term" Elohim" we return to the question under consideration." It would at first sight," said the objector," appear from Scripture that man was originally intended to be perfectly equal to the rest of the animal creation, which is not endowed with intellect, reason, or power of distinguishing between good and evil: but that Adarn's disobedience to the command of God procured him that great perfection which is the Peculiarity of man, viz., the power of distinguishing between good and evil-the noblest of all the faculties of our nature, the essential characteristic of the human race. It thus appears strange that the punishment for rebelliousness should be the means of elevating man to a pinnacle of perfection to which he had not attained previously. This is equivalent to saying that a certain man was rebellious and extremely wicked, wherefore his nature was changed for the better, and he was made to shine as a star in the heavens." Such was the purport and subject of the question, though not in the exact words of the inquirer. Now mark our reply, which was as follows:-" You appear to have studied the matter superficially, and nevertheless you imagine that you can understand a book which has been the guide of past and present generations, when you for a moment withdraw from your lusts and appetites, and glance over its contents as if you were reading a historical work or some poetical composition. Collect your thoughts and examine the matter carefully, for it is not to be understood as you at first sight think, but as you will find after due deliberation; namely, the intellect which was granted to man as the highest endowment, was bestowed on him before his disobedience. With reference to this gift the Bible states that 46 man was created in the form and likeness of God." On account of this gift of intellect man was addressed by God, and received His commandments, as it is said:" And the Lord God commanded Adam" (Gen. ii. 16) -- for no commandments are given to the brute creation or to those who are devoid of understanding. Through the intellect man distinguishes between the true and the false. This faculty Adam possessed perfectly and completely. The right and the wrong are terms employed in the science of apparent truths (morals), not in that of necessary truths, as, e.g, it is not correct to say, in reference to the proposition" the heavens are spherical," it is" good" or to declare the assertion that" the earth is flat" to be" bad" : but we say of the one it is true, of the other it is false. Similarly our language expresses the idea of true and false by the terms emet and sheker, of the morally right and the morally wrong, by tob and ra'. Thus it is the function of the intellect to discriminate between the true and the false -- a distinction which is applicable to all objects of intellectual perception. When Adam was yet in a state of innocence, and was guided solely by reflection and reason -- on account of which it is said:" Thou hast made him (man) little lower than the angels" (Ps. viii. 6) -- he was not at all able to follow or to understand the principles of apparent truths; the most manifest impropriety, viz., to appear in a state of nudity, was nothing unbecoming according to his idea: he could not comprehend why it should be so. After man's disobedience, however, when he began to give way to desires which had their source in his imagination and to the gratification of his bodily appetites, as it is said," And the wife saw that the tree was good for food and delightful to the eyes" (Gen. iii. 6), he was punished by the loss of part of that intellectual faculty which he had previously possessed. He therefore transgressed a command with which he had been charged on the score of his reason; and having obtained a knowledge of the apparent truths, he was wholly absorbed in the study of what is proper and what improper. Then he fully understood the magnitude of the loss he had sustained, what he had forfeited, and in what situation he was thereby placed. Hence we read," And ye shall be like elohim, knowing good and evil," and not" knowing" or" discerning the true and the false" : while in necessary truths we can only apply the words" true and. false," not" good and evil." Further observe the passage," And the eyes of both were opened, and they knew they were naked" (Gen. iii. 7) : it is not said," And the eyes of both were opened, and they saw" : for what the man had seen previously and what he saw after this circumstance was precisely the same: there had been no blindness which was now removed, but he received a new faculty whereby he found things wrong which previously he had not regarded as wrong. Besides, you must know that the Hebrew word pakah used in this passage is exclusively employed in the figurative sense of receiving new sources of knowledge, not in that of regaining the sense of sight. Comp.," God opened her eyes" (Gen. xxi. ig)." Then shall the eyes of the blind be opened" (Isaiah xxxviii. 8)." Open ears, he heareth not" (ibid. Xlii. 20), similar in sense to the verse," Which have eyes to see, and see not" (Ezek. xii. 2). When, however, Scripture says of Adam," He changed his face (panav) and thou sentest him forth" Job xiv. 20), it must be understood in the following way: On account of the change of his original aim he was sent away. For panim, the Hebrew equivalent of face, is derived from the verb panah," he turned," and signifies also" aim," because man generally turns his face towards the thing he desires. In accordance with this interpretation, our text suggests that Adam, as he altered his intention and directed his thoughts to the acquisition of what he was forbidden, he was banished from Paradise: this was his punishment; it was measure for measure. At first he had the privilege of tasting pleasure and happiness, and of enjoying repose and security; but as his appetites grew stronger, and he followed his desires and impulses, (as we have already stated above), and partook of the food he was forbidden to taste, he was deprived of everything, was doomed to subsist on the meanest kind of food, such as he never tasted before, and this even only after exertion and labour, as it is said," Thorns and thistles shall grow up for thee" (Gen. iii. 18)," By the sweat of thy brow," etc., and in explanation of this the text continues," And the Lord God drove him from the Garden of Eden, to till the ground whence he was taken." He was now with respect to food and many other requirements brought to the level of the lower animals: comp.," Thou shalt eat the grass of the field" (Gen. iii. 18). Reflecting on his condition, the Psalmist says," Adam unable to dwell in dignity, was brought to the level of the dumb beast" (Ps. xlix. 13)." May the Almighty be praised, whose design and wisdom cannot be fathomed."
CHAPTER III
IT might be thought that the Hebrew words temunah and tabnit have one and the same meaning, but this is not the case. Tabnit, derived from the verb banah (he built), signifies the build and construction of a thing-that is to say, its figure, whether square, round, triangular, or of any other shape. Comp." the pattern (tabnit) of the Tabernacle and the pattern (tabnit) of all its vessels" (Exod. xxv. 9):" according to the pattern (tabnit) which thou wast shown upon the mount" (Exod. xxv, 40):" the form of any bird" (Deut. iv. 17):" the form (tabnit) of a hand" (Ezek. viii. 3):" the pattern (tabnit) of the porch" (I Chron. xxviii. 11). In all these quotations it is the shape which is referred to. Therefore the Hebrew language never employs the word tabnit in speaking of the qualities of God Almighty.
The term temunah, on the other hand, is used in the Bible in three different senses. It signifies, first, the outlines of things which are perceived by our bodily senses, i.e., their shape and form; as, e.g.," And ye make an image the form (temunat) of some likeness" (Dent. iv. 16):" for ye saw no likeness" (temunah) (Dent. iv. 15). Secondly, the forms of our imagination, i.e., the impressions retained in imagination when the objects have ceased to affect our senses. In this sense it is used in the passage which begins" In thoughts from the visions of the night" (job iv. 13), and which concludes" it remained but I could not recognize its sight, only an image -temunah was before my eyes," i.e., an image which presented itself to my sight during sleep. Thirdly, the true form of an object, which is perceived only by the intellect : and it is in this third signification that the term is applied to God. The words" And the similitude of the Lord shall he behold" (Num. xii. 8) therefore mean" he shall comprehend the true essence of the Lord."
CHAPTER IV
THE three verbs raah, hibbit, and hazab, which denote" he perceived with the eye," are also used figuratively in the sense of intellectual perception. As regards the first of these verbs this is well known, e.g., And he looked (va-yar) and behold a well in the field" (Gen. XXiX. 2) here it signifies ocular perception:" yea, my heart has seen (raah) much of wisdom and of knowledge" (Eccles. i. 16): in this passage it refers to the intellectual perception.
In this figurative sense the verb is to be understood, when applied to God e.g.," I saw (raiti) the Lord" (I Kings xxii. 19):" And the Lord appeared (va-yera) unto him (Gen. xviii. 1):" And God saw (va-yar) that it was good" (Gen. i. 10)" I beseech thee, show me (harem) thy glory" (Exod. xxxiii. 18):" And they saw (va-yiru) the God of Israel" (Exod. xxiv. 10). All these instances refer to intellectual perception, and by no means to perception with the eye as in its literal meaning : for, on the one hand, the eye can only perceive a corporeal object, and in connection with it certain accidents, as colour, shape, etc.: and, on the other hand, God does not perceive by means of a corporeal organ, as will be explained.
In the same manner the Hebrew hibbit signifies" he viewed with the eye; comp." Look (tabbit) not behind thee" (Gen. xix. 17): But his wife looked (va-tabbet) back from him" (Gen. xix. 26):" And if one look (venibbat) unto the land" (Isa. V. 30): and figuratively," to view and observe" with the intellect," to contemplate" a thing till it be understood. In this sense the verb is used in passages like the following:" He hath not beheld (hibbit) iniquity in Jacob" (Num. xxiii. 21): for" iniquity" cannot be seen with the eye. The words," And they looked (ve-hibbitu) after Moses" (Exod. xxxiii. 8) -- in addition to the literal understanding of the phrasewere explained by our Sages in a figurative sense. According to them, these words mean that the Israelites examined and criticised the actions and sayings of Moses. Compare also" Contemplate (habbet), I pray thee, the heaven" (Gen.xv.5); for this took place in a prophetic vision. This verb, when applied to God, is employed in this figurative sense; e.g., 46 to look (mehabbit) upon God" (Exod. iii. 6)" And the similitude of the Lord shall he behold" (yabbit) (Num. xii. 8): And thou canst not look (habbet) on iniquity" (Hab. i. 13).
The same explanation applies to hazah. It denotes to view with the eye, as:" And let our eye look (ve-tahaz) upon Zion" (Mic. iv. 11): and also figuratively, to perceive mentally :" which he saw (hazah) concerning Judah and Jerusalem" (Isa. i. 1):" The word of the Lord came unto Abraham in a vision" (mahazeh) (Gen. xv. 1): in this sense hazab is used in the phrase," Also they saw (va-yehezu) God" (Exod. xxiv. 11). Note this well.
CHAPTER V
WHEN the chief of philosophers (Aristotle) was about to inquire into some very profound subjects, and to establish his theory by proofs, he commenced his treatise with an apology, and requested the reader to attribute the author's inquiries not to presumption, vanity, egotism, or arrogance, as though he were interfering with things of which he had no knowledge, but rather to his zeal and his desire to discover and establish true doctrines, as far as lay in human power. We take the same position, and think that a man, when he commences to speculate, ought not to embark at once on a subject so vast and important; he should previously adapt himself to the study of the several branches of science and knowledge, should most thoroughly refine his moral character and subdue his passions and desires, the offspring of his imagination; when, in addition, he has obtained a knowledge of the true fundamental propositions, a comprehension of the several methods of inference and proof, and the capacity of guarding against fallacies, then he may approach the investigation of this subject. He must, however, not decide any question by the first idea that suggests itself to his mind, or at once direct his thoughts and force them to obtain a knowledge of the Creator, but he must wait modestly and patiently, and advance step by step.
In this sense we must understand the words" And Moses hid his face, for he was afraid to look upon God" (Exod. iii. 6), though retaining also the literal meaning of the passage, that Moses was afraid to gaze at the light which appeared to his eye; but it must on no account be assumed that the Being which is exalted far above every imperfection can be perceived by the eye. This act of Moses was highly commended by God, who bestowed on him a well deserved portion of His goodness, as it is said:" And the similitude of the Lord shall he behold" (Num. xii. 8). This, say our Sages, was the reward for having previously hidden his face, lest he should gaze at the Eternal. (Talm. B. Berakot Fa.)
But" the nobles of the Children of Israel" were impetuous, and allowed their thoughts to go unrestrained: what they perceived was but imperfect. Therefore it is said of them," And they saw the God of Israel, and there was under his feet," etc. (Exod. xxiv. 10): and not merely," and they saw the God of Israel" : the purpose of the whole passage is to criticize their act of seeing and not to describe it. They are blamed for the nature of their perception, which was to a certain extent corporeal -- a result which necessarily followed, from the fact that they ventured too far before being perfectly prepared. They deserved to perish, but at the intercession of Moses this fate was averted by God for the time. They were afterwards burnt at Taberah, except Nadab and Abihu, who were burnt in the Tabernacle of the congregation, according to what is stated by authentic tradition. (Midr. Rabba ad locum.)
If such was the case with them, how much more is it incumbent on us who are inferior, and on those who are below us, to persevere in perfecting our knowledge of the elements, and in rightly understanding the preliminaries which purify the mind from the defilement of error: then we may enter the holy and divine camp in order to gaze : as the Bible says," And let the priests also, which come near to the Lord, sanctify themselves, lest the Lord break forth upon them" (Exod. XiX. 22). Solomon, also, has cautioned all who endeavour to attain this high degree of knowledge in the following figurative terms," Keep thy foot when thou goest to the house of God" (Eccles. iv. 17).
I will now return to complete what I commenced to explain. The nobles of the Children of Israel, besides erring in their perception, were, through this cause, also misled in their actions: for in consequence of their confused perception, they gave way to bodily cravings. This is meant by the words," Also they saw God and did eat and drink" (Exod. xxiv. 11). The principal part of that passage, viz.," And there was under his feet as it were a paved work of a sapphire stone" (Exod. xxiv. 10), will be further explained in the course of the present treatise (ch. xxviii.). All we here intend to say is, that wherever in a similar connection any one of the three verbs mentioned above occurs, it has reference to intellectual perception, not to the sensation of sight by the eye: for God is not a being to be perceived by the eye.
It will do no harm, however, if those who are unable to comprehend what we here endeavour to explain should refer all the words in question to sensuous perception, to seeing lights created [for the purpose], angels, or similar beings.
CHAPTER VI
THE two Hebrew nouns ish and ishshah were originally employed to designate the" male and female" of human beings, but were afterwards applied to the" male and female" of the other species of the animal creation. For instance, we read," Of every clean beast thou shalt take to thee by sevens," ish ve-ishto (Gen. Vii. 2), in the same sense as ish ve-ishshah," male and female." The term zakar u-nekebah was afterwards applied to anything designed and prepared for union with another object Thus we read," The five curtains shall be coupled together, one (ishshah) to the other" (ahotah) (Exod. xxvi. 3).
It will easily be seen that the Hebrew equivalents for" brother and sister" are likewise treated as homonyms, and used, in a figurative sense, like ish and ishshah.
CHAPTER VII
IT is well known that the verb yalad means" to bear,"" they have born (ve-yaledu) him children" (Deut. xxi. 15). The word was next used in a figurative sense with reference to various objects in nature, meaning," to create," e.g." before the mountains were created" (yulladu) (Ps. xc. 2): also," to produce," in reference to that which the earth causes to come forth as if by birth, e.g.," He will cause her to bear (holidah) and bring forth" (Isa. Iv. 10). The verb further denotes," to bring forth," said of changes in the process of time, as though they were things which were born, e.g.," for thou knowest not what a day may bring forth" (yeled) (Prov. xxvii. 1). Another figurative use of the word is its application to the formation of thoughts and ideas, or of opinions resulting from them: comp." and brought forth (ve-yalad) falsehood" (Ps. vii. 14): also," and they please themselves in the children (yalde) of strangers" (Isa. ii. 6), i.e.," they delight in the opinions of strangers." Jonathan the son of Uzziel paraphrases this pass-age, they walk in the customs of other nations."
A man who has instructed another in any subject, and has improved his knowledge, may in like manner be regarded as the parent of the person taught, because he is the author of that knowledge: and thus the pupils of the prophets are called" sons of the prophets," as I shall explain when treating of the homonymity of ben (son). In this figurative sense, the verb yalad (to bear) is employed when it is said of Adam," And Adam lived an hundred and thirty years, and begat (va-yoled) a son in his own likeness, in his form" (Gen. V. 3). As regards the words," the form of Adam, and his likeness," we have already stated (ch. i.) their meaning. Those sons of Adam who were born before that time were not human in the true sense of the word, they had not" the form of man." With reference to Seth who had been instructed, enlightened and brought to human perfection, it could rightly be said," he (Adam) begat a son in his likeness, in his form." It is acknowledged that a man who does not possess this" form" (the nature of which has just been explained) is not human, but a mere animal in human shape and form. Yet such a creature has the power of causing harm and injury, a power which does not belong to other creatures. For those gifts of intelligence and judgment with which he has been endowed for the purpose of acquiring perfection, but which he has failed to apply to their proper aim, are used by him for wicked and mischievous ends; he begets evil things, as though he merely resembled man, or simulated his outward appearance. Such was the condition of those sons of Adam who preceded Seth. In reference to this subject the Midrash says:" During the 130 years when Adam was under rebuke he begat spirits, i.e., demons; when, however, he was again restored to divine favour" he begat in his likeness, in his form." This is the sense of the passage," Adam lived one hundred and thirty years, and he begat in his likeness, in his form" (Gen. v. 3).
CHAPTER VIII
ORIGINALLY the Hebrew term makom (place) applied both to a particular spot and to space in general subsequently it received a wider signification and denoted" position," or degree," as regards the perfection of man in certain things. We say, e.g., this man occupies a certain place in such and such a subject. In this sense this term, as is well known, is frequently used by authors, e.g.," He fills his ancestors' place (makom) in point of wisdom and piety" :" the dispute still remains in its place" (makom), i.e., in statu quo [ante]. In the verse," Blessed be the glory of the Lord from His place" (mekomo) (Ezek. iii. 12), makom has this figurative meaning, and the verse may be paraphrased" Blessed be the Lord according to the exalted nature of His existence," and wherever makom is applied to God, it expresses the same idea, namely, the distinguished position of His existence, to which nothing is equal or comparable, as will be shown below (chap. Ivi.).
It should be observed that when we treat in this work of any homonym, we do not desire you to confine yourself to that which is stated in that particular chapter: but we open for you a portal and direct your attention to those significations of the word which are suited to our purpose, though they may not be complete from a philological point of view. You should examine the prophetical books and other works composed by men of science, notice the meaning of every word which occurs in them, and take homonyms in that sense which is in harmony with the context. What 1 say in a particular passage is a key for the comprehension of all similar passages. For example, we have explained here makom in the sentence" Blessed be the glory of the Lord from His place" (mekomo): but you must understand that the word makom has the same signification in the passage" Behold, a place (makom) is with me" (Exod. xxxiii. 26), viz., a certain degree of contemplation and intellectual intuition (not of ocular inspection), in addition to its literal meanling" a place," viz., the mountain which was pointed out to Moses for seclusion and for the attainment of perfection.
CHAPTER IX
THE original meaning of the word kisse," throne," requires no comment. Since men of greatness and authority, as, e.g., kings, use the throne as a seat, and" the throne" thus indicates the rank, dignity, and position of the person for whom it is made, the Sanctuary has been styled" the throne," inasmuch as it likewise indicates the superiority of I-Em who manifests Himself, and causes His light and glory to dwell therein. Comp." A glorious throne on high from the beginning is the place of our sanctuary" (Jer. xvii.12). For the same reason the heavens are called" throne," for to the mind of him who observes them with intelligence they suggest the Omnipotence of the Being which has called them into existence, regulates their motions, and governs the sublunary world by their beneficial influence: as we read," Thus saith the Lord, The heavens are my throne and the earth my footstool" (Isa. 1xvi. 1); i.e., they testify to my Existence, my Essence, and my Omnipotence, as the throne testifies to the greatness of him who is worthy to occupy it.
This is the idea which true believers should entertain; not, however, that the Omnipotent, Supreme God is supported by any material object; for God is incorporeal, as we shall prove further on; how, then, can He be said to occupy any space, or rest on a body ? The fact which I wish to point out is this : every place distinguished by the Almighty, and chosen to receive His light and splendour, as, for instance, the Sanctuary or the Heavens, is termed" throne" : and, taken in a wider sense, as in the passage" For my hand is upon the throne of God" (Exod. xvii. 16)," the throne" denotes here the Essence and Greatness of God. These, however (the Essence and Greatness of God) need not be considered as something separate from the God Himself or as part of the Creation, so that God would appear to have existed both without the throne, and with the throne: such a belief would be undoubtedly heretical. It is distinctly stated," Thou, 0 Lord, remainest for ever; Thy throne from generation to generation" (Lam. v. 19). By" Thy throne" we must, therefore, understand something inseparable from God. On that account, both here and in all similar passages. the word" throne" denotes God's Greatness and Essence, which are inseparable from His Being.
Our opinion will be further elucidated in the course of this Treatise.
CHAPTER X
WE have already remarked that when we treat in this work of homonyms, we have not the intention to exhaust the meanings of a word (for this is not a philological treatise): we shall mention no other significations but those which bear on our subject. We shall thus proceed in our treatment of the terms alah and yarad.
These two words, alah," he went up," and yarad, 'I he went down," are Hebrew terms used in the sense of ascending and descending. When a body moves from a higher to a lower place, the verb yarad," to go down." is used; when it moves from a lower to a higher place, alah," to go up," is applied. These two verbs were afterwards employed with regard to greatness and power. When a man falls from his high position, we say" he has come down," and when he rises in station" he has gone up." Thus the Almighty says," The stranger that is within thee shall get up above thee very high, and thou shalt come down very low" (Deut. xxviii. 43). Again," The Lord thy God will set thee on high ('elyon) above all nations of the earth" (Deut. xxviii. 1) :" And the Lord magnified Solomon exceedingly" (lema'alah) (I Chron. XXiX. 25). The Sages often employ these expressions, as:" In holy matters men must ascend (ma'alin) and not descend (moridin)." The two words are also applied to intellectual processes, namely, when we reflect on something beneath ourselves we are said to go down, and when our attention is raised to a subject above us we are said to rise.
Now, we occupy a lowly position, both in space and rank in comparison with the heavenly sphere, and the Almighty is Most High not in space, but with respect to absolute existence, greatness and power. When it pleased the Almighty to grant to a human being a certain degree of wisdom or prophetic inspiration, the divine communication thus made to the prophet and the entrance of the Divine Presence into a certain place is termed (yeridah)," descending," while the termination of the prophetic communication or the departure of the divine glory from a place is called aliyah," ascending."
The expressions" to go up" and" to go down," when used in reference to God, must be interpreted in this sense. Again, when, in accordance with the divine will, some misfortune befalls a nation or a region of the earth, and when the biblical account of that misfortune is preceded by the statement that the Almighty visited the actions of the people, and that He punished them accordingly, then the prophetic author employs the term 11 to descend" : for man is so low and insignificant that his actions would not be visited and would not bring punishment on him, were it not for the divine will: as is clearly stated in the Bible, with regard to this idea," What is man that thou shouldst remember him, and the son of man that thou shouldst visit him" (PS. viii. 5).
The design of the Deity to punish man is, therefore, introduced by the verb" to descend" : comp. Go to, let us go down and there confound their language" (Gen. xi. 7)" And the Lord came down to see" (Gen. xi. 5):" I will go down now and see" (Gen. xviii. 21). All these instances convey the idea that man here below is going to be punished.
More numerous, however, are the instances of the first case, viz., in which these verbs are used in connection with the revelation of the word and of the glory of God, e.g.," And I will come down and talk with thee there" (Num. xi. 17):" And the Lord came down upon Mount Sinai (Exod. xix. 20):" The Lord will come down in the sight of all the people (Exod. xix. 11):" And God went up from him" (Gen. xxxv. 13):" And God went up from Abraham" (Gen. XVii. 22). When, on the other hand, it says," And Moses went up unto God" (Exod. xix. 3), it must be taken in the third signification of these verbs, in addition to its literal meaning that Moses also ascended to the top of the mount, upon which a certain material light (the manifestation of God's glory) was visible; but we must not imagine that the Supreme Being occupies a place to which we can ascend, or from which we can descend. He is far from what the ignorant imagine.
CHAPTER XI
THE primary meaning of the Hebrew yashab is" he was seated," as" Now Eli the priest sat (yashab) upon a seat" (I Sam. i. 9): but, since a person can best remain motionless and at rest when sitting, the term was applied to everything that is permanent and unchanging; thus, in the promise that Jerusalem should remain constantly and permanently in an exalted condition, it is stated," She will rise and sit in her place" (Zech. xiv.10): further," He maketh the woman who was childless to sit as a joyful mother of children" (Ps. cxiii. 9): i.e., He makes her happy condition to be permanent and enduring.
When applied to God, the verb is to be taken in that latter sense:" Thou 0 Lord, remainest (tesheb) for ever" (Lam. v. 19):" 0 thou who sittest (ba-yoshebt) in the heavens" (Ps. cxxiii. 1):" He who sitteth in the heavens" (ii. 4), i.e., He who is everlasting, constant, and in no way subject to change; immutable in His Essence, and as He consists of nought but His Essence, He is mutable in no way whatever; not mutable in His relation to other things: for there is no relation whatever existing between Him and any other being, as will be explained below, and therefore no change as regard; such relations can take place in Him. Hence He is immutable in every respect, as He expressly declares," I, the Lord, do not change" (Mal. iii. 6): i.e., in Me there is not any change whatever. This idea is expressed by the term yashab when referring to God.
The verb, when employed of God, is frequently complemented by" the Heavens," inasmuch as the heavens are without change or mutation, that is to say, they do not individually change, as the individual beings on earth, by transition from existence into non-existence.
The verb is also employed in descriptions of God's relation (the term" relation" is here used as a homonym) to existing species of evanescent things: for those species are as constant, well organized, and unvarying as the individuals of the heavenly hosts. Thus we find," Who sitteth over the circle of the earth" (Isa. xl. 22), Who remains constantly and unremittingly over the sphere of the earth; that is to say, over the things that come into existence within that sphere.
Again," The Lord sitteth upon the flood" (Ps. xxix. 10), i.e., despite the change and variation of earthly objects, no change takes place with respect to God's relation (to the earth): His relation to each of the things which come into existence and perish again is stable and constant, for it concerns only the existing species and not the individuals. It should therefore be borne in mind, that whenever the term" sitting" is applied to God, it is used in this sense.
CHAPTER XII
THE term kam (he rose) is a homonym. In one of its significations it is the opposite of" to sit," as" He did not rise (kam) nor move for him" (Esth. v. 9). It further denotes the confirmation and verification of a thing, e.g, :" Tjie Lord will verify (yakem) His promise" (I Sam. i. 23):" The field of Ephron was made sure (va-yakom) as the property of Abraham" (Gen. xxiii. 17)." The house that is in the walled city shall be established (ve-kam)" (Lev. xxv. 30):" And the kingdom of Israel shall be firmly established (ve-kamah) in thy hand" (I Sam. xxiv. 20). It is always in this sense that the verb is employed with reference to the Almighty; as" Now shall I rise (akum), saith the Lord" (Ps. xii. 7), which is the same as saying," Now shall I verify my word and my dispensation for good or evil."" Thou shalt arise (takum) and have mercy upon Zion" (Ps. cii. 13), which means : Thou wilt establish what thou hast promised, viz., that thou wouldst pity Zion.
Generally a person who resolves to set about a matter, accompanies his resolve by rising, hence the verb is employed to express" to resolve" to do a certain thing; as," That my son hath stirred up my servant against me" (I Sam. xxii. 8). The word is figuratively used to signify the execution of a divine decree against a people sentenced to extermination, as" And I win rise against the house of Jeroboam" (Amos vii. 9):" but he win arise against the house of the evildoers" (Isa. XXXi. 2). Possibly in Psalm xii. 7 the verb has this latter sense, as also in Psalm cii. 13, namely: Thou wilt rise up against her enemies.
There are many passages to be interpreted in this manner, but in no way should it be understood that He rises or sits-far be such a notion 1 Our Sages expressed this idea in the formula," In the world above there is neither sitting nor standing ('amidah)" : for the two verbs 'amad and kam are synonyms [and what is said about the former is also applicable to the latter]. CHAPTER XIII
THE term amad (he stood) is a homonym signifying in the first instance" to stand upright," as" When he stood (be-'omdo) before Pharaoh" (Gen. xli. 46):" Though Moses and Samuel stood (ya'amod)" (Jer. xv. 1):" He stood by them" (Gen. xviii. 8). It further denotes" cessation and interruption," as" but they stood still ('amedu) and answered no more" (job xxxii. 16):" and she ceased (va-ta'amod) to bear" (Gen. xxix. 35). Next it signifies" to be enduring and lasting," as," that they may continue (yo'amedu) many days" (jer. xxxii. 14):" Then shalt thou be able to endure ('amod)" (Exod. xviii. 23):" His taste remained ('amad) in him" (Jer. xlviii. 11), i.e., it has continued and remained in existence without any change:" His righteousness standeth for ever" (Ps. cxi. 3), i.e., it is permanent and everlasting. The verb applied to God must be understood in this latter sense, as in Zechariah xiv. 4, And his feet shall stand (ve-'amedu) in that day upon the Mount of Olives (Zech. xiv. 4)," His causes, i.e., the events of which He is the cause, will remain efficient," etc. This will be further elucidated when we speak of the meaning of regel (foot). (Vide infra, chap. xxviii.) In the same sense is this verb employed in Deuteronomy v. 28," But as for thee, stand thou here by me," and Deuteronomy v. 5," I stood between the Lord and you."
CHAPTER XIV
THE homonymous term adam is in the first place the name of the first man, being, as Scripture indicates, derived from adamah," earth." Next, it means" mankind," as" My spirit shall not strive with man (adam)" (Gen. vi. 3). Again" Who knoweth the spirit of the children of man (adam)" (Eccles. iii. 21):" so that a man ( adam) has no pre-eminence above a beast" (Eccles. iii. 19). Adam. signifies also" the multitude ... .. the lower classes" as opposed to those distinguished from the rest, as" Both low (bene adam) and high (bene ish)" (Ps. xlix. 3).
It is in this third signification that it occurs in the verses," The sons of the higher order (Elohim) saw the daughters of the lower order (adam)" (Gen. vi. 2): and" Forsooth! as the humble man (adam) you shall die" (Ps. lxxxii. 7).
CHAPTER XV
ALTHOUGH the two roots nazab and yazab are distinct, yet their meaning is, as you know, identical in all their various forms.
The verb has several meanings: in some instances it signifies" to stand or" to place oneself," as" And his sister stood (va-tetazzab) afar off" (Exod. ii. 4):" The kings of the earth set themselves" (yiyazzebu) (PS. ii. 2):" They came out and stood" (nizzabim) (Num. xvi. 27). In other instances it denotes continuance and permanence, as," Thy word is established (nizzab) in Heaven" (Ps. cxix. 89), i.e., it remains for ever.
Whenever this term is applied to God it must be understood in the latter sense, as," And, behold, the Lord stood (nizzab) upon it" (Gen. xxviii. 13), i.e., appeared as eternal and everlasting" upon it," namely, upon the ladder, the upper end of which reached to heaven, while the lower end touched the earth. This ladder all may climb up who wish to do so, and they must ultimately attain to a knowledge of Him who is above the summit of the ladder, because He remains upon it permanently. It must be well understood that the term" upon it" is employed by me in harmony with this metaphor." Angels of God" who were going up represent the prophets. That the term" angel" was applied to prophets may clearly be seen in the following passages:" He sent an angel" (Num. xx. 16):" And an angel of the Lord came up from Gilgal to Bochim" (judges ii.1). How suggestive, too, is the expression" ascending and descending on it"! The ascent is mentioned before the descent, inasmuch as the" ascending" and arriving at a certain height of the ladder precedes the" descending," i.e., the application of the knowledge acquired in the ascent for the training and instruction of mankind. This application is termed" descent," in accordance with our explanation of the term yarad (chapter x.).
To return to our subject. The phrase" stood upon it" indicates the permanence and constancy of God, and does not imply the idea of physical position. This is also the sense of the phrase" Thou shalt stand upon the rock" (Exod. xxxiii. 21). It is therefore clear that nizzab and amad are identical in this figurative signification. Comp." Behold, I will stand ('omed) before thee there upon the rock in Horeb" (Exod. xvii. 6).
CHAPTER XVI
THE word zur (rock) is a homonym. First, it denotes rock," as" And thou shalt smite the rock" (zur) (Exod. xvii. 6). Then, hard stone," like the flint, e.g.," Knives of stone" (zurim) (josh. V. 2). It is next employed to signify the quarry from which the stones are hewn; comp." Look unto the rock (zur) whence ye are hewn" (Isa. li. 1). From this latter meaning of the term another figurative notion was subsequently derived, viz.," the root and origin" of all things. It is on this account that after the words" Look to the rock whence ye are hewn," the Prophet continues," Look unto Abraham your father," from which we evidently may infer that the words" Abraham your father" serve to explain" the rock whence ye are hewn" : and that the Prophet meant to say," Walk in his ways, put faith in his instruction, and conduct yourselves according to the rule of his life ! for the properties contained in the quarry should be found again in those things which are formed and hewn out of it."
It is in the latter sense that the Almighty is called" rock," He being the origin and the causa efficiens of all things besides Himself. Thus we read," He is the Rock, His work is perfect" (Deut. xxxii. 4):" Of the Rock that begat thee thou art unmindful" (Dent. xxxii. 18):" Their Rock had sold them 11 (-xi- 30):" There is no rock like our God" (I Sam. ii. 2):" The Rock of Eternity" (Isa. xxvi. 4). Again," And thou shalt stand upon the Rock" (Exod. xxxiii. 21), i.e., Be firm and steadfast in the conviction that God is the source of all things, for this will lead you towards the knowledge of the Divine Being. We have shown (chap. viii.) that the words" Behold, a place is with me" (Exod. xxxiii. 21) contain the same idea.
CHAPTER XVII
Do not imagine that only Metaphysics should be taught with reserve to the common people and to the uninitiated: for the same is also the case with the greater part of Natural Science. In this sense we have repeatedly made use of the expression of the Sages," Do not expound the chapter on the Creation in the presence of two" [vide Introd. page 2]. This principle was not peculiar to our Sages: ancient philosophers and scholars of other nations were likewise wont to treat of the principia rerum obscurely, and to use figurative language in discussing such subjects. Thus Plato and his predecessors called Substance the female, and Form the male. (You are aware that the principia of all existing transient things are three, viz., Substance, Form, and Absence of a particular form; the last-named principle is always inherent in the substance, for otherwise the substance would be incapable of receiving a new form: and it is from this point of view that absence [of a particular form) is included among the principia. As soon, then, as a substance has received a certain form, the privation of that form, namely, of that which has just been received, has ceased, and is replaced by the privation of another form, and so on with all possible forms, as is explained in treatises on natural philosophy.) -- Now, if those philosophers who have nothing to fear from a lucid explanation of these metaphysical subjects still were in the habit of discussing them in figures and metaphors, how much more should we, having the interest of religion at heart, refrain from elucidating to the mass any subject that is beyond their comprehension, or that might be taken in a sense directly opposite to the one intended. This also deserves attention.
CHAPTER XVIII
THE three words karab," to come near," naga'," to touch," and nagash," to approach," sometimes signify" contact" or" nearness in space," sometimes the approach of man's knowledge to an object, as if it resembled the physical approach of one body to another. As to the use of karab in the first meaning, viz., to draw near a certain spot, comp." As he drew near (karab) the camp" (Exod. xxxii. 19);" And Pharaoh drew near (hikrib) (Exod. xiv. 10). Naga, in the first sense, viz., expressing the contact of two bodies, occurs in" And she cast it (va-tagga') at his feet" (Exod. iv. 25):" He caused it to touch (va-yagga') my mouth" (Isa. vi. 7). And nagash in the first sense, viz., to approach or move towards another person, is found, e.g., in" And Judah drew near (va-yiggash) unto him" (Gen. xliv. 1).
The second meaning of these three words is" approach by means of knowledge," or" contact by comprehension," not in reference to space. As to naga' in this second sense, comp." for her judgment reacheth (naga') unto heaven" (Jer. li. 9). An instance of karab being used in this meaning is contained in the following passage," And the cause that is too hard for you, bring (takribun) it unto me" (Deut. i. 17): this is equivalent to saying," Ye shall make it known unto me." The verb karab (in the Hiphil) is thus employed in the sense of giving information concerning a thing. The verb nagash is used figuratively in the phrase," And Abraham drew near (vayiggash), and said" (Gen. xviii. 23): this took place in a prophetic vision and in a trance, as will be explained (Part I. chap. xxi., and Part II. chap. xli.; also in" Forasmuch as this people draw near (niggash) me with their mouths and with their lips" (Isa. xxix. 13). Wherever a word denoting approach or contact is employed in the prophetic writings to describe a certain relation between the Almighty and any created being, it has to be understood in this latter sense [viz., to approach mentally]. For, as will be proved in this treatise (II. chap. iv.), the Supreme is incorporeal, and consequently He does not approach or draw near a thing, nor can aught approach or touch Him; for when a being is without corporeality, it cannot occupy space, and all idea of approach, contact, distance, conjunction, separation, touch, or proximity is inapplicable to such a being.
There can be no doubt respecting the verses" The Lord is nigh (karob) unto all them that call upon him" (Ps. cxlv. 18):" They take delight in approaching (kirbat) to God" (Isa. lviii. 2):" The nearness (kirbat) of God is pleasant to Me" (PS. Ixxii. 28): all such phrases intimate a spiritual approach, i.e., the attainment of some knowledge, not, however, approach in space. Thus also" who hath God so nigh (kerobim) unto him" (Dent. iv. 7):" Draw thou near (kerab) and hear" (Dent. V. 27):" And Moses alone shall draw near (ve-niggash) the Lord; but they shall not come nigh (yiggashu)" (Exod. xxiv. 2).
If, however, you wish to take the words" And Moses shall draw near" to mean that he shall draw near a certain place in the mountain, whereon the Divine Light shone, or, in the words of the Bible," where the glory of the Lord abode," you may do so, provided you do not lose sight of the truth that there is no difference whether a person stand at the centre of the earth or at the highest point of the ninth sphere, if this were possible: he is no further away from God in the one case, or nearer to Him in the other; those only approach Him who obtain a knowledge of Him; while those who remain ignorant of Him recede from Him. In this approach towards, or recession from God there are numerous grades one above the other, and 1 shall further elucidate, in one of the subsequent chapters of the Treatise (I. chap. lx., and II. chap. xxxvi.) what constitutes the difference in our perception of God.
In the passage," Touch (ga') the mountains, and they shall smoke
(Ps. cxliv. 5), the verb" touch" is used in a figurative sense, viz.," Let thy word touch them." So also the words," Touch thou him himself" (job ii. 5), have the same meaning as" Bring thy infliction upon him." In a similar manner must this verb, in whatever form it may be employed be interpreted in each place, according to the context: for in some cases it denotes contact of two material objects, in others knowledge and comprehension of a thing, as if he who now comprehends anything which he had not comprehended previously had thereby approached a subject which had been distant from him. This point is of considerable importance.
CHAPTER XIX
THE term male is a homonym which denotes that one substance enters another, and fills it, as" And she filled (va-temalle) her pitcher" (Gen. xxiv. 16):" An omer-full (melo) for each" (Exod. xvi. 32), and many other instances. Next, it signifies the expiration or completion of a fixed period of time, as" And when her days to be delivered were fulfilled (va-yimleu)" (Gen. XXV. 24):" And forty days were completed (va-yimleu) for him" (Gen. 1. It further denotes attainment of the highest degree of excellency, as Full (male) with the blessing of the Lord" (Dent. xxxiii. 23)
Them hath he filled (mille) with wisdom of heart" (Exod. xxxv. 35) He was filled (va-yimmale) with wisdom, and understanding, and cunning" (I Kings vii. 14). In this sense it is said" The whole earth is full (melo) of his glory" (Isa. vi. 4)," All the earth gives evidence of his perfection," i.e. leads to a knowledge of it. Thus also" The glory of the Lord filled (male) the tabernacle" (Exod. xl. 34): and, in fact, every application of the word to God must be interpreted in this manner; and not that He has a body occupying space. If, on the other hand, you prefer to think that in this passage by" the glory of the Lord," a certain light created for the purpose is to be understood, that such light is always termed" glory," and that such light" filled the tabernacle," we have no objection.
CHAPTER XX
THE word ram (high) is a homonym, denoting elevation in space, and elevation in dignity, i.e., greatness, honour, and power. It has the first meaning in" And the ark was lifted up (va-tarom) above the earth" (Gen. vii. 17): and the latter meaning in" I have exalted (harimoti) one chosen out of the people" (Ps. lxxxix. 20;" Forasmuch as I have exalted (harimoti) thee from amongst the dust" (I Kings xvi. 2):" Forasmuch as I exalted (harimott) thee from among the people" (I Kings xiv. 7).
Whenever this term is employed in reference to God, it must be taken in the second sense :" Be thou exalted (rumah), 0 God, above the heavens" (Ps. lvii.12). In the same manner does the root nasa (to Eft up) denote both elevation in space and elevation in rank and dignity. In the former sense it occurs in And they lifted up (va-yisseu) their corn upon their asses" (Gen. xlii. 26) and there are many instances like this in which this verb has the meaning to carry,"" to move" from place to place: for this implies elevation in space. In the second sense we have" And his kingdom shall be exalted" (ve-tinnase) (Num. xxiv. 7):" And he bare them, and carried them" (va-yenasseem) (Isa. Ixiii. 9):" Wherefore do ye exalt yourselves" (titnasseu) (Num. xvi. 3).
Every form of this verb when applied to God has this latter sense -- e.g.," Lift up thyself (hinnase), thou judge of the earth" (PS. XCiV. 2):" Thus saith the High (ram) and Exalted (nisia) One" (Isa. Ivii. 15) -- denoting elevation in rank, quality, and power, and not elevation in space.
You may be surprised that I employ the expression," elevation in rank, quality, and power," and you may say," How can you assert that several distinct expressions denote the same thing ?" It will be explained later on (chap. 1. seqq.) that those who possess a true knowledge of God do not consider that He possesses many attributes, but believe that these various attributes which describe His Might, Greatness, Power, Perfection, Goodness, etc., are identical, denoting His Essence, and not anything extraneous to His Essence. 1 shall devote special chapters to the Names and Attributes of
God; our intention here is solely to show that" high and exalted" in the passage quoted denote elevation in rank, not in space.
CHAPTER XXI
IN its primary signification the Hebrew 'abar," to pass," refers to the motion of a body in space, and is chiefly applied to living creatures moving at some distance in a straight line, e.g.," And He passed over ('abar) before them" (Gen. xxxiii- 3):" Pass ('abor) before the people" (Exod. xvii. 5). Instances of this kind are numerous. The verb was next applied to the passage of sound through air, as" And they caused a sound to pass (va-ya'abiru) through out the camp" (Exod. xxxvi. 6):" That I hear the Lord's people spreading the report" (ma'abirim) (I Sam. ii. 24).
Figuratively it denoted the appearance of the Light and the Divine Presence (Shechinah) which the prophets perceived in their prophetic visions, as it is said," And behold a smoking furnace, and a burning lamp that passed ('abar) between those pieces" (Gen. xv. 17). This took place in a prophetic vision, for the narrative commences," And a deep sleep fell upon Abram." The verb has this latter meaning in Exodus xii. 12," And I shall pass (ve-abartz) through the land of Egypt" (denoting" I shall reveal myself," etc.), and in all similar phrases.
The verb is next employed to express that a person has gone too far, and transgressed the usual limit, in the performance of some act, as" And as a man who is drinking wine has passed ('abarv) the proper limit" (Jer. xxiii. 9).
It is also used figuratively to denote: to abandon one aim, and turn to a different aim and object, e.g.," He shot an arrow, causing it to miss the aim (leba'abiro)" (I Sam. xx. 36). This is the sense, it appears to me, of this verb in" And the Lord passed by (va-ya'abor) before his face (Exod. xxxiv. 6). 1 take" his face" to mean" the face of God: our Teachers likewise interpreted" his face" as being identical with" the face of God." And, although this is found in the midst of Agadic interpretations which would be out of place in this our work, yet it is some support of our view, that the pronoun" his" is employed in this passage as a substitute for" God's" -and the whole passage could in my opinion be explained as follows: Moses sought to attain to a certain perception which is called" the perception of the Divine face," a term occurring in the phrase" My face cannot be seen" : but God vouchsafed to him a perception of a lower degree, viz., the one called," the seeing of the back," in the words," And thou shalt see my back" (Exod. xxxiii. 23). We have mentioned this subject in our work Mishneh Torah. Accordingly, it is stated in the above-mentioned passage that the Lord withheld from Moses that perception which is termed" the seeing of the Divine face," and substituted for it another gift, viz., the knowledge of the acts attributed to God, which, as I shall explain (chap. liv.) are considered to be different and separate attributes of the Supreme. In asserting that God withheld from Moses (the higher knowledge) I mean to say that this knowledge was unattainable, that by its nature it was inaccessible to Moses: for man, whilst able to gain perfection by applying his reasoning faculties to the attainment of what is within the reach of his intellect, either weakens his reason or loses it altogether as soon as he ventures to seek a higher degree of knowledgeas I shall elucidate in one of the chapters of this work-unless he be granted a special aid from heaven, as is described in the words," And I will cover thee with my hand until I pass by" (Exod. xxxiii. 23)
Onkelos, in translating this verse, adopts the same method which he applies to the explanation of similar passages, viz., every expression implying corporeality or corporal properties, when referring to God, he explains by assuming an ellipsis of a nomen regens before" God," thus connecting the expression (of corporeality) with another word which is supplied, and which governs the genitive" God" : e.g.," And behold the Lord stood upon it" (Gen. xxviii. 13), he explains," The glory of the Lord stood arrayed above it." Again," The Lord watch between me and thee" (Gen. xxxi. 49), he paraphrases," The word of the Lord shall watch." This is his ordinary method in explaining Scripture. He applies it also to Exod. xxxiv. 6, which he paraphrases," The Lord caused his Presence to pass before his face and called." According to this rendering the thing which passed was unquestionably some physical object, the pronoun" his" refers to Moses, and the phrase 'al panav is identical with lefanav," before him." Comp." So went the present over before him" ('al panav) (Gen. xxxii. 22). This is likewise an appropriate and satisfactory explanation: and I can adduce still further support for the opinion of Onkelos from the words" while my glory passeth by" (ba'abor) (Exod. xxxiii. 22), which expressly state that the passing object was something ascribed to God, not God Himself: and of this Divine glory it is also said," until I pass by," and" And the Lord passed by before him."
Should it, however, be considered necessary to assume here an ellipsis, according to the method of Onkelos, who supplies in some instances the term 44 the Glory," in others" the Word," and in others" the Divine Presence," as the context may require in each particular case, we may also supply here the word" voice," and explain the passage," And a voice from the Lord passed before him and called." We have already shown that the verb abar," he passed," can be applied to the voice, as in" And they caused a voice to pass through the camp" (Exod. xxxvi. 6). According to this explanation, it was the voice which called. No objection can be raised to applying the verb kara (he called) to kol (voice), for a similar phrase occurs in the Bible in reference to God's commands to Moses," He heard the voice speaking unto him" : and, in the same manner as it can be said" the voice spoke," we may also say" the voice called" : indeed, we can even support this application of the verbs" to say," and" to call," to" the voice," by parallel passages, as" A voice saith 'Cry,' and it says' What shall I cry ? '" (Isa. xl. 6). According to this view, the meaning of the passage under discussion would be:" A voice of God passed before him and called, 'Eternal, Eternal, Allpowerful, All-merciful, and All-gracious!" ' (The word Eternal is repeated; it is in the vocative, for the Eternal is the one who is called. Comp. Moses, Moses! Abraham, Abraham!) This, again, is a very appropriate explanation of the text.
You will surely not find it strange that this subject, so profound and difficult, should bear various interpretations; for it will not impair the force of the argument with which we are here concerned. Either explanation may be adopted: you may take that grand scene altogether as a prophetic vision, and the whole occurrence as a mental operation, and consider that what Moses sought, what was withheld from him, and what he attained, were things perceived by the intellect without the use of the senses (as we have explained above): or you may assume that in addition there was a certain ocular perception of a material object, the sight of which would assist intellectual perception. The latter is the view of Onkelos, unless he assumes that in this instance the ocular perception was likewise a prophetic vision, as was the case with" a smoking furnace and a burning lamp that passed between those pieces" (Gen. xv. 17), mentioned in the history of Abraham. You may also assume that in addition there was a perception of sound, and that there was a voice which passed before him, and was undoubtedly something material. You may choose either of these opinions, for our sole intention and purpose is to guard you against the belief that the phrase" and the Lord passed," is analogous to" pass before the people" (Exod. xvii. 5), for God, being incorporeal, cannot be said to move, and consequently the verb" to pass" cannot with propriety be applied to Him in its primary signification.
CHAPTER XXII
IN Hebrew, the verb bo signifies" to come" as applied to a living being, i.e., its arrival at a certain place, or approach to a certain person, as" Thy brother came (ba) with subtilty" (Gen. xxvii. 35). It next denotes (with regard to a living being)" to enter" a certain place, e.g.," And when Joseph came (va-yabo) into the house" (Gen. Aiii. 26):" When ye come (ta-bou) into the land" (Exod. Xii. 25). The term was also employed metaphorically in the sense of to come" applied to a certain event, that is, to something incorporeal, as When thy sayings come to pass (yabo)" (judg. xiii. 17):" Of that which will come (yabou) over thee" (Isa. xlvii. 13). Nay, it is even applied to privatives, e.g.," Yet evil came (va-yabo)" (job iii. 26):" And darkness came (va-yabo)" Now, since the word has been applied to incorporeal things, it has also been used in reference to God-to the fulfilment of His word, or to the manifestation of His Presence (the Shechinah). In this figurative sense it is said," Lo, 1 come (ba) unto thee in a thick cloud" (Exod. xix. 9):" For the Lord the God of Israel cometh (ba) through it" (Ezek. XliV. 2). In these and all similar passages, the coming of the Shechinah is meant, but the words," And the Lord my God shall come (u-ba)" (Zech. xiv. 5) are identical with" His word will come," that is to say, the promises which He made through the Prophets will be fulfilled; therefore Scripture adds" all the holy ones that are with thee," that is to say," The word of the Lord my God will be performed, which has been spoken by all the holy ones who are with thee, who address the Israelites."
CHAPTER XXIII
Yaza (" he came out" ) is the opposite of ba (" he came in" ). The term yaza is applied to the motion of a body from a place in which it had previously rested, to another place (whether the body be a living being or not), e.g.," And when they were gone out (yazeu) if the city" (Gen. xliv. 4):" If fire break out (teze)" (Exod. xxii. .5). It was then figuratively employed to denote the appearance of something incorporeal, as," The word went out (yaza) of the king's mouth" (Esth. vii. 8):" When this deed of the queen shall come abroad (yeze) unto all women" (Esth. i. 17), that is to say," the report will spread." Again," For out of Zion shall go forth (teze) the Law" (Isa. ii. 3): further," The sun had risen (yaza) upon the earth" (Gen. xix. 23), i.e., its light became visible.
In this figurative sense we must take every expression of coming out when applied to the Almighty, e.g.," Behold, the Lord cometh out (yoze) of his place" (Isa. XXVi. 2 1), i.e.," The word of God, which until now has been in secret, cometh out, and will become manifest," i.e., something will come into being which had not existed before: for everything new emanating from God is ascribed to His word. Comp." By the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth" (PS. xxxiii. 6). This is a simile taken from the conduct of kings, who employ the word as the means of carrying their will into effect. God, however, requires no instrument wherewith to operate in order to perform anything; the effect is produced solely by His will alone. He does not employ any kind of speech, as will be explained further on (chap. Iv.).
The verb" to come out" is thus employed to designate the manifestation of a certain work of God, as we noticed in our interpretation of the phrase," Behold, the Lord cometh out of his place." In a similar manner the term shub," to return," has been figuratively employed to denote the discontinuance of a certain act according to the will of God, as in" I will go and return to my place" (Hosea v. 15): that is to say, the Divine presence (Shechinah) which had been in our midst departed from us, the consequence of which has been the absence of Divine protection from amongst us. Thus the Prophet foretelling misfortune says," And 1 will hide my face from them, and they shall be devoured" (Deut. xxxi. 17): for, when man is deprived of Divine protection he is exposed to all dangers, and becomes the butt of all fortuitous circumstances: his fortune and misfortune then depend on chance. Alas! how terrible a threat ! -- This is the idea contained in the words," I will go and return to my place" (Hos. v. 15).
CHAPTER XXIV
THE term halak is likewise one of the words which denote movements performed by living beings, as in" And Jacob went (halak) on his way" (Gen. xxxii. I), and in many other instances. The verb" to go" was next employed in describing movements of objects less solid than the bodies of living beings, comp." And the waters were going on (halok) decreasing" (Gen. viii. 5):" And the fire went along (va-tibalak) upon the ground" (Exod. ix. 23). Then it was employed to express the spreading and manifestation of something incorporeal, comp." The voice thereof shall go like a serpent" (Jer. XIVi. 22): again," The voice of the Lord God walking in the garden" (Gen. iii. 8). It is" the voice that is qualified by" walking."
Whenever the word" to go" is used in reference to God, it must be taken in this figurative sense, i.e., it applies to incorporeal things, and signifies either the manifestation of something incorporeal, or the withdrawal of the Divine protection, an act corresponding in lifeless beings to the removal of a thin., in living beings to the departure of a living being," walking." The withdrawal of God's protection is called in the Bible" the hiding of God's countenance, as in Deuteronomy xxxi. 18," As for me, I will hide my countenance." On the same ground it has been designated" going away," or moving away from a thing. comp." I will depart and return to my place" (Hos. v. 15). But in the passage," And the anger of the Lord was kindled against them, and he went" (Num. xii. g), the two meanings of the verb are combined. viz., the withdrawal of the Divine protection, expressed by" and he went," and the revelation, manifestation, and appearance of something namely, of the anger which went forth and reached them, in consequence of which Miriam became" leprous, white as snow." The expression 11 to walk" was further applied to conduct, which concerns only the inner life, and which requires no bodily motion, as in the following passages," And thou shalt walk in his ways (Deut. xxviii. 9):" Ye shall walk after the Lord your God" (Deut. xiii. 5) Come ye, and let us walk in the light of the Lord." (Isa. ii. 5).
CHAPTER XXV
THE Hebrew shakan, as is well known, signifies" to dwell," as, And he was dwelling (shoken) in the plains of Mamre" (Gen. xiv. 13): And it came to pass, when Israel dwelt (bishekon)" (Gen. XXXV. 22). This is the most common meaning of the word. But" dwelling in a ]Flace" consists in the continued stay in a place, general or special; when a living being dwells long in a place, we say that it stays in that place, although it unquestionably moves about in it, comp." And he was staying in the plains of Mamre" (Gen. xiv. 13), and," And it came to pass, when Israel stayed" (Gen. XXM 22).
The term was next applied metaphorically to inanimate objects, i.e., to everything which has settled and remains fixed on one object, although the object on which the thing remains is not a place, and the thing itself is not a living being; for instance," Let a cloud dwell upon it [the day]" (job iii. 5): there is no doubt that the cloud is not a living being, and that the day is not a corporeal thing, but a division of time.
In this sense the term is employed in reference to God, that is to Say, to denote the continuance of His Divine Presence (Shechinah) or of His Providence in some place where the Divine Presence manifested itself constantly, or in some object which was constantly protected by Providence. Comp." And the glory of the Lord abode" (Exod. xxiv. 16):" And I will dwell among the children of Israel" (Exod. xxix. 45):" And for the goodwill of him that dwelt in the bush" (Deut. xxxiii. 16). Whenever the term is applied to the Almighty, it must be taken consistently with the context in the sense either as referring to the Presence of His Shechinah (i.e., of His light that was created for the purpose) in a certain place, or of the continuance of His Providence protecting a certain object.
CHAPTER XXVI
You, no doubt, know the Talmudical saying, which includes initself all the various kinds of interpretation connected with oursubject. It runs thus :" The Torah speaks according to the languageof man," that is to say, expressions, which can easily becomprehended and understood by all, are applied to the Creator.Hence the description of God by attributes implying corporeality,in order to express His existence: because the multitude of peopledo not easily conceive existence unless in connection with a body,and that which is not a body nor connected with a body has forthem no existence. Whatever we regard as a state of perfection, islikewise attributed to God, as expressing that He is perfect in everyrespect, and that no imperfection or deficiency whatever is foundin Him. But there is not attributed to God anything which themultitude consider a defect or want; thus He is never representedas eating, drinking, sleeping, being ill, using violence, and the like.Whatever, on the other hand, is commonly regarded as a state ofperfection is attributed to Him, although it is only a state ofperfection in relation to ourselves; for in relation to God, what weconsider to be a state of perfection, is in truth the highest degree ofimperfection. If, however, men were to think that those humanperfections were absent in God, they would consider Him asimperfect.
You are aware that locomotion is one of the distinguishingcharacteristics of living beings, and is indispensable for them intheir progress towards perfection. As they require food and drinkto supply animal waste, so they require locomotion, in order toapproach that which is good for them and in harmony with theirnature, and to escape from what is injurious and contrary to theirnature. It makes, in fact, no difference whether we ascribe to Godeating and drinking or locomotion; but according to human modesof expression, that is to say, according to common notions, eatingand drinking would be an imperfection in God, while motionwould not, in spite of the fact that the necessity of locomotion isthe result of some want. Furthermore, it has been clearly proved,that everything which moves is corporeal and divisible; it will beshown below that God is incorporeal and that He can have nolocomotion; nor can rest be ascribed to Him; for rest can only beapplied to that which also moves. All expressions, however, whichimply the various modes of movement in living beings, areemployed with regard to God in the manner we have described andin the same way as life is ascribed to Him: although motion is anaccident pertaining to living beings, and there is no doubt that,without corporeality, expressions like the following could not beimagined :" to descend, to ascend, to walk, to place, to stand, tosurround, to sit, to dwell, to depart, to enter, to pass, etc.
It would have been superfluous thus to dilate on this subject, wereit not for the mass of the people, who are accustomed to suchideas. It has been necessary to expatiate on the subject, as we haveattempted, for the benefit of those who are anxious to acquireperfection, to remove from them such notions as have grown upwith them from the days of youth.
CHAPTER XXVII
ONKELOS the Proselyte, who was thoroughly acquainted with theHebrew and Chaldaic languages, made it his task to oppose thebelief in God's corporeality. Accordingly, any expressionemployed in the Pentateuch in reference to God, and in any wayimplying corporeality, he paraphrases inconsonance with thecontext. All expressions denoting any mode of motion, areexplained by Him to mean the appearance or manifestation of acertain light that had been created [for the occasion], i.e., theShekhinah (Divine Presence), or Providence. Thus he paraphrases"the Lord will come down" (Exod. xix. 11)," The Lord willmanifest Himself" ;" And God came down" (xvi. 20)," And Godmanifested Himself" : and does not say" And God came down" :" Iwill go down now and see" (Gen. xviii. 21), he paraphrases," Iwill manifest myself now and see." This is his rendering [of theverb yarad," he went down," when used in reference to God]throughout his version, with the exception of the followingpassage," I will go down (ered) with thee into Egypt" (Gen. xlvi.4), which he renders literally. A remarkable proof of this greatman's talents, the excellence of his version, and the correctness ofhis interpretation ! By this version he discloses to us an importantprinciple as regards prophecy.
This narrative begins:" And God spake unto Israel in the visions ofthe night, and said, Jacob, Jacob, etc. And He said, I am God, etc.,I will go down with thee into Egypt" (Gen. XlVi. 2,3)- Seeing thatthe whole narrative is introduced as a vision of the night, Onkelosdid not hesitate to translate literally the words addressed to Jacobin the nocturnal vision, and thus gave a faithful account of theoccurrence. For the passage in question contains a statement ofwhat Jacob was told, not what actually took place, as is the case inthe words," And the Lord came down upon Mount Sinai" (Exod.xix. 20). Here we have an account of what actually occurred in thephysical world; the verb Varad is therefore paraphrased" Hemanifested Himself," and entirely detached from the idea ofmotion. Accounts of what happened in the imagination of man, Imean of what he was told, are not altered. A most remarkabledistinction !
Hence you may infer that there is a great difference between acommunication, designated as having been made in a dream, or avision of the night, and a vision or a manifestation simplyintroduced with phrases like" And the word of the Lord came untome, saying And the Lord spake unto me, saying."
According to my opinion, it is also possible that Onkelosunderstood Elohim in the above passage to signify" angel," andthat for this reason he did not hesitate to translate literally," I willgo down with thee to Egypt." Do not think it strange that Onkelosshould have believed the Elohim, who said to Jacob," I am God,the God of thy father" (ib. 3), to be an angel, for this sentence can,in the same form, also have been spoken by an angel. Thus Jacobsays," And the angel of God spake unto me in a dream, saying,Jacob. And I said, Here am 1," etc. (Gen. xxxi. 11): and concludesthe report of the angel's words to him in the following way," I amthe God of Bethel, where thou anointedst the pillar, and wherethou vowedst a vow unto me" (ib. 13), although there is no doubtthat Jacob vowed to God, not to the angel. It is the usual practiceof prophets to relate words addressed to them by an angel in thename of God, as though God Himself had spoken to them. Suchpassages are all to be explained by supplying the nomen regens,and by considering them as identical with" I am the messenger ofthe God of thy father,"" I am the messenger of God who appearedto thee in Bethel," and the like. Prophecy with its various degrees,and the nature of angels, will be fully discussed in the sequel, inaccordance with the object of this treatise (II. chap. xiv.).
CHAPTER XXVIII
THE term regel is homonymous, signifying, in the first place, thefoot of a living being; comp." Foot for foot (Exod. XXi. 24). Nextit denotes an object which follows another: comp. And all thepeople that follow thee" Oit. that are at thy feet) (ib. xi. 18).Another signification of the word is cc cause"; comp." And theLord hath blessed thee, I being the cause" (leragli) (Gen. xxx. 30),i.e., for my sake; for that which exists for the sake of another thinghas the latter for Its final cause. Examples of the term used in thissense are numerous. It has that meaning in Genesis xxxiii. 14,"Because (leregel) of the cattle that goeth before me, and because(leregel) of the children."
Consequently, the Hebrew text, of which the literal rendering is:"And his feet shall stand in that day upon the Mount of Olives"(Zech. xiv. 4) can be explained in the following way:" And thethings caused by him (raglav) on that day upon the Mount ofOlives, that is to say, the wonders which will then be seen, and ofwhich God will be the Cause or the Maker, will remainpermanently." To this explanation does Jonathan son of Uzielincline in paraphrasing the passage," And he will appear in hismight on that day upon the Mount of Olives. He generallyexpresses terms denoting those parts of the body by which contactand motion are effected, by" his might" [when referring to God],because all such expressions denote acts done by His Will.
In the passage (Exod. xxiv. 10, lit.," And there was under his feet,like the action of the whiteness of a sapphire stone" ), Onkelos, asyou know, in his version, considers the word (raglav)" his feet" asa figurative expression and a substitute for" throne" : the words"under his feet" he therefore paraphrases," And under the throne ofhis glory." Consider this well, and you will observe with wonderhow Onkelos keeps free from the idea of the corporeality of God,and from everything that leads thereto, even in the remotestdegree. For he does not say," and under His throne" : the directrelation of the throne to God, implied in the literal sense of thephrase" His throne," would necessarily suggest the idea that Godis supported by a material object, and thus lead directly to thecorporeality of God: he therefore refers the throne to His glory,i.e., to the Shekhinah, which is a light created for the purpose.
Similarly he paraphrases the words," For my hand I lift up to thethrone of God" (Exod. xvii. 16)," An oath has been uttered byGod, whose Shekhinah is upon the throne of his glory." Thisprinciple found also expression in the popular phrase," the Throneof the Glory."
We have already gone too far away from the subject of thischapter, and touched upon things which will be discussed in otherchapters; we will now return to our present theme. You areacquainted with the version of Onkelos [of the passage quoted]. Hecontents himself with excluding from his version all expressions ofcorporeality in reference to God, and does not show us what they(the nobles of the children of Israel Exod. xxiv. 10) perceived, orwhat is meant by that figure. In all similar instances Onkelos alsoabstains from entering into such questions, and only endeavours toexclude every expression implying corporeality; for theincorporeality of God is a demonstrative truth and anindispensable element in our faith; he could decidedly state all thatwas necessary in that respect. The interpretation of a simile is adoubtful thing: it may possibly have that meaning, but it may alsorefer to something else. It contains besides very profound matter,the understanding of which is not a fundamental element in ourfaith, and the comprehension of which is not easy for the commonpeople. Onkelos, therefore, did not enter at all into this subject.
We, however, remaining faithful to our task in this treatise, findourselves compelled to give our' explanation. According to ouropinion" under his feet" (raglav) denotes" under that of which Heis the cause,"" that which exists through Hirn," as we have alreadystated. They (the nobles of the children of Israel) thereforecomprehended the real nature of the materia prima, whichemanated from Him, and of whose existence He is the only cause.Consider well the phrase," like the action of the whiteness of thesapphire stone." If the colour were the point of comparison, thewords," as the whiteness of the sapphire stone" would havesufficed; but the addition of" like the action" was necessary,because matter, as such, is, as you are well aware, always receptiveand passive, active only by some accident. On the other hand,form, as such, is always active, and only passive by some accident,as is explained in works on Physics. This explains the addition of"like the action" in reference to the materia prima. The expression"the whiteness of the sapphire" refers to the transparency, not tothe white colour: for" the whiteness" of the sapphire is not awhite colour, but the property of being transparent. Things,however, which are transparent, have no colour of their own, as isproved in works on Physics: for if they had a colour they would notpermit all the colours to pass through them nor would they receivecolours: it is only when the transparent object is totally colourless,that it is able to receive successively all the colours. In this respectit (the whiteness of the sapphire) is like the materia prima, whichas such is entirely formless, and thus receives all the forms oneafter the other. What they (the nobles of the children of Israel)perceived was therefore the materia prima, whose relation to Godis distinctly mentioned, because it is the source of those of hiscreatures which are subject to genesis and destruction, and hasbeen created by him. This subject also will be treated later onmore fully.
Observe that you must have recourse to an explanation of thiskind, even when adopting the rendering of Onkelos," And underthe throne of His glory" ; for in fact the materia prima is also underthe heavens, which are called" throne of God," as we haveremarked above. I should not have thought of this unusualinterpretation, or hit on this argument were it not for an utteranceof R. Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, which will be discussed in one of theparts of this treatise (II. chap. xxvi.). The primary object of everyintelligent person must be to deny the corporeality of God, and tobelieve that all those perceptions (described in the above passage)were of a spiritual not of a material character. Note this andconsider it well. CHAPTER XXIX
THE term 'ezeb is homonymous, denoting, in the first place, painand trembling; comp." In sorrow (be-'ezeb) thou shalt bring forthchildren" (Gen. iii. 16). Next it denotes anger; comp." And hisfather had not made him angry ('azabo) at any time" (I Kings i.6):" for he was angry (ne'ezab) for the sake of David" (I Sam. xx.34). The term signifies also provocation: comp." They rebelled,and vexed ('izzebu) his holy spirit" (Isa. lxiii. 10):" and provoked(ya'azibahu) him in the desert" (Ps. lxxviii. 4o);" If there be anyway of provocation ('ozeb) in me" (ib. cxxxix. 24) Every day theyrebel (ye'azzebu) against my words" (ib. Ivi. 6).
In Genesis vi. 6 the word has either the second or the thirdsignification. In the first case, the sense of the Hebrew va-yit'azzebel libbo is God was angry with them on account of the wickednessof their deeds" as to the words" to his heart" used here, and alsoin the history of Noah (ib. viii. 21) 1 will here explain what theymean. With regard to man, we use the expression" he said tohimself," or" he said in his heart," in reference to a subject whichhe did not utter or communicate to any other person. Similarly thephrase" And God said in his heart," is used in reference to an actwhich God decreed without mentioning it to any prophet at thetime the event took place according to the will of God. And afigure of this kind is admissible, since" the Torah speaketh inaccordance with the language of man" (supra c. xxvi.). This isplain and dear. In the Pentateuch no distinct mention is made of amessage sent to the wicked generation of the flood, cautioning orthreatening them with death; therefore, it is said concerning them,that God was angry with them in His heart; likewise when Hedecreed that no flood should happen again, He did not tell aprophet to communicate it to others, and for that reason the words"in his heart" are added.
Taking the verb in the third signification, we explain the passagethus:" And man rebelled against God's will concerning him" : forleb (heart) also signifies" will," as we shall explain when treatingof the homonymity of leb (heart).
CHAPTER XXX
IN its primary meaning akal (to eat) is used in the sense of takingfood by animals: this needs no illustration. It was afterwardsobserved that eating includes two processes-- (1) the loss of thefood, i.e., the destruction of its form, which first takes place; (2)the growth of animals, the preservation of their strength and theirexistence, and the support of all the forces of their body, caused bythe food they take.
The consideration of the first process led to the figurative use ofthe verb in the sense of" consuming," destroying" : hence itincludes all modes of depriving a thing of its form comp." And theland of your enemies shall destroy (lit. eat) you" (Lev. xxvi. 38):" A land that destroyeth (lit. eateth) the inhabitants thereof" (Num.xiii. 32):" Ye shall be destroyed (lit. eaten) with the sword" (Isa. i.6):" Shall the sword destroy (lit. eat)" (2 Sam. ii. 26):" And thefire of the Lord burnt among them, and destroyed (lit. ate) themthat were in the uttermost parts of the camp" (Num. xi. 1):" (God)is a destroying (lit. eating) fire" (Deut. iv. 24), that is, He destroysthose who rebel against Him, as the fire destroys everything thatcomes within its reach. Instances of this kind are very frequent.
With reference to the second effect of the act of eating, the verb"to eat is figuratively used in the sense of" acquiring wisdom ... ..learning"; in short, for all intellectual perceptions. These preservethe human form (intellect) constantly in the most perfect manner,in the same way as food preserves the body in its best condition.Comp." Come ye, buy and eat" (Isa. lv. I):" Hearken diligentlyunto me, and eat ye that which is good" (ib. 2):" It is not good toeat much honey" (Prov. XXV. 27):" My son, eat thou honey,because it is good, and the honeycomb, which is sweet to thy taste;so shall the knowledge of wisdom be unto thy soul" (ib. xxiv. 13,14).
This figurative use of the verb" to eat" in the sense of" acquiringwisdom" is frequently met with in the Talmud, e.g., Come, eat fatmeat at Raba's (Baba Bathra 22a); comp." All expressions ofeating' and ' drinking' found in this book (of Proverbs) refer towisdom," or, according to another reading," to the Law" (Koh.rabba on Eccl. iii. 13) - Wisdom has also been frequently called"water," e.g.," Ho, every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters"(Isa. Iv. 1).
The figurative meaning of these expressions has been so generaland common, that it was almost considered as its primitivesignification, and led to the employment" of hunger" and" thirst"in the sense of" absence of wisdom and intelligence" : comp." Iwill send a famine in the land, not a famine of bread, nor a thirstfor water, but of hearing the words of the Lord" ;" My soulthirsteth for God, for the living God" (Ps. xlii. 3). Instances of thiskind occur frequently. The words," With joy shall ye draw waterout of the wells of salvation" (Isa. Xii. 3), are paraphrased byJonathan son of Uzziel thus :" You will joyfully receive newinstruction from the chosen of the righteous." Consider how heexplains" water" to indicate" the wisdom which will thenspread," and" the wells" (ma'ayene) as being identical with" theeyes of the congregation" (Num. XV. 24), in the sense of" thechiefs," or" the wise." By the phrase," from the chosen of therighteous," he expresses his belief that righteousness is truesalvation. You now see how he gives to every word in this versesome signification referring to wisdom and study. This should bewell considered.
CHAPTER XXXI
KNOW that for the human mind there are certain objects ofperception which are within the scope of its nature and capacity;on the other hand, there are, amongst things Aich actually exist,certain objects which the mind can in no way and by no meansgrasp : the gates of perception are dosed against it. Further, thereare things of which the mind understands one part, but remainsignorant of the other; and when man is able to comprehend certainthings, it does not follow that he must be able to comprehendeverything. This also applies to the senses : they are able toperceive things, but not at every distance: and all other power; ofthe body are limited in a similar way. A man can, e.g., carry twokikkar, but he cannot carry ten kikkar. How individuals of thesame species surpass each other in these sensations and in otherbodily faculties is universally known, but there is a limit to them,and their power cannot extend to every distance or to every degree.
All this is applicable to the intellectual faculties of man. There is aconsiderable difference between one person and another as regardsthese faculties, as is well known to philosophers. While one mancan discover a certain thing by himself, another is never able tounderstand it, even if taught by means of all possible expressionsand metaphors, and during a long period; his mind can in no waygrasp it, his capacity is insufficient for it. This distinction is notunlimited. A boundary is undoubtedly set to the human mindwhich it cannot pass. There are things (beyond that boundary)which are acknowledged to be inaccessible to humanunderstanding, and man does not show any desire to comprehendthem, being aware that such knowledge is impossible, and thatthere are no means of overcoming the difficulty: e.g., we do notknow the number of stars in heaven, whether the number is even orodd; we do not know the number of animals, minerals, or plants,and the like. There are other things, however, which man verymuch desires to know, and strenuous efforts to examine and toinvestigate them have been made by thinkers of all classes, and atall times. They differ and disagree, and constantly raise newdoubts with regard to them, because their minds are bent oncomprehending such things, that is to say, they are moved bydesire
and every one of them believes that he has discovered the wayleading to a true knowledge of the thing, although human reason isentirely unable to demonstrate the fact by convincingevidence.-For a proposition which can be proved by evidence isnot subject to dispute, denial, or rejection: none but the ignorantwould contradict it, and such contradiction is called" denial of ademonstrated proof." Thus you find men who deny the sphericalform of the earth, or the circular form of the line in which the starsmove, and the like: such men are not considered in this treatise.This confusion prevails mostly in metaphysical subjects, less inproblems relating to physics, and is entirely absent from the exactsciences. Alexander Aphrodisius said that there are three causeswhich prevent men from discovering the exact truth : first,arrogance and vainglory; secondly, the subtlety, depth, anddifficulty of any subject which is being examined; thirdly,ignorance and want of capacity to comprehend what might becomprehended. These causes are enumerated by Alexander. At thepresent time there is a fourth cause not mentioned by him, becauseit did not then prevail, namely, habit and training. We naturallylike what we have been accustomed to, and are attracted towardsit. This may be observed amongst villagers; though they rarelyenjoy the benefit of a douche or bath, and have few enjoyments,and pass a life of privation, they dislike town life and do not desireits pleasures, preferring the inferior things to which they areaccustomed, to the better things to which they are strangers; itwould give them no satisfaction to live in palaces, to be clothed insilk, and to indulge in baths, ointments, and perfumes.
The same is the case with those opinions of man to which he hasbeen accustomed from his youth; he likes them, defends them, andshuns the opposite views. This is likewise one of the causes whichprevent men from finding truth, and which make them cling totheir habitual opinions. Such is, e.g., the case with the vulgarnotions with respect to the corporeality of God, and many othermetaphysical questions, as we shall explain. It is the result of longfamiliarity with passages of the Bible, which they are accustomedto respect and to receive as true, and the literal sense of whichimplies the corporeality of God and other false notions; in truth,however, these words were employed as figures and metaphors forreasons to be mentioned below. Do not imagine that what we havesaid of the insufficiency of our understanding and of its limitedextent is an assertion founded only on the Bible: for philosopherslikewise assert the same, and perfectly understand it,- withouthaving regard to any religion or opinion. It is a fact which is onlydoubted by those who ignore things fully proved. This chapter isintended as an introduction to the next.
CHAPTER XXXII
You must consider, when reading this treatise, that mentalperception, because connected with matter, is subject to conditionssimilar to those to which physical perception is subject. That is tosay, if your eye looks around, you can perceive all that is withinthe range of your vision: if, however, you overstrain your eye,exerting it too much by attempting to see an object which is toodistant for your eye, or to examine writings or engravings toosmall for your sight, and forcing it to obtain a correct perception ofthem, you will not only weaken your sight with regard to thatspecial object, but also for those things which you otherwise areable to perceive: your eye will have become too weak to perceivewhat you were able to see before you exerted yourself andexceeded the limits of your vision.
The same is the case with the speculative faculties of one whodevotes himself to the study of any science. If a person studies toomuch and exhausts his reflective powers, he will be confused, andwill not be able to apprehend even that which had been within thepower of his apprehension. For the powers of the body are all alikein this respect.
The mental perceptions are not exempt from a similar condition. Ifyou admit the doubt, and do not persuade yourself to believe thatthere is a proof for things which cannot be demonstrated, or to tryat once to reject and positively to deny an assertion the opposite ofwhich has never been proved, or attempt to perceive things whichare beyond your perception, then you have attained the highestdegree of human perfection, then you are like R. Akibha, who" inpeace entered [the study of these theological problems], and cameout in peace." If, on the other hand, you attempt to exceed the limitof your intellectual power, or at once to reject things as impossiblewhich have never been proved to be impossible, or which are infact possible, though their possibility be very remote, then you willbe like Elisha Aber; you will not only fail to become perfect, butyou will become exceedingly imperfect. Ideas founded on mereimagination will prevail over you, you will incline toward defects,and toward base and degraded habits, on account of the confusionwhich troubles the mind, and of the dimness of its light, just asweakness of sight causes invalids to see many kinds of unrealimages, especially when they have looked for a long time atdazzling or at very minute objects.
Respecting this it has been said," Hast thou found honey ? eat somuch as is sufficient for thee, lest thou be filled therewith, andvomit it" (Prov. xxv. 16). Our Sages also applied this verse toElisha Aber, How excellent is this simile! In comparing knowledgeto food (as we observed in chap. xxx.), the author of Proverbsmentions the sweetest food, namely, honey, which has the furtherproperty of irritating the stomach, and of causing sickness. He thusfully describes the nature of knowledge. Though great, excellent,noble and perfect, it is injurious if not kept within bounds or notguarded properly; it is like honey which gives nourishment and ispleasant, when eaten in moderation, but is totally thrown awaywhen eaten immoderately. Therefore, it is not said" lest thou befilled and loathe it," but" lest thou vomit it." The same idea isexpressed in the words," It is not good to eat much honey" (Prov.XM 27): and in the words," Neither make thyself over-wise: whyshouldst thou destroy thyself ?" (Eccles. vii. 16); comp." Keep thyfoot when thou goest to the house of God" (ibid. v. 1). The samesubject is alluded to in the words of David," Neither do I exercisemyself in great matters, or in things too high for me" (PS. =XL 2),and in the sayings of our Sages:" Do not inquire into things whichare too difficult for thee, do not search what is hidden from thee:study what you are allowed to study, and do not occupy thyselfwith mysteries." They meant to say, Let thy mind only attemptthings which are within human perception; for the study of thingswhich lie beyond man's comprehension is extremely injurious, ashas been already stated. This lesson is also contained in theTalmudical passage, which begins," He who considers fourthings," etc., and concludes," He who does not regard the honourof his Creator" : here also is given the advice which we havealready mentioned, viz., that man should not rashly engage inspeculation with false conceptions, and when he is in doubt aboutanything, or unable to find a proof for the object of his inquiry, hemust not at once abandon, reject and deny it; he must modestlykeep back, and from regard to the honour of his Creator, hesitate[from uttering an opinion) and pause. This has already beenexplained.
It was not the object of the Prophets and our Sages in theseutterances to close the gate of investigation entirely, and to preventthe mind from comprehending what is within its reach, as isimagined by simple and idle people, whom it suits better to putforth their ignorance and incapacity as wisdom and perfection, andto regard the distinction and wisdom of others as irreligion andimperfection, thus taking darkness for light and light for darkness.The whole object of the Prophets and the Sages was to declare thata limit is set to human reason where it must halt. Do not criticisethe words used in this chapter and in others in reference to themind, for we only intended to give some idea of the subject inview, not to describe the essence of the intellect: for other chaptershave been dedicated to this subject.
CHAPTER XXXIII
You must know that it is very injurious to begin with this branchof philosophy, viz., Metaphysics: or to explain [at first] the senseof the similes occurring in prophecies, and interpret the metaphorswhich are employed in historical accounts and which abound inthe writings of the Prophets. On the contrary, it is necessary toinitiate the young and to instruct the less intelligent according totheir comprehension: those who appear to be talented and to havecapacity for the higher method of study, i.e., that based on proofand on true logical argument, should be gradually advancedtowards perfection, either by tuition or by self-instruction. He,however, who begins with Metaphysics, will not only becomeconfused in matters of religion, but will fall into completeinfidelity. I compare such a person to an infant fed with wheatenbread, meat and wine; it will undoubtedly die, not because suchfood is naturally unfit for the human body, but because of theweakness of the child, who is unable to digest the food, and cannotderive benefit from it. The same is the case with the true principlesof science. They were presented in enigmas, dad in riddles, andtaught by an wise men in the most mysterious way that could bedevised, not because they contain some secret evil, or are contraryto the fundamental principles of the Law (as fools think who areonly philosophers in their own eyes), but because of the incapacityof man to comprehend them at the beginning of his studies: onlyslight allusions have been made to them to serve for the guidanceof those who are capable of understanding them. These scienceswere, therefore, called Mysteries (sodoth), and Secrets of the Law(sitre torah), as we shall explain.
This also is the reason why" the Torah speaks the language ofman," as we have explained, for it is the object of the Torah toserve as a guide for the instruction of the young, of women, and ofthe common people; and as all of them are incapable tocomprehend the true sense of the words, tradition was consideredsufficient to convey all truths which were to be established; and asregards ideals, only such remarks were made as would leadtowards a knowledge of their existence, though not to acomprehension of their true essence. When a man attains toperfection, and arrives at a knowledge of the" Secrets of the Law,"either through the assistance of a teacher or by self-instruction,being led by the understanding of one part to the study of the other,he will belong to those who faithfully believe in the trueprinciples, either because of conclusive proof, where proof ispossible, or by forcible arguments, where argument is admissible;he will have a true notion of those things which he previouslyreceived in similes and metaphors, and he will fully understandtheir sense. We have frequently mentioned in this treatise theprinciple of our Sages" not to discuss the Ma'aseh Mercabah evenin the presence of one pupil, except he be wise and intelligent; andthen only the headings of the chapters are to be given to him." Wemust, therefore, begin with teaching these subjects according tothe capacity of the pupil, and on two conditions, first, that he bewise, i.e., that he should have successfully gone through thepreliminary studies, and secondly that he be intelligent, talented,clear-headed, and of quick perception, that is, have a mind of hisown" (mebin midda'ato), as our Sages termed it.
I will now proceed to explain the reasons why we should notinstruct the multitude in pure metaphysics, or begin withdescribing to them the true essence of things, or with showingthem that a thing must be as it is, and cannot be otherwise. Thiswill form the subject of the next chapter; and I proceed to say
CHAPTER XXXIV
THERE are five reasons why instruction should not begin withMetaphysics, but should at first be restricted to pointing out whatis fitted for notice and what may be made manifest to themultitude.
First Reason -- The subject itself is difficult, subtle and profound,"Far off and exceeding deep, who can find it out ?" (Eccles. vii.24). The following words of job may be applied to it:" Whencethen cometh wisdom ? and where is the place of understanding ?"(job xxviii. 20). Instruction should not begin with abstruse anddifficult subjects. In one of the similes contained in the Bible,wisdom is compared to water, and amongst other interpretationsgiven by our Sages of this simile, occurs the following: He whocan swim may bring up pearls from the depth of the sea, he who isunable to swim will be drowned, therefore only such persons ashave had proper instruction should expose themselves to the risk.
Second Reason --The intelligence of man is at first insufficient; forhe is not endowed with perfection at the beginning, but at firstpossesses perfection only in potentia, not in fact. Thus it is said,"And man is born a wild ass" (job xi. 12). If a man possesses acertain faculty in potentia, it does not follow that it must becomein him a reality. He may possibly remain deficient either onaccount of some obstacle, or from want of training in practiceswhich would turn the possibility into a reality. Thus it is distinctlystated in the Bible," Not many are wise" (ib., xxxii. 9): also ourSages say," I noticed how few were those who attained to a higherdegree of perfection" (B. T. Succah 45a). There are many thingswhich obstruct the path to perfection, and which keep man awayfrom it. Where can he find sufficient preparation and leisure tolearn all that is necessary in order to develop that perfection whichhe has in potentia ?
Third Reason. -- The preparatory studies are of long duration, andman, in his natural desire to reach the goal, finds them frequentlytoo wearisome, and does not wish to be troubled by them. Beconvinced that, if man were able to reach the end withoutpreparatory studies, such studies would not be preparatory buttiresome and utterly superfluous. Suppose you awaken any person,even the most simple, as if from sleep, and you say to him, Do younot desire to know what the heavens are, what is their number andtheir form; what beings are contained in them; what the angels are;how the creation of the whole world took place; what is itspurpose, and what is the relation of its various parts to each other;what is the nature of the soul; how it enters the body; whether ithas an independent existence, and if so, how it can existindependently of the body; by what means and to what purpose,and similar problems. He would undoubtedly say" Yes," and showa natural desire for the true knowledge of these things; but he winwish to satisfy that desire and to attain to that knowledge bylistening to a few words from you. Ask him to interrupt his usualpursuits for a week, till he learn all this, he would not do it, andwould be satisfied and contented with imaginary and misleadingnotions; he would refuse to believe that there is anything whichrequires preparatory studies and persevering research.
You, however, know how all these subjects are connectedtogether; for there is nothing else in existence but God and Hisworks, the latter including all existing things besides Him: we canonly obtain a knowledge of I-Em through His works; His worksgive evidence of His existence, and show what must be assumedconcerning Him, that is to say, what must be attributed to Himeither affirmatively or negatively. It is thus necessary to examineall things according to their essence, to infer from every speciessuch true and well established propositions as may assist us in thesolution of metaphysical problems. Again, many propositionsbased on the nature of numbers and the properties of geometricalfigures, are useful in examining things which must be negatived inreference to God, and these negations will lead us to furtherinferences. You will certainly not doubt the necessity of studyingastronomy and physics, if you are desirous of comprehending therelation between the world and Providence as it is in reality, andnot according to imagination. There are also many subjects ofspeculation, which, though not preparing the way for metaphysics,help to train the reasoning power, enabling it to understand thenature of a proof, and to test truth by characteristics essential to it.They remove the confusion arising in the minds of most thinkers,who confound accidental with essential properties, and likewisethe wrong opinions resulting therefrom. We may add, thatalthough they do not form the basis for metaphysical research, theyassist in forming a correct notion of these things, and are certainlyuseful in many other things connected with that discipline.Consequently he who wishes to attain to human perfection, musttherefore first study Logic, next the various branches ofMathematics in their proper order, then Physics, and lastlyMetaphysics. We find that many who have advanced to a certainpoint in the study of these disciplines become weary, and stop: thatothers, who are endowed with sufficient capacity, are interruptedin their studies by death, which surprises them while still engagedwith the preliminary course. Now, if no knowledge whatever hadbeen given,' to us by means of tradition, and if we had not beenbrought to the belief in a thing through the medium of similes, wewould have been bound to form a perfect notion of things withtheir essential characteristics, and to believe only what we couldprove: a goal which could only be attained by long preparation. Insuch a case most people would die, without having known whetherthere was a God or not, much less that certain things must beasserted about Him, and other things denied as defects. From sucha fate not even" one of a city or two of a family" (jer. iii. 14)would have escaped.
As regards the privileged few," the remnant whom the Lord calls"(Joel iii. 5), they only attain the perfection at which they aim afterdue preparatory labour. The necessity of such a preparation and theneed of such a training for the acquisition of real knowledge, hasbeen plainly stated by King Solomon in the following words:" Ifthe iron be blunt, and he do not whet the edge, then must he put tomore strength: and it is profitable to prepare for wisdom" (Eccles.x. 10):" Hear counsel, and receive instruction, that thou mayest bewise in thy latter end" (Prov. XiX. 20).
There is still another urgent reason why the preliminary disciplinesshould be studied and understood. During the study many doubtspresent themselves, and the difficulties, or the objections raisedagainst certain assertions, are soon understood, just as thedemolition of a building is easier than its erection: while, on theother hand, it is impossible to prove an assertion, or to remove anydoubts, without having recourse to several propositions taken fromthese preliminary studies. He who approaches metaphysicalproblems without proper preparation is like a person who journeystowards a certain place, and on the road falls into a deep pit, out ofwhich he cannot rise, and he must perish there: if he had not goneforth, but had remained at home, it would have been better forhim.
Solomon has expatiated in the book of Proverbs on sluggards andtheir indolence, by which he figuratively refers to indolence in thesearch after wisdom. He thus speaks of a man who desires to knowthe final results, but does not exert himself to understand thepreliminary disciplines which lead to them, doing nothing else butdesire." The desire of the slothful killeth him; for his hands refuseto labour. He coveteth greedily all the day long: but the righteousgiveth, and spareth not" (PrOV. XXi. 25, 26): that is to say, if thedesire killeth the slothful, it is because he neglects to seek thething which might satisfy his desire, he does nothing but desire,and hopes to obtain a thing without using the means to reach it. Itwould be better for him were he without that desire. Observe howthe end of the simile throws light on its beginning. It concludeswith the words" but the righteous giveth, and spareth not" : theantithesis of" righteous" and" slothful" can only be justified onthe basis of our interpretation. Solomon thus indicates that 0 sucha man is righteous who gives to everything its due portion; that isto say, who gives to the study of a thing the whole time requiredfor it, and does not devote any part of that time to another purpose.The passage may therefore be paraphrased thus : And the righteousman devotes his ways to wisdom, and does not withhold any ofthem." Comp." Give not thy strength unto women" (Prov. xxxi.3).
The majority of scholars, that is to say, the most famous inscience, are afflicted with this failing, viz., that of hurrying at onceto the final results, and of speaking about them, without treating ofthe preliminary disciplines. Led by folly or ambition to disregardthose preparatory studies, for the attainment of which they areeither incapable or too idle, some scholars endeavour to prove thatthese are injurious or superfluous. On reflection the truth willbecome obvious.
The Fourth Reason is taken from the physical constitution of man.It has been proved that moral conduct is a preparation forintellectual progress, and that only a man whose character is pure,calm and steadfast, can attain to intellectual perfection: that is,acquire correct conceptions. Many men are naturally so constitutedthat all perfection is impossible: e.g., he whose heart is very warmand is himself very powerful, is sure to be passionate, though hetries to counteract that disposition by training; he whose testiclesare warm, humid, and vigorous, and the organs connectedtherewith are surcharged, will not easily refrain from sin, even ifhe makes great efforts to restrain himself. You also find persons ofgreat levity and rashness, whose excited manners and wild gesturesprove that their constituttion is in disorder, and their temperamentso bad that it cannot be cured. Such persons can never attain toperfection: it is utterly useless to occupy oneself with them on sucha subject [as Metaphysics]. For this science is, as you know,different from the science of Medicine and of Geometry, and, fromthe reason already mentioned, it is not every person who is capableof approaching it. It is impossible for a man to study it successfullywithout moral preparation; he must acquire the highest degree ofuprightness and integrity," for the froward is an abomination tothe Lord, but His secret is with the righteous" (Prov. iii. 32).Therefore it was considered inadvisable to teach it to young men;nay, it is impossible for them to comprehend it, on account of theheat of their blood and the flame of youth, which confuses theirminds: that heat, which causes all the disorder, must firstdisappear; they must have become moderate and settled, humble intheir hearts, and subdued in their temperament; only then will theybe able to arrive at the highest degree of the perception of God,i.e., the study of Metaphysics, which is called Ma'aseh MercabahComp. The Lord is nigh unto them that are of a broken heart" (Ps.xxxiv. 18)" I dwell in the high and lofty place, with him also thatis of a contrite and humble spirit: to revive the spirit of thehumble, and to revive the heart of the contrite ones" (Isa. lvii. 15).
Therefore the rule," the headings of the sections may be confidedto him," is further restricted in the Talmud, in the following way:The headings of the sections must only be handed down to anAb-bet-din (President of the Court), whose heart is full of care,i.e., in whom wisdom is united with humility, meekness, and agreat dread of sin. It is further stated there :" The secrets of theLaw can only be communicated to a counsellor, scholar, and goodorator." These qualities can only be acquired if the physicalconstitution of the student favour their development. You certainlyknow that some persons, though exceedingly able, are very weakin giving counsel, while others are ready with proper counsel andgood advice in social and political matters. A person so endowedis called" counsellor" and may be unable to comprehend purelyabstract notions, even such as are similar to common sense. He isunacquainted with them, and has no talent whatever for them; weapply to him the words :" Wherefore is there a price in the hand ofa fool to get wisdom, seeing he hath no heart to it ?" (Prov. xvii.16). Others are intelligent and naturally clear-sighted, able toconvey complicated ideas in concise and well chosen language, --such a person is called" a good orator," but he has not beenengaged in the pursuit of science, or has not acquired anyknowledge of it. Those who have actually acquired a knowledge ofthe sciences, are called" wise in arts" (or" scholars" ): theHebrew term for" wise in arts" -- hakam harashim -has beenexplained in the Talmud as implying, that when such a manspeaks, all become, as t were, speechless.
Now, consider how, in the writings of the Rabbis, the admission ofa person into discourses on metaphysics is made dependent ondistinction in social qualities, and study of philosophy, as well ason the possession of clearsightedness, intelligence, eloquence, andability to communicate things by slight allusions. If a personsatisfies these requirements, the secrets of the Law are confided tohim. In the same place we also read the following passage :-R.Jochanan said to R. Elasar," Come, I will teach you Ma'asehMercabah." The reply was," I am not yet old," or in other words, Ihave not yet become old, I still perceive in myself the hot bloodand the rashness of youth. You learn from this that, in addition tothe above-named good qualities, a certain age is also required.How, then, could any person speak on these metaphysical themesin the presence of ordinary people, of children, and of women!
Fifth Reason. -- Man is disturbed in his intellectual occupation bythe necessity of looking after the material wants of the body,especially if the necessity of providing for wife and children besuperadded: much more so if he seeks superfluities in addition tohis ordinary wants, for by custom and bad habits these become apowerful motive. Even the perfect man to whom we have referred,if too busy with these necessary things, much more so if busy withunnecessary things, and filled with a great desire for them-mustweaken or altogether lose his desire for study, to which he winapply himself with interruption, lassitude, and want of attention.He will not attain to that for which he is fitted by his abilities, orhe will acquire imperfect knowledge, a confused mass of true andfalse ideas. For these reasons it was proper that the study ofMetaphysics should have been exclusively cultivated by privilegedpersons, and not entrusted to the common people. It is not for thebeginner, and he should abstain from it, as the little child has toabstain from taking solid food and from carrying heavy weights.
CHAPTER XXXV
Do not think that what we have laid down in the precedingchapters on the
importance, obscurity, and difficulty of the subject,and its unsuitableness for
communication to ordinary persons,includes the doctrine of God's incorporeality
and His exemptionfrom all affections
This suffices for the guidance of children and of ordinary personswho must believe that there is a Being existing, perfect,incorporeal, not inherent in a body as a force in it-God, who isabove all kinds of deficiency, above A affections. But the questionconcerning the attributes of God, their inadmissibility, and themeaning of those attributes which are ascribed to Him; concerningthe Creation, His Providence, in providing for everything;concerning His will, His perception, His knowledge of everything;concerning prophecy and its various degrees: concerning themeaning of His names which imply the idea of unity, though theyare more than one; all these things are very difficult problems, thetrue" Secrets of the Law" the" secrets" mentioned so frequentlyin the books of the Prophets, and in the words of our Teachers, thesubjects of which we should only mention the headings of thechapters, as we have already stated, and only in the presence of aperson satisfying the above-named conditions.
That God is incorporeal, that He cannot be compared with Hiscreatures, that He is not subject to external influence; these arethings which must be explained to every one according to hiscapacity, and they must be taught by way of tradition to childrenand women, to the stupid and ignorant, as they are taught that Godis One, that He is eternal, and that He alone is to be worshipped.Without incorporeality there is no unity, for a corporeal thing is inthe first case not simple, but composed of matter and form whichare two separate things by definition, and secondly, as it hasextension it is also divisible. When persons have received thisdoctrine, and have been trained in this belief, and are inconsequence at a loss to reconcile it with the writings of theProphets, the meaning of the latter must be made dear andexplained to them by pointing out the homonymity and thefigurative application of certain terms discussed in this part of thework. Their belief in the unity of God and in the words of theProphets will then be a true and perfect belief.
Those who are not sufficiently intelligent to comprehend the trueinterpretation of these passages in the Bible, or to understand thatthe same term admits of two different interpretations, may simplybe told that the scriptural passage is clearly understood by thewise, but that they should content themselves with knowing thatGod is incorporeal, that He is never subject to external influence,as passivity implies a change, while God is entirely free from allchange, that He cannot be compared to anything besides Himself,that no definition includes Him together with any other being, thatthe words of the Prophets are true, and that difficulties met withmay be explained on this principle. This may suffice for that classof persons, and it is not proper to leave them in the belief that Godis corporeal, or that He has any of the properties of materialobjects, just as there is no need to leave them in the belief that Goddoes not exist, that there are more Gods than one, or that any otherbeing may be worshipped.
CHAPTER XXXVI
I SHALL explain to you, when speaking on the attributes of God,in what sense we can say that a particular thing pleases Him, orexcites His anger and His wrath, and in reference to certainpersons that God was pleased with them, was angry with them, orwas in wrath against them. This is not the subject of the presentchapter; I intend to explain in it what I am now going to say. Youmust know, that in examining the Law and the books of theProphets, you will not find the expressions" burning anger," "provocation," or" jealousy" applied to God except in reference toidolatry; and that none but the idolater called" enemy .. ..adversary," or" hater of the Lord." Comp." And ye serve othergods,. and then the Lord's wrath will be kindled against you"(Dent. xi. 16, 17) Lest the anger of the Lord thy God be kindledagainst thee." etc. (ib. vi. 15):" To provoke him to anger throughthe work of your hands" (ib. xrxi. 29):" They have moved me tojealousy with that which is not God; they have provoked me toanger with their vanities" (ib. xxxii. 21):" For the Lord thy God isa jealous God" (ib. vi. 15):" Why have they provoked me to angerwith their graven images, and with strange vanities ?" (Jer. viii.19):" Because of the provoking of his sons and of his daughters"(Dent. xxxii. 19):" For a fire is kindled in mine anger" (ib. 22):"The Lord will take vengeance on His adversaries, and he reservethwrath for his enemies" (Nah. i. 2):" And repayeth them that hateHim" (Deut. vii. 10):" Until He hath driven out His enemies frombefore Him (Num. xxxii. 2 1):" Which the Lord thy God hateth"(Deut. XVi. 22): For every abomination to the Lord, which Hehateth, have they done unto their gods" (ib. xii. P). Instances likethese are innumerable; and if you examine all the examples metwith in the holy writings, you will find that they confirm our view.
The Prophets in their writings laid special stress on this, because itconcerns errors in reference to God, i.e., it concerns idolatry. For ifany one believes that, e.g., Zaid is standing, while in fact he issitting, he does not deviate from truth so much as one whobelieves that fire is under the air, or that water is under the earth,or that the earth is a plane, or things similar to these. The latterdoes not deviate so much from truth as one who believes that thesun consists of fire, or that the heavens form a hemisphere, andsimilar things: in the third instance the deviation from truth is lessthan the deviation of a man who believes that angels cat and drink,and the like. The latter again deviates less from truth than one whobelieves that something besides God is to be worshipped; forignorance and error concerning a great thing, i.e., a thing whichhas a high position in the universe, are of greater importance thanthose which refer to a thing which occupies a lower place:-by"error" 1 mean the belief that a thing is different from what it reallyis: by" ignorance," the want of knowledge respecting things theknowledge of which can be obtained.
If a person does not know the measure of the cone, or thesphericity of the sun, it is not so important as not to know whetherGod exists, or whether the world exists without a God; and if aman assumes that the cone is half (of the cylinder), or that the sunis a circle, it is not so injurious as to believe that God is more thanOne. You must know that idolaters when worshipping idols do notbelieve that there is no God besides them: and no idolater ever didassume that any image made of metal, stone, or wood has createdthe heavens and the earth, and still governs them. Idolatry isfounded on the idea that a particular form represents the agentbetween God and His creatures. This is plainly said in passageslike the following:" Who would not fear thee, 0 king of nations ?"(Jer. x. 7)" And in every place incense is offered unto my name"(Mal. i. 11): by my name" allusion is made to the Being which iscalled by them [i.e., the idolaters]" the First Cause." We havealready explained this in our larger work (Misbneb Torah, I. OnIdolatry, chap. i.), and none of our co-religionists can doubt it.
The infidels, however, though believing in the existence of theCreator, attack the exclusive prerogative of God, namely, theservice and worship which was commanded, in order that thebelief of the people in His existence should be firmly established,in the words," And you shall serve the Lord," etc. (Exod. xxiii.25). By transferring that prerogative to other beings, they cause thepeople, who only notice the rites, without comprehending theirmeaning or the true character of the being which is worshipped, torenounce their belief in the existence of God. They were thereforepunished with death: comp." Thou shalt save alive nothing thatbreatheth" (Deut. xx. 16). The object of this commandment, as isdistinctly stated, is to extirpate that false opinion, in order thatother men should not be corrupted by it any more: in the words ofthe Bible" that they teach you not," etc. (ib. is). They are called"enemies,"" foes ... .. adversaries" : by worshipping idols they aresaid to provoke God to jealousy, anger, and wrath. How great,then,muut be the offence of him who has a wrong opinion of GodHimself, and believes Him to be different from what He truly is,i.e., assumes that He does not exist, that He consists of twoelements, that He is corporeal, that He is subject to externalinfluence, or ascribes to Him any defect whatever. Such a person isundoubtedly worse than he who worships idols in the belief thatthey, as agents, can do good or evil.
Therefore bear in mind that by the belief in the corporeality or inanything connected with corporeality, you would provoke God tojealousy and wrath, kindle His fire and anger, become His foe, Hisenemy, and His adversary in a higher degree than by the worshipof idols. If you think that there is an excuse for those who believein the corporeality of God on the ground of their training, theirignorance or their defective comprehension, you must make thesame concession to the worshippers of idols: their worship is dueto ignorance, or to early training," they continue in the custom oftheir fathers." (T.B. Hullin, 13a) You will perhaps say that theliteral interpretation of the Bible causes men to fall into that doubt,but you must know that idolaters were likewise brought to theirbelief by false imaginations and ideas. There is no excusewhatever for those who, being unable to think for themselves, donot accept [the doctrine of the incorporeality of God] from the truephilosophers. I do not consider those men as infidels who areunable to prove the incorporeality, but I hold those to be so Whodo not believe it, especially when they see that Onkelos andJonathan avoid [in reference to God] expressions implyingcorporeality as much as possible. This is all I intended to say inthis chapter.
CHAPTER XXXVII
THE Hebrew term panim (face) is homonymous: most of itsvarious meanings have a figurative character. It denotes in the firstplace the face of a living being: comp." And all laces are turnedinto paleness" (Jer. xxx. 6):" Wherefore are your laces so sad(Gen. xl. 7). In this sense the term occurs frequently.
The next meaning of the word is" anger"; comp." And her anger(paneha) was gone" (I Sam. i. 18). Accordingly, the term isfrequently used in reference to God in the sense of anger andwrath; comp." The anger (pene) of the Lord hath divided them(Lam. iv. 16) The anger (pene) of the Lord is against them that doevil (Ps. xxxiv. 17) Mine anger (Panai) shall go and I will give theerest" (Exod. xxxiii. 14): Then will I set mine anger" (panai) (Lev.xx. 3): there are many other instances.
Another meaning of the word is" the presence and existence of aperson comp." He died in the presence (pene) [i.e., in the lifetime]of all his brethren" (Gen. xxv. is):" And in the presence (pene) ofall the people I will be glorified" (Lev. x. 3):" He will surely cursethee in thy very presence" (paneka) (job i. 11). In the same sensethe word is used in the following passage," And the Lord spakeunto Moses face to face," i.e., both being present, without anyintervening medium between them. Comp." Come, let us look oneanother in the face" (2 Kings xiv. 8): and also" The Lord talkedwith you face to face" (Deut. v. 4): instead of which we read moreplainly in another place," Ye heard the voice of the words, but sawno similitude: only ye heard a voice" (ib. iv. 12). The hearing ofthe voice without seeing any similitude is termed" face to face."Similarly do the words," And the Lord spake unto Moses face toface" correspond to" There he heard the voice of one speakingunto him" (Num. vii. 89), in the description of God's speaking toMoses. Thus it will be clear to you that the perception of theDivine voice without the intervention of an angel is expressed by" face to face." In the same sense the word panim must beunderstood in" And my face (panai) shall not be seen" (Exod.xxxiii. 23) i.e., my true existence, as it is, cannot becomprehended.
The word panim is also used in Hebrew as an adverb of place, inthe sense of" before," or" between the hands." In this sense it isfrequently employed in reference to God: so also in the passage,"And my face (panai) shall not be seen," according to Onkelos, whorenders it," And those before me shall not be seen." He finds herean allusion to the fact, that there are also higher created beings ofsuch superiority that their true nature cannot be perceived by man:viz., the ideals, separate intellects, which in their relation to Godare described as being constantly before Him, or between Hishands, i.e., as enjoying uninterruptedly the closest attention ofDivine Providence. He, i.e., Onkelos, considers that the thingswhich are described as completely perceptible are those beingswhich, as regards existence, are inferior to the ideals, viz.,substance and form: in reference to which we are told," And thoushalt see that which is behind me" (ibid.), i.e., beings, from which,as it were, I turn away, and which I leave behind me. This figure isto represent the utter remoteness of such beings from the Deity.You shall later on (chap. liv.) hear my explanation of what Moses,our teacher, asked for.
The word is also used as an adverb of time, meaning" before."Comp. In former time (le-phanim) in Israel" (Ruth !v. 7):" Of old(le-phanim) hast Thou laid the foundation of the earth" (PS. Cii.25).
Another signification of the word is" attention and regard."Comp." Thou shalt not have regard (pene) to the poor (Lev. xx.15):" And a person receiving attention (panim)" (Isa. iii. 3): Whodoes not show regard (panim)," etc. (Deut. x. 17, etc.). The wordpanim (face) has a similar signification in the blessing," The Lordturn his face to thee" (i.e., The Lord let his providence accompanythee)," and give thee peace."
CHAPTER XXXVIII
THE Hebrew term ahor is a homonym. It is a noun, signifying"back Comp." Behind (ahare) the tabernacle" (Exod. xxvi. 12) Thespear came out behind him (ahroav)" (2 Sam. ii. 23).
It is next used in reference to time, signifying" after" :" neitherafter him (aharav) arose there any like him" (2 Kings xxiii. 25)"After (ahar) these things" (Gen. xv. 1). In this sense the wordoccurs frequently.
The term includes also the idea of following a thing and ofconforming with the moral principles of some other being. Comp."Ye shall walk after (ahare) the Lord, your God" (Dent. xiii. 5):"They shall walk after (ahare) the Lord" (Hos. xi. 10), i.e., followHis will, walk in the way of His actions, and imitate His virtues:"He walked after (ahare) the commandment" (ib. v.11). In thissense the word occurs in Exod us XXXiii. 20," And thou shalt seemy back" (ahorai): thou shalt perceive that which follows me, issimilar to me, and is the result of my will, i.e., all things created byme, as will be explained in the course of this treatise.
CHAPTER XXXIX
THE Hebrew leb (heart) is a homonymous noun, signifying thatorgan which is the source of life to all beings possessing a heart.Comp." And thrust them through the heart of Absalom" (I Sam.xviii. 14).
This organ being in the middle of the body, the word has beenfiguratively applied to express" the middle part of a thing."Comp." unto the midst (leb) of heaven" (Deut. iv.11):" the midst(labbath) of fire" (Exod. iii. 2).
It further denotes" thought." Comp." Went not mine heart withthee ?" (2 Kings V. 26), i.e., I was with thee in my thought when acertain event happened. Similarly must be explained," And that yeseek not after your own heart" (Num. xv, 39), i.e., after your ownthoughts: Whose heart (i.e., whose thought), turneth away this day"(Deut. xxix. is).
The word further signifies" counsel." Comp." All the rest of Israelwere of one heart (i.e., had one plan) to make David king" (IChron. xii. 38):" but fools die for want of heart," i.e., of counsel;" My heart (i.e., my counsel) shall not turn away from this so long asI live" (job xxvii. 6): for this sentence is preceded by the words,My righteousness I hold fast, and will not let it go" : and thenfollows, my heart shall never turn away from this." -- As regardsthe expression yeheraf, I think that it may be compared with thesame verb in the form nehrefet," a handmaid betrothed (nehrefet)to a man" (Lev. XiX. 20), where nehefeth is similar in meaning tothe Arabic munharifat," turning away," and signifies" turning fromthe state of slavery to that of marriage."
Leh (heart) denotes also" will" : comp." And I shall give youpastors according to my will (libbi)" (Jer. iii. 15)," Is thine heartright as my heart is ?" (2 Kings x. 15), i.e., is thy will right as mywill is ? In this sense the word has been figuratively applied toGod. Comp." That shall do according to that which is in mineheart and in my soul" (I Sam. ii. 35), i.e., according to My will;"And mine eyes and mine heart (i.e., My providence and My will)shall be there perpetually" (I Kings ix. 3).
The word is also used in the sense of" understanding." Comp." Forvain man will be endowed with a heart" Uob xi. 12), i.e., will bewise;" A wise man's heart is at his right hand" (Eccles. X. 2), i.e.,his understanding is engaged in perfect thoughts, the highestproblems. Instances of this kind are numerous. It is in this sense,namely, that of understanding, that the word is used wheneverfiguratively applied to God; but exceptionally it is also used in thesense of" will." It must, in each passage, be explained inaccordance with the context. Also, in the following and similarpassages, it signifies" understanding" :" Consider it in thine heart" (Deut. iv. 39):" And none considereth in his heart" (Isa. xliv. 19).Thus, also," Yet the Lord hath not given you an heart to perceive,"is identical in its meaning with" Unto thee it was shown that thoumightest know" (Deut. iv. 35).
As to the passage," And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with allthine heart" (Ib. vi. 5), 1 explain" with all thine heart" to mean"with all the powers of thine heart," that is, with all the powers ofthe body, for they all have their origin in the heart: and the sense ofthe entire passage is : make the knowledge of God the aim of allthy actions, as we have stated in our Commentary on the Mishnah(Aboth, Eight Chapters, v.), and in our Mishneh Torah, yesodehatorah, chap. ii. 2.
CHAPTER XL
Ruab is a homonym, signifying" air," that is, one of the fourelements. Comp." And the air of God moved (Gen. i. 2).
It denotes also," wind." Comp. And the east wind (ruah) broughtthe locusts" (Exod. x. 13):" west wind" (ruah) (ib. 19). In thissense the word occurs frequently.Next, it signifies" breath." Comp." A breath (ruah) that passethaway, and does not come again" (PS. lxxviii. 39) wherein is thebreath (ruah) of life" (Gen. vii. 15).
It signifies also that which remains of mar after his death, and isnot subject to destruction. Comp." And the spirit (ruah) shallreturn unto God who gave it" (Eccles. xii. 7).
Another signification of this word is" the divine inspiration of theprophets whereby they prophesy" -as we shall explain, whenspeaking on prophecy, as far as it is opportune to discuss thissubject in a treatise like this.Comp." And I will take of the spirit(ruah) which is upon thee, and will put it upon them" (Num. xi.17)" And it came to pass, when the spirit (ruah) rested upon them"(ib. 25): The spirit (ruah) of the Lord spake by me (2 Sam. xxiii.2). The term is frequently used in this sense.
The meaning of" intention ... .. will," is likewise contained in theword ruah. Comp." A fool uttereth all his spirit" (ruah) (Prov.xxix.11), i.e., his intention and will:" And the spirit (ruah) ofEgypt shall fail in the midst thereof, and I will destroy the counselthereof" (Isa. xix. 3), i.e., her intentions will be frustrated, and herplans will be obscured;" Who has comprehended the spirit (ruah)of the Lord, or who is familiar with his counsel that he may tell us?" (Isa. xl. 13), i.e., Who knows the order fixed by His will, orperceives the system of His Providence in the existing world, thathe may tell us ? as we shall explain in the chapters in which weshall speak on Providence.
Thus the Hebrew ruah when used in reference to God, hasgenerally the fifth signification: sometimes, however, as explainedabove, the last signification, viz.," will." The meaning of the wordin each individual case is therefore to be determined by thecontext.
CHAPTER XLI
THE Hebrew nefesh (soul) is a homonymous noun, signifying thevitality which is common to all living, sentient beings. E.g."wherein there is a living soul" (nefesh) (Gen. i. 30). It denotes alsoblood," as in" Thou shalt not eat the blood (nefesh) with the meat" (Dent. xii. 23). Another signification of the term is" reason," thatis, the distinguishing characteristic of man, as in" As the Lordliveth that made us this soul" (Jer. xxxviii. 16). It denotes also thepart of man that remains after his death (nefesh, soul) comp." Butthe soul (nefesh) of my lord shall be bound in the bundle of life (ISam. XXV. 29). Lastly, it denotes" will" ; comp." To bind hisprinces at his will" (be-nafsho) (PS. CV. 22): Thou wilt not deliverme unto the will (be-nefesh) of my enemies" (Ps. xli. 3): andaccording to my opinion, it has this meaning also in the followingpassages," If it be your will (nafshekem) that I should bury mydead" (Gen. xxiii. 8):" Though Moses and Samuel stood beforeme, yet my will (nafshi) could not be toward this people" (Jer. xv.1), that is, I had no pleasure in them, I did not wish to preservethem. When nefesh is used in reference to God, it has the meaning(swill," as we have already explained with reference to thepassage," That shall do according to that which is in my will(bi-lebabi) and in mine intention (be-nafsht)" (I Sam. ii. 35).Simiiarly we explain the phrase," And his will (nafsho) to troubleIsrael ceased" (Judg. x. 16). Jonathan, the son of Uzziel [in theTargum of the Prophets], did not translate this passage, because heunderstood nafshi to have the first signification, and finding,therefore, in these words sensation ascribed to God, he omittedthem from his translation. If, however, nefesh be here taken in thelast signification, the sentence can well be explained. For in thepassage which precedes, it is stated that Providence abandoned theIsraelites, and left them on the brink of death: then they cried andprayed for help, but in vain. When, however, they had thoroughlyrepented, when their misery had increased, and their enemy hadhad power over them, He showed mercy to them, and His will tocontinue their trouble and misery ceased. Note it well, for it isremarkable. The preposition ba in this passage has the force of thepreposition min (" from" or 11 of" ): and ba'amal is identical withme'amal. Grammarians give many instances of this use of thepreposition ba :" And that which remaineth of (ba) the flesh and of(ba) the bread" (Lev. viii. 32):" If there remains but few of (ba)the years" (ib. xxv. 52):" Of (ba) the strangers and of (ba) thoseborn in the land" (Exod. xii. 19).
CHAPTER XLII
Hai (" living" ) signifies a sentient organism (lit." growing" and"having sensation" ), comp." Every moving thing that liveth" (Gen.ix. 3): it also denotes recovery from a severe illness :" And wasrecovered (va-yehi) of his sickness" (Isa. xxxviii. 0' ): 11 In thecamp till they recovered" (hayotam) (josh. v. 8):" quick, raw (bat)flesh" (Lev. xiii. 10).
Mavet signifies" death" and" severe illness," as in" His heartdied (va-yamot) within him, and he became as a stone" (I Sam.xxv. 37), that is, his illness was severe. For this reason it is statedconcerning the son of the woman of Zarephath," And his sicknesswas so sore, that there was no breath left in him" (I Kings xvii.17). The simple expression va-yamoth would have given the ideathat he was very ill, near death, like Nabal when he heard what hadtaken place.
Some of the Andalusian authors say that his breath was suspended,so that no breathing could be perceived at all, as sometimes aninvalid is seized with a fainting fit or an attack of asphyxia, and itcannot be discovered whether he is alive or dead: in this conditionthe patient may remain a day or two.
The term hai has also been employed in reference to theacquisition of wisdom. Comp." So shall they be life (hayyim) untothy soul" (Prov. iii. 22):" For whoso findeth me findeth life" (ib.viii. 35):" For they are life (hayyim) to those that find them" (ib.iv. 22). Such instances are numerous. In accordance with thismetaphor, true principles are called life, and corrupt principlesdeath. Thus the Almighty says," See, I have set before thee thisday life and good and death and evil" (Dent. xxx. 15), showingthat" life" and" good,"" death" and" evil," are identical, andthen He explains these terms. In the same way I understand Hiswords," That ye may live" (ib. v. 33), in accordance with thetraditional interpretation of" That it may be well with thee" [scil.in the life to come] (ib. xxii. 7). In consequence of the frequent useof this figure in our language our Sages said," The righteous evenin death are called living, while the wicked even in life are calleddead." (Talm. B. Berakkoth, P. 78). Note this well.
CHAPTER XLIII
THE Hebrew kanaf is a homonym; most of its meanings aremetaphorical. Its primary signification is" wing of a flyingcreature," e.g.," Any winged (kanaf) fowl that flieth in the air"(Deut. iv. 17).
The term was next applied figuratively to the wings or comers ofgarments comp." upon the four corners (kanfoth) of thy vesture"(ib. xxii. 12).
It was also used to denote the ends of the inhabited part of theearth, and the corners that are most distant from our habitation.Comp." That it might take hold of the ends (kanfoth) of the earth"(job xxxviii. 13):" From the uttermost part (kenaf) of the earthhave we heard songs" (Isa. xxiv. 16).
Ibn Ganab (in his Book of Hebrew Roots) says that kenaf is used inthe sense of" concealing," in analogy with the Arabic kanaftualshaian," I have hidden something," and accordingly explains,Isaiah xxx. 20," And thy teacher will no longer be hidden orconcealed." It is a good explanation, and I think that kenaf has thesame meaning in Deuteronomy xxiii. 1," He shall not take awaythe cover (kenaf) of his father" : also in," Spread, therefore, thycover (kenafeka) over thine handmaid" (Ruth iii. 9). In this sense, Ithink, the word is figuratively applied to God and to angels (forangels are not corporeal, according to my opinion, as I shallexplain). Ruth ii. 12 must therefore be translated" Under whoseprotection (kenafav) thou art come to trust" : and wherever theword occurs in reference to angels, it means concealment. Youhave surely noticed the words of Isaiah (Isa. Vi. 2)," With twainhe covered his face, and with twain he covered his feet." Theirmeaning is this: The cause of his (the angel's) existence is hiddenand concealed; this is meant by the covering of the face. Thethings of which he (the angel) is the cause, and which are called"his feet" (as I stated in speaking of the homonym regel, arelikewise concealed: for the actions of the intelligences are notseen, and their ways are, except after long study, not understood,on account of two reasons -- the one of which is contained in theirown properties, the other in ourselves: that is to say, because ourperception is imperfect and the ideals are difficult to be fullycomprehended. As regards the phrase" and with twain he flieth," Ishall explain in a special chapter (x1ix.) why flight has beenattributed to angels.
CHAPTER XLIV
THE Hebrew ayin is a homonym, signifying" fountain" ; e.g.," Bya fountain (,en) of water" (Gen. xvi. 7). It next denotes" eye" :comp. ('ayin)" Eye for eye" (Exod. xxi. 24). Another meaning ofthe word is" providence," as it is said concerning Jeremiah," Takehim and direct thine attention (eneka) to him" (Jer. xxxix. 12). Inthis figurative sense it is to be understood when used in referenceto God; e.g.," And my providence and my pleasure shall be thereperpetually" (I Kings ix. 3), as we have already explained (page140):" The eyes ('ene), i.e., the Providence of the Lord thy God,are always upon it" (Deut. xi. 12):" They are the eyes ('ene) of theLord, which run to and fro through the whole earth" (Zech. iv. 10),i.e., His providence is extended over everything that is on earth, aswill be explained in the chapters in which we shall treat ofProvidence. When, however, the word" eye" is connected withthe verb" to see," (raah or hazah) as in" Open thine eyes, and see"(I Kings xix. 16):" His eyes behold" (Ps. xi. 4), the phrase denotesperception of the mind, not that of the senses: for every sensationis a passive state, as is well known to you, and God is active, neverpassive, as will be explained by me.
CHAPTER XLV
Shama, is used homonymously. It signifies" to hear," and also" toobey." As regards the first signification, comp." Neither let it beheard out of thy mouth" (Exod. xxiii. 13):" And the fame thereofwas heard in Pharaoh's house" (Gen. xlv. 26). Instances of thiskind are numerous.
Equally frequent are the instances of this verb being used in thesense of" to obey" :" And they hearkened (shame,#) not untoMoses" (Exod. vi. 9)." If they obey (yishme'u) and serve him (jobxxxvi. 11):" Shall we then hearken (nishma') unto you" (Neh. xiii.27) Whosoever will not hearken (yishma') unto thy words" (josh. i.18).
The verb also signifies" to know" (" to understand" ), comp." Anation whose tongue, i.e., its language, thou shalt not understand"(tishma') (Deut. xxviii. 49). The verb shama', used in reference toGod, must be taken in the sense of perceiving, which is part of thethird signification, whenever, according to the literal interpretationof the passage, it appears to have the first meaning: comp." Andthe Lord heard it" (Num. xi. 1):" For that He heareth yourmurmurings" (Exod. xvi. 7). In all such passages mentalperception is meant. When, however, according to the literalinterpretation the verb appears to have the second signification, itimplies that God responded to the prayer of man and fulfilled hiswish, or did not respond and did not fulfil his wish:" I will surelyhear his cry" (Exod. xxii. 23):" I will hear, for I am gracious" (ib.27):" Bow down thine ear, and hear" (2 Kings xix. 16):" But theLord would not hearken to your voice, nor give ear unto you"(Deut. i. 45):" Yea, when ye make many prayers, I will not hear"(Isa. i. 15):" For I will not hear thee 11 (Jer. vii. 16). There aremany instances in which shama' has this sense.
Remarks will now be presented to you on these metaphors andsimiles, which will quench your thirst, and explain to you all theirmeanings without leaving a doubt.
CHAPTER XLVI
WE have already stated, in one of the chapters of this treatise, thatthere is a great difference between bringing to view the existenceof a thing and demonstrating its true essence. We can lead othersto notice the existence of an object by pointing to its accidents,actions, or even most remote relations to other objects: e.g., if youwish to describe the king of a country to one of his subjects whodoes not know him, you can give a description and an account ofhis existence in many ways. You will either say to him, the tallman with a fair complexion and grey hair is the king, thusdescribing him by his accidents; or you will say, the king is theperson round whom are seen a great multitude of men on horseand on foot, and soldiers with drawn swords, over whose headbanners are waving, and before whom trumpets are sounded; or itis the person living in the palace in a particular region of a certaincountry: or it is the person who ordered the building of that wall,or the construction of that bridge: or by some other similar actsand things relating to him. His existence can be demonstrated in astill more indirect way, e.g., if you are asked whether this land hasa king, you will undoubtedly answer in the affirmative." Whatproof have you ?" " The fact that this banker here, a weak and littleperson, stands before this large mass of gold pieces, and that poorman, tall and strong, who stands before him asking in vain foralms of the weight of a carob-grain, is rebuked and is compelled togo away by the mere force of words: for had he not feared theking, he would, without hesitation, have killed the banker, orpushed him away and taken as much of the money as he could."Consequently, this is a proof that this country has a ruler and hisexistence is proved by the well-regulated affairs of the country, onaccount of which the king is respected and the punishmentsdecreed by him are feared. In this whole example nothing ismentioned that indicated his characteristics, and his essentialproperties, by virtue of which he is king. The same is the case withthe information concerning the Creator given to the ordinaryclasses of men in all prophetical books and in the Law. For it wasfound necessary to teach all of them that God exists, and that He isin every respect the most perfect Being, that is to say, He exists notonly in the sense in which the earth and the heavens exist, but Heexists and possesses life, wisdom, power, activity, and all otherproperties which our belief in His existence must include, as willbe shown below. That God exists was therefore shown to ordinarymen by means of similes taken from physical bodies; that He isliving, by a simile taken from motion, because ordinary menconsider only the body as fully, truly, and undoubtedly existing;that which is connected with a body but is itself not a body,although believed to exist, has a lower degree of existence onaccount of its dependence on the body for existence. That,however, which is neither itself a body, nor a force within a body,is not existent according to man's first notions, and is above allexcluded from the range of imagination. In the same mannermotion is considered by the ordinary man as identical with life;what cannot move voluntarily from place to place has no life,although motion is not part of the definition of life, but an accidentconnected with it. The perception by the senses, especially byhearing and seeing, is best known to us; we have no idea or notionof any other mode of communication between the soul of oneperson and that of another than by means of speaking, i.e., by thesound produced by lips, tongue, and the other organs of speech.When, therefore, we are to be informed that God has a knowledgeof things, and that communication is made by Him to the Prophetswho convey it to us, they represent Him to us as seeing andhearing, i.e., as perceiving and knowing those things which can beseen and heard. They represent Him to us as speaking, i.e., thatcommunications from Him reach the Prophets; that is to beunderstood by the term" prophecy," as will be fully explained.God is described as working, because we do not know any othermode of producing a thing except by direct touch. He is said tohave a soul in the sense that He is living, because all living beingsare generally supposed to have a soul; although the term soul is, ashas been shown, a homonym.
Again, since we perform all these actions only by means ofcorporeal organs, we figuratively ascribe to God the organs oflocomotion, as feet, and their soles; organs of hearing, seeing, andsmelling, as ear, eye, and nose; organs and substance of speech, asmouth, tongue, and sound; organs for the performance of work, ashand, its fingers, its palm, and the arm. In short, these organs ofthe body are figuratively ascribed to God, who is above allimperfection, to express that He performs certain acts: and theseacts are figuratively ascribed to Him to express that He possessescertain perfections different from those acts themselves. E.g., wesay that He has eyes, ears, hands, a mouth, a tongue, to expressthat He sees, hears, acts, and speaks: but seeing and hearing areattributed to Him to indicate simply that He perceives. You thusfind in Hebrew instances in which the perception of the one senseis named instead of the other; thus," See the word of the Lord"(Jer. ii, 31), in the same meaning as" Hear the word of the Lord,"for the sense of the phrase is," Perceive what He says" : similarlythe phrase," See the smell of my son" (Gen. xxvii. 27) has thesame meaning as" Smell the smell of my son," for it relates to theperception of the smell. In the same way are used the words," Andall the people saw the thunders and the lightnings" (Exod. xx. 15),although the passage also contains the description of a propheticalvision, as is well known and understood among our people. Actionand speech are likewise figuratively applied to God, to express thata certain influence has emanated from Him, as win be explained(chap. lxv and chap. lxvi.). The physical organs which areattributed to God in the writings of the Prophets are either organsof locomotion, indicating life: organs of sensation, indicatingperception: organs of touch, indicating action: or organs of speech,indicating the divine inspiration of the Prophets, as will beexplained.
The object of all these indications is to establish in our minds thenotion of the existence of a living being, the Maker of everything,who also possesses a knowledge of the things which He has made.We shall explain, when we come to speak of the inadmissibility ofDivine attributes, that all these various attributes convey but onenotion, viz., that of the essence of God. The sole object of thischapter is to explain in what sense physical organs are ascribed tothe Most Perfect Being, namely, that they are mere indications ofthe actions generally performed by means of these organs. Suchactions being perfections respecting ourselves, are predicated ofGod, because we wish to express that He is most perfect in everyrespect, as we remarked above in explaining the Rabbinicalphrase," The language of the Torah is like the language of man."Instances of organs of locomotion being applied to the Creatoroccur as follows :-" My footstool" (Isa. 1xvi. 1):" the place of thesoles of my feet (Ezek. xliii. 7). For examples of organs of touchapplied to God, comp. the hand of the Lord" (Exod. ix. 3):" withthe finger of God" (ib. xxxi. 18):" the work of thy fingers" (Ps.viii. 4)," And thou hast laid thine hand upon me" (ib. cxxxix. 5):"The arm of the Lord" (Isa. liii. 1):" Thy right hand, 0 Lord" (Exod.xv. 6). In instances like the following, organs of speech areattributed to God :" The mouth of the Lord has spoken" (Isa. i.20):" And He would open His lips against thee" (Job xi. 5):" Thevoice of the Lord is powerful" (Ps. xxix. 4):" And his tongue as adevouring fire" (Isa. XXX. 27). Organs of sensation are attributedto God in instances like the following :" His eyes behold, Hiseyelids try" (Ps. xi. 4):" The eyes of the Lord which run to andfro" (Zech. iv. 10):" Bow down thine car unto me, and hear" (2Kings xix. 16):" You have kindled a fire in my nostril" (Jer. xvii.5). Of the inner parts of the human body only the heart isfiguratively applied to God, because" heart" is a homonym, anddenotes also" intellect" : it is besides the source of animal life. Inphrases like" my bowels are troubled for him" (Jer. XXXi. 20):"The sounding of thy bowels" (Isa. Ixiii. 15), the term" bowels" isused in the sense of" heart" : for the term" bowels" is used bothin a general and in a specific meaning; it denotes specifically"bowels," but more generally it can be used as the name of anyinner organ, including" heart." The correctness of this argumentcan be proved by the phrase" And thy law is within my bowels"(Ps. xl. g), which is identical with" And thy law is within myheart." For that reason the prophet employed in this verse thephrase 11 my bowels are troubled" (and 11 the sounding of thybowels" ): the verb hamah is in fact used more frequently inconnection with" heart," than with any other organ; comp." Myheart maketh a noise (homeh) in me" (Jer. iv. 19). Similarly, theshoulder is never used as a figure in reference to God, because it isknown as a mere instrument of transport, and also comes intoclose contact with the thing which it carries. With far greaterreason the organs of nutrition are never attributed to God: they areat once recognized as signs of imperfection. In fact all organs, boththe external and the internal, are employed in the various actionsof the soul: some, as e.g., all inner organs, are the means ofpreserving the individual for a certain time: others, as the organs ofgeneration, are the means of preserving the species; others are themeans of improving the condition of man and bringing his actionsto perfection, as the hands, the feet, and the eyes, all of which tendto render motion, action, and perception more perfect. Animatebeings require motion in order to be able to approach that which isconducive to their welfare, and to move away from the opposite:they require the senses in order to be able to discern what isinjurious to them and what is beneficial. In addition, man requiresvarious kinds of handiwork, to prepare his food, clothing, anddwelling; and he is compelled by his physical constitution toperform such work, namely, to prepare what is good for him. Somekinds of work also occur among certain animals, as far as suchwork is required by those animals. I do not believe that any mancan doubt the correctness of the assertion that the Creator is not inneed of anything for the continuance of His existence, or for theimprovement of His condition. Therefore, God has no organs, or,what is the same, He is not corporeal; His actions areaccomplished by His Essence, not by any organ, and asundoubtedly physical forces are connected with the organs, Hedoes not possess any such forces, that is to say, He has, besides HisEssence, nothing that could be the cause of His action, Hisknowledge, or His will, for attributes are nothing but forces undera different name. It is not my intention to discuss the question inthis chapter. Our Sages laid down a general principle, by which theliteral sense of the physical attributes of God mentioned by theprophets is rejected; a principle which evidently shows that ourSages were far from the belief in the corporeality of God, and thatthey did not think any person capable of misunderstanding it, orentertaining any doubt about it. For that reason they employ in theTalmud and the Midrashim phrases similar to those contained inthe prophecies, without any circumlocution; they knew that therecould not be any doubt about their metaphorical character, or anydanger whatever of their being misunderstood; and that all suchexpressions would be understood as figurative [language],employed to communicate to the intellect the notion of Hisexistence. Now, it was well known that in figurative language Godis compared to a king who commands, cautions, punishes, andrewards, his subjects, and whose servants and attendants publishhis orders, so that they might be acted upon, and they also executewhatever he wishes. Thus the Sages adopted that figure, used itfrequently, and introduced such speech, consent, and refusal of aking, and other usual acts of kings, as became necessary by thatfigure. In all these instances they were sure that no doubt orconfusion would arise from it. The general principle alluded toabove is contained in the following saying of our Sages, mentionedin Bereshith Rabba (c. xxvii.)," Great was the power of theProphets; they compared the creature to its Creator; comp. 'Andover the resemblance of the throne was a resemblance like theappearance of man '" (Ezek. i. 26). They have thus plainly statedthat all those images which the Prophets perceived, i.e. inprophetic visions, are images created by God. This is perfectlycorrect; for every image in our imagination has been created. Howpregnant is the expression," Great is their boldness!" Theyindicated by it, that they themselves found it very remarkable; forwhenever they perceived a word or act difficult to explain, orapparently objectionable, they used that phrase: e.g., a certainRabbi has performed the act (of" hali ah" ) with a slipper, aloneand by night. Another Rabbi, thereupon exclaimed How great ishis boldness to have followed the opinion of the minority." TheChaldee phrase rab gubreh in the original of the latter quotation,and the Hebrew gadol koho in that of the former quotation, havethe same meaning, viz., Great is the power of (or the boldness of).Hence, in the preceding quotation, the sense is, How remarkable isthe language which the Prophets were obliged to use when theyspeak of God the Creator in terms signifying properties of beingscreated by Him. This deserves attention. Our Sages have thusstated in distinct and plain terms that they are far from believing inthe corporeality of God; and in the figures and forms seen in aprophetical vision, though belonging to created beings, theProphets, to use the words of our Sages," compared the creature toits Creator." If, however, after these explanations, any one wishesout of malice to cavil at them, and to find fault with them, thoughtheir method is neither comprehended nor understood by him, theSages o.b.m. will sustain no injury by it.
CHAPTER XLVII
WE have already stated several times that the prophetic booksnever attribute to God anything which ordinary men consider adefect, or which they cannot in their imagination combine with theidea of the Almighty, although such terms may not otherwise bedifferent from those which were employed as metaphors inrelation to Goa. Indeed all things which are attributed to God areconsidered in some way to be perfection, or can at least beimagined [as appertaining to Him].
We must now show why, according to this principle, the senses ofhearing, sight and smell, are attributed to God, but not those oftaste and touch. He is equally elevated above the use of all the fivesenses: they are all defective as regards perception, even for thosewho have no other source of knowledge: because they are passive,receive impressions from without, and are subject to interruptionsand sufferings, as much as the other organs of the body. By savingthat God sees, we mean to state that He perceives visible things:"he hears" is identical with saying" He perceives audible things" :in the same way we might say," He tastes and He touches," in thesense of" He perceives objects which man perceives by means oftaste and touch." For, as regards perception, the senses areidentical: if we deny the existence of one sensation in God, wemust deny that of all other sensations, i.e., the perceptions of thefive senses: and if we attribute the existence of one sensation toHim, i.e., the perception appertaining to one of the senses, we mustattribute all the five sensations. Nevertheless, we find in HolyWrit," And God saw" (Gen. vi. 5):" And God heard" (Num. xi. 1):"And God smelt" (Gen. Viii. 2 1): but we do not meet with theexpressions," And God tasted,"" And God touched." According toour opinion the reason of this is to be found in the idea, which hasa firm hold in the minds of all men, that Goddoesnotcome intocontact with a body in the same manner as one body comes intocontact with another, since He is not even seen by the eye. Whilethese two senses, namely, taste and touch, only act when in closecontact with the object, by sight, hearing, and smell, even distantobjects are perceived. These, therefore, were considered by themultitude appropriate expressions [to be figuratively applied toGod]. Besides, the object in figuratively applying the sensations toHim, could only have been to express that He perceives ouractions: but hearing and sight are sufficient for that, namely, forthe perception of what a man does or says. Thus our Sages, amongother admonitions, gave the following advice and warning:" Knowwhat is above thee, a seeing eye, and a hearing ear." (MishnahAbot, ii.1.)
You, however, know that, strictly speaking, the condition of all thesensations is the same, that the same argument which is employedagainst the existence of touch and taste in God, may be usedagainst sight, hearing, and smell; for they all are materialperceptions and impressions which are subject to change. There isonly this difference, that the former, touch and taste, are at oncerecognized as deficiencies, while the others are considered asperfections. In a similar manner the defect of the imagination iseasily seen, less easily that of thinking and reasoning. Imagination(ra'ayon) therefore, was never employed as a figure in speaking ofGod, while thought and reason are figuratively ascribed to Him.Comp." The thoughts which the Lord thought" (Jer. XEX. 20):"And with his understanding he stretched out the heavens" (ib. x.12). The inner senses were thus treated in the same way as theexternal; some are figuratively applied to God, some not. All thisis according to the language of man; he ascribes to God what heconsiders a perfection, and does not ascribe to Him what heconsiders a defect. In truth, however, no real attribute, implying anaddition to His essence, can be applied to Him, as will be proved.
CHAPTER XLVIII
WHENEVER in the Pentateuch the term" to hear" is applied toGod, Onkelos, the Proselyte, does not translate it literally, butparaphrases it, merely expressing that a certain speech reachedHim, i.e., He perceived it, or that He accepted it or did not accept,when it refers to supplication and prayer as its object. The words"God heard" are therefore paraphrased by him regularly either," Itwas heard before the Lord," or" He accepted" when employed inreference to supplication and prayer; [e.g.]" I will. surely accept,"lit. I will surely hear" (Exod. XXii. 22). This principle is followedby Onkelos in his translation of the Pentateuch without anyexception. But as regards the verb" to see," (raah), his renderingsvary in a remarkable manner, and I was unable to discern hisprinciple or method. In some instances he translates literally," andGod saw" : in others he paraphrases" it was revealed before theLord." The use of the phrase va-haza adonai by Onkelos issufficient evidence that the term haza in Chaldee is homonymous,and that it denotes mental perception as well as the sensation ofsight. This being the case, I am surprised that, in some instancesavoiding the literal rendering, he substituted for it" And it wasrevealed before the Lord." When I, however, examined the variousreadings in the version of Onkelos, which 1 either saw myself orheard from others during the time of my studies, 1 found that theterm" to see" when connected with wrong, injury, or violence,was paraphrased," It was manifest before
was manifest before the Lord."
There is no doubt that the term haza in Chaldee denotes completeapprehension and reception of the object in the state in which ithas been perceived. When Onkelos, therefore, found the verb" tosee" connected with the object" wrong," he did not render itliterally, but paraphrased it," It was revealed before the Lord."Now, I noticed that in all instances of the Pentateuch where seeingis ascribed to God, he translated it literally, except those instanceswhich I will mention to you :" For my affliction was revealedbefore the Lord" (Gen. xxix. 32):" For all that Laban doeth untothee is revealed before me" (ib. xxxi. 12):-although the firstperson in the sentence refers to the angel [and not to God],Onkelos does not ascribe to him that perception which impliescomplete comprehension of the object, because the object is"iniquity" -" The oppression of the children of Israel was known tothe Lord" (Exod. ii. 25):" The oppression of my people was surelyknown to me" (ib. iii. 7):" The affliction is known to me" (ib. 9):"Their oppression is known to me" (ib. iv. 31):" This people isknown to me" (ib. xxxii. 9), i.e., their rebellion is known tomecomp. the Targurn of the passage," And God saw the childrenof Israel (ib. ii. 25), which is equal to" He saw their affliction andtheir trouble" " And it was known to the Lord, and he abhorredthem" (Dent. xxxii. 19):" It was known to him that their powerwas gone" (ib. 36): in this instance the object of the perception islikewise the wrong done to the Israelites, and the increasing powerof the enemy. In all these examples Onkelos is consistent,following the maxim expressed in the words," Thou canst not lookon iniquity" (Hab. i. 13): wherefore he renders the verb" to see,"when referring to oppression or rebellion, It is revealed beforehim, etc. This appropriate and satisfactory explanation, thecorrectness of which 1 do not doubt, is weakened by threepassages, in which, according to this view, I expected to find theverb" to see" paraphrased" to be revealed before him," but foundinstead the literal rendering" to see in the various copies of theTargum. The following are the three passages" And God saw thatthe wickedness of man was great upon the earth (Gen. vi. 6)" Andthe Lord saw the earth, and behold it was corrupt (ib. vi. 12): andGod saw that Leah was hated" (ib. xxx. 3). It appears to me that inthese passages there is a mistake, which has crept into the copiesof the Targum, since we do not possess the Targum in the originalmanuscript of Onkelos, for in that case we should have assumedthat he had a satisfactory explanation of it.
In rendering Genesis xxii. 8," the lamb is known to the Lord," heeither wished to indicate that the Lord was not expected to seekand to bring it, or he considered it inappropriate, in Chaldee toconnect the divine perception with one of the lower animals.
However, the various copies of the Targum must be carefullyexamined with regard to this point, and if you still find thosepassages the same as I quoted them, I cannot explain what hemeant.
CHAPTER XLIX
THE angels are likewise incorporeal: they are intelligenceswithout matter, but they are nevertheless created beings, and Godcreated them, as will be explained below. In Bereshith Rabbah (onGen. iii. 24) we read the following remark of our Sages:" Theangel is called 'the flame of the sword which turned every way'(Gen. iii. 24), in accordance with the words, 'His ministers aflaming fire ' (Ps. civ. 4): the attribute, which turned every way ' isadded, because angels are changeable in form they appear at onetime as males, at another as females; now as spirits; now asangels." By this remark they clearly stated that angels areincorporeal, and have no permanent bodily form independent ofthe mind [of him who perceives them], they exist entirely inprophetic vision, and depend on the action of the imaginativepower, as will be explained when speaking on the true meaning ofprophecy. As to the words" at another time as females," whichimply that the Prophets in prophetical vision perceived angels alsoin the form of women, they refer to the vision of Zechariah (v. 9),"And, behold, there came out two women, and the wind was in theirwings." You know very well how difficult it is for men to form anotion of anything immaterial, and entirely devoid of corporeality,except after considerable training : it is especially difficult forthose who do not distinguish between objects of the intellect andobjects of the imagination, and depend mostly on the mereimaginative power. They believe that all imagined things exist orat least have the possibility of existing: but that which cannot beimagined does not exist, and cannot exist. For persons of thisclass-and the majority of thinkers belong to it-cannot arrive at thetrue solution of any question, or at the explanation of anythingdoubtful. On account of this difficulty the prophetic books containexpressions which, taken literally, imply that angels are corporeal,moving about, endowed with human form, receiving commands ofGod, obeying His word and performing whatever He wishes,according to His command. All this only serves to lead to thebelief that angels exist, and are alive and perfect, in the same wayas we have explained in reference to God. If the figurativerepresentation of angels were limited to this, their true essencewould be believed to be the same as the essence of God, since, inreference to the Creator expressions are likewise employed, whichliterally imply that He is corporeal, living, moving and endowedwith human form. In order, therefore, to give to the mind of menthe idea that the existence of angels is lower than the existence ofGod, certain forms of lower animals were introduced in thedescription of angels. It was thereby shown, that the existence ofGod is more perfect than that of angels, as much as man is moreperfect than the lower animals. Nevertheless no organ of the brutecreation was attributed to the angels except wings. Without wingsthe act of flying appears as impossible as that of walking withoutlegs: for these two modes of motion can only be imagined inconnection with these organs. The motion of flying has beenchosen as a symbol to represent that angels possess life, because itis the most perfect and most sublime movement of the brutecreation. Men consider this motion a perfection to such an extentthat they themselves wish to be able to fly, in order to escapeeasily what is injurious, and to obtain quickly what is useful,though it be at a distance. For this reason this motion has beenattributed to the angels.
There is besides another reason. The bird in its flight is sometimesvisible, sometimes withdrawn from our sight; one moment near tous, and in the next far off: and these are exactly the circumstanceswhich we must associate with the idea of angels, as will beexplained below. This imaginary perfection, the motion of flight,being the exclusive property of the brute creation, has never beenattributed to God. You must not be misled by the passage," And herode upon a cherub, and he did fly" (Ps. xviii. 10), for it is thecherub that did fly, and the simile only serves to denote the rapidarrival of that which is referred to in that passage. Comp. :"Behold, the Lord rideth upon a swift cloud, and shall come intoEgypt" (Isa. xix. 1): that is, the punishment alluded to will comedown quickly upon Egypt. Nor should expressions like" the faceof an ox,"" the face of a lion,"" the face of an eagle ... .. the soleof the foot of a calf," found in the prophecies of Ezekiel (i. 10 and7) mislead you: for all these are explained in a different manner, asyou will learn later, and besides, the prophet only describes theanimals (havyot). The subject will be explained (III. 1.), though bymere hints, as far as necessary, for directing your attention to thetrue interpretation.
The motion of flying, frequently mentioned in the Bible,necessitates, according to our imagination, the existence of wings:wings are therefore given to the angels as symbols expressive oftheir existence, not of their true essence. You must also bear inmind that whenever a thing moves very quickly, it is said to fly, asthat term implies great velocity of motion. Comp." As the eagleflieth" (Deut. xxviii- 49). The eagle flies and moves with greatervelocity than any other bird, and therefore it is introduced in thissimile. Furthermore, the wings are the organs [lit. causes] of flight;hence the number of the wings of angels in the prophetic visioncorresponds to the number of the causes which set a thing inmotion, but this does not belong to the theme of this chapter.(Comp. Il. iv. and x.)
CHAPTER L
WHEN reading my present treatise, bear in mind that by" faith"we do not understand merely that which is uttered with the lips,but also that which is apprehended by the soul, the conviction thatthe object [of belief] is exactly as it is apprehended. If, as regardsreal or supposed truths, you content yourself with giving utteranceto them in words, without apprehending them or believing in them,especially if you do not seek real truth, you have a very easy taskas, in fact, you will find many ignorant people professing articlesof faith without connecting any idea with them.
If, however, you have a desire to rise to a higher state, viz., that ofreflection, and truly to hold the conviction that God is One andpossesses true unity, without admitting plurality or divisibility inany sense whatever, you must understand that God has no essentialattribute in any form or in any sense whatever, and that therejection of corporeality implies the rejection of essentialattributes. Those who believe that God is One, and that He hasmany attributes, declare the unity with their lips, and assumeplurality in their thoughts. This is like the doctrine of theChristians, who say that He is one and He is three, and that thethree are one. Of the same character is the doctrine of those whosay that God is One, but that He has many attributes; and that Hewith His attributes is One, although they deny corporeality andaffirm His most absolute freedom from matter; as if our objectwere to seek forms of expression, not subjects of belief. For beliefis only possible after the apprehension of a thing; it consists in theconviction that the thing apprehended has its existence beyond themind [in reality] exactly as it is conceived in the mind. If inaddition to this we are convinced that the thing cannot be differentin any way from what we believe it to be, and that no reasonableargument can be found for the rejection of the belief or for theadmission of any deviation from it, then the belief is true.Renounce desires and habits, follow your reason, and study what Iam going to say in the chapters which follow on the rejection ofthe attributes; you will then be fully convinced of what we havesaid: you will be of those who truly conceive the Unity of God, notof those who utter it with their lips without thought, like men ofwhom it has been said," Thou art near in their mouth, and far fromtheir reins" (Jer. Xii. 2). It is right that a man should belong to thatclass of men who have a conception of truth and understand it,though they do not speak of it. Thus the pious are advised andaddressed," Commune with your own heart upon your bed and bestill. Selah." (Ps. iv. S.)
CHAPTER LI
THERE are many things whose existence is manifest and obvious;some of these are innate notions or objects of sensation, others arenearly so: and in fact they would require no proof if man had beenleft in his primitive state. Such are the existence of motion, ofman's free will, of phases of production and destruction, and of thenatural properties perceived by the senses, e.g., the heat of fire, thecoldness of water, and many other similar things. False notions,however, may be spread either by a person labouring under error,or by one who has some particular end in view, and whoestablishes theories contrary to the real nature of things, bydenying the existence of things perceived by the senses, or byaffirming the existence of what does not exist. Philosophers arethus required to establish by proof things which are selfevident,and to disprove the existence of things which only exist in man'simagination. Thus Aristotle gives a proof for the existence ofmotion, because it had been denied: he disproves the reality ofatoms, because it had been asserted.
To the same class belongs the rejection of essential attributes inreference
to God. For it is a self-evident truth that the attribute isnot inherent in the
object to which it is ascribed, but it issuperadded to its essence, and is
consequently an accident: if theattribute denoted the essence [
Some thinkers have gone so far as to say that the attributes of Godare neither His essence nor anything extraneous to His essence.This is like the assertion of some theorists, that the ideals, i.e., theuniversalia, are neither existing nor non-existent, and like theviews of others, that the atom does not fill a definite place, butkeeps an atom of space occupied; that man has no freedom ofaction at all, but has acquirement. Such things are only said: theyexist only in words, not in thought, much less in reality. But as youknow, and as all know who do not delude themselves, thesetheories are preserved by a multitude of words, by misleadingsimiles sustained by declamation and invective, and by numerousmethods borrowed both from dialectics and sophistry. If afteruttering them and supporting them by such words, a man were toexamine for himself his own belief on this subject, he would seenothing but confusion and stupidity in an endeavour to prove theexistence of things which do not exist, or to find a mean betweentwo opposites that have no mean. Or is there a mean betweenexistence and non-existence, or between the identity andnon-identity of two things ? But, as we said, to such absurditiesmen were forced by the great licence given to the imagination, andby the fact that every existing material thing is necessarilyimagined as a certain substance possessing several attributes; fornothing has ever been found that consists of one simple substancewithout any attribute. Guided by such imaginations, men thoughtthat God was also composed of many different elements, viz., ofHis essence and of the attributes superadded to His essence.Following up this comparison, some believed that God wascorporeal, and that He possessed attributes: others, abandoning thistheory, denied the corporeality, but retained the attributes. Theadherence to the literal sense of the text of Holy'Writ is the sourceof all this error, as I shall show in some of the chapters devoted tothis theme.
CHAPTER LII
EVERY description of an object by an affirmative attribute, whichincludes the assertion that an object is of a certain kind, must bemade in one of the following five ways :
First. The object is described by its definition, as e.g., man isdescribed as a being that lives and has reason: such a description,containing the true essence of the object, is, as we have alreadyshown, nothing else but the explanation of a name. All agree thatthis kind of description cannot be given of God: for there are noprevious causes to His existence, by which He could be defined:and on that account it is a well-known principle, received by allthe philosophers, who are precise in their statements, that nodefinition can be given of God.
Secondly. An object is described by part of its definition, as when,e.g., man is described as a living being or as a rational being. Thiskind of description includes the necessary connection [of the twoideas]: for when we say that every man is rational we mean by itthat every being which has the characteristics of man must alsohave reason. All agree that this kind of description is inappropriatein reference to God: for if we were to speak of a portion of Hisessence, we should consider His essence to be a compound. Theinappropriateness of this kind of description in reference to God isthe same as that of the preceding kind.
Thirdly. An object is described by something different from itstrue essence, by something that does not complement or establishthe essence of the object. The description, therefore, relates to aquality: but quality, in its most general sense, is an accident. If Godcould be described in this way, He would be the substratum ofaccidents: a sufficient reason for rejecting the idea that Hepossesses quality, since it diverges from the true conception of Hisessence. It is surprising how those who admit the application ofattributes to God can reject, in reference to Him, comparison andqualification. For when they say" He cannot be qualified," theycan only mean that He possesses no quality; and yet every positiveessential attribute of an object either constitutes its essence, -- andin that case it is identical with the essence, -- or it contains aquality of the object.
There are, as you know, four kinds of quality; I will give youinstances of attributes of each kind, in order to show you that thisclass of attributes cannot possibly be applied to God. (a) A man isdescribed by any of his intellectual or moral qualities, or by any ofthe dispositions appertaining to him as an animate being, when,e.g., we speak of a person who is a carpenter, or who shrinks fromsin, or who is ill. It makes no difference whether we say. acarpenter, or a sage, or a physician: by all these we representcertain physical dispositions: nor does it make any differencewhether we say ' sinfearing" or" merciful." Every trade, everyprofession, and every settled habit of man are certain physicaldispositions. All this is clear to those who have occupiedthemselves with the study of Logic. (b) A thing is described bysome physical quality it possesses, or by the absence of the Same,e.g., as being soft or hard. It makes no difference whether we say"soft or hard," or" strong or weak" : in both cases we speak ofphysical conditions. (c) A man is described by his passivequalities, or by his emotions: we speak, e.g., of a person who ispassionate, irritable, timid, merciful, without implying that theseconditions have become permanent. The description of a thing byits colour, taste, heat, cold, dryness, and moisture, belongs also tothis class of attributes. (d) A thing is described by any of itsqualities resulting from quantity as such; we speak, e.g. of a thingwhich is long, short, curved, straight, etc.
Consider all these and similar attributes, and you will find thatthey cannot be employed in reference to God. He is not amagnitude that any quality resulting from quantity as such couldbe possessed by Him; He is not affected by external influences,and therefore does not possess any quality resulting from emotion.He is not subject to physical conditions, and therefore does notpossess strength or similar qualities; He is not an animate being,that He should have a certain disposition of the soul, or acquirecertain properties, as meekness, modesty, etc., or be in a state towhich animate beings as such are subject, as, e.g., in that of healthor of illness. Hence it follows that no attribute coming under thehead of quality in its widest sense, can be predicated of God.Consequently, these three classes of attributes, describing theessence of a thing, or part of the essence, or a quality of it, areclearly inadmissible in reference to God, for they implycomposition, which, as we shall prove, is out of question asregards the Creator. We say, with regard to this latter point, thatHe is absolutely One.
Fourthly. A thing is described by its -relation to another thing, e.g.,to time, to space, or to a different individual: thus we say, Zaid, thefather of A, or the partner of B, or who dwells at a certain place, orwho lived at a stated time. This kind of attribute does notnecessarily imply plurality or change in the essence of the objectdescribed; for the same Zaid, to whom reference is made, is thepartner of Amru, the father of Becr, the master of Khalid, thefriend of Zaid, dwells in a certain house, and was born in a certainyear. Such relations are not the essence of a thing, nor are they sointimately connected with it as qualities. At first thought, it wouldseem that they may be employed in reference to God, but aftercareful and thorough consideration we are convinced of theirinadmissibility. It is quite clear that there is no relation betweenGod and time or space. For time is an accident connected withmotion, in so far as the latter includes the relation of anteriorityand posteriority, and is expressed by number, as is explained inbooks devoted to this subject; and since motion is one of theconditions to which only material bodies are subject, and God isimmaterial, there can be no relation between Him and time.Similarly there is no relation between Him and space. But what wehave to investigate and to examine is this : whether some realrelation exists between God and any of the substances created byHim, by which He could be described ? That there is no correlationbetween Him and any of His creatures can easily be seen: for thecharacteristic of two objects correlative to each other is theequality of their reciprocal relation. Now, as God has absoluteexistence, while all other beings have only possible existence, aswe shall show, there consequently cannot be any correlation[between God and His creatures]. That a certain kind of relationdoes exist between them is by some considered possible, butwrongly. It is impossible to imagine a relation between intellectand sight, although, as we believe, the same kind of existence iscommon to both: how, then, could a relation be imagined betweenany creature and God, who has nothing in common with any otherbeing; for even the term existence is applied to Him and otherthings, according to our opinion, only by way of pure homonymity.Consequently there is no relation whatever between Him and anyother being. For whenever we speak of a relation between twothings, these belong to the same kind; but when two things belongto different kinds though of the same class, there is no relationbetween them. We therefore do not say, this red compared withthat green, is more, or less, or equally intense, although bothbelong to the same class -- colour: when they belong to twodifferent classes, there does not appear to exist any relationbetween them, not even to a man of ordinary Intellect, althoughthe two things belong to the same category: e.g., between ahundred cubits and the heat of pepper there is no relation, the onebeing a quality, the other a quantity; or between wisdom andsweetness, between meekness and bitterness, although all thesecome under the head of quality in its more general signification.How, then, could there be any relation between God and Hiscreatures, considering the important difference between them inrespect to true existence, the greatest of all differences. Besides, ifany relation existed between them, God would be subject to theaccident of relation; and although that would not be an accident tothe essence of God, it would still be, to some extent, a kind ofaccident. You would, therefore, be wrong if you appliedaffirmative attributes in their literal sense to God, though theycontained only relations: these, however, are the most appropriateof all attributes, to be employed, in a less strict sense, in referenceto God, because they do not imply that a plurality of eternal thingsexists, or that any change takes place in the essence of God, whenthose things change to which God is in relation.
Fifthly. A thing is described by its actions: I do not mean by" itsactions" the inherent capacity for a certain work, as is expressedin" carpenter ... .. painter," or" smith" -for these belong to theclass of qualities which have been mentioned above-but I mean theaction the latter has performed-we speak, e.g., of Zaid, who madethis door, built that wall, wove that garment. This kind ofattributes is separate from the essences of the thing described, and,therefore, appropriate to be employed in describing the Creator,especially since we know that these different actions do not implythat different elements must be contained in the substance of theagent, by which the different actions are produced, as will beexplained. On the contrary, all the actions of God emanate fromHis essence, not from any extraneous thing superadded to Hisessence, as we have shown.
What we have explained in the present chapter is this: that God isone in every respect, containing no plurality or any elementsuperadded to His essence : and that the many attributes ofdifferent significations applied in Scripture to God, originate in themultitude of His actions, not in a plurality existing in His essence,and are partly employed with the object of conveying to us somenotion of His perfection, in accordance with what we considerperfection, as has been explained by us. The possibility of onesimple substance excluding plurality, though accomplishingdifferent actions, will be illustrated by examples in the nextchapter.
CHAPTER LIII
THE circumstance which caused men to believe in the existence ofdivine attributes is similar to that which caused others to believe inthe corporeality of God. The latter have not arrived at that beliefby speculation, but by following the literal sense of certainpassages in the Bible. The same is the case with the attributes:when in the books of the Prophets and of the Law, God isdescribed by attributes, such passages are taken in their literalsense, and it is then believed that God possesses attributes: as if Hewere to be exalted above corporeality, and not above thingsconnected with corporeality, i.e., the accidents, I mean Psychicaldispositions, all of which are qualities [and connected withcorporeality]. Every attribute which the followers of this doctrineassume to be essential to the Creator, you will find to express,although they do not distinctly say so, a quality similar to thosewhich they are accustomed to notice in the bodies of all livingbeings. We apply to all such passages the principle," The Torahspeaketh in the language of man," and say that the object of allthese terms is to describe God as the most perfect being, not aspossessing those qualities which are only perfections in relation tocreated living beings. Many of the attributes express different actsof God, but that difference does not necessitate any difference asregards Him from whom the acts proceed. This fact, viz., that fromone agency different effects may result, although that agency hasnot free will, and much more so if it has free will, I will illustrateby an instance taken from our own sphere. Fire melts certain thingsand makes others hard, it boils and burns, it bleaches and blackens.If we described the fire as bleaching, blackening, burning, boiling,hardening and melting, we should be correct, and yet he who doesnot know the nature of fire, would think that it included sixdifferent elements, one by which it blackens, another by which itbleaches, a third by which it boils, a fourth by which it consumes,a fifth by which it melts, a sixth by which it hardens things-actionswhich are opposed to one another, and of which each has itspeculiar property. He, however, who knows the nature of fire, willknow that by virtue of one quality in action, namely, by heat, itproduces all these effects. If this is the case with that which isdone by nature, how much more is it the case with regard to beingsthat act by free will, and still more with regard to God, who isabove all description. If we, therefore, perceive in God certainrelations of various kinds-for wisdom in us is different frompower, and power from will-it does by no means follow thatdifferent elements are really contained in Him, that He containsone element by which He knows, another by which He wills, andanother by which He exercises power, as is, in fact, thesignification of the attributes of God] according to the Attributists.Some of them express it plainly, and enumerate the attributes aselements added to the essence. Others, however, are more reservedwith regard to this matter, but indicate their opinion, though theydo not express it in distinct and intelligible words. Thus, e.g., someof them say:" God is omnipotent by His essence, wise by Hisessence, living by His essence, and endowed with a will by Hisessence." (I will mention to you, as an instance, man's reason,which being one faculty and implying no plurality, enables him toknow many arts and sciences: by the same faculty man is able tosow, to do carpenter's work, to weave, to build, to study, to acquirea knowledge of geometry, and to govern a state. These various actsresulting from one simple faculty, which involves no plurality, arevery numerous; their number, that is, the number of the actionsoriginating in man's reason, is almost infinite. It is thereforeintelligible how in reference to God, those different actions can becaused by one simple substance, that does not include any pluralityor any additional element. The attributes found in Holy Scriptureare either qualifications of His actions, without any reference toHis essence, or indicate absolute perfection, but do not imply thatthe essence of God is a compound of various elements.) For in notadmitting the term" compound," they do not reject the idea of acompound when they admit a substance with attributes.
There still remains one difficulty which led them to that error, andwhich I am now going to mention. Those who assert the existenceof the attributes do not found their opinion on the variety of God'sactions: they say it is true that one substance can be the source ofvarious effects, but His essential attributes cannot be qualificationsof His actions, because it is impossible to imagine that the Creatorcreated Himself. They vary with regard to the so-called essentialattributes -- I mean as regards their number-according to the text ofthe Scripture which each of them follows. 1 will enumerate thoseon which all agree, and the knowledge of which they believe thatthey have derived from reasoning, not from some words of theProphets, namely, the following four :-life, power, wisdom, andwill. They believe that these are four different things, and suchperfections as cannot possibly be absent from the Creator, and thatthese cannot be qualifications of His actions. This is their opinion.But you must know that wisdom and life in reference to God arenot different from each other: for in every being that is consciousof itself, life and wisdom are the same thing, that is to say, if bywisdom we understand the consciousness of self. Besides, thesubject and the object of that consciousness are undoubtedlyidentical [as regards God]: for according to our opinion, He is notcomposed of an element that apprehends, and another that doesnot apprehend; He is not like man, who is a combination of aconscious soul and an unconscious body. If, therefore, by"wisdom" we mean the faculty of self-consciousness, wisdom andlife are one and the same thing. They, however, do not speak ofwisdom in this sense, but of His power to apprehend His creatures.There is also no doubt that power and will do not exist in God inreference to Himself: for He cannot have power or will as regardsHimself: we cannot imagine such a thing. They take theseattributes as different relations between God and His creatures,signifying that He has power in creating things, will in giving tothings existence as He desires, and wisdom in knowing what Hecreated. Consequently, these attributes do not refer to the essenceof God, but express relations between Him and His creatures.
Therefore we, who truly believe in the Unity of God, declare, thatas we do not believe that some element is included in His essenceby which He created the heavens, another by which He created the[four] elements, a third by which He created the ideals, in the sameway we reject the idea that His essence contains an element bywhich He has power, another element by which He has will, and athird by which He has a knowledge of His creatures. On thecontrary, He is a simple essence, without any additional elementwhatever; He created the universe, and knows it, but not by anyextraneous force. There is no difference whether these variousattributes refer to His actions or to relations between Him and Hisworks; in fact, these relations, as we have also shown, exist only inthe thoughts of men. This is what we must believe concerning theattributes occurring in the books of the Prophets: some may also betaken as expressive of the perfection of God by way of comparisonwith what we consider as perfections in us, as we shall explain.
CHAPTER LIV
THE wisest man, our Teacher Moses, asked two things of God,and received a reply respecting both. The one thing he asked was,that God should let him know His true essence: the other, which infact he asked first, that God should let him know His attributes. Inanswer to both these petitions God promised that He would let himknow all His attributes, and that these were nothing but Hisactions. He also told him that His true essence could not beperceived, and pointed out a method by which he could obtain theutmost knowledge of God possible for man to acquire. Theknowledge obtained by Moses has not been possessed by anyhuman being before him or after him. His petition to know theattributes of God is contained in the following words:" Show menow thy way, that 1 may know thee, that I may find grace in thysight" (Exod. xxxiii. 13). Consider how many excellent ideasfound expression in the words." Show me thy way, that I mayknow thee." We learn from them that God is known by Hisattributes, for Moses believed that he knew Him, when he wasshown the way of God. The words" That I may find grace in thysight," imply that he who knows God finds grace in His eyes. Notonly is he acceptable and welcome to God who fasts and prays, buteveryone who knows Him. He who has no knowledge of God is theobject of His wrath and displeasure. The pleasure and thedispleasure of God, the approach to Him and the withdrawal fromHim are proportional to the amount of man's knowledge orignorance concerning the Creator. We have already gone too faraway from our subject, let us now return to it.
Moses prayed to God to grant him knowledge of His attributes, andalso pardon for His people; when the latter had been granted, hecontinued to pray for the knowledge of God's essence in thewords," Show me thy glory" (ib. 18), and then received,respecting his first request," Show me thy way," the followingfavourable reply," I will make all my goodness to pass beforethee" (ib. 19): as regards the second request, however, he wastold," Thou canst not see my face" (ib. 20). The words" all mygoodness" imply that God promised to show him the wholecreation, concerning which it has been stated," And God saweverything that he had made, and, behold, it was very good" (Gen.i. 31); when I say" to show him the whole creation," I mean toimply that God promised to make him comprehend the nature ofall things, their relation to each other, and the way they aregoverned by God both in reference to the universe as a whole andto each creature in particular. This knowledge is referred to whenwe are told of Moses," he is firmly established in all mine house"(Num. xii. 7): that is," his knowledge of all the creatures in Myuniverse is correct and firmly established" : for false opinions arenot firmly established. Consequently the knowledge of the worksof God is the knowledge of His attributes, by which He can beknown. The fact that God promised Moses to give him aknowledge of His works, may be inferred from the circumstancethat God taught him such attributes as refer exclusively to Hisworks, viz.," merciful and gracious, longsuffering and abundant ingoodness," etc., (Exod. xxxiv. 6). It is therefore clear that the wayswhich Moses wished to know, and which God taught him, are theactions emanating from God. Our Sages call them middot(qualities), and speak of the thirteen middoth of God (Talm. B.Rosh ha-shanah, P. 17b): they used the term also in reference toman; comp." there are four different middoth (characters) amongthose who go to the house of learning" ;" There are four differentmiddoth (characters) among those who give charity" (MishnahAbot, v. 13, 14). They do not mean to say that God really possessesmiddot (qualities), but that He performs actions similar to such ofour actions as originate in certain qualities, i.e., in certainpsychical dispositions not that God has really such dispositions.Although Moses was shown all His goodness," i.e., all His works,only the thirteen middot are mentioned, because they include thoseacts of God which refer to the creation and the government ofmankind, and to know these acts was the principal object of theprayer of Moses. This is shown by the conclusion of his prayer,"that I may know thee, that I may find grace in thy sight, andconsider that this nation is thy people" (Exod. xxxiii. 16), that isto say, the people whom I have to rule by certain acts in theperformance of which I must be guided by Thy own acts ingoverning them. We have thus shown that" the ways" used in theBible, and" middot" used in the Mishnah, are identical, denotingthe acts emanating from God in reference to the universe.
Whenever any one of His actions is perceived by us, we ascribe toGod that emotion which is the source of the act when performedby ourselves, and call Him by an epithet which is formed from theverb expressing that emotion. We see, e.g., how well He providesfor the life of the embryo of living beings; how He endows withcertain faculties both the embryo itself and those who have to rearit after its birth, in order that it may be protected from death anddestruction, guarded against all harm, and assisted in theperformance of all that is required [for its development]. Similaracts, when performed by us, are due to a certain emotion andtenderness called mercy and pity. God is, therefore, said to bemerciful: e.g.," Like as a father is merciful to his children, so theLord is merciful to them that fear Him" (Ps. ciii- 13):" And I willspare them, as a man spareth (yahamol) his own son that servethhim" (Mal. iii. I7). Such instances do not imply that God isinfluenced by a feeling of mercy, but that acts similar to thosewhich a father performs for his son, out of pity, mercy and realaffection, emanate from God solely for the benefit of His piousmen, and are by no means the result of any impression or change --[produced in God]. -- When we give something to a person whohas no claim upon us, we perform an act of grace; e.g.," Grantthem graciously unto us" Uudges XXi. 22). [The same term isused in reference to God, e.g.]" which God hath graciously given"(Gen. xxxiii. 5):" Because God hath dealt graciously with me" (ib.11). Instances of this kind are numerous. God creates and guidesbeings who have no claim upon Him to be created and guided byHim; He is therefore called gracious (hannun) -- His actionstowards mankind also include great calamities, which overtakeindividuals and bring death to them, or affect whole families andeven entire regions, spread death, destroy generation aftergeneration, and spare nothing whatsoever. Hence there occurinundations, earthquakes, destructive storms, expeditions of onenation against the other for the sake of destroying it with the swordand blotting out its memory, and many other evils of the samekind. Whenever such evils are caused by us to any person, theyoriginate in great anger, violent jealousy, or a desire for revenge.God is therefore called, because of these acts, jealous ... ..revengeful,"" wrathful," and" keeping anger" (Nah. i. 2) that is tosay, He performs acts similar to those which, when performed byus, originate in certain psychical dispositions, in jealousy, desirefor retaliation, revenge, or anger: they are in accordance with theguilt of those who are to be punished, and not the result of anyemotion: for He is above all defect ! The same is the case with alldivine acts: though resembling those acts which emanate from ourpassions and psychical dispositions, they are not due to anythingsuperadded to His essence. -- The governor of a country, if he is aprophet, should conform to these attributes. Acts [of punishment]must be performed by him moderately and in accordance withjustice, not merely as an outlet of his passion. He must not letloose his anger, nor allow his passion to overcome him: for allpassions are bad, and they must be guarded against as far as it liesin man's power. At times and towards some persons he must bemerciful and gracious, not only from motives of mercy andcompassion, but according to their merits: at other times andtowards other persons he must evince anger, revenge, and wrath inproportion to their guilt, but not from motives of passion. He mustbe able to condemn a person to death by fire without anger,passion, or loathing against him, and must exclusively be guidedby what he perceives of the guilt of the person, and by a sense ofthe great benefit which a large number will derive from such asentence. You have, no doubt, noticed in the Torah how thecommandment to annihilate the seven nations, and" to save alivenothing that breatheth" (Deut. xx. 16) is followed immediately bythe words," That they teach you not to do after all theirabominations, which they have done unto their gods: so should yousin against the Lord your God" (ib. 18): that is to say, you shall notthink that this commandment implies an act of cruelty or ofretaliation; it is an act demanded by the tendency of man toremove everything that might turn him away from the right path,and to dear away all obstacles in the road to perfection, that is, tothe knowledge of God. Nevertheless, acts of mercy, pardon, pity,and grace should more frequently be performed by the governor ofa country than acts of punishment: seeing that all the thirteenmiddoth of God are attributes of mercy with only one exception,namely," visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children"(Exod. xxxiv. 7): for the meaning of the preceding attribute (in theoriginal ve-nakkeh lo yenakkeh) is" and he will not utterlydestroy" : (and not" He will by no means clear the guilty" ):comp." And she will be utterly destroyed (venikketah), she shallsit upon the ground" (Isa. iii. 26). When it is said that God isvisiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, this refersexclusively to the sin of idolatry, and to no other sin. That this isthe case may be inferred from what is said in the tencommandments," upon the third and fourth generation of myenemies" (Exod. xx. 5), none except idolaters being called"enemy" : comp. also" every abomination to the Lord, which hehateth" (Deut. xii. 31). It was, however, considered sufficient toextend the punishment to the fourth generation, because the fourthgeneration is the utmost a man can see of his posterity: and when,therefore, the idolaters of a place are destroyed, the old manworshipping idols is killed, his son, his grandson, and hisgreat-grandson, that is, the fourth generation. By the mention ofthis attribute we are, as it were, told that His commandments,undoubtedly in harmony with His acts, include the death even ofthe little children of idolaters because of the sin of their fathersand grandfathers. This principle we find frequently applied in theLaw, as, e.g., we read concerning the city that has been led astrayto idolatry," destroy it utterly, and all that is therein" (Deut. xiii.15). All this has been ordained in order that every vestige of thatwhich would lead to great injury should he blotted out, as we haveexplained.
We have gone too far away from the subject of this chapter, but wehave shown why it has been considered sufficient to mention onlythese (thirteen) out of all His acts: namely, because they arerequired for the good government of a country; for the chief aim ofman should be to make himself, as far as possible, similar to God :that is to say, to make his acts similar to the acts of God, or as ourSages expressed it in explaining the verse," Ye shall be holy"(Lev. xxi. 2):" He is gracious, so be you also gracious: He ismerciful, so be you also merciful."
The principal object of this chapter was to show that all attributesascribed to God are attributes of His acts, and do not imply thatGod has any qualities.
CHAPTER LV
WE have already, on several occasions, shown in this treatise thateverything that implies corporeality or passiveness, is to benegatived in reference to God, for all passiveness implies change:and the agent producing that state is undoubtedly different fromthe object affected by it: and if God could be affected in any waywhatever, another being beside Him would act on Him and causechange in Him. All kinds of non-existence must likewise benegatived in reference to Him: no perfection whatever cantherefore be imagined to be at one time absent from Him, and atanother present in Him: for if this were the case, He would [at acertain time] only be potentially perfect. Potentiality alwaysimplies non-existence, and when anything has to pass frompotentiality into reality, another thing that exists in reality isrequired to effect that transition. Hence it follows that allperfections must really exist in God, and none of them must in anyway be a mere potentiality. Another thing likewise to be denied inreference to God, is similarity to any existing being. This has beengenerally accepted, and is also mentioned in the books of theProphets: e.g.," To whom, then, will you liken me ?" (Isa. Xl.25):" To whom, then, will you liken God ?" (ib. 18):" There isnone like unto Thee" (Jer. x. 6). Instances of this kind arefrequent. In short, it is necessary to demonstrate by proof thatnothing can be predicated of God that implies any of the followingfour things: corporeality, emotion or change, nonexistence, -- e.g.,that something would be potential at one time and real atanother-and similarity with any of His creatures. In this respect ourknowledge of God is aided by the study of Natural Science. For hewho is ignorant of the latter cannot understand the defect impliedin emotions, the difference between potentiality and reality, thenon-existence implied in all potentiality, the inferiority of a thingthat exists in potentia to that which moves in order to cause itstransition from potentiality into reality, and the inferiority of thatwhich moves for this purpose compared with its condition whenthe transition has been effected. He who knows these things, butwithout their proofs, does not know the details which logicallyresult from these general propositions: and therefore he cannotprove that God exists, or that the [four] things mentioned aboveare inadmissible in reference to God.
Having premised these remarks, I shall explain in the next chapterthe error of those who believe that God has essential attributes:those who have some knowledge of Logic and Natural Sciencewill understand it.
CHAPTER LVI
SIMILARITY is based on a certain relation between two things: ifbetween two things no relation can be found, there can be nosimilarity between them, and there is no relation between twothings that have no similarity to each other; e.g., we do not say thisheat is similar to that colour, or this voice is similar to thatsweetness. This is self-evident. Since the existence of a relationbetween God and man, or between Him and other beings has beendenied, similarity must likewise be denied. You must know thattwo things of the same kind -- i.e., whose essential properties arethe same, and which are distinguished from each other bygreatness and smallness, strength and weakness, etc. -- arenecessarily similar, though different in this one way; e.g., a grainof mustard and the sphere of the fixed stars are similar as regardsthe three dimensions, although the one is exceedingly great, theother exceedingly small, the property of having [three] dimensionsis the same in both: or the heat of wax melted by the sun and theheat of the element of fire, are similar as regards heat: although theheat is exceedingly great in the one case, and exceedingly small inthe other, the existence of that quality (heat) is the same in both.Thus those who believe in the presence of essential attributes inGod, viz., Existence, Life, Power, Wisdom, and Will, should knowthat these attributes, when applied to God, have not the samemeaning as when applied to us, and that the difference does notonly consist in magnitude, or in the degree of perfection, stability,and durability. It cannot be said, as they practically believe, thatHis existence is only more stable, His life more permanent, Hispower greater, His wisdom more perfect, and His will moregeneral than ours, and that the same definition applies to both.This is in no way admissible, for the expression" more than" isused in comparing two things as regards a certain attributepredicated of both of them in exactly the same sense, andconsequently implies similarity [between God and His creatures].When they ascribe to God essential attributes, these so-calledessential attributes should not have any similarity to the attributesof other things, and should according to their own opinion not beincluded in one of the same definition, just as there is no similaritybetween the essence of God and that of other beings. They do notfollow this principle, for they hold that one definition may includethem, and that, nevertheless, there is no similarity between them.Those who are familiar with the meaning of similarity willcertainly understand that the term existence, when applied to Godand to other beings, is perfectly homonymous. In like manner, theterms Wisdom, Power, Will, and Life are applied to God and toother beings by way of perfect homonymity, admitting of nocomparison whatever. Nor must you think that these attributes areemployed as hybrid terms; for hybrid terms are such as are appliedto two things which have a similarity to each other in respect to acertain property which is in both of them an accident, not anessential, constituent element. The attributes of God, however, arenot considered as accidental by any intelligent person, while allattributes applied to man are accidents, according to theMutakallemim. I am therefore at a loss to see how they can findany similarity [between the attributes of God and those of man]:how their definitions can be identical, and their significations thesame ! This is a decisive proof that there is, in no way or sense,anything common to the attributes predicated of God, and thoseused in reference to ourselves: they have only the same names, andnothing else is common to them. Such being the case, it is notproper to believe, on account of the use of the same attributes, thatthere is in God something additional to His essence, in the sameway as attributes are joined to our essence. This is most importantfor those who understand it. Keep it in memory, and study itthoroughly in order to be well prepared for that which I am goingto explain to you.
CHAPTER LVII
ON attributes; remarks more recondite than the preceding. It isknown that existence is an accident appertaining to all things, andtherefore an element superadded to their essence. This mustevidently be the case as regards everything the existence of whichis due to some cause: its existence is an element superadded to itsessence. But as regards a being whose existence is not due to anycause-God alone is that being, for His existence, as we have said,is absolute-existence and essence are perfectly identical; He is nota substance to which existence is joined as an accident, as anadditional element. His existence is always absolute, and has neverbeen a new element or an accident in Him. Consequently Godexists without possessing the attribute of existence. Similarly Helives, without possessing the attribute of life; knows, withoutpossessing the attribute of knowledge; is omnipotent withoutpossessing the attribute of omnipotence; is wise, withoutpossessing the attribute of wisdom: all this reduces itself to oneand the same entity; there is no plurality in Him, as will be shown.It is further necessary to consider that unity and plurality areaccidents supervening to an object according as it consists of manyelements or of one. This is fully explained in the book calledMetaphysics. In the same way as number is not the substance ofthe things numbered, so is unity not the substance of the thingwhich has the attribute of unity, for unity and plurality areaccidents belonging to the category of discrete quantity, andsupervening to such objects as are capable of receiving them.
To that being, however, which has truly simple, absolute existence,and in which composition is inconceivable, the accident of unity isas inadmissible as the accident of plurality; that is to say, God'sunity is not an element superadded, but He is One withoutpossessing the attribute of unity. The investigation of this subject,which is almost too subtle for our understanding, must not bebased on current expressions employed in describing it, for theseyou know that something is in the house, but not exactly what, youask what is in that house, and you are told, not a plant nor amineral. You have thereby obtained some special knowledge ofthe thing; you have learnt that it is a living being, although you donot yet know what kind of a living being it is. The negativeattributes have this in common with the positive, that theynecessarily circumscribe the object to some extent, although suchcircumscription consists only in the exclusion of what otherwisewould not be excluded. In the following point, however, thenegative attributes are distinguished from the positive. Thepositive attributes, although not peculiar to one thing, describe aportion of what we desire to know, either some part of its essenceor some of its accidents: the negative attributes, on the other hand,do not, as regards the essence of the thing which we desire toknow, in any way tell us what it is, except it be indirectly, as hasbeen shown in the instance given by us.
After this introduction, I would observe that, -- as has already beenshown -God's existence is absolute, that it includes nocomposition, as will be proved, and that we comprehend only thefact that He exists, not His essence. Consequently it is a falseassumption to hold that He has any positive attribute: for He doesnot possess existence in addition to His essence: it therefore cannotbe said that the one may be described as an attribute [of the other];much less has He [in addition to His existence] a compoundessence, consisting of two constituent elements to which theattribute could refer: still less has He accidents, which could bedescribed by an attribute. Hence it is clear that He has no positiveattribute whatever. The negative attributes, however, are thosewhich are necessary to direct the mind to the truths which we mustbelieve concerning God; for, on the one hand, they do not implyany plurality, and, on the other, they convey to man the highestpossible knowledge of God; e.g., it has been established by proofthat some being must exist besides those things which can beperceived by the senses, or apprehended by the mind; when we sayof this being, that it exists, we mean that its non-existence isimpossible. We then perceive that such a being is not, for instance,like the four elements, which are inanimate, and we therefore saythat it is living, expressing thereby that it is not dead. We call sucha being incorporeal, because we notice that it is unlike theheavens, which are living, but material. Seeing that it is alsodifferent from the intellect, which, though incorporeal and living,owes its existence to some cause, we say it is the first, expressingthereby that its existence is not due to any cause. We furthernotice, that the existence, that is the essence, of this being is notlimited to its own existence: many existences emanate from it, andits influence is not like that of the fire in producing heat, or that ofthe sun in sending forth light, but consists in constantly givingthem stability and order by well-established rule, as we shall show:we say, on that account, it has power, wisdom, and will, i.e., it isnot feeble or ignorant, or hasty, and does not abandon its creatures:when we say that it is not feeble, we mean that its existence iscapable of producing the existence of many other things: by sayingthat it is not ignorant, we mean" it perceives" or" it lives," -- foreverything that perceives is living-by saying" it is not hasty, anddoes not abandon its creatures," we mean that all these creaturespreserve a certain order and arrangement: they are not left tothemselves; they are not produced aimlessly, but whatevercondition they receive from that being is given with design andintention. We thus learn that there is no other being like unto God,and we say that He is One, i.e., there are not more Gods than one.
It has thus been shown that every attribute predicated of God eitherdenotes the quality of an action, or-when the attribute is intendedto convey some idea of the Divine Being itself, and not of Hisactions-the negation of the opposite. Even these negative attributesmust not be formed and applied to God, except in the way inwhich, as you know, sometimes an attribute is negatived inreference to a thing, although that attribute can naturally never beapplied to it in the same sense, as, e.g., we say," This wall doesnot see." Those who read the present work are aware that,notwithstanding all the efforts of the mind, we can obtain noknowledge of the essence of the heavens -- a revolving substancewhich has been measured by us in spans and cubits, and examinedeven as regards the proportions of the several spheres to each otherand respecting most of their motions-although we know that theymust consist of matter and form; but the matter not being the sameas sublunary matter, we can only describe the heavens in termsexpressing negative properties, but not in terms denoting positivequalities. Thus we say that the heavens are not light, not heavy, notpassive and therefore not subject to impressions, and that they donot possess the sensations of taste and smell: or we use similarnegative attributes. All this we do, because we do not know theirsubstance. What, then, can be the result of our efforts, when we tryto obtain a knowledge of a Being that is free from substance, thatis most simple, whose existence is absolute, and not due to anycause, to whose perfect essence nothing can be superadded, andwhose perfection consists, as we have shown, in the absence of alldefects. All we understand is the fact that He exists, that He is aBeing to whom none of His creatures is similar, who has nothingin common with them, who does not include plurality, who isnever too feeble to produce other beings, and whose relation to theuniverse is that of a steersman to a boat: and even this is not a realrelation, a real simile, but serves only to convey to us the idea thatGod rules the universe: that is, that He gives it duration, andpreserves its necessary arrangement. This subject will be treatedmore fully. Praised be He! In the contemplation of His essence, ourcomprehension and knowledge prove insufficient; in theexamination of His works, how they necessarily result from Hiswill, our knowledge proves to be ignorance, and in the endeavourto extol Him in words, all our efforts in speech are mere weaknessand failure
CHAPTER LIX
THE following question might perhaps be asked : Since there is nopossibility of obtaining a knowledge of the true essence of God,and since it has also been proved that the only thing that man canapprehend of Him is the fact that He exists, and that all positiveattributes are inadmissible, as has been shown , what is thedifference among those who have obtained a knowledge of God ?Must not the knowledge obtained by our teacher Moses, and bySolomon, be the same as that obtained by any one of the lowestclass of philosophers, since there can be no addition to thisknowledge ? But, on the other hand, it is generally accepted amongtheologians and also among philosophers, that there can be a greatdifference between two persons as regards the knowledge of Godobtained by them. Know that this is really the case, that those whohave obtained a knowledge of God differ greatly from each other;for in the same way as by each additional attribute an object ismore specified, and is brought nearer to the true apprehension ofthe observer, so by each additional negative attribute you advancetoward the knowledge of God, and you are nearer to it than he whodoes not negative, in reference to God ' those qualities which youare convinced by proof must be negatived. There may thus be aman who after having earnestly devoted many years to the pursuitof one science, and to the true understanding of its principles, tillhe is fully convinced of its truths, has obtained as the sole result ofthis study the conviction that a certain quality must be negatived inreference to God, and the capacity of demonstrating that it isimpossible to apply it to Him. Superficial thinkers will have noproof for this, will doubtfully ask, Is that thing existing in theCreator, or not ? And those who are deprived of sight willpositively ascribe it to God, although it has been clearly shown thatHe does not possess it. E.g., while I show that God is incorporeal,another doubts and is not certain whether He is corporeal orincorporeal: others even positively declare that He is corporeal,and appear before the Lord with that belief. Now see how great thedifference is between these three men: the first is undoubtedlynearest to the Almighty; the second is remote, and the third stillmore distant from Him. If there be a fourth person who holdshimself convinced by proof that emotions are impossible in God,while the first who rejects the corporeality, is not convinced of thatimpossibility, that fourth person is undoubtedly nearer theknowledge of God than the first, and go on, so that a person who,convinced by proof, negatives a number of things in reference toGod, which according to our belief may possibly be in Him oremanate from Him, is undoubtedly a more perfect man than weare, and would surpass us still more if we positively believed thesethings to be properties of God. It will now be clear to you, thatevery time you establish by proof the negation of a thing inreference to God, you become more perfect, while with everyadditional positive assertion you follow your imagination andrecede from the true knowledge of God. Only by such ways mustwe approach the knowledge of God, and by such researches andstudies as would show us the inapplicability of what isinadmissible as regards the Creator, not by such methods as wouldprove the necessity of ascribing to Him anything extraneous to Hisessence, or asserting that He has a certain perfection, when we findit to be a perfection in relation to us. The perfections are all tosome extent acquired properties, and a property which must beacquired does not exist in everything capable of making suchacquisition.
You must bear in mind, that by affirming anything of God, you areremoved from Him in two respects; first, whatever you affirm, isonly a perfection in relation to us: secondly, He does not possessanything superadded to this essence: His essence includes all Hisperfections, as we have shown. Since it is a well-known fact thateven that knowledge of God which is accessible to man cannot beattained except by negations, and that negations do not convey atrue idea of the being to which they refer, all people, both of pastind present generations, declared that God cannot be the object ofhuman comprehension, that none but Himself comprehends whatHe is, and that our knowledge consists in knowing that we areunable truly to comprehend Him. All philosophers say," He hasoverpowered us by His grace, and is invisible to us through theintensity of His light," like the sun which cannot be perceived byeyes which are too weak to bear its rays. Much more has been saidon this topic, but it is useless to repeat it here. The idea is bestexpressed in the book of Psalms," Silence is praise to Thee" Q^2). It is a very expressive remark on this subject: for whatever weutter with the intention of extolling and of praising Him, containssomething that cannot be applied to God, and includes derogatoryexpressions: it is therefore more becoming to be silent, and to becontent with intellectual reflection, as has been recommended bymen of the highest culture, in the words" Commune with yourown heart upon your bed, and be still" (Ps. iv. 4). You must surelyknow the following celebrated passage in the Talmud-would thatall passages in the Talmud were like that! -- although it is knownto you, I quote it literally, as I wish to point out to you the ideascontained in it :" A certain person, reading prayers in the presenceof Rabbi Haninah, said, 'God, the great, the valiant and thetremendous, the powerful, the strong, and the mighty.' -- The rabbisaid to him, Have you finished all the praises of your Master ? Thethree epithets, ' God, the great, the valiant and the tremendous,' weshould not have applied to God, had Moses not mentioned them inthe Law, and had not the men of the Great Synagogue comeforward subsequently and established their use in the prayer: andyou say all this ! Let this be illustrated by a parable. There wasonce an earthly king, possessing millions of gold coin; he waspraised for owning millions of silver coin: was this not reallydispraise to him ?" Thus far the opinion of the pious rabbi.Consider, first, how repulsive and annoying the accumulation ofall these positive attributes was to him; next, how he showed that,if we had only to follow our reason, we should never' havecomposed these prayers, and we should not have uttered any ofthem. It has, however, become necessary to address men in wordsthat should leave some idea in their minds, and, in accordancewith the saying of our Sages," The Torah speaks in the languageof men," the Creator has been described to us in terms of our ownperfections; but we should not on that account have uttered anyother than the three above-mentioned attributes, and we should nothave used them as names of God except when meeting with themin reading the Law. Subsequently, the men of the GreatSynagogue, who were prophets, introduced these expressions alsointo the prayer, but we should not on that account use [in ourprayers] any other attributes of God. The principal lesson to bederived from this passage is that there are two reasons for ouremploying those phrases in our prayers : first, they occur in thePentateuch; secondly, the Prophets introduced them into theprayer. Were it not for the first reason, we should never haveuttered them; and were it not for the second reason, we should nothave copied them from the Pentateuch to recite them in ourprayers: how then could we approve of the use of those numerousattributes! You also learn from this that we ought not to mentionand employ ill our prayers all the attributes we find applied to Godin the books of the Prophetq: for he does not say," Were it not thatMoses, our Teacher, said them, we should not have been able touse them" : but he adds another condition-" and had not the men ofthe Great Synagogue come forward and established their use in theprayer," because only for that reason are we allowed to use them inour prayers. We cannot approve of what those foolish persons dowho are extravagant in praise, fluent and prolix in the prayers theycompose, and in the hymns they make in the desire to approach theCreator. They describe God in attributes which would be anoffence if applied to a human being; for those persons have noknowledge of these great and important principles, which are notaccessible to the ordinary intelligence of man. Treating the Creatoras a familiar object, they describe Him and speak of Him in anyexpressions they think proper; they eloquently continue to praiseHim in that manner, and believe that they can thereby influenceHim and produce an effect on Him. If they find some phrase suitedto their object in the words of the Prophets they are still moreinclined to consider that they are free to make use of suchtexts-which should at least be explained-to employ them in theirliteral sense, to derive new expressions from them, to form fromthem numerous variations, and to found whole compositions onthem. This license is frequently met with in the compositions ofthe singers, preachers, and others who imagine themselves to beable to compose a poem. Such authors write things which partlyare real heresy, partly contain such folly and absurdity that theynaturally cause those who hear them to laugh, but also to feelgrieved at the thought that such things can be uttered in referenceto God. Were it not that 1 pitied the authors for their defects. anddid not wish to injure them, I should have cited some passages toshow you their mistakes; besides, the fault of their compositions isobvious to all intelligent persons. You must consider it, and thinkthus : If slander and libel is a great sin, how much greater is the sinof those who speak with looseness of tongue in reference to God,and describe Him by attributes which are far below Him; and Ideclare that they not only commit an ordinary sin, butunconsciously at least incur the guilt of profanity and blasphemy.This applies both to the multitude that listens to such prayers, andto the foolish man that recites them. Men, however, whounderstand the fault of such compositions, and, nevertheless, recitethem, may be classed, according to my opinion, among those towhom the following words are applied:" And the children of Israelused words that were not right against the Lord their God" (2Kings xvii. 9): and" utter error against the Lord" (Isa. =ii. 6). Ifyou are of those who regard the honour of their Creator, do notlisten in any way to them, much less utter what they say, and stillless compose such prayers. knowing how great is the offence ofone who hurls aspersions against the Supreme Being. There is nonecessity at all for you to use positive attributes of God with theview of magnifying Him in your thoughts, or to go beyond thelimits which the men of the Great Synagogue have introduced inthe prayers and in the blessings, for this is sufficient for allpurposes, and even more than Sufficient, as Rabbi Haninah said.Other attributes, such as occur in the books of the Prophets, maybe uttered when we meet with them in reading those books; but wemust bear in mind what has already been explained, that they areeither attributes of God's actions, or expressions implying thenegation of the opposite. This likewise should not be divulged tothe multitude; but a reflection of this kind is fitted for the few onlywho believe that the glorification of God does not consist inuttering that which is not to be uttered, but in reflecting on that onwhich man should reflect.
We Will now conclude our exposition of the wise words of R.Haninah. He does not employ any such simile as:" A king whopossesses millions of gold denarii, and is praised as havinghundreds" : for this would imply that God's perfections, althoughmore perfect than those ascribed to man are still of the same kind:but this is not the case, as has been proved. The excellence of thesimile consists in the words: who possesses golden denarii, and ispraised as having silver denarii" this implies that these attributes,though perfections as regards ourselves, are not such as regardsGod; in reference to Him they would all be defects, as is distinctlysuggested in the remark," Is this not an offence to Him ?" '
I have already told you that all these attributes, whateverperfection they may denote according to your idea, imply defectsin reference to God, if applied to Him in the same sense as they areused in reference to ourselves. Solomon has already given ussufficient instruction on this subject by saying," For God is inheaven, and thou upon earth; therefore let thy words be few"(Eccles. V. 2).
CHAPTER LX
I WILL give you in this chapter some illustrations, in order thatyou may better understand the propriety of forming as manynegative attributes as possible, and the impropriety of ascribing toGod any positive attributes. A person may know for certain that a"ship" is in existence, but he may not know to what object thatname is applied, whether to a substance or to an accident: a secondperson then learns that the ship is not an accident: a third, that it isnot a mineral: a fourth, that it is not a plant growing in the earth: afifth, that it is not a body whose parts are joined together by nature:a sixth, that it is not a flat object like boards or doors: a seventh,that it is not a sphere: an eighth, that it is not pointed: a ninth, thatit is not roundshaped: nor equilateral: a tenth, that it is not solid. Itis clear that this tenth person has almost arrived at the correctnotion of a" ship" by the foregoing negative attributes, as if hehad exactly the same notion as those have who imagine it to be awooden substance which is hollow, long, and composed of manypieces of wood, that is to say, who know it by positive attributes.Of the other persons in our illustration, each one is more remotefrom the correct notion of a ship than the next mentioned, so thatthe first knows nothing about it but the name. In the same manneryou will come nearer to the knowledge and comprehension of Godby the negative attributes. But you must be careful, in what younegative, to negative by proof, not by mere words, for each timeyou ascertain by proof that a certain thing, believed to exist in theCreator, must be negatived, you have undoubtedly come one stepnearer to the knowledge of God.
It is in this sense that some men come very near to God, and othersremain exceedingly remote from Him, not in the sense of thosewho are deprived of vision, and believe that God occupies a place,which man can physically approach or from which he can recede.Examine this well, know it, and be content with it. The way whichwill bring you nearer to God has been clearly shown to you; walkin it, if you have the desire. On the other hand, there is a greatdanger in applying positive attributes to God. For it has beenshown that every perfection we could imagine, even if existing inGod in accordance with the opinion of those who assert theexistence of attributes, would in reality not be of the same kind asthat imagined by us, but would only be called by the same name,according to our explanation; it would in fact amount to anegation. Suppose, e.g., you say He has knowledge, and thatknowledge, which admits of no change and of no plurality,embraces many changeable things; His knowledge remainsunaltered, while new things are constantly formed, and Hisknowledge of a thing before it exists, while it exists, and when ithas ceased to exist, is the same without the least change: youwould thereby declare that His knowledge is not like ours: andsimilarly that His existence is not like ours. You thus necessarilyarrive at some negation, without obtaining a true conception of anessential attribute: on the contrary, you are led to assume that thereis a plurality in God, and to believe that He, though one essence,has several unknown attributes. For if you intend to affirm them,you cannot compare them with those attributes known by us, andthey are consequently not of the same kind. You are, as it were,brought by the belief in the reality of the attributes, to say that Godis one subject of which several things are predicated: though thesubject is not like ordinary subjects, and the predicates are not likeordinary predicates. This belief would ultimately lead us toassociate other things with God, and not to believe that He is One.For of every subject certain things can undoubtedly be predicated,and although in reality subject and predicate are combined in onething, by the actual definition they consist of two elements, thenotion contained in the subject not being the same as thatcontained in the predicate. In the course of this treatise it will beproved to you that God cannot be a compound, and that He issimple in the strictest sense of the word.
I do not merely declare that he who affirms attributes of God hasnot sufficient knowledge concerning the Creator, admits someassociation with God, or conceives Him to be different from whatHe is: but I say that he unconsciously loses his belief in God. Forhe whose knowledge concerning a thing is insufficient,understands one part of it while he is ignorant of the other, as, e.g.,a person who knows that man possesses life, but does not knowthat man possesses understanding: but in reference to God, inwhose real existence there is no plurality, it is impossible that onething should be known, and another unknown. Similarly he whoassociates an object with [the properties of] another object,conceives a true and correct notion of the one object. and appliesthat notion also to the other: while those who admit the attributesof God, do not consider them as identical with His essence, but asextraneous elements. Again, he who conceives an incorrect notionof an object, must necessarily have a correct idea of the object tosome extent , he, however, who says that taste belongs to thecategory of quantity has not, according to my opinion, an incorrectnotion of taste, but is entirely ignorant of its nature, for he does notknow to what object the term" taste is to be applied. -- This is avery difficult subject: consider it well.
According to this explanation you will understand, that those whodo not recognize, in reference to God, the negation of things.,which others negative by clear proof, are deficient in theknowledge of God, and are remote from comprehending Him.Consequently, the smaller the number of things is which a personcan negative in relation to God, the less he knows of Him as hasbeen explained in the beginning of this chapter; but the man whoaffirms an attribute of God, knows nothing but the same: for theobject to which, in his imagination, he applies that name, does notexist; it is a mere fiction and invention, as if he applied that nameto a non-existing being, for there is, in reality, no such object. E.g.,some one has heard of the elephant, and knows that it is an animal,and wishes to know its form and nature. A person, who is eithermisled or misleading, tells him it is an animal with one leg, threewings, lives in the depth of the sea, has a transparent body: its faceis wide like that of a man, has the same form and shape, speakslike a man, flies sometimes in the air, and sometimes swims like afish. I should not say, that he described the elephant incorrectly, orthat he has an insufficient knowledge of the elephant, but I wouldsay that the thing thus described is an invention and fiction, andthat in reality there exists nothing like it: it is a non-existing being,called by the name of a really existing being, and like the griffin,the centaur, and similar imaginary combinations for which simpleand compound names have been borrowed from real things. Thepresent case is analogous: namely, God, praised be His name,exists, and His existence has been proved to be absolute andperfectly simple, as I shall explain. If such a simple, absolutelyexisting essence were said to have attributes, as has beencontended, and were combined with extraneous elements, it wouldin no way be an existing thing, as has been proved by us; and whenwe say that that essence, which is called" God," is a substancewith many properties by which it can be described, we apply thatname to an object which does not at all exist. Consider, therefore,what are the consequences of affirming attributes to God ! As tothose attributes of God which occur in the Pentateuch, or in thebooks of the Prophets, we must assume that they are exclusivelyemployed, as has been stated by us, to convey to us some notion ofthe perfections of the Creator, or to express qualities of actionsemanating from Him.
CHAPTER LXI
IT is well known that all the names of God occurring in Scriptureare derived from His actions, except one, namely, theTetragrammaton, which consists of the letters yod, he, vau and he.This name is applied exclusively to God, and is on that accountcalled Shem ha-meforash," The nomen proprium." It is the distinctand exclusive designation of the Divine Being; whilst His othernames are common nouns, and are derived from actions, to whichsome of our own are similar, as we have already explained. Eventhe name Jdonay," Lord," which has been substituted for theTetragrammaton, is derived from the appellative" lord" : comp."The man who is the lord (adone) of the land spake roughly to us"(Gen. xliii. 3o). The difference between 4doni ," my lord," (withhirek under the nun), or Jdonay with kamez), is similar to thedifference between Sari," my prince," and Sarai, Abraham's wife(ib. xvi. 1), the latter form denoting majesty and distinction. Anangel is also addressed as" Adonay" : e.g.," Jdonay (My lord), passnot away, I pray thee" (ib. xviii. 3). 1 have restricted myexplanation to the term Jdonay, the substitute for theTetragrammaton, because it is more commonly applied to Godthan any of the other names which are in frequent use, likedayyan," judge," shadday," almighty zaddik, righteous," hannun,"gracious," rahum" merciful," and elohim" chief all these termsare unquestionably appellations and derivatives. The derivation ofthe name, consisting of yod, hi, vau, and he, is not positivelyknown, the word having no additional signification. This sacredname, which, as you know, was not pronounced except in thesanctuary by the appointed priests, when they gave the sacerdotalblessing, and by the high priest on the Day of Atonement,undoubtedly denotes something which is peculiar to God, and isnot found in any other being. It is possible that in the Hebrewlanguage, of which we have now but a slight knowledge, theTetragrammaton, in the way it was pronounced, conveyed themeaning of" absolute existence." In short, the majesty of the nameand the great dread of uttering it, are connected with the fact that itdenotes God Himself, without including in its meaning any namesof the things created by Him. Thus our Sages say :" ' My name '(Num. vi. 2 7) means the name which is peculiar to Me." -AMother names of God have reference to qualities, and do not signifya simple substance, but a substance with attributes, they beingderivatives. On that account it is believed that they imply thepresence of a plurality in God, I mean to say, the presence ofattributes, that is, of some extraneous element superadded to Hisessence. Such is the meaning of all derivative names: they implythe presence of some attribute and its substratum, though this benot distinctly named. As, however, it has been proved, that God isnot a substratum capable of attributes, we are convinced that thoseappellatives when employed as names of God, only indicate therelation of certain actions to Him, or they convey to us somenotion of His perfection.
Hence R. Haninah would have objected to the expression" thegreat, the mighty, and the tremendous," had it not been for the tworeasons mentioned by him: because such expressions lead men tothink that the attributes are essential, i.e., they are perfectionsactually present in God. The frequent use of names of God derivedfrom actions, led to the belief that He had as many [essential]attributes as there were actions from which the names werederived. The following promise was therefore made, implying thatmankind will at a certain future time understand this subject, andbe free from the error it involves :" In that day will the Lord beOne, and His name One" (Zech. xiv. 9). The meaning of thisprophecy is this: He being One, will then be called by one name,which will indicate the essence of God; but it does not mean thatHis sole name will be a derivative [viz.," One" ]. In the PirkeRabbi Eliezer (chap. iii.) occurs the following passage:" Beforethe universe was created, there was only the Almighty and Hisname." Observe how clearly the author states that all theseappelatives employed as names of God came into existence afterthe Creation. This is true: for they all refer to actions manifested inthe Universe. If, however, you consider His essence as separateand as abstracted from all actions, you will not describe it by anappellative, but by a proper noun, which exclusively indicates thatessence. Every other name of God is a derivative, only theTetragrammaton is a real nomen proprium, and must not beconsidered from any other point of view. You must beware ofsharing the error of those who write amulets (kameot). Whateveryou hear from them, or read in their works, especially in referenceto the names which they form by combination, is utterly senseless;they call these combinations shemot (names) and believe that theirpronunciation demands sanctification and purification, and that byusing them they are enabled to work miracles. Rational personsought not to listen to such men, nor in any way believe theirassertions. No other name is called shem ha-meforash except thisTetragrammaton, which is written, but is not pronouncedaccording to its letters. The words," Thus shall ye bless thechildren of Israel" (Num. vi. 23) are interpreted in Siphri asfollows:" ' Thus,' in the holy language: again ' thus,' with the Shemha-meforash." The following remark, is also found there:" In thesanctuary [the name of God is pronounced] as it is spelt, butelsewhere by its substitutes." In the Talmud, the following passageoccurs :" ' Ehus,' i.e., with the shem ha-meforash. -- You say [thatthe priests, when blessing the people, had to pronounce] the fhemha-meforash: this was perhaps not the case, and they may haveused other names instead.-We infer it from the words : ' And theyshall put My name ' (Num. vi. 27), i.e., My name, which is peculiarto Me." It has thus been shown that the shem ha-meforash (theproper name of God) is the Tetragrammaton, and that this is theonly name which indicates nothing but His essence, and thereforeour Sages in referring to this sacred term said My name' means theone which is peculiar to Me alone."
In the next chapter I will explain the circumstances which broughtmen to a belief in the power of Shemot (names of God): I willpoint out the main subject of discussion, and lay open to you itsmystery, and then not any doubt will be left in your mind, unlessyou prefer to be misguided.
CHAPTER LXII
WE were commanded that, in the sacerdotal blessing, the name ofthe Lord should be pronounced as it is written in the form of theTetragrammaton, the shem ha-meforash. It was not known to everyone how the name was to be pronounced, what vowels were to begiven to each consonant, and whether some of the letters capableof reduplication should receive a dagesh. Wise men successivelytransmitted the pronunciation of the name: it occurred only once inseven years that the pronunciation was communicated to adistinguished disciple. I must, however, add that the statement,"The wise men communicated the Tetragrammaton to their childrenand their disciples once in seven years," does not only refer to thepronunciation but also to its meaning, because of which theTetragrammaton was made a nomen proprium of God, and whichincludes certain metaphysical principles.
Our Sages knew in addition a name of God which consisted oftwelve letters, inferior in sanctity to the Tetragrammaton. I believethat this was not a single noun, but consisted of two or threewords, the sum of their letters being twelve, and that these wordswere used by our Sages as a substitute for the Tetragrammaton,whenever they met with it in the course or their reading theScriptures, in the same manner as we at present substitute for italeph, daleth, etc. [i.e., Adonay," the Lord" ]. There is no doubtthat this name also, consisting of twelve letters, was in this sensemore distinctive than the name Adonay : it was never withheldfrom any of the students; whoever wished to learn it, had theopportunity given to him without any reserve : not so theTetragrammaton: those who knew it did not communicate it exceptto a son or a disciple, once in seven years, When, however,unprincipled men had become acquainted with that name whichconsists of twelve letters and in consequence had become corruptin faith-as is sometimes the case when persons with imperfectknowledge become aware that a thing is not such as they hadimagined-the Sages concealed also that name, and onlycommunicated it to the worthiest among the priests, that theyshould pronounce it when they blessed the people in the Temple;for the Tetragrammeton was then no longer uttered in thesanctuary on account of the corruption of the people. There is atradition, that with the death of Simeon the just, his brother priestsdiscontinued the pronunciation of the Tetragrammaton in theblessing; they used, instead, this name of twelve letters. It isfurther stated, that at first the name of twelve letters wascommunicated to every man; but when the number of impious menincreased it was only entrusted to the worthiest among the priests,whose voice, in pronouncing it, was drowned amid the singing oftheir brother priests. Rabbi Tarphon said," Once I followed mygrandfather to the days [where the blessing was pronounced); Iinclined my ear to listen to a priest [who pronounced the name],and noticed that his voice was drowned amid the singing of hisbrother priests."
There was also a name of forty-two letters known among them.Every intelligent person knows that one word of forty-two letters isimpossible. But it was a phrase of several words which hadtogether forty-two letters. There is no doubt that the words hadsuch a meaning as to convey a correct notion of the essence ofGod, in the way we have stated. This phrase of so many letters iscalled a name because, like other proper nouns, they represent onesingle object, and several words have been employed in order toexplain more clearly the idea which the name represents: for anidea can more easily be comprehended if expressed in manywords. Mark this and observe now that the instruction in regard tothe names of God extended to the signification of each of thosenames, and did not confine itself to the pronunciation of the singleletters which, in themselves, are destitute of an idea. Shemha-meforash applied neither to the name of forty-two letters nor tothat of twelve, but only to the Tetragrammaton, the proper name ofGod, as we have explained. Those two names must have includedsome metaphysical ideas. It can be proved that one of themconveyed profound knowledge, from the following rule laid downby our Sages:" The name of forty-two letters is exceedingly holy; itcan only be entrusted to him who is modest, in the midway of life,not easily provoked to anger, temperate, gentle, and who speakskindly to his fellow men. He who understands it, is cautious withit, and keeps it in purity, is loved above and is liked here below; heis respected by his fellow men; his learning remaineth with him,and he enjoys both this world and the world to come." So far in theTalmud. How grievously has this passage been misunderstood!Many believe that the forty-two letters are merely to bepronounced mechanically; that by knowledge of these, without anyfurther interpretation, they can attain to these exalted ends,although it is stated that he who desires to obtain a knowledge ofthat name must be trained in the virtues named before, and gothrough all the great preparations which are mentioned in thatpassage. On the contrary, it is evident that all this preparation aimsat a knowledge of Metaphysics, and includes ideas whichconstitute the" secrets of the Law," as we have explained (chap.xxxv.). In works on Metaphysics it has been shown that suchknowledge, i.e., the perception of the active intellect, can never beforgotten: and this is meant by the phrase" his learning remainethwith him."
When bad and foolish men were reading such passages, theyconsidered them to be a support of their false pretensions and oftheir assertion that they could, by means of an arbitrarycombination of letters, form a shem (" a name" ) which would actand operate miraculously when written or spoken in a certainparticular way. Such fictions, originally invented by foolish men,were in the course of time committed to writing, and came into thehands of good but weak-minded and ignorant persons who wereunable to discriminate between truth and falsehood, and made asecret of these shemot (names). When after the death of suchpersons those writings were discovered among their papers, it wasbelieved that they contained truths: for," The simple believethevery word" (Prov. xiv. 15).We have already gone too far away from our interesting subjectand recondite inquiry, endeavouring to refute a perverse notion,the absurdity of which every one must perceive who gives athought to the subject. We have, however, been compelled tomention it, in treating of the divine names, their meanings, and theopinions commonly held concerning them. We shall now return toour theme. Having shown that all names of God, with theexception of the Tetragrammaton (Shem ha-meforash), areappellatives, we must now, in a separate chapter, speak on thephrase Ehyeh asher Ehyeh, (Exod. iii. 14), because it is connectedwith the difficult subject under discussion, namely, theinadmissibility of divine attributes.
CHAPTER LXIII
BEFORE approaching the subject of this chapter, we will firstconsider the words of Moses, And they shall say unto me, What isHis name ? what shall I say unto them" (Exod. iii. 13), How farwas this question, anticipated by Moses, appropriate, and how farwas he justified in seeking to be prepared with the answer ? Moseswas correct in declaring," But, behold, they will not believe me,for they will say, The Lord hath not appeared unto thee" (ib. iv. 1):for any man claiming the authority of a prophet must expect tomeet with such an objection so long as he has not given a proof ofhis mission. Again, if the question, as appears at first sight,referred only to the name, as a mere utterance of the lips, thefollowing dilemma would present itself : either the Israelites knewthe name, or they had never heard it: if the name was known tothem, they would perceive in it no argument in favour of themission of Moses, his knowledge and their knowledge of thedivine name being the same. If, on the other hand, they had neverheard it mentioned, and if the knowledge of it was to prove themission of Moses, what evidence would they have that this wasreally the name of God ? Moreover, after God had made knownthat name to Moses, and had told him," Go and gather the eldersof Israel. . . . and they shall hearken to thy voice" (ib. xvi. 18), hereplied," Behold, they will not believe me nor hearken unto myvoice," although God had told him," And they will hearken to thyvoice" : whereupon God answered," What is that in thine hand ?"and he said," A rod" (ib. iv. 2). In order to obviate this dilemma,you must understand what I am about to tell you. You know howwidespread were in those days the opinions of the Sabeans: allmen, except a few individuals, were idolaters, that is to say, theybelieved in spirits, in man's power to direct the influences of theheavenly bodies, and in the effect of talismans. Any one who inthose days laid claim to authority, based it either, like Abraham, onthe fact that, by reasoning and by proof he had been convinced ofthe existence of a Being who rules the whole Universe, or thatsome spiritual power was conferred upon him by a star, by anangel, or by a similar agency; but no one could establish his claimon prophecy, that is to say, on the fact that God had spoken to him,or had entrusted a mission to him: before the days of Moses nosuch assertion had ever been made. You must not be misled by thestatements that God spoke to the Patriarchs, or that He hadappeared to them. For you do not find any mention of a prophecywhich appealed to others, or which directed them. Abraham, Isaac,or Jacob, or any other person before them did not tell the people,"God said unto me, you shall do this thing, or you shall not do thatthing." or" God has sent me to you." Far from it! for God spoke tothem on nothing but of what especially concerned them, i.e., Hecommunicated to them things relating to their perfection, directedthem in what they should do, and foretold them what the conditionof their descendants would be: nothing beyond this. They guidedtheir fellow-men by means of argument and instruction, as isimplied, according to the interpretation generally receivedamongst us, in the words" and the souls that they had gotten inHaran" (Gen. xii. 5). When God appeared to our Teacher Moses,and commanded him to address the people and to bring them themessage, Moses replied that he might first be asked to prove theexistence of God in the Universe, and that only after doing so hewould be able to announce to them that God had sent him. For allmen, with few exceptions, were ignorant of the existence of God;their highest thoughts did not extend beyond the heavenly sphere,its forms or its influences. They could not yet emancipatethemselves from sensation, and had not yet attained to anyintellectual perfection. Then God taught Moses how to teach them,and how to establish amongst them the belief in the existence ofHimself, namely, by saying Ehyeh asher Ehyeh, a name derivedfrom the verb hayah in the sense of" existing," for the verb hayahdenotes cc to be," and in Hebrew no difference is made betweenthe verbs" to be" and" to exist." The principal point in this phraseis that the same word which denotes" existence," is repeated as anattribute. The word asher," that," corresponds to the Arabic illadiand illati, and is an incomplete noun that must be completed byanother noun: it may be considered as the subject of the predicatewhich follows. The first noun which is to be described is ehyeh:the second, by which the first is described, is likewise ehyth, theidentical word, as if to show that the object which is to bedescribed and the attribute by which it is described are in this casenecessarily identical. This is, therefore, the expression of the ideathat God exists, but not in the ordinary sense of the term: or, inother words, He is" the existing Being which is the the existingBeing," that is to say, the Being whose existence is absolute. Theproof which he was to give consisted in demonstrating that there isa Being of absolute existence, that has never been and never winbe without existence. This I will dearly prove (II. Introd. Prop. 20and chap. i.).
God thus showed Moses the proofs by which His existence wouldbe frimly established among the wise men of His people.Therefore the explanation of the name is followed by the words,"Go, gather the elders of Israel," and by the assurance that the elderswould understand what God had shown to him, and would acceptit, as is stated in the words," And they will hearken to thy voice."Then Moses replied as follows: They will accept the doctrine thatGod exists convinced by these intelligible proofs. But, said Moses,by what means shall I be able to show that this existing God hassent me ? Thereupon God gave him the sign. We have thus shownthat the question," What is His name" means" Who is that Being,which according to thy belief has sent thee ?" The sentence,"What is his name" (instead of, Who is He), has here been used asa tribute of praise and homage, as though it had been said, Nobodycan be ignorant of Thy essence and of Thy real existence; if,nevertheless, I ask what is Thy name, I mean, What idea is to beexpressed by the name ? (Moses considered it inappropriate to sayto God that any person was ignorant of God's existence, andtherefore described the Israelites as ignorant of God's name, not asignorant of Him who was called by that name.) -- The name Jahlikewise implies eternal existence. Shadday, however, is derivedfrom day," enough: comp." for the stuff they had was sufficient"(dayyam, Exod. xxxvi. 7) the shin is equal to asher," which," as inshe-kehar," which already" (Eccles. ii. 16). The name Shadday,therefore, signifies" he who is sufficient" : that is to say, He doesnot require any other being for effecting the existence of what Hecreated, or its conservation : His existence is sufficient for that. Inasimilar manner the name basin implies" strength"; comp." he wasstrong (hason) as the oaks" (Amos ii. 9). The same is the casewith" rock," which is a homonym, as we have explained (chap.xvi.). It is, therefore, clear that all these names of God areappellatives, or are applied to God by way of homonymy, like zurand others, the only exception being the tetragrammaton, the Shemha-meforash (the nomen proprium of God), which is not anappellative: it does not denote any attribute of God, nor does itimply anything except His existence. Absolute existence includesthe idea of eternity, i.e., the necessity of existence. Note well theresult at which we have arrived in this chapter.
CHAPTER LXIV
KNOW that in some instances by the phrase" the name of theLord," nothing but the name alone is to be understood; comp."Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain" (Exod.xl. 7):" And he that blasphemeth the name of the Lord" (Lev. xxiv.16). This occurs in numerous other passages. In other instances itmeans the essence and reality of God Himself, as in the phrase" They shall say to me, What is his name" ? Sometimes it standsfor" the word of God," so that" the name of God,"" the word ofGod," and" the command of God," are identical phrases; comp." for my name is in him" (Exod. xxiii. 2 1), that is, My word or Mycommand is in him; i.e., he is the instrument of My desire andwill. 1 shall explain this fully in treating of the homonymity of theterm" angel" (II. chap. vi. and xxxiv.). -- The same is the casewith" The glory of the Lord." The phrase sometimes signifies" thematerial light," which God caused to rest on a certain place inorder to show the distinction of that place, e.g, ," And the glory ofthe Lord (kebod adonay) abode upon Mount Sinai and the cloudcovered it" (Exod. xxiv. 16) :" And the glory of the Lord filled thetabernacle" (ib. xl. 35). Sometimes the essence, the reality of Godis meant by that expression, as in the words of Moses," Show methy glory" (ib. xxxiii. 18), to which the reply was given," For noman shall see me and live" (ib. xx.). This shows that the glory ofthe Lord in this instance is the same as He Himself, and that" Thyglory" has been substituted for" Thyself," as a tribute of homage;an explanation which we also gave of the words," And they shallsay unto me, What is his name ?" Sometimes the term cc glory" denotes the glorification of the Lord by man or by any other being.For the true glorification of the Lord consists in the comprehensionof His greatness, and all who comprehend His greatness andperfection, glorify Him according to their capacity, with thisdifference, that man alone magnifies God in words, expressive ofwhat he has received in his mind, and what he desires tocommunicate to others. Things not endowed with comprehension,as e.g., minerals, may also be considered as glorifying the Lord, forby their natural properties they testify to the omnipotence andwisdom of their Creator, and cause him who examines them topraise God, by means of speech or without the use of words, if thepower of speech be wanting. In Hebrew this licence has beenextended still further, and the use of the verb" to speak" has beenadmitted as applicable in such a case: things which have nocomprehension are therefore said to give utterance to praise, e.g.," All my bones shall say, Lord, who is like unto thee (Ps. xxxv. 10).Because a consideration of the properties of the bones leads to thediscovery of that truth, and it is through them that it becameknown, they are represented as having uttered the divine praise:and since this [cause of God's praise] is itself called" praise," ithas been said" the fulness of the whole earth is his praise" (Isa. vi.3), in the same sense as" the earth is full of his praise (Hab. iii. 3).As to kabod being employed in the sense of praise, comp. Givepraise (kabod) to the Lord your God" (Jer. xiii. 16): also" and inhis temple does every one speak of his praise (kabod)" (Ps. xxix.g), etc. Consider well the homonymity of this term, and explain itin each instance in accordance with the context: you will thusescape great embarrassment.
CHAPTER LXV
AFTER YOU have advanced thus far, and truly comprehended thatGod exists without having the attribute of existence, and that He isOne, without having the attribute of unity, I do not think that Ineed explain to you the inadmissibility of the attribute of speech inreference to God, especially since our people generally believe thatthe Law, i.e., the word ascribed to Him, was created. Speech isattributed to Him, in so far as the word which Moses heard, wasproduced and brought to existence by God in the same manner asHe produced all His other works and creations. As we shall have tospeak more fully on prophecy, we shall here merely show thatspeech is attributed to God in the same way as all other actions,which are similar to our own. When we are told that Godaddressed the Prophets and spoke to them, our minds are merely toreceive a notion that there is a Divine knowledge to which theProphets attain; we are to be impressed with the idea that thethings which the Prophets communicate to us come from the Lord,and are not altogether the products of their own conceptions andideas. This subject, which we have already mentioned above, willreceive further explanation. It is the object of this chapter to showthat the words 11 speaking" and 'c saying" are synonymous termsdenoting (a)" Speech" : as, e.g.," Moses shall speak (yedabber)"(Exod. xix. 19):" And Pharaoh said (va-yomer)" (ib. v. 5): (b)"Thought" as formed in the mind without being expressed inwords; e.g.," And 1 thought (ve-amarti) in my heart" (Eccles. ii.15):" And I thought (vedibbarti) in my heart" (ib.):" And thyheart will imagine (yedabber)" (Prov. xxiii. 33):" ConcerningThee my heart thought (amar)" (Ps. xxvii. 8):" And Esau thought(Va-yomer) in his heart" (Gen. xxvii. 41): examples of this kindare numerous; (c) Will; e.g.," And he said (va-yomer) to slayDavid" (2 Sam. xxi. 16), that is to say, he wished or he intended toslay him:" Dost thou desire (omer) to slay me" (Exod. ii. 14):"And the whole congregation intended (va-yomeru) to stone them(Num. xiv. 10). Instances of this kind are likewise numerous.
The two terms, when applied to God, can only have one of the twolastmentioned significations, viz., he wills and he desires, or hethinks, and there is no difference whether the divine thoughtbecame known to man by means of an actual voice, or by one ofthose kinds of inspiration which I shall explain further on (11.chap. xxxviii.). We must not suppose that in speaking Godemployed voice or sound. or that He has a soul in which thethoughts reside, and that these thoughts are things superadded toHis essence; but we ascribe and attribute to Him thoughts in thesame manner as we ascribe to Him any other attributes. The use ofthese words in the sense of will and desire, is based, as I haveexplained, on the homonymity of these terms. In addition they arefigures borrowed from our common practices, as has been alreadypointed out. For we cannot, at a first glance, see how anything canbe produced by a mere desire: we think that he who wishes toproduce a thing, must perform a certain act, or command some oneelse to perform it. Therefore the command is figuratively ascribedto God when that takes place which He wishes, and we then saythat He commanded that a certain thing should be accomplished.All this has its origin in our comparing the acts of God to our ownacts, and also in the use of the term amar in the sense of" Hedesired," as we have already explained. The words" And He said,"occurring in the account of the creation, signify" He wished," or"He desired." This has already been stated by other authors, and iswell known. A proof for this, namely that the phrase" God said,"in the first chapter of Genesis, must be taken in a figurative sense"He willed," and not in its literal meaning, is found in thecircumstance that a command can only be given to a being whichexists and is capable of receiving the command. Comp." By theword of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of themby the breath of his mouth" (Ps. xxxiii. 6)." His mouth," and" thebreath of his mouth," are undoubtedly figurative expressions, andthe same is the case with" His word" and" His speech." Themeaning of the verse is therefore that they [the heavens and alltheir host] exist through His will and desire. All our eminentauthorities are cognisant of this; and, 1 need not explain that inHebrew amar and dibber have the same meaning, as is proved bythe passage," For it has heard all the words (imre) of the Lordwhich he spake (dibber) unto us" (josh. xxiv. 27).
CHAPTER LXVI
AND the tables were the work of God" (Exod. xxxii. 1:6), that isto say, they were the product of nature, not of art: for all naturalthings are called 46 the work of the Lord," e.g.," These see theworks of the Lord" (Ps. cvii. 24): and the description of the severalthings in nature, as plants, animals, winds, rain, etc., is followed bythe exclamation," 0 Lord, how manifold are thy works!" (Ps. civ.24). Still more striking is the relation between God and Hiscreatures, as expressed in the phrase," The cedars of Lebanon,which he hath planted" (ib. 16): the cedars being the product ofnature, and not of art, are described as having been planted by theLord. Similarly we explain," And the writing was the writing ofGod" (Exod. xxxii. 16): the relation in which the writing stood toGod has already been defined in the words" written with the fingerof God" (ib. xxxi. 18), and the meaning of this phrase is the sameas that of" the work of thy fingers" (Ps. viii. 4). this being said ofthe heavens: of the latter it has been stated distinctly that they weremade by a word; comp." By the word of the Lord were theheavens made" (ib. xxxiii. 6). Hence you learn that in the Bible,the creation of a thing is figuratively expressed by terms denoting" word" and" speech" The same thing which according to onepassage has been made by the word, is represented in anotherpassage as made by the" finger of God." The phrase" written bythe finger of God" is therefore identical with" written by the wordof God" : and if the latter phrase had been used, it would have beenequal to" written by the will and desire of God?' Onkelos adoptedin this place a strange explanation, and rendered the wordsliterally" written by the finger of the Lord" : he thought that" thefinger" was a certain thing ascribed to God; so that" the finger ofthe Lord" is to be interpreted in the same way as" the mountain ofGod" (Exod. iii. 1)," the rod of God" (ib. iv. 20), that is, as beingan instrument created by Him, which by His will engraved thewriting on the tables. I cannot see why Onkelos preferred thisexplanation. It would have been more reasonable to say" writtenby the word of the Lord," in imitation of the verse" BY the wordof the Lord the heavens were made?' Or was the creation of thewriting on the tables more difficult than the creation of the stars inthe spheres ? As the latter were made by the direct will of God, notby means of an instrument, the writing may also have beenproduced by His direct will, not by means of an instrument. Youknow what the Mishnah says,
Ten things were created on Friday in the twilight of the evening,and" the writing" is one of the ten things. This shows howgenerally it was assumed by our forefathers that the writing of thetables was produced in the same manner as the rest of the creation,as we have shown in our Commentary on the Mishnah (Abotb, v.6).
CHAPTER LXVII
SINCE the verb" to say" has been figuratively used to express thewill of the Creator, and the phrase" And he said has repeatedlybeen employed in the account of all the things created in the sixdays of the beginning," the expression" to rest" has likewise beenfiguratively applied to God in reference to the Sabbath-day, onwhich there was no creation; it is therefore said," And he rested(va-yishbot) on the seventh day" (Gen. ii. 2). For 46 to leave offspeaking" is, in Hebrew, likewise expressed by the same verb, as,e.g., So these three men ceased (va-yishbetu) to answer job" (jobxxxii. I) also by nuah, as, in" They spake to Nabal according to allthose words in the name of David, and ceased (va-yanuhu)" (ISam. xxv. 9). In my opinion, (va-yanuhu) means" they ceased tospeak," and waited for the answer; for no allusion to exertionwhatever having previously been mentioned, the words," and theyrested," in its primary signification, would have been entirely outof place in that narrative, even if the young men who spoke hadreally used some exertion. The author relates that having deliveredthat whole speech, which, as you find, consisted of gentleexpressions, they were silent, that is to say, they did not add anyword or act by which the reply of Nabal could be justified: it beingthe object of the entire passage to represent Nabal's conduct asextremely reprehensible. In that sense [viz.," to cease," or" toleave off" ] the verb nuah is used in the phrase" And he left off(va-yanah) on the seventh day."
Our Sages, and some of the Commentators, took, however, nuah inits primary sense" to rest," but as a transitive form (hiphil),explaining the phrase thus:" and he gave rest to the world on theseventh day," i.e., no further act of creation took place on that day.
It is possible that the word va-yanah is derived either from yanah, averb of the class pe-yod, or nahoh, a verb of the class lamed-he,and has this meaning :" he established" or" he governed" theUniverse in accordance with the properties it possessed on theseventh day" : that is to say, while on each of the six days eventstook place contrary to the natural laws now in operationthroughout the Universe, on the seventh day the Universe wasmerely upheld and left in the condition in which it continues toexist. Our explanation is not impaired by the fact that the form ofthe word deviates from the rules of verbs of these two classes: forthere are frequent exceptions to the rules of conjugations, andespecially of the weak verbs: and any interpretation which removessuch a source of error must not be abandoned because of certaingrammatical rules. We know that we are ignorant of the sacredlanguage, and that grammatical rules only apply to the majority ofcases.The same root is also found as a verb ayin-vav in the sense"to place" and" to set," as e.g.," and it shall be established and sheshall be placed (vehunnihah) there upon her own base" (Zech. v.11), and" she suffered neither the birds of the air to settle (la-nuah)on them" (2 Sam. xxi. 10). According to my opinion, the verb hasthe same signification in Hab. in. 16," that 1 might remain firm(anuah) in the day of trouble."
The word (va-yinnafash) is a verb derived from nefesh, thehomonymity of which we have already explained (chap. xls.),namely, that it has the signification of intention or will:(va-yinnafash) accordingly means :" that which he desired wasaccomplished, and what he wished had come into existence."
CHAPTER LXVIII
You are acquainted with the well-known principle of thephilosophers that God
is the intellectus, the ens intelligens, and theens intelligibile. These three
things are in God one and the same,and do not in any way constitute a
plurality. We have alsomentioned it in our larger work," Mishneh
Torah," and we haveexplained there that it is a fundamental principle of
our religion,namely, that He is absolutely one, that nothing combines withHim;
that is to say, there is no Eternal thing besides Him. On thataccount we say
hai adonay," the Lord liveth" (Ruth iii. 13), andnot be adonay,"
the life of the Lord," for His life is not a thingdistinct from His
essence, as wehave explained in treating of theinadmissibility of the
attributes. There is no doubt that he who hasnot studied any works on mental
philosophy, who has notcomprehended the nature of the mind, who has no
knowledge ofits essence, and considers it in no other way than he wouldconsider
the nature of whiteness and of blackness, will find thissubject extremely
difficult, and to him our principle that theintellectus, the intelligens, and
the intelligibile, are in God one andthe same thing, will appear as
unintelligible as if we said that thewhiteness, the whitening substance, and
the material which iswhitened are one and the same thing. And, indeed, many
ignorantpeople refute at once our principle by using such comparisons,.Even
amongst those who imagine that they are wise, many findthis subject difficult,
and are of opinion that it is impossible for themind to grasp the truth of this
proposition, although it is ademonstrated truth, as has been shown by
Metaphysicians. I willtell you now what has been proved. Man, before
comprehending athing, comprehends it in potentia
We have thus shown that the identity of the intellect, theintelligens and the intelligibile, is not only a fact as regards theCreator, but as regards all intellect, when in action. There is,however, this difference, that from time to time our intellectpasses over from mere potentiality to reality, and that the pureintellect, i.e., the active intellect, finds sometimes obstacles,though not in itself, but accidentally in some external cause. It isnot our present intention to explain this subject, but we will merelyshow that God alone, and none besides Him, is an intellectconstantly in action, and there is, neither in Himself nor inanything beside Him, any obstacle whereby His comprehensionwould be hindered. Therefore He always includes the intelligens,the intellectus, and the intelligibile, and His essence is at the sametime the intelligens, the intelligibile, and the intellectus, as isnecessarily the case with all intellect in action.
We have reiterated this idea in the present chapter because it isexceedingly abstruse, and I do not apprehend that the reader willconfound intellectual comprehension with the representativefaculty-with the reproduction of the material image in ourimagination, since this work is de.. signed only for those who havestudied philosophy, and who know what has already been said onthe soul and its faculties.
CHAPTER LXIX
THE philosophers, as you know, call God the First Cause (inHebrew Tlah and sibbah) : but those who are known by the nameof Mutakallemim are very much opposed to the use of that name,and call Him Agens, believing that there is a great differencewhether we say that God is the Cause or that He is the Agens. Theyargue thus : If we say that God is the Cause, the coexistence of theCause with that which was produced by that Cause wouldnecessarily be implied: this again would involve the belief that theUniverse was eternal, and that it was inseparable from God. When,however, we say that God is the 4gens, the co-existence of theJgens with its product is not implied: for the agens can existanterior to its product: we cannot even imagine how an agens canbe in action unless it existed before its own production. This is anargument advanced by persons who do not distinguish between thepotential and the actual. You, however, should know that in thiscase there is no difference whether you employ the term" cause"or" agens" : for if you take the term" cause" in the sense of amere potentiality, it precedes its effect: but if you mean the causein action, then the effect must necessarily co-exist with the causein action. The same is the case with the agens: take it as an agensin reality, the work must necessarily co-exist with its agens. Forthe builder, before he builds the house, is not in reality a builder,but has the faculty for building a house-in the same way as thematerials for the house before it is being built are merely inpotentia -- but when the house has been built, he is the builder inreality, and his product must likewise be in actual existence.Nothing is therefore gained by choosing the term" agens" andrejecting the term" cause." My object here is to show that thesetwo terms are equal, and in the same manner as we call God anAgens, although the work does not yet exist, only because there isno hindrance or obstacle which might prevent Him from doing itwhenever He pleases, we may also call Him the Cause, althoughthe effect may not yet be in existence.
The reason why the philosophers called God the Cause, and didnot call Him the Agens, is not to be sought in their belief that theuniverse is eternal, but in other motives, which I will brieflydescribe to you. It has been shown in. the science of Physics thateverything, except the Primal Cause, owes its origin to thefollowing four causes :-the substance, the form, the agens, the finalcause. These are sometimes direct, sometimes indirect causes; buteach by itself is called" a cause." They also believe-and I do notdiffer from their opinion-that God Himself is the agens, the form,and the end: therefore they call God" the Cause," in order toexpress that He unites in Himself these three causes, viz., that Heis the agens, the form, and the final cause of the universe. In thepresent chapter I only wish to show you in what sense it may besaid of God that He is the agens, the form, and also the final causeof the universe. You need not trouble yourself now with thequestion whether the universe has been created by God, orwhether, as the philosophers have assumed, it is eternal,co-existing with Him. You will find [in the pages of this treatise]full and instructive information on the subject. Here I wish to showthat God is the" cause" of every event that takes place in theworld, just as He is the Creator of the whole universe as it nowexists. It has already been explained in the science of Physics, thata cause must again be sought for each of the four divisions ofcauses. When we have found for any existing thing those fourcauses which are in immediate connexion with it, we find for theseagain causes, and for these again other causes, and so on until wearrive at the first causes. E.g., a certain production has its agens,this agens again has its agens, and so on and on until at last wearrive at a first agens, which is the true agens throughout all theintervening links. If the letter aleph be moved by bet, bet by gimel,gimel by dalet, and dalet by he - and as the series does not extendto infinity, ler us stop at he -- there is no doubt that the hi movesthe letters aleph, bet, gimel, and dalet, and we say correctly thatthe aleph is moved by hi. In that sense everything occurring in theuniverse, although directly produced by certain nearer causes, isascribed to the Creator, as we shall explain. He is the Jgens, andHe is therefore the ultimate cause. We shall also find, after carefulexamination, that every physical and transient form must bepreceded by another such form, by which the substance has beenfitted to receive the next form: the previous form again has beenpreceded by another, and we arrive at length at that form which isnecessary for the existence of all intermediate forms, which are thecauses of the present form. That form to which the forms of allexisting things are traced is God. You must not imagine that whenwe say that God is the first form of all forms existing in theUniverse, we refer to that first form which Aristotle, in the Bookof Metaphysics, describes as being without beginning and withoutend, for he treats of a form which is a physical, and not a purelyintellectual one. When we call God the ultimate form of theuniverse, we do not use this term in the sense of form connectedwith substance, namely, as the form of that substance, as thoughGod were the form of a material being. It is not in this sense thatwe use it, but in the following : Everything existing and endowedwith a form, is whatever it is through its form, and when that formis destroyed its whole existence terminates and is obliterated. Thesame is the case as regards the relation between God and alldistant causes of existing beings: it is through the existence of Godthat all things exist, and it is He who maintains their existence bythat process which is called emanation (in Hebrew shepha'), as willbe explained in one of the chapters of the present work. If God didnot exist, suppose this were possible, the universe would not exist,and there would be an end to the existence of the distant causes,the final effects, and the intermediate causes. Consequently Godmaintains the same relation to the world as the form has to a thingendowed with a form: through the form it is what it is, and on itthe reality and essence of the thing depends. In this sense we maysay that God is the ultimate form, that He is the form of all forms:that is to say, the existence and continuance of all forms in the lastinstance depend on Him, the forms are maintained by Him, in thesame way as all things endowed with forms retain their existencethrough their forms. On that account God is called, in the sacredlanguage, be ha-'olamim," the life of the Universe," as will beexplained (chap. lxxii.). The same argument holds good inreference to all final causes. If you assign to a thing a certainpurpose, you can find for that purpose another purpose. Wemention, e.g., a (wooden) chair; its substance is wood, the joiner isits agens, the square its form, and its purpose is that one should situpon it. You may then ask, For what purpose does one sit upon it ?The answer will be that he who is sitting upon it desires to be highabove the ground. If again you ask, For what purpose does hedesire to be high above the ground, you will receive the answerthat he wishes to appear high in the eyes of those who see him. Forwhat purpose does he wish to appear higher in the eyes of thosewho see 'him ? That the people may respect and fear him. What isthe good of his being feared ? His commands will be respected.For what purpose are his commands to be respected ? That peopleshall refrain from injuring each other. What is the object of thisprecaution ? To maintain order amongst the people. In this wayone purpose necessitates the pre-existence of another, except thefinal purpose, which is the execution of the will of God, accordingto one of the opinions which have been propounded, as will beexplained (III. xiii. and xvii.), and the final answer will be," It isthe will of God." According to the view of others, which willlikewise be explained, the final purpose is the execution of thedecree of His wisdom, and the final answer will be," It has beendecreed by His wisdom." According to either opinion, the series ofthe successive purposes terminates, as has been shown, in God'swilt or wisdom, which, in our opinion, are identical with Hisessence, and are not any thing separate from Himself or differentfrom His essence. Consequently, God is the final purpose ofeverything. Again, it is the aim of everything to become, accordingto its faculties, similar to God in perfection: this is meant by theexpression," His will, which is identical with His essence," as willbe shown below (ibid.). In this sense God is called the End of allends.
I have thus explained to you in what sense God is said to be theJgens, the Form, and the End. This is the reason why thephilosophers not only call Him" the Maker" but also the" Cause."Some of the scholars belonging to the Mutakallemim(Mohammedan theologians), went so far in their folly and in theirvainglory as to say that the non-existence of the Creator, if thatwere possible, would not necessarily imply the non-existence ofthe things created by Him, i.e., the Universe : for a productionneed not necessarily cease to exist when the producer, after havingproduced it, has ceased to exist. They would be right, if God wereonly the maker of the Universe, and if its permanent existencewere not dependent on Him. The storehouse does not cease to existat the death of the builder; for he does not give permanentexistence to the building. God, however, is Himself the form of theUniverse, as we have already shown, and it is He who causes itscontinuance and permanency. It is therefore wrong to say that athing can remain durable and permanent, after the being thatmakes it durable and permanent has ceased to exist, since thatthing can possess no more durability and permanency than it hasreceived from that being. Now you understand the greatness of theerror into which they have fallen through their assumption thatGod is only the 4gens, and not the End or the Form.
CHAPTER LXX
THE term rakab," to ride," is a synonym. In its primarysignification it is applied to man's riding on an animal, in the usualway; e.g.," Now he was riding (rokeb) upon his ass" (Num. XXIi.22). It has then been figuratively used to denote" dominion over athing" : because the rider governs and rules the animal he ridesupon; e.g.," He made him ride (Yarkihehu) on the high places ofthe earth" (Deut. xxxii. 13):" and I will cause thee to ride(ve-hirkabtika) upon the high places of the earth" (Isa. lviii. 14),that is, you shall have dominion over the highest (people) onearth;" I will make Ephraim to ride (arkib)" (Hos. x. 11), i.e., Ishall give him rule and dominion. In this same sense it is said ofGod," who rideth (rokeb) upon the heaven in thy help" (Deut.xxxiii. 26), that is, who rules the heaven; and" Him that rideth(la-rokeb) upon the 'arabot" (Ps. lxviii. 4), i.e., who rules the'arabot, the uppermost, all-encompassing sphere. It has also beenrepeatedly stated by our Sages that there are seven reki im(firmaments, heavens), and that the uppermost of them, theall-surrounding, is called 'arabot. Do not object to the numberseven given by them, although there are more reki'im, for there arespheres which contain several circles (gilgallim), and are countedas one; this is clear to those who have studied that subject, and Ishall also explain it; here I wish merely to point out that our Sagesalways assumed that 'arabot is the uppermost sphere. The 'arabot isalso referred to in the words," who rideth upon the heaven in thyhelp." Thus we read in Talm. B. Hagigah, p. 12," The high andexalted dwelleth on 'arabot, as it is said, 'Extol Him that ridethupon 'arabot '" (Ps.lxviii.4). How is it proved that" heaven" and"'arabot" are identical? The one passage has" who rideth on 'arabot,"the other" who rideth upon the heaven." Hence it is clear that in allthese passages reference is made to the same all-surroundingsphere, concerning which you will hereafter (11. xxiv.) receivemore information. Consider well that the expression" dwellingover it," is used by them, and not" dwelling in it." The latterexpression would have implied that God occupies a place or is apower in the sphere, as was in fact believed by the Sabeans, whoheld that God was the soul of the sphere. By saying" dwelling overit," they indicated that God was separate from the sphere, and wasnot a power in it. Know also that the term" riding upon theheavens," has figuratively been applied to God in order to show thefollowing excellent comparison. The rider is better than the animalupon which he rides-the comparative is only used for the sake ofconvenience, for the rider is not of the same class as the animalupon which he rides-furthermore, the rider moves the animal andleads it as he likes: it is as it were his instrument, which he usesaccording to his will: he is separate from it, apart from it, notconnected with it. In like manner the uppermost sphere, by therotation of which everything moveable is set in motion, is movedby God ` who is separate from the sphere, and is not a power in it.In Beresbit Rabba we read that in commenting on the Divinewords," The eternal God is a refuge" (lit., a dwelling, Deut.xxxiii. 27), our Sages said," He is the dwelling of His world, theworld is not His dwelling." This explanation is then followed bythe remark," The horse is secondary to the rider, the rider is notsubservient to the horse: this is meant by 'Thou wilt ride upon thyhorses'" (Hab. iii. 8). Consider and learn how they described therelation of God to the sphere, asserting that the latter is Hisinstrument, by means of which He rules the universe. Forwhenever you find our Sages saying that in a certain heaven arecertain things, they do not mean to say that in the heavens there areany extraneous things, but that from a certain heaven the forceemanates which is required for the production of certain things,and for their continuing in proper order. The proof for mystatement you may find in the following sayings of our Sages --"The 'arabot, in which there are justice, charity, right, treasures oflife and peace, treasures of blessing, of the souls of the righteous,of the souls and the spirits of those to be born, and of the dew bywhich God will at some future time revive the dead, etc." It is clearthat the things enumerated here are not material, and do notoccupy a place -- for" dew" is not to be taken in its literal sense. --Consider also that here the phrase" in which," meaning" in the'arabot," is used, and not" over which," as if to say that all thethings existing in the universe derive their existence from powersemanating from the 'arabot, which God made to be the origin andthe place of these powers. They are said to include" the treasuresof life" : a perfectly true and correct assertion ! For all existing lifeoriginates in that treasure of life, as will be mentioned below(chap. Ixii., and II. chap. x.). Reflect on the fact that the souls ofthe righteous as well as the souls and the spirits of those to be bornare mentioned here ! How sublime is this idea to him whounderstands it 1 for the soul that remains after the death of man, isnot the soul that lives in a man when he is born; the latter is a merefaculty, while that which has a separate existence after death, is areality: again, the soul and the spirit of man during his life are twodifferent things: therefore the souls and the spirits are both namedas existing in man: but separate from the body only one of themexists. We have already explained the homonymity of ruah (spirit)in this work, and also at the end of Seler ha madda' (Mishneb torahHil. teshubah, viii. 3-4) we treated of the homonymity of theseexpressions. Consider how these excellent and true ideas,comprehended only by the greatest philosophers, are foundscattered in the Midrashim. When a student who disavows truthreads them, he will at first sight deride them, as being contrary tothe real state of things. The cause of this is the circumstance, thatour Sages spoke of these subjects in metaphors: they are toodifficult for the common understanding of the people, as has beennoticed by us several times.
I will now return to the subject which I commenced to explain, inorder to bring it to a conclusion. Our Sages commenced to adduceproofs from Scripture for their assertion that the things enumeratedabove are contained in the 'arabot. As to justice and right theyquote" justice and judgment are the habitation of thy throne" (Ps.lxxxix. 18). In the same way they prove their assertion concerningall things enumerated by them, by showing that they are describedas being related to God, as being near Him. Note this. In the PirkeRabbi Eliezer it is said - God created seven reki'im (heavens), andout of all of them He selected the 'araboth for His royal throne:comp." Exalt him who rideth upon the 'arabot" (Ps. lxviii. 4).These are his (Rabbi Eliezer's) words. Note them likewise.
You must know that in Hebrew the collective noun denotinganimals used for riding is" mercabah." Instances of this noun arenot rare." And Joseph made ready his chariot" (merkabto) (Gen.xivi. 29):" in the second chariot" (be-mirkebet) (ib. xli. 43):"Pharaoh's chariots" (Markebot) (Exod. xv. 4). The followingpassage especially proves that the Hebrew merkabah denotes acollection of animals :" And a merkabah came up and went out ofEgypt for six hundred shekels of silver, and a horse for an hundredand fifty" (I Kings X. 21). Hence we may learn that mercabahdenotes here four horses. Therefore I think that when it was stated,according to the literal sense of the words, that four Hayyot(beasts) carry the Throne of Glory, our Sages called this"mercabah" on account of its similarity with the mercabahconsisting of four single animals. So far has the theme of thischapter carried us, and we shall be compelled to make manyfurther remarks on this subject. Here, however, it is our object, andthe aim of all we have said, to show that" who rideth uponheaven" (Deut. YX iii. 26) means" who sets the all-surroundingsphere in motion, and turns it by His power and will." The samesense is contained in the conclusion of that verse:" and in hisexcellency the spheres," i.e., who in His excellency moves thespheres (shehakim). In reference to the first sphere, the 'arahot, theverb to ride" is used, in reference to the rest, the noun 6'excellency," because through the motion of the uppermost spherein its daily circuit, all the spheres move, participating as parts inthe motion of the whole: and this being that great power that setseverything in motion, it is called" excellency." Let this subjectconstantly remain in your memory when you study what I amgoing to say: for it -- i.e., the motion of the uppermost sphere is thegreatest proof for the existence of God, as I shall demonstrate.Note this.
CHAPTER LXXI
KNOW that many branches of science relating to the correctsolution of these problems, were once cultivated by ourforefathers, but were in the course of time neglected, especially inconsequence of the tyranny which barbarous nations exercisedover us. Besides, speculative studies were not open to all men, aswe have already stated (Introd. P. 2, and 1. chap. xxxi.), only thesubjects taught in the Siriptures were accessible to all. Even thetraditional Law, as you are well aware, was not originallycommitted to writing, in conformity with the rule to which ournation generally adhered," Things which I have communicated toyou orally, you must not communicate to others in writing." Withreference to the Law, this rule was very opportune; for while itremained in force it averted the evils which happenedsubsequently, viz., great diversity of opinion, doubts as to themeaning of written words, slips of the pen, dissensions among thepeople, formation of new sects, and confused notions aboutpractical subjects. The traditional teaching was in fact, accordingto the words of the Law, entrusted to the Great Tribunal, as wehave already stated in our works on the Talmud. (Introd. toMishneh Torah and Introd. to Commen. on the Mishnah).
Care having been taken, for the sake of obviating injuriousinfluences, that the Oral Law should not be recorded in a formaccessible to all, it was but natural that no portion of" the secretsof the Law" (i.e., metaphysical problems) would be permitted tobe written down or divulged for the use of all men. These secrets,as has been explained, were orally communicated by a few ablemen to others who were equally distinguished. Hence the principleapplied by our teachers," The secrets of the Law can only beentrusted to him who is a councillor, a cunning artificer, etc." Thenatural effect of this practice was that our nation lost theknowledge of those important disciplines. Nothing but a fewremarks and allusions are to be found in the Talmud and theMidrashim, like a few kernels enveloped in such a quantity ofhusk, that the reader is generally occupied with the husk, andforgets that it encloses a kernel.
In addition you will find that in the few works composed by theGeonim and the Karaites on the unity of God and on such matteras is connected with this doctrine, they followed the lead of theMohammedan Mutakallemim, and what they wrote is insignificantin comparison with the kindred works of the Mohammedans. Italso happened, that at the time when the Mohammedans adoptedthis method of the Kalam, there arose among them a certain sect,called Mu'tazilah, i.e., Separatists. In certain things our scholarsfollowed the theory and the method of these Mu'tazilah. Althoughanother sect, the Asha'ariyah, with their own peculiar views, wassubsequently established amongst the Mohammedans, you will notfind any of these views in the writings of our authors: not becausethese authors preferred the opinions of the first-named sect tothose of the latter, but because they chanced first to becomeacquainted with the theory of the Mu'tazilah, which they adoptedand treated as demonstrated truth. On the other hand ourAndalusian scholars followed the teachings of the philosophers,from whom they accepted those opinions which were not opposedto our own religious principles. You will find that they did notadopt any of the methods of the Mutakallemim; in many respectsthey approached the view expressed in the present treatise, as maybe noticed in the few works which were recently written byauthors of that school. You should also know that whatever theMohammedans, that is, the Mu'tazilah and the Ashaariyah, said onthose subjects, consists in nothing but theories founded onpropositions which are taken from the works of those Greek andSyrian scholars who attempted to oppose the system of thephilosophers, and to refute their arguments. The following was thecause of that opposition: At the time when the Christian Churchbrought the Greeks and Syrians into its fold, and promulgated itswell-known dogmas, the opinions of the philosophers were currentamongst those nations: and whilst philosophy flourished, kingsbecame defenders of the Christian faith. The learned Greek andSyrian Christians of the age, seeing that their dogmas wereunquestionably exposed to severe attacks from the existingphilosophical systems, laid the foundation for this science ofDogmatics: they commenced by putting forth, such propositions aswould support their doctrines, and be useful for the refutation ofopinions opposed to the fundamental principles of the Christianreligion.
When the Mohammedans caused Arabic translations of thewritings of the Philosophers to be made, those criticisms werelikewise translated. When the opinions of John the Grammarian, ofIbn Adi, and of kindred authors on those subjects were madeaccessible to them, they adopted them, and imagined that they hadarrived at the solution of important problems. Moreover, theyselected from the opinions of the ancient philosophers whateverseemed serviceable to their purposes, although later critics hadproved that those theories were false: as, e.g., the theories of atomsand of a vacuum. They believed that the discussions of thoseauthors were of a general character, and contained propositionsuseful for the defence of positive religion. At a subsequent periodthe same theories were more fully developed, and presented anaspect unknown to those Theologians of the Greeks and othernations who were the immediate successors of the Philosophers.At a later time, when the Mohammedans adopted certain peculiartheological theories they were naturally obliged to defend them;and when their new theories, again became the subject ofcontroversy among them, each party laid down such propositionsas suited their special doctrine.Their arguments undoubtedly involved certain principles whichconcerned the three communities-Jews, Christians, andMohammedans, such as the creatio ex nihilo, which affordedsupport to the belief in miracles and to various other doctrines.There are, however, other subjects of belief which the Christiansand Mohammedans have undertaken to defend, such as thedoctrine of the Trinity in the theological works of the former, and"the Word" in the works of some Mohammedan sects; in order toprove the dogmas which they thus desired to establish, they werecompelled to resort to certain hypotheses. It is not our object tocriticize things which are peculiar to either creed, or books whichwere written exclusively in the interest of the one community orthe other. We merely maintain that the earlier Theologians, both ofthe Greek Christians and of the Mohammedans, when they laiddown their propositions, did not investigate the real properties ofthings: first of all they considered what must be the properties ofthe things which should yield proof for or against a certain creed;and when this was found they asserted that the thing must beendowed with those properties: then they employed the sameassertion as a proof for the identical arguments which had led tothe assertion, and by which they either supported or refuted acertain opinion. This course was followed by able men whooriginated this method, and adopted it in their writings. Theyprofessed to be free from preconceived opinions, and to have beenled to a stated result by actual research. Therefore whenphilosophers of a subsequent date studied the same writings theydid not perceive the true character of the arguments; on thecontrary, they found in the ancient works strong proofs and avaluable support for the acceptance or the rejection of certainopinions, and thus thought that, so far as religious principles wereconcerned, there was no necessity whatever to prove or refute anyof their propositions, and that the first Mutakallemim haddiscussed those subjects with the sole object of defeating certainviews of the philosophers, and demonstrating the insufficiency oftheir proofs. Persons who hold this opinion, do not suspect howmuch they are mistaken; for the first Mutakallemirn tried to provea proposition when it was expedient to demonstrate its truth; andto disprove it, when its rejection was desirable, and when it wascontrary to the opinion which they wished to uphold, although thecontradiction might only become obvious after the application of ahundred successive propositions. In this manner the earlierMutakallemim effected a radical cure of the malady! I tell you,however, as a general rule, that Themistius was right in saying thatthe properties of things cannot adapt themselves to our opinions,but our opinions must be adapted to the existing properties.
Having studied the works of these Mutakallemim, as far as I hadan opportunity, just as I had studied the writings of thephilosophers according to the best of my ability, I found that themethod of all Mutakallemim was the same in its generalcharacteristics, namely, they assume that the really existing formof things proves nothing at all, because it is merely one of thevarious phases of the things, the opposite of which is equallyadmissible to our minds. In many instances these Theologianswere guided by their imagination, and thought that they werefollowing the dictates of the intellect. They set forth thepropositions which I shall describe to you, and demonstrated bytheir peculiar mode of arguing that the Universe had a beginning.The theory of the creatio ex nihilo being thus established, theyasserted, as a logical consequence, that undoubtedly there must bea Maker who created the Universe. Next they showed that thisMaker is One, and from the Unity of the Creator they deduced HisIncorporeality. This method was adopted by every MohammedanMutakallem in the discussion of this subject, and by those of ourco-religionists who imitated them and walked in their footstepsAlthough the Mutakallemim disagree in the methods of theirproofs, and employ different propositions in demonstrating the actof creation or in rejecting the eternity of the Universe, theyinvariably begin with proving the creatio ex nihilo, and establishon that proof the existence of God. I have examined this method,and find it most objectionable. It must be rejected, because all theproofs for the creation have weak points, and cannot be consideredas convincing except by those who do not know the differencebetween a proof, a dialectical argument, and a sophism. Thosewho understand the force of the different methods will clearly seethat all the proofs for the creation are questionable, becausepropositions have been employed which have never been proved. Ithink that the utmost that can be effected by believers in the truthof Revelation is to expose the shortcomings in the proofs ofphilosophers who hold that the Universe is eternal, and if forsootha man has effected this, he has accomplished a great deed ! For itis well known to all clear and correct thinkers who do not wish todeceive themselves, that this question, namely, whether theUniverse has been created or is eternal, cannot be answered withmathematical certainty; here human intellect must pause. We shallhave occasion to speak more fully on this subject, but for thepresent it may suffice to state that the philosophers have for thelast three thousand years been continually divided on that subject,as far as we can learn from their works and the record of theiropinions.
Such being the nature of this theory, how can we employ it as anaxiom and establish on it the existence of the Creator ? In that casethe existence of God would be uncertain: if the universe had abeginning, God does exist: if it be eternal, God does not exist; theexistence of God would therefore remain either an open question,or we should have to declare that the creation had been proved,and compel others by mere force to accept this doctrine, in orderthus to be enabled to declare that we have proved the existence ofGod. Such a process is utterly inadmissible. The true method,which is based on a logical and indubitable proof, consists,according to my opinion, in demonstrating the existence of God,His unity, and Ifis incorporeality by such philosophical argumentsas are founded on the theory of the eternity of the Universe. I donot propose this method as though I believed in the eternity of theUniverse, for 1 do not follow the philosophers on this point, butbecause by the aid of this method these three principles, viz., theexistence of God, His unity and His incorporeality can be fullyproved and verified, irrespectively of the question whether theuniverse has had a beginning or not. After firmly establishing thesethree principles by an exact proof, we shall treat of the problem ofcreation and discuss it as fully as possible. You are at liberty tocontent yourself with the declaration of the Mutakallemim, and tobelieve that the act of creation has been demonstrated by proof:nor can there be any harm if you consider it unproven that theuniverse had a beginning, and accept this theory as supported bythe authority of the Prophets. Before you learn our opinion onprophecy, which will be given in the present work, do not ask, howcould the belief in prophecy be justified, if it were assumed thatthe universe was eternal, We will not now expatiate on thatsubject. You should, however, know that some of the propositions,started and proved by the Radicals, i.e., the Mutakallemim, inorder to prove the act of creation, imply an order of things contraryto that which really exists, and involve a complete change in thelaws of nature: this fact will be pointed out to you, for it will benecessary to mention their propositions and their argumentation.My method, as far as I now can explain it in general terms, is asfollows. The universe is either eternal or has had a beginning: if ithad a beginning, there must necessarily exist a being which causedthe beginning; this is clear to common sense; for a thing that hashad a beginning, cannot be the cause of its own beginning, anothermust have caused it. The universe was, therefore, created by God.If on the other hand the universe were eternal, it could in variousways be proved that apart from the things which constitute theuniverse, there exists a being which is neither body nor a force in abody, and which is one, eternal, not preceded by any cause, andimmutable. That being is God. You see that the proofs for theExistence, the Unity and the Incorporeality of God must varyaccording to the propositions admitted by us. Only in this way canwe succeed in obtaining a perfect proof, whether we assume theeternity or the creation of the universe. For this reason you willfind in my works on the Talmud, whenever I have to speak of thefundamental principles of our religion, or to prove the existence ofGod, that 1 employ arguments which imply the eternity of theuniverse. I do not believe in that eternity, but I wish to establishthe principle of the existence of God by an indisputable proof, andshould not like to see this most important principle founded on abasis which every one could shake or attempt to demolish, andwhich others might consider as not being established at all;especially when 1 see that the proofs of the philosophers are basedon those visible properties of things, which can only be ignored bypersons possessing certain preconceived notions, while theMutakallemim establish their arguments on propositions which areto such an extent contrary to the actual state of things as to compelthese arguers to deny altogether the existence of the laws of nature.When I shall have to treat of the creation, I shall in a specialchapter prove my opinion to some extent, and shall attain the sameend which every one of the Mutakallemim had in view, yet 1 shallnot contradict the laws of nature, or reject any such part of theAristotelean theory as has been proved to be correct. Even themost cogent of the Proofs offered by the Mutakallemim respectingthe act of creation, has only been obtained by reversing the wholeorder of things and by rejecting everything fully demonstrated bythe philosophers. I, however, shall be able to give a similar proofwithout ignoring the laws of nature and without being forced tocontradict facts which have been clearly perceived. I find itnecessary to mention to you the general propositions of theMutakallemim, by which they prove the act of creation, theExistence of God, His Unity and His Incorporeality. I intend toexplain their method, and also to point out the inferences whichare to be drawn from each proposition. After this, I shall describethose theories of the philosophers which are closely connectedwith our subject, and I shall then explain their method.
Do not ask me to prove in this work the propositions of thephilosophers, which I shall briefly mention to you: they form theprincipal part of Physics and Metaphysics. Nor must you expectthat I should repeat the arguments of the Mutakallemim in supportof their propositions, with which they wasted their time, withwhich the time of future generations will likewise be wasted, andon which numerous books have been written. Their propositions,with few exceptions, are contradicted by the visible properties ofthings, and beset with numerous objections. For this reason theywere obliged to write man books and controversial works indefence of their theories, for the refutation of objections, and forthe reconciliation of all apparent contradictions, although in realitythis object cannot be attained by any sophistical contrivance. As tothe propositions of the philosophers which I shall briefly explain,and which are indispensable for the demonstration of the threeprinciples-the Existence, the Unity, and the Incorporeality of God,they will for the greater part be admitted by you as soon as youshall hear them and understand their meaning; whilst in thediscussion of other parts reference must be made for their proofs toworks on Physics and Metaphysics, and if you direct your attentionto such passages as will be pointed out to you, you will findeverything verified that requires verification.
I have already told you that nothing exists except God and thisuniverse, and that there is no other evidence for His Existence butthis universe in its entirety and in its several parts. Consequentlythe universe must be examined as it is: the propositions must bederived from those properties of the universe which are clearlyperceived, and hence you must know its visible form and itsnature. Then only will you find in the universe evidence for theexistence of a being not included therein. I have considered it,therefore, necessary to discuss first in a merely colloquial manner,in the next chapter, the totality of existing things, and to confineour remarks to such as have been fully proved and establishedbeyond all doubt. In subsequent chapters I shall treat of thepropositions of the Mutakallemim, and describe the method bywhich they explain the four fundamental principles. In the chapterswhich will follow, I propose to expound the propositions of thephilosophers and the methods applied by them in verifying thoseprinciples. In the last place, I shall explain to you the methodapplied by me in proving those four principles, as I have stated toyou.
CHAPTER LXXII
KNOW that this Universe, in its entirety, is nothing else but oneindividual being: that is to say, the outermost heavenly sphere,together with all included therein, is as regards individualitybeyond all question a single being like Said and Omar. The varietyof its substances -- I mean the substances of that sphere and all itscomponent parts-is like the variety of the substances of a humanbeing : just as, e.g., Said is one individual, consisting of varioussolid substances, such as flesh, bones, sinews, of various humours,and of various spiritual elements: in like manner this sphere in itstotality is composed of the celestial orbs, the four elements andtheir combinations: there is no vacuum whatever therein, but thewhole space is filled up with matter. Its centre is occupied by theearth, earth is surrounded by water, air encompasses the water, fireenvelopes the air, and this again is enveloped by the fifthsubstance (quintessence). These substances form numerousspheres, one being enclosed within another so that no intermediateempty space, no vacuum, is left. One sphere surrounds and closelyjoins the other. All the spheres revolve with constant uniformity,without acceleration or retardation: that is to say, each sphereretains its individual nature as regards its velocity and thepeculiarity of its motion: it does not move at one time quicker, atanother slower. Compared with each other, however, some of thespheres move with less, others with greater velocity. Theoutermost, all-encompassing sphere, revolves with the greatestspeed; it completes its revolution in one day, and causeseverything to participate in its motion, just as every particle of athing moves when the entire body is in motion: for existing beingsstand in the same relation to that sphere as a part of a thing standsto the whole. These spheres have not a common centre: the centresof some of them are identical with the centre of the Universe,while those of the rest are different from it. Some of the sphereshave a motion independent of that of the whole Universe,constantly revolving from East to West, while other spheres movefrom West to East. The stars contained in those spheres are part oftheir respective orbits: they are fixed in them, and have no motionof their own, but participating in the motion of the sphere of whichthey are a part, they appear themselves to move. The entiresubstance of this revolving fifth element is unlike the substance ofthose bodies which consist of the other four elements, and areenclosed by the fifth element.
The number of these spheres encompassing the Universe cannotpossibly be less than eighteen: it may even be larger; but this is amatter for further investigation. It also remains an open questionwhether there are spheres which, without moving round the centreof the Universe, have nevertheless a circular motion. Within thatsphere which is nearest to us, a substance is contained which isdifferent from the substance of the fifth element: it first receivedfour primary forms, and then became in these four forms, fourkinds of matter : earth, water, air, fire. Each of the four elementsoccupies a certain position of its own assigned to it by nature: it isnot found in another place, so long as no other but its own naturalforce acts upon it; it is a dead body; it has no life, no perception,no spontaneous motion, and remains at rest in its natural place.When moved from its place by some external force, it returnstowards its natural place as soon as that force ceases to operate.For the elements have the property of moving back to their place ina straight line, but they have no properties which would causethem to remain where they are, or to move otherwise than in astraight line. The rectilinear motions of these four elements whenreturning to their original place are of two kinds, either centrifugal,viz., the motion of the air and the fire; or centripetal, viz., themotion of the earth, and the water; and when the elements havereached their original place, they remain at rest.
The spherical bodies, on the other hand, have life, possess a soulby which they move spontaneously; they have no properties bywhich they could at any time come to a state of rest: in theirperpetual rotations they are not subject to any change, except thatof position. The question whether they are endowed with anintellect, enabling them to comprehend, cannot be solved withoutdeep research. Through the constant revolution of the fifthelement, with all contained therein, the four elements are forced tomove and to change their respective positions, so that fire and airare driven into the water, and again these three elements enter thedepth of the earth. Thus are the elements mixed together; andwhen they return to their respective places, parts of the earth, inquitting their places, move together with the water, the air and thefire. In this whole process the elements act and react upon eachother. The elements intermixed, are then combined, and form atfirst various kinds of vapours: afterwards the several kinds ofminerals, every species of plants, and many species of livingbeings, according to the relative proportion of the constituentparts. All transient beings have their origin in the elements, intowhich again they resolve when their existence comes to an end.The elements themselves are subject to being transformed fromone into another; for although one substance is common to all,substance without form is in reality impossible, just as the physicalform of these transient beings cannot exist without substance. Theformation and the dissolution of the elements, together with thethings composed of them, and resolving into them, follow eachother in rotation. The changes of the finite substance, insuccessively receiving one form after the other, may therefore becompared to the revolution of the sphere in space, when each partof the sphere periodically reappears in the same position.
As the human body consists both of principal organs and of othermembers which depend on them and cannot exist without thecontrol of those organs, so does the universe consist both ofprincipal parts, viz., the quintessence, which encompasses the fourelements and of other parts which are subordinated and require aleader, viz., the four elements and the things composed of them.
Again, the principal part in the human body, namely, the heart, isin constant motion, and is the source of every motion noticed inthe body: it rules over the other members, and communicates tothem through its own pulsations the force required for theirfunctions. The outermost sphere by its motion rules in a similarway over all other parts of the universe, and supplies all thingswith their special properties. Every motion in the universe has thusits origin in the motion of that sphere: and the soul of everyanimated being derives its origin from the soul of that samesphere.
The forces which according to this explanation are communicatedby the spheres to this sublunary world are four in number, viz., (a)the force which effects the mixture and the composition of theelements, and which undoubtedly suffices to form the minerals: (b)the force which supplies every growing thing with its vegetativefunctions: (c) the force which gives to each living being its vitality,and (a) the force which endows rational beings with intellect. Allthis is effected through the action of light and darkness, which areregulated by the position and the motion of the spheres round theearth.
When for one instant the beating of the heart is interrupted, mandies, and all his motions and powers come to an end. In a likemanner would the whole universe perish, and everything thereincease to exist if the spheres were to come to a standstill.
The living being as such is one through the action of its heart,although some parts of the body are devoid of motion andsensation, as, e.g., the bones, the cartilage, and similar parts. Thesame is the case with the entire universe; although it includesmany beings without motion and without life, it is a single beingliving through the motion of the sphere, which may be comparedto the heart of an animated being. You must therefore consider theentire globe as one individual being which is endowed with life,motion, and a soul. This mode of considering the universe is, aswill be explained, indispensable, that is to say, it is very useful fordemonstrating the unity of God; it also helps to elucidate theprinciple that He who is One has created only one being.
Again, it is impossible that any of the members of a human bodyshould exist by themselves, not connected with the body, and atthe same time should actually be organic parts of that body, that isto say, that the liver should exist by itself, the heart by itself, or theflesh by itself. In like manner, it is impossible that one part of theUniverse should exist independently of the other parts in theexisting order of things as here considered, viz., that the fireshould exist without the co-existence of the earth, or the earthwithout the heaven, or the heaven without the earth.
In man there is a certain force which unites the members of thebody, controls them, and gives to each of them what it requires forthe conservation of its condition, and for the repulsion ofinjury-the physicians distinctly call it the leading force in the bodyof the living being: sometimes they call it" nature." The Universelikewise possesses a force which unites the several parts with eachother, protects the species from destruction, maintains theindividuals of each species as long as possible, and endows someindividual beings with permanent existence. Whether this forceoperates through the medium of the sphere or otherwise remainsan open question.
Again, in the body of each individual there are parts which areintended for a certain purpose, as the organs of nutrition for thepreservation of the individual, the organs of generation for thepreservation of the species, the hands and eyes for administering tocertain wants, as to food, etc.: there are also parts which, inthemselves, are not intended for any purpose, but are mereaccessories and adjuncts to the constitution of the other parts. Thepeculiar constitution of the organs, indispensable for theconservation of their particular forms and for the performance oftheir primary functions, produces, whilst it serves its specialpurpose, according to the nature of the substance, other things,such as the hair and the complexion of the body. Being mereaccessories, they are not formed according to a fixed rule: someare altogether absent in many individuals: and vary considerably inothers. This is not the case with the organs of the body. You neverfind that the liver of one person is ten times larger than that ofanother person, but you may find a person without a beard, orwithout hair on certain parts of his body, or with a beard ten timeslonger than that of another man. Instances of this phenomenon,viz., great variation as regards hair and colour, are not rare. Thesame differences occur in the constitution of the Universe. Somespecies exist as an integral part of the whole system: these areconstant and follow a fixed law: though they vary as far as theirnature permits, this variation is insignificant in quantity andquality. Other species do not serve any purpose: they are the mereresult of the general nature of transient things, as, e.g., the variousinsects which are generated in dunghills, the animals generated inrotten fruit, or in fetid liquids, and worms generated in theintestines, etc. In short, everything devoid of the power ofgeneration belongs to this class. You will, therefore, find that thesethings do not follow a fixed law, although their entire absence isjust as impossible as the absence of different complexions and ofdifferent kinds of hair amongst human beings.
In man there are substances the individual existence of which ispermanent, and there are other substances which are only constantin the species not in the individuals, as, e.g., the four humours. Thesame is the case in the Universe: there are substances which areconstant in individuals, such as the fifth element, which is constantin all its formations, and other substances which are constant in thespecies, as, e.g., the four elements and all that is composed ofthem.
The same forces which operate in the birth and the temporalexistence of the human being operate also in his destruction anddeath. This truth holds good with regard to this whole transientworld. The causes of production are at the same time the causes ofdestruction. This may be illustrated by the following example. Ifthe four forces which are present in every being sustained by food,viz., attraction, retention, digestion, and secretion, were, likeintelligent forces, able to confine themselves to what is necessary,and to act at the proper time and within the proper limits, manwould be exempt from those great sufferings and the numerousdiseases [to which he is exposed]. Since, however, such is not thecase, and since the forces perform their natural functions withoutthought and intelligence, without any consciousness of theiraction, they necessarily cause dangerous maladies and great pains,although they are the direct cause of the birth and the temporalexistence of the human being. This fact is to be explained asfollows : if the attractive force would absorb nothing but thatwhich is absolutely beneficial, and nothing but the quantity whichis required, man would be free from many such sufferings anddisorders. But such is not the case: the attractive force absorbs anyhumour that comes within the range of its action, although suchhumour be ill-adapted in quality or in quantity. It is, therefore,natural that sometimes a humour is absorbed which is too warm,too cold, too thick, or too thin, or that too much humour isabsorbed, and thus the veins are choked, obstruction and decayensue, the quality of the humour is deteriorated, its quantitiesaltered, diseases are originated, such as scurvy, leprosy, abscess, ora dangerous illness, such as cancer, elephantiasis, gangrene, and atlast the organ or organs are destroyed. The same is the case withevery one of the four forces, and with all existing beings. The sameforce that originates all things, and causes them to exist for acertain time, namely, the combination of the elements which aremoved and penetrated by the forces of the heavenly spheres, thatsame cause becomes throughout the world a source of calamities,such as devastating rain, showers, snow-storms, hail, hurricanes,thunder, lightning, malaria, or other terrible catastrophes by whicha place or many places or an entire country may be laid waste,such as landslips, earthquakes, meteoric showers and floodsissuing forth from the seas and from the interior of the earth.
Bear in mind, however, that in all that we have noticed about thesimilarity between the Universe and the human being, nothingwould warrant us to assert that man is a microcosm; for althoughthe comparison in all its parts applies to the Universe and anyliving being in its normal state, we never heard that any ancientauthor called the ass or the horse a microcosm. This attribute hasbeen given to man alone on account of his peculiar faculty ofthinking, I mean the intellect, viz., the hylic intellect whichappertains to no other living being. This may be explained asfollows. An animal does not require for its sustenance any plan,thought or scheme; each animal moves and acts by its nature, eatsas much as it can find of suitable things, it makes its resting-placewherever it happens to be, cohabits with any mate it meets whilein heat in the periods of its sexual excitement. In this manner doeseach individual conserve itself for a certain time, and perpetuatesthe existence of its species without requiring for its maintenancethe assistance or support of any of its fellow creatures: for all thethings to which it has to attend it performs by itself. With man it isdifferent; if an individual had a solitary existence, and were, likean animal, left without guidance, he would soon perish, he wouldnot endure even one day, unless it were by mere chance, unless hehappened to find something upon which he might feed. For thefood which man requires for his subsistence demands much workand preparation, which can only be accomplished by reflection andby plan; many vessels must be used, and many individuals, each inhis peculiar work, must be employed. It is therefore necessary thatone person should organize the work and direct men in such amanner that they should properly cooperate, and that they shouldassist each other. The protection from heat in summer and fromcold in winter, and shelter from rain, snow, and wind, require inthe same manner the preparation of many things, none of whichcan properly be done without design and thought. For this reasonman has been endowed with intellectual faculties, which enablehim to think, consider, and act, and by various labours to prepareand procure for himself food, dwelling and clothing, and to controlevery organ of his body, causing both the principal and thesecondary organs to perform their respective functions.Consequently, if a man, being deprived of his intellectual faculties,only possessed vitality, he would in a short time be lost. Theintellect is the highest of all faculties of living creatures: it is verydifficult to comprehend, and its true character cannot beunderstood as easily as man's other faculties.
There also exists in the Universe a certain force which controls thewhole, which sets in motion the chief and principal parts, andgives them the motive power for governing the rest. Without thatforce, the existence of this sphere, with its principal and secondaryparts, would be impossible. It is the source of the existence of theUniverse in all its parts. That force is God: blessed be His name ! Itis on account of this force that man is called microcosm: for helikewise possesses a certain principle which governs all the forcesof the body, and on account of this comparison God is called" thelife of the Universe comp." and he swore by the life of theUniverse" (Dan. xii. 7).
You must understand that in the parallel which we have drawnbetween the whole universe, on the one hand, and the individualman, on the other, there is a complete harmony in all the pointswhich we mentioned above only in the following three points adiscrepancy may be noticed.
First, the principal organ of any living being which has a heart,derives a benefit from the organs under the control of the heart,and the benefits of the organs thus become the benefits of theheart. This is not the case in the constitution of the universe. Thatpart which bestows authority or distributes power, does not receivein return any benefit from the things under its control: whatever itgrants, is granted in the manner of a generous benefector, not fromany selfish motive, but from a natural generosity and kindliness;only for the sake of imitating the ways of the Most High.
Secondly, living creatures endowed with a heart have it within thebody and in the midst thereof: there it is surrounded by organswhich it governs. Thus it derives a benefit from them, for theyguard and protect it, and they do not allow that any injury fromwithout should approach it. The reverse occurs in the case of theUniverse. The superior part encompasses the inferior parts, itbeing certain that it cannot be affected by the action of any otherbeing; and even if it could be affected, there is nobody without itthat could affect it. While it influences all that is contained within,it is not influenced by any act or force of any material being. Thereis, however, some similarity [between the universe and man] inthis point. In the body of animals, the organs more distant from theprincipal organ are of less importance than those nearer to it. Alsoin the universe, the nearer the parts are to the centre, the greater istheir turbidness, their solidity, their inertness, their dimness anddarkness, because they are further away from the loftiest element,from the source of light and brightness, which moves by itself andthe substance of which is the most rarefied and simplest : from theoutermost sphere. At the same ratio at which a body is nearer thissphere, it derives properties from it, and rises above the spheresbelow it.
Thirdly. The faculty of thinking is a force inherent in the body, andis not separated from it, but God is not a force inherent in the bodyof the universe, but is separate from all its parts. How God rulesthe universe and provides for it is a complete mystery: man isunable to solve it. For, on the one hand, it can be proved that Godis separate from the universe, and in no contact whatever with it;but, on the other hand, His rule and providence can be proved toexist in all parts of the universe, even in the smallest. Praised beHe whose perfection is above our comprehension.
It is true, we might have compared the relation between God andthe universe, to the relation between the absolute acquired intellectand man; it is not a power inherent in the body, but a power whichis absolutely separate from the body, and is from without broughtinto contact with the body. The rational faculty of man may befurther compared to the intelligence of the spheres, which are, as itwere, material bodies. But the intelligence of the spheres, purelyspiritual beings, as well as man's absolute and acquired intellect,are subjects of deep study and research: the proof of theirexistence, though correct, is abstruse, and includes argumentswhich present doubts, are exposed to criticism, and can be easilyattacked by objectors. We have, therefore, preferred to illustratethe relation of God to the universe by a simile which is clear, andwhich will not be contradicted in any of the points which havebeen laid down by us without any qualification. The oppositioncan only emanate either from an ignorant man, who contradictstruths even if they are perfectly obvious, just as a personunacquainted with geometry rejects elementary propositions whichhave been clearly demonstrated, or from the prejudiced man whodeceives himself. Those, however, who wish to study the subjectmust persevere in their studies until they are convinced that all ourobservations are true, and until they understand that our account ofthis universe unquestionably agrees with the existing order ofthings. If a man is willing to accept this theory from one whounderstands how to prove things which can be proved, let himaccept it, and let him establish on it his arguments and proofs. If,on the other hand, he refuses to accept without proof even theforegoing principles, let him inquire for himself, and ultimately hewill find that they are correct." Lo this, we have searched it, so itis; hear it, and know thou it for thy good" (Job v. 27).
After these preliminary remarks, we will treat of the subject whichwe promised to introduce and to explain.
CHAPTER LXXIII
THERE are twelve propositions common to all Mutakallemim,however different their individual opinions and methods may be;the Mutakallemim require them in order to establish their views onthe four principles. I shall first enumerate these propositions, andthen discuss each separately, together with the inferences whichmay be drawn from it.
PROPOSITION I. All things are composed of atoms.
PROPOSITION II. There is a vacuum.
PROPOSITION III. Time is composed of time-atoms.
PROPOSITION IV. Substance cannot exist without numerousaccidents.
PROPOSITION V. Each atom is completely furnished with theaccidents (which I will describe), and cannot exist without them.
PROPOSITION VI. Accidents do not continue in existence duringtwo timeatoms.
PROPOSITION VII. Both positive and negative properties have areal existence, and are accidents which owe their existence tosome causa efficiens.
PROPOSITION VIII. All existing things, i.e., all creatures, consistof substance and of accidents, and the physical form of a thing islikewise an accident.
PROPOSITION IX. No accident can form the substratum foranother accident.
PROPOSITION X. The test for the possibility of an imaginedobject does not consist in its conformity with the existing laws ofnature.
PROPOSITION XI. The idea of the infinite is equallyinadmissible, whether the infinite be actual, potential, oraccidental, i.e., there is no difference whether the infinite beformed by a number of co-existing things, or by a series of things,of which one part comes into existence when another has ceased toexist, in which case it is called accidental infinite: in both cases theinfinite is rejected by the Mutakallemim as fallacious.
PROPOSITION XII. The senses mislead, and are in many casesinefficient; their perceptions, therefore, cannot form the basis ofany law, or yield data for any proof.
FIRST PROPOSITION.
The Universe, that is, everything contained in it, is composed ofvery small parts [atoms] which are indivisible on account of theirsmallness; such an atom has no magnitude; but when severalatoms combine, the sum has a magnitude, and thus forms a body.''If, therefore, two atoms were joined together, each atom wouldbecome a body, and they would thus form two bodies, a theorywhich in fact has been proposed by some Mutakellemim. All theseatoms are perfectly alike; they do not differ from each other in anypoint. The Mutakallemim further assert, that it is impossible tofind a body that is not composed of such equal atoms which areplaced side by side. According to this view genesis andcomposition are identical: destruction is the same asdecomposition. They do not use the term" destruction," for theyhold that" genesis" implies composition and decomposition,motion and rest. These atoms, they believe, are not, as wassupposed by Epicurus and other Atomists numerically constant:but are created anew whenever it pleases the Creator: theirannihilation is therefore not impossible. Now I will explain to youtheir opinion concerning the vacuum.
SECOND PROPOSITION.
On the vacuum. The original Mutakallemim also believe that thereis a vacuum. i.e., one space, or several spaces which containnothing, which are not occupied by anything whatsoever, andwhich are devoid of all substance. This proposition is to them anindispensable sequel to the first. For, if the Universe were full ofsuch atoms, how could any of them move ? For it is impossible toconceive that one atom should move into another. And yet thecomposition, as well as the decomposition of things, can only beeffected by the motion of atoms! Thus the MutaLaflemim arecompelled to assume a vacuum, in order that the atoms maycombine, separate, and move in that vacuum which does notcontain any thing or any atom.
THIRD PROPOSITION.
Time is composed of time-atoms," i.e., of many parts, which onaccount of their short duration cannot be divided. This propositionalso is a logical consequence of the first. The Mutakallemimundoubtedly saw how Aristotle proved that time, space, andlocomotion are of the same nature, that is to say, they can bedivided into parts which stand in the same proportion to each other: if one of them is divided, the other is divided in the sameproportion. They, therefore, knew that if time were continuous anddivisible ad infinitum, their assumed atom of space would ofnecessity likewise be divisible. Similarly, if it were supposed thatspace is continuous, it would necessarily follow, that thetime-element, which they considered to be indivisible, could alsobe divided. This has been shown by Aristotle in the treatise called1croasis. Hence they concluded that space was not continuous, butwas composed of elements that could not be divided; and that timecould likewise be reduced to time-elements, which wereindivisible. An hour is, e.g., divided into sixty minutes, the minuteinto sixty seconds, the second into sixty parts, and so on: at lastafter ten or more successive divisions by sixty, time-elements areobtained, which are not subjected to division, and in fact areindivisible, just as is the case with space. Time would thus be anobject of position and order.
The Mutakallemim did not at all understand the nature of time.This is a matter of course: for if the greatest philosophers becameembarrassed when they investigated the nature of time, if some ofthem were altogether unable to comprehend what time really was,and if even Galenus declared time to be something divine andincomprehensible, what can be expected of those who do notregard the nature of things ?
Now, mark what conclusions were drawn from these threepropositions and were accepted by the Mutakallemim as true. Theyheld that locomotion consisted in the translation of each atom of abody from one point to the next one: accordingly the velocity ofone body in motion cannot be greater than that of another body.When, nevertheless, two bodies are observed to move during thesame time through different spaces, the cause of this difference isnot attributed by them to the fact that the body which has movedthrough a larger distance had a greater velocity, but to thecircumstance that motion which in ordinary language is calledslow, has been interrupted by more moments of rest, while themotion which ordinarily is called quick has been interrupted byfewer moments of rest. When it is shown that the motion of anarrow, which is shot from a powerful bow, is in contradiction totheir theory, they declare that in this case too the motion isinterrupted by moments of rest. They believe that it is the fault ofman's senses if he believes that the arrow moves continuously, forthere are many things which cannot be perceived by the senses, asthey assert in the twelfth proposition. But we ask them:" Have youobserved a complete revolution of a millstone ? Each point in theextreme circumference of the stone describes a large circle in thevery same time in which a point nearer the centre describes a smallcircle: the velocity of the outer circle is therefore greater than thatof the inner circle. You cannot say that the motion of the latter wasinterrupted by more moments of rest; for the whole moving body,i.e., the millstone, is one coherent body." They reply," During thecircular motion, the parts of the millstone separate from eachother, and the moments of rest interrupting the motion of theportions nearer the centre are more than those which interrupt themotion of the outer portions." We ask again," How is it that themillstone, which we perceive as one body, and which cannot beeasily broken, even with a hammer, resolves into its atoms when itmoves, and becomes again one coherent body, returning to itsprevious state as soon as it comes to rest, while no one is able tonotice the breaking up [of the stone] ?" Again their reply is basedon the twelfth proposition, which is to the effect that theperception of the senses cannot be trusted, and thus only theevidence of the intellect is admissible. Do not imagine that youhave seen in the foregoing example the most absurd of theinferences which may be drawn from these three propositions : theproposition relating to the existence of a vacuum leads to morepreposterous and extravagant conclusions. Nor must you supposethat the aforegoing theory concerning motion is less irrational thanthe proposition resulting from this theory, that the diagonal of asquare is equal to one of its sides, and some of the Mutakallemimgo so far as to declare that the square is not a thing of realexistence. In short, the adoption of the first proposition would betantamount to the rejection of all that has been proved inGeometry. The propositions in Geometry would, in this respect, bedivided into two classes: some would be absolutely rejected: e.g.,those which relate to properties of the incommensurability and thecommensurability of lines and planes, to rational and irrationallines, and all other propositions contained in the tenth book ofEuclid, and in similar works. Other propositions would appear tobe only partially correct: e.g., the solution of the problem to dividea line into two equal parts, if the line consists of an odd number ofatoms: according to the theory of the Mutakallemim such a linecannot be bisected. Furthermore, in the wellknown book ofproblems by the sons of Shakir are contained more than a hundredproblems, all solved and practically demonstrated: but if therereally were a vacuum, not one of these problems could be solved,and many of the waterworks [described in that book] could nothave been constructed. The refutation of such propositions is amere waste of time. I will now proceed to treat of the otherpropositions mentioned above.
FOURTH PROPOSITION.
The accidents of things have real existence: they are elementssuperadded to the substance itself, and no material thing can bewithout them." Had this proposition been left by theMutakallemim in this form it would have been correct, simple,clear, and indisputable. They have, however, gone further,asserting that a substance which has not the attribute of life, mustnecessarily have that of death; for it must always have one of twocontrasting properties. According to their opinion, colour, taste,motion or rest, combination or separation, etc., can be predicatedof all substances, and, if a substance have the attribute of life, itmust at the same time possess such other kinds of accidents, aswisdom or folly, freewill or the reverse, power or weakness,perception or any of its opposites, and, in short, the substance musthave the one or the other of all correlative accidents appertainingto a living being.
FIFTH PROPOSITION.
The atom is fully provided with all these foregoing accidents, andcannot exist if any be wanting." The meaning of the proposition isthis : The Mutakallemim say that each of the atoms created by Godmust have accidents, such as colour, smell, motion, or rest, exceptthe accident of quantity : for according to their opinion an atomhas no magnitude; and they do not designate quantity as anaccident, nor do they apply to it the laws of accidents. Inaccordance with this proposition, they do not say, when anaccident is noticed in a body, that it is peculiar to the body as such,but that it exists in each of the atoms which form the constituentelements of that body. E.g., take a heap of snow; the whitenessdoes not exist in that heap as a whole, but each atom of the snow iswhite, and therefore the aggregate of these atoms is likewisewhite. Similarly they say that when a body moves each atom of itmoves, and thus the whole body is in motion. Life likewise exists,according to their view, in each atom of a living body. The same isthe case according to their opinion with the senses: in each atom ofthe aggregate they notice the faculty of perception. Life, sensation,intellect and wisdom are considered by them as accidents, likeblackness and whiteness, as will be shown in the further discussionof their theory.
Concerning the soul, they do not agree. The view mostpredominant among them is the following :-- The soul is anaccident existing in one of the atoms of which, e.g., man iscomposed; the aggregate is called a being endowed with a soul, inso far as it includes that atom. Others are of opinion that the soul iscomposed of ethereal atoms, which have a peculiar faculty byvirtue of which they constitute the soul, and that these atoms aremixed with the atoms of the body. Consequently they maintain thatthe soul is an accident.
As to the intellect, I found that all of them agreed in considering itto be an accident joined to one of the atoms which constitute thewhole of the intelligent being. But there is a confusion amongthem about knowledge: they are uncertain whether it is an accidentto each of the atoms which form the knowing aggregate, orwhether it belongs only to one atom. Both views can be disprovedby a reductio ad absurdum, when the following facts are pointedout to them. Generally metals avid stones have a peculiar colour,which is strongly pronounced, but disappears when they arepulverised. Vitriol, which is intensely green, becomes white dustwhen pounded; this shows that that accident exists only in theaggregate, not in the atoms. This fact is more striking in thefollowing instance : when parts of a living being are cut off theycease to live, a proof that the accident [of life] belongs to theaggregate of the living being, not to each atom. In order to meetthis objection they say that the accident is of no duration, but isconstantly renewed. In discussing the next proposition I shallexplain their view on this subject.
SIXTH PROPOSITION.
" The accidents do not exist during two time-atoms." -- The senseof the proposition is this: They believe that God creates asubstance, and simultaneously its accidents: that the Creator isincapable of creating a substance devoid of an accident, for that isimpossible: that the essential characteristic of an accident is itsincapability of enduring for two periods, for two timeatoms: thatimmediately after its creation it is utterly destroyed, and anotheraccident of the same kind is created: this again is destroyed and athird accident of the same kind is created, and so on, so long asGod is pleased to preserve [in that substance] this kind of accident:but He can at His will create in the same substance an accident ofa different kind, and if He were to discontinue the creation and notproduce a new accident, that substance would at once cease toexist. This is one of the opinions held by the Mutakallemim: it hasbeen accepted by most of them, and it is the so-called" theory ofthe creation of the accidents." Some of them, however, and theybelong to the sect of the Mu'tazilah, say that there are accidentswhich endure for a certain period, and other accidents which donot endure for two atoms of time; they do not follow a fixedprinciple in deciding what class of accidents has and what classhas not a certain duration. The object of this proposition is tooppose the theory that there exists a natural force from which eachbody derives its peculiar properties. They prefer to assume thatGod himself creates these properties without the intervention of anatural force or of any other agency : a theory which implies thatno accident can have any duration. For suppose that certainaccidents could endure for a certain period and then cease to exist,the question would naturally be asked, What is the cause of thatnon-existence ? They would not be satisfied with the reply thatGod by His will brought about this non-existence, andnon-existence does not at all require any agens whatever: for assoon as the agens leaves off acting, the product of the agens ceaseslikewise to exist. This is true to some extent. Having thus chosento establish the theory that there does not exist any natural forceupon which the existence or non-existence of a thing depends, theywere compelled to assume that the properties of things weresuccessively renewed. When God desires to deprive a thing of itsexistence, He, according to some of the Mutakallemim,discontinues the creation of its accidents, and eo ipso the bodyceases to exist. Others, however, say that if it pleased the Almightyto destroy the world, He would create the accident of destruction,which would be without any substratum. The destruction of theUniverse would be the correlative accident to that of existence. --In accordance with this [sixth] proposition they say, that the clothwhich according to our belief we dyed red, has not been dyed by usat all, but God created that colour in the cloth when it came intocontact with the red pigment: we believe that colour to havepenetrated into the cloth, but they assert that this is not the case.They say that God generally acts in such a way, that, e.g., the blackcolour is not created unless the cloth is brought into contact withindigo; but this blackness, which God creates in the instant whenthe cloth touches the black pigment is of no duration, and anothercreation of blackness then takes place: they further say that afterthe blackness is gone, He does not create a red or green colour, butagain a black colour.
According to this principle, the knowledge which we have ofcertain things to-day, is not the same which we had of themyesterday; that knowledge is gone, and another like it has beencreated. They positively believe that this does take place,knowledge being an accident. In like manner it would follow thatthe soul, according to those who believe that it is an accident, isrenewed each moment in every animated being, say a hundredthousand times; for, as you know, time is composed of time-atoms.In accordance with this principle they assert that when man isperceived to move a pen, it is not he who has really moved it; themotion produced in the pen is an accident which God has createdin the pen; the apparent motion of the hand which moves the pen islikewise an accident which God has created in the moving hand;but the creative act of God is performed in such a manner that themotion of the hand and the motion of the pen follow each otherclosely; but the hand does not act, and is not the cause of the pen'smotion: for, as they say, an accident cannot pass from one thing toanother. Some of the Mutakallemim accordingly contend that thiswhite cloth, which is coloured when put into the vessel filled withindigo, has not been blackened by the indigo: for blackness beingan attribute of indigo, does not pass from one object to another.There does not exist any thing to which an action could beascribed: the real agens is God, and He has [in the foregoinginstance] created the blackness in the substance of the cloth whenit came into contact with the indigo, for this is the method adoptedby Him. In short, most of the Mutakallemim believe that it mustnever be said that one thing is the cause of another; some of themwho assumed causality were blamed for doing so. As regards,however, the acts of man their opinions are divided. Most of them,especially the sect of the Asha'ariyah, assume that when the pen isset in motion God has created four accidents, none of which is thecause of any of the rest, they are only related to each other asregards the time of their co-existence, and have no other relation toeach other. The first accident is man's will to move the pen, thesecond is man's power to do so, the third is the bodily motionitself, i.e., the motion of the hand, and the fourth is the motion ofthe pen. They believe that when a man has the will to do a thingand, as he believes, does it, the will has been created for him, thenthe power to conform to the will, and lastly the act itself. The act isnot accomplished by the power created in man: for, in reality, noact can be ascribed to that power. The Mu'tazilah contend that manacts by virtue of the power which has been created in him. Someof the Asha'ariyah assert that the power created in man participatesin the act, and is connected with it, an opinion which has beenrejected by the majority of them. The will and the power created inman, according to the concurrent belief of the Mutakallemim,together with the act created in him, according to some of them,are accidents without duration. In the instance of the pen, Godcontinually creates one motion after the other so long as the pen isin motion; it only then ceases to move when God has created in itthe accident of rest; and so long as the pen is at rest, Godcontinually renews in it that accident. Consequently in every oneof these moments, i.e., of the time-atoms, God creates someaccident in every existing individual, e.g., in the angels, in thespheres and in other things: this creation takes place continuallyand without interruption. Such is, according to their opinion, theright interpretation of the creed that God is the causa efficiens. ButI, together with all rational persons, apply to those theories thewords," Will you mock at Him, as you mock at man ?" for theirwords are indeed nothing but mockery.
SEVENTH PROPOSITION.
The absence of a property is itself a property that exists in thebody, a something superadded to its substance, an actual accident,which is constantly renewed: as soon as it is destroyed it isreproduced." The reason why they hold this opinion is this: they donot understand that rest is the absence of motion; death theabsence of life; that blindness is the absence of sight, and that allsimilar negative properties are the absence of the positivecorrelatives. The relation between motion and rest is, according totheir theory, the same as the relation between heat and cold,namely, as heat and cold are two accidents found in two objectswhich have the properties of heat and cold, so motion is anaccident created in the thing which moves, and rest an accidentcreated in the thing which rests; it does not remain in existenceduring two consecutive time-atoms, as we have stated in treatingof the previous proposition. Accordingly, when a body is at rest,God has created the rest in each atom of that body, and so long asthe body remains at rest God continually renews that property. Thesame, they believe, is the case with a man's wisdom and ignorance:the latter is considered by them as an actual accident, which issubject to the constant changes of destruction and creation, so longas there remains a thing of which such a man is ignorant. Deathand life are likewise accidents, and as the Mutakallemim distinctlystate, life is constantly destroyed and renewed during the wholeexistence of a living being; when God decrees its death, He createsin it the accident of death after the accident of life, which does notcontinue during two time-atoms, has ceased to exist. -All this theystate clearly.
The logical consequence of this proposition is that the accident ofdeath created by God instantly ceases to exist, and is replaced byanother death which again is created by God: otherwise deathcould not continue. Death is thus continually created in the samemanner as life is renewed every moment. But I should wish toknow how long God continues to create death in a dead body.Does He do so whilst the form remains, or whilst one of the atomsexists ? For in each of the atoms of the body the accident of deathwhich God creates is produced, and there are to be found teeth ofpersons who died thousands of years ago: we see that those teethhave not been deprived of existence, and therefore the accident ofdeath has during all these thousands of years been renewed, andaccording to the opinion prevailing amongst those theorists, deathwas continually replaced by death. Some of the Mu'tazilah holdthat there are cases in which the absence of a physical property isnot a real property, that weariness is the absence of strength, andignorance the absence of knowledge; but this cannot be said inevery case of negative properties : it cannot be said that darkness isthe mere absence of light, or that rest is the absence of motion.Some negative properties are thus considered by them as having areal existence, while other negative properties are considered asnon-existing, just as suits their belief. Here they proceed in thesame manner as they proceed respecting the duration of accidents,and they contend that some accidents exist a long time, and otheraccidents do not last two time-atoms. Their sole object is tofashion the Universe according to their peculiar opinions andbeliefs.
EIGHTH PROPOSITION.
There exists nothing but substance and accident, and the physicalform of things belong to the class of accidents." It is the object ofthis proposition to show that all bodies are composed of similaratoms, as we have pointed out in explaining the first proposition.The difference of bodies from each other is caused by theaccidents, and by nothing else. Animality, humanity, sensibility,and speech, are denoted as accidents like blackness, whiteness,bitterness, and sweetness, and the difference between twoindividuals of two classes is the same as the difference of twoindividuals of the same class. Also the body of the heaven, thebody of the angels, the body of the Divine Thronesuch as it isassumed to be-the body of anything creeping on the earth, and thebody of any plant, have one and the same substance; they onlydiffer in the peculiarity of the accidents, and in nothing else - thesubstance of all things is made up of equal atoms.
NINTH PROPOSITION.
None of the accidents form the substratum of another accident: itcannot be said, This is an accident to a thing which is itself anaccident to a substance. All accidents are directly connected withthe substance." The Mutakallemim deny the indirect relation of theaccident to the substance, because if such a relation were assumedit would follow that the second accident could only exist in thesubstance after another accident had preceded it, a conclusion towhich they would object even with regard to some specialaccidents; they prefer to show that these accidents can exist inevery possible substance, although such substance is notdetermined by any other accident; for they hold that all theaccidents collectively determine the thing. They advance alsoanother proof [in support of this proposition], namely : Thesubstratum which is the bearer of certain attributes must continueto exist for a certain time: how, then, could the accident;which-according to their opinion-does not remain in existence fortwo moments, become the substratum of something else ?
TENTH PROPOSITION.
This proposition concerns the theory of" admissibility," which ismentioned by the Mutakallemim, and forms the principal supportof their doctrine. Mark its purport: they observe that everythingconceived by the imagination is admitted by the intellect aspossible: e.g., that the terrestrial globe should become theall-encompassing sphere, or that this sphere should become theterrestrial globe: reason does not find here an impossibility: or thatthe sphere of fire should move towards the centre, and the sphereof earth towards the circumference. Human intellect does notperceive any reason why a body should be in a certain placeinstead of being in another. In the same manner they say thatreason admits the possibility that an existing being should belarger or smaller than it really is, or that it should be different inform and position from what it really is; e.g., a man might have theheight of a mountain, might have several heads, and fly in the air;or an elephant might be as small as an insect, or an insect as hugeas an elephant. This method of admitting possibilities is applied tothe whole Universe. Whenever they affirm that a thing belongs tothis class of admitted possibilities, they say that it can have thisform. and that it is also possible that it be found differently, andthat the one form is not more possible than the other; but they donot ask whether the reality confirms their assumption. They saythat the thing which exists with certain constant and permanentforms, dimensions, and properties, only follows the direction ofhabit, just as the king generally rides on horseback through thestreets of the city, and is never found departing from this habit; butreason does not find it impossible that he should walk on footthrough the place: there is no doubt that he may do so, and thispossibility is fully admitted by the intellect. Similarly, earth movestowards the centre, fire turns away from the centre; fire causesheat, water causes cold, in accordance with a certain habit; but it islogically not impossible that a deviation from this habit shouldoccur, namely, that fire should cause cold, move downward, andstill be fire; that the water should cause heat, move upward, andstill be water. On this foundation their whole fabric is constructed.They admit, however, the impossibility of two opposite propertiescoexisting at the same time in one substance. This is impossible;reason would not admit this possibility. Again, reason does notadmit the possibility of---asubstance existing without an accident,or an accident existing without a substance. a possibility admittedby some of the Mutakallemim. It is also impossible that asubstance should become an accident, that an accident shouldbecome a substance, or that one substance should penetrateanother. They admit that reason rejects all these things asimpossible. It is perfectly true that no notion whatever can beformed of those things which they describe as impossible; whilst anotion can be formed of those things which they consider aspossible. The philosophers object to this method. and say, You calla thing impossible because it cannot be imagined, or possiblebecause it can be imagined: and thus you consider as possible thatwhich is found possible by imagination, not by the intellect,consequently you determine that a thing is necessary, possible, orimpossible in some instances, by the aid of the imagination -- notby the intellect --and in other instances by the ordinary commonsense. as Abu Nasr says in speaking of that which theMutakallemim call intellect. It is clear that they describe aspossible that which can be imagined, whether the realitycorrespond to it or not, and as impossible that which cannot beimagined. This proposition can only be established by the nineaforementioned propositions, and no doubt these were exclusivelyrequired for the support of this proposition. This you will seeclearly when I shall show and explain to you some important partsof this theory, which I shall now introduce in the form of adiscussion supposed to have taken place between a Mutakallemand a philosopher.
The Mutakallem said to the philosopher: What is the reason thatwe find the substance of iron extremely hard and strong, with adark colour; the substance of cream, on the other hand, extremelysoft and white ? The philosopher replied as follows: All physicalbodies have two kinds of accidents : those which concern theirsubstance, as, e.g., the health and the illness of a man: and thosewhich concern their form, as, e.g., the astonishment and laughterof a man. The substances of compound bodies differ very much intheir ultimate form, according to the difference of the formspeculiar to each component substance. Hence the substance of ironhas become in its properties the opposite of the substance ofcream, and this difference is attended by the difference ofaccidents. You notice, therefore, hardness in the one, and softnessin the other : two accidents, whose difference results from thedifference which exists in the forms of the substances: while thedarkness and the whiteness are accidents whose divergencecorresponds to that of the two substances in their ultimatecondition. The Mutakallern refuted this reply by means of hispropositions, as I am now going to state :-- There does not exist aform which, as you believe, modifies the substance, and thuscauses substances to be different from each other: this difference isexclusively effected by the accidents-according to the theory of theKallm, which we mentioned in explaining the eighth proposition.He then continued thus : There is no difference between thesubstance of iron and that of cream; all things are composed of thesame kind of atoms. -- We explained the view of theMutakallemim on this point in treating of the first proposition, thelogical consequences of which are, as we have shown, the secondand the third propositions: they further require the twelfthproposition, in order to establish the theory of atoms. Nor do theyadmit that any accidents determine the nature of a substance, orpredispose it to receive certain other accidents: for, according totheir opinion, an accident cannot be the substratum of anotheraccident, as we have shown in explaining the ninth proposition;nor can it have any duration, according to the sixth proposition.When the Mutakallemim have established all that they wish toinfer from these propositions, they arrive at the conclusion that thecomponent atoms of cream and of iron are alike. -The relation ofeach atom to each of the accidents is the same; one atom is notmore adapted than another to receive a certain accident: and as acertain atom is not more fitted to move than to rest, so one atom isnot more apt than another to receive the accident of life, of reason,of sensation. It is here of no moment whether a thing contains alarger or smaller quantity of atoms, for, according to the view ofthe Mutakallemim, which we explained in treating of the fifthproposition, every accident [of a thing] exists in each of its atoms.All these propositions lead to the conclusion that a human being isnot better constituted to become wise than the bat, and establishthe theory of admissibility expressed in this [tenth] proposition.Every effort was made to demonstrate this proposition, because itis the best means for proving anything they like, as will beexplained.
NOTE. -- Mark, 0 reader, that if you know the nature of the souland its properties, and if you have a correct notion of everythingwhich concerns the soul, you will observe that most animalspossess imagination. As to the higher class of animals, that is,those which have a heart, it is obvious that they have imagination.Man's distinction does not consist in the possession of imagination,and the action of imagination is not the same as the action of theintellect, but the reverse of it. For the intellect analyses and dividesthe component parts of things, it forms abstract ideas of them,represents them in their true form as well as in their causalrelations, derives from one object a great many facts, which-for theintellect-totally differ from each other, just as two humanindividuals appear different to the imagination: it distinguishesthat which is the property of the genus from that which is peculiarto the individual, -- and no proof is correct, unless founded on theformer; the intellect further determines whether certain qualities ofa thing are essential or non-essential. Imagination has none ofthese functions. It only perceives the individual, the compound inthat aggregate condition in which it presents itself to the senses; orit combines things which exist separately, joins some of themtogether, and represents them all as one body or as a force of thebody. Hence it is that some imagine a man with a horse's head,with wings, etc. This is called a fiction, a phantasm; it is a thing towhich nothing in the actual world corresponds. Nor canimagination in any way obtain a purely immaterial image of anobject, however abstract the form of the image may be.Imagination yields therefore no test for the reality of a thing.
Hear what profit we derive from the preliminary disciplines, andhow excellent the propositions are which we learn through them.Know that there are certain things, which would appearimpossible, if tested by man's imagination, being as inconceivableas the co-existence of two opposite properties in one object: yet theexistence of those same things, which cannot be represented byimagination, is nevertheless established by proof, and attested bytheir reality. E.g., Imagine a large globe, of any magnitude youlike, even as large as the all-encompassing sphere: further an axispassing through the centre, and two persons standing on the twoextremities of the axis in such a manner that their feet are in thesame straight line with the axis, which may be either in the planeof the horizon or not: in the first case both persons would fall, inthe second case one, namely the one who stands on the lowerextremity would fall, the other would remain standing, as far asour imagination can perceive. It has however, already been provedthat the earth has the form of a globe, that it is inhabited on bothextremities of a certain diameter, that both the inhabitants havetheir heads towards the heaven, and their legs towards each other,and yet neither can possibly fall, nor can it be imagined; for it isincorrect to say that the one extremity is above, the other below;but the term" above" and" below" apply to both of them asregards their relative position to each other. Similarly it has beenproved in the second chapter of the book on Conic Sections, thattwo lines, which at first are at a certain distance from each other,may approach each other in the same proportion as they areproduced further, and yet would never meet, even if they wereproduced to infinity, although they are observed to be constantlyconverging. This is a fact which cannot easily be conceived, andwhich does not come within the scope of imagination. Of thesetwo lines the one is straight, the other curved, as stated in theaforementioned book. It has consequently been proved that thingswhich cannot be perceived or imagined, and which would be foundimpossible if tested solely by imagination, are nevertheless in realexistence. The non-existence of things which are represented byimagination as possible has likewise been established by proof,e.g., the corporeality of God, and His existence as a force residingin a body. Imagination perceives nothing except bodies, orproperties inherent in bodies.
It has thus been clearly shown that in man exists a certain facultywhich is entirely distinct from imagination, and by which thenecessary, the possible, and the impossible can be distinguishedfrom each other. This inquiry is most useful. It is of the greatestprofit to him who desires to guard himself against the errors ofmen guided by imagination I Do not think that the Mutakallemimignore this altogether: to some extent they do take it intoconsideration; they know it, and call that which can be imaginedwithout having reality-as, e.g., the corporeality of God -- aphantom and a fancy; they state frequently that such phantoms arenot real. It is for this reason that they advance the first ninepropositions and establish on them the proof of the tenth,according to which all those imaginable things which they wish toadmit as possible are really possible, because of the similarity ofan atoms and the equality of all accidents as regards theiraccidentality, as we have explained.
Consider, 0 reader, and bear in mind that this requires deepresearch. For there are certain notions which some believe to befounded on reason, while others regard them as mere fictions. Insuch cases it would be necessary to find something that couldshow the difference between conceptions of the intellect and mereimaginary fancies. When the philosopher, in his way of expressinghimself, contends," Reality is my evidence; by its guidance Iexamine whether a thing is necessary, possible, or impossible," thereligionist replies," This is exactly the difference between us: thatwhich actually exists, has, according to my view, been producedby the will of the Creator, not by necessity; just as it has beencreated with that special property, it might have been created withany other property, unless the impossibility which you postulate beproved by a logical demonstration."
About this admissibility (of imaginable things) I shall have to saymore, and I shall return to it in various parts of this treatise: for itis not a subject which should be rejected in haste and on the spurof the moment.
ELEVENTH PROPOSITION.
The existence of the infinite is in every respect impossible." Thefollowing is an explanation of this proposition. The impossibilityof the existence of an infinite body has been dearly demonstrated;the same can be said of an infinite number of bodies, though eachof them be finite, if these beings, infinite in number, exist at thesame time: equally impossible is the existence of an infinite seriesof causes, namely, that a certain thing should be the cause ofanother thing, but itself the effect of another cause, which again isthe result of another cause, and so on to infinity, or that things inan infinite series, either bodies or ideals, should be in actualexistence, and in causal relation to each other. This causal relationis the essential order of nature, in which, as has been fully proved,the infinite is impossible. As regards the virtual and the accidentalexistence of the infinite, it has been established in some cases; ithas been proved, e.g., that a body can virtually be divided adinfinitum, also that time can be divided ad infinitum: in other casesit is still an open question, as, e.g., the existence of the infinite insuccession, which is called the accidental infinite, i.e., a series ofthings in which one thing comes forth when the other is gone, andthis again in its turn succeeded a thing which had ceased to exist,and so on ad infinitum. This subject requires deep research.
Those who boast that they have proved the eternity of the Universesay that time is infinite: an assertion which is not necessarilyerroneous: for only when one atom has ceased to exist, the otherfollows. Nor is it absolutely wrong, when they assert, that theaccidents of the substance succeed each other in an infinite series,for these accidents do not co-exist, but come in succession oneafter the other, and the impossibility of the infinite in that case hasnot been proved. The Mutakallemim, however, make no differencebetween the existence of an infinite body and the divisibility of abody or of time ad infinitum, between the co-existence of aninfinite number of things, as e.g., the individual human beings whoexist at present, and the infinite number of beings successivelyexisting, as, e.g., Reuben the son of Jacob, and Jacob the son ofIsaac, and Isaac the son of Abraham, and so on to infinity. This isaccording to their opinion as inadmissible as the first case: theybelieve these four forms of the infinite to be quite equal. Some ofthe Mutakallemim endeavour to establish their propositionconcerning the last named form of the infinite, and to demonstrateits impossibility by a method which I shall explain in this treatise;others say that this impossibility is a self-evident axiom andrequires no further proof. But if it were undoubtedly wrong toassume that an infinite number of things can exist in succession,although that link of the series which exists at present is finite, theinadmissibility of the eternity of the Universe would be equallyselfevident, and would not require for its proof any otherproposition. This, however, is not the place for investigating thesubject.
TWELFTH PROPOSITION.
The senses are not always to be trusted." For two reasons theMutakallemim find fault with the perception of the senses. First,the senses are precluded from perceiving many objects, either onaccount of the smallness of the objects -- this is the case with theatoms, as we have already statedor on account of the remoteness ofthe objects from the person who desires to perceive them; e.g., wecannot see, hear, or smell at a distance of many miles; nor do weperceive the motion of the heavens. Secondly, the sensesmisapprehend the objects of their perception : a large objectappears small from a distance: a small object immersed in waterappears larger: a crooked thing appears straight when partly placedin water, and partly out of it; things appear yellow to a personsuffering from jaundice; sweet things are bitter to him whosetongue has imbibed red gall; and they mention many other thingsof this kind. Therefore they say, we cannot trust our senses so faras to establish any proof on their perceptions. You must notbelieve that the Mutakallemim had no purpose in agreeing uponthis proposition, or as most of the later adherents of that schoolaffirm, that the first Mutakallemim had no ulterior object inendeavouring to prove the existence of atoms. On the contrary,every proposition here mentioned is indispensable; if one of thesebe rejected, the whole theory falls to the ground. Thelastmentioned proposition is of particular importance; for whenour senses perceive things by which any of the foregoingpropositions are confuted, the Mutakallemim say that no noticeshould be taken of the perception of the senses so long as theproposition is supported by the testimony of the intellect, andestablished (as they believe) by proof. Thus they say that thecontinuous motion is interrupted by moments of rest; that themillstone in its motion is broken into atoms; that the white colourof a garment ceases to exist, and another whiteness comes in itsstead. All these theories are contrary to what the eye perceives, andmany inferences are drawn from the assumed existence of avacuum, all of which are contradicted by the senses. TheMutakallemim, however, meet these objections by saying,whenever they can do so, that the perception of these things iswithheld from the senses: in other instances they maintain that thecontradiction has its source in the deceptive character of thesenses. You know that this theory is very ancient, and was thepride of the sophists, who asserted that they themselves were itsauthors; this is stated by Galenus in his treatise on natural forces;and you know well what he says of those who will not admit theevidence of the senses.
Having discussed these propositions, I now proceed to explain thetheory of the Mutakallemim concerning the above-mentioned fourproblems.
CHAPTER LXXIV
IN this chapter will be given an outline of the proofs by which theMutakallemim attempt to demonstrate that the universe is noteternal. You must of course not expect that I shall quote theirlengthy arguments verbatim: I only intend to give an abstract ofeach proof, to show in what way it helps to establish the theory ofthe creatio ex nihilo or to confute the eternity of the universe, andbriefly to notice the propositions they employed in support of theirtheory. If you were to read their well-known and voluminouswritings, you would not discover any arguments with which theysupport their view left unnoticed in the present outline, but youmight find there greater copiousness of words combined with moregrace and elegance of style; frequently they employ rhyme,rhythm, and poetical diction, and sometimes mysterious phraseswhich perhaps are intended to startle persons listening to theirdiscourses, and to deter those who might otherwise criticize them.You would also find many repetitions; questions propounded and,as they believe, answered, and frequent attacks on those who differfrom their opinions.
The First Argument.
Some of the Mutakallemim thought that by proving the creation ofone thing, they demonstrated the creatio ex nihilo in reference tothe entire universe. E.g., Zaid, who from a small molecule hadgradually been brought to a state of perfection, has undoubtedlynot effected this change and development by his own efforts, butowes it to an external agency. It is therefore clear that an agent isrequired for such organization and successive transmutation. Apalm-tree or any other object might equally be selected to illustratethis idea. The whole universe, they argue, is analogous to theseinstances. Thus you see how they believe that a law discovered inone thing may equally be applied to everything.
The Second 4rgument.
This argument is likewise based on the belief that the proof bywhich the creation of one thing is demonstrated, holds good for thecreatio ex nihilo in reference to the whole universe. E.g., a certainindividual, called Zaid, who one time was not yet in existence,subsequently came into existence; and if it be assumed that Amr,his father, was the cause of his existence, Amr himself mustlikewise have passed from non-existence into existence: supposethen that Zaid's father unquestionably owed his origin to Khaled,Zaid's grandfather, it would be found that Khaled himself did notexist from eternity, and the series of causes could thus be carriedback to infinity. But such an infinite series of beings isinadmissible according to the theory of the Mutakallemim, as wehave shown in our discussion of the eleventh proposition. Incontinuing this species of reasoning, you come to a first man, whohad no parent, viz. Adam. Then you will of course ask, whencecame this first man ? If, e.g., the reply be given that he was madeout of earth, you will again inquire," Whence came that earth ?" "Out of water."" Whence came the water ?" The inquiry would becarried on, either ad infinitum, which is absurd, or until you meetwith a something that came into existence from absolutenon-existence: in this latter case you would arrive at the real truth:here the series of inquiries ends. This result of the question proves,according to the opinion of the Mutakallemim, that the wholeuniverse came into existence from absolute non-existence.
The Third Argument.
The atoms of things are necessarily either joined together orseparate, and even the same atoms may at one time be united atanother disunited. It is therefore evident that the nature of theatoms does not necessitate either their combination or theirseparation: for if they were separate by virtue of their nature theywould never join, and if they were joined by virtue of their nature,they could never again be separated. Thus there is no reason whyatoms should rather be combined than separate, or vice versa, whyrather in a state of separation than of combination. Seeing thatsome atoms are joined, others separate, and again others subject tochange, they being combined at one time and separated at another,the fact may therefore be taken as a proof that the atoms cannotcombine or separate without an agent. This argument, according tothe opinion of the Mutakallemim, establishes the theory that theuniverse has been created from nothing. You have already beentold, that those who employ this argument rely on the firstproposition of the Mutakallemim with its corollaries.
The Fourth Argument.
The whole Universe is composed of substance and accidents;every substance must possess one accident or more, and since theaccidents are not eternal, the substance, the substratum of theaccidents, cannot be eternal: for that which is joined to transientthings and cannot exist without them is itself transient. Thereforethe whole Universe has had a beginning. To the objection, that thesubstance may possibly be eternal while the accidents, though inthemselves transient, succeed each other in an infinite series, theyreply that, in this case, an infinite number of transient things wouldbe in existence, an eventuality which, according to their theory, isimpossible. This argument is considered by them the best andsafest, and has been accepted by many of them as a strict proof. Itsacceptance implies the admission of the following threepropositions, the object of which is well understood byphilosophers. (1) An infinite series of things, of which the onesucceeds when the other has ceased to exist, is impossible. (2) Allaccidents have a beginning.-Our opponent, who defends the theoryof the eternity of the universe, can refute this proposition bypointing to one particular accident, namely to the circular motionof the sphere: for it is held by Aristotle that this circular motion iseternal, and, therefore, the spheres which perform this motion are,according to his opinion, likewise eternal. It is of no use to provethat all other accidents have a beginning; for our opponent doesnot deny this: he says that accidents may supervene an objectwhich has existed from eternity, and may follow each other inrotation. He contents himself with maintaining that this particularaccident, viz., circular motion, the motion of the heavenly sphere,is eternal, and does not belong to the class of transient accidents. Itis therefore necessary to examine this accident by itself, and toprove that it is not eternal. (3) The next proposition which theauthor of this argument accepts is as follows : Every materialobject consists of substance and accidents, that is to say, of atomsand accidents in the sense in which the Mutakallemim use theterm. But if a material object were held to be a combination ofmatter and form, as has been proved by our opponent, it would benecessary to demonstrate that the primal matter and the primalform are transient, and only then the proof of the creatio ex nihilowould be complete.
The Filth Argument.
This argument is based on the theory of Determination, and ismade much of by the Mutakallemim. It is the same as the theorywhich I explained in discussing the tenth proposition. Namely,when they treat either of the Universe in general, or of any of itsparts, they assume that it can have such properties and suchdimensions as it actually has; that it may receive such accidents asin reality are noticed in it, and that it may exist in such a place andat such a time as in fact is the case; but it may be larger or smaller,may receive other properties and accidents, and come to existenceat an earlier or a later period, or in a different place. Consequently,the fact that a thing has been determined in its composition, size,place, accident and time -- a variation in all these points beingpossible-is a proof that a being exists which freely chooses anddetermines these divers relations: and the circumstance that theUniverse or a part of it requires a being able to make this selection,proves that the Universe has been created ex nihilo. For there is nodifference which of the following expressions is used: todetermine, to make, to create, to produce, to originate, or to intend:these verbs have all one and the same meaning. TheMutakallemim give a great many examples, both of a general anda special character. They say it is not more natural for earth to beunder water than to be above water; who then determined itsactual position ? Or, is it more natural that the sun is round thanthat it should be square or triangular: for all qualities have thesame relation to a body capable of possessing them. Who thendetermined one particular quality ? In a similar way they treat ofevery individual being: when, e.g., they notice flowers of differentcolours, they are unable to explain the phenomenon, and they takeit as a strong proof in favour of their theory: they say," Behold, theearth is everywhere alike, the water is alike; why then is thisflower red and that one yellow ? Some being must havedetermined the colour of each, and that being is God. A being musttherefore exist which determines everything, both as regards theUniverse generally, and each of its parts individually. All this isthe logical consequence of the tenth proposition. The theory ofdetermination is moreover adopted by some of those who assumethe eternity of the Universe, as will be explained below. Inconclusion, I consider this to be the best argument: and in anotherpart I shall more fully acquaint you with the opinion I have formedconcerning the theory of Determination.
The Sixth Argument.
One of the modern Mutakallemim thought that he had found a verygood argument, much better than any advanced hitherto, namely,the argument based on the triumph of existence overnon-existence. He says that, according to the common belief, theexistence of the Universe is merely possible . for if it werenecessary, the Universe would be God-but he seems to forget thatwe are at issue with those who, whilst they believe in the existenceof God, admit at the same time the eternity of the Universe. -- Theexpression" A thing is possible" denotes that the thing may eitherbe in existence or not in existence, and that there is not morereason why it should exist than why it should not exist. The factthat a thing, the existence of which is possible, actually doesexist-although it bears the same relation to the state of existence asto that of non-existence -- proves that there is a Being which gavethe preference to existence over non-existence. This argument isvery forcible; it is a modified form of the foregoing argumentwhich is based on the theory of determination. He only chose theterm" preference" instead of" determination," and instead ofapplying it to the properties of the existing being he applies it to"the existence of the being itself." He either had the intention tomislead, or he misunderstood the proposition, that the existence ofthe Universe is possible. Our opponent who assumes the eternityof the Universe, employs the term" possible," and says," theexistence of the Universe is possible" in a sense different fromthat in which the Mutakallem applies it, as will be explainedbelow. Moreover it may be doubted whether the conclusion, thatthe Universe owes its origin to a being which is able to givepreference to existence over non-existence, is correct. For we mayapply the terms" preference" and" determination" to anythingcapable of receiving either of two properties which are contrary oropposed to each other: and when we find that the thing actuallypossesses one property and not the other, we are convinced thatthere exists a determining agent. E.g., you say that a piece ofcopper could just as well be formed into a kettle as into a lamp:when we find that it is a lamp or a kettle, we have no doubt that adeciding and determining agent had advisedly chosen one of thetwo possible forms: for it is clear that the substance of copperexisted, and that before the determination took place it had neitherof the two possible forms which have just been mentioned. When,however, it is the question whether a certain existing object iseternal, or whether it has passed from non-existence into existence,this argument is inadmissible: for it cannot be asked who decidedin favour of the existence of a thing, and rejected its nonexistence,except when it has been admitted that it has passed fromnonexistence into existence: in the present case this is just thepoint under discussion. If we were to take the existence and thenon-existence of a thing as mere objects of imagination, we shouldhave to apply the tenth proposition which gives prominence toimagination and fiction, and ignores the things which exist inreality, or are conceived by the intellect. Our opponent, however,who believes in the eternity of the Universe, will show that we canimagine the non-existence of the universe as well as we canimagine any other impossibility. It is not my intention to refutetheir doctrine of the creatio ex nihilo : I only wish to show theincorrectness of their belief that this argument differs from the onewhich precedes: since in fact the two arguments are identical, andare founded on the well-known principle of determination.
The Seventh Argument.
One of the modern Mutakallemim says that he is able to prove thecreation of the Universe from the theory put forth by thephilosophers concerning the immortality of the soul. He arguesthus: If the world were eternal the number of the dead wouldnecessarily be infinite, and consequently an infinite number ofsouls would coexist, but it has long since been shown that thecoexistence of an infinite number of things is positivelyimpossible. This is indeed a strange argument! One difficulty isexplained by another which is still greater 1 Here the saying, wellknown among the Arameans, may be applied:" Your guaranteewants himself a guarantee." He rests his argument on theimmortality of the soul, as though he understood this immortality,in what respect the soul is immortal, or what the thing is which isimmortal! If, however, he only meant to controvert the opinion ofhis opponent, who believed in the eternity of the Universe, andalso in the immortality of the soul, he accomplished his task,provided the opponent admitted the correctness of the idea whichthat Mutakallem formed of the philosopher's view on theimmortality of the soul. Some of the later philosophers explainedthis difficulty as follows: the immortal souls are not substanceswhich occupy a locality or a space, and their existence in aninfinite number is therefore not impossible. You must bear in mindthat those abstract beings which are neither bodies nor forcesdwelling in bodies, and which in fact are ideals-are altogetherincapable of being represented as a plurality unless some ideals bethe cause of the existence of others, and can be distinguished fromeach other by the specific difference that some are the efficientcause and others the effect: but that which remains of Zaid [afterhis death] is neither the cause nor the effect of that which is left ofAmr, and therefore the souls of all the departed form only onebeing as has been explained by Ibn Bekr Ibn AI-zaig, and otherswho ventured to speak on these profound subjects. In short, suchintricate disciplines, which our mind can scarcely comprehend,cannot furnish any principles for the explanation of other subjects.-- It should be noted that whoever endeavours to prove or todisprove the eternity of the Universe by these arguments of theMutakallemim, must necessarily rely on one of the two followingpropositions, or on both of them; namely on the tenth proposition,according to which the actual form of a thing is merely one ofmany equally possible forms, and which implies that there must bea being capable of making the special selection: or on the eleventhproposition which rejects the existence of an infinite series ofthings coming successively into existence. The last-namedproposition is demonstrated in various ways, e.g., they advert to aclass of transient individuals, and to a certain particular date. Fromthe theory which asserts the eternity of the Universe, it wouldfollow that the individuals of that class up to that particular dateare infinite in number; a thousand years later the individuals ofthat class are likewise infinite in number; the last number mustexceed the previous one by the number of the individuals born inthose thousand years, and consequently one infinite number wouldbe larger than another. The same argument is applied to therevolutions of the heavenly sphere, and in like manner it is shownthat one infinite number of revolutions would be larger thananother; the same result is obtained when revolutions of onesphere are compared with those of another moving more -slowly;the revolutions of both spheres [though unequal] would be infinitein number. Similarly they proceed with all those accidents whichare subject to destruction and production; the individual accidentsthat have passed into non-existence are counted and represented asthough they were still in existence, and as though they were thingswith a definite beginning; this imaginary number is then eitherincreased or reduced. Yet all these things have no reality and aremere fictions. Abunazar Alfarabi in criticizing this proposition, hasexposed all its weak points, as you will clearly perceive, when youstudy his book on the changeable beings earnestly anddispassionately. These are the principal arguments of theMutakallemim in seeking to establish the creatio ex nihilo. Havingthus proved that the Universe is not eternal, they necessarily inferthat there is an Agens who created it in accordance with Hisintention, desire and will. They then proceed to prove the unity ofthat Agens as I am going to point out in the next chapter.
CHAPTER LXXV
IN this chapter I shall explain to you how the Mutakallemim provethe Unity of God. They contend that the Maker and Creator of theUniverse, the existence of whom is testified by all nature, is One.Two propositions are employed by them in demonstrating theUnity of God, viz., two deities or more would neutralize eachother, and if several deities existed they would be distinguishedfrom each other by a specific difference.
First Argument.
The first argument is that of mutual neutralization, and isemployed by the majority of the Mutakallemim. It is to thefollowing effect: -- If the Universe had two Gods, it wouldnecessarily occur that the atom -- subject to a combination withone or two opposite qualities-either remained without either ofthem, and that is impossible, or, though being only one atom,included both qualities at the same time, and that is likewiseimpossible. E.g., whilst one of the two deities determined that oneatom or more should be warm, the other deity might determinethat the same should be cold: the consequence of the mutualneutralization of the two divine beings would thus be that theatoms would be neither warm nor cold -- a contingency which isimpossible, because all bodies must combine with one of twoopposites; or they would be at the same time both warm and cold.Similarly, it might occur that whilst one of the deities desired thata body be in motion, the other might desire that it be at rest; thebody would then be either without motion and rest, or would bothmove and rest at the same time. Proofs of this kind are founded onthe atomic theory contained in the first proposition of theMutakallemim, on the proposition which refers to the creation ofthe accidents, and on the proposition that negatives are propertiesof actual existence and require for their production an agens. For ifit were assumed that the substance of this world which, accordingto the philosophers is subject to successive production anddestruction, is different from the substance of the world above,viz., from the substance of the spheres -- a fact established byproof-and that as the Dualists assert, there are two divine beings,one of whom rules this world without influencing the spheres,whilst the other governs the world above without interfering withthis world -- such theory would not involve the mutualneutralization of the two deities. If it were then objected, that theexistence of two deities would necessitate an imperfection in bothof them, in so far as one deity would be unable to influence theprovince of the other, the objection would be met by the reply thatthis inability need not be considered a defect in either of them: forthat which is not included within the sphere of action of a beingcan of course not be performed by that being, and an agens is notdeficient in power, if it is unable to perform what is intrinsicallyimpossible. Thus we, Monotheists, do not consider it a defect inGod, that He does not combine two opposites in one object, nor dowe test His omnipotence by the accomplishment of any similarimpossibility. When the Mutakallemim noticed the weakness oftheir argument, for which they had some apparent support, theyhad recourse to another argument.
Second Argument.
If there were two Gods, there would necessarily be some elementcommon to both, whilst some element present in the one would beabsent in the other, and constitute the specific difference betweenthem. This is a philosophic and sound argument for those who areable to examine it, and to obtain a clear insight into its premises,which will be further explained, in our exposition of the view ofthe philosophers on this point. But it cannot be accepted by thosewho admit the existence of divine attributes. For according to theiropinion, the Primal Cause includes many different elements. Theyrepresent its wisdom and its omnipotence as two different things,and again the omnipotence as different from the will.Consequently it would not be impossible that either of the twodivine beings possessed several properties, some of which wouldbe common to both, and some peculiar to only one of them.
Third Argument.
This argument is likewise based on one of the Propositions of theKalarn. For some of the Mutakallemim belonging to the old schoolassume, that when the Creator wills a thing, the will is not anelement superadded to the essence of God: it is a will without asubstratum. In accordance with the propositions which we havementioned, and of which, as you will see, it is difficult to form atrue conception, they say that one will, which is independent ofany substratum, cannot be ascribed to two beings: for, as theyassert, one cause cannot be the source of two laws for twoessences. This is, as I told you, the method of explaining onedifficulty by means of another and still greater difficulty. For asthey define the Will, it is inconceivable, and some have, therefore,considered it to be a mere non-entity: others who admit itsexistence, meet with many insuperable difficulties. TheMutakallemim, nevertheless, establish on its existence one of theproofs for the unity of God.
Fourth Argument.
The existence of an action is necessarily positive evidence of theexistence of an agens, but does not prove the existence of morethan one agens. There is no difference whether the existence ofone God be assumed or the existence of two, or three, or twenty, orany number. This is plain and clear. But the argument does notseem to prove the non-existence of a multitude of deities; it onlyshows that their number is unknown; the deity may be one solebeing, but may also include several divine beings. The followingsupplemental argument has therefore been advanced: possibility isinapplicable to the existence of God, which is absolute: thepossibility of the existence of more than one God must thereforebe denied. This is the whole essence of the proof, and its fallacy isself-evident; for although the notion of possibility cannot beapplied to the existence of God, it can be applied to our knowledgeof God: for an alternative in our knowledge of a thing does notinvolve an alternative in the actual existence of the thing, andperhaps there is neither a tripartite deity as the Christians believe,nor an undivided Unity as we believe. This is clear to those whohave been taught to notice the conclusions implied in givenpremises.
Fifth Argument.
One of the modern Mutakallemim thought that he found a proof ofthe Unity of God in the idea of requisiteness. Suppose there weretwo divine beings; if one of them were able to create the universe,the second God would be superfluous, and there would be no needfor his existence. If, on the other hand, the entire universe couldnot be created or governed except by both of them, each of them.would be imperfect in to far as he would require the co-operationof another being, and would thus be limited in power. Thisargument is, in fact, only a variation of" the mutual neutralizationof two deities." There is this difficulty in such proofs, that a certaindegree of imperfection is ascribed to a Being which does notaccomplish tasks beyond its sphere. We do not call a person weakbecause he cannot move a thousand hundredweights, and we donot say that God is imperfect because He cannot transformHimself into a body, or cannot create another being like Himself,or make a square whose diagonal should be equal to one of itssides. In the same manner we should not consider it animperfection in God, if He were not the only Creator, and if it wereabsolutely necessary that there should be two Creators; notbecause the one God required the assistance of the other, butbecause the existence of both of them was equally necessary, andbecause it was impossible that it should be otherwise. Further wedo not say that the Almighty is imperfect, because He does not,according to the opinion of the Mutakallemim, produce a bodyotherwise than by the creation of atoms, and by their combinationwith accidents created in them. That inability is not called want orimperfection, since another process is impossible. In like mannerthe Dualist might say, that it is impossible for one Being to actalone, and that this circumstance constitutes no imperfection ineither of the Deities, because the absolute existence of one Deitynecessitates the coexistence of the other. Some of theMutakallemim, weary of these arguments, declared that the Unityof God is a doctrine which must be received as a matter of faith,but most of them rejected this theory, and reviled its authors. I,however, hold, that those who accept this theory are right-minded,and shrink from admitting an erroneous opinion; when they do notperceive any cogency in the arguments, and find that the proofsadvanced in favour of the doctrine are inconclusive, they prefer toassume that it could only be received as a matter of faith. For theMutakallemim do not hold that the Universe has any definedproperties on which a true proof could be founded, or that man'sintellect is endowed with any such faculty as would enable him toform correct conclusions. It is, however, not without a motive thatthey defend this theory: they wish to assume such a form of theUniverse, as could be employed to support a doctrine for whichotherwise no proof could be found, and would lead us to neglectthe investigation of that which in fact can be proved. We can onlyappeal to the Almighty and to those intelligent persons whoconfess their error when they discover it.
CHAPTER LXXVI
THE reasonings and arguments of the Mutakallemim todemonstrate the Incorporeality of God are very weak., and indeedinferior to their arguments for the Unity of God. They treat thedoctrine of the Incorporeality of God as if it were the logicalsequence of the theory of His Unity, and they say that the attribute" one" cannot be applied to a corporeal object. Those who maintainthat God is incorporeal because a corporeal object consists ofsubstance and form -- a combination known to be impossible inthe Divine Being, are not in my opinion Mutakallemim, and suchan argument is not founded on the propositions of the Kalim; onthe contrary, it is a logical proof based on the theory of substanceand form, and on a right conception of their properties. It has thecharacter of a philosophical argument, and I shall fully explain itwhen treating of the arguments of the philosophers. Here we onlypropose to discuss the arguments by which the Mutakallemimdesire to prove the Incorporeality of God in accordance with theirpropositions and the method of their reasoning.
First Argument.
If God were corporeal, His true essence would necessarily eitherexist entirely in every part of the body, that is to say, in each of itsatoms, or would be confined to one of the atoms. In the latteralternative the other atoms would be superfluous, and theexistence of the corporeal being [with the exception of the oneatom] would be of no purpose. If, on the other hand, each atomfully represented the Divine Being, the whole body would not beone deity, but a complex of deities, and this would be contrary tothe doctrine adopted by the kalam that God is one. An examinationof this argument shows that it is based on the first and fifthpropositions. But there is room for the following objection:" Goddoes not consist of atoms, that is to say, He is not, as you assert,composed of a number of elements created by Himself, but is onecontinuous body, and indivisible except in man's imagination,which affords no test; for in man's imagination the substance of theheavens may be torn or rent asunder. The philosopher holds thatsuch a possibility results from assuming a similarity and ananalogy between the visible, i.e., the bodies which exist among us,and the invisible."
Second Argument.
This argument, they believe, is of great importance. Its mainsupport is the impossibility of comparison, i.e., the belief that Godcannot be compared to any of His creatures; and that He would becomparable to other corporeal objects if He were corporeal. Theyput great stress on this argument, and say as follows:" If it wereasserted that God is corporeal, but that His substance is not likethat of other corporeal beings, it would be self-contradictory: forall bodies are alike as regards their substance, and aredistinguished from each other by other things, viz., the accidents."They also argue that if God were corporeal it would follow that Hehas created another being like Himself. This argument is refuted intwo ways. First, the objector does not admit the impossibility ofcomparison; he asks how it could be proved that God cannot becompared to any of His creatures. No doubt that, in support oftheir view, that a comparison between the Almighty and any otherbeing is inadmissible, they would have to cite the words of theProphets, and thus accept this doctrine by the authority oftradition, not by the authority of reason. The argument that God, ifcomparable to any of His creatures, would be found to havecreated beings like Himself, is refuted by the objector in thefollowing way:" The created things are not like Him in everyrespect; for I do not deny that God has many properties andpeculiarities." For he who admits the corporeality of God does notdeny the existence of properties in the divine Being. Another andmore forcible argument is this: All who have studied philosophy,and have made themselves thoroughly acquainted withphilosophical theories, assume as demonstrated facts, first that theterm substance, when applied to the spheres above and to thecorporeal objects here on earth is a perfect homonym, for thesubstance of the one is not the substance of the other: and secondlythat the forms of the things on this earth are different from theforms of the spheres; the terms substance and form when appliedboth to things below and to the spheres above are homonyms;although there is no doubt that the spheres have [like the thingsbelow, three] dimensions, they are corporeal because they consistof substance and form, not because they have dimensions. If thisexplanation is admitted with reference to the spheres, how muchmore is he who believes that God is corporeal justified in sayingthat God is a corporeal being which has dimensions, but which inits substance, its true nature and properties is very different fromall created bodies, and that the term" substance" is applied to Himand to His creatures homonymously, in the same manner as thetrue believers, who have a correct conception of the divine idea,apply the term" existence" homonymously to Him and to Hiscreatures. The Corporealists do not admit that all bodies consist ofsimilar atoms: they believe that God created all things, and thatthese differ from each other both in their substances and in theirconstituent properties: and just as the substance of dung differsfrom the substance of the sun, so does, according to this theory, thesubstance of the spheres and the star$ differ from the substance ofthe created light, i.e., the Divine Glory (Shechinah), and again thesubstance of the Divine Glory, or the pillar of cloud created [forthe purpose], differ from the substance of the Most High; for thesubstance of the latter is sublime, perfect, simple, constant andimmutable. His absolute existence remains always the same, andHe creates all things according to His will and desire. How couldthis argument, though it be weak, be refuted by these strangemethods of the Mutakallemim, which I pointed out to you ?
Third Argument.
If God were corporeal, He would be finite, and so far thisargument is correct; if He were finite, He would have certaindimensions and a certain form; this is also a correct conclusion.But they continue thus: Attribute to God any magnitude or formwhatever: He might be either larger or smaller, and might alsohave a different form. The fact that He has one special magnitudeand one special form presupposes the existence of a determiningagens. I have heard that they attach great importance to thisargument, but in truth it is the weakest of all the argumentsmentioned above. It is founded on the tenth proposition, thefeebleness of which in ignoring the actual properties of things, wehave dearly shown in regard to ordinary beings and must be muchmore evident in regard to the Creator. There is no differencebetween this argument and their assertion that the fact of theexistence of the Universe having been preferred to itsnon-existence proves the existence of an agens that preferred theexistence of the Universe to its non-existence at a time when bothwere equally possible. If it were asked why this argument shouldnot be applied to God-viz., that His mere existence proved theexistence of an agens which determined His existence and rejectedHis non-existence -- they would undoubtedly answer that thisadmission would only lead to a repetition of the same argumentuntil at length a being be found whose existence is not merelypotential but necessary, and which does not require a causaefficiens. But this same answer can also be applied to dimensionsand to form. It can only be said in reference to all other forms andmagnitudes, the existence of which is possible, that is to say whichcame into existence after a state of non-existence, that they mighthave been larger or smaller than they actually are, or that theymight have had a form different from that which they actuallypossess, and require for this reason some determining agens. Butthe forms and dimensions of God (who is above all imperfectionand similitude)! did not come into existence according to theopinion of the Corporealist after a state of non-existence, andtherefore no determining agens was necessary: His substance withits dimensions and forms has a necessary existence; no agens wasrequired to decide upon His existence, and to reject Hisnon-existence, since nonexistence is altogether inadmissible inGod. In like manner there was no force required to determine Hismagnitude and form, they were absolutely inseparable from Hisexistence.
If you wish to go in search of truth, to cast aside your passions,your tradition, and your fondness of things you have beenaccustomed to cherish, if you wish to guard yourself against error:then consider the fate of these speculators and the result of theirlabours: observe how they rushed, as it were, from the ashes intothe fire. They denied the nature of the existing things,misrepresented the properties of heaven and earth, and thoughtthat they were able, by their propositions, to prove the creation ofthe world, but in fact they were far from proving the creatio exnihilo, and have weakened the arguments for the existence, theunity, and the incorporeality of God. The proofs of all thesedoctrines must be based on the well-known nature of the existingthings, as perceived by the senses and the intellect.
Having thus discussed the arguments of the Mutakallemim, weshall now proceed to consider the propositions of the philosophersand their arguments for the existence of God, His Unity and HisIncorporeality, and we shall for the present assume the Eternity ofthe Universe without finally accepting it. Next to this we shalldevelop our own method, which is the result of deep study, indemonstrating these three principles, and we shall then examinethe theory of the Eternity of the Universe as assumed by thephilosophers.
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PART TWO
INTRODUCTION
TWENTY-FIVE of the propositions which are employed in theproof for the existence of God, or in the arguments demonstratingthat God is neither corporeal nor a force connected with a materialbeing, or that He is One, have been fully established, and theircorrectness is beyond doubt. Aristotle and the Peripatetics whofollowed him have proved each of these propositions. There is,however, one proposition which we do not accept-namely, theproposition which affirms the Eternity of the Universe, but we willadmit it for the present, because by doing so we shall be enabledclearly to demonstrate our own theory.
PROPOSITION I.
The existence of an infinite magnitude is impossible.
PROPOSITION II.
The co-existence of an infinite number of finite magnitudes isimpossible.
PROPOSITION III.
The existence of an infinite number of causes and effects isimpossible, even if these were not magnitudes: if, e.g., oneIntelligence were the cause of a second, the second the cause of athird, the third the cause of a fourth, and so on, the series could notbe continued ad infinitum.
PROPOSITION IV.
Four categories are subject to change :
(a.) Substance. -- Changes which affect the substance of a thing arecalled genesis and destruction.
(b.) Quantity. -- Changes in reference to quantity are increase anddecrease.
(c.) Quality. -- Changes in the qualities of things aretransformations.
(d.) Place. -- Change of place is called motion.
The term" motion" is properly applied to change of place, but isalso used in a general sense of all kinds of changes.
PROPOSITION V.
Motion implies change and transition from potentiality toactuality.
PROPOSITION VI.
The motion of a thing is either essential or accidental: or it is dueto an external force, or to the participation of the thing in themotion of another thing. This latter kind of motion is similar to theaccidental one. An instance of essential motion may be found inthe translation of a thing from one place to another. The accidentof a thing, as, e.g., its black colour, is said to move when the thingitself changes its place. The upward motion of a stone, owing to aforce applied to it in that direction, is an instance of a motion dueto an external force. The motion of a nail in a boat may serve toillustrate motion due to the participation of a thing in the motionof another thing; for when the boat moves, the nail is said to movelikewise. The same is the case with everything composed ofseveral parts: when the thing itself moves, every part of it islikewise said to move.
PROPOSITION VII.
Things which are changeable are, at the same time, divisible.Hence everything that moves is divisible, and consequentlycorporeal; but that which is indivisible cannot move, and cannottherefore be corporeal.
PROPOSITION VIII.
A thing that moves accidentally must come to rest, because it doesnot move of its own accord: hence accidental motion cannotcontinue for ever.
PROPOSITION IX.
A corporeal thing that sets another corporeal thing in motion canonly effect this by setting itself in motion at the time it causes theother thing to move.
PROPOSITION X.
A thing which is said to be contained in a corporeal object mustsatisfy either of the two following conditions : it either existsthrough that object, as is the case with accidents, or it is the causeof the existence of that object: such is, e.g., its essential property.In both cases it is a force existing in a corporeal object.
PROPOSITION XI.
Among the things which exist through a material object, there aresome which participate in the division of that object, and aretherefore accidentally divisible, as, e.g., its colour, and all otherqualities that spread throughout its parts. On the other hand,among the things which form the essential elements of an object,there are some which cannot be divided in any way, as, e.g., thesoul and the intellect.
PROPOSITION XII.
A force which occupies all parts of a corporeal object is finite, thatobject itself being finite.
PROPOSITION XIII.
None of the several kinds of change can be continuous, exceptmotion from place to place, provided it be circular.
PROPOSITION XIV.
Locomotion is in the natural order of the several kinds of motionthe first and foremost. For genesis and corruption are preceded bytransformation, which, in its turn, is preceded by the approach ofthe transforming agent to the object which is to be transformed.Also, increase and decrease are impossible without previousgenesis and corruption.
PROPOSITION XV.
Time is an accident that is related and joined to motion in such amanner that the one is never found without the other. Motion isonly possible in time, and the idea of time cannot be conceivedotherwise than in connexion with motion; things which do notmove have no relation to time.
PROPOSITION XVI.
Incorporeal bodies can only be numbered when they are forcessituated in a body; the several forces must then be countedtogether with substances or objects in which they exist. Hencepurely spiritual beings, which are neither corporeal nor forcessituated in corporeal objects, cannot be counted, except whenconsidered as causes and effects.
PROPOSITION XVII.
When an object moves, there must be some agent that moves it,from without, as, e.g., in the case of a stone set in motion by thehand: or from within, e.g., when the body of a living being moves.Living beings include in themselves, at the same time, the movingagent and the thing moved: when, therefore, a living being dies,and the moving agent, the soul, has left the body, i.e., the thingmoved, the body remains for some time in the same condition asbefore, and yet cannot move in the manner it has movedpreviously. The moving agent, when included in the thing moved,is hidden from, and imperceptible to, the senses. Thiscircumstance gave rise to the belief that the body of an animalmoves without the aid of a moving agent. When we thereforeaffirm, concerning a thing in motion, that it is its own movingagent, or, as is generally said, that it moves of its own accord, wemean to say that the force which really sets the body in motionexists in that body itself.
PROPOSITION XVIII.
Everything that passes over from a state of potentiality to that ofactuality, is caused to do so by some external agent: because if thatagent existed in the thing itself, and no obstacle prevented thetransition, the thing would never be in a state of potentiality, butalways in that of actuality. If, on the other hand, while the thingitself contained that agent, some obstacle existed, and at a certaintime that obstacle was removed, the same cause which removedthe obstacle would undoubtedly be described as the cause of thetransition from potentiality to actuality, [and not the force situatedwithin the body]. Note this.
PROPOSITION XIX.
A thing which owes its existence to certain causes has in itselfmerely the possibility of existence: for only if these causes exist,the thing likewise exists. It does not exist if the causes do not existat all, or if they have ceased to exist, or if there has been a changein the relation which implies the existence of that thing as anecessary consequence of those causes.
PROPOSITION XX.
A thing which has in itself the necessity of existence cannot havefor its existence any cause whatever.
PROPOSITION XXI.
A thing composed of two elements has necessarily theircomposition as the cause of its present existence. Its existence istherefore not necessitated by its own essence; it depends on theexistence of its two component parts and their combination.
PROPOSITION XXII.
Material objects are always composed of two elements [at least],and are without exception subject to accidents. The twocomponent elements of all bodies are substance and form. Theaccidents attributed to material objects are quantity, geometricalform, and position.
PROPOSITION XXIII.
Everything that exists potentially and whose essence includes acertain state of possibility, may at some time be without actualexistence.
PROPOSITION XXIV.
That which is potentially a certain thing is necessarily material, forthe state of possibility is always connected with matter.
PROPOSITION XXV.
Each compound substance consists of matter and form, andrequires an agent for its existence, viz., a force which sets thesubstance in motion, and thereby enables it to receive a certainform. The force which thus prepares the substance of a certainindividual being, is called the immediate motor.
Here the necessity arises of investigating into the properties ofmotion, the moving agent and the thing moved. But this hasalready been explained sufficiently; and the opinion of Aristotlemay be expressed in the following proposition: Matter does notmove of its own accord-an important proposition that led to theinvestigation of the Prime Motor (the first moving agent).
Of these foregoing twenty-five propositions some may be verifiedby means of a little reflection and the application of a fewpropositions capable of proof, or of axioms or theorems of almostthe same force, such as have been explained by me. Others requiremany arguments and propositions, all of which, however, havebeen established by conclusive proofs partly in the Physics and itscommentaries, and partly in the Metaphysics and its commentary. Ihave already stated that in this work it is not my intention to copythe books of the philosophers or to explain difficult problems, butsimply to mention those propositions which are closely connectedwith our subject, and which we want for our purpose.
To the above propositions one must be added which enunciatesthat the universe is eternal, and which is held by Aristotle to betrue, and even more acceptable than any other theory. For thepresent we admit it, as a hypothesis, only for the purpose ofdemonstrating our theory. It is the following proposition :
PROPOSITION XXVI
Time and motion are eternal, constant, and in actual existence.
In accordance with this proposition, Aristotle is compelled toassume that there exists actually a body with constant motion, viz.,the fifth element. He therefore says that the heavens are notsubject to genesis or destruction, because motion cannot begenerated nor destroyed. He also holds that every motion mustnecessarily be preceded by another motion, either of the same or ofa different kind. The belief that the locomotion of an animal is notpreceded by another motion, is not true: for the animal is caused tomove, after it had been in rest, by the intention to obtain those verythings which bring about that locomotion. A change in its state ofhealth, or some image, or some new idea can produce a desire toseek that which is conducive to its welfare and to avoid that whichis contrary. Each of these three causes sets the living being inmotion, and each of them is produced by various kinds of motion.Aristotle likewise asserts that everything which is created must,before its actual creation, have existed in potentia. By inferencesdrawn from this assertion he seeks to establish his proposition,viz., The thing that moves is finite, and its path finite; but itrepeats the motion in its path an infinite number of times. This canonly take place when the motion is circular, as has been stated inProposition XIII. Hence follows also the existence of an infinitenumber of things which do not co-exist but follow one after theother.
Aristotle frequently attempts to establish this proposition; but Ibelieve that he did not consider his proofs to be conclusive. Itappeared to him to be the most probable and acceptableproposition. His followers, however, and the commentators of hisbooks, contend that it contains not only a probable but ademonstrative proof, and that it has, in fact, been fully established.On the other hand, the Mutakallemirn try to prove that theproposition cannot be true, as, according to their opinion, it isimpossible to conceive how an infinite number of things couldeven come into existence successively. They assume thisimpossibility as an axiom. I, however, think that this proposition isadmissible, but neither demonstrative, as the commentators ofAristotle assert, nor, on the other hand, impossible, as theMutakallemim say. We have no intention to explain here theproofs given by Aristotle, or to show our doubts concerning them,or to set forth our opinions on the creation of the universe. I heresimply desire to mention those propositions which we shall requirefor the proof of the three principles stated above. Having thusquoted and admitted these propositions, I will now proceed toexplain what may be inferred from them.
CHAPTER I
ACCORDING to Proposition XXV., a moving agent must existwhich has moved the substance of all existing transient things andenabled it to receive Form. The cause of the motion of that agent isfound in the existence of another motor of the same or of adifferent class, the term" motion," in a general sense, beingcommon to four categories (Prop. IV.). This series of motions isnot infinite (Prop. III.); we find that it can only be continued tillthe motion of the fifth element is arrived at, and then it ends. Themotion of the fifth element is the source of every force that movesand prepares any substance on earth for its combination with acertain form, and is connected with that force by a chain ofintermediate motions. The celestial sphere [or the fifth element)performs the act of locomotion which is the first of the severalkinds of motion (Prop. XIV.), and all locomotion is found to be theindirect effect of the motion of this sphere: e.g., a stone is set inmotion by a stick, the stick by a man's hand, the hand by thesinews, the sinews by the muscles, the rnuscles by the nerves, thenerves by the natural heat of the body, and the heat of the body byits form. This is undoubtedly the immediate motive cause, but theaction of this immediate cause is due to a certain design, e.g., tobring a stone into a hole by striking against it with a stick in orderto prevent the draught from coming through the crevice. Themotion of the air that causes the draught is the effect of the motionof the celestial sphere. Similarly it may be shown that the ultimatecause of all genesis and destruction can be traced to the motion ofthe sphere. But the motion of the sphere must likewise have beeneffected by an agent (Prop. XVII.) residing either without thesphere or within it; a third case being impossible. In the first case,if the motor is without the sphere, it must either be corporeal orincorporeal: if incorporeal, it cannot be said that the agent iswithout the sphere: it can only be described as separate from it:because an incorporeal object can only be said metaphorically toreside without a certain corporeal object. In the second case, if theagent resides within the sphere, it must be either a force distributedthroughout the whole sphere so that each part of the sphereincludes a part of the force, as is the case with the heat of fire: or itis an indivisible force, e.g., the soul and the intellect (Props. X.and XL). The agent which sets the sphere in motion mustconsequently be one of the following four things: a corporealobject without the sphere: an incorporeal object separate from it: aforce spread throughout the whole of the sphere; or an indivisibleforce [within the sphere].
The first case, viz., that the moving agent of the sphere is acorporeal object without the sphere, is impossible, as will beexplained. Since the moving agent is corporeal, it must itself movewhile setting another object in motion (Prop. IX.), and as the sixthelement would likewise move when imparting motion to anotherbody, it would be set in motion by a seventh element, which mustalso move. An infinite number of bodies would thus be requiredbefore the sphere could be set in motion. This is contrary toProposition II.
The third case, viz., that the moving object be a force distributedthroughout the whole body, is likewise impossible. For the sphereis corporeal, and must therefore be finite (Prop. I.): also the force itcontains must be finite (Prop. XII.), since each part of the spherecontains part of the force (Prop. XI.): the latter can consequentlynot produce an infinite motion, such as we assumed according toProposition XXVI., which we admitted for the present.
The fourth case is likewise impossible, viz., that the sphere is setin motion by an indivisible force residing in the sphere in the samemanner as the soul resides in the body of man. For this force,though indivisible, could not be the cause of infinite motion byitself alone: because if that were the case the prime motor wouldhave an accidental motion (Prop.VI.). But things that moveaccidentally must come to rest (Prop. VIII.), and then the thingcomes also to rest which is set in motion. (The following mayserve as a further illustration of the nature of accidental motion.When man is moved by the soul, i.e., by his form, to go from thebasement of the house to the upper storey, his body moves directly,while the soul, the. really efficient cause of that motion,participates in it accidentally. For through the translation of thebody from the basement to the upper storey, the soul has likewisechanged its place, and when no fresh impulse for the motion of thebody is given by the soul, the body which has been set in motionby such impulse comes to rest, and the accidental motion of thesoul is discontinued). Consequently the motion of that supposedfirst motor must be due to some cause which does not form part ofthings composed of two elements, viz., a moving agent and anobject moved: if such a cause is present the motor in thatcompound sets the other element in motion; in the absence of sucha cause no motion takes place. Living beings do therefore notmove continually, although each of them possesses an indivisiblemotive element; because this element is not constantly in motion,as it would be if it produced motion of its own accord. On thecontrary, the things to which the action is due are separate fromthe motor. The action is caused either by desire for that which isagreeable, or by aversion from that which is disagreeable, or bysome image, or by some ideal when the moving being has thecapacity of conceiving it. When any of these causes are presentthen the motor acts: its motion is accidental, and must thereforecome to an end (Prop. VIII.). If the motor of the sphere were ofthis kind the sphere could not move ad infinitum. Our opponent,however, holds that the spheres move continually ad infinitum: ifthis were the case, and it is in fact possible (Prop. XIII.), theefficient cause of the motion of the sphere must, according to theabove division, be of the second kind, viz., something incorporealand separate from the sphere.
It may thus be considered as proved that the efficient cause of themotion of the sphere, if that motion be eternal, is neither itselfcorporeal nor does it reside in a corporeal object; it must moveneither of its own accord nor accidentally; it must be indivisibleand unchangeable (Prop. VII. and Prop. V.). This Prime Motor ofthe sphere is God, praised be His name !
The hypothesis that there exist two Gods is inadmissible, becauseabsolutely incorporeal beings cannot be counted (Prop. XVI.),except as cause and effect; the relation of time is not applicable toGod (Prop. XV.), because motion cannot be predicated of Him.
The result of the above argument is consequently this: the spherecannot move ad infinitum of its own accord; the Prime Motor isnot corporeal, nor a force residing within a body; it is One,unchangeable, and in its existence independent of time. Three ofour postulates are thus proved by the principal philosophers.
The philosophers employ besides another argument, based on thefollowing proposition of Aristotle. If there be a thing composed oftwo elements, and the one of them is known to exist also by itself,apart from that thing, then the other element is likewise found inexistence by itself separate from that compound. For if the natureof the two elements were such that they could only existtogether-as, e.g., matter and form-then neither of them could inany way exist separate from the other. The fact that the onecomponent is found also in a separate existence proves that thetwo elements are not indissolubly connected, and that the samemust therefore be the case with the other component. Thus weinfer from the existence of honey-vinegar and of honey by itself,that there exists also vinegar by itself. After having explained thisproposition Aristotle continues thus : We notice many objectsconsisting of a motor and a motum, i.e., objects which set otherthings in motion, and whilst doing so are themselves set in motionby other things; such is dearly the case as regards all the middlemembers of a series of things in motion. We also see a thing that ismoved, but does not itself move anything, viz., the last member ofthe series: consequently a motor must exist without being at thesame time a motum, and that is the Prime Motor, which, not beingsubject to motion, is indivisible, incorporeal, and independent oftime, as has been shown in the preceding argument.
Third Philosophical Argument. -- This is taken from the words ofAristotle, though he gives it in a different form. It runs as follows:There is no doubt that many things actually exist, as, e.g., thingsperceived with the senses. Now there are only three casesconceivable, viz., either all these things are without beginning andwithout end, or all of them have beginning and end, or some arewith and some without beginning and end. The first of these threecases is altogether inadmissible, since we dearly perceive objectswhich come into existence and are subsequently destroyed. Thesecond case is likewise inadmissible, for if everything had but atemporary existence all things might be destroyed, and that whichis enunciated of a whole class of things as possible is necessarilyactual. All things must therefore come to an end, and then nothingwould ever be in existence, for there would not exist any being toproduce anything. Consequently nothing whatever would exist [ifall things were transient]; but as we see things existing, and findourselves in existence we conclude as follows :-Since there areundoubtedly beings of a temporary existence, there must also be aneternal being that is not subject to destruction, and whoseexistence is real, not merely possible.
It has been further argued that the existence of this being isnecessary, either on account of itself alone or on account of someexternal force. In the latter case its existence and non-existencewould be equally possible, because of its own properties, but itsexistence would be necessary on account of the external force.That force would then be the being that possesses absoluteexistence (Prop. XIX). It is therefore certain that there must be abeing which has absolutely independent existence, and is thesource of the existence of all things, whether transient orpermanent, if, as Aristotle assumes. there is in existence such athing, which is the effect of an eternal cause, and must thereforeitself be eternal. This is a proof the correctness of which is notdoubted, disputed, or rejected, except by those who have noknowledge of the method of proof. We further say that theexistence of anything that has independent existence is not due toany cause (Prop. X.), and that such a being does not include anyplurality whatever (Prop. XXI.); consequently it cannot be a body,nor a force residing in a body (Prop. XXIL). It is now clear thatthere must be a being with absolutely independent existence, abeing whose existence cannot be attributed to any external cause,and which does not include different elements; it cannot thereforebe corporeal, or a force residing in 4 corporeal object; this being isGod.
It can easily be proved that absolutely independent existencecannot be attributed to two beings. For, if that were the case,absolutely independent existence would be a property added to thesubstance of both; neither of them would be absolutelyindependent on account of their essence, but only through a certainproperty, viz., that of this independent existence, which is commonto both. It can besides be shown in many ways that independentexistence cannot be reconciled with the principle of dualism byany means. It would make no difference, whether we imagine twobeings of similar or of different properties. The reason for all thisis to be sought in the absolute simplicity and in the utmostperfection of the essence of this being, which is the only memberof its species, and does not depend on any cause whatever thisbeing has therefore nothing in common with other beings.
Fourth Argument. -- This is likewise a well-known philosophicalargument. We constantly see things passing from a state ofpotentiality to that of actuality, but in every such case there is forthat transition of a thing an agent separate from it (Prop. XVIII). Itis likewise clear that the agent has also passed from potentiality toactuality. It has at first been potential, because it could not beactual, owing to some obstacle contained in itself, or on account ofthe absence of a certain relation between itself and the object of itsaction: it became an actual agent as soon as that relation waspresent. Whichever cause be assumed, an agent is again necessaryto remove the obstacle or to create the relation. The same can beargued respecting this last-mentioned agent that creates therelation or removes the obstacle. This series of causes cannot goon ad infinitum: we must at last arrive at a cause of the transitionof an object from the state of potentiality to that of actuality,which is constant, and admits of no potentiality whatever. In theessence of this cause nothing exists potentially, for if its essenceincluded any possibility of existence it would not exist at all (Prop.XXIII.): it cannot be corporeal, but it must be spiritual (Prop.XXIV.); and the immaterial being that includes no possibilitywhatever, but exists actually by its own essence, is God. Since Heis incorporeal, as has been demonstrated, it follows that He is One(Prop. XVI).
Even if we were to admit the Eternity of the Universe, we could byany of these methods prove the existence of God; that He is Oneand incorporeal, and that He does not reside as a force in acorporeal object.
The following is likewise a correct method to prove theIncorporeality and the Unity of God: If there were two Gods, theywould necessarily have one element in common by virtue of whichthey were Gods, and another element by which they weredistinguished from each other and existed as two Gods; thedistinguishing element would either be in both different from theproperty common to both-in that case both of them would consistof different elements, and neither of them would be the FirstCause, or have absolutely independent existence; but theirexistence would depend on certain causes (Prop. XIX.) -- or thedistinguishing element would only in one of them be differentfrom the element common to both : then that being could not haveabsolute independence.
Another proof of the Unity of God. -- It has been demonstrated byproof that the whole existing world is one organic body, all partsof which are connected together; also, that the influences of thespheres above pervade the earthly substance and prepare it for itsforms. Hence it is impossible to assume that one deity be engagedin forming one part, and another deity in forming another part ofthat organic body of which all parts are closely connected together.A duality could only be imagined in this way, either that at onetime the one deity is active, the other at another time, or that bothact simultaneously, nothing being done except by both together.The first alternative is certainly absurd for many reasons: if at thetime the one deity be active the other could also be active, there isno reason why the one deity should then act and the other not; if,on the other hand, it be impossible for the one deity to act whenthe other is at work, there must be some other cause [besides thesedeities] which [at a certain time] enables the one to act anddisables the other. [Such difference would not be caused by time],since time is without change, and the object of the action likewiseremains one and the same organic whole. Besides, if two deitiesexisted in this way, both would be subject to the relations of time,since their actions would depend on time; they would also in themoment of acting pass from potentiality to actuality, and requirean agent for such transition: their essence would besides includepossibility [of existence]. It is equally absurd to assume that bothtogether produce everything in existence, and that neither of themdoes anything alone; for when a number of forces must be unitedfor a certain result, none of these forces acts of its own accord, andnone is by itself the immediate cause of that result, but their unionis the immediate cause. It has, furthermore, been proved that theaction of the absolute cannot be due to an [external] cause. Theunion is also an act which presupposes a cause effecting thatunion, and if that cause be one, it is undoubtedly God: but if it alsoconsists of a number of separate forces, a cause is required for thecombination of these forces, as in the first case. Finally, onesimple being must be arrived at, that is the cause of the existenceof the Universe, which is one whole; it would make no differencewhether we assumed that the First Cause had produced theUniverse by creatio ex nihilo, or whether the Universe co-existedwith the First Cause. It is thus clear how we can prove the Unity ofGod from the fact that this Universe is one whole.
Anotber argument concerning the Incorporeality of God. -- Everycorporeal object is composed of matter and form (Prop. XXII.):every compound of these two elements requires an agent foreffecting their combination. Besides, it is evident that a body isdivisible and has dimensions: a body is thus undoubtedly subject toaccidents. Consequently nothing corporeal can be a unity, eitherbecause everything corporeal is divisible or because it is acompound; that is to say, it can logically be analysed into twoelements; because a body can only be said to be a certain bodywhen the distinguishing element is added to the corporealsubstratum, and must therefore include two elements: but it hasbeen proved that the Absolute admits of no dualism whatever.
Now that we have discussed these proofs, we will expound ourown method in accordance with our promise.
CHAPTER II
THE fifth essence, i.e., the heavenly spheres, must either betransient, and in this case motion would likewise be temporary, or,as our opponent assumes, it must be eternal. If the spheres aretransient, then God is their Creator: for if anything comes intoexistence after a period of non-existence, it is selfevident that anagent exists which has effected this result. It would be absurd tocontend that the thing itself effected it. If, on the other hand, theheavenly spheres be eternal, with a regular perpetual motion, thecause of this perpetual motion, according to the Propositionsenumerated in the Introduction, must be something that is neither abody, nor a force residing in a body, and that is God, praised beHis name! We have thus shown that whether we believe in theCreatio ex Nihilo, or in the Eternity of the Universe, we can proveby demonstrative arguments the existence of God, i.e., an absoluteBeing, whose existence cannot be attributed to any cause, or admitin itself any potentiality. The theory that God is One andIncorporeal has likewise been established by proof without anyreference to the theory of the Creation or the Eternity of theUniverse. This has been explained by us in the third philosophicalargument [in support of the Existence of God], and also in oursubsequent description of the methods of the philosophers inproving the Incorporeality and the Unity of God.
We deem it now convenient to continue with the theory of thephilosophers, and to give their proofs for the existence ofIntelligences. We will then show that their theory in this regard isin harmony with the teaching of Scripture concerning the existenceof angels. After the full treatment of angels this subject we shallreturn to our task and discuss the theory of creatio ex nihilo. Forthe best arguments in favour of this theory cannot be fullycomprehended unless the theory of the existence of Intelligencesbe well understood, and also the method which I adopt in provingtheir existence. We must, however, first give the following note,which will introduce you into the secrets of this whole subject,both of that which we have already given and of what will yet begiven.
Note. -- It was not my intention when writing this treatise toexpound natural science or discuss metaphysical systems; it wasnot my object to prove truths which have already beendemonstrated, or describe the number and the properties of thespheres : for the books written on these subjects serve theirpurpose, and if in some points they are not satisfactory, 1 do notthink that what I could say would be better than what has alreadybeen explained by others. But my intention was, as has been statedin the Introduction, to expound Biblical passages which have beenimpugned, and to elucidate their hidden and true sense, which isabove the comprehension of the multitude. When you thereforenotice that I prove the existence and number of Intelligences or thenumber of the spheres, with the causes of their motion, or discussthe true relation of matter and form, the meaning of Divinemanifestation, or similar subjects, you must not think that I intendmerely to establish a certain philosophical proposition; for thesesubjects have been discussed in many books, and most of themhave been demonstrated by proof. I only desire to mention thatwhich might, when well understood, serve as a means of removingsome of the doubts concerning anything taught in Scripture: andindeed many difficulties will disappear when that which I amabout to explain is taken into consideration. From the Introductionto this treatise you may learn that its principal object is toexpound, as far as can be done, the account of the Creation (Gen.i.-iii.), and of the Divine Chariot (Ezek. i.), and to answerquestions raised in respect to Prophecy and to the knowledge ofGod. You will sometimes notice that I am rather explicit on truthsalready ascertained: some of them Natural Philosophy hasestablished as facts: others Metaphysics has either fullydemonstrated, or at least shown to be worthy of belief: othersMathematics have made plain. But you will invariably find that myexposition includes the key for the understanding of someallegorical passage of Holy Writ and its esoteric interpretation, andthat I have mentioned, explained, and demonstrated the subjectonly because it furthers the knowledge of the" Divine Chariot,"or" the Creation," or explains some principle with respect toProphecy, or to the belief in any of the truths taught in Scripture.Now, having made this statement, we return to the subject ofwhich we began to treat.
CHAPTER III
THE theory of Aristotle in respect to the causes of the motion ofthe spheres led him to assume the existence of Intelligences.Although this theory consists of assertions which cannot beproved, yet it is the least open to doubt, and is more systematicthan any other, as has been stated by Alexander in the book calledThe Origin of the Universe. It includes maxims which are identicalwith those taught in Scripture, and it is to a still greater extent inharmony with doctrines contained in well-known genuineMidrashim, as will be explained by me. For this reason I will citehis views and his proofs, and collect from them what coincideswith the teachings of Scripture, and agrees with the doctrine heldby our Sages.
CHAPTER IV
THE enunciation that the heavenly sphere is endowed with a soulwill appear reasonable to all who sufficiently reflect on it: but atfirst thought they may find it unintelligible or even objectionable;because they wrongly assume that when we ascribe a soul to theheavenly spheres we mean something like the soul of man, or thatof an ass, or ox. We merely intend to say that the locomotion ofthe sphere undoubtedly leads us to assume some inherent principleby which it moves; and this principle is certainly a soul. For itwould be absurd to assume that the principle of the circular motionof the spheres was like that of the rectilinear motion of a stonedownward or of fire upwards, for the cause of the latter motion is anatural property and not a soul; a thing set in motion by a naturalproperty moves only as long as it is away from the proper place ofits element, but when it has again arrived there, it comes to rest;whilst the sphere continues its circular motion in its own place. Itis, however, not because the sphere has a soul, that it moves in thismanner; for animate beings move either by instinct or by reason.By" instinct" I mean the intention of an animal to approachsomething agreeable, or to retreat from something disagreeable;e.g., to approach the water it seeks because of thirst, or to retreatfrom the sun because of its heat. It makes no difference whetherthat thing really exists or is merely imaginary, since theimagination of something agreeable or of something disagreeablelikewise causes the animal to move. The heavenly sphere does notmove for the purpose of withdrawing from what is bad orapproaching what is good. For in the first instance it moves towardthe same point from which it has moved away, and vice versa itmoves away from the same point towards which it has moved.Secondly, if this were the object of the motion, we should expectthat the sphere would move towards a certain point, and wouldthen rest; for if it moved for the purpose of avoiding something,and never obtained that object, the motion would be in vain. Thecircular motion of the sphere is consequently due to the action ofsome idea which produces this particular kind of motion; but asideas are only possible in intellectual beings, the heavenly sphereis an intellectual being. But even a being that is endowed with thefaculty of forming an idea, and possesses a soul with the faculty ofmoving, does not change its place on each occasion that it formsan idea: for an idea alone does not produce motion, as has beenexplained in [Aristotle's] Metaphysics. We can easily understandthis, when we consider how often we form ideas of certain things,yet do not move towards them, though we are able to do so; it isonly when a desire arises for the thing imagined, that we move inorder to obtain it. We have thus shown that both the soul, theprinciple of motion, and the intellect, the source of the ideas,would not produce motion without the existence of a desire for theobject of which an idea has been formed. It follows that theheavenly sphere must have a desire for the ideal which it hascomprehended, and that ideal, for which it has a desire, is God,exalted be His name! When we say that God moves the spheres,we mean it in the following sense: the spheres have a desire tobecome similar to the ideal comprehended by them. This ideal,however, is simple in the strictest sense of the word, and notsubject to any change or alteration, but constant in producingeverything good, whilst the spheres are corporeal: the latter cantherefore not be like this ideal in any other way, except in theproduction of circular motion: for this is the only action ofcorporeal beings that can be perpetual; it is the most simplemotion of a body; there is no change in the essence of the sphere,nor in the beneficial results of its motion.
When Aristotle had arrived at this result, he further investigatedthe subject, and found, by proof, that there were many spheres, andthat all moved in circles, but each with its peculiar motion asregards velocity and direction. He naturally argued that the idealcomprehended by the one sphere, which completes its circuit inone day, is different from that of another sphere which completesits circuit in thirty years: he thus arrived at the conclusion thatthere were as many ideals as there were spheres: each sphere has adesire for that ideal which is the source of its existence, and thatdesire is the cause of its individual motion, so that in fact the idealsets the sphere in motion. Aristotle does not say, nor does anyother authority, that there are ten or a hundred ideals: he simplystates that their number agrees with that of the spheres. When,therefore, some of his contemporaries held that the number ofspheres was fifty, he said, if that was true, the number of idealsmust likewise be fifty. For the scholars in his time were few andpossessed but imperfect learning; they thought that there must be aseparate sphere for each movement, because they did not knowthat what appear to be several distinct movements can beexplained as resulting from the inclination of one sphere as is, e.g.,the case with the change in the longitude of a star, its declinationand the places of its rising and setting noticed in the circle of thehorizon. This point, however, does not concern us at present: let ustherefore return to our subject.
The later philosophers assumed ten Intelligences, because theycounted the spheres containing stars and the all-encompassingsphere, although some of the spheres included several distinctorbits. There are altogether nine spheres, viz., theall-encompassing sphere, that of the fixed stars, and those of theseven planets: nine Intelligences correspond to the nine spheres:the tenth Intelligence is the Active Intellect. The existence of thelatter is proved by the transition of our intellect from a state ofpotentiality to that of actuality, and by the same transition in thecase of the forms of all transient beings. For whatever passes frompotentiality into actuality, requires for that transition an externalagent of the same kind as itself. Thus the builder does not build thestorehouse in his capacity of workman, but in that of a person thathas the form of the storehouse in his mind; and that form of thebuilding which exists in the mind of the builder caused thetransition of the potential form of the storehouse into actuality, andimpressed it on the material of the building. As that which givesform to matter must itself be pure form, so the source of intellectmust itself be pure intellect, and this source is the Active Intellect.The relation of the latter to the elements and their compounds isthe same as that of the Intelligences to their respective spheres:and our intellect in action, which originates in the Active Intellect,and enables us to comprehend that intellect, finds a parallel in theintellect of each of the spheres which originates in the Intelligencecorresponding to that sphere, and enables the sphere tocomprehend that Intelligence, to form an idea of it, and to move inseeking to become similar to it.Aristotle further infers, what has already been explained, that Goddoes not act by means of direct contact. When, e.g., He destroysanything with fire, the fire is set in motion through the movementof the spheres, and the spheres by the Intelligences: the latter,which are identical with" the angels," and act by direct influence,are consequently, each in its turn, the cause of the motion of thespheres; as however, purely spiritual beings do not differ in theiressence, and are by no means discrete quantities, he (Aristotle)came to the following conclusion: God created the firstIntelligence, the motive agent of the first sphere; the Intelligencewhich causes the second sphere to move has its source and originin the first Intelligence, and so on: the Intelligence which sets thesphere nearest to the earth in motion is the source and origin of theActive Intellect, the last in the series of purely spiritual beings.The series of material bodies similarly begins with the uppermostsphere, and ends with the elements and their compounds. TheIntelligence which moves the uppermost sphere cannot be theAbsolute Being, for there is an element common to allIntelligences, namely, the property of being the motive agent of asphere, and there is another element by which each of them isdistinguished from the rest; each of the ten Intelligences includes,therefore, two elements, and consequently another being must bethe First Cause.
This is the theory, and opinion of Aristotle on these questions, andhis proofs, where proof is possible, are given in various works ofthe Aristotelian school. In short, he believes that the spheres areanimated and intellectual beings, capable of fully comprehendingthe principia of their existence: that there exist purely spiritualbeings (Intelligences), which do not reside in corporeal objects,and which derive existence from God; and that these form theintermediate element between God and this material world.
In the chapters which follow I will show how far the teaching ofScripture is in harmony with these views, and how far it differsfrom them. CHAPTER V
SCRIPTURE supports the theory that the spheres are animate andintellectual, i.e., capable of comprehending things: that they arenot, as ignorant persons believe, inanimate masses like fire andearth, but are, as the philosophers assert, endowed with life, andserve their Lord, whom they mightily praise and glorify; comp."The heavens declare the glory of God," etc. (Ps. xix. 2). It is a greaterror to think that this is a mere figure of speech: for the verbs" todeclare" and" to relate," when joined together, are, in Hebrew,only used of intellectual beings. That the Psalmist really means todescribe the heavens' own doing, in other words, what the spheresactually do, and not what man thinks of them, may be best inferredfrom the words," There is no speech, nor language, their voice isnot heard" (ver. 4). Here he dearly shows that he describes theheavens themselves as in reality praising God, and declaring Hiswonders without words of lip and tongue. When man praises Godin words actually uttered, he only relates the ideas which he hasconceived, but these ideas form the real praise. The reason why hegives expression to these ideas is to be found in his desire tocommunicate them to others, or to make himself sure that he hastruly conceived them. Therefore it is said," Commune with yourown heart upon your bed, and be still" (Ps. iv. 5). Only ignorant orobstinate persons would refuse to admit this proof taken fromScripture.
As to the opinion of our Sages, 1 do not see any necessity forexpounding or demonstrating it. Consider only the form they gaveto the blessing recited on seeing the new moon, the ideasrepeatedly occurring in the prayers and the remarks in the Midrashon the following and similar passages:-- And the host of heavenworshippeth thee" (Neh. ix. 6):" When the morning stars sangtogether, and all the sons of God shouted for joy" (job -viii. 7). InBereshit Rabba, on the passage --" And the earth was empty andformless" (Gen. i. 2), our Sages remark as follows :" The wordstohu and bohu mean mourning and crying; the earth mourned andcried on account of her evil lot, saying, ' I and the heavens werecreated together, and yet the beings above live for ever, and we aremortal."' Our Sages, by this remark, indicate their belief that thespheres are animated beings, and not inanimate matter like theelements.
The opinion of Aristotle, that the spheres are capable ofcomprehension and conception, is in accordance with the words ofour prophets and our theologians or Sages. The philosophersfurther agree that this world below is governed by influencesemanating from the spheres, and that the latter comprehend andhave knowledge of the things which they influence. This theory isalso met with in Scripture: comp. [the stars and all the host ofheaven]" which the Lord thy God hath divided unto all nations"(Deut. iv. 19), that is to say, the stars, which God appointed to bethe means of governing His creatures, and not the objects of man'sworship. It has therefore been stated clearly:" And to rule over theday and over the night" (Gen. i. 18). The term" ruling" hererefers to the power which the spheres possess of governing theearth, in addition to the property of giving light and darkness. Thelatter property is the direct cause of genesis and destruction it isdescribed in the words," And to divide the light from the darkness(ibid.). It is impossible to assume that those who rule a thing areignorant of that very thing which they rule, if we take" to rule" inits proper sense. We will add another chapter on this subject.
CHAPTER VI
As for the existence of angels, there is no necessity to cite anyproof from Scripture, where the fact is frequently mentioned. Theterm elohim signifies" judges" : comp." The cause of both partiesshall come before the 'judges" ' (ha-elohim; Exod. xxii. 8). It hasbeen figuratively applied to angels, and to the Creator as beingjudge over the angels. When God says," I am the Lord your God,"the pronoun" your" refers to all mankind; but in the phrase eloheha-elohim, He is described as the God of the angels, and in adoneha-adonim, as the Lord of the spheres and the stars, which are themasters of the rest of the corporeal creation. The nouns elohim andadonim in these phrases do not refer to human judges or masters,because these are in rank inferior to the heavenly bodies: muchless do they refer to mankind in general, including masters andservants, or to objects of stone and wood worshipped by some asgods; for it is no honour or greatness to God to be superior tostone, wood, or a piece of metal. The phrases therefore admit of noother meaning than this: God is the judge over the judges; i.e., overthe angels, and the Lord over the spheres.
We have already stated above that the angels are incorporeal. Thisagrees with the opinion of Aristotle: there is only this difference inthe names employed -- he uses the term" Intelligences," and wesay instead" angels." His theory is that the Intelligences areintermediate beings between the Prime Cause and existing things,and that they effect the motion of the spheres, on which motion theexistence of all things depends. This is also the view we meet within all parts of Scripture: every act of God is described as beingperformed by angels. But" angel" means" messenger" : henceevery one that is intrusted with a certain mission is an angel. Eventhe movements of the brute creation are sometimes due to theaction of an angel, when such movements serve the purpose of theCreator, who endowed it with the power of performing thatmovement; e.g.," God hath sent His angel, and hath shut the lions'mouths that they have not hurt me" (Dan. vi. 22). Anotherinstance may be seen in the movements of Balaarn's ass, describedas caused by an angel. The elements are also called angels. Comp." Who maketh winds His angels, flaming fire His ministers" (Ps.civ. 4). There is no doubt that the word" angel" is used of amessenger sent by man; e.g.," And Jacob sent angels" (Gen. xxxii.4): of a prophet, e.g.," And an angel of the Lord came up fromGilgal to Bochim" (judges ii. I):" And He sent an angel, and hathbrought us forth out of Egypt" (Num. xx. 16). It is also used ofideals, perceived by prophets in prophetic visions, and of man'sanimal powers, as will be explained in another place.
When we assert that Scripture teaches that God rules this worldthrough angels, we mean such angels as are identical with theIntelligences. In some passages the plural is used of God, e.g.," Letus make man in our image" (Gen. i. 26)" Go to, let us go down,and there confound their language" (ibid. xi. 7). Our Sages explainthis in the following manner: God, as it were, does nothing withoutcontemplating the host above. I wonder at the expression"contemplating," which is the very expression used by Plato . God,as it were," contemplates the world of ideals, and thus producesthe existing beings." In other passages our Sages expressed it moredecidedly :" God does nothing without consulting the host above"(the word familia, used in the original, is a Greek noun, andsignifies" host" ). On the words," what they have already made"(Eccles. ii. 12), the following remark is made in Bereshit Rabbaand in Midrash Koheleth:" It is not said 'what He has made,' but'what they have made'; hence we infer that He, as it were, with Hiscourt, have agreed upon the form of each of the limbs of manbefore placing it in its position, as it is said, ' He hath made theeand established thee '" (Dent. xxxii. 6). In Bereshit Rabba (chap.li.) it is also stated, that wherever the term" and the Lord"occurred in Scripture, the Lord with His court is to be understood.These passages do not convey the idea that God spoke, thought,reflected, or that He consulted and employed the opinion of otherbeings, as ignorant persons have believed. How could the Creatorbe assisted by those whom He created! They only show that allparts of the Universe, even the limbs of animals in their actualform, are produced through angels: for natural forces and angelsare identical. How bad and injurious is the blindness of ignorance!Say to a person who is believed to belong to the wise men of Israelthat the Almighty sends His angel to enter the womb of a womanand to form there the foetus, he will be satisfied with the account:he will believe it, and even find in it a description of the greatnessof God's might and wisdom; although he believes that the angelconsists of burning fire, and is as big as a third part of theUniverse, yet he considers it possible as a divine miracle. But tellhim that God gave the seed a formative power which produces andshapes the limbs, and that this power is called" angel," or that allforms are the result of the influence of the Active Intellect, andthat the latter is the angel, the Prince of the world, frequentlymentioned by our Sages, and he will turn away; because he cannotcomprehend the true greatness and power of creating forces thatact in a body without being perceived by our senses. Our Sageshave already stated-for him who has understanding-that all forcesthat reside in a body are angels, much more the forces that areactive in the Universe. The theory that each force acts only in oneparticular way, is expressed in Bereskit Rabba (chap. l.) asfollows:" One angel does not perform two things, and two angelsdo not perform one thing" : this is exactly the property of allforces. We may find a confirmation of the opinion that the naturaland psychical forces of an individual are called angels in astatement of our Sages which is frequently quoted, and occursoriginally in Bereshit Rabba (chap. lxxviii.):" Every day Godcreates a legion of angels; they sing before Him, and disappear."When, in opposition to this statement, other statements werequoted to the effect that angels are eternal-and, in fact, it hasrepeatedly been shown that they live permanently-the reply hasbeen given that some angels live permanently, others perish; andthis is really the case: for individual forces are transient, whilst thegenera are permanent and imperishable. Again, we read (inBereshit Rabba, chap. lxxxv.), in reference to the relation betweenJudah and Tamar:" R. Jochanan said that Judah was about to passby [without noticing Tamar], but God caused the angel of lust, i.e.,the libidinous disposition, to present himself to him." Man'sdisposition is here called an angel. Likewise we frequently meetwith the phrase" the angel set over a certain thing.'' InMidrash-Koheleth (on Eccles. x. 7) the following passage occurs:"When man sleeps, his soul speaks to the angel, the angel to thecherub." The intelligent reader will find here a clear statement thatman's imaginative faculty is also called" angel," and that" cherub" is used for man's intellectual faculty. How beautiful must thisappear to him who understands it; how absurd to the ignorant!
We have already stated that the forms in which angels appear formpart of the prophetic vision. Some prophets see angels in the formof man, e.g.," And behold three men stood by him" (Gen. xviii.2): others perceive an angel as a fearful and terrible being, e.g.,"And his countenance was as the countenance of an angel of God,very terrible" (judges xiii. 6): others see them as fire, e.g.," Andthe angel of the Lord appeared to him in a flame of fire" (Exod.iii. 2). In Bereshit Rabba (chap. l.) the following remark occurs:"To Abraham, whose prophetic power was great, the angelsappeared in the form of men; to Lot, whose power was weak, theyappeared as angels." This is an important principle as regardsProphecy; it will be fully discussed when we treat of that subject(chap. xxxii. sqq.). Another passage in Bereshit Rabba (ibid.) runsthus:" Before the angels have accomplished their task they arecalled men, when they have accomplished it they are angels."Consider how clearly they say that the term" angel" signifiesnothing but a certain action, and that every appearance of an angelis part of a prophetic vision, depending on the capacity of theperson that perceives it.
There is nothing in the opinion of Aristotle on this subject contraryto the teaching of Scripture. The whole difference between himand ourselves is this : he believes all these beings to be eternal,co-existing with the First Cause as its necessary effect; but webelieve that they have had a beginning, that God created theIntelligences, and gave the spheres the capacity of seeking tobecome like them: that in creating the Intelligences and thespheres, He endowed them with their governing powers. In thispoint we differ from him.
In the course of this treatise we shall give his theory as well as thetheory of Creatio ex nihilo taught in Scripture.
CHAPTER VII
WE have already explained that the term" angel" is a homonym,and is used of the intellectual beings, the spheres, and theelements: for all these are engaged in performing a divinecommand. But do not imagine that the Intelligences and thespheres are like other forces which reside in bodies and act by thelaws of nature without being conscious of what they do. Thespheres and the Intelligences are conscious of their actions, andselect by their own free will the objects of their influence,although not in the same manner as we exercise free will and ruleover other things, which only concern temporary beings. I havebeen led to adopt this theory by certain passages in Scripture: e.g.,an angel says to Lot :" For I cannot do anything," etc. (Gen. XiX.21): and telling him to deliver himself, the angel says :" Behold Ihave accepted thee concerning this thing" (ver. 21).
Again:" Take heed before him, and listen to his voice," etc. (Exod.xxiii. 21). These passages show that angels are conscious of whatthey do, and have free will in the sphere of action intrusted tothem, just as we have free will within our province, and inaccordance with the power given to us with our very existence.The difference is that what we do is the lowest stage of excellence,and that our influence and actions are preceded by nonaction;whilst the Intelligences and the spheres always perform that whichis good, they contain nothing except what is good and perfect, aswill be shown further on, and they have continually been activefrom the beginning.
CHAPTER VIII
IT is one of the ancient beliefs, both among the philosophers andother people, that the motions of the spheres produced mighty andfearful sounds. They observed how little objects produced by rapidmotion a loud, shrilling, and terrifying noise, and concluded thatthis must to a far higher degree be the case with the bodies of thesun, the moon and the stars, considering their greatness and theirvelocity. The Pythagoreans believed that the sounds were pleasant,and, though loud, had the same proportions to each other as themusical notes. They also explained why these mighty andtremendous sounds are not heard by us. This belief is alsowidespread in our nation. Thus our Sages describe the greatness ofthe sound produced by the sun in the daily circuit in its orbit. Thesame description could be given of all heavenly bodies. Aristotle,however, rejects this, and holds that they produce no sounds. Youwill find his opinion in the book The Heavens and the World (DeCoelo). You must not find it strange that Aristotle differs herefrom the opinion of our Sages. The theory of the music of thespheres is connected with the theory of the motion of the stars in afixed sphere, and our Sages have, in this astronomical question,abandoned their own theory in favour of the theory of others. Thus,it is distinctly stated," The wise men of other nations havedefeated the wise men of IsraeM' It is quite right that our Sageshave abandoned their own theory: for speculative matters everyone treats according to the results of his own study, and every oneaccepts that which appears to him established by proof.
CHAPTER IX
WE have stated above that in the age of Aristotle the number ofspheres was not accurately known: and that those who at presentcount nine spheres consider a sphere containing several rotatingcircles as one, a fact well known to all who have a knowledge ofastronomy. We need, therefore, not reject the opinion of those whoassume two spheres in accordance with the words of Scripture :"Behold the heaven and the heaven of heavens are the Lord's"(Dent. x. 14). They reckon all the spheres with stars, i.e., with allthe circles in which the stars move, as one: the all-encompassingsphere in which there are no stars, is regarded by them as thesecond: hence they maintain that there are two spheres.
I will here introduce an explanation which is necessary for theunderstanding of our view on the present subject. There is adifference among ancient astronomers whether the spheres ofMercury and Venus are above or below the sun, because no proofcan be given for the position of these two spheres. At first it wasgenerally assumed that they were above the sunnote this well; lateron Ptolemy maintained that they were below the sun; because hebelieved that in this manner the whole arrangement of the sphereswould be most reasonable: the sun would be in the middle, havingthree stars below and three above itself. More recently someAndalusian scholars concluded, from certain principles laid downby Ptolemy, that Venus and Mercury were above the sun. IbnAflah of Seville, with whose son I was acquainted, has written afamous book on the subject: also the excellent philosopherAbu-Bekr ibn-Alzaig, one of whose pupils was my fellow-student,has treated of this subject and offered certain proofs-which wehave copied --of the improbability of Venus and Mercury beingabove the sun. The proofs given by Abu-Bekr show only theimprobability, not the impossibility. In short, whether it be so ornot, the ancients placed Venus and Mercury above the sun, andhad, therefore, the following five spheres : that of the moon, whichis undoubtedly the nearest to us; that of the sun, which is, ofcourse, above the former: then that of the five planets, the sphereof the fixed stars, and the outermost sphere, which does notcontain any star. Consequently there are four spheres containingfigures, i.e., stars, which were called figures by the ancients intheir well-known works-viz., the spheres of the fixed stars, of thefive planets, of the sun, and of the moon: above these there is onesphere which is empty, without any star. This number is for me ofgreat importance in respect to an idea which none of thephilosophers clearly stated, though I was led to it by variousutterances of the philosophers and of our Sages. I will now statethe idea and expound it.
CHAPTER X
IT is a well-known fact that the philosophers, when they discuss intheir works the order of the Universe, assume that the existingorder of things in this sublunary world of transient beings dependson forces which emanate from the spheres. We have mentionedthis several times. In like manner our Sages say," There is nosingle herb below without its corresponding star above, that beatsupon it and commands it to grow." Comp." Knowest thou theordinances of heaven ? Canst thou set the dominion thereof in theearth ?" (Job xxxviii. 33). The term mazzal, literally meaning aconstellation in the Zodiac, is also used of every star, as may beinferred from the following passage in the beginning of BereshitRahha (chap. x.) :" While one star (mazzal) completes its circuitin thirty days, another completes it in thirty years." They have thusclearly expressed it, that even each individual being in this worldhas its corresponding star. Although the influences of the spheresextend over all beings, there is besides the influence of a particularstar directed to each particular species: a fact noticed also inreference to the several forces in one organic body; for the wholeUniverse is like one organic body, as we have stated above. Thusthe philosophers speak of the peculiar influence of the moon onthe particular element water. That this is the case is proved by theincrease and decrease of the water in the seas and rivers accordingto the increase and decrease of the moon; also by the rising and thefalling of the seas according to the advance or return of the moon,i.e., her ascending and her descending in the several quarters of hercourse. This is clear to every one who has directed his attention tothese phenomena. The influence of the sun's rays upon fire mayeasily be noticed in the increase of heat or cold on earth, accordingas the sun approaches the earth or recedes or is concealed from it.All this is so clear that I need not explain it further. Now itoccurred to my mind that the four spheres which contain starsexercise influence upon all beings on earth that come intoexistence, and, in fact, are the cause of their existence: but each ofthe four spheres is the exclusive source of the properties of oneonly of the four elements, and becomes by its own motion thecause of the motion and changes of that element. Thus water is setin motion by the moon-sphere, fire by the sun-sphere, air by theother planets, which move in many and different courses withretrogressions, progressions, and stations, and therefore producethe various forms of the air with its frequent changes, contractions,and expansions: the sphere of the other stars, namely, the fixedstars, sets earth in motion; and it may be that on this account, viz.,on account of the slow motion of the fixed stars, earth is butslowly set in motion to change and to combine with otherelements. The particular influence which the fixed stars exerciseupon earth is implied in the saying of our Sages, that the numberof the species of plants is the same as that of the individualsincluded in the general term" stars."
The arrangement of the Universe may therefore be assumed to beas follows: there are four spheres, four elements set in motion bythem, and also four principal properties which earthly beingsderive from them, as has been stated above. Furthermore, there arefour causes of the motion of every sphere, namely, the followingfour essential elements in the sphere: its spherical shape, its soul,its intellect, by which the sphere is capable of forming ideas, andthe Intelligence, which the sphere desires to imitate. Note thiswell. The explanation of what I said is this : the sphere could nothave been continuously in motion, had it not this peculiar form;continuity of motion is only possible when the motion is circular.Rectilinear motion, even if frequently repeated in the samemoment, cannot be continuous: for when a body movessuccessively in two opposite directions, it must pass through amoment of rest, as has been demonstrated in its proper place. Thenecessity of a continuous motion constantly repeated in the samepath implies the necessity of a circular form. The spheres musthave a soul; for only animate beings can move freely. There mustbe some cause for the motion, and as it does not consist in the fearof that which is injurious, or the desire of that which is profitable,it must be found in the notion which the spheres form of a certainbeing, and in the desire to approach that being. This formation of anotion demands, in the first place, that the spheres possessintellect; it demands further that something exists whichcorresponds to that notion, and which the spheres desire toapproach. These are the four causes of the motion of the spheres.The following are the four principal forces directly derived fromthe spheres: the nature of minerals, the properties peculiar toplants, the animal faculties, and the intellect. An examination ofthese forces shows that they have two functions, namely, toproduce things and to perpetuate them; that is to say, to preservethe species perpetually, and the individuals in each species for acertain time. These are also the functions ascribed to Nature,which is said to be wise, to govern the Universe, to provide, as itwere, by plan for the production of living beings, and to providealso for their preservation and perpetuation. Nature createsformative faculties, which are the cause of the production of livingbeings, and nutritive faculties as the source of their temporalexistence and preservation. It may be that by Nature the DivineWill is meant, which is the origin of these two kinds of facultiesthrough the medium of the spheres.
As to the number four, it is strange, and demands our attention. InMidrash Tanhuma the following passage occurs:" How many stepswere in Jacob's ladder ?-Four." The question refers to the verse," And behold a ladder set upon the earth," etc. (Gen. xxviii. 12). Inall the Midrashim it is stated that there were four hosts of angels:this statement is frequently repeated. Some read in the abovepassage:" How many steps were in the ladder ?-Seven." But allreadings and all Midrashim unanimously express that the angelswhom Jacob saw ascending the ladder, and descending, were onlyfour; two of whom were going up and two coming down. Thesefour angels, the two that went up and the two that came down,occupied one step of the ladder, standing in one line. Hence it hasbeen inferred that the breadth of the ladder in this vision wasfour-thirds of the world. For the breadth of an angel in a propheticvision is equal to one-third of the world: comp." And his body waslike tarshish (two-sixths)" (Dan. x. 6): the four angels thereforeoccupied four-thirds of the world.-Zechariah, in describing theallegorical vision of" the four chariots that came out frombetween two mountains, which mountains were mountains ofbrass" (Zech. vi. 1), adds the explanation," These are the fourspirits of the heavens which go forth from standing before the Lordof all the earth" (ibid. ver. 5). By these four spirits the causes aremeant which produce all changes in the Universe. The term" brass" (nehoshet), employed here, and the phrase" burnishedbrass" (nehoshet kalal), used by Ezekiel (i. 7), are to some extenthomonymous, and will be discussed further on.
The saying of our Sages, that the angel is as broad as the third partof the Universe, or, in the words of Bereshit Rabba (chap. x.), thatthe angel is the third part of the world, is quite clear; we havealready explained it in our large work on the Holy Law. The wholecreation consists of three parts, (1) the pure intelligences, orangels: (2) the bodies of the spheres: and (3) the materia prima, orthe bodies which are below the spheres, and are subject to constantchange.
In this manner may those understand the dark sayings of theprophets who desire to understand them, who awake from thesleep of forgetfulness, deliver themselves from the sea ofignorance, and raise themselves upward nearer the higher beings.But those who prefer to swim in the waters of their ignorance, andto" go down very low," need not exert the body or heart; they needonly cease to move, and they will go down by the law of nature.Note and consider well all we have said.
CHAPTER XI
WHEN a simple mathematician reads and studies theseastronomical discussions, he believes that the form and the numberof the spheres are facts established by proof. But this is not thecase: for the science of astronomy does not aim at demonstratingthem, although it includes subjects that can be proved; e.g., it hasbeen proved that the path of the sun is inclined against the equator:this cannot be doubted. But it has not yet been decided whether thesphere of the sun is excentric or contains a revolving epicycle, andthe astronomer does not take notice of this uncertainty, for hisobject is simply to find an hypothesis that would lead to a uniformand circular motion of the stars without acceleration, retardation,or change, and which is in its effects in accordance withobservation. He will, besides, endeavour to find such an hypothesiswhich would require the least complicated motion and the leastnumber of spheres: he will therefore prefer an hypothesis whichwould explain all the phenomena of the stars by means of threespheres to an hypothesis which would require four spheres. Fromthis reason we adopt, in reference to the circuit of the sun, thetheory of excentricity, and reject the epicyclic revolution assumedby Ptolemy. When we therefore perceive that all fixed stars movein the same way uniformly, without the least difference, weconclude that they are all in one sphere. It is, however, notimpossible that the stars should have each its own sphere, with aseparate centre, and yet move in the same way. If this theory beaccepted, a number of Intelligences must be assumed, equal to thatof the stars, and therefore Scripture says in reference to them," Isthere any number of his armies ?" (job xxv. 3): for theIntelligences, the heavenly bodies, and the natural forces, arecalled the armies of God. Nevertheless the species of the stars canbe numbered, and therefore we would still be justified in countingthe spheres of the fixed stars collectively as one, just as the fivespheres of the planets, together with the numerous spheres theycontain, are regarded by us as one. Our object in adopting thisnumber is, as you have noticed, to divide the influences which wecan trace in the Universe according to their general character,without desiring to fix the number of the Intelligences and thespheres. All we wish to point out is this : in the first place, that thewhole Creation is divided into three parts, viz. (1) the pureIntelligences; (2) the bodies of the spheres endowed withpermanent forms -- (the forms of these bodies do not pass fromone substratum to another, nor do their substrata undergo anychange whatever): and (3) the transient earthly beings, all of whichconsist of the same substance. Furthermore, we desire to show thatthe ruling power emanates from the Creator, and is received by theIntelligences according to their order: from the Intelligences partof the good and the light bestowed upon them is communicated tothe spheres, and the latter, being in possession of the abundanceobtained of the Intelligences, transmit forces and properties untothe beings of this transient world. We must, however, add that thepart which benefits the part below it in the order described doesnot exist for the sole purpose of producing that benefit. For if thiswere the case it would lead to the paradox that the higher, better,and nobler beings existed for the sake of beings lower in rank,whilst in reality the object should be of greater importance thanthe means applied for attaining it. No intelligent person will admitthat this is possible. The nature of the influence which one part ofthe Creation exercises upon another must be explained as follows:A thing perfect in a certain way is either perfect only in itself,without being able to communicate that perfection to anotherbeing, or it is so perfect that it is capable of imparting perfection toanother being. A person may possess wealth sufficient for his ownwants without being able to spare anything for another, or he mayhave wealth enough to benefit also other people, or even to enrichthem to such an extent as would enable them to give part of theirproperty to others. In the same manner the creative act of theAlmighty in giving existence to pure Intelligences endows the firstof them with the power of giving existence to another, and so on,down to the Active Intellect, the lowest of the purely spiritualbeings. Besides producing other Intelligences, each Intelligencegives existence to one of the spheres, from the highest down to thelowest, which is the sphere of the moon. After the latter followsthis transient world, i.e., the materia prima, and all that has beenformed of it. In this manner the elements receive certain propertiesfrom each sphere, and a succession of genesis and destruction isproduced.
We have already mentioned that these theories are not opposed toanything taught by our Prophets or by our Sages. Our nation iswise and perfect, as has been declared by the Most High, throughMoses, who made us perfect :" Surely this great nation is a wiseand understanding people" (Deut. iv. 6). But when wickedbarbarians have deprived us of our possessions, put an end to ourscience and literature, and killed our wise men, we have becomeignorant; this has been foretold by the prophets, when theypronounced the punishment for our sins:" The wisdom of theirwise men shall perish, and the understanding of their prudent menshall be hid" (Isa. xxix. 14). We are mixed up with other nations;we have learnt their opinions, and followed their ways and acts.The Psalmist, deploring this imitation of the actions of othernations, says," They were mingled among the nations, and learnedtheir works" (Ps. cvi. 35). Isaiah likewise complains that theIsraelites adopted the opinions of their neighbours., and says," Andthey please themselves in the children of strangers" (Isa. ii. 6): or,according to the Aramaic version of Jonathan, son of Uzziel," Andthey walk in the ways of the nations." Having been brought upamong persons untrained in philosophy, we are inclined toconsider these philosophical opinions as foreign to our religion,just as uneducated persons find them foreign to their own notions.But, in fact, it is not so.
Since we have repeatedly spoken of the influence emanating fromGod and the Intelligences, we will now proceed to explain what isthe true meaning of this influence, and after that I will discuss thetheory of the Creation.
CHAPTER XII
IT is dear that whenever a thing is produced, an efficient causemust exist for the production of the thing that has not existedpreviously. This immediate efficient cause is either corporeal orincorporeal: if corporeal, it is not the efficient cause on account ofits corporeality, but on account of its being an individual corporealobject, and therefore by means of its form. I will speak of thissubject later on. The immediate efficient cause of a thing mayagain be the effect of some cause, and so on, but not ad infinitum.The series of causes for a certain product must necessarilyconclude with a First Cause, which is the true cause of thatproduct, and whose existence is not due to another cause. Thequestion remains, Why has this thing been produced now and notlong before, since the cause has always been in existence ? Theanswer is, that a certain relation between cause and product hasbeen absent, if the cause be corporeal: or, that the substance hasnot been sufficiently prepared, if the cause be incorporeal. All thisis in accordance with the teachings of natural science. We ignorefor the present the question whether to assume the Eternity of theUniverse, or the Creatio ex nihilo. We do not intend to discuss thequestion here.
In Physics it has been shown that a body in acting upon anotherbody must either directly be in contact with it, or indirectlythrough the medium of other bodies. E.g., a body that has beenheated has been in contact with fire, or the air that surrounds thebody has been heated by the fire, and has communicated the heatto the body; the immediate cause of the heat in this body is thecorporeal substance of the heated air. The magnet attracts ironfrom a distance through a certain force communicated to the airround the iron. The magnet does therefore not act at all distances,just as fire does not act at every distance, but only as long as theair between the fire and the object is affected by the fire. When theair is no longer affected by the fire which is under a piece of wax,the latter does not melt. The same is the case with magnetism.When an object that has previously not been warm has nowbecome warm, the cause of its heat must now have been created:either some fire has been produced, or the distance of the fire fromthe object has been changed, and the altered relation between thefire and the object is the cause now created. In a similar mannerwe find the causes of all changes in the Universe to be changes inthe combination of the elements that act upon each other when onebody approaches another or separates from it. There are, however,changes which are not connected with the combination of theelements, but concern only the forms of the things; they requirelikewise an efficient cause: there must exist a force that producesthe various forms. This cause is incorporeal, for that whichproduces form must itself be abstract form, as has been shown inits proper place. I have also indicated the proof of this theorem inprevious chapters. The following may, in addition, serve toillustrate it : All combinations of the elements are subject toincrease and decrease, and this change takes place gradually. It isdifferent with forms: they do not change gradually, and aretherefore without motion: they appear and disappearinstantaneously, and are consequently not the result of thecombination of corporeal elements. This combination merelyprepares matter for receiving a certain form. The efficient causewhich produces the form is indivisible, because it is of the samekind as the thing produced. Hence it may be concluded that theagent that has produced a certain form, or given it to a certainsubstance, must itself be an abstract form. The action of thisincorporeal agent cannot depend on a certain relation to thecorporeal product: being incorporeal, it cannot approach a body, orrecede from it: nor can a body approach the incorporeal agent, orrecede from it, because there is no relation of distance betweencorporeal and incorporeal beings. The reason why the action hasnot taken place before must be sought in the circumstance that thesubstance has not been prepared for the action of the abstract form.
It is now clear that the action of bodies upon each other, accordingto their forms, prepares the substance for receiving the action of anincorporeal being, or Form. The existence of actions of purelyincorporeal beings, in every case of change that does not originatein the mere combination of elements, is now firmly established.These actions do not depend on impact, or on a certain distance.They are termed" influence" (or" emanation" ), on account oftheir similarity to a water-spring. The latter sends forth water in alldirections, has no peculiar side for receiving or spending itscontents: it springs forth on all sides, and continually waters bothneighbouring and distant places. In a similar manner incorporealbeings, in receiving power and imparting it to others, are notlimited to a particular side, distance, or time. They act continually;and whenever an object is sufficiently prepared, it receives theeffect of that continuous action, called" influence" (or"emanation" ). God being incorporeal, and everything being thework of Him as the efficient cause, we say that the Universe hasbeen created by the Divine influence, and that all changes in theUniverse emanate from Him. In the same sense we say that Hecaused wisdom to emanate from Him and to come upon theprophets. In all such cases we merely wish to express that anincorporeal Being, whose action we call" influence," has produceda certain effect. The term" influence" has been consideredapplicable to the Creator on account of the similarity between Hisactions and those of a spring. There is no better way of describingthe action of an incorporeal being than by this analogy; and noterm can be found that would accurately describe it. For it is asdifficult to form an idea of that action as to form an idea of theincorporeal being itself. As we imagine only bodies or forcesresiding in bodies, so we only imagine actions possible when theagent is near, at a certain distance, and on a particular side. Thereare therefore persons who, on learning that God is incorporeal, orthat He does not approach the object of His action, believe that Hegives commands to angels, and that the latter carry them out byapproach or direct contact, as is the case when we producesomething. These persons thus imagine also the angels as bodies.Some of them, further, believe that God commands an action inwords consisting, like ours, of letters and sound, and that therebythe action is done. All this is the work of the imagination, whichis, in fact, identical with" evil inclination." For all our defects inspeech or in character are either the direct or the indirect work ofimagination. This is not the subject of the present chapter, inwhich we only intended to explain the term" influence" in so faras it is applied to incorporeal beings, namely, to God and to theIntelligences or angels. But the term is also applied to the forces ofthe spheres in their effects upon the earth: and we speak of the"influence" of the spheres, although the spheres are corporeal, andthe stars, being corporeal, only act at certain distances, i.e., at asmaller or a greater distance from the centre, or at a definitedistance from each other, a circumstance which led to Astrology.
As to our assertion that Scripture applies the notion of" influence"to God, compare" They have forsaken me, the fountain of livingwaters" (Jer. ii. 13), i.e., the Divine influence that gives life orexistence, for the two are undoubtedly identical. Further," Forwith Thee is the fountain of life" (Ps. xxxvi. 10), i.e., the Divineinfluence that gives existence. The concluding words of thisverse," in Thy light we see light," express exactly what we said,namely, that by the influence of the intellect which emanates fromGod we become wise, by it we are guided and enabled tocomprehend the Active Intellect. Note this.
CHAPTER XIII
AMONG those who believe in the existence of God, there arefound three different theories as regards the question whether theUniverse is eternal or not.
First Theory. -- Those who follow the Law of Moses, our Teacher,hold that the whole Universe, i.e., everything except God, has beenbrought by Him into existence out of non-existence. In thebeginning God alone existed, and nothing else; neither angels, norspheres, nor the things that are contained within the spheresexisted. He then produced from nothing all existing things such asthey are, by Hiswill and desire. Even time itself is among thethings created; for time depends on motion, i.e., on an accident inthings which move, and the things upon whose motion timedepends are themselves created beings, which have passed fromnon-existence into existence. We say that God existed before thecreation of the Universe, although the verb existed appears toimply the notion of time; we also believe that He existed aninfinite space of time before the Universe was created; but in thesecases we do not mean time in its true sense. We only use the termto signify something analogous or similar to time. For time isundoubtedly an accident, and, according to our opinion, one of thecreated accidents, like blackness and whiteness: it is not a quality,but an accident connected with motion. This must be clear to allwho understand what Aristotle has said on time and its realexistence.
The following remark does not form an essential part of ourpresent research; it will nevertheless be found useful in the courseof this discussion. Many scholars do not know what time really is,and men like Galen were so perplexed about it that they askedwhether time has a real existence or not; the reason for thisuncertainty is to be found in the circumstance that time is anaccident of an accident. Accidents which are directly connectedwith material bodies, e.g., colour and taste, are easily understood,and correct notions are formed of them. There are, however,accidents which are connected with other accidents, e.g., thesplendour of colour, or the inclination and the curvature of a line:of these it is very difficult to form a correct notion, especiallywhen the accident which forms the substratum for the otheraccident is not constant but variable. Both difficulties are presentin the notion of time: it is an accident of motion, which is itself anaccident of a moving object: besides, it is not a fixed property: onthe contrary, its true and essential condition is, not to remain in thesame state for two consecutive moments. This is the source ofignorance about the nature of time.
We consider time a thing created: it comes into existence in thesame manner as other accidents, and the substances which formthe substratum for the accidents. For this reason, viz., because timebelongs to the things created, it cannot be said that God producedthe Universe in the beginning.
Consider this well; for he who does not understand it is unable torefute forcible objections raised against the theory of Creatio exnihilo. If you admit the existence of time before the Creation, youwill be compelled to accept the theory of the Eternity of theUniverse. For time is an accident and requires a substratum. Youwill therefore have to assume that something [beside God] existedbefore this Universe was created, an assumption which it is ourduty to oppose.
This is the first theory, and it is undoubtedly a fundamentalprinciple of the Law of our teacher Moses; it is next in importanceto the principle of God's unity. Do not follow any other theory.Abraham, our father, was the first that taught it, after he hadestablished it by philosophical research. He proclaimed,therefore," the name of the Lord the God of the Universe" (Gen.xxi. 33): and he had previously expressed this theory in the words," The Possessor of heaven and earth" (ibid. xiv. 22).
Second Theory. -- The theory of all Philosophers whose opinionsand works are known to us is this: It is impossible to assume thatGod produced anything from nothing, or that He reduces anythingto nothing; that is to say, it is impossible that an object consistingof matter and form should be produced when that matter isabsolutely absent, or that it should be destroyed in such a mannerthat that matter be absolutely no longer in existence. To say of Godthat He can produce a thing from nothing or reduce a thing tonothing is, according to the opinion of these philosophers, thesame as if we were to say that He could cause one substance tohave at the same time two opposite properties, or produce anotherbeing like Himself, or change Himself into a body, or produce asquare the diagonal of which be equal to its side, or similarimpossibilities. The philosophers thus believe that it is no defect inthe Supreme Being that He does not produce impossibilities, forthe nature of that which is impossible is constant-it does notdepend on the action of an agent, and for this reason it cannot bechanged, Similarly there is, according to them, no defect in thegreatness of God, when He is unable to produce a thing fromnothing, because they consider this as one of the impossibilities.They therefore assume that a certain substance has coexisted withGod from eternity in such a manner that neither God existedwithout that substance nor the latter without God. But they do nothold that the existence of that substance equals in rank that of God:for God is the cause of that existence, and the substance is in thesame relation to God as the clay is to the potter, or the iron to thesmith: God can do with it what He pleases; at one time He formsof it heaven and earth, at another time He forms some other thing.Those who hold this view also assume that the heavens aretransient, that they came into existence, though not from nothing,and may cease to exist, although they cannot be reduced tonothing. They are transient in the same manner as the individualsamong living beings which are produced from some existingsubstance, and are again reduced to some substance that remains inexistence. The process of genesis and destruction is, in the case ofthe heavens, the same as in that of earthly beings.
The followers of this theory are divided into different schools,whose opinions and principles it is useless to discuss here: butwhat I have mentioned is common to all of them. Plato holds thesame opinion. Aristotle says in his Physics, that according to Platothe heavens are transient. This view is also stated in Plato'sTimaeus. His opinion, however, does not agree with our belief:only superficial and careless persons wrongly assume that Platohas the same belief as we have. For whilst we hold that theheavens have been created from absolutely nothing, Plato believesthat they have been formed out of something. -- This is the secondtheory.
Third Theory. -- viz., that of Aristotle, his followers, andcommentators. Aristotle maintains, like the adherents of thesecond theory, that a corporeal object cannot be produced withouta corporeal substance. He goes, however, farther, and contendsthat the heavens are indestructible. For he holds that the Universein its totality has never been different, nor will it ever change: theheavens, which form the permanent element in the Universe, andare not subject to genesis and destruction, have always been so;time and motion are eternal, permanent, and have neitherbeginning nor end; the sublunary world, which includes thetransient elements, has always been the same, because the materiaprima is itself eternal, and merely combines successively withdifferent forms; when one form is removed, another is assumed.This whole arrangement, therefore, both above and here below, isnever disturbed or interrupted, and nothing is produced contrary tothe laws or the ordinary course of Nature. He further says-thoughnot in the same terms-that he considers it impossible for God tochange His will or conceive a new desire; that God produced thisUniverse in its totality by His will, but not from nothing. Aristotlefinds it as impossible to assume that God changes His will orconceives a new desire, as to believe that He is nonexisting, or thatHis essence is changeable. Hence it follows that this Universe hasalways been the same in the past, and will be the same eternally.
This is a full account of the opinions of those who consider thatthe existence of God, the First Cause of the Universe, has beenestablished by proof. But it would be quite useless to mention theopinions of those who do not recognize the existence of God, butbelieve that the existing state of things is the result of accidentalcombination and separation of the elements, and that the Universehas no Ruler or Governor. Such is the theory of Epicurus and hisschool, and similar philosophers, as stated by Alexander[Aphrodisiensis]; it would be superfluous to repeat their views,since the existence of God has been demonstrated whilst theirtheory is built upon a basis proved to be untenable. It is likewiseuseless to prove the correctness of the followers of the secondtheory in asserting that the heavens are transient, because they atthe same time believe in the Eternity of the Universe, and so longas this theory is adopted, it makes no difference to us whether it isbelieved that the heavens are transient, and that only theirsubstance is eternal, or the heavens are held to be indestructible, inaccordance with the view of Aristotle. All who follow the Law ofMoses, our Teacher, and Abraham, our Father, and all who adoptsimilar theories, assume that nothing is eternal except God, andthat the theory of Creatio ex nihilo includes nothing that isimpossible, whilst some thinkers even regard it as an establishedtruth.
After having described the different theories, I will now proceed toshow how Aristotle proved his theory, and what induced him toadopt it.
CHAPTER XIV
IT is not necessary to repeat in every chapter that I write thistreatise with the full knowledge of what you have studied: that Itherefore need not quote the exact words of the philosophers: itwill suffice to give an abstract of their views. I will, however,point out the methods which they employ, in the same manner as Ihave done when I discussed the theories of the Mutakallemim. Nonotice will be taken of the opinion of any philosopher but that ofAristotle: his opinions alone deserve to be criticized, and if ourobjections or doubts with regard to any of these be well founded,this must be the case in a far higher degree in respect to all otheropponents of our fundamental principles.
I now proceed to describe the methods of the philosophers.
First Method. -- According to Aristotle, motion, that is to say,motion par excellence, is eternal. For if the motion had abeginning, there must already have been some motion when itcame into existence, for transition from potentiality into actuality,and from non-existence into existence, always implies motion;then that previous motion, the cause of the motion which follows,must be eternal, or else the series would have to be carried back adinfinitum. On the same principle he maintains that time is eternal,for time is related to and connected with motion : there is nomotion except in time, and time can only be perceived by motion,as has been demonstrated by proof. By this argument Aristotleproves the eternity of the Universe.
Second Method. -- The First Substance common to the fourelements is eternal. For if it had a beginning it would have comeinto existence from another substance; it would further beendowed with a form, as coming into existence is nothing butreceiving Form. But we mean by" First Substance" a formlesssubstance; it can therefore not have come into existence fromanother substance, and must be without beginning and withoutend: hence it is concluded that the Universe is eternal.
Third Method. -- The substance of the spheres contains noopposite elements: for circular motion includes no such oppositedirections as are found in rectilinear motion. Whatever isdestroyed, owes its destruction to the opposite elements itcontains. The spheres contain no opposite elements; they aretherefore indestructible, and because they are indestructible theyare also without beginning. Aristotle thus assumes the axiom thateverything that has had a beginning is destructible, and thateverything destructible has had a beginning; that things withoutbeginning are indestructible, and indestructible things are withoutbeginning. Hence follows the Eternity of the Universe.
Fourth Method. -- The actual production of a thing is preceded intime by its possibility. The actual change of a thing is likewisepreceded in time by its possibility. From this proposition Aristotlederives the eternity of the circular motion of the spheres. TheAristotelians in more recent time employ this proposition indemonstrating the Eternity of the Universe. They argue thus: Whenthe Universe did not yet exist, its existence was either possible ornecessary, or impossible. If it was necessary, the Universe couldnever have been non-existing; if impossible, the Universe couldnever have been in existence; if possible, the question arises, Whatwas the substratum of that possibility ? for there must be inexistence something of which that possibility can be predicated.This is a forcible argument in favour of the Eternity of theUniverse. Some of the later schools of the Mutakallemimimagined that they could confute this argument by objecting thatthe possibility rests with the agent, and not with the production.But this objection is of no force whatever: for there are twodistinct possibilities, viz., the thing produced has had thepossibility of being produced before this actually took place: andthe agent has had the possibility of producing it before he actuallydid so. There are, therefore, undoubtedly two possibilities -- that ofthe substance to receive a certain form, and that of the agent toperform a certain act.
These are the principal methods, based on the properties of theUniverse, by which Aristotle proves the Eternity of the Universe.There are, however, other methods of proving the Eternity of theUniverse. They are based on the notions formed of God, andphilosophers after Aristotle derived them from his philosophy.Some of them employed the following argument :
Fifth Method. -- If God produced the Universe from nothing, Hemust have been a potential agent before He was an actual one, andmust have passed from a state of potentiality into that of actuality-- a process that is merely possible, and requires an agent foreffecting it. This argument is likewise a source of great doubts,and every intelligent person must examine it in order to refute itand to expose its character.
Sixth Method. -- An agent is active at one time and inactive atanother, according as favourable or unfavourable circumstancesarise. The unfavourable circumstances cause the abandonment ofan intended action. The favourable ones, on the other hand, evenproduce a desire for an action for which there has not been a desirepreviously. As, however, God is not subject to accidents whichcould bring about a change in His will, and is not affected byobstacles and hindrances that might appear or disappear, it isimpossible, they argue, to imagine that God is active at one timeand inactive at another. He is, on the contrary, always active in thesame manner as He is always in actual existence.
Seventh Method. -- The actions of God are perfect; they are in noway defective, nor do they contain anything useless or superfluous.In similar terms Adstotle frequently praises Him, when he says thatNature is wise and does nothing in vain, but makes everything asperfect as possible. The philosophers therefore contend that thisexisting Universe is so perfect that it cannot be improved, andmust be permanent; for it is the result of God's wisdom, which isnot only always present in His essence, but is identical with it.
All arguments in favour of the Eternity of the Universe are basedon the above methods, and can be traced to one or other of them.The following objection is also raised against Creatio ex nihilo :How could God ever have been inactive without producing orcreating anything in the infinite past ? How could He have passedthe long infinite period which preceded the Creation withoutproducing anything, so as to commence, as it were, only yesterday,the Creation of the Universe ? For even if you said, e.g., that Godcreated previously as many successive worlds as the outermostsphere could contain grains of mustard, and that each of theseworlds existed as many years: considering the infinite existence ofGod, it would be the same as if He had only yesterday commencedthe Creation. For when we once admit the beginning of theexistence of things after their non-existence, it makes nodifference whether thousands of centuries have passed since thebeginning, or only a short time. Those who defend the Eternity ofthe Universe find both assumptions equally improbable.
Eighth Method. -- The following method is based on thecircumstance that the theory implies a belief which is so commonto all peoples and ages, and so universal, that it appears to expressa real fact and not merely an hypothesis. Aristotle says that allpeople have evidently believed in the permanency and stability ofthe heavens; and thinking that these were eternal, they declaredthem to be the habitation of God and of the spiritual beings orangels. By thus attributing the heavens to God, they expressed theirbelief that the heavens are indestructible. Several other argumentsof the same kind are employed by Aristotle in treating of thissubject in order to support the results of his philosophicalspeculation by common sense.
CHAPTER XV
IN this chapter I intend to show that Aristotle was well aware thathe had not proved the Eternity of the Universe. He was notmistaken in this respect. He knew that he could not prove histheory, and that his arguments and proofs were only apparent andplausible. They are the least objectionable, according toAlexander; but, according to the same authority, Aristotle couldnot have considered them conclusive, after having himself taughtus the rules of logic, and the means by which arguments can berefuted or confirmed.
The reason why I have introduced this subject is this : Laterphilosophers, disciples of Aristotle, assume that he has proved theEternity of the Universe, and most of those who believe that theyare philosophers blindly follow him in this point, and accept all hisarguments as conclusive and absolute proofs. They consider itwrong to differ from Aristotle, or to think that he was ignorant ormistaken in anything. For this reason, taking their standpoint, Ishow that Aristotle himself did not claim to have proved theEternity of the Universe. He says in his book Physics (viii., chap.i.) as follows :" All the Physicists before us believed that motion iseternal, except Plato, who holds that motion is transient; accordingto his opinion the heavens are likewise transient." Now if Aristotlehad conclusive proofs for his theory, he would not have consideredit necessary to support it by citing the opinions of precedingPhysicists, nor would he have found it necessary to point out thefolly and absurdity of his opponents. For a truth, once establishedby proof, does neither gain force nor certainty by the consent of allscholars, nor lose by the general dissent. We further find thatAristotle, in the book The Heavens and the World, introduces histheory of the Eternity of the Universe in the following manner:" Let us inquire into the nature of the heavens, and see whether theyare the product of something or not, destructible or not." After thisstatement of the problem, he proceeds to cite the views of thosewho hold that the heavens have had a beginning, and continuesthus :" By doing this, our theory will be most plausible andacceptable in the opinion of profound thinkers; and it will be themore so, when, as we propose, the arguments of our opponents arefirst heard. For if we were to state our opinion and our argumentswithout mentioning those of our opponents, our words would bereceived less favourably. He who desires to be just must not showhimself hostile to his opponent; he must have sympathy with him,and readily acknowledge any truth contained in his words; he mustadmit the correctness of such of his opponent's arguments as hewould admit if they were in his own favour!' This is the contents ofthe words of Aristotle. Now, I ask you, men of intelligence, can wehave any complaint against him after this frank statement ? Or canany one now imagine that a real proof has been given for theEternity of the Universe ? Or can Aristotle, or any one else, believethat a theorem, though fully proved, would not be acceptableunless the arguments of the opponents were fully refuted ? Wemust also take into consideration that Aristotle describes thistheory as his opinion, and his proofs as arguments. Is Aristotleignorant of the difference between argument and proof? betweenopinions, which may be received more or less favourably, andtruths capable of demonstration ? or would rhetorical appeal to theimpartiality of opponents have been required for the support of histheory if a real proof had been given ? Certainly not. Aristotle onlydesires to show that his theory is better than those of hisopponents, who hold that philosophical speculation leads to theconviction that the heavens are transient, but have never beenentirely without existence: or that the heavens have had abeginning, but are indestructible; or to defend any of the otherviews mentioned by him. In this he is undoubtedly right; for hisopinion is nearer the truth than theirs, so far as a proof can betaken from the nature of existing things: we differ from him, aswill be explained. Passion, that exercises great influence in mostof the different sects, must have influenced even the philosopherswho wished to affirm that Aristotle demonstrated his theory byproof. Perhaps they really believe it, and assume that Aristotlehimself was not aware of it, as it was only discovered after hisdeath ! My conviction is, that what Aristotle says on the Eternity ofthe Universe, the cause of the variety in the motion of the spheresand the order of the Intelligences, cannot be proved, and thatAristotle never intended to prove these things. I agree with himthat the ways of proving this theory have their gates closed beforeus, there being no foundation on which to build up the proof. Hiswords on this subject are well known. He says," There are thingsconcerning which we are unable to reason, or which we find toohigh for us: to say why these things have a certain property is asdifficult as to decide whether the Universe is eternal or not." So farAristotle. The interpretation which Abu-nasr offers of this parallelis well known. He denies that Aristotle had any doubt about theEternity of the Universe, and is very severe upon Galen, whomaintains that this theory is still doubtful, and that no proof hasbeen offered. According to Abu-nasr, it is clear and demonstrableby proof that the heavens are eternal, but all that is enclosed withinthe heavens is transient. We hold, that by none of the methodsmentioned in this chapter can a theory be established, refuted, orshaken.
We have mentioned these things only because we know that themajority of those who consider themselves wise, although theyknow nothing of science, accept the theory of the Eternity of theUniverse on the authority of famous scholars. They reject thewords of the prophets, because the latter do not employ anyscientific method by which only a few persons would be instructedwho are intellectually well prepared, but simply communicate thetruth as received by Divine inspiration.
In the chapters which follow we will expound the theory of theCreation in accordance with the teaching of Scripture.
CHAPTER XVI
IN this chapter I will first expound my view on this question, andthen support it by argument-not by such arguments as those of theMutakallemim, who believe that they have proved the Crtatio exnihilo. I will not deceive myself, and consider dialectical methodsas proofs: and the fact that a certain proposition has been provedby a dialectical argument win never induce me to accept thatproposition, but, on the contrary, will weaken my faith in it, andcause me to doubt it. For when we understand the fallacy of aproof, our faith in the proposition itself is shaken. It is thereforebetter that a proposition which cannot be demonstrated be receivedas an axiom, or that one of the two opposite solutions of theproblem be accepted on authority. The methods by which theMutakallemirn proved the Crtatio ex nihilo have already beendescribed by me, and I have exposed their weak points. As to theproofs of Aristotle and his followers for the Eternity of theUniverse, they are, according to my opinion, not conclusive; theyare open to strong objections, as will be explained. I intend toshow that the theory of the Creation, as taught in Scripture,contains nothing that is impossible; and that all thosephilosophical arguments which seem to disprove our view containweak points which make them inconclusive, and render the attackson our view untenable. Since I am convinced of the correctness ofmy method, and consider either of the two theories-viz., theEternity of the Universe, and the Creation-as admissible, I acceptthe latter on the authority of Prophecy, which can teach thingsbeyond the reach of philosophical speculation. For the belief inprophecy is, as will be shown in the course of this treatise,consistent even with the belief in the Eternity of the Universe.When I have established the admissibility of our theory, I will, byphilosophical reasoning, show that our theory of the Creation ismore acceptable than that of the Eternity of the Universe; andalthough our theory includes points open to criticism, I will showthat there are much stronger reasons for the rejection of the theoryof our opponents.
I will now proceed to expound the method by which the proofsgiven for the Eternity of the Universe can be refuted.
CHAPTER XVII
EVERYTHING produced comes into existence fromnon-existence; even when the substance of a thing has been inexistence, and has only changed its form, the thing itself, whichhas gone through the process of genesis and development, and hasarrived at its final state, has now different properties from thosewhich it possessed at the commencement of the transition frompotentiality to reality, or before that time. Take, e.g., the humanovum as contained in the female's blood when still included in itsvessels: its nature is different from what it was in the moment ofconception, when it is met by the semen of the male and begins todevelop: the properties of the semen in that moment are differentfrom the properties of the living being after its birth when fullydeveloped. It is therefore quite impossible to infer from the naturewhich a thing possesses after having passed through all stages ofits development, what the condition of the thing has been in themoment when this process commenced: nor does the condition ofa thing in this moment show what its previous condition has been.If you make this mistake, and attempt to prove the nature of athing in potential existence by its properties when actuallyexisting, you will fall into great confusion: you win reject evidenttruths and admit false opinions. Let us assume, in our aboveinstance, that a man born without defect had after his birth beennursed by his mother only a few months; the mother then died, andthe father alone brought him up in a lonely island, till he grew up,became wise, and acquired knowledge. Suppose this man hasnever seen a woman or any female being: he asks some personhow man has come into existence, and how he has developed, andreceives the following answer:" Man begins his existence in thewomb of an individual of his own class, namely, in the womb of afemale, which has a certain form. While in the womb he is verysmall; yet he has life, moves, receives nourishment, and graduallygrows, till he arrives at a certain stage of development. He thenleaves the womb and continues to grow till he is in the condition inwhich you see him." The orphan will naturally ask :" Did thisperson, when he lived, moved, and grew in the womb, eat anddrink, and breathe with his mouth and his nostrils ? Did he excreteany substance ?" The answer will be," No." Undoubtedly he willthen attempt to refute the statements of that person, and to provetheir impossibility, by referring to the properties of a fullydeveloped person, in the following manner:" When any one of usis deprived of breath for a short time he dies, and cannot move anylonger: how then can we imagine that any one of us has beeninclosed in a bag in the midst of a body for several months andremained alive, able to move ? If any one of us would swallow aliving bird, the bird would die immediately when it reached thestomach, much more so when it came to the lower part of thebelly; if we should not take food or drink with our mouth, in a fewdays we should undoubtedly be dead: how then can man remainalive for months without taking food ? If any person would takefood and would not be able to excrete it, great pains and deathwould follow in a short time, and yet I am to believe that man haslived for months without that function! Suppose by accident a holewere formed in the belly of a person, it would prove fatal, and yetwe are to believe that the navel of the foetus has been open! Whyshould the foetus not open the eyes, spread forth the bands andstretch out the legs, if, as you think, the limbs are all whole andperfect." This mode of reasoning would lead to the conclusion thatman cannot come into existence and develop in the mannerdescribed.
If philosophers would consider this example well and reflect on it,they would find that it represents exactly the dispute betweenAristotle and ourselves. We, the followers of Moses, our Teacher,and of Abraham, our Father, believe that the Universe has beenproduced and has developed in a certain manner, and that it hasbeen created in a certain order. The Aristotelians oppose us, andfound their objections on the properties which the things in theUniverse possess when in actual existence and fully developed.We admit the existence of these properties, but hold that they areby no means the same as those which the things possessed in themoment of their production; and we hold that these propertiesthemselves have come into existence from absolute non-existence.Their arguments are therefore no objection whatever to our theory:they have demonstrative force only against those who hold that thenature of things as at present in existence proves the Creation. Butthis is not my opinion.I will now return to our theme, viz., to the description of theprincipal proofs of Aristotle, and show that they prove nothingwhatever against us, since we hold that God brought the entireUniverse into existence from absolute non-existence, and that Hecaused it to develop into the present state. Aristotle says that themateria prima is eternal, and by referring to the properties oftransient beings he attempts to prove this statement, and to showthat the materia prima could not possibly have been produced. Heis right; we do not maintain that the materia prima has beenproduced in the same manner as man is produced from the ovum,and that it can be destroyed in the same manner as man is reducedto dust. But we believe that God created it from nothing, and thatsince its creation it has its own properties, viz., that all things areproduced of it and again reduced to it, when they cease to exist;that it does not exist without Form; and that it is the source of allgenesis and destruction. Its genesis is not like that of the thingsproduced from it, nor its destruction like theirs: for it has beencreated from nothing, and if it should please the Creator, He mightreduce it to absolutely nothing. The same applies to motion.Aristotle founds some of his proofs on the fact that motion is notsubject to genesis or destruction. This is correct: if we considermotion as it exists at present, we cannot imagine that in its totalityit should be subject, like individual motions, to genesis anddestruction. In like manner Aristotle is correct in saying thatcircular motion is without beginning, in so far as seeing therotating spherical body in actual existence, we cannot conceive theidea that that rotation has ever been absent. The same argument weemploy as regards the law that a state of potentiality precedes allactual genesis. This law applies to the Universe as it exists atpresent, when everything produced originates in another thing: butnothing perceived with our senses or comprehended in our mindcan prove that a thing created from nothing must have beenpreviously in a state of potentiality. Again, as regards the theorythat the heavens contain no opposites [and are thereforeindestructible], we admit its correctness: but we do not maintainthat the production of the heavens has taken place in the same wayas that of a horse or ass, and we do not say that they are Eke plantsand animals, which are destructible on account of the oppositeelements they contain. In short, the properties of things when fullydeveloped contain no clue as to what have been the properties ofthe things before their perfection. We therefore do not reject asimpossible the opinion of those who say that the heavens wereproduced before the earth, or the reverse, or that the heavens haveexisted without stars, or that certain species of animals have beenin existence, and others not. For the state of the whole Universewhen it came into existence may be compared with that of animalswhen their existence begins: the heart evidently precedes thetesticles, the veins are in existence before the bones: although,when the animal is fully developed, none of the parts is missingwhich is essential to its existence. This remark is not superfluous,if the Scriptural account of the Creation be taken literally; inreality, it cannot be taken literally, as will be shown when we shalltreat of this subject.
The principle laid down in the foregoing must be well understood;it is a high rampart erected round the Law, and able to resist allmissiles directed against it. Aristotle, or rather his followers, mayperhaps ask us how we know that the Universe has been created:and that other forces than those it has at present were acting in itsCreation, since we hold that the properties of the Universe, as itexists at present, prove nothing as regards its creation ? We reply,there is no necessity for this according to our plan; for we do notdesire to prove the Creation, but only its possibility: and thispossibility is not refuted by arguments based on the nature of thepresent Universe, which we do not dispute. When we haveestablished the admissibility of our theory, we shall then show itssuperiority. In attempting to prove the inadmissibility of Creatio exnihilo, the Aristotelians can therefore not derive any support fromthe nature of the Universe: they must resort to the notion our mindhas formed of God. Their proofs include the three methods which Ihave mentioned above, and which are based on the notionconceived of God. In the next chapter I will expose the weakpoints of these arguments, and show that they really prove nothing.
CHAPTER XVIII
THiz first method employed by the philosophers is this: theyassume that a transition from potentiality to actuality would takeplace in the Deity itself, if He produced a thing only at a certainfixed time. The refutation of this argument is very easy. Theargument applies only to bodies composed of substance-theelement that possesses the possibility [of change] -- and form; forwhen such a body does not act for some time, and then acts byvirtue of its form, it must undoubtedly have possessed somethingin potentia that hath now become actual, and the transition canonly have been effected by some external agent. As far ascorporeal bodies are concerned, this has been fully proved. Butthat which is incorporeal and without substance does not includeanything merely possible; everything it contains is always inexistence. The above argument does not apply to it, and it is notimpossible that such a being acts at one time and does not act atanother. This does not imply a change in the incorporeal beingitself nor a transition from potentiality to actuality. The ActiveIntellect may be taken as an illustration. According to Aristotleand his school, the Active Intellect, an incorporeal being, acts atone time and does not act at another, as has been shown byAbu-nasr in his treatise on the Intellect. He says there quitecorrectly as follows :" It is an evident fact that the Active Intellectdoes not act continually, but only at times." And yet he does notsay that the Active Intellect is changeable, or passes from a state ofpotentiality to that of actuality, although it produces at one timesomething which it has not produced before. For there is norelation or comparison whatever between corporeal andincorporeal beings, neither in the moment of action nor in that ofinaction. It is only by homonymity that the term" action" is usedin reference to the forms residing in bodies, and also in referenceto absolutely spiritual beings. The circumstance that a purelyspiritual being does not effect at one time that which it effects atanother, does not necessitate a transition from potentiality toactuality: such a transition is necessary in the case of forcesconnected with bodies. It might, perhaps, be objected that ourargument is, to some extent, a fallacy; since it is not due toanything contained in the Active Intellect itself, but to the absenceof substances sufficiently prepared for its action, that at times itdoes not act: it does act always when substances sufficientlyprepared are present, and, when the action does not continue, it isowing to the absence of substance sufficiently prepared, and not toany change in the Intellect. I answer that it is not our intention tostate the reason why God created at one time and not at another:and, in referring to the Active Intellect as a parallel, we do notmean to assert that God acts at one time and not at another, in thesame manner as the Active Intellect, an absolutely spiritual being,acts intermittently. We do not make this assertion, and, if we did,the conclusion would be fallacious. What we infer, and what weare justified in inferring, is this: the Active Intellect is neither acorporeal object nor a force residing in a body: it actsintermittently, and yet whatever the cause may be why it does notalways act, we do not say that the Active Intellect has passed froma state of potentiality to that of actuality: or that it implies thepossibility [of change], or that an agent must exist that causes thetransition from potentiality to actuality. We have thus refuted thestrong objection raised by those who believe in the Eternity of theUniverse: since we believe that God is neither a corporeal body nora force residing in a body, we need not assume that the Creation,after a period of inaction, is clue to a change in the CreatorHimself.
The second method employed in proving the Eternity of theUniverse is based on the theory that all wants, changes, andobstacles are absent from the Essence of God. Our refutation ofthis proof, which is both difficult and profound, is this. Everybeing that is endowed with free will and performs certain acts inreference to another being, necessarily interrupts those acts at onetime or another, in consequence of some obstacles or changes.E.g., a person desires to have a house, but he does not build one,because he meets with some obstacles: he has not the material, orhe has the material, but it is not prepared for the purpose onaccount of the absence of proper instruments; or he has materialand instruments, and yet does not build a house, because he doesnot desire to build it: since he feels no want for a refuge. Whenchanged circumstances, as heat or cold, impel him to seek arefuge, then he desires to build a house. Thus changedcircumstances change his will, and the will, when it meets withobstacles, is not carried into effect. This, however, is only the casewhen the causes of the actions are external: but when the actionhas no other purpose whatever than to fulfil the will, then the willdoes not depend on the existence of favourable circumstances. Thebeing endowed with this will need not act continually even in theabsence of all obstacles, because there does not exist anything forthe sake of which it acts, and which, in the absence of allobstacles, would necessitate the action: the act simply follows thewill. But, some might ask, even if we admit the correctness of allthis, is not change imputed in the fact that the will of the beingexists at one time and not at another ? I reply thus : The trueessence of the will of a being is simply the faculty of conceiving adesire at one time and not conceiving it at another. In the case ofcorporeal beings, the will which aims at a certain external objectchanges according to obstacles and circumstances. But the will ofan absolutely spiritual being which does not depend on externalcauses is unchangeable, and the fact that the being desires onething one day and another thing another day, does not imply achange in the essence of that being, or necessitate the existence ofan external cause [for this change in the desire]. Similarly it hasbeen shown by us that if a being acted at one time and did not actat another, this would not involve a change in the being itself. It isnow clear that the term" will" is homonymously used of man'swill and of the will of God, there being no comparison whateverbetween God's will and that of man. The objection is refuted, andour theory is not shaken by it. This is all we desire to establish.
The third method employed in proving the Eternity of the Universeis this : whatever the wisdom of God finds necessary to produce isproduced eo ipso: but this wisdom, being His Essence, is eternal,and that which results from His wisdom must be eternal. This is avery weak argument. As we do not understand why the wisdom ofGod produced nine spheres, neither more nor less, or why He fixedthe number and size of the stars exactly as they are; so we cannotunderstand why His wisdom at a certain time caused the Universeto exist, whilst a short time before it had not been in existence. Allthings owe their existence to His eternal and constant wisdom, butwe are utterly ignorant of the ways and methods of that wisdom,since, according to our opinion [that God has no attributes], Hiswill is identical with His wisdom, and all His attributes are oneand the same thing, namely, His Essence or Wisdom. More will besaid on this question in the section on Providence. Thus thisobjection to our theory falls likewise to the ground.
There is no evidence for the theory of the Eternity of the Universe,neither in the fact cited by Aristotle of the general consent of theancient peoples when they describe the heavens as the habitationof the angels and of God, nor in the apparent concurrence ofScriptural texts with this belief. These facts merely prove that theheavens lead us to believe in the existence of the Intelligences, i.e.,ideals and angels, and that these lead us to believe in the existenceof God; for He sets them in motion, and rules them. We willexplain and show that there is no better evidence for the existenceof a Creator, as we believe, than that furnished by the heavens: butalso according to the opinion of the philosophers, as has beenmentioned by us, they give evidence that a being exists that setsthem in motion, and that this being is neither a corporeal body nora force residing in a body.
Having proved that our theory is admissible, and not impossible, asthose who defend the Eternity of the Universe assert, I will, in thechapters which follow, show that our theory is preferable from aphilosophical point of view, and expose the absurdities implied inthe theory of Aristotle.
CHAPTER XIX
IT has been shown that according to Aristotle, and according to allthat defend his theory, the Universe is inseparable from God; He isthe cause, and the Universe the effect; and this effect is anecessary one: and as it cannot be explained why or how Godexists in this particular manner, namely, being One andincorporeal, so it cannot be asked concerning the whole Universewhy or how it exists in this particular way. For it is necessary thatthe whole, the cause as well as the effect, exist in this particularmanner, it is impossible for them not to exist, or to be differentfrom what they actually arc. This leads to the conclusion that thenature of everything remains constant, that nothing changes itsnature in any way, and that such a change is impossible in anyexisting thing. It would also follow that the Universe is not theresult of design, choice, and desire; for if this were the case, theywould have been non-existing before the design had beenconceived.
We, however, hold that all things in the Universe are the result ofdesign, and not merely of necessity; He who designed them maychange them when He changes His design. But not every design issubject to change; for there are things which are impossible, andtheir nature cannot be altered, as will be explained. Here, in thischapter, I merely wish to show by arguments almost as forcible asreal proofs, that the Universe gives evidence of design: but I willnot fall into the error in which the Mutakallemim have so muchdistinguished themselves, namely, of ignoring the existing natureof things or assuming the existence of atoms, or the successivecreation of accidents, or any of their propositions which I havetried to explain, and which are intended to establish the principleof Divine selection. You must not, however, think that theyunderstood the principle in the same sense as we do, although theyundoubtedly aimed at the same thing, and mentioned the samethings which we also will mention, when they treated of DivineSelection. For they do not distinguish between selection in the caseof a plant to make it red and not white, or sweet and not bitter, anddetermination in the case of the heavens which gave them theirpeculiar geometrical form and did not give them a triangular orquadrilateral shape. The Mutakal lemim established the principleof determination by means of their propositions, which have beenenumerated above (Part I., chap. lxxiii.). I will establish thisprinciple only as far as necessary, and only by philosophicalpropositions based on the nature of things. But before I begin myargument, I will state the following facts: Matter is common tothings different from each other; there must be either one externalcause which endows this matter partly with one property, partlywith another, or there must be as many different causes as thereare different forms of the matter common to all things. This isadmitted by those who assume the Eternity of the Universe. Afterhaving premised this proposition, I will proceed with thediscussion of our theme from an Aristotelian point of view, inform of a dialogue.
We.--You have proved that all things in the sublunary world haveone common substance; why then do the species of things vary ?why are the individuals in each species different from each other ?Aristotelian. -- Because the composition of the things formed ofthat substance varies. For the common substance at first receivedfour different forms, and each form was endowed with twoqualities, and through these four qualities the substance was turnedinto the elements of which all things are formed. The compositionof the elements takes place in the following manner :-First they aremixed in consequence of the motion of the spheres, and then theycombine together; a cause for variation arises then in the variationof the degree of heat, cold, moisture, and dryness of the elementswhich form the constituent parts of the things. By these differentcombinations things are variously predisposed to receive differentforms: and these in their turn are again prepared to receive otherforms, and so on. Each generic form finds a wide sphere in itssubstance both as regards quality and quantity: and the individualsof the classes vary accordingly. This is fully explained in NaturalScience. It is quite correct and clear to every one that readilyacknowledges the truth, and does not wish to deceive himself.
We. -- Since the combination of the elements prepares substancesand enables them to receive different forms, what has prepared thefirst substance and caused one part of it to receive the form of fire,another part the form of earth, and the parts between these two theforms of water and of air, since one substance is common to all ?Through what has the substance of earth become more fit for theform of earth, and the substance of fire more fit for that of fire ?
Ar. -- The difference of the elements was caused by their differentposition for the different places prepared the same substancedifferently, in the following way : the portion nearest thesurrounding sphere became more rarified and swifter in motion,and thus approaching the nature of that sphere, it received by thispreparation the form of fire. The farther the substance is awayfrom the surrounding sphere towards the centre, the denser, themore solid, and the less luminous it is; it becomes earth; the sameis the cause of the formation of water and air. This is necessarilyso: for it would be absurd to deny that each part of the substance isin a certain place: or to assume that the surface is identical withthe centre, or the centre with the surface. This difference in placedetermined the different forms, i.e., predisposed the substance toreceive different forms.
We. -- Is the substance of the surrounding sphere, i.e., the heavens,the same as that of the elements ?
Ar. -- No; the substance is different, and the forms are different.The term" body" is homonymously used of these bodies belowand of the heavens, as has been shown by modern philosophers.All this has been demonstrated by proof.
But let now the reader of this treatise hear what I have to say.Aristotle
bass proved that the difference of forms becomes evidentby the difference of
actions. Since, therefore, the motion of theelements is rectilinear, and that
of the spheres circular, we inferthat the substances are different. This
inference is supported byNatural Science. When we further notice that
substances withrectilinear motion differ in their directions, that some
moveupward, some downward, and that substances which move in thesame direction
have different velocities, we infer that their formsmust be different. Thus we
learn that there are four elements. Inthe same way we come to the conclusion
that the substance of allthe spheres is the same, since they all have circular
motion. Theirforms, however, are different, since one sphere moves from cast
towest, and another from west to east; and their motions have alsodifferent
velocities. We can now put the following question toAristotle: There is one
substance common to all spheres: each onehas its own peculiar form. Who thus
determined and predisposedthese spheres to receive different forms ? Is there
above thespheres any being capable of determining this except God ? I willshow
the profundity and the extraordinary acumen which Aristotledisplayed when this
question troubled him. He strove very hard tomeet this objection with
arguments, which, however, were notborne out by facts. Although he does not
mention this objection, itis clear from his words that he endeavours to show
the nature ofthe spheres, as he has shown that of the things in the
sublunaryworld. Everything is, according to him, the result of a law ofNature,
and not the result of the design of a being that designs as itlikes, or the
determination of a being that determines as it pleases.He has not carried out
the idea consistently, and it will never bedone. He tries indeed to find the
cause why the sphere moves fromeast and not from west; why some spheres move
with greatervelocity, others with less velocity, and he finds the cause of
thesedifferences in their different positions in reference to theuppermost
sphere. He further attempts to show why there areseveral spheres for each of
the seven planets, while there is onlyone sphere for the large number of fixed
stars. For all this heendeavours to state the reason, so as to show that the
whole orderis the necessary result of the laws of Nature. He has not
attainedhis object. For as regards the things in the sublunary world,
hisexplanations are in accordance with facts, and the relation betweencause and
effect is clearly shown. It can therefore be assumed thateverything is the
necessary result of the motions and influences ofthe spheres. But when he
treats of the properties of the spheres, hedoes not clearly show the causal
relation, nor does he explain thephenomena in that systematic way which the
hypothesis of naturallaws would demand. For let us consider the spheres : in
one cage asphere with greater velocity is above a sphere with less velocity,
inanother case we notice the reverse: in a third case there are twospheres with
equal velocities, one above the other. There are,besides, other phenomena which
speak strongly against thehypothesis that all is regulated by the laws of
Nature, and I willdevote a special chapter to the discussion of these
phenomena. Inshort, there is no doubt that Aristotle knew the weakness of
hisarguments in tracing and describing the cause of all these things,and
therefore he prefaces his researches on these things asfollows:-" We will
now thoroughly investigate two problems,which it is our proper duty to
investigate and to discuss accordingto our capacity, wisdom, and opinion. This
our attempt must not beattributed to presumption and pride, but to our
extraordinary zealin the study of philosophy; when we attempt the highest
andgrandest problems, and endeavour to offer some proper solution,every one
that hears it should rejoice and be pleased." So farAristotle. This shows
that he undoubtedly knew the weakness ofhis theory. How much weaker must it appear
when we bear inmind that the science of Astronomy was not yet fully
developed,and that in the days of Aristotle the motions of the spheres werenot
known so well as they are at present. I think that it was theobject of
Aristotle in attributing in his Metaphysics oneIntelligence to every sphere, to
assume the existence of somethingcapable of determining the peculiar course of
each sphere. Lateron I will show that he has not gained anything thereby; but
now 1will explain the words," according to our capacity, wisdom,
andopinion," occurring in the passage which we quoted. I have notnoticed
that any of the commentators explain them. The term" ouropinion"
refers to the principle that everything is the result ofnatural laws, or to the
theory of the Eternity of the Universe. By"our wisdom" he meant the
knowledge of that which is clear andgenerally accepted, viz., that the
existence of every one of thesethings is due to a certain cause, and not to
chance. By" ourcapacity" he meant the insufficiency of our intellect
to find thecauses of all these things. He only intended to trace the causes
fora few of them; and so he did. For he gives an excellent reason whythe sphere
of the fixed stars moves slowly, while the other spheresmove with greater
velocity, namely, because its motion is in adifferent direction [from the
uppermost sphere]. He further saysthat the more distant a sphere is from the
eighth sphere the greateris its velocity. But this rule does not hold good in
all cases, as Ihave already explained
According to our theory of the Creation, all this can easily beexplained; for we say that there is a being that determines thedirection and the velocity of the motion of each sphere: but we donot know the reason why the wisdom of that being gave to eachsphere its peculiar property. If Aristotle had been able to state thecause of the difference in the motion of the spheres, and show thatit corresponded as he thought to their relative positions, this wouldhave been excellent, and the variety in their motions would beexplained in the same way as the variety of the elements, by theirrelative position between the centre and the surface: but this is notthe case, as I said before.
There is a phenomenon in the spheres which more dearly showsthe existence of voluntary determination; it cannot be explainedotherwise than by assuming that some being designed it: thisphenomenon is the existence of the stars. The fact that the sphereis constantly in motion, while the stars remain stationary, indicatesthat the substance of the stars is different from that of the spheres.Abu-nasr has already mentioned the fact in his additions to thePhysics of Aristotle. He says :" There is a difference between thestars and the spheres: for the spheres are transparent, the stars areopaque: and the cause of this is that there is a difference, howeversmall it may be, between their substances and forms." So farAbu-nasr. But I do not say that there is a small difference, but avery great difference: because I do not infer it from thetransparency of the spheres, but from their motions. I amconvinced that there are three different kinds of substance, withthree different forms, namely:--(1) Bodies which never move oftheir own accord; such are the bodies of the stars: (2) bodies whichalways move, such are the bodies of the spheres: (3) bodies whichboth move and rest, such are the elements. Now, I ask, what hasunited these two bodies, which, according to my opinion, differvery much from each other, though, according to Abu-nasr, only alittle ? Who has prepared the bodies for this union ? In short, itwould be strange that, without the existence of design, one of twodifferent bodies should be joined to the other in such a manner thatit is fixed to it in a certain place but does not combine with it. It isstill more difficult to explain the existence of the numerous stars inthe eighth sphere: they are all spherical; some of them are large,some small; here we notice two stars apparently distant from eachother one cubit: there a group of ten close together; whilst inanother place there is a large space without any star. Whatdetermined that the one small part should have ten stars, and theother portion should be without any star ? and the whole body ofthe sphere being uniform throughout, why should a particular staroccupy the one place and not another? The answer to these andsimilar questions is very difficult, and almost impossible, if weassume that all emanates from God as the necessary result ofcertain permanent laws, as Aristotle holds. But if we assume thatall this is the result of design, there is nothing strange orimprobable: and the only question to be asked is this : What is thecause of this design ? The answer to this question is that all thishas been made for a certain purpose, though we do not know it;there is nothing that is done in vain, or by chance. It is well knownthat the veins and nerves of an individual dog or ass are not theresult of chance: their magnitude is not determined by chance: noris it by chance, but for a certain purpose, that one vein is thick,another thin: that one nerve has many branches, another has none:that one goes down straight, whilst another is bent; it is wellknown that all this must be just as it is. How, then, can anyreasonable person imagine that the position, magnitude, andnumber of the stars, or the various courses of their spheres, arepurposeless, or the result of chance ? There is no doubt that everyone of these things is necessary and in accordance with a certaindesign: and it is extremely improbable that these things should bethe necessary result of natural laws, and not that of design.
The best proof for design in the Universe I find in the differentmotions of the spheres, and in the fixed position of the stars in thespheres. For this reason you find all the prophets point to thespheres and stars when they want to prove that there must exist aDivine Being. Thus Abraham reflected on the stars, as is wellknown: Isaiah (Xl. 26) exhorts to learn from them the existence ofGod, and says," Lift up your eyes on high, and behold who hathcreated these things ?" Jeremiah [calls God]" The Maker of theheavens" : Abraham calls Him" The God of the heavens" (Gen.xxiv. 7): [Moses], the chief of the Prophets, uses the phraseexplained by us (Part L, chap. lxx.)," He who rideth on theheavens" (Dent. xxxiii. 26). The proof taken from the heavens isconvincing: for the variety of things in the sublunary world, thoughtheir substance is one and the same, can be explained as the workof the influences of the spheres, or the result of the variety in theposition of the substance in relation to the spheres, as has beenshown by Aristotle. But who has determined the variety in thespheres and the stars, if not the Will of God ? To say that theIntelligences have determined it is of no use whatever: for theIntelligences are not corporeal, and have no local relation to thespheres. Why then should the one sphere in its desire to approachthe Intelligence, move eastward, and another westward ? Is the oneIntelligence in the east, the other in the west ? or why does onemove with great velocity, another slowly ? This difference is not inaccordance with their distances from each other, as is well known.We must then say that the nature and essence of each spherenecessitated its motion in a certain direction, and in a certainmanner, as the consequence of its desire to approach itsIntelligence. Aristotle clearly expresses this opinion. We thus havereturned to the part from which we started: and we ask, Since thesubstance of all things is the same, what made the nature of oneportion different from another ? Why has this sphere a desirewhich produces a motion different from that which the desire ofanother sphere produces ? This must have been done by an agentcapable of determining. We have thus been brought to examinetwo questions :-- (1) Is it necessary to assume that the variety ofthe things in the Universe is the result of Design, and not of fixedlaws of Nature, or is it not necessary ? (2) Assuming that all this isthe result of Design, does it follow that it has been created afternot having existed, or does Creatio ex nihilo not follow, and hasthe Being which has determined all this done always so ? Some ofthose who believe in the Eternity of the Universe hold the lastopinion. I will now begin the examination of these two questions,and explain them as much as necessary in the following chapters.
CHAPTER XX
ACCORDING to Aristotle, none of the products of Nature are dueto chance. His proof is this : That which is due to chance does notreappear constantly nor frequently, but all products of Naturereappear either constantly or at least frequently. The heavens, withall that they contain, are constant: they never change, as has beenexplained, neither as regards their essence nor as regards theirplace. But in the sublunary world we find both things which areconstant and things which reappear frequently [though notconstantly]. Thus, e.g., the heat of fire and the downward tendencyof a stone are constant properties, whilst the form and life of theindividuals in each species are the same in most cases. All this isclear. If the parts of the Universe are not accidental, how can thewhole Universe be considered as the result of chance ? Thereforethe existence of the Universe is not due to chance. The followingis, in short, the objection which Aristotle raises against one of theearlier philosophers who assumed that the Universe is the result ofchance, and that it came into existence by itself, without any cause
Some assume that the heavens and the whole Universe came intoexistence spontaneously, as well as the rotation and motion [of thespheres], which has produced the variety of things and establishedtheir present order. This opinion implies a great adsurdity. Theyadmit that animals and plants do not owe their existence orproduction to chance, but to a certain cause, be that cause Nature,or reason, or the like: e.g., they do not assume that everythingmight be formed by chance of a certain seed or semen, but that ofa certain seed only an olive-tree is produced, and of a certainsemen only a human being is developed. And yet they think thatthe heavens, and those bodies which appear divine among the restof bodies, came into existence spontaneously, without the action ofany such cause as produces plants and animals. Having thusexamined this theory, Aristotle then proceeds to refute it at greaterlength. It is therefore clear that Aristotle believes and proves thatthings in real existence are not accidental: they cannot beaccidental, because they are essential, i.e., there is a cause whichnecessitates that they should be in their actual condition, and onaccount of that cause they are just as they in reality are. This hasbeen proved, and it is the opinion of Aristotle. But I do not thinkthat, according to Aristotle, the rejection of the spontaneous originof things implies the admission of Design and Will. For as it isimpossible to reconcile two opposites, so it is impossible toreconcile the two theories, that of necessary existence by causality,and that of Creation by the desire and will of a Creator. For thenecessary existence assumed by Aristotle must be understood inthis sense, that for everything that is not the product of work theremust be a certain cause that produces it with its properties: for thiscause there is another cause, and for the second a third, and so on.The series of causes ends with the Prime Cause, from whicheverything derives existence, since it is impossible that the seriesshould continue ad infinitum. He nevertheless does not mean tosay that the existence of the Universe is the necessary product ofthe Creator, i.e., the Prime Cause, in the same manner as theshadow is caused by a body, or heat by fire, or light by the sun.Only those who do not comprehend his words attribute such ideasto him. He uses here the term necessary in the same sense as weuse the term when we say that the existence of the intellectusnecessarily implies that of the intellectum, for the former is theefficient cause of the latter in so far as intellectum. Even Aristotleholds that the Prime Cause is the highest and most perfectIntellect; he therefore says that the First Cause is pleased, satisfied,and delighted with that which necessarily derives existence fromHim, and it is impossible that He should wish it to be different.But we do not call this" design," and it has nothing in commonwith design. E.g., man is pleased, satisfied, and delighted that he isendowed with eyes and hands, and it is impossible that he shoulddesire it to be otherwise, and yet the eyes and hands which a manhas are not the result of his design, and it is not by his owndetermination that he has certain properties and is able to performcertain actions. The notion of design and determination appliesonly to things not yet in existence, when there is still thepossibility of their being in accordance with the design or not. I donot know whether the modern Aristotelians understood his wordsto imply that the existence of the Universe presupposes somecause in the sense of design and determination, or whether, inopposition to him, they assumed design and determination, in thebelief that this does not conflict with the theory of the Eternity ofthe Universe.
Having explained this, I will now proceed to examine the opinionsof the modern philosophers.
CHAPTER XXI
SOME of the recent philosophers who adhere to the theory of theEternity of the Universe hold that God produces the Universe, thatHe by His will designs and determines its existence and form: theyreject, however, the theory that this act took place at one certaintime, and assume that this always has been the case, and willalways be so. The circumstance that we cannot imagine an agentotherwise than preceding the result of its action, they explain bythe fact that this is invariably the case in all that we produce:because for agents of the same kind as we are, there are somemoments in which they are not active, and are only agents inpotentia: they become agents when they act. But as regards Godthere are no moments of nonaction, or of potentiality in anyrespect; He is not before His work, He is always an actual agent.And as there is a great difference between His essence and ours, sois also a great difference between the relation of His work to Himand the relation of our work to us. They apply the same argumentto will and determination; for there is no difference in this respectwhether we say He acts, wills, designs, or determines. They furtherassume that change in His action or will is inadmissible. It istherefore clear that these philosophers abandoned the term"necessary result," but retained the theory of it: they perhaps soughtto use a better expression, or to remove an objectionable term. Forit is the same thing, whether we say in accordance with the view ofAristotle that the Universe is the result of the Prime Cause, andmust be eternal as that Cause is eternal, or in accordance withthese philosophers that the Universe is the result of the act, design,will, selection, and determination of God, but it has always beenso, and will always be so; in the same manner as the rising of thesun undoubtedly produces the day, and yet it does not precede it.But when we speak of design we do not mean it in this sense: wemean to express by it that the Universe is not the" necessaryresult" of God's existence, as the effect is the necessary result ofthe efficient cause: in the latter case the effect cannot be separatedfrom the cause: it cannot change unless the cause changes entirely,or at least in some respect. If we accept this explanation we easilysee how absurd it is to say that the Universe is in the same relationto God as the effect is to the efficient cause, and to assume at thesame time that the Universe is the result of the action anddetermination of God.
Having fully explained this subject, we come to the questionwhether the cause, which must be assumed for the variety ofproperties noticed in the heavenly beings, is merely an efficientcause, that must necessarily produce that variety as its effect, orwhether that variety is due to a determining agent, such as webelieve, in accordance with the theory of Moses our Teacher.Before I discuss this question I will first explain fully whatAristotle means by" necessary result" : after that I will show bysuch philosophical arguments as are free from every fallacy why Iprefer the theory of Creatio ex nihilo. It is dear that when he saysthat the first Intelligence is the necessary result of the existence ofGod, the second Intelligence the result of the existence of the first,the third of the second [and so on], and that the spheres are thenecessary result of the existence of the Intelligences, and so forth,in the well-known order which you learnt from passages dealingwith it, and of which we have given a resume in this part (ch. iv.)-- he does not mean that the one thing was first in existence, andthen the second came as the necessary result of the first: he deniesthat any one of these beings has had a beginning. By" necessaryresult" he merely refers to the causal relation: he means to say thatthe first Intelligence is the cause of the existence of the second: thesecond of the third, and so on to the last of the Intelligences: andthe same is also the case as regards the spheres and the materiaprima: none of these preceded another, or has been in existencewithout the existence of that other. We say, e.g., that the necessaryresult of the primary qualities are roughness [and] smoothness,hardness [and] softness, porosity and solidity: and no persondoubts that heat, cold, moisture, and dryness are the causes ofsmoothness and roughness, of hardness and softness, porosity andsolidity, and similar qualities, and that the latter are the necessaryresult of those four primary qualities. And yet it is impossible thata body should exist with the primary qualities without thesecondary ones: for the relation between the two sets of qualities isthat of causality, not that of agent and its product. just in the sameway the term" necessary result" is used by Aristotle in referenceto the whole Universe, when he says that one portion is the resultof the other, and continues the series up to the First Cause as hecalls it, or first Intellect, if you prefer this term. For we all meanthe same, only with this difference, that according to Aristotleeverything besides that Being is the necessary result of the latter,as I have already mentioned: whilst, according to our opinion, thatBeing created the whole Universe with design and will, so that theUniverse which had not been in existence before, has by His willcome into existence. I will now begin in the following chapters myproofs for the superiority of our theory, that of Creatio ex nihilo.
CHAPTER XXII
ARISTOTLE and all philosophers assume as an axiom that asimple element can only produce one simple thing, whilst acompound can produce as many things as it contains simpleelements; e.g., fire combines in itself two properties, heat anddryness: it gives heat by the one property, and produces dryness bythe other: an object composed of matter and form produces certainthings on account of its matter, and others on account of its form,if [both matter and form] consist of several elements. Inaccordance with this axiom, Aristotle holds that the directemanation from God must be one simple Intelligence, and nothingelse.
A second axiom assumed by him is this: Things are not producedby other things at random; there must be some relation betweencause and effect. Thus accidents are not produced by accidentspromiscuously; quality cannot be the origin of quantity, norquantity that of quality; a form cannot emanate from matter, normatter from form.
A third axiom is this : A single agent that acts with design andwill, and not merely by the force of the laws of Nature, canproduce different objects.
A fourth axiom is as follows: An object, whose several elementsare only connected by juxtaposition, is more properly a compoundthan an object whose different elements have entirely combined:e.g., bone, flesh, veins, or nerves, are more simple than the hand orthe foot, that are a combination of bone, flesh, veins, and nerves.This is very clear, and requires no further explanation. Havingpremised these axioms, I ask the following question: Aristotleholds that the first Intelligence is the cause of the second, thesecond of the third, and so on, till the thousandth, if we assume aseries of that number. Now the first Intellect is undoubtedlysimple. How then can the compound form of existing things comefrom such an Intellect by fixed laws of Nature, as Aristotleassumes ? We admit all he said concerning the Intelligences, thatthe further they are away from the first, the greater is the variety oftheir compounds, in consequence of the larger number of theobjects comprehensible by the Intelligences: but even afteradmitting this, the question remains, By what law of Nature did thespheres emanate from the Intelligences ? What relation is therebetween material and immaterial beings ? Suppose we admit thateach sphere emanates from an Intelligence of the form mentioned;that the Intelligence, including, as it were, two elements, in so faras it comprehends itself and another thing, produces the nextIntelligence by the one element, and a sphere by the other; but thequestion would then be, how the one simple element couldproduce the sphere, that contains two substances and two forms,namely, the substance and the form of the sphere, and also thesubstance and the form of the star fixed in that sphere. For,according to the laws of Nature, the compound can only emanatefrom a compound. There must therefore be one element, fromwhich the body of the sphere emanates, and another element, fromwhich the body of the star emanates. This would be necessary evenif the substance of all stars were the same; but it is possible thatthe luminous stars have not the same substance as thenon-luminous stars; it is besides well known that each body has itsown matter and its own form. It must now be clear that thisemanation could not have taken place by the force of the laws ofNature, as Aristotle contends. Nor does the difference of themotions of the spheres follow the order of their positions: andtherefore it cannot be said that this difference is the result ofcertain laws of Nature. We have already mentioned this (ch. xix.).
There is in the properties of the spheres another circumstance thatis opposed to the assumed laws of Nature; namely, if the substanceof all spheres is the same, why does it not occur that the form ofone sphere combines with the substance of another sphere, as isthe case with things on earth, simply because their substance is fit[for such changes] ? If the substance of all spheres is the same, if itis not assumed that each of them has a peculiar substance, and if,contrary to all principles, the peculiar motion of each sphere is noevidence for the special character of its substance, why thenshould a certain form constantly remain united with a certainsubstance ? Again, if the stars have all one substance, by what arethey distinguished from each other ? is it by forms ? or byaccidents ? Whichever be the case, the forms or the accidentswould interchange, so that they would successively unite withevery one of the stars, so long as their substance [being the same]admits the combinations [with every one of the forms or theaccidents]. This shows that the term substance, when used of thespheres or the stars, does not mean the same as it signifies whenused of the substance of earthly things, but is applied to the twosynonymously. It further shows that every one of the bodies of thespheres has its own peculiar form of existence different from thatof all other beings. Why then is circular motion common to allspheres, and why is the fixed position of the stars in theirrespective spheres common to all stars ? If we, however, assumedesign and determination of a Creator, in accordance with Hisincomprehensible wisdom, all these difficulties disappear. Theymust arise when we consider the whole Universe, not as the resultof free will, but as the result of fixed laws of Nature: a theorywhich, on the one hand, is not in harmony with the existing orderof things, and does not offer for it a sufficient reason or argument;and, on the other hand, implies many and great improbabilities.For, according to this theory God, whose perfection in everyrespect is recognised by all thinking persons, is in such relation tothe Universe that He cannot change anything; if He wished tomake the wing of a fly longer, or to reduce the number of the legsof a worm by one, He could not accomplish it. According toAristotle, He does not try such a thing, and it is wholly impossiblefor Him to desire any change in the existing order of things: if Hecould, it would not increase His perfection: it might, on thecontrary, from some point of view, diminish it.
Although I know that many partial critics will ascribe my opinionconcerning the theory of Aristotle to insufficient understanding, orto intentional opposition, I will not refrain from stating in short theresults of my researches, however poor my capacities may be. Ihold that the theory of Aristotle is undoubtedly correct as far as thethings are concerned which exist between the sphere of the moonand the centre of the earth. Only an ignorant person rejects it, or aperson with preconceived opinions of his own, which he desires tomaintain and to defend, and which lead him to ignore clear facts.But what Aristotle says concerning things above the sphere of themoon is, with few exceptions, mere imagination and opinion; to astill greater extent this applies to his system of Intelligences, and tosome of his metaphysical views: they include greatimprobabilities, [promote] ideas which all nations consider asevidently corrupt, and cause views to spread which cannot beproved.
It may perhaps be asked why I have enumerated all the doubtswhich can be raised against the theory of Aristotle: whether bymere doubts a theory can be overthrown, or its oppositeestablished ? This is certainly not the case. But we treat thisphilosopher exactly as his followers tell us to do. For Alexanderstated that when a theory cannot be established by proof, the twomost opposite views should be compared as to the doubtsentertained concerning each of them, and that view which admitsof fewer doubts should be accepted. Alexander further says thatthis rule applies to all those opinions of Aristotle in Metaphysicsfor which he offered no proof. For those that followed Aristotlebelieved that his opinions are far less subject to doubt than anyother opinion. We follow the same rule. Being convinced that thequestion whether the heavens are eternal or not cannot be decidedby proof, neither in the affirmative nor in the negative, we haveenumerated the objections raised to either view, and shown howthe theory of the Eternity of the Universe is subject to strongerobjections, and is more apt to corrupt the notions concerning God[than the other]. Another argument can be drawn from the fact thatthe theory of the Creation was held by our Father Abraham, and byour Teacher Moses.
Having mentioned the method of testing the two theories by theobjections raised against them, I find it necessary to give somefurther explanation of the subject.
CHAPTER XXIII
IN comparing the objections raised against one theory with thoseraised against the opposite theory, in order to decide in favour ofthe least objectionable, we must not consider the number of theobjections, but the degree of improbability and of deviation fromreal facts [pointed out by the objections]: for one objection maysometimes have more weight than a thousand others. But thecomparison cannot be trustworthy unless the two theories beconsidered with the same interest, and if you are predisposed infavour of one of them, be it on account of your training or becauseof some advantage, you are too blind to see the truth. For thatwhich can be demonstrated you cannot reject, however much youmaybe inclined against it; but in questions like those underconsideration you are apt to dispute [in consequence of yourinclination). You will, however, be able to decide the question, asfar as necessary, if you free yourself from passions, ignorecustoms, and follow only your reason. But many are the conditionswhich must be fulfilled. First you must know your mentalcapacities and your natural talents: you will find this out when youstudy all mathematical sciences, and are well acquainted withLogic. Secondly, you must have a thorough knowledge of NaturalScience, that you may be able to understand the nature of theobjections. Thirdly, you must be morally good. For if a person isvoluptuous or passionate, and, loosening the reins, allows hisanger to pass the just limits, it makes no difference whether he isso from nature or from habit, he will blunder and stumble in hisway, he will seek the theory which is in accordance with hisinclinations. I mention this lest you be deceived; for a personmight some day, by some objection which he raises, shake yourbelief in the theory of the Creation, and then easily mislead you:you would then adopt the theory [of the Eternity of the Universe)which is contrary to the fundamental principles of our religion, andleads to" speaking words that turn away from God." You mustrather have suspicion against your own reason, and accept thetheory taught by two prophets who have laid the foundation for theexisting order in the religious and social relations of mankind.Only demonstrative proof should be able to make you abandon thetheory of the Creation: but such a proof does not exist in Nature.
You will not find it strange that I introduce into this discussionhistorical matter in support of the theory of the Creation, seeingthat Aristotle, the greatest philosopher, in his principal works,introduces histories in support of the theory of the Eternity of theUniverse. In this regard we may justly quote the saying:" Shouldnot our perfect Law be as good as their gossip ?" (B. T. Bababatra, 115 b). When he supports his view by quoting Sabeanstories, why should we not support our view by that which Mosesand Abraham said, and that which follows from their words ?
I have before promised to describe in a separate chapter the strongobjections which must occur to him who thinks that humanwisdom comprehends fully the nature of the spheres and theirmotions: that these are subject to fixed laws, and capable of beingcomprehended as regards order and relation. I will now explainthis.
CHAPTER XXIV
You know of Astronomy as much as you have studied with me,and learnt from the book Almagest; we had not sufficient time togo beyond this. The theory that [the spheres] move regularly, andthat the assumed courses of the stars are in harmony withobservation, depends, as you are aware, on two hypotheses : wemust assume either epicycles, or excentric spheres, or acombination of both. Now I will show that each of these twohypotheses is irregular, and totally contrary to the results ofNatural Science. Let us first consider an epicycle, such as has beenassumed in the spheres of the moon and the five planets, rotatingon a sphere, but not round the centre of the sphere that carries it.This arrangement would necessarily produce a revolving motion;the epicycle would then revolve, and entirely change its place: butthat anything in the spheres should change its place is exactly whatAristotle considers impossible. For that reason Abu-bekribn-Alzaig, in an astronomical treatise which he wrote, rejects theexistence of epicycles. Besides this impossibility, he mentionsothers, showing that the theory of epicycles implies other absurdnotions. I will here explain them :-- (1) It is absurd to assume thatthe revolution of a cycle has not the centre of the Universe for itscentre: for it is a fundamental principle in the order of theUniverse that there are only three kinds of motion-from the centre,towards the centre, and round the centre: but an epicycle does notmove away from the centre, nor towards it, nor round it. (2) Again,according to what Aristotle explains in Natural Science, there mustbe something fixed round which the motion takes place: this is thereason why the earth remains stationary. But the epicycle wouldmove round a centre which is not stationary. I have heard thatAbu-bekr discovered a system in which no epicycles occur; butexcentric spheres are not excluded by him. I have not heard it fromhis pupils: and even if it be correct that he discovered such asystem, he has not gained much by it: for excentricity is likewiseas contrary as possible to the principles laid down by Aristotle. Forit seems to me that an excentric sphere does not move round thecentre of the Universe, but round an imaginary point distant fromthe centre, and therefore round a point which is not fixed. A personignorant of astronomy might think that the motion of the excentricspheres may still be considered as taking place round somethingfixed, since their centre is apparently within the sphere of themoon. I would admit this if the centre were situated in the regionof fire or air, although the spheres would not move round a stablepoint. But 1 will show that the amount of excentricity has, in acertain way, been described in the Almagest; and later scholarshave calculated the exact amount of excentricity in terms of radiiof the earth, and have proved the result. The same measure hasbeen used in astronomy in describing all distances and magnitudes.It has thu been shown that the point round which the sun moveslies undoubtedly beyond the sphere of the moon, and below thesuperficies of the sphere of Mercury. The centre for the circuit ofMars, that is, the centre of the excentric sphere of Mars, is beyondthe sphere of Mercury, and below the sphere of Venus. The centreof Jupiter has the same distance: it lies between the sphere ofVenus and that of Mercury, whilst the centre of Saturn liesbetween the spheres of Mars and Jupiter. Now, consider howimprobable all this appears according to the laws of NaturalScience. You will find it out when you consider the knowndistances and magnitudes of each sphere and each star, allexpressed in terms of the radii of the earth. There is a uniformmeasure for all, and the excentricity of each sphere is notdetermined by units proportionate to its own magnitude.
It is still more improbable and more objectionable to assume thatthere are two spheres, the one within the other; that these areclosely joined from all sides, and have, nevertheless, differentcentres. For in this case the smaller sphere might move whilst thelarger be at rest; but the smaller cannot be at rest when the largermoves, and must move with the larger when the latter rotatesround any other axis than that which passes through the twocentres. Now we have this proposition which can be proved; and,further, the established theory that there is no vacuum, and also theassumed excentricity of the spheres; from all this it follows that inevery two spheres the motion of the upper one should cause thelower sphere to move in the same way, and round the same centre.But this is not the case: the outer and the inner spheres do notmove in the same way, and not round the same centre or the sameaxis: each of them has its peculiar motion. For this reason it hasbeen assumed that between every two spheres there are substancesdifferent from those of the spheres. It may be very much doubtedwhether this is the case: for where should the centres of theseintermediate substances be placed ? have these substances likewisetheir own peculiar motion ? Thabith has explained theabove-mentioned theory in one of his treatises, and proved that wemust assume a substance of a spherical form intermediate betweenone sphere and the other. All this is part of that which I have notexplained to you when you studied with me, for I was afraid youmight become confused and would not understand even thosethings which I wished to show you. But as to the inclination andthe deviation assumed in respect to the latitude of the paths ofVenus and Mercury, I have already dearly shown you viva vocethat it is impossible to imagine material beings under suchconditions. You have seen that Ptolemy has already pointed outthis difficulty. He says as follows:" Let no one think that these andsimilar principles are improbable. If any one considers what wehave here expounded in the same light as he considers thingsproduced by skill and subtle work, he will find it improbable; butit is not right to compare human things to divine things." This is, asyou know, what Ptolemy says, and I have already pointed out toyou the passages by which you can verify all I said, except what Istated about the position of the centres of the excentric: spheres:for I have not heard that any one has paid attention to thisquestion. But you will understand it when you know the length ofthe diameter of each sphere, and the extent of its excentricity interms of radii of the earth, according to the facts which Kabici hasestablished in his treatise on the distances. When you notice thesedistances you will confirm my words.
Consider, therefore, how many difficulties arise if we accept thetheory which Aristotle expounds in Physics. For, according to thattheory, there are no epicycles, and no excentric spheres, but allspheres rotate round the centre of the earth ! How then can thedifferent courses of the stars be explained ? how is it possible toassume a uniform perfect rotation with the phenomena which weperceive, except by admitting one of the two hypotheses or both ofthem ? The difficulty is still more apparent when we find thatadmitting what Ptolemy said as regards the epicycle of the moon,and its inclination towards a point different both from the centre ofthe Universe and from its own centre, the calculations according tothese hypotheses are perfectly correct, within one minute: thattheir correctness is confirmed by the most accurate calculation ofthe time, duration, and extent of the eclipses, which is alwaysbased on these hypotheses. Furthermore, how can we reconcile,without assuming the existence of epicycles, the apparentretrogression of a star with its other motions ? How can rotation ormotion take place round a point which is not fixed ? These are realdifficulties.
I have explained to you already viva voce, that these difficulties donot concern the astronomer: for he does not profess to tell us theexisting properties of the spheres, but to suggest, whether correctlyor not, a theory in which the motion of the stars is circular anduniform, and yet in agreement with our observation. You knowthat Abu-bekr al-Zaig, in his treatise on Physics, expresses a doubtwhether Aristotle knew the excentricity of the sun but ignored it,and only discussed the effect of the inclination, because he sawthat the effect of the excentricity was identical with that of theinclination; or whether he did not perceive it. The truth is that hedid not notice it or hear of it: the science was not perfect in hisage. If he had heard of it, he would have strongly opposed it; if hehad been convinced of its correctness, he would have been greatlyembarrassed as regards all that he said on the question. What I saidbefore (ch. xxii.) 1 will repeat now, namely, that the theory ofAristotle, in explaining the phenomena in the sublunary world, isin accordance with logical inference: here we know the causalrelation between one phenomenon and another; we see how farscience can investigate them, and the management of nature isclear and intelligible. But of the things in the heavens man knowsnothing except a few mathematical calculations, and you see howfar these go. I say in the words of the poet," The heavens are theLord's, but the earth He hath given to the sons of man" (Ps. cxv.16): that is to say, God alone has a perfect and true knowledge ofthe heavens, their nature, their essence, their form, their motions,and their causes; but He gave man power to know the things whichare under the heavens: here is man's world, here is his home, intowhich he has been placed, and of which he is himself a portion.This is in reality the truth. For the facts which we require inproving the existence of heavenly beings are withheld from us: theheavens are too far from us, and too exalted in place and rank.Man's faculties are too deficient to comprehend even the generalproof the heavens contain for the existence of Him who sets themin motion. It is in fact ignorance or a kind of madness to weary ourminds with finding out things which are beyond our reach. withouthaving the means of approaching them. We must content ourselveswith that which is within our reach, and that which cannot beapproached by logical inference let us leave to him who has beenendowed with that great and divine influence, expressed in thewords:" Mouth to mouth do I speak with Him" (Num. xii. 8).
This is all I can say on this question; another person may perhapsbe able to establish by proof what appears doubtful to me. It is onaccount of my great love of truth that I have shown myembarrassment in these matters and I have not heard, nor do Iknow that any of these theories have been established by proof.
CHAPTER XXV
WE do not reject the Eternity of the Universe, because certainpassages in Scripture confirm the Creation; for such passages arenot more numerous than those in which God is represented as acorporeal being; nor is it impossible or difficult to find for them asuitable interpretation. We might have explained them in the samemanner as we did in respect to the Incorporeality of God. Weshould perhaps have had an easier task in showing that theScriptural passages referred to are in harmony with the theory ofthe Eternity of the Universe if we accepted the latter, than we hadin explaining the anthropomorphisms in the Bible when werejected the idea that God is corporeal. For two reasons, however,we have not done so, and have not accepted the Eternity of theUniverse. First, the Incorporeality of God has been demonstratedby proof: those passages in the Bible, which in their literal sensecontain statements that can be refuted by proof, must and can beinterpreted otherwise. But the Eternity of the Universe has notbeen proved; a mere argument in favour of a certain theory is notsufficient reason for rejecting the literal meaning of a Biblical text,and explaining it figuratively, when the opposite theory can besupported by an equally good argument.
Secondly, our belief in the Incorporeality of God is not contrary toany of the fundamental principles of our religion: it is not contraryto the words of any prophet. Only ignorant people believe that it iscontrary to the teaching of Scripture: but we have shown that thisis not the case: on the contrary, Scripture teaches theIncorporeality of God. If we were to accept the Eternity of theUniverse as taught by Aristotle, that everything in the Universe isthe result of fixed laws, that Nature does not change, and that thereis nothing supernatural, we should necessarily be in opposition tothe foundation of our religion, we should disbelieve all miraclesand signs, and certainly reject all hopes and fears derived fromScripture, unless the miracles are also explained figuratively. TheAllegorists amongst the Mohammedans have done this, and havethereby arrived at absurd conclusions. If, however, we accepted theEternity of the Universe in accordance with the second of thetheories which we have expounded above (ch. xxiii.), andassumed, with Plato, that the heavens are likewise transient, weshould not be in opposition to the fundamental principles of ourreligion: this theory would not imply the rejection of miracles, but,on the contrary, would admit them as possible. The Scriptural textmight have been explained accordingly, and many expressionsmight have been found in the Bible and in other writings thatwould confirm and support this theory. But there is no necessityfor this expedient, so long as the theory has not been proved. Asthere is no proof sufficient to convince us, this theory need not betaken into consideration, nor the other one: we take the text of theBible literally, and say that it teaches us a truth which we cannotprove: and the miracles are evidence for the correctness of ourview.
Accepting the Creation, we find that miracles are possible, thatRevelation is possible, and that every difficulty in this question isremoved. We might be asked, Why has God inspired a certainperson and not another ? Why has He revealed the Law to oneparticular nation, and at one particular time? why has Hecommanded this, and forbidden that ? why has He shown througha prophet certain particular miracles ? what is the object of theselaws ? and Why has He not made the commandments and theprohibitions part of our nature, if it was His object that we shouldlive in accordance with them ? We answer to all these questions:He willed it so; or, His wisdom decided so. just as He created theworld according to His will, at a certain time, in a certain form,and as we do not understand why His will or His wisdom decidedupon that peculiar form, and upon that peculiar time, so we do notknow why His will or wisdom determined any of the thingsmentioned in the preceding questions. But if we assume that theUniverse has the present form as the result of fixed laws, there isoccasion for the above questions: and these could only beanswered in an objectionable way, implying denial and rejection ofthe Biblical texts, the correctness of which no intelligent persondoubts. Owing to the absence of all proof, we reject the theory ofthe Eternity of the Universe: and it is for this very reason that thenoblest minds spent and will spend their days in research. For ifthe Creation had been demonstrated by proof, even if onlyaccording to the Platonic hypothesis, all arguments of thephilosophers against us would be of no avail. If, on the other hand,Aristotle had a proof for his theory, the whole teaching ofScripture would be rejected, and we should be forced to otheropinions. I have thus shown that all depends on this question. Noteit.
CHAPTER XXVI
IN the famous chapters known as the Chapters of Rabbi Eliezer, 1find R. Eliezer the Great saying something more extraordinarythan 1 have ever seen in the utterances of any believer in the Lawof Moses. 1 mean the following passage:" Whence were theheavens created ? He took part of the light of His garment,stretched it like a cloth, and thus the heavens were extendingcontinually, as it is said : He covereth Himself with light as with agarment, He stretcheth the heavens like a curtain" (Ps. civ. 2)."Whence was the earth created ? He took of the snow under thethrone of glory, and threw it; according to the words: He saith tothe snow, Be thou earth" (job xxxvii. 6). These are the wordsgiven there; and I, in my surprise, ask, What was the belief of thissage ? did he think that nothing can be produced from nothing, andthat a substance must have existed of which the things wereformed ? and did he for this reason ask whence were the heavensand the earth created ? What has he gained by the answer ? Wemight ask him, Whence was the light of His garment created ? orthe snow under the throne of His glory ? or the throne of gloryitself ? If the terms" the light of His garment" and" the throne ofglory" mean something eternal, they must be rejected; the wordswould imply an admission of the Eternity of the Universe, thoughonly in the form taught by Plato. The creation of the throne ofglory is mentioned by our Sages, though in a strange way: for theysay that it has been created before the creation of the Universe.Scripture, however, does not mention the creation of the throne,except in the words of David," The Lord hath established histhrone in the heavens" (Ps. ciii. 19), which words admit offigurative interpretation; but the eternity of the throne is distinctlydescribed," Thou, 0 Lord, dwellest for ever, thy throne for everand ever" (Lam. v. 19). Now, if R. Eliezer had believed that thethrone was eternal, so that the word" throne" expressed anattribute of God, and not something created, how could anythingbe produced of a mere attribute ? Stranger still is his expression"of the light of His garment."
In short, it is a passage that greatly confuses the notions of allintelligent and religious persons. I am unable to explain itsufficiently. I quoted it in order that you may not be misled by it.One important thing R. Eliezer taught us here, that the substanceof the heavens is different from that of the earth: that there are twodifferent substances : the one is described as belonging to God,being the light of His garment, on account of its superiority; andthe other, the earthly substance, which is distant from Hissplendour and light, as being the snow under the throne of Hisglory. This led me to explain the words," And under his feet as thework of the whiteness of the sapphire" (Exod. xxiv. 10), asexpressing that the nobles of the children of Israel comprehendedin a prophetical vision the nature of the earthly materia prima. For,according to Onkelos, the pronoun in the phrase," His feet," refersto" throne," as I have shown: this indicates that the whitenessunder the throne signifies the earthly substance. R. Eliczer has thusrepeated the same idea, and told us that there are two substancesahigher one, and a lower one; and that there is not one substancecommon to all things. This is an important subject, and we mustnot think light of the opinion which the wisest men in Israel haveheld on this point. It concerns an important point in explaining theexistence of the Universe, and one of the mysteries of the Law. InBereshit Rabba (chap. xii.) the following passage occurs:" R.Eliezer says, The things in the heavens have been created of theheavens, the things on earth of the earth." Consider howingeniously this sage stated that all things on earth have onecommon substance: the heavens and the things in them have onesubstance, different from the first. He also explains in the Chapters[of R. Eliezer), in addition to the preceding things, the superiorityof the heavenly substance, and its proximity to God; and, on theother hand, the inferiority of the earthly substance and its position.Note it.
CHAPTER XXVII
WE have already stated that the belief in the Creation is afundamental principle of our religion: but we do not consider it aprinciple of our faith that the Universe will again be reduced tonothing. It is not contrary to the tenets of our religion to assumethat the Universe will continue to exist for ever. It might beobjected that everything produced is subject to destruction, as hasbeen shown: consequently the Universe, having had a beginning,must come to an end. This axiom cannot be applied according toour views. We do not hold that the Universe came into existence,like all things in Nature, as the result of the laws of Nature. Forwhatever owes its existence to the action of physical laws is,according to the same laws, subject to destruction : the same lawwhich caused the existence of a thing after a period ofnon-existence, is also the cause that the thing is not permanent:since the previous non-existence proves that the nature of thatthing does not necessitate its permanent existence. According toour theory, taught in Scripture, the existence or non-existence ofthings depends solely on the will of God and not on fixed laws,and, therefore, it does not follow that God must destroy theUniverse after having created it from nothing. It depends on Hiswill. He may, according to His desire, or according to the decree ofHis wisdom, either destroy it, or allow it to exist, and it is thereforepossible that He will preserve the Universe for ever, and let it existpermanently as He Himself exists. It is well known that our Sagesnever said that the throne of glory will perish, although theyassumed that it has been created. No prophet or sage evermaintained that the throne of glory will be destroyed orannihilated: but, on the contrary, the Scriptural passages speak ofits permanent existence. We are of opinion that the souls of thepious have been created, and at the same time we believe that theyare immortal. Some hold, in accordance with the literal meaningof the Midrashim, that the bodies of the pious will also enjoyeverlasting happiness. Their notion is like the well-known belief ofcertain people, that there are bodily enjoyments in Paradise. Inshort, reasoning leads to the conclusion that the destruction of theUniverse is not a certain fact. There remains only the question asto what the prophets and our Sages say on this point; whether theyaffirm that the world will certainly come to an end, or not. Mostpeople amongst us believe that such statements have been made,and that the world will at one time be destroyed. I will show youthat this is not the case: and that, on the contrary, many passages inthe Bible speak of the permanent existence of the Universe. Thosepassages which, in the literal sense, would indicate the destructionof the Universe, are undoubtedly to be understood in a figurativesense, as will be shown. If, however, those who follow the literalsense of the Scriptural texts reject our view, and assume that theultimate certain destruction of the Universe is part of their faith,they are at liberty to do so. But we must tell them that the belief inthe destruction is not necessarily implied in the belief in theCreation; they believe it because they trust the writer, who used afigurative expression, which they take literally. Their faith,however, does not suffer by it.
CHAPTER XXVIII
MANY of our coreligionists thought that King Solomon believedin the Eternity of the Universe. This is very strange. How can wesuppose that any one that adheres to the Law of Moses, ourTeacher, should accept that theory ? if we were to assume thatSolomon has on this point, God forbid, deviated from the Law ofMoses, the question would be asked, Why did most of the Prophetsand of the Sages accept it of him ? Why have they not opposedhim, or blamed him for holding that opinion, as he has beenblamed for having married strange women, and for other things ?The reason why this has been imputed to him is to be found in thefollowing passage :" They desired to suppress the book Koheleth,because its words incline towards scepticism." It is undoubtedlytrue that certain passages in this book include, when takenliterally, opinions different from those taught in the Law, and theymust therefore be explained figuratively. But the theory of theEternity of the Universe is not among those opinions, the bookdoes not even contain any passage that implies this theory; muchless a passage in which it is clearly set forth. There are, however,in the book, some passages which imply the indestructibility of theUniverse, a doctrine that is true: and from the fact that theindestructibility of the Universe is taught in this book, somepersons wrongly inferred that the author believed in the Eternity ofthe Universe. The following are the words that refer to theindestructibility of the Universe:" And the earth remaineth forever." And those who do not agree with me as regards the abovedistinction [between the indestructibility and the Eternity of theUniverse], are compelled to explain the term le-'olam Qit.," forever" ), to mean 11 the time fixed for the existence of the earth."Similarly they explain the words of God," Yet all the days of theearth" (Gen. Viii. 22) to signify the days fixed for its existence.But I wonder how they would explain the words of David :" Helaid the foundations of the earth, that it should not be moved forever" (Ps. civ. 5). If they maintain here also that the term le-'olamva-'ed (lit." for ever" ) does not imply perpetuity, they must cometo the conclusion that God exists only for a fixed period, since thesame term is employed in describing the perpetuity of God," TheLord will reign (le-'olam) for ever" (Exod. xv. 18, or Ps. x. 16).We must, however, bear in mind that olam only signifiesperpetuity when it is combined with ad: it makes no differencewhether 'ad follows, as in 'olam va-'ed, or whether it precedes, asin 'ad 'olam. The words of Solomon which only contain the wordle-'olam, have therefore less force than the words of David, whouses the term olam va-'ed. David has also in other passages clearlyspoken of the incorruptibility of the heavens, the perpetuity andimmutability of their laws, and of all the heavenly beings. Hesays," Praise ye the Lord from the heavens, etc. For Hecommanded, and they were created. He hath also stablished themfor ever and ever; he hath made a decree which shall not pass" (Ps.cxlviii. 1-6): that is to say, there will never be a change in thedecrees which God made, or in the sources of the properties of theheavens and the earth, which the Psalmist has mentioned before.But he distinctly states that they have been created. For he says,"He hath commanded, and they were created." Jeremiah (xxxi. 35)likewise says," He giveth the sun for a light by day, and theordinances of the moon and of the stars for a light by night," etc."If these ordinances depart from before me, saith the Lord, then theseed of Israel also shall cease from being a nation before me forever." He thus declares, that these decrees will never be removed,although they had a beginning. We therefore find this idea, whenwe search for it, expressed not only by Solomon but also by others.Solomon himself has stated that these works of God, the Universe,and all that is contained in it, remain with their properties for ever,although they have been created. For he says," Whatsoever Goddoeth, it shall be for ever: nothing can be put to it, nor anythingtaken away from it" (Eccles. iii. 14). He declares in these wordsthat the world has been created by God and remains for ever. Headds the reason for it by saying," Nothing can be put to it, noranything taken from it:" for this is the reason for the perpetuity, asif he meant to say that things are changed in order to supply thatwhich is wanting, or in order to take away what is superfluous. Theworks of God being most perfect, admitting no addition ordeduction, must remain the same for ever. It is impossible thatanything should exist that could cause a change in them. In theconclusion of the verse, Solomon, as it were describes the purposeof exceptions from the laws of Nature, or an excuse for changes inthem, when he says," And God doeth it (viz., He performsmiracles) that men should fear before him." The words whichfollow," That which hath been is now; and that which is to be hathalready been, and God seeketh that which is pursued," contain theidea that God desires the perpetuity and continuity of the Universe.The fact that the works of God are perfect, admitting of noaddition or diminution, has already been mentioned by Moses, thewisest of all men, in the words:" The rock, His work is perfect"(Deut. xxxii. 14). All His works or creations are most perfect,containing no defect whatever, nothing superfluous, nor anythingunnecessary. Also whatever God decrees for those created things,and whatever He effects through them, is perfectly just, and is theresult of His wisdom, as will be explained in some chapters of thistreatise.
CHAPTER XXIX
IF we hear a person speaking whose language we do notunderstand, we undoubtedly know that he speaks, but do not knowwhat his words mean; it may even happen that we hear somewords which mean one thing in the tongue of the speaker, andexactly the reverse in our language, and taking the words in thesense which they have in our language, we imagine that thespeaker employed them in that sense. Suppose, e.g., an Arab hearsof a Hebrew the word abah, he thinks that the Hebrew relates howa man despised and refused a certain thing, whilst the Hebrew inreality says that the man was pleased and satisfied with it. Thevery same thing happens to the ordinary reader of the Prophets:some of their words he does not understand at all, like those towhom the prophet says (Isa. xxix. 11)," the vision of all is becomeunto you as the words of a book that is sealed" : in other passageshe finds the opposite or the reverse of what the prophet meant; tothis case reference is made in the words," Ye have perverted thewords of the living God" (Jer. xxiii. 36). Besides, it must be bornein mind that every prophet has his own peculiar diction, which is,as it were, his language, and it is in that language that the prophecyaddressed to him is communicated to those who understand it.After this preliminary remark you will understand the metaphorfrequently employed by Isaiah, and less frequently by otherprophets, when they describe the ruin of a kingdom or thedestruction of a great nation in phrases like the following :-" Thestars have fallen,"" The heavens are overthrown,"" The sun isdarkened,"" The earth is waste, and trembles," and similarmetaphors. The Arabs likewise say of a person who has met with aserious accident," His heavens, together with his earth, have beencovered" : and when they speak of the approach of a nation'sprosperity, they say," The light of the sun and moon hasincreased,"" A new heaven and a new earth has been created," orthey use similar phrases. So also the prophets, in referring to theruin of a person, of a nation, or of a country, describe it as theresult of God's great anger and wrath, whilst the prosperity of anation is the result of God's pleasure and satisfaction. In the formercase the prophets employ such phrases as" He came forth,"" camedown,"" roared,"" thundered," or" caused his voice to be heard" :also" He commanded,"" said,"" did,"" made," and the like, aswill be shown. Sometimes the prophets use the term" mankind"instead of" the people of a certain place," whose destruction theypredict: e.g., Isaiah speaking of the destruction of Israel says," Andthe Lord will remove man far away" (Isa. vi. 12). So alsoZephaniah (i. 3, 4)," And I will cut off man from off the earth. Iwill also stretch out mine hand upon Judah." Note this likewise.
Having spoken of the language of the prophets in general, I willnow verify and prove my statement. When Isaiah received thedivine mission to prophesy the destruction of the Babylonianempire, the death of Sermacherib and that of Nebuchadnezzar,who rose after the overthrow of Sennacherib, he commences in thefollowing manner to describe their fall and the end of theirdominion, their defeat, and such evils as are endured by all whoare vanquished and compelled to flee before the victorious sword[of the enemy] :" For the stars of heaven, and the constellationsthereof, shall not give their light: the sun is darkened in his goingforth, and the moon shall not cause her light to shine" (xiii. 10):again," Therefore I will shake the heavens, and the earth shallremove out of her place, in the wrath of the Lord of hosts, and inthe day of his fierce anger" (xiii. 13). I do not think that anyperson is so foolish and blind, and so much in favour of the literalsense of figurative and oratorical phrases, as to assume that at thefall of the Babylonian kingdom a change took place in the natureof the stars of heaven, or in the light of the sun and moon, or thatthe earth moved away from its centre. For all this is merely thedescription of a country that has been defeated: the inhabitantsundoubtedly find all light dark, and all sweet things bitter : thewhole earth appears too narrow for them, and the heavens arechanged in their eyes. He speaks in a similar manner when hedescribes the poverty and humiliation of the people of Israel, theircaptivity and their defeat, the continuous misfortunes caused bythe wicked Sennacherib when he ruled over all the fortified placesof Judah, or the loss of the entire land of Israel when it came intothe possession of Sermacherib. He says (xxiv. 17):" Fear, and thepit, and the snare, are upon thee, 0 inhabitant of the earth. And itshall come to pass, that he who fleeth from the noise of the fearshall fall into the pit; and he that cometh out of the midst of the pitshall be taken in the snare: for the windows from on high are open,and the foundations of the earth do shake. The earth is utterlybroken down, the earth is clean dissolved, the earth is movedexceedingly. The earth shall reel to and fro like a drunkard." At theend of the same prophecy, when Isaiah describes how God willpunish Sennacherib, destroy his mighty empire, and reduce him todisgrace, he uses the following figure (xxiv. 23):" Then the moonshall be confounded, and the sun ashamed, when the Lord of hostsshall reign," etc. This verse is beautifully explained by Jonathan,the son of Uzziel; he says that when Sermacherib will meet withhis fate because of Jerusalem, the idolaters will understand thatthis is the work of God; they will faint and be confounded. Hetherefore translates the verse thus:" Those who worship the moonwill be ashamed, and those who bow down to the sun will behumbled, when the kingdom of God shall reveal itself," etc. Theprophet then pictures the peace of the children of Israel after thedeath of Sennacherib, the fertility and the cultivation of their land,and the increasing power of their kingdom through Hezekiali. Heemploys here the figure of the increase of the light of the sun andmoon. When speaking of the defeated, he says that for them thelight of the sun and moon will be diminished and darkened: in thesame sense their light is said to increase for the victorious. We canfrequently notice the correctness of this figure of speech. Whengreat troubles befall us, our eyes become dim, and we cannot seeclearly because the spiritus visus is made turbid by the prevailingvapours, and is weakened and diminished by great anxiety andstraits of the soul: whilst in a state of gladness and comfort of thesoul the spiritus visus becomes dear, and man feels as if the lighthad increased. Thus the good tidings that the people shall dwell inZion, and in Jerusalem, and shall weep no more, etc., conclude inthe following manner :" Moreover, the light of the moon shall beas the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold,as the light of seven days, in the day that the Lord bindeth up -thebreaches of his people, and healeth the stroke of their wound" (Isa.xxx. 19, 26): that is to say, when God will raise them up again afterthey had fallen through the wicked Sennacherib. The, phrase" asthe light of seven days" signifies, according to the commentators," very great light" : for in this same sense the number" seven" isfrequently used in Hebrew. I think that reference is made by thisphrase to the seven days of the dedication of the temple in thereign of Solomon; for there was never a nation so great,prosperous, and happy in every respect, as Israel was at that time,and therefore the prophet says, that Israel's greatness and happinesswill be the same as it was in those seven days. Speaking of wickedEdom, Israel's oppressor, Isaiah says :" Their slain also shall becast out, and their stink shall come up out of their carcases, and themountains shall be melted with their blood. And all the host ofheaven shall be dissolved, and the heavens shall be rolled togetheras a scroll : and all their host shall fall down, as a leaf falleth offfrom the vine, and as a fig falleth from the fig-tree. For my swordshall be bathed in heaven; behold, I shall come down uponIdumea, and upon the people of my curse, to judgment," etc. (Isa.xxxiv. 3-5). Will any person who has eyes to see find in theseverses any expression that is obscure, or that might lead him tothink that they contain an account of what will befall the heavens ?or anything but a figurative description of the ruin of the Edomites,the withdrawal of God's protection from them, their decline, andthe sudden and rapid fall of their nobles ? The prophet means tosay that the individuals, who were like stars as regards theirpermanent, high, and undisturbed position, will quickly comedown, as a leaf falleth from the vine, and as a fig falling from thefig-tree. This is self-evident; and there would be no need tomention it, much less to speak on it at length, had it not becomenecessary, owing to the fact that the common people, and evenpersons who are considered as distinguished scholars, quote thispassage without regarding its context or its purpose, [in support oftheir view of the future destruction of the heavens]. They believethat Scripture describes here what will, in future, happen to theheavens, in the same manner as it informs us how the heavenshave come into existence. Again, when Isaiah told the Israeliteswhat afterwards became a well-known fact-that Sennacherib, withhis allied nations and kings, would perish, and that the Israeliteswould be helped by God alone, he employed figurative language,and said:" See how the heavens decay and the earth withers away,and all beings on the earth die, and you are saved" : that is to say,those who have filled the earth, and have been considered, to usean hyperbole, as permanent and stable as the heavens, will quicklyperish and disappear like smoke: and their famous power, that hasbeen as stable as the earth, will be destroyed like a garment. Thepassage to which I refer begins:" For the Lord hath comfortedZion: He hath comforted all her waste places," etc." Hearken untome, my people," etc." My righteousness is near : my salvation isgone forth," etc. It continues thus :" Lift up your eyes to theheavens, and look upon the earth beneath: for the heavens shallvanish like smoke, and the earth shall wax old like a garment, andthey that dwell therein shall die in like manner; for my salvationshall be for ever, and my righteousness shall not be abolished" (Isa. li. 3-6). The restoration of the kingdom of Israel, its stabilityand permanence, is described as a creation of heaven and earth.For Isaiah frequently speaks of the land of a king as if it were thewhole Universe, as if heaven and earth belonged to him. Hetherefore comforts Israel and says: be hungry," etc. (ver. 13); (8)and moral improvement of our nation to such a degree that weshall be a blessing on the earth, and the previous troubles will beforgotten:" And he shall call his servants by another name: that hewho blesseth himself in the earth, shall bless himself in the God oftruth; and he that sweareth in the earth, shall swear by the God oftruth; because the former troubles are forgotten, and because theyare hid from mine eyes. For, behold, I create new heavens, and anew earth: and the former shall not be remembered, nor come intomind. But be ye glad and rejoice for ever in that which I create :for, behold, I create Jerusalem a rejoicing, and her people a joy.And I will rejoice in Jerusalem, and joy in my people," etc. (lxv.15-19). The whole subject must now be clear and evident; for thewords," I create new heavens, and a new earth," etc., are followedby the explanation," I create Jerusalem a rejoicing, and her peoplea joy," etc. The prophet then adds that the seed and name of Israelwill be as permanent as their faith and as the rejoicing in it, whichGod promised to create and to spread over the whole earth: forfaith in God and rejoicing in it are two possessions which, onceobtained, are never lost or changed. This is expressed in thewords:" For as the new heavens and the new earth, which I willmake, remain before me, saith the Lord, so shall your seed andyour name remain" (lxvi. 22). But of other nations, in someinstances, the seed remains, whilst the name has perished; so, e.g.,many people are of the seed of the Persians or Greeks, withoutbeing known by that special name; they bear the names of othernations, of which they form part. According to my opinion, wehave here a prophecy that our religion, which gives us our specialname, will remain permanently.
As these figures are frequent in Isaiah, I explained an of them. Butwe meet with them also in the words of other prophets. Jeremiah,in describing the destruction of Jerusalem in consequence of oursins, says (iv. 23) :" I beheld the earth, and, lo, it was withoutform, and void," etc. Ezekiel (xxxii. 7, 8) foretells the destructionof the kingdom of Egypt, and the death of Pharaoh, throughNebuchadnezzar, in the following words :" And when I shall putthee out, I will cover the heaven, and make the stars thereof dark; Iwill cover the sun with a cloud, and the moon shall not give herlight. All the bright lights of heaven will I make dark over thee,and set darkness upon thy land, saith the Lord." Joel, the son ofPethuel (ii. 10), describes the multitude of locusts that came in hisdays as follows :" The earth shall quake before them: the heavensshall tremble: the sun and the moon shall be dark, and the starsshall withdraw their shining." Amos (viii. 9, 10), speaking of thedestruction of Samaria, says:" I will cause the sun to go down atnoon, and I will darken the earth in the dear day; and I win turnyour feasts," etc. Micah (i. 3, 4), in relating the fall of Samaria,uses the following well-known rhetorical figures:" For, behold, theLord cometh forth out of his place, and will come down, and treadupon the high places of the earth. And the mountains shall bemolten," etc. Similarly Haggai (ii. 6, 7), in describing thedestruction of the kingdom of the Medes and Persians :" I willshake the heavens and the earth, and the sea, and the dry land: andI will shake all nations," etc. When [David] (Ps. lx. 4) describeshow, during the expedition of Joab against the Edomites, thenation was low and weak, and how he prayed to God for Hisassistance, he says:" Thou hast made the earth to tremble: thou hastbroken it : heal the breaches thereof: for it shaketh." In anotherinstance he expresses the idea that we need not fear when we seeother nations die and perish, because we rely on God's support, andnot on our sword and strength, in accordance with the words :" Apeople saved by the Lord, the shield of thy help" (Deut. xxxiii. 29):he says (Ps. xlvi. 2) :" Therefore will we not fear, though the earthbe removed, and though the mountains be shaken in the midst ofthe sea."
The following figurative language is employed in Scripture inreferring to the death of the Egyptians in the Red Sea :" Thewaters saw thee; they were afraid : the depths also were troubled,etc. The voice of thy thunder was in the heaven: the lightningslightened the world: the earth trembled and shook" (Ps. lxxvii.17-19)." Was the Lord displeased against the rivers ?" etc. (Hab.iii. 8)." There went up a smoke out of his nostrils," etc. (Ps. xviii.9)." The earth trembled," etc. (judges v. 4, in the Song ofDeborah). There are many other instances; but those which I havenot quoted can be explained in accordance with those which I havecited.
Let us now consider the words of Joel (iii. 3-5):" And I will showwonders in the heavens and in the earth, blood and fire, and pillarsof smoke. The sun shall be turned into darkness, and the moon intoblood, before the great and terrible day of the Lord come. And itshall come to pass, that whosoever shall call on the name of theLord shall be delivered, for in Mount Zion and in Jerusalem shallbe deliverance," etc. I refer them to the defeat of Sennacherib nearJerusalem; but they may be taken as an account of the defeat ofGog and Magog near Jerusalem in the days of the Messiah, if thisappears preferable, although nothing is mentioned in this passagebut great slaughter, destruction, fire, and the diminution of thelight of the two luminaries. You may perhaps object: How can theday of the fall of Sennacherib, according to our explanation, becalled" the great and the terrible day of the Lord ?" But you mustknow that a day of great salvation or of great distress is called" thegreat and terrible day of the Lord." Thus Joel (ii.11) says of the dayon which the locusts came over the land," For the day of the Lordis great and terrible, and who can abide it ?"
Our opinion, in support of which we have quoted these passages, isclearly established, namely, that no prophet or sage has everannounced the destruction of the Universe, or a change of itspresent condition, or a permanent change of any of its properties.When our Sages say," The world remains six thousand years, andone thousand years it will be waste," they do not mean a completecessation of existing things; the phrase" one thousand years it willbe waste" distinctly shows that time will continue: besides, this isthe individual opinion of one Rabbi, and in accordance with oneparticular theory. But on the other hand the words," There isnothing new under the sun" (Eccles. i. 9), in the sense that no newcreation takes place in any way and under any circumstances,express the general opinion of our Sages, and include a principlewhich every one of the doctors of the Mishnah and the Talmudrecognises and makes use of in his arguments. Even those whounderstand the words" new heavens and a new earth" in theirliteral sense hold that the heavens, which will in future be formed,have already been created and arc in existence, and that for thisreason the present tense 46 remain" is used, and not the future"will remain." They support their view by citing the text," There isnothing new under the sun." Do not imagine that this is opposed toour opinion. They mean, perhaps, to say that the natural laws, bywhich the promised future condition of Israel will be effected,have been in existence since the days of the Creation, and in thatthey are perfectly correct. When 1, however, said that no prophetever announced" a permanent change of any of its properties," Iintended to except miracles. For although the rod was turned into aserpent, the water into blood, the pure and noble hand into aleprous one, without the existence of any natural cause that couldeffect these or similar phenomena, these changes were -notpermanent, they have not become a physical property. On thecontrary, the Universe since continues its regular course. This ismy opinion; this should be our belief. Our Sages, however, saidvery strange things as regards miracles: they are found in BereshitRabba, and in Midrash Koheleth, namely, that the miracles are tosome extent also natural: for they say, when God created theUniverse with its present physical properties, He made it part ofthese properties, that they should produce certain miracles atcertain times, and the sign of a prophet consisted in the fact thatGod told him to declare when a certain thing will take place, butthe thing itself was effected according to the fixed laws of Nature.If this is really the meaning of the passage referred to, it testifies tothe greatness of the author, and shows that he held it to beimpossible that there should be a change in the laws of Nature, ora change in the will of God [as regards the physical properties ofthings] after they have once been established. He thereforeassumes, e.g., that God gave the waters the property of joiningtogether, and of flowing in a downward direction, and ofseparating only at the time when the Egyptians were drowned, andonly in a particular place. I have already pointed out to you thesource of this passage, and it only tends to oppose the hypothesisof a new creation. It is said there : R. Jonathan said, God made anagreement with the sea that it should divide before the Israelites:thus it is said," And the sea returned to its strength when themorning appeared" (Exod. xiv. 27). R. Jeremiah, son of Elazar,said: Not only with the sea, but with all that has been created in thesix days of the beginning [was the agreement made]: this isreferred to in the words," 1, even my hands have stretched out theheavens, and all their host have I commanded" (Isa. xlv. 12): i.e., Ihave commanded the sea to divide, the fire not to hurt Hananiah,Mishael, and Azariah, the lions not to harm Daniel, and the fish tospit out Jonah. The same is the case with the rest of the miracles.
We have thus clearly stated and explained our opinion, that weagree with Aristotle in one half of his theory. For we believe thatthis Universe remains perpetually with the same properties withwhich the Creator has endowed it, and that none of these will everbe changed except by way of miracle in some individual instances,although the Creator has the power to change the whole Universe,to annihilate it, or to remove any of its properties. The Universe,had, however, a beginning and commencement, for when nothingwas as yet in existence except God, His wisdom decreed that theUniverse be brought into existence at a certain time, that it shouldnot be annihilated or changed as regards any of its properties,except in some instances: some of these are known to us, whilstothers belong to the future, and are therefore unknown to us. Thisis our opinion and the basis of our religion. The opinion ofAristotle is that the Universe, being permanent and indestructible,is also eternal and without beginning. We have already shown thatthis theory is based on the hypothesis that the Universe is thenecessary result of causal relation, and that this hypothesisincludes a certain amount of blasphemy. Having come thus far wewill make in the next chapter a few remarks on passages in thefirst chapters of Genesis. For the primary object in this treatise hasbeen to expound as much as possible of the Scriptural account ofthe Creation (ma'aseh bereshit), and the description of theheavenly chariot (ma'aseh mercabah). But let us premise twogeneral observations.
First, the account given in Scripture of the Creation is not, as isgenerally believed, intended to be in all its parts literal. For if thiswere the case, wise men would not have kept its explanationsecret, and our Sages would not have employed figurative speech[in treating of the Creation] in order to hide its true meaning, norwould they have objected to discuss it in the presence of thecommon people. The literal meaning of the words might lead us toconceive corrupt ideas and to form false opinions about God, oreven entirely to abandon and reject the principles of our Faith. It istherefore right to abstain and refrain from examining this subjectsuperficially and unscientifically. We must blame the practice ofsome ignorant preachers and expounders of the Bible, who thinkthat wisdom consists in knowing the explanation of words, andthat greater perfection is attained by employing more words andlonger speech. It is, however, right that we should examine theScriptural texts by the intellect, after having acquired a knowledgeof demonstrative science, and of the true hidden meaning ofprophecies. But if one has obtained some knowledge in this matterhe must not preach on it, as I stated in my Commentary on theMishnah (Fiagigah, ii. 7), and our Sages said distinctly : From thebeginning of the book to this place - after the account of the sixthclay of the Creation-it is" the glory of God to conceal a thing"(Prov. XXV. 2).
We have thus dearly stated our opinion. It is, however, part of theDivine plan that every one who has obtained some perfectiontransmit it to some other persons, as will be shown in the chapteron Prophecy. It is, therefore, impossible for a scholar to possessknowledge of these problems, whether it be through his ownresearches or through his master's teaching, withoutcommunicating part of that knowledge to others; it cannot be donein dear words; it must be done sparingly byway of hints. We findin the words of some of our Sages numerous hints and notes of thiskind, but mixed up with the words of others and with othersubjects. In treating of these mysteries, as a rule, I quote as muchas contains the principal idea, and leave the rest for those who areworthy of it.
Secondly, the prophets employ homonymous terms and use wordswhich are not meant to be understood in their ordinarysignification, but are only used because of some other meaningwhich they admit, e.g.," a rod of an almond-tree (shaked),"because of the words which follow," for I will hasten (shaked)"(Jer. i. I 1, 12), as will be shown in the chapter on Prophecy.According to the same principle Ezekiel in the account of theDivine Chariot employs, as we have stated the term hashmal(Ezek. i. 4): also regel egel (v. 7), nehoshet kalal (v. 7), and similarterms: Zechariah (vi. 1) likewise adopts this method, and says Andthe mountains were mountains of nehoshet (brass)," anti the like.
After these two remarks I will proceed to the chapter which I havepromised.
CHAPTER XXX
THERE is a difference between first and beginning (or principle).The latter exists in the thing of which it is the beginning, orco-exists with it: it need not precede it: e.g., the heart is thebeginning of the living being; the element is the beginning of thatof which it is the basis. The term" first" is likewise applied tothings of this kind; but is also employed in cases where precedencein time alone is to be expressed, and the thing which precedes isnot the beginning (or the cause) of the thing that follows. E.g., wesay A. was the first inhabitant of this house, after him came B: thisdoes not imply that A is the cause of B inhabiting the house. InHebrew, tehillah is used in the sense of" first" : e.g., when Godfirst (tehillat) spake to Hosea (Hos. i. 1), and the" beginning" isexpressed by reshith, derived from rosh," head," the principal partof the living being as regards position. The Universe has not beencreated out of an element that preceded it in time, since time itselfformed part of the Creation. For this reason Scripture employs theterm" bereshit" (in a principle), in which the beth is a prepositiondenoting" in." The true explanation of the first verse of Genesis isas follows:" In [creating] a principle God created the beings aboveand the things below." This explanation is in accordance with thetheory of the Creation. We find that some of our Sages arereported to have held the opinion that time existed before theCreation. But this report is very doubtful, because the theory thattime cannot be imagined with a beginning, has been taught byAristotle, as I showed you, and is objectionable. Those who havemade this assertion have been led to it by a saying of one of ourSages in reference to the terms" one day .. .. a second day." Takingthese terms literally, the author of that saying asked, Whatdetermined" the first day," since there was no rotating sphere, andno sun ? and continues as follows : Scripture uses the term" oneday" : R. Jehudah, son of R. Simon, said:" Hence we learn that thedivisions of time have existed previously." R. Abahu said," Hencewe learn that God built worlds and again destroyed them." Thislatter exposition is still worse than the former. Consider thedifficulty which these two Rabbis found in the statement that timeexisted before the creation of the sun. We shall undoubtedly soonremove this difficulty, unless these two Rabbis intended to inferfrom the Scriptural text that the divisions of time must haveexisted before the Creation, and thus adopted the theory of theEternity of the Universe. But every religious man rejects this. Theabove saying is, in my opinion, certainly of the same character asthat of R. Eliezer," Whence were the heavens created," etc., (chap.xxvi.). In short, in these questions, do not take notice of theutterances of any person. I told you that the foundation of our faithis the belief that God created the Universe from nothing; that timedid not exist previously, but was created: for it depends on themotion of the sphere, and the sphere has been created.
You must know that the particle et in the phrase et ha-shamayimve-et ha-arez (" the heavens and the earth" ) signifies" togetherwith" : our Sages have explained the word in the same sense inmany instances. Accordingly they assume that God created withthe heavens everything that the heavens contain, and with the eartheverything the earth includes. They further say that thesimultaneous Creation of the heavens and the earth is implied inthe words," I call unto them, they stand up together" (Ps. xlviii.).Consequently, all things were created together, but were separatedfrom each other successively. Our Sages illustrated this by thefollowing simile : We sow various seeds at the same time; somespring forth after one day, some after two, and some after threedays, although all have been sown at the same time. According tothis interpretation, which is undoubtedly correct, the difficulty isremoved, which led R. jehudah, son of R. Simon, to utter theabove saying, and consisted in the doubt as to the thing by whichthe first day, the second, and the third were determined. InBereshit Rabba, our Sages, speaking of the light created on thefirst day according to the Scriptural account, say as follows: theselights [of the luminaries mentioned in the Creation of the fourthday] are the same that were created on the first day, but were onlyfixed in their places on the fourth day. The meaning [of the firstverse] has thus been clearly stated.
We must further consider that the term erez is a homonym, and isused in a general and a particular sense. It has a more generalsignification when used of everything within the sphere of themoon, i.e., of all the four elements; and is used in particular of oneof them, of the lowest, viz., earth. This is evident from the passage:" And the earth was without form and void, and darkness was onthe surface of the deep. And the wind of God moved upon the faceof the waters." The term" earth" [mentioned here, and in the firstverse] includes all the four elements, whilst further on it is said,"And God called the dry land Earth" (Gen. i. 10).
It is also important to notice that the words," And God called acertain thing a certain name," are invariably intended todistinguish one thing from others which are called by the samecommon noun. I explain, therefore, the first verse in Genesis thus :In creating the principle God created the things above and thosebelow. Erez in this verse denotes" the things below," or 11 thefour elements," and in the verse," And God called the dry landEarth" (erez), it signifies the element earth. This subject is nowmade clear.
The four elements indicated, according to our explanation, in theterm erez" earth," in the first verse, are mentioned first after theheavens: for there are named erez (earth), ruah (air), mayim(water), and hoshek (fire). By hoshek the element fire is meant,nothing else; comp." And thou heardest his words out of the midstof the fire" (Deut. iv. 36): and," When ye heard the voice out ofthe midst of the hosbek" (darkness) (ibid. V. 2): again," Allhosbek (darkness) shall be hid in his secret places : a fire notblown shall consume him" (job XX. 26). The element fire iscalled hosbek because it is not luminous, it is only transparent; forif it were luminous we should see at night the whole atmosphere inflames. The order of the four elements, according to the naturalposition is here described: namely, first earth, above it water, airclose to water, and fire above air; for by placing air over water,hoshek (fire), which is" upon the face of the deep," is undoubtedlyabove air. It was here necessary to use the term ruah elohim,because air is described here as in motion (merahelet), and themotion of the air is, as a rule, ascribed to God; comp." And therewent forth a wind from the Lord" (Num. xi- 31);" Thou didstblow with thy wind" (Exod * xv. 10):" And the Lord turned amighty strong west wind" (ibid. x. 19), and the like. As the firsthoshek, which denotes the element fire, is different from thehoshek mentioned further on in the sense of" darkness," the latteris explained and distinguished from the former, according to ourexplanation, in the words," And darkness he called Night." This isnow dear.
The phrase," And he divided between the waters," etc., does notdescribe a division in space, as if the one part were merely abovethe other, whilst the nature of both remained the same, but adistinction as regards their nature or form. One portion of thatwhich was first called water was made one thing by certainproperties it received, and another portion received a differentform, and this latter portion is that which is commonly calledwater and of this it is said," And the gathering of the waters hecalled Seas." Scripture even indicates that the first mayim ('Iwater" ) in the phrase," On the face of the waters," does not referto the waters which form the seas and that part of the element"water," having received a particular form, and being above the air,is distinguished from the other part which has received the form ofordinary water. For the words," And he divided between the waterswhich are beneath the firmament and the waters which are abovethe firmament are similar in meaning to the phrase," And Goddivided between the light and the darkness," and refer to adistinction by a separate form. The firmament itself was formed ofwater; and in the words of our Sages (Bereshit Rabba: cap. iv.),"The middle drop congealed and formed the heavens."
Here likewise Scripture says, in accordance with what I saidabove,
"And God called the firmament Heaven" (Gen. i. 8), in order toexplain the homonymity of the term shamayim (heaven), and toshow that shamayim in the first verse is not the firmament which isalso called shamayim (heaven). The difference is more clearlyexpressed in the words," In the open firmament of heaven" (ibid.i. 20): here it is shown that" firmament" (raki'a) and" heaven"(shamayim), are two different things. In consequence of thishomonymity of the term shamayim the term raki'a (firmament) isalso used of the true heaven, just as the real firmament issometimes called shamayim (heaven); comp." And God set themin the raki'a (firmament) of the heaven" (ibid. i. 17).
This verse shows clearly that the stars, the sun, and the moon arenot, as people believe, on the surface of the spheres, but they arefixed in the spheres, and this has been proved satisfactorily, therebeing no vacuum in the Universe: for it is said," in the firmamentof the heaven," and not" upon the firmament of the heaven?'
It is therefore clear that there has been one common element calledwater, which has been afterwards distinguished by three differentforms: one part forms the seas, another the firmament, and a thirdpart is over the firmament, and all this is separate from the earth.The Scriptural text follows here a peculiar method in order toindicate some extraordinary mysteries. It has also been declared byour Sages that the portion above the firmament is only water byname, not in reality, for they say (Babyl. Talmud, Hagigah 14b)"Four entered the paradise," etc. R. Akiba said to them," When youcome to the stores of pure marble, do not say, Water, water, for itis written, ' He that telleth lies shall not tarry in my sight '" (Ps. ci.7). Consider, if you belong to the class of thinking men, howclearly and distinctly this passage explains the subject for thosewho reflect on it! Understand that which has been proved byAristotle in his book. On Meteorology, and note whatever men ofscience have said on meteorological matters.
It is necessary to inquire into the reason why the declaration" thatit was good" is not found in the account of the second day of theCreation. The various Midrashic sayings of our Sages on this pointare well known: the best of them is the explanation that thecreation of the water was not completed on that day. According tomy opinion the reason is likewise clear, and is as follows : Whenthe creation of any part of the Universe is described that ispermanent, regular, and in a settled order, the phrase" that it isgood" is used. But the account of the firmament, with that whichis above it and is called water, is, as you see, of a very mysteriouscharacter. For if taken literally the firmament would appear at firstthought to be merely an imaginary thing, as there is no othersubstance but the elements between us and the lowest of theheavenly spheres, and there is no water above the air: and if thefirmament, with that which is over it, be supposed to be above theheavens, it would a fortiori seem to be unreal anduncomprehensible. But if the account be understood in a figurativesense and according to its true meaning, it is still more mysterious,since it was considered necessary to make this one of the mosthidden secrets, in order to prevent the multitude from knowing it.This being the case, how could it be said [of the creation of thesecond day]" that it was good" ? This phrase would tell us that itis perfectly dear what share the thing to which it refers takes in thepermanent existence of the Universe. But what good can peoplefind in a thing whose real nature is hidden, and whose apparentnature is not real ? Why, therefore, should it be said in reference toit," that it was good" ? I must, however, give the followingadditional explanation. Although the result of the second day'screation forms an important element among the existing things, thefirmament was not its primary object in the organization of theUniverse, and therefore it could not be said" that it was good" : itwas only the means for the uncovering of the earth. Note this. OurSages have already explained that the herbs and trees, which Godcaused to spring forth from the ground, were caused by God togrow, after He had sent down rain upon them; and the passagebeginning," And there went up a mist from the earth" (ii. 6), refersto that which took place before the creative act, related in thewords," Let the earth bring forth grass," etc. (i. ii.). ThereforeOnkelos translates it:" And there had gone up a mist from theearth?' It is also evident from the text itself, where it is distinctlysaid," And every plant in the field before it was in the earth," etc.(ii. 5). This question is now explained.
It is well known to every philosopher that the principal causes ofproduction and destruction, after the influence of the spheres, arelight and darkness, in so far as these are accompanied by heat andcold. For by the motion of the spheres the elements intermix, andby light and darkness their constitution changes. The first changeconsists in the formation of two kinds of mist; these are the firstcauses of meteorological phenomena, such as rain: they alsocaused the formation of minerals, of plants, of animals, and at lastof man. It is likewise known that darkness is the natural propertyof all things on earth; in them light is accidental, coming from anexternal cause, and therefore everything remains in a state of restin the absence of light. The Scriptural account of the Creationfollows in every respect exactly the same order, without anydeviation.
Note also the saying of our Sages:" When the Universe wascreated, all things were created with size, intellect, and beautyfully developed, i.e., everything was created perfect in magnitudeand form, and endowed with the most suitable properties: the wordzibyonam (their beauty) used here has the same meaning as zebi, 'glory '" (Ezek. xx. 6). Note this likewise, for it includes a principlefully established.
The following point now claims our attention. The account of thesix days of creation contains, in reference to the creation of man,the statement :" Male and female created he them" (i. 27), andconcludes with the words:" Thus the heavens and the earth werefinished, and all the host of them" (ii. 1), and yet the portionwhich follows describes the creation of Eve from Adam, the treeof life, and the tree of knowledge, the history of the serpent andthe events connected therewith, and all this as having taken placeafter Adam had been placed in the Garden of Eden. All our Sagesagree that this took place on the sixth day, and that nothing newwas created after the close of the six days. None of the thingsmentioned above is therefore impossible, because the laws ofNature were then not yet permanently fixed. There are, however,some utterances of our Sages on this subject [which apparentlyimply a different view]. I will gather them from their differentsources and place them before you, and I will refer also to certainthings by mere hints, just as has been done by the Sages. I Youmust know that their words, which I am about to quote, are mostperfect, most accurate, and clear to those for whom they were said.I will therefore not add long explanations, lest I make theirstatements plain, and I might thus become" a revealer of secrets,"but I will give them in a certain order, accompanied with a fewremarks, which will suffice for readers like you.
One of these utterances is this :" Adam and Eve were at firstcreated as one being, having their backs united: they were thenseparated, and one half was removed and brought before Adam asEve." The term mizal'otav (lit." of his ribs" ) signifies" of hissides." The meaning of the word is proved by referring to :peba,"the side" of the tabernacle (Exod. XXVi. 20), which Onkelosrenders setar (" side" ), and so also mi-zal'otav is rendered by him"mi-sitrohi" (of his sides). Note also how clearly it has been statedthat Adam and Eve were two in some respects, and yet theyremained one, according to the words," Bone of my bones, andflesh of my flesh" (Gen. ii. 23). The unity of the two is proved bythe fact that both have the same name, for she is called ishshah(woman), because she was taken out of ish (man), also by thewords," And shall cleave unto his wife, and they shall be oneflesh" (ii. 24). How great is the ignorance of those who do not seethat all this necessarily includes some [other] idea [besides theliteral meaning of the words]. This is now clear.
Another noteworthy Midrashic remark of our Sages is thefollowing:
The serpent had a rider, the rider was as big as a camel, and it wasthe rider that enticed Eve: this rider was Samael." Samael is thename generally applied by our Sages to Satan. Thus they say inseveral places that Satan desired to entice Abraham to sin, and toabstain from binding Isaac, and he desired also to persuade Isaacnot to obey his father. At the same time they also say, in referenceto the same subject, viz., the Akedah (" the binding of Isaac"), thatSamael came to Abraham and said to him," What! hast thou, beingan old man, lost thy senses ?" etc. This shows that Samael andSatan are identical. There is a meaning in this name [Samael]), asthere is also in the name nahash (" serpent" ). In describing howthe serpent came to entice Eve, our sages say:" Samad was ridingon it, and God was laughing at both the camel and its rider." It isespecially of importance to notice that the serpent did notapproach or address Adam, but all his attempts were directedagainst Eve, and it was through her that the serpent caused injuryand death to Adam. The greatest hatred exists between the serpentand Eve, and between his seed and her seed; her seed beingundoubtedly also the seed of man. More remarkable still is the wayin which the serpent is joined to Eve, or rather his seed to her seed;the head of the one touches the heel of the other. Eve defeats theserpent by crushing its head, whilst the serpent defeats her bywounding her heel. This is likewise dear.
The following is also a remarkable passage, most absurd in itsliteral sense; but as an allegory it contains wonderful wisdom, andfully agrees with real facts, as will be found by those whounderstand all the chapters of this treatise. When the serpent cameto Eve he infected her with poison; the Israelites, who stood atMount Sinai, removed that poison; idolaters, who did not stand atMount Sinai, have not got rid of it. Note this likewise. Again theysaid :" The tree of life extends over an area of five hundred years'journey, and it is from beneath it that all the waters of the creationsprang forth" : and they added the explanation that this measurereferred to the thickness of its body, and not to the extent of itsbranches, for they continue thus :" Not the extent of the branchesthereof, but the stem thereof [korato, lit., ' its beam,' signifyinghere ' its stem') has a thickness of five hundred years' journey."This is now sufficiently clear. Again:" God has never shown thetree of knowledge [of good and evil] to man, nor will He evershow it." This is correct, for it must be so according to the natureof the Universe. Another noteworthy saying is this:" And the LordGod took the man, i.e., raised him, and placed him in the Gardenof Eden," i.e., He gave him rest. The words" He took him,"" Hegave him," have no reference to position in space, but they indicatehis position in rank among transient beings, and the prominentcharacter of his existence. Remarkable and noteworthy is the greatwisdom contained in the names of Adam, Cain, and Abel, and inthe fact that it was Cain who slew Abel in the field, that both ofthem perished, although the murderer had some respite, and thatthe existence of mankind is due to Seth alone. Comp." For Godhas appointed me another seed" (iv. 25). This has proved true.
It is also necessary to understand and consider the words," AndAdam gave names" (ii. 20): here it is indicated that languages areconventional, and that they are not natural, as has been assumed bysome. We must also consider the four different terms employed inexpressing the relations of the heavens to God, bore (Creator),'oseb (Maker), koneb (Possessor), and el (God). Comp." Godcreated the heaven and the earth" (i. 1):" In the day that God-made the earth and the heavens" (ii. 4):" Possessor of heaven andearth" (xiv. 19):" God of the Universe" (xxi, 31):" The God ofheaven and the God of the earth" (xxiv. 3). As to the verbs,konen," he established," tafah," he spanned," and natab," hestretched out," occurring in the following passages," Which thouhast established" (Ps. viii. 4)," My right hand hath spanned theheavens" (Isa. xviii. 13)," Who stretchest out the heavens" (PS.civ. 2), they are included in the term asah (" he made" ): the verbyazar," he formed," does not occur in reference to the heavens.According to my opinion the verb yazar denotes to make a form, ashape, or any other accident (for form and shape are likewiseaccidents). It is therefore said, yozer or," Who formeth the light"(Isa. xiv. 7), light being an accident; yozer harim," That formeththe mountains" (Amos iv, 13), i.e., that gave them their shape. Inthe same sense the verb is used in the passage," And the Lord Godformed (va-yizer) all the beasts," etc. (Gen. ii, 7). But in referenceto the Universe, viz., the heavens and the earth, which comprisesthe totality of the Creation, Scripture employs the verb bara, whichwe explain as denoting he produced something from nothing; also'asah (" he made" ) on account of the general forms or naturalproperties of the things which were given to them; kanah," hepossessed," because God rules over them like a master over hisservants. For this reason He is also called," The Lord of the wholeearth" (Jos. iii. 11-13): ha-adon," the Lord" (Exod. xx., iii. 17).But although none can be a master unless there exists somethingthat is in his possession, this attribute cannot be considered toimply the belief in the eternal existence of a materia prima, sincethe verbs bara," he created," and 'asah," he made," are alsoemployed in reference to the heavens. The Creator is called theGod of the heavens and the God of the Universe, on account of therelations between Him and the heavens; He governs, and they aregoverned; the word elohim does not signify" master" in the senseof" owner" : it expresses the relation between His position in thetotality of existing beings, and the position of the heavens or theUniverse; He is God, not they, i.e., not the heavens. Note this.
This, together with those explanations which we have given, andwhich we intend to give, in reference to this subject, may suffice,considering the object of this treatise and the capacity of thereader.
CHAPTER XXXI
IT is perhaps dear why the laws concerning Sabbath are so severe,that their transgression is visited with death by stoning, and thatthe greatest of the prophets put a person to death for breaking theSabbath. The commandment of the Sabbath is the third from thecommandment concerning the existence and the unity of God. Forthe commandment not to worship any other being is merely anexplanation of the first. You know already from what I have said,that no opinions retain their vitality except those which areconfirmed, published, and by certain actions constantly revivedamong the people. Therefore we are told in the Law to honour thisday; in order to confirm thereby the principle of Creation whichwill spread in the world, when all peoples keep Sabbath on thesame day. For when the question is asked, why this is done, theanswer is given:" For in six days the Lord hath made," etc. (Exod.xx. 11). Two different reasons are given for this commandment,because of two different objects. In the Decalogue in Exodus, thefollowing reason is given for distinguishing the Sabbath:" For insix days," etc. But in Deuteronomy (chap. v. 15) the reason isgiven:" And thou shalt remember that thou hast been a slave in theland of Egypt, etc., therefore the Lord thy God commanded thee,"etc. This difference can easily be explained. In the former, thecause of the honour and distinction of the day is given; comp."Therefore the Lord hath blessed the day of the Sabbath andsanctified it" (Exod. xx. 10), and the cause for this is," For in sixdays," etc. But the fact that God has given us the law of theSabbath and commanded us to keep it, is the consequence of ourhaving been slaves; for then our work did not depend on our will,nor could we choose the time for it; and we could not rest. ThusGod commanded us to abstain from work on the Sabbath, and torest, for two purposes; namely, (1) That we might confirm the truetheory, that of the Creation, which at once and clearly leads to thetheory of the existence of God. (2) That we might remember howkind God has been in freeing us from the burden of the Egyptians.-- The Sabbath is therefore a double blessing : it gives us correctnotions, and also promotes the well-being of our bodies.
CHAPTER XXXII
THERE are as many different opinions concerning Prophecy asconcerning the Eternity or Non-Eternity of the Universe. For wehave shown that those who assume the existence of God as provedmay be divided into three classes, according to the view they takeof the question, whether the Universe is eternal or not. Similarlythere are three different opinions on Prophecy. I will not notice theview of the Atheist: he does not believe in the Existence of God,much less in Prophecy; but I will content myself with discussingthe various opinions [on Prophecy] held by those who believe inGod.
1. Among those who believe in Prophecy, and even among ourcoreligionists, there are some ignorant people who think asfollows: God selects any person He pleases, inspires him with thespirit of Prophecy, and entrusts him with a mission. It makes nodifference whether that person be wise or stupid, old or young;provided he be, to some extent, morally good. For these peoplehave not yet gone so far as to maintain that God might also inspirea wicked person with His spirit. They admit that this is impossible,unless God has previously caused him to improve his ways.
2. The philosophers hold that prophecy is a certain faculty of manin a state of perfection, which can only be obtained by study.Although the faculty is common to the whole race, yet it is notfully developed in each individual, either on account of theindividual's defective constitution, or on account of some otherexternal cause. This is the case with every faculty common to aclass. It is only brought to a state of perfection in some individuals,and not in all; but it is impossible that it should not be perfect insome individual of the class: and if the perfection is of such anature that it can only be produced by an agent, such an agent mustexist. Accordingly, it is impossible that an ignorant person shouldbe a prophet: or that a person being no prophet in the evening,should, unexpectedly on the following morning, find himself aprophet, as if prophecy were a thing that could be foundunintentionally. But if a person, perfect in his intellectual andmoral faculties, and also perfect, as far as possible, in hisimaginative faculty, prepares himself in the manner which will bedescribed, he must become a prophet; for prophecy is a naturalfaculty of man. It is impossible that a man who has the capacity forprophecy should prepare himself for it without attaining it , just asit is impossible that a person with a healthy constitution should befed well, and yet not properly assimilate his food; and the like.
3. The third view is that which is taught in Scripture, and whichforms one of the principles of our religion. It coincides with theopinion of the philosophers in all points except one. For webelieve that, even if one has the capacity for prophecy, and hasduly prepared himself, it may yet happen that he does not actuallyprophesy. It is in that case the will of God [that withholds fromhim the use of the faculty]. According to my opinion, this fact is asexceptional as any other miracle, and acts in the same way. For thelaws of Nature demand that every one should be a prophet, whohas a proper physical constitution, and has been duly prepared asregards education and training. If such a person is not a prophet, heis in the same position as a person who, like Jeroboam (I Kingsxiii.
), is deprived of the use of his hand, or of his eyes, as was the casewith the army of Syria, in the history of Elisha (2 Kings vi. 18). Asfor the principle which I laid down, that preparation and perfectionof moral and rational faculties are the sine qua non, our Sages sayexactly the same:" The spirit of prophecy only rests upon personswho are wise, strong, and rich." We have explained these words inour Commentary on the Mishnah, and in our large work. We statedthere that the Sons of the Prophets were constantly engaged inpreparation. That those who have prepared themselves may still beprevented from being prophets, may be inferred from the history ofBaruch, the son of Nerijah: for he followed Jeremiah, whoprepared and instructed him; and yet he hoped in vain forprophecy; comp.," I am weary with my sighing, and rest have I notfound." He was then told through Jeremiah," Thus saith the Lord,Thus shalt thou say to him, Thou seekest for thee great things, donot seek" (Jer. xlv. 5). It may perhaps be assumed that prophecy ishere described as a thing" too great" for Baruch. So also the factthat" her prophets did not find visions from the Lord" (Lam. ii. 4),may be considered as the result of the exile of her prophets, as willbe explained (chap. xxxvi.). There are, however, numerouspassages in Scripture as well as in the writings of our Sages, whichsupport the principle that it depends chiefly on the will of Godwho is to prophesy, and at what time; and that He only selects thebest and the wisest. We hold that fools and ignorant people areunfit for this distinction. It is as impossible for any one of these toprophesy as it is for an ass or a frog; for prophecy is impossiblewithout study and training; when these have created the possibility,then it depends on the will of God whether the possibility is to beturned into reality. We must not be misled by the words ofJeremiah (i. 5)," Before I formed thee in the womb I knew thee,and before thou camest forth from the womb I have sanctifiedthee" : for this is the case with all prophets: there must be aphysical preparation from the beginning of their existence, as willbe explained. As to the words," For I am young" (ibid. ver. 6), itis well known that the pious Joseph, when he was thirty years old,is called by the Hebrew" young" (na-ar): also Joshua, when hewas nearly sixty years old. For the statement," and his ministerJoshua, the son of Nun, was young," occurs in the account of theGolden Calf (Exod. xxxiii. 11). Moses was then eighty-one yearsold, he lived one hundred and twenty years; Joshua, who survivedhim fourteen years, lived one hundred and ten years and mustconsequently have been at least fifty-seven years old at the timewhen the Golden Calf was made, and yet he is called na'ar," young." Nor must we be misled by prophecies like the following:" I will pour out my spirit over an flesh, and your sons and yourdaughters shall prophesy" : since it is distinctly stated what ismeant by" prophesy" in this place, viz.," Your old men will dreamdreams, your young men shall see visions." For we call alsoprophets all those who reveal something unknown by surmises, orconjectures, or correct inferences. Thus" prophets of Baal" and" of Ashirah" are mentioned in Scripture. And God says," If therearise among you a prophet or a dreamer of dreams," etc. (Deut.xiii. 1). As to the revelation on Mount Sinai, all saw the great fire,and heard the fearful thunderings, that caused such anextraordinary terror; but only those of them who were dulyqualified were prophetically inspired, each one according to hiscapacities. Therefore it is said," Come up unto the Lord, thou andAaron, Nadab and Abihu." Moses rose to the highest degree ofprophecy, according to the words," And Moses alone shall comenear the Lord." Aaron was below him, Nadab and Abihu belowAaron, and the seventy elders below Nadab and Abihu, and the restbelow the latter, each one according to his degree of perfection.Similarly our Sages wrote: Moses bad his own place and Aaron hisown. Since we have touched upon the revelation on Mount Sinai,we will point out in a separate chapter what may be inferred asregards the nature of that event, both from the Scriptural text, inaccordance with reasonable interpretation, and from the words ofour Sages.
CHAPTER XXXIII
IT is clear to me that what Moses experienced at the revelation onMount Sinai was different from that which was experienced by allthe other Israelites, for Moses alone was addressed by God, and forthis reason the second person singular is used in the TenCommandments; Moses then went down to the foot of the mountand told his fellow-men what he had heard. Comp.," I stoodbetween the Lord and you at that time to tell you the word of theLord" (Dent. v. 5). Again, Moses spake, and God answered himwith a loud voice" (Exod. xix. 19). In the Mechilta our Sages saydistinctly that he brought to them every word as he had heard it.Furthermore, the words," In order that the people hear when Ispeak with thee" (Exod. xix. 9), show that God spoke to Moses,and the people only heard the mighty sound, not distinct words. Itis to the perception of this mighty sound that Scripture refers in thepassage," When ye hear the sound" (Dent. v. 20); again it isstated," You heard a sound of words" (ibid. iv. 12), and it is notsaid" You heard words"; and even where the hearing of the wordsis mentioned, only the perception of the sound is meant. It wasonly Moses that heard the words, and he reported them to thepeople. This is apparent from Scripture, and from the utterances ofour Sages in general. There is, however, an opinion of our Sagesfrequently expressed in the Midrashim, and found also in theTalmud, to this effect: The Israelites heard the first and the secondcommandments from God, i.e., they learnt the truth of theprinciples contained in these two commandments in the samemanner as Moses, and not through Moses. For these twoprinciples, the existence of God and His Unity, can be arrived at bymeans of reasoning, and whatever can be established by proof isknown by the prophet in the same way as by any other person; hehas no advantage in this respect. These two principles were notknown through prophecy alone. Comp.," Thou hast been shown toknow that," etc. (Deut. iv. 34). But the rest of the commandmentsare of an ethical and authoritative character, and do not contain[truths] perceived by the intellect. Notwithstanding all that hasbeen said by our Sages on this subject, we infer from Scripture aswell as from the words of our Sages, that the Israelites heard onthat occasion a certain sound which Moses understood to proclaimthe first two commandments, and through Moses all otherIsraelites learnt them when he in intelligible sounds repeated themto the people. Our Sages mention this view, and support it by theverse," God hath spoken once; twice have I heard this" (Ps. Ixii.11). They state distinctly, in the beginning of Midrash Hazita, thatthe Israelites did not hear any other command directly from G0d;comp." A loud voice, and it was not heard again" (Deut. v. 19). Itwas after this first sound was heard that the people were seizedwith the fear and terror described in Scripture, and that they said,"Behold the Lord our God has shown us, etc., and now why shall wedie, etc. Come thou near," etc. Then Moses, the most distinguishedof all mankind, came the second time, received successively theother commandments, and came down to the foot of the mountainto proclaim them to the people, whilst the mighty phenomenacontinued; they saw the fire, they heard the sounds, which werethose of thunder and lightning during a storm, and the loud soundof the shofar: and all that is said of the many sounds heard at thattime, e.g., in the verse," and all the people perceived the sounds,"etc., refers to the sound of the shofar, thunder, and similar sounds.But the voice of the Lord, that is, the voice created for thatpurpose, which was understood to include the diversecommandments, was only heard once, as is declared in the Law,and has been clearly stated by our Sages in the places which I haveindicated to you. When the people heard this voice their soul leftthem; and in this voice they perceived the first twocommandments. It must, however, be noticed that the people didnot understand the voice in the same degree as Moses did. I willpoint out to you this important fact, and show you that it was amatter of tradition with the nation, and well known by our Sages.For, as a rule, Onkelos renders the word va-yedabber by u-mallel ("and God spake '): this is also the case with this word in thebeginning of the twentieth chapter of Exodus, but the words ve-alyedabber immanu elohim," let not God speak to us" (Exod. xx.19), addressed by the people to Moses, is rendered vela yitmallelimmanu min kodam adonai (" Let not aught be spoken to us by theLord" ). Onkelos makes thus the same distinction which we made.You know that according to the Talmud Onkelos received all theseexcellent interpretations directly from R. Eliezer and R. Joshua,the wisest men in Israel. Note it, and remember it, for it isimpossible for any person to expound the revelation on MountSinai more fully than our Sages have done, since it is one of thesecrets of the Law. It is very difficult to have a true conception ofthe events, for there has never been before, nor will there ever beagain, anything like it. Note it.
CHAPTER XXXIV
THE meaning of the Scriptural passage," Behold I will send anangel before thee," etc. (Exod. xxiii. 20), is identical with theparallel passage in Deuteronomy which God is represented to haveaddressed to Moses at the revelation on Mount Sinai, namely," Iwill raise them up a prophet from among their brethren," etc.(Deut. xviii. 18). The words," Beware of him, and obey his voice,"etc., said in reference to the angel, prove [that this passage speaksof a prophet]. For there is no doubt that the commandment is givento the ordinary people, to whom angels do not appear withcommandments and exhortations, and it is therefore unnecessaryto tell them not to disobey him. The meaning of the passagequoted above is this: God informs the Israelites that He will raiseup for them a prophet, to whom an angel will appear in order tospeak to him, to command him, and to exhort him; he thereforecautions them not to rebel against this angel, whose word theprophet will communicate to them. Therefore it is expressly saidin Deuteronomy," Unto him ye shall hearken" (Deut. xviii. 15):"And it shall come to pass that whosoever shall not hearken untomy words which he shall speak in my name," etc. (ibid. 19). Thisis the explanation of the words," for my name is in him" (Exod.xxiv. 22). The object of all this is to say to the Israelites, This greatsight witnessed by you, the revelation on Mount Sinai, will notcontinue for ever, nor will it ever be repeated. Fire and cloud willnot continually rest over the tabernacle, as they are resting now onit: but the towns will be conquered for you, peace will be securedfor you in the land, and you will be informed of what you have todo, by an angel whom I will send to your prophets; he will thusteach you what to do, and what not to do. Here a principle is laidclown which I have constantly expounded, viz., that all prophetsexcept Moses receive the prophecy through an angel. Note it.
CHAPTER XXXV
I HAVE already described the four points in which the prophecy ofMoses our Teacher was distinguished from that of other prophets,in books accessible to every one, in the Commentary on theMishnah (Sanhedrin x. I) and in Mishneh-torah (S. Madd'a I. vii.6); 1 have also adduced evidence for my explanation, and shownthe correctness thereof. I need not repeat the subject here, nor is itincluded in the theme of this work. For I must tell you thatwhatever I say here of prophecy refers exclusively to the form ofthe prophecy of all prophets before and after
Moses. But as to the prophecy of Moses I will not discuss it in thiswork with one single word, whether directly or indirectly, because,in my opinion, the term prophet is applied to Moses and other menhomonymously. A similar distinction, I think, must be madebetween the miracles wrought by Moses and those wrought byother prophets, for his signs are not of the same class as themiracles of other prophets. That his prophecy was distinguishedfrom that of all his predecessors is proved by the passage," And Iappeared to Abraham, etc., but by my name, the Lord, I was notknown unto them" (Exod. vi. 3). We thus learn that his propheticperception was different from that of the Patriarchs, and excelledit; a fortiori it must have excelled that of other prophets beforeMoses. As to the distinction of Moses' prophecy from that ofsucceeding prophets, it is stated as a fact," And there arose not aprophet since in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew faceto face" (Deut.xxxiv. 10). It is thus clear that his propheticperception was above that of later prophets in Israel, who are" akingdom of priests and a holy nation," and" in whose midst is theLord" : much more is it above that of prophets among othernations.
The general distinction between the wonders of Moses and thoseof other prophets is this: The wonders wrought by prophets, or forthem, are witnessed by a few individuals, e.g., the wonderswrought by Elijah and Elisha; the king of Israel is thereforesurprised, and asked Gehazi to describe to him the miracleswrought by Elisha :" Tell me, I pray thee, all the great things thatElisha hath done. And it came to pass as he was telling, etc. AndGehazi said: 'My lord, 0 king, this is the woman, and this is herson, whom Elisha restored to life '" (2 Kings viii. 4, 5). The sameis the case with the signs of every other prophet, except Moses ourTeacher. Scripture, therefore, declares that no prophet will ever,like Moses, do signs publicly in the presence of friend and enemy,of his followers and his opponents; this is the meaning of thewords:" And there arose not a prophet since in Israel like untoMoses, etc., in all the signs and the wonders, etc., in the sight of allIsrael." Two things are here mentioned together; namely, that therewill not arise a prophet that will perceive as Moses perceived, or aprophet that will do as he did; then it is pointed out that the signswere made in the presence of Pharaoh, all his servants and all hisland, the opponents of Moses, and also in the presence of all theIsraelites, his followers. Comp." In the sight of all Israel." This isa distinction not possessed by any prophet before Moses; nor, as iscorrectly foretold, will it ever be possessed by another prophet. Wemust not be misled by the account that the light of the sun stoodstill certain hours for Joshua, when" he said in the sight of Israel,"etc. (josh. x. 12): for it is not said there" in the sight of all Israel,"as is said in reference to Moses. So also the miracle of Elijah, atMount Carmel, was witnessed only by a few people. When I saidabove that the sun stood still certain hours, I explain the words"ka-jom tamim" to mean" the longest possible day," becausetamim means" perfect," and indicates that that day appeared to thepeople at Gibeon as their longest day in the summer. Your mindmust comprehend the distinction of the prophecy and the wondersof Moses, and understand that his greatness in propheticperception was the same as his power of producing miracles. Ifyou further assume that we are unable fully to comprehend thenature of this greatness, you will understand that when I speak, inthe chapters which follow this, on prophecy and the differentclasses of prophets, I only refer to the prophets which have notattained the high degree that Moses attained. This is what I desiredto explain in this chapter.
CHAPTER XXXVI
PROPHECY is, in truth and reality, an emanation sent forth by theDivine Being through the medium of the Active Intellect, in thefirst instance to man's rational faculty, and then to his imaginativefaculty; it is the highest degree and greatest perfection man canattain: it consists in the most Perfect development of theimaginative faculty. Prophecy is a faculty that cannot in any waybe found in a person, or acquired by man, through a culture of hismental and moral faculties: for even if these latter were as goodand perfect as possible, they would be of no avail, unless they werecombined with the highest natural excellence of the imaginativefaculty. You know that the full development of any faculty of thebody, such as the imagination, depends on the condition of theorgan, by means of which the faculty acts. This must be the bestpossible as regards its temperament and its size, and also asregards the purity of its substance. Any defect in this respectcannot in any way be supplied or remedied by training. For whenany organ is defective in its temperament, proper training can inthe best case restore a healthy condition to some extent, but cannotmake such an organ perfect. But if the organ is defective as regardssize, position, or as regards the substance and the matter of whichthe organ is formed, there is no remedy. You know all this, and Ineed not explain it to you at length.
Part of the functions of the imaginative faculty is, as you wellknow, to retain impressions by the senses, to combine them, andchiefly to form images. The principal and highest function isperformed when the senses are at rest and pause in their action, forthen it receives, to some extent, divine inspiration in the measureas it is predisposed for this influence. This is the nature of thosedreams which prove true, and also of prophecy, the differencebeing one of quantity, not of quality. Thus our Sages say, thatdream is the sixtieth part of prophecy: and no such comparisoncould be made between two things of different kinds, for wecannot say the perfection of man is so many times the perfection ofa horse. In Bereshit Rabba (sect. xvii.) the following saying of ourSages occurs," Dream is the nobelet (the unripe fruit) ofprophecy." This is an excellent comparison, for the unripe fruit(nohelet) is really the fruit to some extent, only it has fallen fromthe tree before it was fully developed and ripe. In a similar mannerthe action of the imaginative faculty during sleep is the same as atthe time when it receives a prophecy, only in the first case it is notfully developed, and has not yet reached its highest degree. Butwhy need I quote the words of our Sages, when I can refer to thefollowing passage of Scripture :" If there be among you a prophet,I, the Lord, will make myself known unto him in a vision, in adream will I speak to him" (Num. xii. 6). Here the Lord tells uswhat the real essence of prophecy is, that it is a perfection acquiredin a dream or in a vision (the original mareh is a noun derivedfrom the verb raah): the imaginative faculty acquires such anefficiency in its action that it sees the thing as if it came fromwithout, and perceives it as if through the medium of bodilysenses. These two modes of prophecy, vision and dream, includeall its different degrees. It is a well-known fact that the thingwhich engages greatly and earnestly man's attention whilst he isawake and in the full possession of his senses forms during hissleep the object of the action of his imaginative faculty.Imagination is then only influenced by the intellect in so far as it ispredisposed for such influence. It would be quite useless toillustrate this by a simile, or to explain it fully, as it is clear, andevery one knows it. It is like the action of the senses, the existenceof which no person with common sense would ever deny. Afterthese introductory remarks you will understand that a person mustsatisfy the following conditions before he can become a prophet:The substance of the brain must from the very beginning be in themost perfect condition as regards purity of matter, composition ofits different parts, size and position: no part of his body must sufferfrom ill-health; he must in addition have studied and acquiredwisdom, so that his rational faculty passes from a state ofpotentiality to that of actuality; his intellect must be as developedand perfect as human intellect can be; his passions pure andequally balanced; all his desires must aim at obtaining aknowledge of the hidden laws and causes that are in force in theUniverse; his thoughts must be engaged in lofty matters: hisattention directed to the knowledge of God, the consideration ofHis works, and of that which he must believe in this respect. Theremust be an absence of the lower desires and appetites, of theseeking after pleasure in eating, drinking, and cohabitation: and, inshort, every pleasure connected with the sense of touch. (Aristotlecorrectly says that this sense is a disgrace to us, since we possess itonly in virtue of our being animals; and it does not include anyspecifically human element, whilst enjoyments connected withother senses, as smell, hearing, and sight, though likewise of amaterial nature, may sometimes include [intellectual] pleasure,appealing to man as man, according to Aristotle. This remark,although forming no part of our subject, is not superfluous, for thethoughts of the most renowned wise men are to a great extentaffected by the pleasures of this sense, and filled with a desire forthem. And yet people are surprised that these scholars do notprophesy, if prophesying be nothing but a certain degree in thenatural development of man.) It is further necessary to suppressevery thought or desire for unreal power and dominion; that is tosay, for victory, increase of followers, acquisition of honour, andservice from the people without any ulterior object. On thecontrary, the multitude must be considered according to their trueworth; some of them are undoubtedly like domesticated cattle, andothers like wild beasts, and these only engage the mind of theperfect and distinguished man in so far as he desires to guardhimself from injury, in case of contact with them, and to derivesome benefit from them when necessary. A man who satisfiesthese conditions, whilst his fully developed imagination is inaction, influenced by the Active Intellect according to his mentaltraining, -- such a person will undoubtedly perceive nothing butthings very extraordinary and divine, and see nothing but God andHis angels. His knowledge will only include that which is realknowledge, and his thought will only he directed to such generalprinciples as would tend to improve the social relations betweenman and man.
We have thus described three kinds of perfection: mentalperfection acquired by training, perfection of the naturalconstitution of the imaginative faculty, and moral perfectionproduced by the suppression of every thought of bodily pleasures,and of every kind of foolish or evil ambition. These qualities are,as is well known, possessed by the wise men in different degrees,and the degrees of prophetic faculty vary in accordance with thisdifference. Faculties of the body are, as you know, at one timeweak, wearied, and corrupted, at others in a healthy state.Imagination is certainly one of the faculties of the body. You find,therefore, that prophets are deprived of the faculty of prophesyingwhen they mourn, are angry, or are similarly affected. Our Sagessay, Inspiration does not come upon a prophet when he is sad orlanguid. This is the reason why Jacob did not receive anyrevelation during the period of his mourning, when his imaginationwas engaged with the loss of Joseph. The same was the case withMoses, when he was in a state of depression through the multitudeof his troubles, which lasted from the murmurings of the Israelitesin consequence of the evil report of the spies, till the death of thewarriors of that generation. He received no message of God, as heused to do, even though he did not receive prophetic inspirationthrough the medium of the imaginative faculty, but directlythrough the intellect. We have mentioned it several times thatMoses did not, like other prophets, speak in similes. This will befurther explained (chap. xlv.), but it is not the subject of thepresent chapter. There were also persons who prophesied for acertain time and then left off altogether, something occurring thatcaused them to discontinue prophesying. The same circumstance,prevalence of sadness and dulness, was undoubtedly the directcause of the interruption of prophecy during the exile: for can therebe any greater misfortune for man than this : to be a slave boughtfor money in the service of ignorant and voluptuous masters, andpowerless against them as they unite in themselves the absence oftrue knowledge and the force of all animal desires ? Such an evilstate has been prophesied to us in the words," They shall run toand fro to seek the word of God, but shall not find it" (Amos viii.12):" Her king and her princes are among the nations, the law isno more, her prophets also find no vision from the Lord" (Lam. ii.9). This is a real fact, and the cause is evident; the pre-requisites[of prophecy] have been lost. In the Messianic period-may it sooncommence-prophecy will therefore again be in our midst, as hasbeen promised by God.
CHAPTER XXXVII
IT is necessary to consider the nature of the divine influence,which enables us to think, and gives us the various degrees ofintelligence. For this influence may reach a person only in a smallmeasure, and in exactly the same proportion would then be hisintellectual condition, whilst it may reach another person in such ameasure that, in addition to his own perfection, he can be themeans of perfection for others. The same relation may be observedthroughout the whole Universe. There are some beings so perfectthat they can govern other beings, but there are also beings that areonly perfect in so far as they can govern themselves and cannotinfluence other beings. In some cases the influence of the [Active]Intellect reaches only the logical and not the imaginative faculty;either on account of the insufficiency of that influence, or onaccount of a defect in the constitution of the imaginative faculty,and the consequent inability of the latter to receive that influence :this is the condition of wise men or philosophers. If, however, theimaginative faculty is naturally in the most perfect condition, thisinfluence may, as has been explained by us and by otherphilosophers, reach both his logical and his imaginative faculties:this is the case with prophets. But it happens sometimes that theinfluence only reaches the imaginative faculty on account of theinsufficiency of the logical faculty, arising either from a naturaldefect, or from a neglect in training. This is the case withstatesmen, lawgivers, diviners, charmers, and men that have truedreams, or do wonderful things by strange means and secret arts,though they are not wise men; all these belong to the third class. Itis further necessary to understand that some persons belonging tothe third class perceive scenes, dreams, and confused images,when awake, in the form of a prophetic vision. They then believethat they are prophets; they wonder that they perceive visions, andthink that they have acquired wisdom without training. They fallinto grave errors as regards important philosophical principles, andsee a strange mixture of true and imaginary things. All this is theconsequence of the strength of their imaginative faculty, and theweakness of their logical faculty, which has not developed, andhas not passed from potentiality to actuality.
It is well known that the members of each class differ greatly fromeach other. Each of the first two classes is again subdivided, andcontains two sections, namely, those who receive the influenceonly as far as is necessary for their own perfection, and those whoreceive it in so great a measure that it suffices for their ownperfection and that of others. A member of the first class, the wisemen, may have his mind influenced either only so far, that he isenabled to search, to understand, to know, and to discern, withoutattempting to be a teacher or an author, having neither the desirenor the capacity; but he may also be influenced to such a degreethat he becomes a teacher and an author. The same is the case withthe second class. A person may receive a prophecy enabling him toperfect himself but not others; but he may also receive such aprophecy as would compel him to address his fellowmen, teachthem, and benefit them through his perfection. It is dear that,without this second degree of perfection, no books would havebeen written, nor would any prophets have persuaded others toknow the truth. For a scholar does not write a book with the objectto teach himself what he already knows. But the characteristic ofthe intellect is this : what the intellect of one receives istransmitted to another, and so on, till a person is reached that canonly himself be perfected by such an influence, but is unable tocommunicate it to others, as has been explained in some chaptersof this treatise (chap. xi.). It is further the nature of this element inman that he who possesses an additional degree of that influence iscompelled to address his fellowmen, under all circumstances,whether he is listened to or not, even if he injures himself thereby.Thus we find prophets that did not leave off speaking to the peopleuntil they were slain; it is this divine influence that moves them,that does not allow them to rest in any way, though they mightbring upon themselves great evils by their action. E.g., whenJeremiah was despised, like other teachers and scholars of his age,he could not, though he desired it, withhold his prophecy, or ceasefrom reminding the people of the truths which they rejected.Comp." For the Word of the Lord was unto me a reproach and amocking all day, and I said, I will not mention it, nor will I againspeak in His name; but it was in mine heart as a burning fire,enclosed in my bones, and I was wearied to keep it, and did notprevail" (jer. xx. 8, g). This is also the meaning of the words ofanother prophet," The Lord God hath spoken, who shall notprophesy ?" (Amos iii. 8) Note it.
CHAPTER XXXVIII
EVERY man possesses a certain amount of courage, otherwise hewould not stir to remove anything that might injure him. Thispsychical force seems to me analogous to the physical force ofrepulsion. Energy varies like all other forces, being great in onecase and small in another. There are, therefore, people who attacka lion, whilst others run away at the sight of a mouse. One attacksa whole army and fights, another is frightened and terrified by thethreat of a woman. This courage requires that there be in a man'sconstitution a certain disposition for it. If man, in accordance witha certain view, employs it more frequently, it develops andincreases, but, on the other hand, if it is employed, in accordancewith the opposite view, more rarely, it will diminish. From ourown youth we remember that there are different degrees of energyamong boys.
The same is the case with the intuitive faculty; all possess it, but indifferent degrees. Man's intuitive power is especially strong inthings which he has well comprehended, and in which his mind ismuch engaged. Thus you may yourself guess correctly that acertain person said or did a certain thing in a certain matter. Somepersons are so strong and sound in their imagination and intuitivefaculty that, when they assume a thing to be in existence, thereality either entirely or partly confirms their assumption.Although the causes of this assumption are numerous, and includemany preceding, succeeding, and present circumstances, by meansof the intuitive faculty the intellect can pass over all these causes,and draw inferences from them very quickly, almostinstantaneously. This same faculty enables some persons toforetell important coming events. The prophets must have hadthese two forces, courage and intuition, highly developed, andthese were still more strengthened when they were under theinfluence of the Active Intellect. Their courage was so great that,e.g., Moses, with only a staff in his hand, dared to address a greatking in his desire to deliver a nation from his service. He was notfrightened or terrified, because he had been told," I will be withthee" (Exod. iii. 12). The prophets have not all the same degree ofcourage, but none of them have been entirely without it. ThusJeremiah is told:" Be not afraid of them," etc. (jer. i. 8), andEzekiel is exhorted," Do not fear them or their word" (Ezek. ii.6). In the same manner, you find that all prophets possessed greatcourage. Again, through the excellence of their intuitive faculty,they could quickly foretell the future, but this excellence, as is wellknown, likewise admits of different degrees.
The true prophets undoubtedly conceive ideas that result frompremisses which human reason could not comprehend by itself;thus they tell things which men could not tell by reason andordinary imagination alone; for [the action of the prophets' mentalcapacities is influenced by] the same agent that causes theperfection of the imaginative faculty, and that enables the prophetthereby to foretell a future event with such clearness as if it was athing already perceived with the senses, and only through themconveyed to his imagination. This agent perfects the prophet'smind, and influences it in such a manner that he conceives ideaswhich are confirmed by reality, and are so dear to him as if hededuced them by means of syllogisms.
This should be the belief of all who choose to accept the truth. For[all things are in a certain relation to each other, and] what isnoticed in one thing may be used as evidence for the existence ofcertain properties in another, and the knowledge of one thing leadsus to the knowledge of other things But [what we said of theextraordinary powers of our imaginative faculty] applies withspecial force to our intellect, which is directly influenced by theActive Intellect, and caused by it to pass from potentiality toactuality. It is through the intellect that the influence reaches theimaginative faculty. How then could the latter be so perfect as tobe able to represent things not previously perceived by the senses,if the same degree of perfection were withheld from the intellect,and the latter could not comprehend things otherwise than in theusual manner, namely, by means of premiss, conclusion, andinference ? This is the true characteristic of prophecy, and of thedisciplines to which the preparation for prophecy must exclusivelybe devoted. I spoke here of true prophets in order to exclude thethird class, namely, those persons whose logical faculties are notfully developed, and who do not possess any wisdom, but are onlyendowed with imaginative and inventive powers. It may be thatthings perceived by these persons are nothing but ideas which theyhad before, and of which impressions were left in theirimaginations together with those of other things: but whilst theimpressions of other images are effaced and have disappeared,certain images alone remain, are seen and considered as new andobjective, coming from without. The process is analogous to thefollowing case: A person has with him in the house a thousandliving individuals; all except one of them leave the house: whenthe person finds himself alone with that individual, he imaginesthat the latter has entered the house now, contrary to the fact thathe has only not left the house. This is one of the many phenomenaopen to gross =interpretations and dangerous errors, and many ofthose who believed that they were wise perished thereby.
There were, therefore, men who supported their opinion by adream which they had, thinking that the vision during sleep wasindependent of what they had previously believed or heard whenawake. Persons whose mental capacities are not fully developed,and who have not attained intellectual perfection, must not takeany notice of these [dreams]. Those who reach that perfectionmay, through the influence of the divine intellect, obtainknowledge independent of that possessed by them when awake.They are true prophets, as is distinctly stated in Scripture, ve-nabilebab hokmah (Ps. xc. 12)," And the true prophet possesseth aheart of wisdom." This must likewise he noticed.
CHAPTER XXXIX
WE have given the definition of prophecy, stated its truecharacteristics, and shown that the prophecy of Moses our Teacherwas distinguished from that of other prophets; we will now explainthat this distinction alone qualified him for the office ofproclaiming the Law, a mission without a parallel in the historyfrom Adam to Moses, or among the prophets who came after him;it is a principle in our faith that there will never be revealedanother Law. Consequently we hold that there has never been, norwill there ever be, any other divine Law but that of Moses ourTeacher. According to what is written in Scripture and handeddown by tradition, the fact may be explained in the following way:There were prophets before Moses, as the patriarchs Shem, Eber,Noah, Methushelah, and Enoch, but of these none said to anyportion of mankind that God sent him to them and commandedhim to convey to them a certain message or to prohibit or tocommand a certain thing. Such a thing is not related in Scripture,or in authentic tradition. Divine prophecy reached them as we haveexplained. Men like Abraham, who received a large measure ofprophetic inspiration, called their fellow-men together and ledthem by training and instruction to the truth which they hadperceived. Thus Abraham taught, and showed by philosophicalarguments that there is one God, that He has created everythingthat exists beside Him, and that neither the constellations noranything in the air ought to be worshipped; he trained hisfellow-men in this belief, and won their attention by pleasantwords as well as by acts of kindness. Abraham did not tell thepeople that God had sent him to them with the commandconcerning certain things which should or should not be done.Even when it was commanded that he, his sons, and his servantsshould be circumcised, he fulfilled that commandment, but he didnot address his fellow-men prophetically on this subject. ThatAbraham induced his fellow-men to do what is right, telling themonly his own will [and not that of God], may be learnt from thefollowing passage of Scripture:" For I know him, because hecommands his sons and his house after him, to practiserighteousness and judgment" (Gen. xix. 19). Also Isaac, Jacob,Levi, Kohath, and Amrarn influenced their fellow-men in the sameway. Our Sages, when speaking of prophets before Moses, usedexpressions like the following: The bet-din (court of justice) ofEber, the bet-din of Methushelah, and in the college ofMethushelah; although all these were prophets, yet they taughttheir fellow-men in the manner of preachers, teachers, andpedagogues, but did not use such phrases as the following:" AndGod said to me, Speak to certain people so and so." This was thestate of prophecy before Moses. But as regards Moses, you knowwhat [God] said to him, what he said [to the people], and thewords addressed to him by the whole nation :" This day we haveseen that God doth talk with man, and that he liveth"(Deut.V.21).The history of all our prophets that lived after Moses is wellknown to you; they performed, as it were, the function of warningthe people and exhorting them to keep the Law of Moses,threatening evil to those who would neglect it, and announcingblessings to those who would submit to its guidance. This webelieve will always be the case. Comp." It is not in the heavensthat one might say," etc. (ibid. xxx. 12):" For us and for ourchildren for ever" (ibid. xxix. 28). It is but natural that it should beso. For if one individual of a class has reached the highestperfection possible in that class, every other individual mustnecessarily be less perfect, and deviate from the perfect measureeither by surplus or deficiency. Take, e.g., the normal constitutionof a being, it is the most proper composition possible in that class:any constitution that deviates from that norm contains somethingtoo much or too little. The same is the case with the Law. It isclear that the Law is normal in this sense: for it contains" juststatutes and judgments" (Deut. iv. 8): but" just" is here identicalwith" equibalanced." The statutes of the Law do not imposeburdens or excesses as are implied in the service of a hermit orpilgrim, and the like: but, on the other hand, they are not sodeficient as to lead to gluttony or lewdness, or to prevent, as thereligious laws of the heathen nations do, the development of man'smoral and intellectual faculties. We intend to discuss in thistreatise the reasons of the commandments, and we shall then show,as far as necessary, the justice and wisdom of the Law, on accountof which it is said:" The Law of God is perfect, refreshing theheart" (Ps. xix. 8). There are persons who believe that the Lawcommands much exertion and great pain, but due considerationwill show them their error. Later on I will show how easy it is forthe perfect to obey the Law. Comp." What does the Lord thy Godask of thee ?" etc. (Dent. x. 12):" Have I been a wilderness toIsrael ?" (Jer. ii. 31). But this applies only to the noble ones;whilst wicked, violent, and pugnacious persons find it mostinjurious and hard that there should be any divine authority tendingto subdue their passion. To low-minded, wanton, and passionatepersons it appears most cruel that there should be an obstacle intheir way to satisfy their carnal appetite, or that a punishmentshould be inflicted for their doings. Similarly every godless personimagines that it is too hard to abstain from the evil he has chosenin accordance with his inclination. We must not consider the Laweasy or hard according as it appears to any wicked, lowminded,and immoral person, but as it appears to the judgment of the mostperfect, who, according to the Law, are fit to be the example for allmankind. This Law alone is called divine; other laws, such as thepolitical legislations among the Greeks, or the follies of theSabcans, are the works of human leaders, but not of prophets, as Ihave explained several times.
CHAPTER XL
IT has already been fully explained that man is naturally a socialbeing, that by virtue of his nature he seeks to form communities:man is therefore different from other living beings that are notcompelled to combine into communities. He is, as you know, thehighest form in the creation, and he therefore includes the largestnumber of constituent elements: this is the reason why the humanrace contains such a great variety of individuals, that we cannotdiscover two persons exactly alike in any moral quality, or inexternal appearance. The cause of this is the variety in man'stemperament, and in accidents dependent on his form: for withevery physical form there are connected certain special accidentsdifferent from those which are connected with the substance. Sucha variety among the individuals of a class does not exist in anyother class of living beings; for the variety in any other species islimited; only man forms an exception; two persons maybe sodifferent from each other in every respect that they appear tobelong to two different classes. Whilst one person is so cruel thathe kills his youngest child in his anger, another is too delicate andfaint-hearted to kill even a fly or worm. The same is the case withmost of the accidents. This great variety and the necessity of sociallife are essential elements in man's nature. But the well-being ofsociety demands that there should be a leader able to regulate theactions of man; he must complete every shortcoming, removeevery excess, and prescribe for the conduct of all, so that thenatural variety should be counterbalanced by the uniformity oflegislation, and the order of society be well established. I thereforemaintain that the Law, though not a product of Nature, isnevertheless not entirely foreign to Nature. It being the will of Godthat our race should exist and be permanently established, He inHis wisdom gave it such properties that men can acquire thecapacity of ruling others. Some persons are therefore inspired withtheories of legislation, such as prophets and lawgivers: otherspossess the power of enforcing the dictates of the former, and ofcompelling people to obey them, and to act accordingly. Such arekings, who accept the code of lawgivers, and [rulers] who pretendto be prophets, and accept, either entirely or partly, the teaching ofthe prophets. They accept one part while rejecting another part,either because this course appears to them more convenient, or outof ambition, because it might lead people to believe that the rulersthemselves had been prophetically inspired with these laws, anddid not copy them from others. For when we like a certainperfection, find pleasure in it, and wish to possess it, wesometimes desire to make others believe that we possess thatvirtue, although we are fully aware that we do not possess it. Thuspeople, e.g., adorn themselves with the poems of others, andpublish them as their own productions. It also occurs in the worksof wise men on the various branches of Science, that an ambitious,lazy person sees an opinion expressed by another person,appropriates it, and boasts that he himself originated it. The same[ambition] occurs also with regard to the faculty of prophecy.There were men who, like Zedekiah, the son of Chenaanah (IKings xxii. ii, 24) boasted that they received a prophecy, anddeclared things which have never been prophesied. Others, likeHananiah, son of Azzur (Jer. xxviii. 1-5), claim the capacity ofprophecy, and proclaim things which, no doubt, have been said byGod, that is to say, that have been the subject of a divineinspiration, but not to them. They nevertheless say that they areprophets, and adorn themselves with the prophecies of others. Allthis can easily be ascertained and recognized. I will, however, fullyexplain this to you, so that no doubt be left to you on this question,and that you may have a test by which you may distinguishbetween the guidance of human legislation, of the divine law, andof teachings stolen from prophets. As regards those who declarethat the laws proclaimed by them are their own ideas, no furthertest is required: the confession of the defendant makes theevidence of the witness superfluous. I only wish to instruct youabout laws which are proclaimed as prophetic. Some of these aretruly prophetic, originating in divine inspiration, some are ofnon-prophetic character, and some, though prophetic originally,are the result of plagiarism. You will find that the sole object ofcertain laws, in accordance with the intention of their author, whowell considered their effect, is to establish the good order of thestate and its affairs, to free it from all mischief and wrong: theselaws do not deal with philosophic problems, contain no teachingfor the perfecting of our logical faculties, and are not concernedabout the existence of sound or unsound opinions. Their soleobject is to arrange, under all circumstances, the relations of mento each other, and to secure their well-being, in accordance withthe view of the author of these laws. These laws are political, andtheir author belongs, as has been stated above, to the third class,viz., to those who only distinguish themselves by the perfection oftheir imaginative faculties. You will also find laws which, in alltheir rules, aim, as the law just mentioned, at the improvement ofthe material interests of the people: but, besides, tend to improvethe state of the faith of man, to create first correct notions of God,and of angels, and to lead then the people, by instruction andeducation, to an accurate knowledge of the Universe : thiseducation comes from God; these laws are divine. The questionwhich now remains to be settled is this: Is the person whoproclaimed these laws the same perfect man that received them byprophetic inspiration, or a plagiarist, who has stolen these ideasfrom a true prophet ? In order to be enabled to answer thisquestion, we must examine the merits of the person, obtain anaccurate account of his actions, and consider his character. Thebest test is the rejection, abstention, and contempt of bodilypleasures: for this is the first condition of men, and a fortiori ofprophets: they must especially disregard pleasures of the sense oftouch, which, according to Aristotle, is a disgrace to us: and, aboveall, restrain from the pollution of sensual intercourse. Thus Godexposes thereby false prophets to public shame, in order that thosewho really seek the truth may find it, and not err or go astray; e.g.,Zedekiah, son of Maasiah, and Ahab, son of Kolaiah, boasted thatthey had received a prophecy. They persuaded the people to followthem, by proclaiming utterances of other prophets: but all the timethey continued to seek the low pleasures of sensual intercourse,committing even adultery with the wives of their companions andfollowers. God exposed their falsehood as He has exposed that ofother false prophets. The king of Babylon burnt them, as Jeremiahdistinctly states:" And of them shall be taken up a curse by all thecaptivity of Judah, which are in Babylon, saying, The Lord makethee like Zedekiah, and like Ahab, whom the king of Babylonroasted in the fire. Because they have committed villany in Israel,and have committed adultery with their neighbours' wives, andhave spoken lying words in my name, which I have notcommanded them" (Jer. xxix. 22, 23). Note what is meant bythese words.
CHAPTER XLI
I NEED not explain what a dream is, but I will explain themeaning of the term mareh," vision," which occurs in thepassage:" In a vision (be-mareh) do I make myself known untohim" (Num. xii. 6). The term signifies that which is also calledmareh ha-nebuah," prophetic vision," yad ha-shem," the hand ofGod," and mahazeb," a vision." It is something terrible and fearfulwhich the prophet feels while awake, as is distinctly stated byDaniel:" And I saw this great vision, and there remained nostrength in me, for my comeliness was turned in me intocorruption, and I retained no strength" (Dan, x. 8). He afterwardscontinues," Thus was I in deep sleep on my face, and my facetoward the ground" (ibid. ver. 9). But it was in a prophetic visionthat the angel spoke to him and" set him upon his knees." Undersuch circumstances the senses cease to act, and the [ActiveIntellect] influences the rational faculties, and through them theimaginative faculties, which become perfect and active.Sometimes the prophecy begins with a prophetic vision, theprophet greatly trembles, and is much affected in consequence ofthe perfect action of the imaginative faculty: and after that theprophecy follows. This was the case with Abraham. Thecommencement of the prophecy is," The word of the Lord came toAbraham in a vision" (Gen. xv. 1): after this," a deep sleep fellupon Abraham" : and at last," he said unto Abraham," etc. Whenprophets speak of the fact that they received a prophecy, they saythat they received it from an angel, or from God; but even in thelatter case it was likewise received through an angel. Our Sages,therefore, explain the words," And the Lord said unto her" that Hespake through an angel. You must know that whenever Scripturerelates that the Lord or an angel spoke to a person, this took placein a dream or in a prophetic vision.
There are four different ways in which Scripture relates the factthat a divine communication was made to the prophet. (1) Theprophet relates that he heard the words of an angel in a dream orvision; (2) He reports the words of the angel without mentioningthat they were perceived in a dream or vision, assuming that it iswell known that prophecy can only originate in one of the twoways," In a vision I will make myself known unto him, in a dreamI will speak unto him" (Num. xii. 6). (3) The prophet does notmention the angel at all; he says that God spoke to him, but hestates that he received the message in a dream or a vision. (4) Heintroduces his prophecy by stating that God spoke to him, or toldhim to do a certain thing, or speak certain words, but he does notexplain that he received the message in a dream or vision, becausehe assumes that it is well known, and has been established as aprinciple that no prophecy or revelation originates otherwise thanin a dream or vision, and through an angel. Instances of the firstform are the following:-" And the angel of the Lord said unto mein a dream, Jacob" (Gen. xxxi. 11):" And an angel said unto Israelin a vision of night" (ibid. xlvi. 2):" And an angel came to Balaamby night" :" And an angel said unto Balaam" (Num. xxii. 20-72).Instances of the second form are these:" And Elohim (an angel),said unto Jacob, Rise, go up to Bethel" (Gen. xxxv. 1); AndElohim. said unto him, Thy name is Jacob," etc. (ibid. xxxv. 10);And an angel of the Lord called unto Abraham out of heaven thesecond time" (ibid. xxii. 15):" And Elohim said unto Noah" (ibid.vi. 13). The following is an instance of the third form:" The wordof the Lord came unto Abraham in a vision" (ibid. xv. 1).Instances of the fourth form are :" And the Lord said untoAbraham" (ibid. xviii. 13);" And the Lord said unto Jacob,Return," etc. (ibid. xxxi. 3):" And the Lord said unto Joshua"(josh. v. 9):" And the Lord said unto Gideon" (judges vii. 2). Mostof the prophets speak in a similar manner:" And the Lord said untome" (Deut. ii. 2):" And the word of the Lord came unto me" (Ezek. xxx. 1):" And the word of the Lord came" (2 Sam. xxiv. 11)
" And behold, the word of the Lord came unto him" (I Kings xix.9):" And the word of the Lord came expressly" (Ezek. i. 3):" Thebeginning of the word of the Lord by Hosea" (Hos. i. 2):" Thehand of the Lord was upon me" (Ezek. xxxvii. 1). There are agreat many instances of this class Every passage in Scriptureintroduced by any of these four forms is a prophecy proclaimed bya prophet; but the phrase," And Elohim (an angel) came to acertain person in the dream of night," does not indicate a prophecy,and the person mentioned in that phrase is not a prophet; thephrase only informs us that the attention of the person was calledby God to a certain thing, and at the same time that this happenedat night. For just as God may cause a person to move in order tosave or kill another person, so He may cause, according to Hiswill, certain things to rise in man's mind in a dream by night. Wehave no doubt that the Syrian Laban was a perfectly wicked man,and an idolater; likewise Abimelech, though a good man amonghis people, is told by Abraham concerning his land [Gerar] and hiskingdom," Surely there is no fear of God in this place" (Gen. xx.11) And yet concerning both of them, viz., Laban and Abimelech,it is said [that an angel appeared to them in a dream]. Comp." AndElohirn (an angel) came to Abimelech in a dream by night" (ibid.ver. 3): and also," And Elohim came to the Syrian Laban in thedream of the night" (ibid. XXXi. 24). Note and consider thedistinction between the phrases," And Elohim came," and"Elohim. said," between" in a dream by night," and" in a vision bynight." In reference to Jacob it is said," And an angel said to Israelin the visions by night" (Gen. xlvi. 2), but in reference to Labanand Abimelech," And Elohim. came," etc. Onkelos makes thedistinction dear; he translates, in the last two instances, ata memarmin kodam adonai," a word came from the Lord," and notve-itgeli," and the Lord appeared." The phrase," And the Lordsaid to a certain person," is employed even when this person wasnot really addressed by the Lord, and did not receive any prophecy,but was informed of a certain thing through a prophet. E.g.," Andshe went to inquire of the Lord" (Gen. XXV. 22): that is,according to the explanation of our Sages, she went to the collegeof Eber, and the latter gave her the answer; and this is expressedby the words," And the Lord said unto her" (ibid. ver. 23). Thesewords have also been explained thus, God spoke to her through anangel; and by" angel" Eber is meant here, for a prophet issometimes called" angel," as will be explained; or the angel thatappeared to Eber in this vision is referred to, or the object of theMidrash explanation is merely to express that wherever God isintroduced as directly speaking to a person, i.e., to any of theordinary prophets, He speaks through an angel, as has been setforth by us (chap. xxxiv.).
CHAPTER XLII
WE have already shown that the appearance or speech of an angelmentioned in Scripture took place in a vision or dream; it makesno difference whether this is expressly stated or not, as we haveexplained above. This is a point of considerable importance. Insome cases the account begins by stating that the prophet saw anangel; in others, the account apparently introduces a human being,who ultimately is shown to be an angel; but it makes no difference,for if the fact that an angel has been heard is only mentioned at theend, you may rest satisfied that the whole account from thebeginning describes a prophetic vision. In such visions, a propheteither sees God who speaks to him, as will be explained by us, orhe sees an angel who speaks to him, or he hears some onespeaking to him without seeing the speaker, or he sees a man whospeaks to him, and learns afterwards that the speaker was an angel.In this latter kind of prophecies, the prophet relates that he saw aman who was doing or saying something, and that he learntafterwards that it was an angel.
This important principle was adopted by one of our Sages, one ofthe most distinguished among them, R. Hiya the Great (BerrshitRabba, xlviii.), in the exposition of the Scriptural passagecommencing," And the Lord appeared unto him in the plain ofMamre" (Gen. xviii.). The general statement that the Lordappeared to Abraham is followed by the description in whatmanner that appearance of the Lord took place; namely, Abrahamsaw first three men; he ran and spoke to them. R. Hiya, the authorof the explanation, holds that the words of Abraham," My Lord, ifnow I have found grace in thy sight, do not, I pray thee, pass fromthy servant," were spoken by him in a prophetic vision to one ofthe men; for he says that Abraham addressed these words to thechief of these men. Note this well, for it is one of the greatmysteries [of the Law]. The same, I hold, is the case when it is saidin reference to Jacob," And a man wrestled with him" (Gen. xxxii.25): this took place in a prophetic vision, since it is expresslystated in the end (ver. 31) that it was an angel. The circumstancesare here exactly the same as those in the vision of Abraham, wherethe general statement," And the Lord appeared to him," etc., isfollowed by a detailed description. Similarly the account of thevision of Jacob begins," And the angels of God met him" (Gen.xxxii. 2): then follows a detailed description how it came to passthat they met him; namely, Jacob sent messengers, and afterhaving prepared and done certain things," he was left alone," etc.," and a man wrestled with him" (ibid. ver. 24). By this term" man" [one of] the angels of God is meant, mentioned in the phrase," And angels of God met him" : the wrestling and speaking wasentirely a prophetic vision. That which happened to Balaam on theway, and the speaking of the ass, took place in a prophetic vision,since further on, in the same account, an angel of God isintroduced as speaking to Balaam. I also think that what Joshuaperceived, when" he lifted up his eyes and saw, and behold a manstood before him" (josh. v. 13) was a prophetic vision, since it isstated afterwards (ver. 114) that it was" the prince of the host ofthe Lord." But in the passages," And an angel of the Lord came upfrom Gilgal" (judges ii. 1):" And it came to pass that the angel ofthe Lord spake these words to all Israel" (ibid. ver. 2): the" angel"is, according to the explanation of our Sages, Phineas. They say,The angel is Phineas, for, when the Divine Glory rested upon him,he was" like an angel." We have already shown (chap. vi.) that theterm" angel" is homonymous, and denotes also" prophet," as isthe case in the following passages:-" And He sent an angel, and Hehath brought us up out of Egypt" (Num. xx. 16):" Then spakeHaggai, the angel of the Lord, in the Lords message" (Hagg. i.13):" But they mocked the angels of God" (2 Chron. xxxvi. 16).Comp. also the words of Daniel," And the man Gabriel, whom Ihad seen in the vision at the beginning, being caused to fly swiftly,touched me about the time of the evening oblation" (Dan. ix. 11).All this passed in a prophetic vision. Do not imagine that an angelis seen or his word heard otherwise than in a prophetic vision orprophetic dream, according to the principle laid down:-" I makemyself known unto him in a vision, and speak unto him in adream" (Num. xii. 6). The instances quoted may serve as anillustration of those passages which I do not mention. From therule laid down by us that prophecy requires preparation, and fromour interpretation of the homonym" angel," you will infer thatHagar, the Egyptian woman, was not a prophetess; also Manoahand his wife were no prophets: for the speech they heard, orimagined they heard, was like the bat-kol (prophetic echo), whichis so frequently mentioned by our Sages, and is something thatmay be experienced by men not prepared for prophecy. Thehomonymity of the word" angel" misleads in this matter. This isthe principal method by which most of the difficult passages in theBible can be explained. Consider the words," And an angel of theLord found her by the well of water" (Gen. xvi. 7), which aresimilar to the words referring to Joseph-" And a man found him,and behold, he was erring in the field" (ibid. xxxvii. 15). All theMidrashim assume that by man in this passage an angel is meant.
CHAPTER XLIII
WE have already shown in our work that the prophets sometimesprophesy in allegories; they use a term allegorically, and in thesame prophecy the meaning of the allegory is given. In our dreams,we sometimes believe that we are awake, and relate a dream toanother person, who explains the meaning, and all this goes onwhile we dream. Our Sages call this" a dream interpreted in adream." In other cases we learn the meaning of the dream afterwaking from sleep. The same is the case with prophetic allegories.Some are interpreted in the prophetic vision. Thus it is related inZechariah, after the description of the allegorical vision --" Andthe angel that talked with me came again and waked me as a manthat is awakened from his sleep. And he said unto me, 'What dostthou see etc. (Zech. iv. 1-2), and then the allegory is explained(ver. 6, sqq.).
Another instance we find in Daniel. It is first stated there:" Danielhad a dream and visions of his head upon his bed" (Dan. vii. 1).The whole allegory is then given, and Daniel is described assighing that he did not know its interpretation. He asks the angelfor an explanation, and he received it in a prophetic vision. Herelates as follows:" I came near unto one of those that stood by,and asked him the truth of all this. So he told me, and made meknow the interpretation of the things" (ibid. ver. 16). The wholescene is called hazon (vision), although it was stated that Danielhad a dream, because an angel explained the dream to him in thesame manner as is mentioned in reference to a prophetic dream. Irefer to the verse:" A vision appeared to me Daniel, after thatwhich appeared to me at the first" (ibid. viii. 1). This is dear, forhazon (vision) is derived from haza," to see," and mareb," vision,"from raah," to see" ; and haza and raah are synonymous. There istherefore no difference whether we use mareh, or mahazeh, orhazon, there is no other mode of revelation but the two mentionedin Scripture:" In a vision I make myself known to him, in a dreamI will speak unto him" (Num. xii. 6). There are, however, differentdegrees [of prophetic proficiency], as will be shown (chap. xlv.).
There are other prophetic allegories whose meaning is not given ina prophetic vision. The prophet learns it when he awakes from hissleep. Take, e.g., the staves which Zechariah took in a propheticvision.
You must further know that the prophets see things shown to themallegorically, such as the candlesticks, horses, and mountains ofZechariah (Zech. iv. 2; vi. 1-7), the scroll of Ezekiel (Ezek. ii. 9),the wall made by a plumb-line (Amos vii. 7), which Amos saw, theanimals of Daniel (Dan. vii. and viii.), the seething pot of Jeremiah(Jer. i. 13), and similar allegorical objects shown to representcertain ideas. The prophets, however, are also shown things whichdo not illustrate the object of the vision, but indicate it by theirname through its etymology or homonymity. Thus the imaginativefaculty forms the image of a thing, the name of which has twomeanings, one of which denotes something different [from theimage]. This is likewise a kind of allegory. Comp. Makkalshaked," almond staff," of Jeremiah (i. 11-12). It was intended toindicate by the second meaning of shaked the prophecy," For Iwill watch" (shoked), etc., which has no relation whatever to thestaff or to almonds. The same is the case with the kelub kayiz," abasket of summer fruit," seen by Amos, by which the completionof a certain period was indicated," the end (ha-kez) having come"(Amos Viii. 2). Still more strange is the following manner ofcalling the prophet's attention to a certain object. He is shown adifferent object, the name of which has neither etymologically norhomonymously any relation to the first object, but the names ofboth contain the same letters, though in a different order, Take,e.g., the allegories of Zechariah (chap. xi- 7, sqq.). He takes in aprophetic vision staves to lead the flock; he calls the one No'ain(pleasure), the other hobelim. He indicates thereby that the nationwas at first in favour with God, who was their leader and guide.They rejoiced in the service of God, and found happiness in it,while God was pleased with them, and loved them, as it is said,"Thou hast avouched the Lord thy God," etc., and" the Lord hathavouched thee," etc. (Dent. xxvi. 17, 18) They were guided anddirected by Moses and the prophets that followed him. But later achange took place. They rejected the love of God, and Godrejected them, appointing destroyers like Jeroboam and Manasseas their rulers. Accordingly, the word hobelim has the samemeaning [viz., destroying] as the root habal has in Mebabbelimkeramim," destroying vineyards" (Song of Sol. ii. 15). But theprophet found also in this name Hobelim the indication that thepeople despised God, and that God despised them. This is,however, not expressed by the word habal, but by a transpositionof the letters Het, Bet, and Lamed, the meaning of despising andrejecting is obtained. &mp." My soul loathed them, and their soulalso abhorred me" [bahalah] (Zech. xi. 8). The prophet hadtherefore to change the order of the fetters in habal into that ofBabal. In this way we find very strange things and also mysteries(Sodot) in the words nehoshet, Kalal, regel, rgel, and hashmal ofthe Mercahah, and in other terms in other passages. After theabove explanation you will see the mysteries in the meaning ofthese expressions if you examine them thoroughly.
CHAPTER XLIV
PROPHECY is given either in a vision or in a dream, as we havesaid so many times, and we will not constantly repeat it. We saynow that when a prophet is inspired with a prophecy he may see anallegory, as we have shown frequently, or he may in a propheticvision perceive that God speaks to him, as is said in Isaiah (vi. 8),"And I heard the voice of the Lord saying, Whom shall I send, andwho will go for us ?" or he hears an angel addressing him, andsees him also. This is very frequent, e.g.," And the angel of Godspake unto me," etc. (Gen. xxxi. 11):" And the angel that talkedwith me answered and said unto me, Dost thou not know whatthese are" (Zech. iv. 5 ):" And I heard one holy speaking" (Dan.viii. 13). Instances of this are innumerable. The prophet sometimessees a man that speaks to him. Comp.," And behold there was aman, whose appearance was like the appearance of brass, and theman said to me," etc. (Ezek. xl. 3, 4), although the passage begins," The hand of the Lord was upon me" (ibid. ver. 1). In some casesthe prophet sees no figure at all, only hears in the prophetic visionthe words addressed to him; e.g., And I heard the voice of a manbetween the banks of LTW" (Dan. viii. 16)" There was silence,and I heard a voice" (in the speech of Eliphaz, job iv. 16):" And Iheard a voice of one that spake to me" (Ezek. i. 28). The beingwhich Ezekiel perceived in the prophetic vision was not the samethat addressed him: for at the conclusion of the strange andextraordinary scene which Ezekiel describes expressly as havingbeen perceived by him, the object and form of the prophecy isintroduced by the words," And I heard a voice of a man that spaketo me." After this remark on the different kinds of prophecy, assuggested by Scripture, I say that the prophet may perceive thatwhich he hears with the greatest possible intensity, just as a personmay hear thunder in his dream, or perceive a storm or anearthquake; such dreams are frequent. The prophet may also hearthe prophecy in ordinary common speech, without anythingunusual. Take, e.g., the account of the prophet Samuel. When hewas called in a prophetic vision, he believed that the priest Elicalled him; and this happened three times consecutively. The textthen explains the cause of it, saying that Samuel naturally believedthat Eli had called him, because at that time he did not yet knowthat God addressed the prophet in this form, nor had that secret asyet been revealed to him. Comp.," And Samuel did not yet knowthe Lord, and the word of the Lord was not yet revealed to him,"i.e., he did not yet know, and it had not yet been revealed to him,that the word of God is communicated in this way. The words," Hedid not yet know the Lord," may perhaps mean that Samuel hadnot yet received any prophecy; for in reference to a prophet'sreceiving divine communication it is said," I make myself knownto him in a vision, I speak to him in a dream" (Num. xii. 6). Themeaning of the verse accordingly is this, Samuel had not yetreceived any prophecy, and therefore did not know that this wasthe form of prophecy. Note it.
CHAPTER XLV
AFTER having explained prophecy in accordance with reason andScripture, I must now describe the different degrees of prophecyfrom these two points of view. Not all the degrees of prophecywhich I will enumerate qualify a person for the office of a prophet.The first and the second degrees are only steps leading toprophecy, and a person possessing either of these two degrees doesnot belong to the class of prophets whose merits we have beendiscussing. When such a person is occasionally called prophet, theterm is used in a wider sense, and is applied to him because he isalmost a prophet. You must not be misled by the fact thataccording to the books of the Prophets, a certain prophet, afterhaving been inspired with one kind of prophecy, is reported tohave received prophecy in another form. For it is possible for aprophet to prophesy at one time in the form of one of the degreeswhich I am about to enumerate, and at another time in anotherform. In the same manner, as the prophet does not prophesycontinuously, but is inspired at one time and not at another, so hemay at one time prophesy in the form of a higher degree, and atanother time in that of a lower degree; it may happen that thehighest degree is reached by a prophet only once in his lifetime,and afterwards remains inaccessible to him, or that a prophetremains below the highest degree until he entirely loses thefaculty: for ordinary prophets must cease to prophesy a shorter orlonger period before their death. Comp." And the word of theLord ceased from Jeremiah" (Ezra i. 1)" And these are the lastwords of David" (2 Sam. xxiii.1). From these instances it can beinferred that the same is the case with all prophets. After thisintroduction and explanation, I will begin to enumerate the degreesof prophecy to which I have referred above.
(1) The first degree of prophecy consists in the divine assistancewhich is given to a person, and induces and encourages him to dosomething good and grand, e.g., to deliver a congregation of goodmen from the hands of evildoers; to save one noble person, or tobring happiness to a large number of people; he finds in himselfthe cause that moves and urges him to this deed. This degree ofdivine influence is called" the spirit of the Lord" : and of theperson who is under that influence we say that the spirit of theLord came upon him, clothed him, or rested upon him, or the Lordwas with him, and the like. All the judges of Israel possessed thisdegree, for the following general statement is made concerningthem --" The Lord raised up judges for them; and the Lord waswith the judge, and he saved them" (judges ii. 18). Also all thenoble chiefs of Israel belonged to this class. The same is distinctlystated concerning some of the judges and the kings:--" The spiritof the Lord came upon Jephthah" (ibid. xi. 29): of Samson it issaid," The spirit of the Lord came upon him" (ibid. xiv. 19):" Andthe spirit of the Lord came upon Saul when he heard those words" (I Sam. xi. 6). When Amasa was moved by the holy spirit to assistDavid," A spirit clothed Amasa, who was chief of the captains,and he said, Thine are we, David," etc.(I Chron. xii. 18). Thisfaculty was always possessed by Moses from the time he hadattained the age of manhood: it moved him to slay the Egyptian,and to prevent evil from the two men that quarrelled; it was sostrong that, after he had fled from Egypt out of fear, and arrived inMidian, a trembling stranger, he could not restrain himself frominterfering when he saw wrong being done; he could not bear it.Comp." And Moses rose and saved them" (Exod. ii. 17). Davidlikewise was filled with this spirit, when he was anointed with theoil of anointing. Comp." And the spirit of God came upon Davidfrom that day and upward" (I Sam. xvi. 13). He thus conqueredthe lion and the bear and the Philistine, and accomplished similartasks, by this very spirit. This faculty did not cause any of theabove-named persons to speak on a certain subject, for it only aimsat encouraging the person who possesses it to action; it does notencourage him to do everything, but only to help either adistinguished man or a whole congregation when oppressed, or todo something that leads to that end. just as not an who have a truedream are prophets, so it cannot be said of every one who isassisted in a certain undertaking, as in the acquisition of property,or of some other personal advantage, that the spirit of the Lordcame upon him, or that the Lord was with him, or that heperformed his actions by the holy spirit. We only apply suchphrases to those who have accomplished something very good andgrand, or something that leads to that end: e.g., the success ofJoseph in the house of the Egyptian, which was the first causeleading evidently to great events that occurred subsequently.
(2) The second degree is this : A person feels as if something cameupon him, and as if he had received a new power that encourageshim to speak. He treats of science, or composes hymns, exhorts hisfellow-men, discusses political and theological problems; all thishe does while awake, and in the full possession of his senses. Sucha person is said to speak by the holy spirit. David composed thePsalms, and Solomon the Book of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and theSong of Solomon by this spirit; also Daniel, job, Chronicles, andthe rest of the Hagiographa were written in this holy spirit;therefore they are called ketubim (Writings, or Written), i.e.,written by men inspired by the holy spirit. Our Sages mention thisexpressly concerning the Book of Esther. In reference to such holyspirit, David says:" The spirit of the Lord spoke in me, and hisword is on my tongue" (2 Sam. xxiii. 2): i.e., the spirit of the Lordcaused him to utter these words. This class includes the seventyelders of whom it is said," And it came to pass when the spiritrested upon them, that they prophesied, and did not cease" (Num.xi. 25): also Eldad and Medad (ibid. ver. 26): furthermore, everyhigh priest that inquired [of God] by the Urim and Tummim; onwhom, as our Sages say, the divine glory rested, and who spoke bythe holy spirit; Yabaziel, son of Zechariah, belongs likewise to thisclass. Comp." The spirit of the Lord came upon him in the midstof the assembly, and he said, Listen, all Judah and inhabitants ofJerusalem, thus saith the Lord unto you," etc. (2 Chron. xx. 14, 15):also Zechariah, son of Jehoiada the priest. Comp." And he stoodabove the people and said unto them, Thus saith God" (ibid. xxiv.20): furthermore, Azariah, son of Oded: comp." And Azariah, sonof Oded, when the spirit of the Lord came upon him, went forthbefore Asa," etc. (ibid. xv. 1, 2); and all who acted under similarcircumstances. You must know that Balaam likewise belonged tothis class, when he was good; this is indicated by the words," AndGod put a word in the mouth of Balaam" (Num. xxiii. 5), i.e.,Balaam spoke by divine inspiration; he therefore says of himself,"Who heareth the words of God," etc. (ibid. xxiv. 4)
We must especially point out that David, Solomon, and Danielbelonged to this class, and not to the class of Isaiah, Jeremiah,Nathan the prophet, Elijah the Shilonite, and those like them. ForDavid, Solomon, and Daniel spoke and wrote inspired by the holyspirit, and when David says," The God of Israel spoke and saidunto me, the rock of Israel" (2 Sam. xxiii. 3), he meant to say thatGod promised him happiness through a prophet, through Nathan oranother prophet. The phrase must here be interpreted in the samemanner as in the following passages," And God said to her" (Gen.XXV. 26):" And God said unto Solomon, Because this hath beenin thy heart, and thou hast not kept my covenant," etc. (I Kings xi.11). The latter passage un doubtedly contains a prophecy of Ahijahthe Shilonite, or another prophet, who foretold Solomon that evilwould befall him. The passage, God appeared to Solomon atGibeon in a dream by night, and God said (ibid. iii. 5), does notcontain a real prophecy, such as is introduced by the words" Theword of the Lord came to Abram in a vision, saying" (Gen. xv. 1)or," And God said to Israel in the visions of the night" (ibid. xlvi.2), or such as the prophecies of Isaiah and Jeremiah contain: in allthese cases the prophets, though receiving the prophecy in aprophetic dream, are told that it is a prophecy, and that they havereceived prophetic inspiration. But in the case of Solomon, theaccount concludes," And Solomon awoke, and behold it was adream" (I Kings iii. 15): and in the account of the second divineappearance, it is said," And God appeared to Solomon a secondtime, as he appeared to him at Gibeon" (ibid. ix. 2): it wasevidently a dream.
This kind of prophecy is a degree below that of which Scripturesays," In a dream I will speak to him" (Num. xii. 6). Whenprophets are inspired in a dream, they by no means call this adream, although the prophecy reached them in a dream, butdeclare it decidedly to be a prophecy. Thus Jacob, our father, whenawaking from a prophetic dream, did not say it was a dream, butdeclared," Surely there is the Lord in this place," etc. (Gen. xxviii.16):" God the Almighty appeared to me in Luz, in the land ofCanaan" (ibid. xlviii. 3), expressing thereby that it was aprophecy. But in reference to Solomon we read And Solomonawoke, and behold it was a dream" (I Kings iii. 15). SimilarlyDaniel declares that he had a dream; although he sees an angel andhears his word, he speaks of the event as of a dream: even when hehad received the information [concerning the dreams ofNebukadnezzar], he speaks of it in the following mauner --" Thenwas the secret revealed to Daniel in a night vision (Dan. ii. 19). Onother occasions it is said," He wrote down the dream" " I saw inthe visions by night," etc.;" And the visions of my head confusedme" (Dan. vii. 1, 2, 15):" I was surprised at the vision, and nonenoticed it" (ibid. Viii. 27). There is no doubt that this is onedegree below that form of prophecy to which the words," In adream I will speak to him," are applied. For this reason the nationdesired to place the book of Daniel among the Hagiographa, andnot among the Prophets. I have, therefore, pointed out to you, thatthe prophecy revealed to Daniel and Solomon, although they sawan angel in the dream, was not considered by them as a perfectprophecy, but as a dream containing correct information. Theybelonged to the class of men that spoke, inspired by the ruahha-kodesh," the holy spirit." Also in the order of the holy writings,no distinction is made between the books of Proverbs,Ecclesiastes, Daniel, Psalms, Ruth, and Esther; they are all writtenby divine inspiration. The authors of all these books are calledprophets in the more general sense of the term.
(3) The third class is the lowest [class of actual prophets, i.e.) ofthose who introduce their speech by the phrase," And the word ofthe Lord came unto me," or a similar phrase. The prophet sees anallegory in a dream-under those conditions which we havementioned when speaking of real prophecy -- and in the propheticdream itself the allegory is interpreted. Such are most of theallegories of Zechariah.
(4) The prophet hears in a prophetic dream something clearly anddistinctly, but does not see the speaker. This was the case withSamuel in the beginning of his prophetic mission, as has beenexplained (chap. xliv.).
(5) A person addresses the prophet in a dream, as was the case insome of the prophecies of Ezekiel. Comp." And the man spakeunto me, Son of man," etc. (Ezek. xl. 4).
(6) An angel speaks to him in a dream; this applies to most of theprophets: e.g.," And an angel of God said to me in a dream ofnight" (Gen. xxxi. 11).
(7) In a prophetic dream it appears to the prophet as if God spoketo him. Thus Isaiah says," And I saw the Lord, and I heard thevoice of the Lord saying, Whom shall I send, and who will go forus ?" (Isa. vi. 1, 8). Micaiah, son of Imla, said likewise," I saw theLord" (I Kings xxii. ig).
(8) Something presents itself to the prophet in a prophetic vision;he sees allegorical figures, such as were seen by Abraham in thevision" between the pieces" (Gen. xv. 9, 10): for it was in a visionby daytime, as is distinctly stated.
(9) The prophet hears words in a prophetic vision; as, e.g., is saidin reference to Abraham," And behold, the word came to him,saying, This shall not be thine heir" (ibid. xv. 4).
(10) The prophet sees a man that speaks to him in a propheticvision: e.g., Abraham in the plain of Marare (ibid. xviii. 1), andJoshua in Jericho (josh. v. 13)
(11) He sees an angel that speaks to him in the vision, as was thecase when Abraham was addressed by an angel at the sacrifice ofIsaac (Gen. xxii. 15). This I hold to be-if we except Moses-thehighest degree a prophet can attain according to Scripture,provided he has, as reason demands, his rational faculties fullydeveloped. But it appears to me improbable that a prophet shouldbe able to perceive in a prophetic vision God speaking to him; theaction of the imaginative faculty does not go so far, and thereforewe do not notice this in the case of the ordinary prophets: Scripturesays expressly," In a vision I will make myself known, in a dreamI will speak to him"; the speaking is here connected with dream,the influence and the action of the intellect is connected withvision: comp. In a vision I will make myself known to him"(etvadda', hitpael. of yada', to know" but it is not said here that ina vision anything is heard from God. When 1, therefore, met withstatements in Scripture that a prophet heard words spoken to him,and that this took place in a vision, it occurred to me that the casein which God appears to address the prophet seems to be the onlydifference between a vision and a dream, according to the literalsense of the Scriptural text. But it is possible to explain thepassages in which a prophet is reported to have heard in the courseof a vision words spoken to him, in the following manner : at firsthe has had a vision, but subsequently he fell into a deep sleep, andthe vision was changed into a dream. Thus we explained thewords," And a deep deep fell upon Abram" (Gen. xy. 12): and ourSages remark thereon," This was a deep sleep of prophecy."According to this explanation. it is only in a dream that the prophetcan hear words addressed to him; it makes no difference in whatmanner words are spoken. Scripture supports this theory," In adream I will speak to him." But in a prophetic vision onlyallegories are perceived, or rational truths are obtained, that lead tosome knowledge in science, such as can be arrived at by reasoning.This is the meaning of the words," In a vision I will make myselfknown unto him." According to this second explanation, thedegrees of prophecy are reduced to eight, the highest of them beingthe prophetic vision, including all kinds of vision, even the case inwhich a man appears to address the prophet, as has beenmentioned. You will perhaps ask this question: among thedifferent degrees of prophecy there is one in which prophets, e.g.,Isaiah, Micaiah, appear to hear God addressing them; how can thisbe reconciled with the principle that all prophets are propheticallyaddressed through an angel, except Moses our Teacher, inreference to whom Scripture says," Mouth to mouth I speak tohim" (Num. xii. 8) ? I answer, this is really the case, the mediumhere being the imaginative faculty that hears in a prophetic dreamGod speaking; but Moses heard the voice addressing him" fromabove the covering of the ark from between the two cherubim"(Exod. xxv. 22) without the medium of the imaginative faculty. InMishne-torah we have given the characteristics of this kind ofprophecy, and explained the meaning of the phrases," Mouth tomouth I speak to him";" As man speaketh to his neighbour" (Exod.xxxiii. 11), and the like. Study it there, and 1 need not repeat whathas already been said.
CHAPTER XLVI
ONE individual may be taken as an illustration of the individualsof the whole species. From its properties we learn those of eachindividual of the species. I mean to say that the form of oneaccount of a prophecy illustrates all accounts of the same class.After this remark you will understand that a person maysometimes dream that he has gone to a certain country, marriedthere, stayed there for some time, and had a son, whom he gave acertain name, and who was in a certain condition [though nothingof all this has really taken place]: so also in prophetic allegoriescertain objects are seen, acts performed-if the style of the allegorydemands it-things are done by the prophet, the intervals betweenone act and another determined, and journeys undertaken from oneplace to another; but all these things are only processes of aprophetic vision, and not real things that could be perceived by thesenses of the body. Some of the accounts simply relate theseincidents [without premising that they are part of a vision],because it is a wellknown fact that all these accounts refer toprophetic visions, and it was not necessary to repeat in each case astatement to this effect.
Thus the prophet relates:" And the Lord said unto me," and neednot add the explanation that it was in a dream. The ordinary readerbelieves that the acts, journeys, questions, and answers of theprophets really took place, and were perceived by the senses, anddid not merely form part of a prophetic vision. I will mention herean instance concerning which no person will entertain the leastdoubt. I will add a few more of the same kind, and these will showyou how those passages must be understood which I do not cite.The following passage in Ezekiel (Viii- 1, 3) is clear, and admitsof no doubt:" I sat in mine house, and the elders of Judah satbefore me, etc., and a spirit lifted me up between the earth and theheaven, and brought me in the visions of God to Jerusalem," etc.:also the passage," Thus I arose and went into the plain" (iii. 2, 3),refers to a prophetic vision: just as the words," And he broughthim forth abroad, and said, Look now toward heaven and tell thestars, if thou be able to number them" (Gen. xv. 5) describe avision. The same is the case with the words of Ezekiel (xxxvii. 1),"And set me down in the midst of the valley." In the description ofthe vision in which Ezekiel is brought to Jerusalem, we read asfollows:" And when I looked, behold a hole in the wall. Then saidhe unto me, Son of man, dig now in the wall: and when I haddigged in the wall, behold a door" (ibid. viii. 7-8), etc. It was thusin a vision that he was commanded to dig in the wall, to enter andto see what people were doing there, and it was in the same visionthat he digged, entered through the hole, and saw certain things, asis related. just as all this forms part of a vision, the same may besaid of the following passages :" And thou take unto thee a tile,"etc.," and lie thou also on thy left side," etc.:" Take thou alsowheat and barley," etc.," and cause it to pass over thine head andupon thy beard" (chaps. iv. and v.) It was in a prophetic vision thathe saw that he did all these actions which he was commanded todo. God forbid to assume that God would make his prophetsappear an object of ridicule and sport in the eyes of the ignorant,and order them to perform foolish acts. We must also bear in mindthat the command given to Ezekiel implied Isobedience to theLaw, for he, being a priest, would, in causing the razor to pass overevery corner of the beard and of the head, have been guilty oftransgressing two prohibitions in each case. But it was only donein a prophetic vision. Again, when it is said," As my servant Isaiahwent naked and barefoot" ( Isa. xx. 3), the prophet did so in aprophetic vision. Weak-minded persons believe that the prophetrelates here what he was commanded to do, and what he actuallydid, and that he describes how he was commanded to dig in a wanon the Temple mount although he was in Babylon, and relates howhe obeyed the command, for he says," And I digged in the wall."But it is distinctly stated that all this took place in a vision.
It is analogous to the description of the vision of Abraham whichbegins,
The word of the Lord came to Abram in a vision, saying" (Gen.xv. 1): and contains at the same time the passage," He broughthim forth abroad, and said, Look now to the heaven and count thestars" (ibid. ver. 6). It is evident that it was in a vision thatAbraham saw himself brought forth from his place lookingtowards the heavens and being told to count the stars. This isrelated [without repeating the statement that it was in a vision].The same I say in reference to the command given to Jeremiah, toconceal the girdle in the Euphrates, and the statement that heconcealed it, examined it after a long time, and found it rotten andspoiled (Jer. xiii. 4-7). An this was allegorically shown in a vision;Jeremiah did not go from Palestine to Babylon, and did not see theEuphrates. The same applies to the account of the commandmentgiven to Hosea (i.-iii.) :" Take unto thee a wife of whoredom, andchildren of whoredom," to the birth of the children and to thegiving of names to them. All this passed in a prophetic vision.When once stated that these are allegories, there is left no doubtthat the events related had no real existence, except in the minds ofthose of whom the prophet says" And the vision of every one wasunto them like the words of a sealed book (Isa. xxix. 11). I believethat the trial of Gideon (judges Vi. 21, 27) with the fleece andother things was a vision. I do not call it a prophetic vision, asGideon had not reached the degree of prophets, much less thatheight which would enable him to do wonders. He only rose to theheight of the judges of Israel, and he has even been counted by ourSages among persons of little importance, as has been pointed outby us.
The same can be said of the passage in Zechariah (xi. 7)," And Ifed the flock of slaughter," and all the incidents that aresubsequently described: the graceful asking for wages, theacceptance of the wages, the wanting of the money, and the castingof the same into the house of the treasure: all these incidents formpart of the vision. He received the commandment and carried it outin a prophetic vision or dream.
The correctness of this theory cannot be doubted, and only thosedo not comprehend it who do not know to distinguish between thatwhich is possible, and that which is impossible. The instancesquoted may serve as an illustration of other similar Scripturalpassages not quoted by me. They are all of the same kind, and inthe same style. Whatever is said in the account of a vision, that theprophet heard, went forth, came out, said, was told, stood, sat,went up, went down, journeyed, asked, or was asked, all is part ofthe prophetic vision; even when there is a lengthened account, thedetails of which are well connected as regards the time, thepersons referred to, and the place. After it has once been statedthat the event described is to be understood figuratively, it must beassumed for certain that the whole is a prophetic vision.
CHAPTER XLVII
IT is undoubtedly clear and evident that most prophecies are givenin images, for this is the characteristic of the imaginative faculty,the organ of prophecy. We find it also necessary to say a fewwords on the figures, hyperboles, and exaggerations that occur inScripture. They would create strange ideas if we were to take themliterally without noticing the exaggeration which they contain, or ifwe were to understand them in accordance with the originalmeaning of the terms, ignoring the fact that these are usedfiguratively. Our Sages say distinctly Scripture uses hyperbolic orexaggerated language and quote as an instance," cities walled andfortified, rising up to heaven (Deut. i. 28). As a hyperbole ourSages quote," For the bird of heaven carries the voice" (Eccles. x.20): in the same sense it is said," Whose height is like that ofcedar trees" (Amos ii. 9). Instances of this kind are frequent in thelanguage of all prophets; what they say is frequently hyperbolic orexaggerated, and not precise or exact. What Scripture says aboutOg," Behold, his bedstead was an iron bedstead, nine cubits itslength," etc. (Deut.), does not belong to this class of figures, for thebedstead (eres, comp. arsenu, Song of Sol. i. 16) is never exactly,of the same dimensions as the person using it; it is not like a dressthat fits round the body; it is always greater than the person thatsleeps therein; as a rule, is it by a third longer. If, therefore, the bedof Og was nine cubits in length, he must, according to thisproportion, have been six cubits high, or a little more. The words,"by the cubit of a man," mean, by the measure of an ordinary man,and not by the measure of Og; for men have the limbs in a certainproportion. Scripture thus tells us that Og was double as long as anordinary person, or a little less. This is undoubtedly an exceptionalheight among men, but not quite impossible. As regards theScriptural statement about the length of man's life in those days, Isay that only the persons named lived so long, whilst other peopleenjoyed the ordinary length of life. The men named wereexceptions, either in consequence of different causes, as e.g., theirfood or mode of living, or by way of miracle, which admits of noanalogy.
We must further discuss the figurative language employed inScripture. In some cases this is clear and evident, and doubted byno person: e.g.," The mountains and hills shall break forth in songbefore you, and all the trees of the wood clap their hands" (Isa. Iv.12): this is evidently figurative language; also the followingpassage --" The fir-trees rejoice at thee," etc. (ibid. xiv. 8), whichis rendered by Jonathan, son of Uzziel," The rulers rejoice at thee,who are rich in possessions." This figure is similar to that used inthe phrase," Butter of kine and milk of sheep," etc. (Dent. xxxii.14).
And these figures are very frequent in the books of the prophets.Some are easily recognised by the ordinary reader as figures,others with some difficulty. Thus nobody doubts that the blessing,"May the Lord open to thee his good treasure, the heavens," must betaken figuratively; for God has no treasure in which He keeps therain. The same is the case with the following passage-" He openedthe doors of heaven, he rained upon them manna to eat" (PS.lxxviii. 23, 24). No person assumes that there is a door or gate inheaven, but every one understands that this is a simile and afigurative expression. In the same way must be understood thefollowing passages -- The heavens were opened" (Ezek. i. 1):" Ifnot, blot me out from thy book which thou hast written" (Exod.xxxii. 32);" I will blot him out from the book of life" (ibid. ver. 33). All these phrases are figurative: and we must not assume thatGod has a book in which He writes, or from which He blots out, asthose generally believe that do not find figurative speech in thesepassages. They are all of the same kind. You must explainpassages not quoted by me by those which I have quoted in thischapter. Employ your reason, and you will be able to discern whatis said allegorically, figuratively, or hyperbolically, and what ismeant literally, exactly according to the original meaning of thewords. You will then understand all prophecies, learn and retainrational principles of faith, pleasing in the eyes of God who is mostpleased with truth, and most displeased with falsehood; your mindand heart will not be so perplexed as to believe or accept as lawwhat is untrue or improbable, whilst the Law is perfectly true whenproperly understood. Thus Scripture says," Thy testimonies arerighteousness for ever" (Ps. cxix. 144): and" I the Lord speakrighteousness" (Isa. xlv. 19). If you adopt this method, you willnot imagine the existence of things which God has not created, oraccept principles which might partly lead to atheism, or to acorruption of your notions of God so as to ascribe to Himcorporeality, attributes, or emotions, as has been shown by us, norwill you believe that the words of the prophets are false: for thecause of this disease is ignorance of what we have explained.These things belong likewise to the mysteries of the Law; andalthough we have treated them in a general manner, they can easilybe understood in all their details in accordance with the aboveremarks.
CHAPTER XLVIII
IT is clear that everything produced must have an immediate causewhich produced it; that cause again a cause, and so on, till the FirstCause, viz., the will and decree of God is reached. The prophetstherefore omit sometimes the intermediate causes, and ascribe theproduction of an individual thing directly to God, saying that Godhas made it. This method is wen known, and we, as well as othersof those who seek the truth, have explained it; it is the belief of ourco-religionists.
After having heard this remark, listen to what I will explain in thischapter; direct your special attention to it more than you have doneto the other chapters of this part. It is this : As regards theimmediate causes of things produced, it makes no differencewhether these causes consist in substances, physical properties,freewill, or chance-by freewill I mean that of man -- or even in thewill of another living being. The prophets [omit them and] ascribethe production directly to God and use such phrases as, God hasdone it, commanded it, or said it: in all such cases the verbs" tosay,"" to speak," cc to command,"" to call," and" to send" areemployed. What I desired to state in this chapter is this :According to the hypothesis and theory accepted, it is God thatgave will to dumb animals, freewill to the human being, andnatural properties to everything; and as accidents originate in theredundancy of some natural force, as has been explained [byAristotlel and are mostly the result of the combined action ofnature, desire, and freewill : it can consequently be said ofeverything which is produced by any of these causes, that Godcommanded that it should be made, or said that it should be so. Iwill give you instances, and they will guide you in theinterpretation of passages which I do not mention. As regardsphenomena produced regularly by natural causes, such as themelting of the snow when the atmosphere becomes warm, theroaring of the sea when a storm rages [I quote the followingpassages]," He sendeth his word and melteth them" (Ps. cxlvii.18):" And he saith, and a storm-wind riseth, and lifteth up itswaves" (ibid. cvii. 25) In reference to the rain we read:" I willcommand the clouds that they shall not rain," etc. (Isa. v. 6).Events caused by man's freewill, such as war, the dominion of onenation over another, the attempt of one person to hurt another, orto insult him, [are ascribed to God, as] e.g., in reference to thedominion of Nebuchadnezzar and his host," I have commendedmy holy ones, also I have called my heroes for my anger (Isa. xiii.3): and" I will send him against a hypocrite nation" (ibid. x. 6) inreference to Shimei, son of Gera," For God said to him, CurseDavid" (2 Sam. xvi. 10): in reference to the deliverance of Joseph,the righteous, from prison," He sent an angel and loosed him" (Ps.cv. 20): in reference to the victory of the Persians over theChaldees," I will send to Babylon scatterers, and they shall scatterit" (Jer. li. 2): in reference to the providing of food to Eliah," Ihave commanded there a woman, a widow, to maintain thee" (IKings xvii. 9): and Joseph, the righteous, says:" Not ye have sentme hither," etc. (Gen. xlv. 8). The case that the will of an animal orits desire for some of its natural wants is the cause of some event,may be illustrated by the following instance :" And God spake untothe fish, and it vomited out Jonah" (ii. 11). The act is ascribed toGod, because He gave the fish the will, and not because He madeit a prophet or endowed it with a prophetical spirit. Similarly it issaid of the locusts that appeared in the days of Joel, son ofPethuel," Mighty is he that accomplishes his word" (Joel ii. 11): orof the beasts that took possession of the land of Edom whendestroyed in the days of Sennacherib," He cast lot for them, andhis hand divided it unto them by a line" (Isa. xxxiv. 27). Althoughhere the verbs" to say,"" to command,"" to send," are not used,the meaning is evidently the same, and you must explain allpassages that are analogous to it in a similar manner. Eventsevidently due to chance are ascribed to God: e.g., in reference toRebecca," Let her be a wife to the son of thy master, as the Lordspake" (Gen. xxiv. 51): in reference to David and Jonathan," Go,for the Lord has sent thee." (I Sam. xx. 22): in reference toJoseph," God sent me before you" (Gen. xlv. 7). You see clearlythat the providing of a cause, in whatever manner this may takeplace, by substance, accident, freewill, or win, is always expressedby one of the five terms, commanding, saying, speaking, sending,or calling. Note this, and apply it everywhere according to thecontext. Many difficulties will thereby be removed, and passagesapparently containing things far from truth will prove to be true.This is the conclusion of the treatise on Prophecy, its allegoriesand language. It is all I intend to say on this subject in this treatise.We will now commence to treat of other subjects, with the help ofthe Most High.
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PART THREE
INTRODUCTION
WE have stated several times that it is our primary object in thistreatise to expound, as far as possible, the Biblical account of theCreation (Ma'aseh bereshit) and the description of the DivineChariot (Ma'aseh Mercabah) in a manner adapted to the training ofthose for whom this work is written.
We have also stated that these subjects belong to the mysteries ofthe Law. You are well aware how our Sages blame those whoreveal these mysteries, and praise the merits of those who keepthem secret, although they are perfectly clear to the philosopher. Inthis sense they explain the passage," Her merchandise shall be forthem that dwell before the Lord, to eat sufficiently" (Isa. xxiii.18), which concludes in the original with the words ve-li-mekasseh'atik, i.e., that these blessings are promised to him who hidesthings which the Eternal has revealed [to him], viz., the mysteriesof the Law (Babyl. Talmud, Pesabim 119a). If you haveunderstanding you will comprehend that which our Sages pointedout. They have dearly stated that the Divine Chariot includesmatters too deep and too profound for the ordinary intellect. It hasbeen shown that a person favoured by Providence with reason tounderstand these mysteries is forbidden by the Law to teach themexcept viva voce, and on condition that the pupil possess certainqualifications, and even then only the heads of the sections may becommunicated. This has been the cause why the knowledge of thismystery has entirely disappeared from our nation, and nothing hasremained of it. This was unavoidable, for the explanation of thesemysteries was always communicated via voce, it was nevercommitted to writing. Such being the case, how can I venture tocall your attention to such portions of it as may be known,intelligible, and perfectly clear to me ? But if, on the other hand, Iwere to abstain from writing on this subject, according to myknowledge of it, when I die, as I shall inevitably do, thatknowledge would die with me, and I would thus inflict great injuryon you and all those who are perplexed [by these theologicalproblems]. I would then be guilty of withholding the truth fromthose to whom it ought to be communicated, and of jealouslydepriving the heir of his inheritance. I should in either case beguilty of gross misconduct.
To give a full explanation of the mystic passages of the Bible iscontrary to the Law and to reason; besides, my knowledge of themis based on reasoning, not on divine inspiration [and is thereforenot infallible]. I have not received my belief in this respect fromany teacher, but it has been formed by what 1 learnt from Scriptureand the utterances of our Sages, and by the philosophicalprinciples which I have adopted. It is therefore possible that myview is wrong, and that I misunderstood the passages referred to.Correct thought and divine help have suggested to me the propermethod, viz., to explain the words of the prophet Ezckiel in such amanner that those who will read my interpretation will believe thatI have not added anything to the contents of the text, but only, as itwere, translated from one language into another, or given a shortexposition of plain things. Those, however, for whom this treatisehas been composed, will, on reflecting on it and thoroughlyexamining each chapter, obtain a perfect and clear insight into allthat has been clear and intelligible to me. This is the utmost thatcan be done in treating this subject so as to be useful to all withoutfully explaining it.
After this introductory remark I ask you to study attentively thechapters which follow on this sublime, important, and grandsubject, which is the pin upon which everything hangs, and thepillar upon which everything rests.
CHAPTER I
IT is well known that there are men whose face is like that of otheranimals thus the face of some person is like that of a lion, that ofanother person like that of an ox, and so on: and man's face isdescribed according as the form of his face resembles the form ofthe face of other animals. By the expressions," the face of an ox,""the face of a lion,"" the face of an eagle" (Ezek, i. 10), theprophet describes a human face inclining towards the forms ofthese various species. This interpretation can be supported by twoproofs. First, the prophet says of the Hayyot in general that" theirappearance is this, they have the form of man" (ver. 5), and thenin describing each of the Hayyot he attributes to them the face of aman, that of an ox, that of a lion, and that of an eagle. Secondly, inthe second description of the Chariot, which is intended as asupplement to the first, the prophet says, Each hath four faces; theone is the face of a cherub, the second a man's face, the third alion's face, and the fourth that of an eagle (ibid. x. W. He thusclearly indicates that the terms" the face of an ox" and" the faceof a cherub" are identical. But cherub designates" a youth." Byanalogy we explain the two other terms-" the face of a lion" and"the face of an eagle" in the same manner." The face of the ox" hasbeen singled out on account of the etymology of the Hebrew termshor (ox), as has been indicated by me. It is impossible to assumethat this second description refers to the perception of anotherprophetic vision, because it concludes thus" This is the Hayyahwhich I saw at the river Chebar" (ibid. ver. 15). What we intendedto explain is now clear.
CHAPTER II
THE prophet says that he saw four Hayyot: each of them had fourfaces, four wings, and two hands, but on the whole their form washuman. Comp." They had the likeness of a man" (Ezek. i. 5). Thehands are also described as human hands, because these haveundoubtedly, as is well known, such a form as enables them toperform all manner of cunning work. Their feet are straight that isto say, they are without joints. This is the meaning of the phrase astraight foot," taken literally. Similarly our Sages say, the words,"And their feet were straight feet" (ibid. i. 7), show that the beingsabove do not sit. Note this likewise. The soles of the feet of theHayyot, the organs of walking, are described as different from thefeet of man, but the hands are like human hands. The feet areround, for the prophet says," like the sole of a round foot." Thefour Hayyot are closely joined together, there is no space orvacuum left between them. Comp." They were joined one toanother" (ibid. i. 9)." But although they were thus joined together,their faces and their wings were separated above" (ibid. ver. 11).Consider the expression" above" employed here, although thebodies were closely joined, their faces and their wings wereseparated, but only above. The prophet then states that they aretransparent; they are" like burnished brass" (ibid. ver, 7). He alsoadds that they are luminous. Comp." Their appearance was likeburning coals of fire" (ibid. ver. 13). This is all that has been saidas regards the form, shape, face, figure, wings, hands, and feet ofthe Hayyot. The prophet then begins to describe the motions ofthese Hayyot, namely, that they have a uniform motion, withoutany curvature, deviation, or deflexion :" They turned not whenthey went" (ver. 17). Each of the Hayyot moves in the direction ofits face. Comp." They went every one in the direction of his face"(ver. 9). Now, it is here clearly stated that each Hayyab went in thedirection of its face, but since each Hayyah has several faces, I ask,in the direction of which face ? In short, the four Hayyot do notmove in the same direction; for, if this were the case, a specialmotion would not have been ascribed to each of them: it would nothave been said," They went each one towards the side of his face."The motion of these Hayyot is further described as a running, soalso their returning is described as a running. Comp." And theHayyot ran, and returned as the appearance of a flash of lightning"(ver. 14), razoh being the infinitive of ruz," to run," and sbob theinfinitive instead of Aub," to return." The ordinary words, halochand bo," to go" and" to come," are not used, but such words asindicate running to and fro: and these are further explained by thephrase," As the appearance of a flash of lightning" (bazak, usedby the prophet, is identical with barak), for the lightning appears tomove very quickly; it seems to hasten and to run from a certainplace, and then to turn back and to come again to the place fromwhich it had started. This is repeated several times with the samevelocity. Jonathan, the son of Uzziel, renders the phrase razovashob thus: They move round the world and return at once, andare as swift as the appearance of lightning. This quick movementand return the Hayyah does not perform of its own accord, butthrough something outside of it, viz., the Divine Will; for" towhichever side it is the Divine Will that the Hayyah should move,thither the Hayyah moves," in that quick manner which isexpressed by" running and returning." This is implied in thewords," Whithersoever the spirit was to go they went (ver. 20):"They turned not when they went" (ver. 17). By" the spirit (ruah),the prophet does not mean" the wind," but" the intention," as wehave explained when discussing the homonym ruah (spirit). Themeaning of the phrase is, that whithersoever it is the Divine Willthat the Hayyah shall go, thither it runs. Jonathan, the son ofUzziel, gives a similar explanation : Towards the place whither itis the will to go, they go; they do not turn when they go. Theemployment of the future tense of the verbs yihyeh and yeleku inthis passage seems to imply that sometimes it will be the will ofGod that the Hayyah should move in one direction, in which it willin fact move, and at other times it will be His will that the Hayyahshould move in the opposite direction, in which it will then move.An explanation is, however, added, which is contrary to/thisconclusion, and shows that the future form (yihyeh) of the verb hashere the meaning of the preterite, as is frequently the case inHebrew. The direction in which God desires the Hayyah to movehas already been determined and fixed, and the Hayyah moves inthat direction which His will has determined long ago, withouthaving ever changed. The prophet, therefore, in explaining, and atthe same time concluding [this description of the Hayyot], says,"Whithersoever the spirit was to go they go, thither was the spirit togo" (ver. 20). Note this wonderful interpretation. This passageforms likewise part of the account of the motion of the four Hayyotwhich follows the description of their form.
Next comes the description of another part; for the prophet relatesthat he saw a body beneath the Hayyot, but closely joining them.This body, which is connected with the earth, consists likewise offour bodies, and has also four faces. But no distinct form isascribed to it: neither that of man nor that of any other livingbeing. The [four bodies] are described as great, tremendous, andterrible; no form is given to them, except that they are coveredwith eyes. These are the bodies called Ofannim (lit. wheels). Theprophet therefore says:" Now, as I beheld the Rayyot, behold onewheel upon the earth beside the living creatures, with his fourfaces" (ver. 15). He thus distinctly states that the 0fannim form abody, of which the one part touches the Hayyot, and the other partthe earth; and that the Ofan has four faces. But he continues --"The appearance of the Ofannim (wheels) and their work was likeunto the colour of a beryl: and they four had one likeness" (ver.16). By speaking of four Ofannim, after having mentioned onlyone Ofan, the prophet indicates that the" four faces" and the" fourOfannim" are identical. These four Olannim have the same form;comp.," And they four had one likeness." The Ofannim are thendescribed as partly inter-joined; for" their appearance and theirwork was as it were a wheel in the middle of a wheel (ver. 16). Inthe description of the Hayyot such a phrase, with the term in themiddle of" (tok) is not employed. The Vayyot are partly joined,according to the words," they were joined one to another" (ver.11): whilst in reference to the Ofannim it is stated that they arepartly intermixed," as it were a wheel in the middle of a wheel"The body of the Olannim is described as being covered with eyes;it is possible that a body covered with real eyes is here meant, or abody with different colours ['ayin denoting" eye," also" colour" ],as in the phrase" the colour thereof ['eno] as the colour (ke'en) ofbdellium" (Num. xi. 7): or a body filled with likenesses of things.In this latter sense the term ayin is used by our Sages in phraseslike the following:Like that [ke'en] which he has stolen, like that[ke'en] which he has robbed; or different properties and qualitiesare meant, according to the meaning of the word 'ayin in thepassage," It may be that the Lord will look (be'enai) on mycondition" (2 Sam. xvi. 12). So much for the form of the Ofannim.Their motion is described as being without curvature anddeviation; as being straight, without any change. This is expressedin the words," When they went, they went upon their four sides:and they turned not when they went" (E.: ver. 117). The fourOfannim do not move of their own accord, as the Hayyot, and haveno motion whatever of their own; they are set in motion by otherbeings, as is emphatically stated twice. The Hayyot are the movingagents of the Ofannim. The relation between the Ofan and theHayyah may be compared to the relation between a lifeless bodytied to the hand or the leg of a living animal; whithersoever thelatter moves, thither moves also the piece of wood, or the stone,which is tied to the named limb of the animal. This is expressed inthe following words :--" And when the Hayyot went, the Ofannimwent by them; and when the living creatures were lifted up fromthe earth, the Ofannim were lifted up" (ver. 19):" and theOfannim were lifted up over against them" (ver. 20). And thecause of this is explained thus :-" The spirit of the Hayyah was inthe Ofannim" (ibid.). For the sake of emphasis and furtherexplanation the prophet adds," When those went, these went; andwhen those stood, these stood; and when those were lifted up fromthe earth, the Ofannim were lifted up over against them; for thespirit of the Hayyah was in the Ofannin" (ver. 2 1). The order ofthese movements is therefore as follows :-Whithersoever it is thewill of God that the Hayyot should move, thither they move oftheir own accord. When the Hayyot move the Ofannim necessarilyfollow them, because they are tied to them, and not because theymove of their own accord in the direction in which the Hayyotmove. This order is expressed in the words," Whithersoever thespirit was to go, they went, thither was the spirit to go; and theOfannim were lifted up over against them: for the spirit of theHayyah was in the Ofannim" (ver. 20). I have told you thatJonathan, the son of Uzziel, translates the verse thus," to the placewhither it was the will that the ffayyot should go," etc.
After having completed the account of the Hayyot, with their formand motion, and of the Ofannim, which are beneath the Hayyot,connected with them and forced to move when the Hayyot move,the prophet begins to describe a third object which he perceivedprophetically, and gives the account of a new thing, viz., of thatwhich is above the Hayyot. He says that the firmament is above thefour Hayyot, above the firmament is the likeness of a throne, andover the throne the likeness of the appearance of mar. This is thewhole account of what the prophet perceived at first at the riverChebar.
CHAPTER III
WHEN Ezekiel recalled to memory the form of the Chariot, whichhe described in the beginning of the book, the same visionpresented itself to him a second time; in this vision he was borneto Jerusalem. He explains in describing it things which have notbeen made clear at first, e.g., he substitutes the term" cherubim"for Hayyot, whereby he expresses that the Hayyot of the first visionare likewise angels like the cherubim. He says, therefore:" Wherethe cherubims went, the Ofannim went by them: and when thecherubims lifted up their wings to mount up from the earth, thesame Ofannim also turned not from beside them" (x. 16). By thesewords he shows how closely connected the two motions are [viz.,that of the Rayyot and that of the Ofannim]. The prophet adds,"This is the Hayyah that I saw under the God of Israel by the riverof Chebar: and I knew that they were cherubims" (ver. 20). Hethus describes the same forms and the same motions, and statesthat the Hayyot and the cherubim are identical. A second point isthen made clear in this second description, namely, that theOfannim are spherical; for the prophet says," As for the Ofannim,it was cried unto them in my hearing, o sphere" (ver. 13). A thirdpoint concerning the Ofannim is illustrated here in the followingwords:" To the place whither the head looked they followed it:they turned not as they went" (ver. 11). The motion of theOfannim is thus described as involuntary, and directed" to theplace whither the head looketh: and of this it is stated that itmoves" whither the spirit is to go" (i. 20). A fourth point is addedconcerning the Ofannim, namely," And the Ofannim were full ofeyes round about, even the Ofannim that they four had" (x. 12).This has not been mentioned before. In this second descriptionthere are further mentioned" their flesh, and their backs, and theirhands, and their wings" (ibid.), whilst in the first account none ofthese is mentioned: and it is only stated that they are bodies.Though they are endowed in the second account with flesh, hands,and wings, no form is given to them. In the second account eachOfan is attributed to a cherub," one Ofan by one cherub, andanother Ofan by another cherub." The four Hayyot are thendescribed as one Hayyah on account of their interjoining:" This isthe Hayyah that I saw under the God of Israel by the river ofChebar" (ver. 20). Also the Olannim, though being four innumber, as has been mentioned, are called" one Ofan upon theearth" (ver. 15), because they interjoin, and" they four have onelikeness" (ver. 16). This is the additional explanation which thesecond vision gives of the form of the Hayyot and the Ofannim.
CHAPTER IV
IT is necessary to call your attention to an idea expressed byjonathan, the son of Uzziel. When he saw that the prophet says inreference to the Ofannim," It was cried unto them in my hearing,O gilgal" (" sphere" ) (x. 13), he assumed that by Ofannim theheavens are meant, and rendered Ofan by gilgal," sphere," andOfannim by gilgelaya," spheres." I have no doubt that he found aconfirmation of his opinion in the words of the prophet that theOfannim were like unto the colour of tarshish (ver. 16), a colourascribed to the heavens, as is well known. When he, therefore,noticed the passage," Now as I beheld the Hayyot, behold oneOlan upon the earth" (i. 15), which clearly shows that theOfannim were upon the earth, he had a difficulty in explaining it inaccordance with his opinion. Following, however, hisinterpretation, he explains the terms erez, employed here asdenoting the inner surface of the heavenly sphere, which may beconsidered as erez (" earth" or" below" ), in relation to all that isabove that surface. He therefore translates the words ofan ehadba-arez, as follows:" One ofan was below the height of theheavens." Consider what his explanation of the passage must be. Ithink that he gave this explanation because he thought that gilgaldenotes in its original meaning" heaven." My opinion is that gilgalmeans originally" anything rolling"; comp." And I will roll thee(ve-gilgaltika) down from the rocks" (jer. li. 25):" and rolled(va-yagel) the stone" (Gen. xidx. 10): the same meaning the wordhas in the phrase:" Like a rolling thing (galgal) before thewhirlwind" (Isa. xvii. 13). The poll of the head, being round, istherefore called gulgolet: and because everything round rollseasily, every spherical thing is called gilgal: also the heavens arecalled gilgallim on account of their spherical form. Thus our Sagesuse the phrase," It is a wheel (gilgal) that moves round the world": and a wooden ball, whether small or large, is called gilgal. If so,the prophet merely intended by the words," As for the Olannim, itis cried to them in my hearing, 0 sphere" (gilgal), to indicate theshape of the Ofannim, as nothing has been mentioned beforerespecting their form and shape; but he did not mean to say thatthe Ofannim are the same as the heavens. The term" like tarshish"is explained in the second account, in which it is said of theOfannim :" And the appearance of the Ofannim was like thecolour of tarshish." This latter passage is translated by jonathan,the son of Uzziel," like the colour of a precious stone," exactly inthe same manner as Onkelos translates the phrase ke-ma'ase libnatha-sappir," like the work of the whiteness of sapphire" (Exod.xxix. 10). Note this. You will not find it strange that I mention theexplanation of jonathan, son of Uzziel, whilst I gave a differentexplanation myself: for you will find many of the wise men andthe commentators differ sometimes from him in the interpretationof words and in many things respecting the prophets. Why shouldit be otherwise in these profound matters ? Besides, I do not decidein favour of my interpretation. It is for you to learn both-the wholeof his explanation, from what I have pointed out to you, and alsomy own opinion. God knoweth which of the two explanations is inaccordance with that which the prophet intended to say.
CHAPTER V
IT is necessary to notice that the plural marot elohim," visions ofGod," is here used, and not the singular mareh," vision," for therewere several things, of different kinds, that were perceived by theprophet. The following three things were perceived by him: theOlannim, the Hayyot, and the man above the Hayyot. Thedescription of each of these visions is introduced by the wordva-ereh," and I beheld?' For the account of the Hayyot, begins,"And I looked (va-ereh), and behold a whirlwind," etc. (Ezek. i. 4).The account of the Ofannim begins :" Now as I beheld (va-ereh)the Hayyot, behold one ofan upon the earth" (ver. 15). The visionof that which is above the Hayyot in order and rank begins:" And Isaw (va-ereh) as the colour of the amber, etc., from the appearanceof his loins even upward" (ver. 27). The word va-ereh," and Ibeheld," only occurs these three times in the description of theMercabah. The doctors of the Mishnah have already explained thisfact, and my attention was called to it by their remarks. For theysaid that only the two first visions, namely, that of the Rayyot andthe Ofannim, might be interpreted to others; but of the third vision,viz., that of the hashmal and all that is connected with it, only theheads of the sections may be taught. Rabbi [Jehudah], the Holy, isof opinion that all the three visions are called ma'aseh mercabah,and nothing but the heads of the sections could be communicatedto others. The exact words of the discussion are as follows:--Where does maaseh mereabhah end ? Rabbi says, with the lastva-ereh; Rabbi YizIiak says it ends at the word hashmal (ver. 27).The portion from va-ereh to hashmal may be fully, taught; of thatwhich follows, only the heads of the sections; according to some itis the passage from va-ereh to hashmal, of which the heads of thesections may be taught, but that which follows may only be studiedby those who possess the capacity, whilst those that cannot study itby themselves must leave it. -- It is clear from the words of ourSages that different visions are described, as may also be inferredfrom the repetition of the word va-ereh, and that these visions aredifferent from each other in degree: the last and highest of them isthe vision commencing," And I saw as the colour of hashmal" :that is to say, the divided figure of the man, described as" theappearance of fire, etc., from the appearance of his loins evenupward, and from the appearance of his loins even downward,"etc. There is a difference of opinion among our Sages whether it ispermitted to give by way of hints an exposition of any part of thisthird vision, or whether it is prohibited even to teach of it theheads of the sections, so that only the wise can arrive atunderstanding it by their own studies. You will also notice adifference of opinion among our Sages in reference to the two firstvisions, viz., that of the Hayyot and that of the Olannim whetherthese may be taught explicitly or only by way of hints, darksayings, and heads of sections. You must also notice the order ofthese three visions. First comes the vision of the HaYyot, becausethey are first in rank and in the causal relation, as it is said," Forthe spirit of the Hayyah was in the Olannim," and also for otherreasons. The vision of the Ofannim [comes next, and] is followedby one which is higher than the Hayyot, as has been shown. Thecause of this arrangement is, that in study the first two mustnecessarily precede the third, and in fact they lead to it.
CHAPTER VI
THE sublime and great subject which Ezekiel by propheticimpulse began to teach us in the description of the Mercabah, isexactly the same which Isaiah taught us in general outlines,because he did not require all the detail. Isaiah says," I saw theLord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up, and his train filledthe temple. Above it stood seraphims," etc. (Isa. vi. 1 seq.). OurSages have already stated all this clearly, and called our attentionto it. For they say that the vision of Ezekiel is the same as that ofIsaiah, and illustrate their view by the following simile :-Two mensaw the king riding, the one a townsman, the other a countryman.The former, seeing that his neighbours know well how the kingrides, simply tells them that he saw the king; but the villager,wishing to tell his friends things which they do not know, relates indetail how the king was riding, describes his followers, and theofficers who execute his order and command. This remark is amost useful hint; it is contained in the following passage (Hagigab,13 b) :" Isaiah saw all that has been seen by Ezekiel: Isaiah is likea townsman that sees the king, Ezekiel like a countryman that seesthe king." These words can be explained in the manner which Ihave just mentioned, viz., the generation of Isaiah did not requirethe detailed description: his account," I saw the Lord," etc.,sufficed. The generation of the Babylonian exile wanted to learnall the details. It is, however, possible that the author of this sayingheld Isaiah as more perfect than Ezekiel, so that the vision mighthave overawed Ezekiel and appeared fearful to him; but Isaiah wasso familiar with it that he did not consider it necessary tocommunicate it to others as a new thing, especially as it was wellknown to the intelligent.
CHAPTER VII
ONE Of the points that require investigation is the connexionbetween the vision of the mercabah and the year, month, and day,and also the place of the vision. A reason must be found for thisconnexion, and we must not think that it is an indifferent elementin the vision. We must consider the words," the heavens wereopened" (Ezek. i. 1): they give the key to the understanding of thewhole. The figure of opening, also that of opening the gates,occurs frequently in the books of the prophets: e.g.," Open ye thegates that the righteous nation may enter in" (Isa. xxvi. 2):" Heopened the doors of heaven" (Ps. lxx-viii. 23):" Lift them up, yeeverlasting doors" (ibid. xxiv. 9):" Open to me the gates ofrighteousness, I will go into them, and I will praise the Lord" (ibid.cxviii. 19). There are many other instances of this kind. You mustfurther notice that the whole description refers undoubtedly to aprophetic vision, as it is said," And the hand of the Lord was thereupon him" (Ezek. i. 3): and yet there is a very great differencebetween the various parts of the description, for in the account ofthe Hayyot the prophet does not say four Hayyot, but" the likenessof the four Hayyot" (ibid. ver. 5): similarly he says," And thelikeness of a firmament was over the heads of the Hayyot" ver.22):" as the appearance of a sapphire stone, the likeness of athrone," and" the likeness of the appearance of man above it" (ver.26). In all these instances the word" likeness" is used, whilst inthe account of the Ofannim the phrases," the likeness ofOlannim," the" likeness of an Ofan," are not employed, but theyare described in a positive manner as beings in actual existence,with their real properties. The sentence" they four had onelikeness" must not mislead you, for here the word" likeness" isnot used in the same connexion or in the same sense as indicatedabove. In the description of the last vision the prophet confirmsand explains this view. When he commences to describe thefirmament in detail, he says," the firmament," without adding thewords" the likeness of," for he says," And I looked, and behold, inthe firmament that was above the head of the cherubims thereappeared over them as it were a sapphire stone, as the appearanceof the likeness of a throne" (x. 1). Here the prophet speaks of" thefirmament" and not of" the likeness of the firmament," as he doeswhen he connects the firmament with the heads of the likeness ofthe Hayyot (i. 22). But, as regards the throne, he says," thelikeness of a throne appeared over them," in order to indicate thatthe firmament was first perceived and then the likeness of thethrone was seen over it. Consider this well.
You must further notice that in the description of the first visionthe Hayyot have wings and at the same time human hands, whilstin the second vision, in which the term cherubim is substituted forHayyot, at first only wings were perceived, and later on humanhands were seen. Comp." And there appeared in the cherubims theform of a man's hand under their wings" (x. 8). Here" form"(tabnit) is used instead of" likeness" (demut): and the hands areplaced under the wings. Note this.
Consider that in reference to the ofannim, the prophet says,le-'ummatam," over against them," although he does not ascribe tothem any form.
He further says," As the appearance of the bow that is in the cloudin the day of rain, so was the appearance of the brightness roundabout. This was the appearance of the likeness of the glory," etc. (i.28). The substance and true essence of the bow described here iswell known. The simile and comparison is in this case veryextraordinary, and is undoubtedly part of the prophecy; and note itwell.
It is also noteworthy that the likeness of man above the throne isdivided, the upper part being like the colour of hashmal, the lowerpart like the appearance of fire. As regards the word hashmal, ithas been explained to be a compound of two words bash and mal,including two different notions, viz., bash signifying" swiftness,"and mal denoting" pause." The two different notions are herejoined in one word in order to indicate figuratively the twodifferent parts, -the upper part and the lower. We have alreadygiven a second explanation, namely, that hashmal includes the twonotions of speech and silence: in accordance with the saying of ourSages," At times they are silent, at times they speak," thusderiving bash of the same root as heheshethi," I have been silent"(Isa. xlii. 14);' the word hashmal thus includes two notions, andindicates" speech without sound." There is no doubt that thewords," at times they are silent, at times they speak," refer to acreated object. Now consider how they clearly stated that thedivided likeness of man over the throne does not represent God,who is above the whole chariot, but represents a part of thecreation. The prophet likewise says" that is the likeness of theglory of the Lord" : but" the glory of the Lord" is different from"the Lord" Himself, as has been shown by us several times. All thefigures in this vision refer to the glory of the Lord, to the chariot,and not to Him who rides upon the chariot; for God cannot becompared to anything. Note this. I have thus given you also in thischapter as much of the heads of the sections as will be useful toyou for the comprehension of this subject, if you fill out [thesections of] these heads. If you consider all that has been said inthis part up to this chapter, the greater part of this subject or thewhole of it will be clear to you. except a few points and somerepetitions the meaning of which is unknown. Perhaps furtherstudy will help to reveal even these things so that nothing willremain unintelligible.
Do not expect or hope to hear from me after this chapter a word onthis subject, either explicitly or implicitly, for all that could be saidon it has been said, though with great difficulty and struggle. I willnow begin to treat of some of the other subjects which I hope toelucidate in this treatise.
CHAPTER VIII
TRANSIENT bodies are only subject to destruction through theirsubstance and not through their form, nor can the essence of theirform be destroyed: in this respect they are permanent. The genericforms, as you know, are all permanent and stable. Form can onlybe destroyed accidentally, i.e., on account of its connexion withsubstance, the true nature of which consists in the property ofnever being without a disposition to receive form. This is thereason why no form remains permanently in a substance; aconstant change takes place, one form is taken off and another isput on. How wonderfully wise is the simile of King Solomon, inwhich he compares matter to a faithless wife: for matter is neverfound without form, and is therefore always like such a wife whois never without a husband, never single; and yet, though beingwedded, constantly seeks another man in the place of her husband:she entices and attracts him in every possible manner till heobtains from her what her husband has obtained. The same is thecase with matter. Whatever form it has, it is disposed to receiveanother form; it never leaves off moving and casting off the formwhich it has in order to receive another. The same takes placewhen this second form is received. It is therefore clear that allcorruption, destruction, or defect comes from matter. Take, e.g.,man; his deformities and unnatural shape of limbs; all weakness,interruption, or disorder of his actions, whether innate or not,originate in the transient substance, not in the form. All otherliving beings likewise die or become ill through the substance ofthe body and not through its form. Man's shortcomings and sins areall due to the substance of the body and not to its form; while allhis merits are exclusively due to his form. Thus the knowledge ofGod, the formation of ideas, the mastery of desire and passion, thedistinction between that which is to be chosen and that which is tobe rejected, all these man owes to his form; but eating, drinking,sexual intercourse, excessive lust, passion, and all vices, have theirorigin in the substance of his body. Now it was dear that this wasthe case, -- it was impossible, according to the wisdom of God,that substance should exist without form, or any of the forms ofthe bodies without substance, and it was necessary that the verynoble form of man, which is the image and likeness of God, as hasbeen shown by us, should be joined to the substance of dust anddarkness, the source of all defect and loss. For these reasons theCreator gave to the form of man power, rule, and dominion overthe substance;-- the form can subdue the substance, refuse thefulfilment of its desires, and reduce them, as far as possible, to ajust and proper measure. The station of man varies according tothe exercise of this power. Some persons constantly strive tochoose that which is noble, and to seek perpetuation in accordancewith the direction of their nobler part,-- their form: their thoughtsare engaged in the formation of ideas, the acquisition of trueknowledge about everything, and the union with the divineintellect which flows down upon them, and which is the source ofman's form. Whenever they are led by the wants of the body to thatwhich is low and avowedly disgraceful, they are grieved at theirposition, they feel ashamed and confounded at their situation.They try with all their might to diminish this disgrace, and to guardagainst it in every possible way. They feel like a person whom theking in his anger ordered to remove refuse from one place toanother in order to put him to shame; that person tries as much aspossible to hide himself during the time of his disgrace: he perhapsremoves a small quantity a short distance in such a manner that hishands and garments remain clean, and he himself be unnoticed byhis fellow-men. Such would be the conduct of a free man, whilst aslave would find pleasure in such work;-- he would not consider ita great burden, but throw himself into the refuse, smear his faceand his hands, carry the refuse openly, laughing and singing. Thisis exactly the difference in the conduct of different men. Someconsider, as we just said, all wants of the body as shame, disgrace,and defect to which they are compelled to attend: this is chiefly thecase with the sense of touch, which is a disgrace to us according toAristotle, and which is the cause of our desire for eating, drinking,and sensuality. Intelligent persons must, as much as possible,reduce these wants, guard against them, feel grieved whensatisfying them, abstain from speaking of them, discussing them,and attending to them in company with others. Man must havecontrol over all these desires, reduce them as much as possible,and only retain of them as much as is indispensable. His aim mustbe the aim of man as man, viz., the formation of ideas, and nothingelse. The best and sublimest among them is the idea which manforms of God, angels, and the rest of the creation according to hiscapacity. Such men are always with God, and of them it is said,"Ye are princes, and all of you are children of the Most High" (Ps.lxxxii. 6). This is man's task and purpose. Others, however, thatare separated from God form the multitude of fools, and do just theopposite. They neglect all thought and all reflection on ideas, andconsider as their task the cultivation of the sense of touch,-- thatsense which is the greatest disgrace: they only think and reasonabout eating and love. Thus it is said of the wicked who aredrowned in eating, drinking, and love," They also have erredthrough wine, and through strong drink are out of the way," etc.(Isa. xxviii. 7)," for all tables are full of vomit and filthiness, sothat there is no place clean" (ver. 8): again," And women rule overthem" (ibid. iii. 2),-- the opposite of that which man was told inthe beginning of the creation," And for thy husband shall thydesire be, and he shall rule over thee" (Gen. iii. 16). The intensityof their lust is then described thus," Every one neighed after hisneighbour's wife," etc. (Jer. v. 8):" they are all adulterers, anassembly of treacherous men" (ibid. ix. 2). The whole book of theProverbs of Solomon treats of this subject, and exhorts to abstainfrom lust and intemperance. These two vices ruin those that hateGod and keep far from Him; to them the following passages maybe applied," They are not the Lord's" (ibid. v. 10):" Cast them outof my sight, and let them go forth" (ibid. xv. 1). As regards theportion beginning," Who can find a virtuous woman ?" it is clearwhat is meant by the figurative expression," a virtuous woman."When man possesses a good sound body that does not overpowerhim nor disturb the equilibrium in him, he possesses a divine gift.In short, a good constitution facilitates the rule of the soul over thebody, but it is not impossible to conquer a bad constitution bytraining. For this reason King Solomon and others wrote the morallessons; also all the commandments and exhortations in thePentateuch aim at conquering the desires of the body. Those whodesire to be men in truth, and not brutes, having only theappearance and shape of men, must constantly endeavour toreduce the wants of the body, such as eating, love, drinking, anger,and all vices originating in lust and passion; they must feelashamed of them and set limits to them for themselves. As foreating and drinking in so far as it is indispensable, they will eatand drink only as much as is useful and necessary as food, and notfor the purpose of pleasure. They will also speak little of thesethings, and rarely congregate for such purposes. Thus our Sages, asis well known, kept aloof from a banquet that was not part of areligious act, and pious men followed the example of R. Phinebas,son of jair, who never dined with other persons, and even refusedto accept an invitation of R. jehudah, the Holy. Wine may betreated as food, if taken as such, but to form parties for the purposeof drinking wine together must be considered more disgracefulthan the unrestrained conduct of persons who in daylight meet inthe same house undressed and naked. For the natural action of thedigestive organ is indispensable to man, he cannot do without it;whilst drunkenness depends on the free will of an evil man. Toappear naked in the presence of other people is misconduct onlyaccording to public opinion, not according to the dictates ofreason, whilst drunkenness, which ruins the mind and the body ofman, reason stamps as a vice. You, therefore, who desire to act ashuman beings must keep away from it, and even from speaking ofit. On sexual intercourse, I need not add anything after I havepointed out in the commentary on Abot (i. 17) how it- is treated byour Law, which is the teaching of pure wisdom-no excusewhatever should induce us to mention it or to speak of it. Thus ourSages said, that Elisha the prophet is called holy, because he didnot think of it, and consequently never found himself polluted withsemen. In a similar manner they say that Jacob had the first issueof semen for the conception of Reuben. All these traditionalstories have the object of teaching the nation humane conduct.There is a well-known saying of our Sages," The thoughts aboutthe sin are more dangerous than the sin itself." I can offer a goodexplanation of this saying: When a person is disobedient, this isdue to certain accidents connected with the corporeal element inhis constitution; for man sins only by his animal nature, whereasthinking is a faculty of man connected with his form,-- a personwho thinks sinfully sins therefore by means of the nobler portionof his self: and he who wrongly causes a foolish slave to work doesnot sin as much as he who wrongly causes a noble and free man todo the work of a slave. For this specifically human element, withall its properties and powers, should only be employed in suitablework, in attempts to join higher beings, and not in attempts to godown and reach the lower creatures. You know how we condemnlowness of speech, and justly so, for speech is likewise peculiar toman and a boon which God granted to him that he may bedistinguished from the rest of living creatures. Thus God says,"Who gave a mouth to man ?" (Exod. iv.11): and the prophetdeclares," The Lord God hath given me a learned tongue" (Isa. 1.4). This gift, therefore, which God gave us in order to enable us toperfect ourselves, to learn and to teach, must not be employed indoing that which is for us most degrading and perfectlydisgraceful; we must not imitate the songs and tales of ignorantand lascivious people. It may be suitable to them, but is not fit forthose who are told," And ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priestsand a holy nation" (Exod. xix. 6). Those who employ the facultyof thinking and speaking in the service of that sense which is nohonour to us, who think more than necessary of drink and love, oreven sing of these things: they employ and use the divine gift inacts of rebellion against the Giver, and in the transgression of Hiscommandments. To them the following words may be applied:"And I multiplied her silver and gold, which they prepared for Baal" (Hos. ii. 10). I have also a reason and cause for calling ourlanguage the holy language-do not think it is exaggeration or erroron my part, it is perfectly correct-the Hebrew language has nospecial name for the organ of generation in females or in males,nor for the act of generation itself, nor for semen, nor for secretion.The Hebrew has no original expressions for these things, and onlydescribes them in figurative language and by way of hints, as if toindicate thereby that these things should not be mentioned, andshould therefore have no names; we ought to be silent about them,and when we are compelled to mention them, we must manage toemploy for that purpose some suitable expressions, although theseare generally used in a different sense. Thus the organ ofgeneration in males is called in Hebrew gid, which is a figurativeterm, reminding of the words, And thy neck is an iron sinew" (gid)(Isa. xlviii. 4). It is also called shupka, pouring out 'I (Deut. xxiii.2), on account of its function. The female organ is called kobah(Num. xxv. 8), from kebab (Dent. xviii. 3), which denotes"stomach" : rehem," womb," is the inner organ in which the foetusdevelops; zoah (Isa. xxviii. 8)," refuse," is derived from the verbyaza," he went out"; for" urine" the phrase meme raglayim," thewater of the feet" (2 Kings. xviii. 17), is used; semen is expressedby shikbat zera'," a layer of seed." For the act of generation thereis no expression whatever in Hebrew: it is described by thefollowing words only: ba'al," he was master" : shakab," he lay" :lakah," he took"; gillah 'ervah," he uncovered the nakedness." Benot misled by the word yishgalennah (Deut. xxviii. 30), to take itas denoting that act: this is not the case, for shegal denotes afemale ready for cohabitation. Comp." Upon thy right hand didstand the maiden" (shegal)" in gold of Ophir" (Ps. xlv. io).Yishgalennah, according to the Kethib, denotes therefore he willtake the female for the purpose of cohabitation."
We have made in the greater part of this chapter a digression fromthe theme of this treatise, and introduced some moral and religiousMatter, although they do not entirely belong to the subject of thistreatise, but the course of the discussion has led to it.
CHAPTER IX
THE corporeal element in man is a large screen and partition thatprevents him from perfectly perceiving abstract ideals: this wouldbe the case even if the corporeal element were as pure and superioras the substance of the spheres; how much more must this be thecase with our dark and opaque body. However great the exertion ofour mind may be to comprehend the Divine Being or any of theideals, we find a screen and partition between Him and ourselves.Thus the prophets frequently hint at the existence of a partitionbetween God and us. They say He is concealed from us in vapours,in darkness, in mist, or in a thick cloud: or use similar figures toexpress that on account of our bodies we are unable tocomprehend His essence. This is the meaning of the words,"Clouds and darkness are round about Him" (Ps. xcvii. 2). Theprophets tell us that the difficulty consists in the grossness of oursubstance: they do not imply, as might be gathered from the literalmeaning of their words, that God is corporeal, and is invisiblebecause He is surrounded by thick clouds, vapours, darkness, ormist. This figure is also expressed in the passage," He madedarkness His secret place" (Ps. xviii. 12). The object of Godrevealing Himself in thick clouds, darkness, vapours, and mist wasto teach this lesson; for every prophetic vision contains somelesson by means of allegory; that mighty vision, therefore, thoughthe greatest of all visions, and above all comparison, viz., Hisrevelation in a thick cloud, did not take place without any purpose,it was intended to indicate that we cannot comprehend Him onaccount of the dark body that surrounds us. It does not surroundGod, because He is incorporeal. A tradition is current among ourpeople that the day of the revelation on Mount Sinai was misty,cloudy, and a little rainy. Comp." Lord, when thou wentest forthfrom Seir, when thou marchedst out of the field of Edom, the earthtrembled, and the heavens dropped water" (judges v. 4). The sameidea is expressed by the words" darkness, clouds, and thickdarkness" (Deut. iv. 11). The phrase does not denote that darknesssurrounds God, for with Him there is no darkness, but the great,strong, and permanent light, which, emanating from Him,illuminates all darkness, as is expressed by the prophetic simile,"And the earth shined with His glory" (Ezek. xliii. 2).
CHAPTER X
THE Mutakallemim, as I have already told you, apply the termnon-existence only to absolute non-existence, and not to theabsence of properties. A property and the absence of that propertyare considered by them as two opposites, they treat, e.g., blindnessand sight, death and life, in the same way as heat and cold.Therefore they say, without any qualification, nonexistence doesnot require any agent, an agent is required when something isproduced. From a certain point of view this is correct. Althoughthey hold that non-existence does not require an agent, they say inaccordance with their principle that God causes blindness anddeafness, and gives rest to anything that moves, for they considerthese negative conditions as positive properties. We must nowstate our opinion in accordance with the results of philosophicalresearch. You know that he who removes the obstacle of motion isto some extent the cause of the motion, e.g., if one removes thepillar which supports the beam he causes the beam to move, as hasbeen stated by Aristotle in his Physics (VIII., chap. iv.): in thissense we say of him who removed a certain property that heproduced the absence of that property, although absence of aproperty is nothing positive. just as we say of him who puts out thelight at night that he has produced darkness, so we say of him whodestroyed the sight of any being that he produced blindness,although darkness and blindness are negative properties, andrequire no agent. In accordance with this view we explain thefollowing passage of Isaiah:" I form the light and create (bore)darkness : I make peace, and create (bore) evil" (Isa. xlv. 7), fordarkness and evil are non-existing things. Consider that theprophet does not say, I make ('oseh) darkness, I make ('oseh) evil,because darkness and evil are not things in positive existence towhich the verb &c to make" would apply; the verb bara" hecreated" is used, because in Hebrew this verb is applied tonon-existing things e.g.," In the beginning God created" (bara),etc.: here the creation took place from nothing. Only in this sensecan non-existence be said to be produced by a certain action of anagent. In the same way we must explain the following passage :"Who bath made man's mouth ? or who maketh the dumb, or thedeaf, or the seeing," etc. (Exod. iv. 11). The passage can also beexplained as follows: Who has made man able to speak ? or cancreate him without the capacity of speaking, i.e., create asubstance that is incapable of acquiring this property ? for he whoproduces a substance that cannot acquire a certain property may becalled the producer of that privation. Thus we say, if any oneabstains from delivering a fellow-man from death, although he isable to do so, that he killed him. It is now clear that according toan these different views the action of an agent cannot be directlyconnected with a thing that does not exist: only indirectly isnon-existence described as the result of the action of an agent,whilst in a direct manner an action can only influence a thingreally in existence; accordingly, whoever the agent may be, he canonly act upon an existing thing.
After this explanation you must recall to memory that, as has beenproved, the [so-called] evils are evils only in relation to a certainthing, and that which is evil in reference to a certain existing thing,either includes the nonexistence of that thing or the non-existenceof some of its good conditions. The proposition has therefore beenlaid down in the most general terms," All evils are negations."Thus for man death is evil: death is his non-existence. Illness,poverty, and ignorance are evils for man: all these are privations ofproperties. If you examine all single cases to which this generalproposition applies, you will find that there is not one case inwhich the proposition is wrong except in the opinion of those whodo not make any distinction between negative and positiveproperties, or between two opposites, or do not know the nature ofthings,-- who, e.g., do not know that health in general denotes acertain equilibrium, and is a relative term. The absence of thatrelation is illness in general, and death is the absence of life in thecase of any animal. The destruction of other things; is likewisenothing but the absence of their form.
After these propositions, it must be admitted as a fact that it cannotbe said of God that He directly creates evil, or He has the directintention to produce evil: this is impossible. His works are allperfectly good. He only produces existence, and all existence isgood: whilst evils are of a negative character, and cannot be actedupon. Evil can only he attributed to Him in the way we havementioned. He creates evil only in so far as He produces thecorporeal element such as it actually is: it is always connected withnegatives, and is on that account the source of all destruction andall evil. Those beings that do not possess this corporeal elementare not subject to destruction or evil: consequently the true work ofGod is all good, since it is existence. The book which enlightenedthe darkness of the world says therefore," And God saweverything that He had made, and, behold, it was very good" (Gen.i. 31). Even the existence of this corporeal element, low as it inreality is, because it is the source of death and all evils, is likewisegood for the permanence of the Universe and the continuation ofthe order of things, so that one thing departs and the othersucceeds. Rabbi Meir therefore explains the words" and behold itwas very good" (tob me'od): that even death was good inaccordance with what we have observed in this chapter.Remember what I said in this chapter, consider it, and you willunderstand all that the prophets and our Sages remarked about theperfect goodness of all the direct works of God. In Bereshit Rabba(chap. i.) the same idea is expressed thus:" No evil comes downfrom above."
CHAPTER XI
ALL the great evils which men cause to each other because ofcertain intentions, desires, opinions, or religious principles, arelikewise due to non-existence, because they originate in ignorance,which is absence of wisdom. A blind man, for example, who hasno guide, stumbles constantly, because he cannot see, and causesinjury and harm to himself and others. In the same manner variousclasses of men, each man in proportion to his ignorance, bringgreat evils upon themselves and upon other individual members ofthe species. If men possessed wisdom, which stands in the samerelation to the form of man as the sight to the eye, they would notcause any injury to themselves or to others: for the knowledge oftruth removes hatred and quarrels, and prevents mutual injuries.This state of society is promised to us by the prophet in the words:" And the wolf shall dwell with the lamb," etc.:" and the cow andthe bear shall feed together," etc.: and" the sucking child shallplay on the hole of the asp," etc. (Isa. id. 6 seq). The prophet alsopoints out what will be the cause of this change: for he says thathatred, quarrel, and fighting will come to an end, because men willthen have a true knowledge of God." They shall not hurt nordestroy in all my holy mountain : for the earth shall be full of theknowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea" (ibid. ver. g).Note it.
CHAPTER XII
MEN frequently think that the evils in the world are morenumerous than the good things; many sayings and songs of thenations dwell on this idea. They say that a good thing is found onlyexceptionally, whilst evil things are numerous and lasting. Notonly common people make this mistake, but even many whobelieve that they are wise. Al-Razi wrote a well-known book OnMetaphysics [or Theology]. Among other mad and foolish things,it contains also the idea, discovered by him, that there exists moreevil than good. For if the happiness of man and his pleasure in thetimes of prosperity be compared with the mishaps that befallhim,-- such as grief, acute pain, defects, paralysis of the limbs,fears, anxieties, and troubles,-- it would seem as if the existence ofman is a punishment and a great evil for him. This authorcommenced to verify his opinion by counting all the evils one byone; by this means he opposed those who hold the correct view ofthe benefits bestowed by God and His evident kindness, viz., thatGod is perfect goodness, and that all that comes from Him isabsolutely good. The origin of the error is to be found in thecircumstance that this ignorant man, and his party among thecommon people, judge the whole universe by examining onesingle person. For an ignorant man believes that the wholeuniverse only exists for him; as if nothing else required anyconsideration. If, therefore, anything happens to him contrary tohis expectation, he at once concludes that the whole universe isevil. If, however, he would take into consideration the wholeuniverse, form an idea of it, and comprehend what a small portionhe is of the Universe, he will find the truth. For it is dear thatpersons who have fallen into this widespread error as regards themultitude of evils in the world, do not find the evils among theangels, the spheres and stars, the elements, and that which isformed of them, viz., minerals and plants, or in the various speciesof living beings, but only in some individual instances of mankind.They wonder that a person, who became leprous in consequence ofbad food, should be afflicted with so great an illness and suffersuch a misfortune; or that he who indulges so much in sensualityas to weaken his sight, should be struck With blindness! and thelike. What we have, in truth, to consider is this :-The wholemankind at present in existence, and a fortiori, every other speciesof animals, form an infinitesimal portion of the permanentuniverse. Comp." Man is like to vanity" (Ps. cxliv. 4):" Howmuch less man, that is a worm; and the son of man, which is aworm" (job xxv. 6):" How much less in them who dwell in housesof clay" (ibid. iv. 19):" Behold, the nations are as a drop of thebucket" (Isa. xl. 15). There are many other passages in the booksof the prophets expressing the same idea. It is of great advantagethat man should know his station, and not erroneously imagine thatthe whole universe exists only for him. We hold that the universeexists because the Creator wills it so; that mankind is low in rankas compared with the uppermost portion of the universe, viz., withthe spheres and the stars: but, as regards the angels, there cannotbe any real comparison between man and angels, although man isthe highest of all beings on earth; i.e., of all beings formed of thefour elements. Man's existence is nevertheless a great boon to him,and his distinction and perfection is a divine gift. The numerousevils to which individual persons are exposed are due to thedefects existing in the persons themselves. We complain and seekrelief from our own faults: we suffer from the evils which we, byour own free will, inflict on ourselves and ascribe them to God,who is far from being connected with them! Comp." Is destructionhis [work] ? No. Ye [who call yourselves] wrongly his sons, youwho are a perverse and crooked generation" (Deut. xxxii. 5). Thisis explained by Solomon, who says," The foolishness of manperverteth his way, and his heart fretteth against the Lord" (Prov.xix. 3).
I explain this theory in the following manner. The evils that befallan are of three kinds :
(1) The first kind of evil is that which is caused to man by thecircumstance that he is subject to genesis and destruction, or thathe possesses a body. It is on account of the body that some personshappen to have great deformities or paralysis of some of theorgans. This evil may be part of the natural constitution of thesepersons, or may have developed subsequently in consequence ofchanges in the elements, e.g., through bad air, or thunderstorms orlandslips. We have already shown that, in accordance with thedivine wisdom, genesis can only take place through destruction,and without the destruction of the individual members of thespecies the species themselves would not exist permanently. Thusthe true kindness, and beneficence, and goodness of God is clear.He who thinks that he can have flesh and bones without beingsubject to any external influence, or any of the accidents of matter,unconsciously wishes to reconcile two opposites, viz., to be at thesame time subject and not subject to change. If man were neversubject to change there could be no generation: there would be onesingle being, but no individuals forming a species. Galen, in thethird section of his book, The Use of the Limbs, says correctly thatit would be in vain to expect to see living beings formed of theblood of menstruous women and the semen virile, who will notdie, will never feel pain, or will move perpetually, or will shinelike the sun. This dictum of Galen is part of the following moregeneral proposition :-- Whatever is formed of any matter receivesthe most perfect form possible in that species of matter: in eachindividual case the defects are in accordance with the defects ofthat individual matter. The best and most perfect being that can beformed of the blood and the semen is the species of man, for as faras man's nature is known, he is living, reasonable, and mortal. It istherefore impossible that man should be free from this species ofevil. You will, nevertheless, find that the evils of the above kindwhich befall man are very few and rare: for you find countries thathave not been flooded or burned for thousands of years: there arethousands of men in perfect health, deformed individuals are astrange and exceptional occurrence, or say few in number if youobject to the term exceptional,-- they are not one-hundredth, noteven one-thousandth part of those that are perfectly normal.
(2) The second class of evils comprises such evils as people causeto each other, when, e.g., some of them use their strength againstothers. These evils are more numerous than those of the first kind:their causes are numerous and known; they likewise originate inourselves, though the sufferer himself cannot avert them. This kindof evil is nevertheless not widespread in any country of the wholeworld. It is of rare occurrence that a man plans to kill hisneighbour or to rob him of his property by night. Many personsare, however, afflicted with this kind of evil in great wars: butthese are not frequent, if the whole inhabited part of the earth istaken into consideration.
(3) The third class of evils comprises those which every one causesto himself by his own action. This is the largest class, and is farmore numerous than the second class. It is especially of these evilsthat all men complain,only few men are found that do not sinagainst themselves by this kind of evil. Those that are afflictedwith it are therefore justly blamed in the words of the prophet,"This hath been by your means" (Mal. i. 9): the same is expressedin the following passage," He that doeth it destroyeth his ownsoul" (Prov. vi. 32). In reference to this kind of evil, Solomonsays," The foolishness of man perverteth his way" (ibid. xix. 3).In the following passage he explains also that this kind of evil isman's own work," Lo, this only have I found, that God hath mademan upright, but they have thought out many inventions" (Eccles.vii. 29), and these inventions bring the evils upon him. The samesubject is referred to in job (v. 6)," For affliction cometh not forthof the dust, neither doth trouble spring out of the ground." Thesewords are immediately followed by the explanation that manhimself is the author of this class of evils," But man is born untotrouble." This class of evils originates in man's vices, such asexcessive desire for eating, drinking, and love; indulgence in thesethings in undue measure, or in improper manner, or partaking ofbad food. This course brings diseases and afflictions upon bodyand soul alike. The sufferings of the body in consequence of theseevils are well known; those of the soul are twofold :-First, suchevils of the soul as are the necessary consequence of changes inthe body, in so far as the soul is a force residing in the body; it hastherefore been said that the properties of the soul depend on thecondition of the body. Secondly, the soul, when accustomed tosuperfluous things, acquires a strong habit of desiring things whichare neither necessary for the preservation of the individual nor forthat of the species. This desire is without a limit, whilst thingswhich are necessary are few in number and restricted withincertain limits; but what is superfluous is without end-- e.g., youdesire to have your vessels of silver, but golden vessels are stillbetter : others have even vessels of sapphire, or perhaps they canbe made of emerald or rubies, or any other substance that could besuggested, Those who are ignorant and perverse in their thoughtare constantly in trouble and pain, because they cannot get asmuch of superfluous things as a certain other person possesses.They as a rule expose themselves to great dangers, e.g., byseavoyage, or service of kings, and all this for the purpose ofobtaining that which is superfluous and not necessary. When theythus meet with the consequences of the course which they adopt,they complain of the decrees and judgments of God; they begin toblame the time, and wonder at the want of justice in its changes;that it has not enabled them to acquire great riches, with whichthey could buy large quantities of wine for the purpose of makingthemselves drunk, and numerous concubines adorned with variouskind of ornaments of gold, embroidery, and jewels, for the purposeof driving themselves to voluptuousness beyond their capacities, asif the whole Universe existed exclusively for the purpose of givingpleasure to these low people. The error of the ignorant goes so faras to say that God's power is insufficient, because He has given tothis Universe the properties which they imagine cause these greatevils, and which do not help all evil-disposed persons to obtain theevil which they seek, and to bring their evil souls to the aim oftheir desires, though these, as we have shown, are really withoutlimit. The virtuous and wise, however, see and comprehend thewisdom of God displayed in the Universe. Thus David says," Allthe paths of the Lord are mercy and truth unto such as keep Hiscovenant and His testimonies" (Ps. xxv. 10). For those whoobserve the nature of the Universe and the commandments of theLaw, and know their purpose, see dearly God's mercy and truth ineverything; they seek, therefore, that which the Creator intended tobe the aim of man, viz., comprehension. Forced by the claims ofthe body, they seek also that which is necessary for thepreservation of the body," bread to eat and garment to clothe," andthis is very little; but they seek nothing superfluous: with veryslight exertion man can obtain it, so long as he is contented withthat which is indispensable. All the difficulties and troubles wemeet in this respect are due to the desire for superfluous things:when we seek unnecessary things, we have difficulty even infinding that which is indispensable. For the more we desire to havethat which is superfluous, the more we meet with difficulties; ourstrength and possessions are spent in unnecessary things, and arewanting when required for that which is necessary. Observe howNature proves the correctness of this assertion. The morenecessary a thing is for living beings, the more easily it is foundand the cheaper it is: the less necessary it is, the rarer and dearer itis. E.g., air, water, and food are indispensable to man : air is mostnecessary, for if man is without air a short time he dies; whilst hecan be without water a day or two. Air is also undoubtedly foundmore easily and cheaper [than water]. Water is more necessarythan food; for some people can be four or five days without food,provided they have water; water also exists in every country inlarger quantities than food, and is also cheaper. The sameproportion can be noticed in the different kinds of food; that whichis more necessary in a certain place exists there in larger quantitiesand is cheaper than that which is less necessary. No intelligentperson, I think, considers musk, amber, rubies, and emerald asvery necessary for man except as medicines: and they, as well asother like substances, can be replaced for this purpose by herbsand minerals. This shows the kindness of God to His creatures,even to us weak beings. His righteousness and justice as regards allanimals are well known; for in the transient world there is amongthe various kinds of animals no individual being distinguishedfrom the rest of the same species by a peculiar property or anadditional limb. On the contrary, all physical, psychical, and vitalforces and organs that are possessed by one individual are foundalso in the other individuals. If any one is somehow different it isby accident, in consequence of some exception, and not by anatural property; it is also a rare occurrence. There is no differencebetween individuals of a species in the due course of Nature; thedifference originates in the various dispositions of theirsubstances. This is the necessary consequence of the nature of thesubstance of that species: the nature of the species is not morefavourable to one individual than to the other. It is no wrong orinjustice that one has many bags of finest myrrh and garmentsembroidered with gold, while another has not those things, whichare not necessary for our maintenance; he who has them has notthereby obtained control over anything that could be an essentialaddition to his nature, but has only obtained something illusory ordeceptive. The other, who does not possess that which is notwanted for his maintenance, does not miss anythingindispensable:" He that gathered much had nothing over, and hethat gathered little had no lack: they gathered every man accordingto his eating" (Exod. xvi. 18). This is the rule at all times and inall places; no notice should be taken of exceptional cases, as wehave explained.
In these two ways you will see the mercy of God toward Hiscreatures, how He has provided that which is required, in properproportions, and treated all individual beings of the same specieswith perfect equality. In accordance with this correct reflection thechief of the wise men says," All his ways are judgment" (Deut.xxxii. 4): David likewise says:" All the paths of the Lord aremercy and truth" (Ps. xxv. 10): he also says expressly" The Lordis good to all; and his tender mercies are over all his work" (ibid.cxlv. 9): for it is an act of great and perfect goodness that He gaveus existence: and the creation of the controlling faculty in animalsis a proof of His mercy towards them, as has been shown by us.
CHAPTER XIII
INTELLIGENT persons are much perplexed when they inquireinto the purpose of the Creation. I will now show how absurd thisquestion is, according to each one of the different theories[above-mentioned]. An agent that acts with intention must have acertain ulterior object in that which he performs. This is evident,and no philosophical proof is required. It is likewise evident thatthat which is produced with intention has passed over fromnon-existence to existence. It is further evident, and generallyagreed upon, that the being which has absolute existence, whichhas never been and win never be without existence, is not in needof an agent. We have explained this before. The question," Whatis the purpose thereof ?" cannot be asked about anything which isnot the product of an agent; therefore we cannot ask what is thepurpose of the existence of God. He has not been created.According to these propositions it is clear that the purpose issought for everything produced intentionally by an intelligentcause: that is to say, a final cause must exist for everything thatowes its existence to an intelligent being: but for that which isWithout a beginning, a final cause need not be sought, as has beenstated by us. After this explanation you will understand that thereis no occasion to seek the final cause of the whole Universe,neither according to our theory of the Creation, nor according tothe theory of Aristotle, who assumes the Eternity of the Universe.For according to Aristotle, who holds that the Universe has not hada beginning, an ultimate final cause cannot be sought even for thevarious parts of the Universe. Thus it cannot be asked, accordingto his opinion, What is the final cause of the existence of theheavens ? Why are they limited by this measure or by that number? Why is matter of this description ? What is the purpose of theexistence of this species of animals or plants ? Aristotle considersall this as the result of a permanent order of things. NaturalPhilosophy investigates into the object of everything in Nature, butit does not treat of the ultimate final cause, of which we speak inthis chapter. It is a recognized fact in Natural Philosophy thateverything in Nature has its object, or its final cause, which is themost important of the four causes, though it is not easilyrecognized in most species. Aristotle repeatedly says that Natureproduces nothing in vain, for every natural action has a certainobject. Thus, Aristotle says that plants exist for animals; andsimilarly he shows of other parts of the Universe for what purposethey exist. This is still more obvious in the case of the organs ofanimals. The existence of such a final cause in the various parts ofNature has compelled philosophers to assume the existence of aprimal cause apart from Nature; it is called by Aristotle theintellectual or divine cause, and this cause creates one thing for thepurpose of another. Those who acknowledge the truth will acceptas the best proof for the Creation the fact that everything in Natureserves a certain purpose, so that one thing exists for the benefit ofanother; this fact is supported by numerous instances, and showsthat there is design in Nature; but the existence of design in Naturecannot be imagined unless it be assumed that Nature has beenproduced.
I will now return to the subject of this chapter, viz., the final cause.Aristotle has already explained that in Nature the efficient cause ofa thing, its form, and its final cause are identical: that is to say,they are one thing in relation to the whole species. E.g., the formof Zeid produces the form of his son Amr; its action consists inimparting the form of the whole species [of man] to the substanceof Amr, and the final cause is Amr's possession of human form.The same argument is applied by Aristotle to every individualmember of a class of natural objects which is brought to existenceby another individual member. The three causes coincide in allsuch cases. All this refers only to the immediate purpose of athing; but the existence of an ultimate purpose in every species,which is considered as absolutely necessary by every one whoinvestigates into the nature of things, is very difficult to discover:and still more difficult is it to find the purpose of the wholeUniverse. I infer from the words of Aristotle that according to hisopinion the ultimate purpose of the genera is the preservation ofthe course of genesis and destruction: and this course is absolutelynecessary (in the first instance] for the successive formation ofmaterial objects, because individual. beings formed of matter arenot permanent; [secondly], for the production of the best and themost perfect beings that can be formed of matter, because theultimate purpose [in these productions] is to arrive at perfection.Now it is dear that man is the most perfect being formed of matter;he is the last and most perfect of earthly beings, and in this respectit can truly be said that all earthly things exist for man, i.e., that thechanges which things undergo serve to produce the most perfectbeing that can be produced. Aristotle, who assumes the Eternity ofthe Universe, need therefore not ask to what purpose does manexist, for the immediate purpose of each individual being is,according to his opinion, the perfection of its specific form. Everyindividual thing arrives at its perfection fully and completely whenthe actions that produce its form are complete. The ultimatepurpose of the species is the perpetuation of this form by therepeated succession of genesis and destruction, so that there mightalways be a being capable of the greatest possible perfection. Itseems therefore clear that, according to Aristotle, who assumes theEternity of the Universe, there is no occasion for the question whatis the object of the existence of the Universe. But of those whoaccept our theory that the whole Universe has been created fromnothing, some hold that the inquiry after the purpose of theCreation is necessary, and assume that the Universe was onlycreated for the sake of man's existence, that he might serve God.Everything that is done they believe is done for man's sake; eventhe spheres move only for his benefit, in order that his wants mightbe supplied. The literal meaning of some passages in the books ofthe prophets greatly support this idea. Comp." He formed it (viz.,the earth) to be inhabited" (Isa. xlv. 18):" If my covenant of dayand night were not," etc. (Jer. xxxiii. 25);" And spreadeth them outas a tent to dwell in" (Isa. xl. 22). If the sphere existed for the sakeof man, how much more must this be the case with all other livingbeings and the plants. On examining this opinion as intelligentpersons ought to examine all different opinions, we shall discoverthe errors it includes. Those who hold this view, namely, that theexistence of man is the object of the whole creation, may be askedwhether God could have created man without those previouscreations, or whether man could only have come into existenceafter the creation of all other things. If they answer in theaffirmative, that man could have been created even if, e.g., theheavens did not exist, they will be asked what is the object of allthese things, since they do not exist for their own sake but for thesake of something that could exist without them ? Even if theUniverse existed for man's sake and man existed for the purpose ofserving God, as has been mentioned, the question remains, What isthe end of serving God ? He does not become more perfect if allHis creatures serve Him and comprehend Him as far as possible;nor would He lose anything if nothing existed beside Him. It mightperhaps be replied that the service of God is not intended for God'sperfection; it is intended for our own perfection,-- it is good for us,it makes us perfect. But then the question might be repeated, Whatis the object of our being perfect ? We must in continuing theinquiry as to the purpose of the creation at last arrive at theanswer, It was the Will of God, or His Wisdom decreed it; and thisis the correct answer. The wise men in Israel have, therefore,introduced in our prayers (for Neilah of the Day of Atonement) thefollowing passage:--" Thou hast distinguished man from thebeginning, and chosen him to stand before Thee; who can say untoThee, What dost Thou ? And if he be righteous, what does he giveThee ?" They have thus clearly stated that it was not a final causethat determined the existence of all things, but only His will. Thisbeing the case, we who believe in the Creation must admit thatGod could have created the Universe in a different manner asregards the causes and effects contained in it, and this would leadto the absurd conclusion that everything except man existedwithout any purpose, as the principal object, man, could have beenbrought into existence without the rest of the creation. I considertherefore the following opinion as most correct according to theteaching of the Bible, and best in accordance with the results ofphilosophy; namely, that the Universe does not exist for man'ssake, but that each being exists for its own sake, and not becauseof some other thing. Thus we believe in the Creation, and yet neednot inquire what purpose is served by each species of the existingthings, because we assume that God created all parts of theUniverse by His will; some for their own sake, and some for thesake of other beings, that include their own purpose in themselves.In the same manner as it was the will of God that man shouldexist, so it was His will that the heavens with their stars shouldexist, that there should be angels, and each of these beings is itselfthe purpose of its own existence. When anything can only existprovided some other thing has previously existed, God has causedthe latter to precede it; as, e.g., sensation precedes comprehension.We meet also with this view in Scripture" The Lord hath madeeverything (la-ma'anehu) for its purpose (Prov. xvi. 4). It ispossible that the pronoun in la-maanehu refers to the object; but itcan also be considered as agreeing with the subject; in which casethe meaning of the word is, for the sake of Himself, or His willwhich is identical with His self [or essence], as has been shown inthis treatise. We have also pointed out that Flis essence is alsocalled His glory. The words," The Lord hath made everything forHimself," express therefore the same idea as the following verse,"Everything that is called by my name: I have created it for myglory, I have formed it; yea, I have made it" (Isa. xliii. 7): that is tosay, everything that is described as My work has been made by Mefor the sake of My will and for no other purpose. The words," Ihave formed it,"" I have made it," express exactly what I pointedout to you, that there are things whose existence is only possibleafter certain other things have come into existence. To thesereference is made in the text, as if to say, I have formed the firstthing which must have preceded the other things, e.g., matter hasbeen formed before the production of material beings: I have thenmade out of that previous creation, or after it, what I intended toproduce, and there was nothing but My will. Study the book whichleads all who want to be led to the truth, and is therefore calledTorah (Law or Instruction), from the beginning of the account ofthe Creation to its end, and you will comprehend the opinionwhich we attempt to expound. For no part of the creation isdescribed as being in existence for the sake of another part, buteach part is declared to be the product of God's will, and to satisfyby its existence the intention [of the Creator]. This is expressed bythe phrase," And God saw that it was good" (Gen. i. 4, etc.). Youknow our interpretation of the saying of our Sages," Scripturespeaks the purpose of protecting his house by night from thievesthat the king was chosen. To some extent this is correct: for whenhis house is protected, and he has derived this benefit through theking whom the country had chosen, it appears as if it were theobject of the king to protect the house of that man. In this mannerwe must explain every verse, the literal meaning of which wouldimply that something superior was created for the sake ofsomething inferior, viz., that it is part of the nature of the superiorthing [to influence the inferior in a certain manner]. We remainfirm in our belief that the whole Universe was created inaccordance with the will of God, and we do not inquire for anyother cause or object. just as we do not ask what is the purpose ofGod's existence, so we do not ask what was the object of His will,which is the cause of the existence of all things with their presentproperties, both those that have been created and those that will becreated.
You must not be mistaken and think that the spheres and theangels were created for our sake. Our position has already beenpointed out to us," Behold, the nations are as a drop of a bucket"(Isa. xl.15). Now compare your own essence with that of thespheres, the stars, and the Intelligences, and you will comprehendthe truth, and understand that man is superior to everything formedof earthly matter, but not to other beings; he is found exceedinglyinferior when his existence is compared with that of the spheres,and a fortiori when compared with that of the Intelligences.Comp." Behold, he putteth no trust in his servants: and hismessengers he charged with folly: how much less in them thatdwell in houses of clay, whose foundation is in the dust, which arecrushed before the moth ?" (job iv. A, 19). The expression" hisservants," occurring in this passage, does not denote humanbeings; this may be inferred from the words," How much less inthem that dwell in houses of clay ?" The" servants" referred to inthis place are the angels; whilst by the term" his messengers" thespheres are undoubtedly meant. Eliphas himself, who uttered theabove words, explains this [in the second speech] when he refersto it in one of his replies in other words, saying," Behold, heputteth no trust in his holy ones; yea, the heavens are not clean inhis sight, how much more abominable and filthy is man, whodrinketh iniquity like water" (ibid. xv. 15, 16). He thus showsthat" his servants" and" his holy ones" are identical, and thatthey are not human beings; also that" his messengers," mentionedin the first passage, are the same as" the heavens." The term"folly" is explained by the phrase" they are not clean in his sight,"i.e., they are material: although their substance is the purest andthe most luminous, compared with the Intelligences it appearsdark, turbid, and impure. The phrase," Behold, he putteth no trustin his servants." is employed in reference to the angels, indicatingthat these do not possess perpetual existence, since, as we believe,they have had a beginning; and even according to those whoassume the Eternity of the Universe, the existence of the angels isat all events dependent on and therefore inferior to, the absoluteexistence of God. The words," How much more abominable andfilthy is man," in the one passage, correspond to the phrase" Howmuch less in those who dwell in houses of clay" in the otherpassage. Their meaning is this: How much less in man who isabominable and filthy, in whose person crookedness orcorporeality is mixed up and spread through all his parts."Iniquity" ('avlah) is identical with crookedness," as may beinferred from the passage," In the land of uprightness he will actwith iniquity" (Isa. xxvi. 10), and ish," man," is here used in thesame sense as adam," human being" : for" man" in a generalsense is sometimes expressed in Scripture by ish. Comp." He whosmiteth a man (ish) and he die" (Exod. xxi. 12).
This must be our belief when we have a correct knowledge of ourown self, and comprehend the true nature of everything; we mustbe content, and not trouble our mind with seeking a certain finalcause for things that have none, or have no other final cause buttheir own existence, which depends on the Will of God, or, if youprefer, on the Divine Wisdom.
CHAPTER XIV
IN order to obtain a correct estimate of ourselves, we must reflecton the results of the investigations which have been made into thedimensions and the distances of the spheres and the stars. Thedistances are clearly stated in radii of the earth, and are wellknown, since the circumference and the radius of the earth areknown. It has been proved that the distance between the centre ofthe earth and the outer surface of the sphere of Saturn is a journeyof nearly eight thousand seven hundred solar years. Suppose aday's journey to be forty legal miles of two thousand ordinarycubits, and consider the great and enormous distance ! or in thewords of Scripture," Is not God in the height of heaven ? andbehold the height of the stars, how high they are!" (job xxii. 12):that is to say, learn from the height of the heavens how far we arefrom comprehending God, for there is an enormous distancebetween ourselves and these corporeal objects, and the latter aregreatly distinguished from us by their position, and hidden from usas regards their essence and most of their actions. How much moreincompreliensible therefore is their Maker, who is incorporeal!The great distance which has been proved is, in fact, the least thatcan be assumed. The distance between the centre of the earth andthe surface of the sphere of the fixed stars can by no means be less,but it may possibly be many times as great: for the measure of thethickness of the body of the spheres has not been proved, and theleast possible has been assumed, as appears from the treatises Onthe Distances. The same is the case with the substances which arebetween every two spheres. According to logical inference, as hasbeen mentioned by Thabit, the thickness of these substancescannot be accurately stated, since they do not contain any star,which might serve as a means if obtaining it. As to the thickness ofthe sphere of the fixed stars, it is at least four years' journey, asmay be inferred from the measure of the stars contained in thesphere. The body of each of these stars is more than ninety timesas big as the globe of the earth, and it is possible that the thicknessof the sphere is still greater. Of the ninth sphere, that causes thedaily revolution of the whole system of spheres, we do not knowthe dimensions; it contains no stars, and therefore we have nomeans of finding out its magnitude. Now consider the enormousdimensions and the large number of these material beings. If thewhole earth is infinitely small in comparison with the sphere of thestars, what is man compared with all these created beings ! flow,then, could any one of us imagine that these things exist for hissake and benefit, and that they are his tools ! This is the result ofan examination of the corporeal beings : how much more so willthis be the result of an examination into the nature of theIntelligences !
The following question may be asked against the opinion ofphilosophers on this subject: There is no doubt that from aphilosophical point of view it would be a mistake to assume thatthe spheres exist for the purpose of regulating the fate of oneindividual person or community; but it is not absurd to think thatthey serve to regulate the affairs of mankind, since these mightyindividual beings would serve to give existence to the individualmembers of the species, the number of which, according to thephilosophers, will never come to an end. We can best illustrate thisby the following simile: An artisan makes iron tools of ahundred-weight for the purpose of making a small needle of theweight of a grain. If only one needle had to be produced, we admitthat it would certainly be bad management, though it would not beentirely a failure: but if with those enormous tools needle afterneedle is produced, even many hundred-weights of needles, thepreparation of those tools would be a wise act and excellentmanagement. In a similar manner the object of the spheres may bethe continuance of successive genesis and destruction; and thesuccession of genesis and destruction serves, as has already beensaid, to give existence to mankind. This idea is supported byBiblical texts and sayings [of our Sages]. The philosopher repliesthus : If the difference between the heavenly bodies and thetransient individual members of the species consisted in theirdifferent sizes, this opinion could be maintained: but as thedifference consists in their essence, it remains improbable that thesuperior beings should be the means of giving existence to thelower ones. In short, this question supports our belief in theCreation; and this is the principal object of this chapter. [It serves]besides [a second purpose]. I frequently hear from those who knowsomething about astronomy, that our Sages exaggerated thedistances [of the heavenly bodies] when they said that thethickness of each sphere is five hundred years' journey; thedistance of the seven spheres from each other five hundred years'journey, so that the distance of the outer surface of the seventhsphere from the centre of the earth is seven thousand years'journey. Those who hear such statements consider them [at firstthought] as exaggeration, and believe that the distance is not sogreat. But you may ascertain from the data proved in scientifictreatises on the distances, that the centre of the earth is distantfrom the inner surface of the seventh sphere, that of Saturn, nearlyseven thousand and twenty-four years' journey. The number eightthousand and seven hundred given by us, refers to the distance ofthe centre of the earth from the inner surface of the eighth sphere.The distance of the spheres from each other, mentioned byastronomers, is identical with the thickness of the substance thatintervenes between one sphere and the other, and does not implythat there is a vacuum. You must, however, not expect thateverything our Sages say respecting astronomical matters shouldagree with observation, for mathematics were not fully developedin those days: and their statements were not based on the authorityof the Prophets, but on the knowledge which they eitherthemselves possessed or derived from contemporary men ofscience. But I will not on that account denounce what they saycorrectly in accordance with real fact, as untrue or accidentallytrue. On the contrary, whenever the words of a person can beinterpreted in such a manner that they agree with fully establishedfacts, it is the duty of every educated and honest man to do so.
CHAPTER XV
THAT which is impossible has a permanent and constant property,which is not the result of some agent, and cannot in any waychange, and consequently we do not ascribe to God the power ofdoing what is impossible. No thinking man denies the truth of thismaxim; none ignore it, but such as have no idea of Logic. There is,however, a difference of opinion among philosophers withreference to the existence of any particular thing. Some of themconsider its existence to be impossible, and hold that God cannotproduce the thing in question, whilst others think that it is possible,and that God can create it if He pleases to do so. E.g., allphilosophers consider that it is impossible for one substratum tohave at the same moment two opposite properties, or for theelementary components of a thing, substance and accident, tointerchange, so that the substance becomes accident, and theaccident becomes substance, or for a material substance to bewithout accident. Likewise it is impossible that God shouldproduce a being like Himself, or annihilate, corporify, or changeHimself. The power of God is not assumed to extend to any ofthese impossibilities. But the existence of accidents independent ofsubstance is possible according to one class of philosophers, theMutazilah, whilst according to others it is impossible; it must,however, be added that those who admit the existence of anaccident independent of substance, have not arrived at thisconclusion by philosophical research alone: but it was mainly bythe desire to defend certain religious principles, which speculationhad greatly shaken, that they had recourse to this theory. In asimilar manner the creation of corporeal things, otherwise thanfrom a substance, is possible according to our view, whilst thephilosophers say that it is impossible. Again, whilst philosopherssay that it is impossible to produce a square with a diagonal equalto one of the sides, or a solid angle that includes four right angles,or similar things, it is thought possible by some persons who areignorant of mathematics, and who only know the words of thesepropositions, but have no idea of that which is expressed by them.I wonder whether this gate of research is open, so that all mayfreely enter, and whilst one imagines a thing and considers itpossible, another is at liberty to assert that such a thing isimpossible by its very nature: or whether the gate is closed andguarded by certain rules, so that we are able to decide withcertainty whether a thing is physically impossible. I should alsolike to know, in the latter case, whether imagination or reason hasto examine and test objects as to their being possible or not;likewise how things imagined, and things conceived intellectually,are to be distinguished from each other. For it occurs that weconsider a thing as physically possible, and then some one objects,or we ourselves fear that our opinion is only the result ofimagination, and not that of reason. In such a case it would bedesirable to ascertain whether there exists some faculty todistinguish between imagination and intellect, [and if so,] whetherthis faculty is different from both, or whether it is part of theintellect itself to distinguish between intellectual and imaginaryobjects. All this requires investigation, but it does not belong to thetheme of this chapter.
We have thus shown that according to each one of the differenttheories there are things which are impossible, whose existencecannot be admitted, and whose creation is excluded from thepower of God, and the assumption that God does not change theirnature does not imply weakness in God, or a limit to His power.Consequently things impossible remain impossible, and do notdepend on the action of an agent. It is now clear that a differenceof opinion exists only as to the question to which of the twoclasses a thing belongs: whether to the class of the impossible, orto that of the possible. Note it.
CHAPTER XVI
THE philosophers have uttered very perverse ideas as regards God's Omniscience of everything beside Himself: they have stumbled in such a manner that they cannot rise again, nor can those who adopt their views. 1 will further on tell you the doubts that led them to these perverse utterances on this question; and I will also tell you the opinion which is taught by our religion, and which differs from the evil and wrong principles of the philosophers as regards God's Omniscience.
The principal reason that first induced the philosophers to adopt their theory is this: at first thought we notice an absence of system in human affairs. Some pious men live a miserable and painful life, whilst some wicked people enjoy a happy and pleasant life. On this account the philosophers assumed as possible the cases which you will now hear. They said that only one of two things is possible, either God is ignorant of the individual or particular things on earth, and does not perceive them, or He perceives and knows them. These are all the cases possible. They then continued thus: If He perceives and knows all individual things, one of the following three cases must take place: (1) God arranges and manages human affairs well, perfectly and faultlessly; (2) He is overcome by obstacles, and is too weak and powerless to manage human affairs; (3) He knows [all things] and can arrange and manage them, but leaves and abandons them, as too base, low, and vile, or from jealousy; as we may also notice among ourselves some who are able to make another person happy, well knowing what he wants for his happiness, and still in consequence of their evil disposition, their wickedness and jealousy against him, they do not help him to his happiness. -- This is likewise a complete enumeration of all possible cases. For those who have a knowledge of a certain thing necessarily either (1) take care of the thing which they know, and manage it, or (2) neglect it (as we, e.g., neglect and forget the cats in our house, or things of less importance); or (3) while taking care of it, have not sufficient power and strength for its management, although they have the will to do so. Having enumerated these different cases, the philosophers emphatically decided that of the three cases possible [as regards the management of a thing] by one who knows that thing], two are inadmissible in reference to God -- viz., want of power, or absence of will: because they imply either evil disposition or weakness, neither of which can by any means be attributed to Him. Consequently there remains only the alternative that God is altogether ignorant of human affairs, or that He knows them and manages them well. Since we, however, notice that events do not follow a certain order, that they cannot be determined by analogy, and are not in accordance with what is wanted, we conclude that God has no knowledge of them in any way or for any reason. This is the argument which led the philosophers to speak such blasphemous words. In the treatise On Providence, by Alexander Aphrodisiensis, you will find the same as I have said about the different views of the philosophers, and as I have stated as to the source of their error.
You must notice with surprise that the evil into which these philosophers have fallen is greater than that from which they sought to escape, and that they ignore the very thing which they constantly pointed out and explained to us. They have fallen into a greater evil than that from which they sought to escape, because they refuse to say that God neglects or forgets a thing, and yet they maintain that His knowledge is imperfect, that He is ignorant of what is going on here on earth, that He does not perceive it. They also ignore, what they constantly point out to us, in as much as they judge the whole universe by that which befalls individual men, although, according to their own view, frequently stated and explained, the evils of man originate in himself, or form part of his material nature. We have already discussed this sufficiently. After having laid this foundation, which is the ruin of all good principles, and destroys the majesty of all true knowledge, they sought to remove the opprobrium by declaring that for many reasons it is impossible that God should have a knowledge of earthly things, for the individual members of a species can only be perceived by the senses, and not by reason: but God does not perceive by means of any of the senses. Again, the individuals are infinite, but knowledge comprehends and circumscribes the object of its action, and the infinite cannot be comprehended or circumscribed; furthermore, knowledge of individual beings, that are subject to change, necessitates some change in him who possesses it, because this knowledge itself changes constantly. They have also raised the following two objections against those who hold, in accordance with the teaching of Scripture, that God knows things before they come into existence. First, this theory implies that there can be knowledge of a thing that does not exist at all: secondly, it leads to the conclusion that the knowledge of an object in potentia is identical with the knowledge of that same object in reality. They have indeed come to very evil conclusions, and some of them assumed that God only knows the species, not the individual beings, whilst others went as far as to contend that God knows nothing beside Himself, because they believe that God cannot have more than one knowledge.
Some of the great philosophers who lived before Aristotle agree with us, that God knows everything, and that nothing is hidden from Him. Alexander also refers to them in the above-mentioned treatise; he differs from them, and says that the principal objection against this theory is based on the fact that we clearly see evils befalling good men, and wicked men enjoying happiness.
In short, you see that if these philosophers would find human affairs managed according to rules laid down by the common people, they would not venture or presume to speak on this subject. They are only led to this speculation because they examine the affairs of the good and the wicked, and consider them as being contrary to all rule, and say in the words of the foolish in our nation, "The way of the Lord is not right" (Ezek. xxxiii. 17).
After having shown that knowledge and Providence are connected with each other, I will now proceed to expound the opinions of thinkers on Providence, and then I shall attempt to remove their doubts as to God's knowledge of individual beings.
CHAPTER XVII
THERE are four different theories concerning Divine Providence; they are all ancient, known since the time of the Prophets, when the true Law was revealed to enlighten these dark regions.
First Theory.--There is no Providence at all for anything in the Universe; all parts of the Universe, the heavens and what they contain, owe their origin to accident and chance; there exists no being that rules and governs them or provides for them. This is the theory of Epicurus, who assumes also that the Universe consists of atoms, that these have combined by chance, and have received their various forms by mere accident. There have been atheists among the Israelites who have expressed the same view; it is reported of them: "They have denied the Lord, and said he is not" (Jer. v. 12). Aristotle has proved the absurdity of the theory, that the whole Universe could have originated by chance; he has shown that, on the contrary, there is a being that rules and governs the Universe. We have already touched upon this subject in the present treatise.
Second Theory.--Whilst one part of the Universe owes its existence to Providence, and is under the control of a ruler and governor, another part is no abandoned and left to chance. This is the view of Aristotle about Providence, and I will now explain to you his theory. He holds that God controls the spheres and what they contain: therefore the individual beings in the spheres remain permanently in the same form. Alexander has also expressed it in his writings that Divine Providence extends down to, and ends with, the sphere of the moon. This view results from his theory of Eternity of the Universe; he believes that Providence is in accordance with the nature of the Universe: consequently in the case of the spheres with their contents, where each individual being has a permanent existence, Providence gives permanency and constancy. From the existence of spheres other beings derive existence, which are constant in their species but not in their individuals: in the same manner it is said that Providence sends forth [from the spheres to the earth] sufficient influence to secure the immortality and constancy of the species, without securing at the same time permanence for the individual beings of the species. But the individual beings in each species have not been entirely abandoned, that portion of the materia prima which has been purified and refined, and has received the faculty of growth, is endowed with properties that enable it to exist a certain time, to attract what is useful and to repel what is useless. That portion of the materia prima which has been subject to a further development, and has received the faculty of sensation, is endowed with other properties for its protection and preservation; it has a new faculty of moving freely toward that which is conducive to, and away from that which is contrary to its well-being. Each individual being received besides such properties as are required for the preservation of the species to which it belongs. The portion of the materia prima which is still more refined, and is endowed with the intellectual faculty, possesses a special property by which each individual, according to the degree of his perfection, is enabled to manage, to calculate, and to discover what is conducive both to the temporary existence of the individual and to the preservation of the species. All other movements, however, which are made by the individual members of each species are due to accident; they are not, according to Aristotle, the result of rule and management; e.g., when a storm or gale blows, it causes undoubtedly some leaves of a tree to drop, breaks off some branches of another tree, tears away a stone from a heap of stones, raises dust over herbs and spoils them, and stirs up the sea so that a ship goes down with the whole or part of her contents. Aristotle sees no difference between the falling of a leaf or a stone and the death of the good and noble people in the ship; nor does he distinguish between the destruction of a multitude of ants caused by an ox depositing on them his excrement and the death of worshippers killed by the fall of the house when its foundations give way; nor does he discriminate between the case of a cat killing a mouse that happens to come in her way, or that of a spider catching a fly, and that of a hungry lion meeting a prophet and tearing him. In short, the opinion of Aristotle is this: Everything is the result of management which is constant, which does not come to an end and does not change any of its properties, as e.g., the heavenly beings, and everything which continues according to a certain rule, and deviates from it only rarely and exceptionally, as is the case in objects of Nature. All these are the result of management, i.e., in a close relation to Divine Providence. But that which is not constant, and does not follow a certain rule, as e.g., incidents in the existence of the individual beings in each species of plants or animals, whether rational or irrational, is due to chance and not to management; it is in no relation to Divine Providence. Aristotle holds that it is even impossible to ascribe to Providence the management of these things. This view is closely connected with his theory of the Eternity of the Universe, and with his opinion that everything different from the existing order of things in Nature is impossible. It is the belief of those who turned away from our Law, and said: "God hath forsaken the earth" (Ezek. ix. 9).
Third Theory.--This theory is the reverse of the second. According to this theory, there is nothing in the whole Universe, neither a class nor an individual being, that is due to chance; everything is the result of will, intention, and rule. It is a matter of course that he who rules must know [that which is under his control]. The Mohammedan Ashariyah adhere to this theory, notwithstanding evident absurdities implied in it; for they admit that Aristotle is correct in assuming one and the same cause [viz., the wind] for the fall of leaves [from the tree] and for the death of a man [drowned in the sea]. But they hold at the same time that the wind did not blow by chance; it is God that caused it to move; it is not therefore the wind that caused the leaves to fall; each leaf falls according to the Divine decree; it is God who caused it to fall at a certain time and in a certain place; it could not have fallen before or after that time or in another place, as this has previously been been decreed. The Ashariyah were therefore compelled to assume that motion and rest of living beings are predestined, and that it is not in the power of man to do a certain thing or to leave it undone. The theory further implies a denial of possibility in these things: they can only be either necessary or impossible. The followers of this theory accepted also the last-mentioned proposition, and say, that we call certain things possible, as e.g., the facts that Zeid stands, and that Amr is coming: but they are only possible for us, whilst in their relation to God they cannot be called possible: they are either necessary or impossible. It follows also from this theory, that precepts are perfectly useless, since the people to whom any law is given are unable to do anything: they can neither do what they are commanded nor abstain from what they are forbidden. The supporters of this theory hold that it was the will of God to send prophets, to command, to forbid, to promise, and to threaten, although we have no power [over our actions]. A duty would thus be imposed upon us which is impossible for us to carry out, and it is even possible that we may suffer punishment when obeying the command and receive reward when disobeying it. According to this theory, it must also be assumed that the actions of God have no final cause. All these absurdities are admitted by the Ashariyah for the purpose of saving this theory. When we see a person born blind or leprous, who could not have merited a punishment for previous sins, they say, It is the will of God; when a pious worshipper is tortured and slain, it is likewise the will of God; and no injustice can be asserted to Him for that, for according to their opinion it is proper that God should afflict the innocent and do good to the sinner. Their views on these matters are well known.
Fourth Theory. -- Man has free will; it is therefore intelligible that the Law contains commands and prohibitions, with announcements of reward and punishment. All acts of God are due to wisdom; no injustice is found in Him, and He does not afflict the good. The Mu'tazila profess this theory, although they do not believe in man's absolute free will. They hold also that God takes notice of the falling of the leaf and the destruction of the ant, and that His Providence extends over all things. This theory likewise implies contradictions and absurdities. The absurdities are these: The fact that some persons are born with defects, although they have not sinned previously, is ascribed to the wisdom of God, it being better for those persons to be in such a condition than to be in a normal state, though we do not see why it is better; and they do not suffer thereby any punishment at all, but, on the contrary, enjoy God's goodness. In a similar manner the slaughter of the pious is explained as being for them the source of an increase of reward in future life. They go even further in their absurdities. We ask them why is God only just to man and not to other beings, and how has the irrational animal sinned, that it is condemned to be slaughtered? and they reply it is good for the animal, for it will receive reward for it in the world to come; also the flea and the louse will there receive compensation for their untimely death: the same reasoning they apply to the mouse torn by a cat or vulture; the wisdom of God decreed this for the mouse, in order to reward it after death for the mishap. I do not consider it proper to blame the followers of any of the Past named] three theories on Providence, for they have been driven to accept them by weighty considerations. Aristotle was guided by that which appears to be the nature of things. The Ashariyah refused to ascribe to God ignorance about anything, and to say that God whilst knowing one individual being or one portion of the Universe is ignorant of another portion; they preferred to admit the above-mentioned absurdities. The Mu'tazilites refused to assume that God does what is wrong and unjust; on the other hand, they would not contradict common sense and say that it was not wrong to inflict pain on the guiltless, or that the mission of the Prophets and the giving of the Law had no intelligible reason. They likewise preferred to admit the above-named absurdities. But they even contradicted themselves, because they believe on the one hand that God knows everything, and on the other that man has free win. By a little consideration we discover the contradiction.
Fifth Theory. -- This is our theory, or that of our Law. I will show you [first] the view expressed on this subject in our prophetical books, and generally accepted by our Sages. I will then give the opinion of some later authors among us, and lastly, I will explain my own belief. The theory of man's perfectly free will is one of the fundamental principles of the Law of our Teacher Moses, and of those who follow the Law. According to this principle man does what is in his power to do, by his nature, his choice, and his will; and his action is not due to any faculty created for the purpose. All species of irrational animals likewise move by their own free will. This is the Will of God; that is to say, it is due to the eternal divine will that all living beings should move freely, and that man should have power to act according to his will or choice within the limits of his capacity. Against this principle we hear, thank God, no opposition on the part of our nation. Another fundamental principle taught by the Law of Moses is this: Wrong cannot be ascribed to God in any way whatever; all evils and afflictions as well as all kinds of happiness of man, whether they concern one individual person or a community, are distributed according to justice; they are the result of strict judgment that admits no wrong whatever. Even when a person suffers pain in consequence of a thorn having entered into his hand, although it is at once drawn out, it is a punishment that has been inflicted on him [for sin], and the least pleasure he enjoys is a reward [for some good action]; all this is meted out by strict justice; as is said in Scripture, "all his ways are judgment" (Deut. xxxii. 4); we are only ignorant of the working of that judgment.
The different theories are now fully explained to you; everything in the varying human affairs is due to chance, according to Aristotle, to the Divine Will alone according to the Ashariyah, to Divine Wisdom according to the Mu'tazilites, to the merits of man according to our opinion. It is therefore possible, according to the Ashariyah, that God inflicts pain on a good and pious man in this world, and keeps him for ever in fire, which is assumed to rage in the world to come , they simply say it is the Will of God. The Mu'tazilites would consider this as injustice, and therefore assume that every being, even an ant, that is stricken with pain [in this world], has compensation for it, as has been mentioned above; and it is due to God's Wisdom that a being is struck and afflicted in order to receive compensation. We, however, believe that all these human affairs are managed with justice; far be it from God to do wrong, to punish any one unless the punishment is necessary and merited. It is distinctly stated in the Law, that all is done in accordance with justice; and the words of our Sages generally express the same idea. They clearly say: "There is no death without sin, no sufferings without transgression." (B. T. Shabbath, 55a.) Again, "The deserts of man are meted out to him in the same measure which he himself employs." (Mish. Sotah, i. 7.) These are the words of the Mishnah. Our Sages declare it wherever opportunity is given, that the idea of God necessarily implies justice; that He will reward the most pious for all their pure and upright actions, although no direct commandment was given them through a prophet; and that He will punish all the evil deeds of men, although they have not been prohibited by a prophet, if common sense warns against them, as e.g., injustice and violence. Thus our Sages say: "God does not deprive any being of the full reward [of its good deed]" (B. T. Pes. 118a) again, "He who says that God remits part of a punishment, will be punished severely; He is long-suffering, but is sure to exact payment." (B. T. Baba K. 50a.) Another saying is this: "He who has received a commandment and acts accordingly is not like him who acts in the same manner without being commanded to do so" (B. T. Kidd. 31a); and it is distinctly added that he who does a good thing without being commanded, receives nevertheless his reward. The same principle is expressed in all sayings of our Sages. But they contain an additional doctrine which is not found in the Law; viz., the doctrine of "afflictions of love," as taught by some of our Sages. According to this doctrine it is possible that a person be afflicted without having previously committed any sin, in order that his future reward may be increased; a view which is held by the Mu'tazilites, but is not supported by any Scriptural text. Be not misled by the accounts of trials, such as "God tried Abraham" (Gen. xxii. 1); "He afflicted thee and made thee hungry," etc. (Deut. viii. 3); for you will hear more on this subject later on (chap. xxiv.). Our Law is only concerned with the relations of men; but the idea that irrational living beings should receive a reward, has never before been heard of in our nation: the wise men mentioned in the Talmud do not notice it; only some of the later Geonim were pleased with it when they heard it from the sect of the Mu'tazilites, and accepted it.
My opinion on this principle of Divine Providence I will now explain to you. In the principle which I now proceed to expound I do not rely on demonstrative proof, but on my conception of the spirit of the Divine Law, and the writings of the Prophets. The principle which I accept is far less open to objections, and is more reasonable than the opinions mentioned before. It is this: In the lower or sublunary portion of the Universe Divine Providence does not extend to the individual members of species except in the case of mankind. It is only in this species that the incidents in the existence of the individual beings, their good and evil fortunes, are the result of justice, in accordance with the words, "For all His ways are judgment." But I agree with Aristotle as regards all other living beings, and à fortiori as regards plants and all the rest of earthly creatures. For I do not believe that it is through the interference of Divine Providence that a certain leaf drops [from a tree], nor do I hold that when a certain spider catches a certain fly, that this is the direct result of a special decree and will of God in that moment; it is not by a particular Divine decree that the spittle of a certain person moved, fell on a certain gnat in a certain place, and killed it; nor is it by the direct will of God that a certain fish catches and swallows a certain worm on the surface of the water. In all these cases the action is, according to my opinion, entirely due to chance, as taught by Aristotle. Divine Providence is connected with Divine intellectual influence, and the same beings which are benefited by the latter so as to become intellectual, and to comprehend things comprehensible to rational beings, are also under the control of Divine Providence, which examines all their deeds in order to reward or punish them. It may be by mere chance that a ship goes down with all her contents, as in the above-mentioned instance, or the roof of a house falls upon those within; but it is not due to chance, according to our view, that in the one instance the men went into the ship, or remained in the house in the other instance: it is due to the will of God, and is in accordance with the justice of His judgments, the method of which our mind is incapable of understanding. I have been induced to accept this theory by the circumstance that I have not met in any of the prophetical books with a description of God's Providence otherwise than in relation to human beings. The prophets even express their surprise that God should take notice of man, who is too little and too unimportant to be worthy of the attention of the Creator: how, then, should other living creatures be considered as proper objects for Divine Providence! Comp. "What is man, that thou takest knowledge of him?" (Ps. cxliv. 3); "What is man, that thou art mindful of him?" (ibid. viii. 8). It is clearly expressed in many Scriptural passages that God provides for all men, and controls all their deeds -- e.g., "He fashioneth their hearts alike, he considereth all their works" (ibid. xxxiii. 15); "For thine eyes are open upon all the ways of the sons of men, to give every one according to his ways" (Jer. xxxii. 19). Again: "For his eyes are upon the ways of man, and he seeth all his goings" (Job xxxii. 21). In the Law there occur instances of the fact that men are governed by God, and that their actions are examined by him. Comp. "In the day when I visit I will visit their sin upon them" (Exod. xxxii. 34) "I will even appoint over you terror" (Lev. xxvi. 16); "Whosoever hath sinned against me, him will I blot out of my book" (Exod. xxxii. 33); "The same soul will I destroy" (Lev. xxiii. 30); "I will even set my face against that soul" (ibid. xx. 6). There are many instances of this kind. All that is mentioned of the history of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob is a perfect proof that Divine Providence extends. to every man individually. But the condition of the individual beings of other living creatures is undoubtedly the same as has been stated by Aristotle. On that account it is allowed, even commanded, to kill animals; we are permitted to use them according to our pleasure. The view that other living beings are only governed by Divine Providence in the way described by Aristotle, is supported by the words of the Prophet Habakkuk. When he perceived the victories of Nebuchadnezzar, and saw the multitude of those slain by him, he said, "O God, it is as if men were abandoned, neglected, and unprotected like fish and like worms of the earth." He thus shows that these classes are abandoned. This is expressed in the following passage: "And makest men as the fishes of the sea, as the creeping things, that have no ruler over them. They take up all of them with the angle," etc. (Hab. i. 14, 15). The prophet then declares that such is not the case; for the events referred to are not the result of abandonment, forsaking, and absence of Providence, but are intended as a punishment for the people, who well deserved all that befell them. He therefore says: "O Lord, Thou hast ordained them for judgment, and O mighty God, Thou hast established them for correction" (ibid. ver. 12). Our opinion is not contradicted by Scriptural passages like the following: "He giveth to the beast his food" (Ps. cxlvii. 9); "The young lions roar after their prey, and seek their meat from God" (ibid. civ. 21);" Thou openest thine hand, and satisfiest the desire of every living thing" (ibid. cxlv. 16); or by the saying of our Sages: "He sitteth and feedeth all, from the horns of the unicorns even unto the eggs of insects." There are many similar sayings extant in the writings of our Sages, but they imply nothing that is contrary to my view. All these passages refer to Providence in relation to species, and not to Providence in relation to individual animals. The acts of God are as it were enumerated; how He provides for every species the necessary food and the means of subsistence. This is clear and plain. Aristotle likewise holds that this kind of Providence is necessary, and is in actual existence. Alexander also notices this fact in the name of Aristotle, viz., that every species has its nourishment prepared for its individual members; otherwise the species would undoubtedly have perished. It does not require much consideration to understand this. There is a rule laid down by our Sages that it is directly prohibited in the Law to cause pain to an animal, and is based on the words: "Wherefore hast thou smitten thine ass?" etc. (Num. xxii. 32). But the object of this rule is to make us perfect; that we should not assume cruel habits; and that we should not uselessly cause pain to others; that, on the contrary, we should be prepared to show pity and mercy to all living creatures, except when necessity demands the contrary: "When thy soul longeth to eat flesh," etc. (Deut. xii. 20). We should not kill animals for the purpose of practising cruelty, or for the purpose of play. It cannot be objected to this theory, Why should God select mankind as the object of His special Providence, and not other living beings? For he who asks this question must also inquire, Why has man alone, of all species of animals, been endowed with intellect? The answer to this second question must be, according to the three afore-mentioned theories: It was the Will of God, it is the decree of His Wisdom, or it is in accordance with the laws of Nature. The same answers apply to the first question. Understand thoroughly my theory, that I do not ascribe to God ignorance of anything or any kind of weakness; I hold that Divine Providence is related and closely connected with the intellect, because Providence can only proceed from an intelligent being, from a being that is itself the most perfect Intellect. Those creatures, therefore, which receive part of that intellectual influence, will become subject to the action of Providence in the same proportion as they are acted upon by the Intellect. This theory is in accordance with reason and with the teaching of Scripture, whilst the other theories previously mentioned either exaggerate Divine Providence or detract from it. In the former case they lead to confusion and entire nonsense, and cause us to deny reason and to contradict that which is perceived with the senses. The latter case, viz., the theory that Divine Providence does not extend to man, and that there is no difference between man and other animals, implies very bad notions about God; it disturbs all social order, removes and destroys all the moral and intellectual virtues of man.
CHAPTER XVIII
HAVING shown in the preceding chapter that of all living beings mankind alone is directly under the control of Divine Providence, I will now add the following remarks: It is an established fact that species have no existence except in our own minds. Species and other classes are merely ideas formed in our minds, whilst everything in real existence is an individual object, or an aggregate of individual objects. This being granted, it must further be admitted that the result of the existing Divine influence, that reaches mankind through the human intellect, is identical with individual intellects really in existence, with which, e.g., Zeid, Amr, Kaled and Bekr, are endowed. Hence it follows, in accordance with what I have mentioned in the preceding chapter, that the greater the share is which a person has obtained of this Divine influence, on account of both his physical predisposition and his training, the greater must also be the effect of Divine Providence upon him, for the action of Divine Providence is proportional to the endowment of intellect, as has been mentioned above. The relation of Divine Providence is therefore not the same to all men; the greater the human perfection a person has attained, the greater the benefit he derives from Divine Providence. This benefit is very great in the case of prophets, and varies according to the degree of their prophetic faculty; as it varies in the case of pious and good men according to their piety and uprightness. For it is the intensity of the Divine intellectual influence that has inspired the prophets, guided the good in their actions, and perfected the wisdom of the pious. In the same proportion as ignorant and disobedient persons are deficient in that Divine influence, their condition is inferior, and their rank equal to that of irrational beings; and they are "like unto the beasts" (Ps. xlix. 21). For this reason it was not only considered a light thing to slay them, but it was even directly commanded for the benefit of mankind. This belief that God provides for every individual human being in accordance with his merits is one of the fundamental principles on which the Law is founded.
Consider how the action of Divine Providence is described in reference to every incident in the lives of the patriarchs, to their occupations, and even to their passions, and how God promised to direct His attention to them. Thus God said to Abraham, "I am thy shield" (Gen. xv. 1); to Isaac, "I will be with thee, and I will bless thee" (ibid. xxvi. 3); to Jacob, "I am with thee, and will keep thee" (ibid. xxviii. 15); to [Moses] the chief of the Prophets, "Certainly I will be with thee, and this shall be a token unto thee" (Exod. iii. 12); to Joshua, "As I was with Moses, so I shall be with thee" (Josh. i. 5). It is clear that in all these cases the action of Providence has been proportional to man's perfection. The following verse describes how Providence protects good and pious men, and abandons fools; "He Will keep the feet of his saints, and the wicked shall be silent in darkness: for by strength shall no man prevail" (1 Sam. ii. 9). When we see that some men escape plagues and mishaps, whilst others perish by them, we must not attribute this to a difference in the properties of their bodies, or in their physical constitution," for by strength shall no man prevail"; but it must be attributed to their different degrees of perfection, some approaching God, whilst others moving away from Him. Those who approach Him are best protected, and "He will keep the feet of his saints"; but those who keep far away from Him are left exposed to what may befall them; there is nothing that could protect them from what might happen; they are like those who walk in darkness, and are certain to stumble. The protection of the pious by Providence is also expressed in the following passages: -- "He keepeth all his bones," etc. (Ps. xxxiv. 21); "The eyes of the Lord are upon the righteous" (ibid. ver. 16); "He shall call upon me and I shall answer him" (ibid. xci. 15). There are in Scripture many more passages expressing the principle that men enjoy Divine protection in proportion to their perfection and piety. The philosophers have likewise discussed this subject. Abu-nasr, in the Introduction to his Commentary on Aristotle's Nikomachean Ethics, says as follows: -- Those who possess the faculty of raising their souls from virtue to virtue obtain, according to Plato, Divine protection to a higher degree.
Now consider how by this method of reasoning we have arrived at the truth taught by the Prophets, that every person has his individual share of Divine Providence in proportion to his perfection. For philosophical research leads to this conclusion, if we assume, as has been mentioned above, that Divine Providence is in each case proportional to the person's intellectual development. It is wrong to say that Divine Providence extends only to the species, and not to individual beings, as some of the philosophers teach. For only individual beings have real existence, and individual beings are endowed with Divine Intellect; Divine Providence acts, therefore, upon these individual beings.
Study this chapter as it ought to be studied; you will find in it all the fundamental principles of the Law; you will see that these are in conformity with philosophical speculation, and all difficulties will be removed; you will have a clear idea of Divine Providence.
After having described the various philosophical opinions on Providence, and on the manner how God governs the Universe, I will briefly state the opinion of our co-religionists on the Omniscience of God, and what I have to remark on this subject.
CHAPTER XIX
IT is undoubtedly an innate idea that God must be perfect in everyrespect and cannot be deficient in anything. It is almost an innateidea that ignorance in anything is a deficiency, and that God cantherefore not be ignorant of anything. But some thinkers assume,as I said before, haughtily and exultingly, that God knows certainthings and is ignorant of certain other things. They did so becausethey imagined that they discovered a certain absence of order inman's affairs, most of which are not only the result of physicalproperties, but also of those faculties which he possesses as abeing endowed with free will and reason. The Prophets havealready stated the proof which ignorant persons offer for theirbelief that God does not know our actions: viz., the fact thatwicked people are seen in happiness, case, and peace. This factleads also righteous and pious persons to think that it is of no usefor them to aim at that which is good and to suffer for it throughthe opposition of other people. But the Prophets at the same timerelate how their own thoughts were engaged on this question, andhow they were at last convinced that in the instances to whichthese arguments refer, only the end and not the beginning ought tobe taken into account. The following is a description of thesereflections (Ps. lxxiii.11, seq.) :" And they say, How does Godknow ? and is there knowledge in the Most High ? Behold, theseare the ungodly who prosper in the world; they increase in riches.Verily I have cleansed my heart in vain, and washed my hands ininnocency." He then continues," When I thought to know this, itwas too painful for me, until I went into the sanctuary of God thenunderstood I their end. Surely thou didst set them in slipperyplaces thou castedst them down into destruction. How are theybrought into desolation, as in a moment! They are utterlyconsumed with terrors." The very same ideas have also beenexpressed by the prophet Malachi, for he says thus (Mal. iii.13-18):" Your words have been stout against me, saith the Lord.As you have said, It is vain to serve God: and what profit is it thatwe have kept his ordinance, and that we have walked mournfullybefore the Lord of hosts ? And now we can the proud happy; yea,they that work wickedness are set up: yea, they that tempt God areeven delivered. Then they that feared the Lord spake often one toanother, etc. Then shall ye return and discern between therighteous and the wicked, between him that serveth God and himthat serveth him not." David likewise shows how general this viewwas in his time, and how it led and caused people to sin and tooppress one another. At first he argues against this theory, and thenhe declares that God is omniscient. He says as follows :-" Theyslay the widow and the stranger, and murder the fatherless. Yetthey say, The Lord shall not see, neither shall the God of Jacobregard it. Understand, ye brutish among the people, and ye fools,when will you be wise ? He that planted the ear, shall he not hear ?He that formed the eye, shall he not see ? He that chastisethnations, shall not he correct ? or he that teacheth man knowledge?" I will now show you the meaning of these arguments, but first Iwill point out how the opponents to the words of the Prophetsmisunderstood this passage. Many years ago some intelligentco-religionists -- they were physicians-told me that they weresurprised at the words of David; for it would follow from hisarguments that the Creator of the mouth must eat and the Creatorof the lungs must cry; the same applies to all other organs of ourbody. You who study this treatise of mine, consider how grosslythey misunderstood David's arguments. Hear now what its truemeaning is: He who produces a vessel must have had in his mindan idea of the use of that instrument, otherwise he could not haveproduced it. If, e.g., the Smith had not formed an idea of sewingand possessed a knowledge of it, the needle would not have hadthe form so indispensable for sewing. The same is the case with allinstruments. When some philosopher thought that God, whoseperception is purely intellectual, has no knowledge of individualthings, which are perceivable only by the senses, David takes hisargument from the existence of the senses, and argues thus:-- If thesense of sight had been utterly unknown to God, how could Hehave produced that organ of the sense of sight ? Do you think thatit was by chance that a transparent humour was formed, and thenanother humour with certain similar properties, and besides amembrane which by accident had a hole covered with a hardenedtransparent substance ? in short, considering the humour of theeye, its membranes and nerves, with their well-known functions,and their adaptation to the purpose of sight, can any intelligentperson imagine that all this is due to chance ? Certainly not; wesee here necessarily design in nature, as has been shown by allphysicians and philosophers; but as nature is not an intellectualbeing, and is not capable of governing [the universe], as has beenaccepted by all philosophers, the government (of the universe],which shows signs of design, originates, according to thephilosophers, in an intellectual cause, but is according to our viewthe result of the action of an intellectual being, that endowseverything with its natural properties. If this intellect wereincapable of perceiving or knowing any of the actions of earthlybeings, how could He have created, or, according to the othertheory, caused to emanate from Himself, properties that bringabout those actions of which He is supposed to have no knowledge? David correctly calls those who believe in this theory brutes andfools. He then proceeds to explain that the error is due to ourdefective understanding: that God endowed us with the intellectwhich is the means of our comprehension, and which on accountof its insufficiency to form a true idea of God has become thesource of great doubts: that He therefore knows what our defectsare, and how worthless the doubts are which originate in our faultyreasoning. The Psalmist therefore says:" He who teaches manknowledge, the Lord, knoweth the thoughts of man that they arevanity" (ibid. xciv. 10-11).
My object in this chapter was to show how the belief of theignorant, that God does not notice the affairs of man because theyare uncertain and unsystematic, is very ancient. Comp." And theIsraelites uttered things that were not right against the Lord" (2Kings xvii. 9). In reference to this passage the Midrash says :"What have they uttered ? This Pillar [i.e., God] does not see, norhear, nor speak" : i.e., they imagine that God takes no notice ofearthly affairs, that the Prophets received of God neitheraffirmative nor negative precepts; they imagine so, simply becausehuman affairs are not arranged as every person would think itdesirable. Seeing that these are not in accordance with their wish,they say," The Lord does not see us" (Ezek. viii. 12). Zephaniah(i. 12) also describes those ignorant persons" who say in theirheart the Lord will not do good, neither will he do evil." I will tellyou my own opinion as regards the theory that God knows anthings on earth, but I will before state some propositions which aregenerally adopted, and the correctness of which no intelligentperson can dispute.
CHAPTER XX
IT is generally agreed upon that God cannot at a certain timeacquire knowledge which He did not possess previously; it isfurther impossible that His knowledge should include anyplurality, even according to those who admit the Divine attributes.As these things have been fully proved, we, who assert theteaching of the Law, believe that God's knowledge of many thingsdoes not imply any plurality; His knowledge does not change likeours when the objects of His knowledge change. Similarly we saythat the various events are known to Him before they take place;He constantly knows them, and therefore no fresh knowledge isacquired by Him. E.g., He knows that a certain person isnon-existent at present, will come to existence at a certain time,will continue to exist for sometime, and will then cease to exist.When this person, in accordance with God's foreknowledgeconcerning him, comes into existence, God's knowledge is notincreased; it contains nothing that it did not contain before, butsomething has taken place that was known previously exactly as ithas taken place. This theory implies that God's knowledge extendsto things not in existence, and includes also the infinite. Wenevertheless accept it, and contend that we may attribute to Godthe knowledge of a thing which does not yet exist, but theexistence of which God foresees and is able to effect. But thatwhich never exists cannot be an object of His knowledge; just asour knowledge does not comprise things which we consider asnon-existing. A doubt has been raised, however, whether Hisknowledge includes the infinite. Some thinkers assume thatknowledge has the species for its object, and therefore extends atthe same time to all individual members of the species. This viewis taken by every man who adheres to a revealed religion andfollows the dictates of reason. Philosophers, however, havedecided that the object of knowledge cannot be a non-existingthing, and that it cannot comprise that which is infinite. Since,therefore, God's knowledge does not admit of any increase, it isimpossible that He should know any transient thing. He onlyknows that which is constant and unchangeable. Otherphilosophers raised the following objection : God does not knoweven things that remain constant; for His knowledge would theninclude a plurality according to the number of objects known; theknowledge of every thing being distinguished by a certainpeculiarity of the thing. God therefore only knows His ownessence.
My opinion is this : the cause of the error of all these schools istheir belief that God's knowledge is like ours; each school points tosomething withheld from our knowledge, and either assumes thatthe same must be the case in God's knowledge, or at least findssome difficulty how to explain it. We must blame the philosophersin this respect more than any other persons, because theydemonstrated that there is no plurality in God, and that He has noattribute that is not identical with His essence; His knowledge andHis essence are one and the same thing; they likewisedemonstrated, as we have shown, that our intellect and ourknowledge are insufficient to comprehend the true idea of Hisessence. How then can they imagine that they comprehend Hisknowledge, which is identical with His essence; seeing that ourincapacity to comprehend His essence prevents us fromunderstanding the way how He knows objects ? for His knowledgeis not of the same kind as ours, but totally different from it andadmitting of no analogy. And as there is an Essence of independentexistence, which is, as the philosophers, call it, the Cause of theexistence of all things, or, as we say, the Creator of everything thatexists beside Him, so we also assume that this Essence knowseverything, that nothing whatever of all that exists is hidden fromit, and that the knowledge attributed to this essence has nothing incommon with our knowledge, just as that essence is in no way likeour essence. The homonymity of the term" knowledge" misledpeople; [they forgot that] only the words are the same, but thethings designated by them are different: and therefore they came tothe absurd conclusion that that which is required for ourknowledge is also required for God's knowledge.
Besides, I find it expressed in various passages of Scripture thatthe fact that God knows things while in a state of possibility, whentheir existence belongs to the future, does not change the nature ofthe possible in any way; that nature remains unchanged; and theknowledge of the realization of one of several possibilities doesnot yet effect that realization. This is likewise one of thefundamental principles of the Law of Moses, concerning whichthere is no doubt nor any dispute. Otherwise it would not havebeen said," And thou shalt make a battlement for thy roof," etc.(Dent. xxii. 8), or" Lest he die in the battle, and another man takeher" (ibid. xx. 7). The fact that laws were given to man, bothaffirmative and negative, supports the principle, that God'sknowledge of future [and possible] events does not change theircharacter. The great doubt that presents itself to our mind is theresult of the insufficiency of our intellect. Consider in how manyways His knowledge is distinguished from ours according to all theteaching of every revealed religion. First, His knowledge is one,and yet embraces many different kinds of objects. Secondly, it isapplied to things not in existence. Thirdly, it comprehends theinfinite. Fourthly, it remains unchanged, though it comprises theknowledge of changeable things: whilst it seems [in reference toourselves] that the knowledge of a thing that is to come intoexistence is different from the knowledge of the thing when it hascome into existence; because there is the additional knowledge ofits transition from a state of potentiality into that of reality. Fifthly,according to the teaching of our Law, God's knowledge of one oftwo eventualities does not determine it, however certain thatknowledge may be concerning the future occurrence of the oneeventuality.-Now I wonder what our knowledge has in commonwith God's knowledge, according to those who treat God'sknowledge as an attribute. Is there anything else common to bothbesides the mere name ? According to our theory that God'sknowledge is not different from His essence, there is an essentialdistinction between His knowledge and ours, like the distinctionbetween the substance of the heavens and that of the earth. TheProphets have clearly expressed this. Comp." For my thoughts arenot your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord.For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higherthan your ways" (Isa. Iv. 8-9). In short, as we cannot accuratelycomprehend His essence, and yet we know that His existence ismost perfect, free from all admixture of deficiency, change, orpassiveness, so we have no correct notion of His knowledge,because it is nothing but His essence, and yet we are convincedthat He does not at one time obtain knowledge which He had notbefore; i.e., He obtains no new knowledge, He does not increase it,and it is not finite; nothing of all existing things escapes Hisknowledge, but their nature is not changed thereby; that which ispossible remains possible. Every argument that seems to contradictany of these statements is founded on the nature of our knowledge,that has only the name in common with God's knowledge. Thesame applies to the term intention; it is homonymously employedto designate our intention towards a certain thing, and the intentionof God. The term" management" (Providence) is likewisehomonymously used of our management of a certain thing, and ofGod's management. In fact management, knowledge, and intentionare not the same when ascribed to us and when ascribed to God.When these three terms are taken in both cases in the same sense,great difficulties must arise: but when it is noticed that there is agreat difference whether a thing is predicated of God or of us, thetruth will become clear. The difference between that which isascribed to God and that which is ascribed to man is expressed inthe words above mentioned," And your ways are not my ways."
CHAPTER XXI
THERE is a great difference between the knowledge which theproducer of a thing possesses concerning it, and the knowledgewhich other persons possess concerning the same thing. Suppose athing is produced in accordance with the knowledge of theproducer, the producer was then guided by his knowledge in theact of producing the thing. Other people, however, who examinethis work and acquire a knowledge of the whole of it, depend forthat knowledge on the work itself. E.g., An artisan makes a box inwhich weights move with the running of the water, and thusindicate how many hours have passed of the day and of the night.The whole quantity of the water that is to run out, the differentways in which it runs, every thread that is drawn, and every littleball that descends-all this is fully perceived by him who makes theclock; and his knowledge is not the result of observing themovements as they are actually going on: but, on the contrary, themovements are produced in accordance with his knowledge. Butanother person who looks at that instrument will receive freshknowledge at every movement he perceives; the longer he lookson, the more knowledge does he acquire: he will graduallyincrease his knowledge till he fully understands the machinery. Ifan infinite number of movements were assumed for thisinstrument, he would never be able to complete his knowledge.Besides, he cannot know any of the movements before they takeplace, since he only knows them from their actual occurrence. Thesame is the case with every object, and its relation to ourknowledge and God's knowledge of it. Whatever we know of thethings is derived from observation: on that account it is impossiblefor us to know that which will take place in future, or that which isinfinite.
Our knowledge is acquired and increased in proportion to thethings known by us. This is not the case with God. His knowledgeof things is not derived from the things themselves: if this were thecase, there would be change and plurality in His knowledge; on thecontrary, the things are in accordance with His eternal knowledge,which has established their actual properties, and made part ofthem purely spiritual, another part material and constant as regardsits individual members, a third part material and changeable asregards the individual beings according to eternal and constantlaws. Plurality, acquisition, and change in His knowledge istherefore impossible. He fully knows His unchangeable essence,and has thus a knowledge of all that results from any of His acts. Ifwe were to try to understand in what manner this is done, it wouldbe the same as if we tried to be the same as God, and to make ourknowledge identical with His knowledge. Those who seek thetruth, and admit what is true, must believe that nothing is hiddenfrom God; that everything is revealed to His knowledge, which isidentical with His essence; that this kind of knowledge cannot becomprehended by us; for if we knew its method, we would possessthat intellect by which such knowledge could be acquired. Suchintellect does not exist except in God, and is at the same time Hisessence. Note this well, for I think that this is an excellent idea,and leads to correct views: no error will be found in it: nodialectical argument: it does not lead to any absurd conclusion, norto ascribing any defect to God. These sublime and profoundthemes admit of no proof whatever, neither according to ouropinion who believe in the teaching of Scripture, nor according tothe philosophers who disagree and are much divided on thisquestion. In all questions that cannot be demonstrated, we mustadopt the method which we have adopted in this question aboutGod's Omniscience. Note it.
CHAPTER XXII
THE strange and wonderful Book of job treats of the same subjectas we are discussing: its basis is a fiction, conceived for thepurpose of explaining the different opinions which people hold onDivine Providence. You know that some of our Sages clearlystated job has never existed, and has never been created, and thathe is a poetic fiction. Those who assume that he has existed, andthat the book is historical, are unable to determine when and wherejob lived. Some of our Sages say that he lived in the days of thePatriarchs: others hold that he was a contemporary of Moses:others place him in the days of David, and again others believe thathe was one of those who returned from the Babylonian exile. Thisdifference of opinion supports the assumption that he has neverexisted in reality. But whether he has existed or not, that which isrelated of him is an experience of frequent occurrence, is a sourceof perplexity to all thinkers, and has suggested theabove-mentioned opinions on God's Omniscience and Providence.This perplexity is caused by the account that a simple and perfectperson, who is upright in his actions, and very anxious to abstainfrom sin, is afflicted by successive misfortunes, namely, by loss ofproperty, by the death of his children, and by bodily disease,though he has not committed any sin. According to both theories,viz., the theory that job did exist, and the theory that he did notexist, the introduction to the book is certainly a fiction; I mean theportion which relates to the words of the adversary, the words ofGod to the former, and the handing over of job to him. Thisfiction, however, is in so far different from other fictions that itincludes profound ideas and great mysteries, removes great doubts,and reveals the most important truths. I will discuss it as fully aspossible: and I will also ten you the words of our Sages thatsuggested to me the explanation of this great poem.
First, consider the words:" There was a man in the land Uz." Theterm Uz. has different meanings; it is used as a proper noun.Comp." Uz, his first-born" (Gen. XXii. 21): it is also imperativeof the verb Uz," to take advice." Comp. uzu," take counsel" (Isa.viii. 10). The name Uz therefore expresses the exhortation toconsider well this lesson, study it, grasp its ideas, and comprehendthem, in order to see which is the right view." The sons of Godthen came to present themselves before the Lord, and theadversary came also among them and in their number" (chap. i. 6,ii. 1). It is not said :" And the sons of God and the adversary cameto present themselves before the Lord" : this sentence would haveimplied that the existence of all that came was of the same kindand rank. The words used are these :" And the sons of God cameto present themselves before the Lord, and the adversary came alsoamong them." Such a phrase is only used in reference to one thatcomes without being expected or invited; he only comes amongothers whose coming has been sought. The adversary is thendescribed as going to and fro on the earth, and walking up anddown thereon. He is in no relation to the beings above, and has noplace among them. For this reason it is said," from going to andfro on the earth, and walking up and down on it," for his" going"and" walking" can only take place on the earth. [job], the simpleand righteous man, is given and handed over to the adversary;whatever evils and misfortunes befell job as regards his property,children, and health, were all caused by this adversary. When thisidea is sufficiently indicated, the author begins to reflect on it: oneopinion job is represented to hold, whilst other opinions aredefended by his friends. I will further on expound these opinionswhich formed the substance of the discussion on the misfortunesof job, caused by the adversary alone. job, as well as his friends,were of opinion that God Himself was the direct agent of whathappened, and that the adversary was not the intermediate cause. Itis remarkable in this account that wisdom is not ascribed to job.The text does not say he was an intelligent, wise, or clever man;but virtues and uprightness, especially in actions, are ascribed tohim. If he were wise he would not have any doubt about the causeof his suffering, as will be shown later on. Besides, his misfortunesare enumerated in the same order as they rank in man's estimation.There are some who are not perplexed or discouraged by loss ofproperty, thinking little of it: but are terrified when they arethreatened with the death of their children and are killed by theiranxiety. There are others who bear without shock or fainting eventhe loss of their children, but no one endowed with sensation isable to bear bodily pain. We generally extol God in words, andpraise Him as righteous and benevolent, when we prosper and arehappy, or when the grief we have to bear is moderate. But [it isotherwise] when such troubles as are described in job come overus. Some of us deny God, and believe that there is no rule in theUniverse, even if only their property is lost. Others retain theirfaith in the existence of justice and order, even when sufferingfrom loss of property, whereas loss of children is too muchaffliction for them. Others remain firm in their faith, even with theloss of their children; but there is no one who can patiently bearthe pain that reaches his own person: he then murmurs andcomplains of injustice either in his heart or with his tongue.
Now consider that the phrase," to present themselves before theLord," is used in reference to the sons of God, both the first and thesecond times, but in reference to the adversary, who appeared oneither occasion among them and in their number, this phrase is notused the first time, whilst in his second appearance" the adversaryalso came among them to present himself before the Lord."Consider this, and see how very extraordinary it is!-These ideaspresented themselves like an inspiration to me.-The phrase," topresent themselves before the Lord," implies that they are beingswho are forced by God's command to do what He desires. Thismay be inferred from the words of the prophet Zechariahconcerning the four chariots that came forth. He says:" And theangel answered and said to me, These four winds of the heavenscome forth from presenting themselves before the Lord of thewhole earth" (Zech. vi. 5). It is clear that the relation of the sonsof God to the Universe is not the same as that of the adversary.The relation of the sons of God is more constant and morepermanent. The adversary has also some relation to the Universe,but it is inferior to that of the sons of God. It is also remarkable inthis account that in the description of the adversary's wanderingabout on the earth, and his performing certain actions, it isdistinctly stated that he has no power over the soul: whilst powerhas been given to him over all earthly affairs, there is a partitionbetween him and the soul; he has not received power over the soul.This is expressed in the words," But keep away from his soul"(job. ii. 6). 1 have already shown you the homonymous use of theterm" soul" (nefesh) in Hebrew (Part L, chap. xli.). It designatesthat element in man that survives him; it is this Portion over whichthe adversary has no power.-- After these remarks of mine listen tothe following useful instruction given by our Sages, who in truthdeserve the title of" wise men" : it makes clear that which appearsdoubtful, and reveals that which has been hidden, and disclosesmost of the mysteries of the Law. They said in the Talmud asfollows: R. Simeon, son of Lakish, says:" The adversary (satan),evil inclination (yezer ha-ra'), and the angel of death, are one andthe same being." Here we find all that has been mentioned by us insuch a dear manner that no intelligent person will be in doubtabout it. It has thus been shown to you that one and the same thingis designated by these three different terms, and that actionsascribed to these three are in reality the actions of one and thesame agent. Again, the ancient doctors of the Talmud said:" Theadversary goes about and misleads, then he goes up and accuses,obtains permission, and takes the soul." You have already beentold that when David at the time of the plague was shown theangel" with the sword drawn in his hand stretched out overJerusalem" (2 Sam. xxiv. 17), it was done for the purpose ofconveying a certain idea to him. The same idea was also expressedin the vision concerning the sins of the sons of Joshua, the highpriest, by the words," And the adversary stood on his right hand toaccuse him" (Zech. iii. 1). The vision then reveals that [theadversary] is far from God, and continues thus:" The Lord willrebuke thee, 0 adversary, the Lord who hath chosen Jerusalem winrebuke thee" (ibid. ver. 2). Balaam saw prophetically the samevision in his journey, addressing him with the words," Behold Ihave come forth to be a hindrance to thee" (Num. xxii. 32). TheHebrew, satan, is derived from the same root as seteh," turn away" (Prov. iv. 15): it implies the notion of turning and moving awayfrom a thing; he undoubtedly turns us away from the way of truth,and leads us astray in the way of error. The same idea is containedin the passage," And the imagination of the heart of man is evilfrom his youth" (Gen. Viii. 21). The theory of the good and theevil inclinations (yezer ha-tob, ve-yezrer ha-ra') is frequentlyreferred to in our religion. Our Sages also say," Serve God withyour good and your evil inclinations." (B. T. Ber. 57a.) They alsosay that the evil inclination we receive at our birth: for" at thedoor sin croucheth" (Gen. iv. 7), as is distinctly said in the Law,"And the imagination of the heart of man is evil from his youth"(ibid. Viii. 21). The good inclination, however, comes when themini is developed. In explaining the allegory representing the bodyof man and his different faculties, our Sages (B. T. Ned. 32b)said:" The evil inclination is called a great king, whilst the goodinclination is a child, poor, though wise" (Eccles. ix. 14). All thesesayings of our Sages are contained in their writings, and are wellknown. According to our Sages the evil inclination, the adversary(satan), and the angel [of death], are undoubtedly identical; and theadversary being called" angel," because he is among the sons ofGod, and the good inclination being in reality an angel, it is to thegood and the evil inclinations that they refer in their well-knownwords," Every person is accompanied by two angels, one being onhis right side, one on his left." In the Babylonian Gemara(Shabbath 119b), they say distinctly of the two angels that one isgood and one bad. SSe what extraordinary ideas this passagediscloses, and how many false ideas it removes.
I believe that I have fully explained the idea contained in theaccount of job; but I will now show the character of the opinionattributed to job, and of the opinions attributed to his friends, andsupport my statement by proofs gathered from the words of each ofthem. We need not take notice of the remaining passages whichare only required for the context, as has been explained to you inthe beginning of this treatise.
CHAPTER XXIII
ASSUMING the first part of the history of job as having actuallytaken place, the five, viz., job and his friends, agreed that themisfortune of job was known to God, and that it was God thatcaused job's suffering. They further agree that God does no wrong,and that no injustice can be ascribed to Him. You will find theseideas frequently repeated in the words of job. When you considerthe words of the five who take part in the discussion, you willeasily notice that things said by one of them are also uttered by therest. The arguments are repeated, mixed up, and interrupted byjob's description of his acute pain and troubles, which had comeupon him in spite of his strict righteousness, and by an account ofhis charity, humane disposition, and good acts. The replies of thefriends to job are likewise interrupted by exhortations to patience,by words of comfort, and other speeches tending to make himforget his grief. He is told by them to be silent; that he ought not tolet loose the bridle of his tongue, as if he were in dispute withanother man; that he ought silently to submit to the judgments ofGod. job replies that the intensity of his pains did not permit himto bear patiently, to collect his thoughts and to say what he oughtto say. The friends, on the other hand, contend that those who actwell receive reward, and those who act wickedly are punished.When a wicked and rebellious person is seen in prosperity, it maybe assumed for certain that a change will take place; he will die, ortroubles will afflict him and his house. When we find a worshipperof God in misfortune, we may be certain that God will heal thestroke of his wound. This idea is frequently repeated in the wordsof the three friends, Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zofar, who agree in thisopinion. It is, however, not the object of this chapter to describe inwhat they agree, but to define the distinguishing characteristic ofeach of them, and to elucidate the opinion of each as regards thequestion why the most simple and upright man is afflicted with thegreatest and acutest pain. job found in this fact a proof that theright cons and the wicked are equal before God, who holds allmankind in contempt. job therefore says (ix. 22, 23) :" This is onething, therefore I said it, He destroyeth the perfect and the wicked.If the scourge slay suddenly, he will laugh at the trial of theinnocent." He thus declares that when a scourge comes suddenly,killing and destroying all it meets, God laughs at the trial of theinnocent. He further confirms this view in the following passage:"One dieth in his full strength, being wholly at case and quiet. Hisvessels are full of milk, etc. And another dieth in the bitterness ofhis soul, and never eateth with pleasure. They shall lie down alikein the dust, and the worms shall cover them" (ibid. xxi. 23-26). Ina similar manner he shows the good condition and prosperity ofwicked people; and is even very explicit on this point. He speaksthus:" Even when I remember I am afraid, and trembling takethhold on my flesh. Wherefore do the wicked live, become old, yea,are mighty in power ? Their seed is established in their sight withthem," etc. (ibid. 6-8). Having thus described their prosperity headdresses his opponents, and says to them :" Granted that as youthink, the children of this prosperous atheist will perish after hisdeath, and their memory will be blotted out, what harm will thefate of his family cause him after his death ? For what pleasurehath he in his house after him, when the number of his months iscut off in the midst ?" (ibid. 21). job then explains that there is nohope after death, so that the cause [of the misfortune of therighteous man] is nothing else but entire neglect on the part ofGod. He is therefore surprised that God has not abandoned thecreation of man altogether; and that after having created him, Hedoes not take any notice of him. He says in his surprise :" Hastthou not poured me out as milk, and curdled me like cheese ?" etc.(ibid. x. 10, seq.). This is one of the different views held by somethinkers on Providence. Our Sages (B. T. Baba B. 16a) condemnedthis view of job as mischievous, and expressed their feeling inwords like the following :" dust should have filled the mouth ofjob" :" job wished to upset the dish" :" job denied the resurrectionof the dead" :" He commenced to blaspheme." When, however,God said to Eliphaz and his colleagues," You have not spoken ofme the thing that is right, as my servant job hath" (xlii. 7), ourSages assume as the cause of this rebuke, the maxim" Man is notpunished for that which he utters in his pain"; and that Godignored the sin of job [in his utterances], because of the acutenessof his suffering. But this explanation does not agree with the objectof the whole allegory. The words of God are justified, as I willshow, by the fact that job abandoned his first very erroneousopinion, and himself proved that it was an error. It is the opinionwhich suggests itself as plausible at first thought, especially in theminds of those who meet with mishaps, well knowing that theyhave not merited them through sins. This is admitted by all, andtherefore this opinion was assigned to job. But he is represented tohold this view only so long as he was without wisdom, and knewGod only by tradition, in the same manner as religious peoplegenerally know Him. As soon as he had acquired a true knowledgeof God, he confessed that there is undoubtedly true felicity in theknowledge of God; it is attained by all who acquire thatknowledge, and no earthly trouble can disturb it. So long as job'sknowledge of God was based on tradition and communication, andnot on research, he believed that such imaginary good as ispossessed in health, riches, and children, was the utmost that mencan attain: this was the reason why he was in perplexity, and whyhe uttered the above-mentioned opinions, and this is also themeaning of his words:" I have heard of thee by the hearing of theear; but now mine eye seeth thee. Wherefore 1 abhor myself, andrepent because of dust and ashes" (xlii. 5, 6): that is to say heabhorred all that he had desired before, and that he was sorry thathe had been in dust and ashes; comp." and he sat down among theashes" (ii. 8). On account of this last utterance, which implies trueperception, it is said afterwards in reference to him," for you havenot spoken of me the thing that is right, as my servant job hath."
The opinion set forth by Eliphaz in reference to job's suffering islikewise one of the current views on Providence. He holds that thefate of job was in accordance with strict justice. job was guilty ofsins for which he deserved his fate. Eliphaz therefore says to job :"Is not thy wickedness great, and thine iniquities infinite ?" (xxii.5). He then points out to him that his upright actions and his goodways, on which he relies, need not be so perfect in the eyes of Godthat no punishment should be inflicted on him." Behold, heputteth no trust in his servants: and his angels he chargeth withfolly: how much less in them that dwell in houses of clay," etc. (iv.17-18). Eliphaz never abandoned his belief that the fate of man isthe result of justice, that we do not know all our shortcomings forwhich we are punished, nor the way how we incur the punishmentthrough them.
Bildad the Shuffite defends in this question the theory of rewardand compensation. He therefore tells job that if he is innocent andwithout sin, his terrible misfortunes will be the source of greatreward, will be followed by the best compensation, and will provea boon to him as the cause of great bliss in the future world. Thisidea is expressed in the words :" If thou be pure and upright,surely now he will awake for thee, and make the habitation of thyrighteousness prosperous. Though thy beginning was small, yet thylatter end will greatly increase" (viii. 6-8). This opinionconcerning, Providence is widespread, and we have alreadyexplained it.
Zofar the Naamathite holds that the Divine Will is the source ofeverything that happens: no further cause can be sought for Hisactions, and it cannot be asked why He has done this and why Hehas not done that. That which God does can therefore not beexplained by the way of justice or the result of wisdom. His trueEssence demands that He does what He wills; we are unable tofathom the depth of His wisdom, and it is the law and rule of thiswisdom that whatever He does is done because it is His will andfor no other cause. Zofar therefore says to job:" But oh that Godwould speak, and open his lips against thee; and that he wouldshow thee the secrets of wisdom, for wisdom hath two portions 1Know, therefore, that God exacteth of thee less than thine iniquitydeserveth. Canst thou by searching find out God ? canst thou findout the Almighty unto perfection ?" (xi. 6-7).
In this manner consider well how the Book of job discusses theproblem, which has perplexed many people ` and led them toadopt in reference to Divine Providence some one of the theorieswhich I have explained above: all possible different theories arementioned therein. The problem is described either by way offiction or in accordance with real fact, as having manifested itselfin a man famous for his excellency and wisdom. The viewascribed to job is the theory of Aristotle. Eliphaz holds the opiniontaught in Scripture, Bildad's opinion is identical with that of theMu'tazilah, whilst Zofar defends the theory of the Asha'riyah.These were the ancient views on Providence; later on a new theorywas set forth, namely, that ascribed to Elihu. For this reason he isplaced above the others, and described as younger in years butgreater in wisdom. He censures job for his foolishly exaltinghimself, expressing surprise at such great troubles befalling a goodman, and dwelling on the praises of his own deeds. He also tellsthe three friends that their minds have been weakened by greatage. A profound and wonderful discourse then follows. Reflectingon his words we may at first thought be surprised to find that hedoes not add anything to the words of Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zofar;and that he only repeats their ideas in other terms and moreexplicitly. For he likewise censures and rebukes job, attributesjustice to God, relates His wonders in nature, and holds that God isnot affected by the service of the worshipper, nor by thedisobedience of the rebellious. All this has already been said byHis colleagues. But after due consideration we see clearly the newidea introduced by Elihu, which is the principal object of hisspeech, an idea which has not been uttered by those who spokebefore him. In addition to this he mentions also other things setforth by the previous speakers, in the same manner as each of therest, viz., job and his three friends, repeat what the others havesaid. The purpose of this repetition is to conceal the opinionpeculiar to each speaker, and to make all appear in the eyes of theordinary reader to utter one and the same view, although in realitythis is not the case. The new idea, which is peculiar to Elihu andhas not been mentioned by the others, is contained in his metaphorof the angel's intercession. It is a frequent occurrence, he says, thata man becomes ill, approaches the gates of death, and is alreadygiven up by his neighbours. If then an angel, of any kind whatever,intercedes on his behalf and prays for him, the intercession andprayers are accepted; the patient rises from his illness, is saved,and returns to good health. This result is not always obtained:intercession and deliverance do not always follow each other: ithappens only twice, or three times. Elihu therefore says:" If therebe an angel with him, an interpreter, one among a thousand, toshow unto man his uprightness," etc. (xxxiii. 29). He thendescribes man's condition when convalescent and the rejoicing athis recovery, and continues thus:" Lo, all these things workethGod twice, three times with man" (ibid. 29). This idea occurs onlyin the words of Elihu. His description of the method of prophecy inpreceding verses is likewise new. He says :" Surely God speakethin one way, yea in two ways, yet man perceiveth it not. In a dream,in a vision of the night, when deep sleep falleth upon man, inslumberings upon the bed" (ibid. 14, 15). He afterwards supportsand illustrates his theory by a description of many naturalphenomena, such as thunder, lightning, rain, and winds; with theseare mixed up accounts of various incidents of life, e.g., an accountof pestilence contained in the following passage:" In a momentthey die, and at midnight; the people become tumultuous and passaway" (xxxiv. 2o). Great wars are described in the followingverse:" He breaketh in pieces mighty men without number, andsetteth others in their stead" (ibid. 24).
There are many more passages of this kind. In a similar manner theRevelation that reached job (chap. xxxviii., chap. xli.), andexplained to him the error of his whole belief, constantly describesnatural objects, and nothing else; it describes the elements,meteorological phenomena, and peculiarities of various kinds ofliving beings. The sky, the heavens, Orion and Pleiades are onlymentioned in reference to their influence upon our atmosphere, sothat job's attention is in this prophecy only called to things belowthe lunar sphere. Elihu likewise derives instruction from the natureof various kinds of animals. Thus he says :" He teacheth usthrough the beasts of the earth, and maketh us wise through thefowls of heaven" (xxxv. 11). He dwells longest on the nature of theLeviathan, which possesses a combination of bodily peculiaritiesfound separate in different animals, in those that walk, those thatswim, and those that fly. The description of all these things servesto impress on our minds that we are unable to comprehend howthese transient creatures come into existence, or to imagine howtheir natural properties commenced to exist, and that these are notlike the things which we are able to produce. Much less can wecompare the manner in which God rules and manages Hiscreatures with the manner in which we rule and manage certainbeings. We must content ourselves with this, and believe thatnothing is hidden from God, as Elihu says:" For his eyes are uponthe- ways of man, and he seeth all his goings. There is no darknessnor shadow of death, where the workers of iniquity may hidethemselves" (xxxiv. 21, 22). But the term management, whenapplied to God, has not the same meaning which it has whenapplied to us; and when we say that He rules His creatures we donot mean that He does the same as we do when we rule over otherbeings. The term" rule" has not the same definition in both cases:it signifies two different notions, which have nothing in commonbut the name. In the same manner, as there is a difference betweenworks of nature and productions of human handicraft, so there is adifference between God's rule, providence, and intention inreference to all natural forces, and our rule, providence, andintention in reference to things which are the objects of our rule,providence, and intention. This lesson is the principal object of thewhole Book of job; it lays down this principle of faith, andrecommends us to derive a proof from nature, that we should notfall into the error of imagining His knowledge to be similar toours, or His intention, providence, and rule similar to ours. Whenwe know this we shall find everything that may befall us easy tobear; mishap will create no doubts in our hearts concerning God,whether He knows our affairs or not, whether He provides for us orabandons us. On the contrary, our fate will increase our love ofGod; as is said in the end of this prophecy:" Therefore I abhormyself and repent concerning the dust and ashes" (xlii. 6): and asour Sages say:" The pious do everything out of love, and rejoice intheir own afflictions." (B. T. Shabb. 88b.) If you pay to my wordsthe attention which this treatise demands, and examine all that issaid in the Book of job, all will be clear to you, and you will findthat I have grasped and taken hold of the whole subject; nothinghas been left unnoticed, except such portions as are onlyintroduced because of the context and the whole plan of theallegory. I have explained this method several times in the courseof this treatise.
CHAPTER XXIV
THE doctrine of trials is open to great objections: it is in fact moreexposed to objections than any other thing taught in Scripture. It ismentioned in Scripture six times, as I will show in this chapter.People have generally the notion that trials consist in afflictionsand mishaps sent by God to man, not as punishments for past sins,but as giving opportunity for great reward. This principle is notmentioned in Scripture in plain language, and it is only in one ofthe six places referred to that the literal meaning conveys thisnotion. I will explain the meaning of that passage later on. Theprinciple taught in Scripture is exactly the reverse; for it is said:"He is a God of faithfulness, and there is no iniquity in him" (Deut.xxxii. 4).
The teaching of our Sages, although some of them approve thisgeneral belief (concerning trials], is on the whole against it. Forthey say," There is no death without sin, and no affliction withouttransgression." (See p. 285.) Every intelligent religious personshould have this faith, and should not ascribe any wrong to God,who is far from it; he must not assume that a person is innocentand perfect and does not deserve what has befallen him. The trialsmentioned in Scripture in the [six) passages, seem to have beentests and experiments by which God desired to learn the intensityof the faith and the devotion of a man or a nation. [If this were thecase] it would be very difficult to comprehend the object of thetrials, and yet the sacrifice of Isaac seems to be a case of this kind,as none witnessed it, but God and the two concerned [Abrahamand Isaac]. Thus God says to Abraham," For now I know that thoufearest God," etc. (Gen. xxii. 12). In another passage it is said:" Forthe Lord your God proveth you to know whether ye love," etc.(Dent. xiii. 4). Again," And to prove thee to know what was inthine heart," etc. (ibid. Viii. 2). 1 will now remove all thedifficulties.
The sole object of all the trials mentioned in Scripture is to teachman what he ought to do or believe; so that the event which formsthe actual trial is not the end desired: it is but an example for ourinstruction and guidance. Hence the words" to know (la-da'at)whether ye love," etc., do not mean that God desires to knowwhether they loved God; for He already knows it; but la-da'at," toknow," has here the same meaning as in the phrase" to know(la-da'at) that I am the Lord that sanctifieth you" (Exod. xxxi. 13),i.e., that all nations shall know that I am the Lord who sanctifiethyou. In a similar manner Scripture says :-If a man should rise,pretend to be a prophet, and show you his signs by which hedesired to convince you that his words are true, know that Godintends thereby to prove to the nations how firmly you believe inthe truth of God's word, and how well you have comprehended thetrue Essence of God; that you cannot be misled by any tempter tocorrupt your faith in God. Your religion will then afford aguidance to all who seek the truth, and of all religions man willchoose that which is so firmly established that it is not shaken bythe performance of a miracle. For a miracle cannot prove thatwhich is impossible; it is useful only as a confirmation of thatwhich is possible, as we have explained in our Mishneh-torah.(Yesode ha-torah vii. f. viii. 3.)
Having shown that the term" to know" means" that all peoplemay know," we apply this interpretation to the following wordssaid in reference to the manna:" To humble thee, and to provethee, to know what was in thine heart, whether thou wouldst keephis commandments, or not" (Dent. viii. 2). All nations shall know,it shall be published throughout the world, that those who devotethemselves to the service of God are supported beyond theirexpectation. In the same sense it was said when the mannacommenced to come down," that I may prove them whether theywill walk in my law or no" (Exod. xvi. 4): i.e., let every one whodesires try and see whether it is useful and sufficient to devotehimself to the service of God. It is, however, said a third time inreference to the manna:" Who fed thee in the wilderness withmanna, which thy fathers knew not, that he might humble thee,and that he might prove thee, to do thee good at thy latter end"(Deut. viii. 16). This might induce us to think that God sometimesafflicts man for the purpose of increasing his reward. But in truththis is not the case. We may rather assume one of the twofollowing explanations: either this passage expresses the same ideaas is expressed in the first and second passages, viz., to show [toall people] whether faith in God is sufficient to secure man'smaintenance and his relief from care and trouble, or not. Or theHebrew term le-nassoteka means" to accustom thee" : the word isused in this sense in the following passage:" She has notaccustomed (nisseta) the sole of her foot to set it upon the ground"(ibid. xxviii. 56). The meaning of the above passage would thenbe:" God has first trained you in the hardships of the wilderness, inorder to increase your welfare when you enter the land of Canaan."It is indeed a fact that the transition from trouble to ease givesmore pleasure than continual case. It is also known that theIsraelites would not have been able to conquer the land and fightwith its inhabitants, if they had not previously undergone thetrouble and hardship of the wilderness. Scripture says in referenceto this:" For God said, Lest peradventure the people repent whenthey see war, and they return to Egypt. But God led the peopleabout, through the way of the wilderness of the Red Sea; and thechildren of Israel went up harnessed out of the land of Egypt"(Exod. xiii. 17, 18). Ease destroys bravery, whilst trouble and carefor food create strength; and this was [also for the Israelites] thegood that ultimately came out of their wanderings in thewilderness. The passage," For God is come to prove you, and thathis fear may be before your faces, that ye sin not" (ibid. xx. 20),expresses the same idea as is expressed in Deuteronomy (xiii. 4) inreference to a person who prophesies -in the name of idols, namelyin the words:" For the Lord your God proveth you to knowwhether ye love the Lord." We have already explained the meaningof the latter passage. In the same sense Moses said to the Israeliteswhen they stood round Mount Sinai:" Do not fear; the object ofthis great sight which you perceived is that you should see the truthwith your own eyes. When the Lord your God, in order to showyour faithfulness to Him, will prove you by a false prophet, whowill tell you the reverse of what you have heard, you will remainfirm and your steps will not slide. If I had come as a messenger asyou desired, and had told you that which had been said unto meand which you had not heard, you would perhaps consider as truewhat another might tell you in opposition to that which you heardfrom me. But it is different now, as you have heard it in the midstof the great sight."
The account of Abraham our father binding his son, includes twogreat ideas or principles of our faith. First, it shows us the extentand limit of the fear of God. Abraham is commanded to perform acertain act, which is not equalled by any surrender of property orby any sacrifice of life, for it surpasses everything that can bedone, and belongs to the class of actions which are believed to becontrary to human feelings. He had been without child, and hadbeen longing for a child; he had great riches, and was expectingthat a nation should spring from his seed. After all hope of a sonhad already been given up, a son was born unto him. How greatmust have been his delight in the child ! how intensely must hehave loved him! And yet because he feared God, and loved to dowhat God commanded, he thought little of that beloved child, andset aside all his hopes concerning him, and consented to kill himafter a journey of three days. If the act by which he showed hisreadiness to kill his son had taken place immediately when hereceived the commandment, it might have been the result ofconfusion and not of consideration. But the fact that he performedit three days after he had received the commandment, proves thepresence of thought, proper consideration, and careful examinationof what is due to the Divine command and what is in accordancewith the love and fear of God. There is no necessity to look for thepresence of any other idea or of anything that might have affectedhis emotions. For Abraham did not hasten to kill Isaac out of fearthat God might slay him or make him poor, but solely because it isman's duty to love and to fear God, even without hope of reward orfear of punishment. We have repeatedly explained this. The angel,therefore, says to him," For now I know," etc. (ibid. ver. 12), thatis, from this action, for which you deserve to be truly called aGod-fearing man, all people shall learn how far we must go in thefear of God. This idea is confirmed in Scripture: it is distinctlystated that one sole thing, fear of God, is the object of the wholeLaw with its affirmative and negative precepts, its promises and itshistorical examples, for it is said," If thou wilt not observe to doall the words of this Law that are written in this book, that thoumayest fear this glorious and fearful name, the Lord thy God," etc.(Deut. xxviii. 58). This is one of the two purposes of the 'akedah(sacrifice or binding of Isaac).
The second purpose is to show how the prophets believed in thetruth of that which came to them from God by way of inspiration.We shall not think that what the prophets heard or saw inallegorical figures may at times have included incorrect ordoubtful elements, since the Divine communication was made tothem, as we have shown, in a dream or a vision and through theimaginative faculty. Scripture thus tells us that whatever theProphet perceives in a prophetic vision, he considers as true andcorrect and not open to any doubt; it is in his eyes like all otherthings perceived by the senses or by the intellect. This is proved bythe consent of Abraham to slay" his only son whom he loved," ashe was commanded, although the commandment was received in adream or a vision. If the Prophets had any doubt or suspicion asregards the truth of what they saw in a prophetic dream orperceived in a prophetic vision, they would not have consented todo what is unnatural, and Abraham would not have found in hissoul strength enough to perform that act, if he had any doubt [asregards the truth of the commandment]. It was just the right thingthat this lesson derived from the 'akedah (" sacrifice" ) should betaught through Abraham and a man like Isaac. For Abraham wasthe first to teach the Unity of God, to establish the faith (in Him],to cause it to remain among coming generations, and to win hisfellow-men for his doctrine; as Scripture says of him:" I know him,that he will command," etc. (Gen. viii. 19). In the same manner ashe was followed by others in his true and valuable opinions whenthey were heard from him, so also the principles should beaccepted that may be learnt from his actions; especially from theact by which he confirmed the principle of the truth of prophecy,and showed how far we must go in the fear and the love of God.
This is the way how we have to understand the accounts of trials;we must not think that God desires to examine us and to try us inorder to know what He did not know before. Far is this from Him;He is far above that which ignorant and foolish people imagineconcerning Him, in the evil of their thoughts. Note this.
CHAPTER XXV
[MAN's] actions are divided as regards their object into fourclasses; they are either purposeless, unimportant, in vain, or good.An action is in vain if the object which is sought by it is notobtained on account of some obstacles. Thus people frequently usethe phrase" thou hast worked in vain" in reference to a personwho looks out for some one and cannot find him: or whoundertakes the troubles of a journey for his business without profit.Our endeavours and exertions are in vain as regards a patient thatis not cured. This applies to all actions which are intended forcertain purposes that are not realized. Purposeless are such actions,which serve no purpose at all. Some persons, e.g., do somethingwith their hands whilst thinking of something else. The actions ofthe insane and confused are of this kind.- Unimportant are suchactions by which a trivial object is sought, an object that is notnecessary and is not of great use. This is the case when a persondances without seeking to benefit his digestion by that exercise, orperforms certain actions for the purpose of causing laughter. Suchactions are certainly mere pastimes. Whether an action belongs tothis class or not depends on the intention of those who perform it,and on the degree of their perfection. For many things arenecessary or very useful in the opinion of one person andsuperfluous in the opinion of another. E.g., bodily exercise, in itsdifferent kinds, is necessary for the proper preservation of healthin the opinion of him who understands the science of medicine;writing is considered as very useful by scholars. When people takeexercise by playing with the ball, wrestling, stretching out thehands or keeping back the breathing, or do certain things aspreparation for writing, shape the pen and get the paper ready,such actions are mere pastimes in the eyes of the ignorant, but thewise do not consider them as unimportant. Useful are such actionsas serve a proper purpose: being either necessary or useful for thepurpose which is to be attained. This division [of man's actions] is,as I believe, not open to any objection. For every action is eitherintended for a certain purpose or is not intended; and if intendedfor a certain purpose, that purpose may be important orunimportant, is sometimes attained and sometimes missed. Thisdivision is therefore complete.
After having explained this division, I contend that no intelligentperson can assume that any of the actions of God can be in vain,purposeless, or unimportant. According to our view and the viewof all that follow the Law of Moses, all actions of God are"exceedingly good." Thus Scripture says," And God saw everythingthat he had made, and behold, it was very good" (Gen. i. 31). Andthat which God made for a certain thing is necessary or [at least)very useful for the existence of that thing. Thus food is necessaryfor the existence of living beings: the possession of eyes is veryuseful to man during his life, although food only serves to sustainliving beings a certain time, and the senses are only intended toprocure to animals the advantages of sensation. The philosopherslikewise assume that in Nature there is nothing in vain, so thateverything that is not the product of human industry serves acertain purpose, which may be known or unknown to us. There arethinkers that assume that God does not create one thing for thesake of another, that existing things are not to each other in therelation of cause and effect; that they are all the direct result of theWill of God, and do not serve any purpose. According to thisopinion we cannot ask why has He made this and not that; for Hedoes what pleases Him, without following a fixed system. Thosewho defend this theory must consider the actions of God aspurposeless, and even as inferior to purposeless actions: for whenwe perform purposeless actions, our attention is engaged by otherthings and we do not know what we are doing; but God, accordingto these theorists, knows what He is doing, and knowingly does itfor no purpose or use whatever. The absurdity of assuming thatsome of God's actions are trivial, is apparent even at first sight, andno notice need be taken of the nonsensical idea that monkeys werecreated for our pastime. Such opinions originate only in man'signorance of the nature of transient beings, and in his overlookingthe principle that it was intended by the Creator to produce in itspresent form everything whose existence is possible; a differentform was not decreed by the Divine Wisdom, and the existence [ofobjects of a different form] is therefore impossible, because theexistence of all things depends on the decree of GoXs wisdom.Those who hold that God's works serve no purpose whateverbelieve that an examination of the totality of existing thingscompels them to adopt this theory. They ask what is the purpose ofthe whole Universe ? they necessarily answer, like all those whobelieve in the Creation, that it was created because God willed itso, and for no other purpose. The same answer they apply to allparts of the Universe, and do not admit that the hole in the uveaand the transparency of the cornea are intended for the purpose ofallowing the rpiritur visus to pass and to perceive certain objects;they do not assume that these circumstances are causes for thesight; the hole in the uvea and the transparent matter over it are notthere because of the sight, but because of the Will of God,although the sense of sight could have been created in a differentform. There are passages in the Bible which at first sight we mightunderstand to imply this theory. E.g.," The Lord hath donewhatever he pleased" (Ps. cxxxv. 6):" His soul desired it and hemade it" (job xxiii. 13):" Who will say unto thee, What doest thou?" (Eccles. viii. 4). The meaning of these and similar verses isthis: whatever God desires to do is necessarily done; there isnothing that could prevent the realization of His will. The object ofHis will is only that which is possible, and of the things possibleonly such as His wisdom decrees upon. When God desires toproduce the best work, no obstacle or hindrance intervenesbetween Hirn and that work. This is the opinion held by allreligious people, also by the philosophers; it is also our opinion.For although we believe that God created the Universe fromnothing, most of our wise and learned men believe that theCreation was not the exclusive result of Ilis will; but Ilis wisdom,which we are unable to comprehend, made the actual existence ofthe Universe necessary. The same unchangeable wisdom found itas necessary that non-existence should precede the existence of theUniverse. Our Sages frequently express this idea in the explanationof the words," He hath made everything beautiful in his time"(Eccles. iii. 11), only in order to avoid that which is objectionable,viz., the opinion that God does things without any purposewhatever. This is the belief of most of our Theologians: and in asimilar manner have the Prophets expressed the idea that all partsof natural products are well arranged, in good order, connectedwith each other, and stand to each other in the relation of causeand effect; nothing of them is purposeless, trivial, or in vain; theyare all the result of great wisdom. Comp." 0 Lord, how manifoldare thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all: the earth is fullof thy riches" (PS. CiV. 24):" And all his works are done in truth"(ibid. 4) The Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth" (Prov. iii.19). This idea occurs frequently; there is no necessity to believeotherwise; philosophic speculation leads to the same result; viz.,that in the whole of Nature there is nothing purposeless, trivial, orunnecessary, especially in the Nature of the spheres, which are inthe best condition and order, in accordance with their superiorsubstance.
Know that the difficulties which lead to confusion in the questionwhat is the purpose of the Universe or of any of its parts, arisefrom two causes : firstly, man has an erroneous idea of himself,and believes that the whole world exists only for his sake;secondly, he is ignorant both about the nature of the sublunaryworld, and about the Creator's intention to give existence to allbeings whose existence is possible, because existence isundoubtedly good.
The consequences of that error and of the ignorance about the twothings named, are doubts and confusion, which lead many toimagine that some of God's works are trivial, others purposeless,and others in vain. Those who adopt this absurd idea that God'sactions are utterly purposeless, and refuse to consider them as theresult of Ilis wisdom, are afraid they might otherwise be compelledto admit the theory of the Eternity of the Universe, and guardthemselves against it by the above theory I have already told youthe view which is set forth in Scripture on this question, and whichit is proper to accept. It is this: it is not unreasonable to assumethat the works of God, their existence and precedingnon-existence, are the result of His wisdom, but we are unable tounderstand many of the ways of His wisdom in His works. On thisprinciple the whole Law of Moses is based; it begins with thisprinciple:" And God saw all that He had made, and, behold, it wasvery good" (Gen. i. 3 1): and it ends with this principle:" TheRock, perfect is His work" (Deut. xxxii. 4). Note it. When youexamine this view and that of the philosophers, taking intoconsideration all preceding chapters which are connected with thissubject, you will find that there is no other difference of opinion asregards any portions of the Universe, except that the philosophersbelieve in the Eternity of the Universe and we believe in theCreation. Note this.
CHAPTER XXVI
As Theologians are divided on the question whether the actions ofGod are the result of His wisdom, or only of His will without beingintended for any purpose whatever, so they are also divided asregards the object of the commandments which God gave us.Some of them hold that the commandments have no object at all;and are only dictated by the win of God. Others are of opinion thatall commandments and prohibitions are dictated by His wisdomand serve a certain aim; consequently there is a reason for eachone of the precepts: they are enjoined because they are useful. Allof us, the common people as well as the scholars, believe thatthere is a reason for every precept, although there arecommandments the reason of which is unknown to us, and inwhich the ways of God's wisdom are incomprehensible. This viewis distinctly expressed in Scripture; comp." righteous statutes andjudgments" (Deut. iv. 8) the judgments of the Lord are true, andrighteous altogether" (Ps. xix. to). There are commandmentswhich are called hukkim," ordinances," like the prohibition ofwearing garments of wool and linen (sha'atnez), boiling meat andmilk together, and the sending of the goat [into the wilderness onthe Day of Atonement]. Our Sages use in reference to themphrases like the following:" These are things which I have fullyordained for thee: and you dare not criticize them" :" Your evilinclination is turned against them" : and" non-Jews find themstrange." But our Sages generally do not think that such preceptshave no cause whatever, and serve no purpose; for this would leadus to assume that God's actions are purposeless. On the contrary,they hold that even these ordinances have a cause, and arecertainly intended for some use, although it is not known to us;owing either to the deficiency of our knowledge or the weaknessof our intellect. Consequently there is a cause for everycommandment: every positive or negative precept serves a usefulobject; in some cases the usefulness is evident, e.g., the prohibitionof murder and theft; in others the usefulness is not so evident, e.g.,the prohibition of enjoying the fruit of a tree in the first three years(Lev. xix. 73), or of a vineyard in which other seeds have beengrowing (Deut. xxii. 9). Those commandments, whose object isgenerally evident, are called" judgments" (mishpatim): thosewhose object is not generally clear are called" ordinances"(hukkim). Thus they say [in reference to the words of Moses] : Kilo dabar rek hu mi-kem Oit." for it is not a vain thing for you,"Deut. xxxii. 74):" It is not in vain, and if it is in vain, it is only sothrough you." That is to say, the giving of these commandments isnot a vain thing and without any useful object; and if it appears soto you in any commandment, it is owing to the deficiency in yourcomprehension. You certainly know the famous saying thatSolomon knew the reason for all commandments except that ofthe" red heifer." Our Sages also said that God concealed thecauses of commandments, lest people should despise them, asSolomon did in respect to three commandments, the reason forwhich is dearly stated. In this sense they always speak; andScriptural texts support the idea. I have, however, found oneutterance made by them in Bereshit-rabba (sect. xliv.), whichmight at first sight appear to imply that some commandments haveno other reason but the fact that they are commanded, that no otherobject is intended by them, and that they do not serve any usefulobject I mean the following passage: What difference does it maketo God whether a beast is killed by cutting the neck in front or inthe back ? Surely the commandments are only intended as a meansof trying man; in accordance with the verse," The word of God is atest" (lit. tried) (Ps. xviii. 31). Although this passage is verystrange, and has no parallel in the writings of our Sages, I explainit, as you shall soon hear, in such a manner that I remain in accordwith the meaning of their words and do not depart from theprinciple which we agreed upon, that the commandments serve auseful object;" for it is not a vain thing for you" :" I have not saidto the seed of Jacob, seek me in vain. I the Lord speakrighteousness, declare that which is right" (Isa. xlv. 19). I will nowtell you what intelligent persons ought to believe in this respect;namely, that each commandment has necessarily a cause, as far asits general character is concerned, and serves a certain object; butas regards its details we hold that it has no ulterior object. Thuskilling animals for the purpose of obtaining good food is certainlyuseful, as we intend to show (below, ch. xlviii.); that, however, thekilling should not be performed by nehirah (poleaxing the animal),but by shehitah (cutting the neck), and by dividing the oesophagusand the windpipe in a certain place; these regulations and the likeare nothing but tests for man's obedience. In this sense you willunderstand the example quoted by our Sages [that there is nodifference] between killing the animal by cutting its neck in frontand cutting it in the back. I give this instance only because it hasbeen mentioned by our Sages; but in reality [there is some reasonfor these regulations]. For as it has become necessary to eat theflesh of animals, it was intended by the above regulations to ensurean easy death and to effect it by suitable means; whilstdecapitation requires a sword or a similar instrument, the shehitahcan be performed with any instrument; and in order to ensure aneasy death our Sages insisted that the knife should be wellsharpened.
A more suitable instance can be cited from the detailedcommandments concerning sacrifices. The law that sacrificesshould be brought is evidently of great use, as will be shown by us(infra, chap. xlvi.): but we cannot say why one offering should be alamb, whilst another is a ram; and why a fixed number of themshould be brought. Those who trouble themselves to find a causefor any of these detailed rules, are in my eyes void of sense: theydo not remove any difficulties, but rather increase them. Thosewho believe that these detailed rules originate in a certain cause,are as far from the truth as those who assume that the whole law isuseless. You must know that Divine Wisdom demanded it -- or, ifyou prefer, say that circumstances made it necessary-that thereshould be parts [of His work] which have no certain object: and asregards the Law, it appears to be impossible that it should notinclude some matter of this kind. That it cannot be avoided may beseen from the following instance. You ask why must a lamb besacrificed and not a ram ? but the same question would be asked,why a ram had been commanded instead of a lamb, so long as oneparticular kind is required. The same is to be said as to thequestion why were seven lambs sacrificed and not eight; the samequestion might have been asked if there were eight, ten, or twentylambs, so long as some definite number of lambs were sacrificed.It is almost similar to the nature of a thing which can receivedifferent forms, but actually receives one of them. We must notask why it has this form and not another which is likewisepossible, because we should have to ask the same question ifinstead of its actual form the thing had any of the other possibleforms. Note this, and understand it. The repeated assertion of ourSages that there are reasons for all commandments, and thetradition that Solomon knew them, refer to the general purpose ofthe commandments, and not to the object of every detail. Thisbeing the case, I find it convenient to divide the six hundred andthirteen precepts into classes: each class will include manyprecepts of the same kind, or related to each other by theircharacter. I will [first] explain the reason of each class, and showits undoubted and undisputed object, and then I shall discuss eachcommandment in the class, and expound its reason. Only very fewwill be left unexplained, the reason for which I have been unableto trace unto this day. I have also been able to comprehend in somecases even the object of many of the conditions and details as faras these can be discovered. You will hear all this later on. But inorder to fully explain these reasons I must premise severalchapters; in these I will discuss principles which form the basis ofmy theory. I will now begin these chapters.
CHAPTER XXVII
THE general object of the Law is twofold: the well-being of thesoul, and the well-being of the body. The well-being of the soul ispromoted by correct opinions communicated to the peopleaccording to their capacity. Some of these opinions are thereforeimparted in a plain form, others allegorically: because certainopinions are in their plain form too strong for the capacity of thecommon people. The well-being of the body is established by aproper management of the relations in which we live one toanother. This we can attain in two ways: first by removing allviolence from our midst: that is to say, that we do not do every oneas he pleases, desires, and is able to do; but every one of us doesthat which contributes towards the common welfare. Secondly, byteaching every one of us such good morals as must produce a goodsocial state. Of these two objects, the one, the well-being of thesoul, or the communication of correct opinions, comesundoubtedly first in rank, but the other, the well-being of the body,the government of the state, and the establishment of the bestpossible relations among men, is anterior in nature and time. Thelatter object is required first: it is also treated [in the Law] mostcarefully and most minutely, because the well-being of the soulcan only be obtained after that of the body has been secured. For ithas already been found that man has a double perfection: the firstperfection is that of the body, and the second perfection is that ofthe soul. The first consists in the most healthy condition of hismaterial relations, and this is only possible when man has all hiswants supplied, as they arise; if he has his food, and other thingsneedful for his body, e.g., shelter, bath, and the like. But one manalone cannot procure all this; it is impossible for a single man toobtain this comfort; it is only possible in society, since man, as iswell known, is by nature social.
The second perfection of man consists in his becoming an actuallyintelligent being; i.e., he knows about the things in existence allthat a person perfectly developed is capable of knowing. Thissecond perfection certainly does not include any action or goodconduct, but only knowledge, which is arrived at by speculation, orestablished by research.
It is clear that the second and superior kind of perfection can onlybe attained when the first perfection has been acquired: for aperson that is suffering from great hunger, thirst, heat, or cold,cannot grasp an idea even if communicated by others, much lesscan he arrive at it by his own reasoning. But when a person is inpossession of the first perfection, then he may possibly acquire thesecond perfection, which is undoubtedly of a superior kind, and isalone the source of eternal life. The true Law, which as we said isone, and beside which there is no other Law, viz., the Law of ourteacher Moses, has for its purpose to give us the twofoldperfection. It aims first at the establishment of good mutualrelations among men by removing injustice and creating thenoblest feelings. In this way the people in every land are enabledto stay and continue in one condition, and every one can acquirehis first perfection. Secondly, it seeks to train us in faith, and toimpart correct and true opinions when the intellect is sufficientlydeveloped. Scripture clearly mentions the twofold perfection, andtells us that its acquisition is the object of all the divinecommandments. Comp." And the Lord commanded us to do allthese statutes, to fear the Lord our God, for our good always, thathe might preserve us alive as it is this day" (Dent. vi. 24). Here thesecond perfection is first mentioned because it is of greaterimportance, being, as we have shown, the ultimate aim of man'sexistence. This perfection is expressed in the phrase," for ourgood always." You know the interpretation of our Sages," ' that itmay be well with thee' (ibid. xxii. 7), namely, in the world that isall good, 'and that thou mayest prolong thy days' (ibid.), i.e., in theworld that is all eternal." In the same sense I explain the words,"for our good always," to mean that we may come into the worldthat is all good and eternal, where we may live permanently; andthe words," that he might preserve us alive as it is this day," Iexplain as referring to our first and temporal existence, to that ofour body, which cannot be in a perfect and good condition exceptby the co-operation of society, as has been shown by us.
CHAPTER XXVIII
IT is necessary to bear in mind that Scripture only teaches thechief points of those true principles which lead to the trueperfection of man, and only demands in general terms faith inthem. Thus Scripture teaches the Existence, the Unity, theOmniscience, the Omnipotence, the Win, and the Eternity of God.All this is given in the form of final results, but they cannot beunderstood fully and accurately except after the acquisition ofmany kinds of knowledge. Scripture further demands belief incertain truths, the belief in which is indispensable in regulating oursocial relations: such is the belief that God is angry with those whodisobey Him, for it leads us to the fear and dread of disobedience[to the will of God]. There are other truths in reference to thewhole of the Universe which form the substance of the various andmany kinds of speculative sciences, and afford the means ofverifying the above-mentioned principles as their final result. ButScripture does not so distinctly prescribe the belief in them as itdoes in the first case; it is implied in the commandment," to lovethe Lord" (Deut. xi. 13). It may be inferred from the words," Andthou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thysoul, and with all thy might" (ibid. vi. 5), what stress is laid on thiscommandment to love God. We have already shown in theMishneh-torah (res. ha-torah ii. 2) that this love is only possiblewhen we comprehend the real nature of things, and understand thedivine wisdom displayed therein. We have likewise mentionedthere what our Sages remark on this subject.
The result of all these preliminary remarks is this : The reason of acommandment, whether positive or negative, is clear, and itsusefulness evident, if it directly tends to remove injustice, or toteach good conduct that furthers the well-being of society, or toimpart a truth which ought to be believed either on its own meritor as being indispensable for facilitating the removal of injusticeor the teaching of good morals. There is no occasion to ask for theobject of such commandments: for no one can, e.g., be in doubt asto the reason why we have been commanded to believe that God isone: why we are forbidden to murder, to steal, and to takevengeance, or to retaliate, or why we are commanded to love oneanother. But there are precepts concerning which people are indoubt, and of divided opinions, some believing that they are merecommands, and serve no purpose whatever, whilst others believethat they serve a certain purpose, which, however, is unknown toman. Such are those precepts which in their literal meaning do notseem to further any of the three above-named results : to impartsome truth, to teach some moral, or to remove injustice. They donot seem to have any influence upon the well-being of the soul byimparting any truth, or upon the well-being of the body bysuggesting such ways and rules as are useful in the government ofa state, or in the management of a household. Such are theprohibitions of wearing garments containing wool and linen; ofsowing divers seeds, or of boiling meat and milk together; thecommandment of covering the blood [of slaughtered beasts andbirds], the ceremony of breaking the neck of a calf [in case of aperson being found slain, and the murderer being unknown]; thelaw concerning the first-born of an ass, and the like. I am preparedto tell you my explanation of all these commandments, and toassign for them a true reason supported by proof, with theexception of some minor rules, and of a few commandments, as Ihave mentioned above. I will show that all these and similar lawsmust have some bearing upon one of the following three things,viz., the regulation of our opinions, or the improvement of oursocial relations, which implies two things, the removal of injustice,and the teaching of good morals. Consider what we said of theopinions [implied in the laws]; in some cases the law contains atruth which is itself the only object of that law, as e.g., the truth ofthe Unity, Eternity, and Incorporeality of God; in other cases, thattruth is only the means of securing the removal of injustice, or theacquisition of good morals; such is the belief that God is angrywith those who oppress their fellow-men, as it is said," Mineanger will be kindled, and I will slay," etc. (Exod. xxii. 23); or thebelief that God hears the crying of the oppressed and vexed, todeliver them out of the hands of the oppressor and tyrant, as it iswritten," And it shall come to pass, when he will cry unto me, thatI will hear, for I am gracious (Exod. xxii. 25).
CHAPTER XXIX
IT is well known that the Patriarch Abraham was brought up in thereligion and the opinion of the Sabeans, that there is no divinebeing except the stars. I will tell you in this chapter their workswhich are at present extant in Arabic translations, and also in theirancient chronicles; and I win show you their opinion and theirpractice according to these books. You win then see clearly thatthey consider the stars as deities, and the sun as the chief deity.They believe that all the seven stars are gods, but the twoluminaries are greater than all the rest. They say distinctly that thesun governs the world, both that which is above and that which isbelow; these are exactly their expressions. In these books, and intheir chronicles, the history of Abraham our father is given in thefollowing manner. Abraham was brought up in Kutha; when hediffered from the people and declared that there is a Maker besidesthe sun, they raised certain objections, and mentioned in theirarguments the evident and manifest action of the sun in theUniverse." You are right," said Abraham;" [the sun acts in thesame manner] as ' the axe in the hand of him that hews with it."'Then some of his arguments against his opponents are mentioned.In short, the king put him in prison; but he continued many days,while in prison, to argue against them. At last the king was afraidthat Abraham might corrupt the kingdom, and turn the peopleaway from their religion; he therefore expelled Abraham intoSyria, after having deprived him of all his property.
This is their account which you find clearly stated in the bookcalled The Nabatean Agriculture. Nothing is said there of theaccount given in our trustworthy books, nor do they mention whathe learnt by way of prophecy; for they refused to believe him,because he attacked their evil doctrine. I do not doubt that when heattacked the doctrine of all his fellowmen, he was cursed,despised, and scorned by these people who adhered to theirerroneous opinions. When he submitted to this treatment for thesake of God, as ought to be done for the sake of His glory, Godsaid to him," And I will bless them that bless thee, and curse themthat curse thee" (Gen. xii. 3). The result of the course whichAbraham took, is the fact that most people, as we see at present,agree in praising him, and being proud of him; so that even thosewho are not his descendants call themselves by his name. No oneopposes him, and no one ignores his merits, except some ignobleremnants of the nations left in the remote corners of the earth, likethe savage Turks in the extreme North, and the Indians in theextreme South. These are remnants of the Sabeans, who oncefilled the earth.
Those who were able to think, and were philosophers in thosedays, could only raise themselves to the idea that God is the spiritof the spheres: the spheres with their stars being the body, and Godthe spirit. Abu-becr al-Zaig mentions this in his Commentary onthe book of Physics.
All the Sabeans thus believed in the eternity of the Universe, theheavens being in their opinion God. Adam was in their belief ahuman being born from male and female, like the rest of mankind;he was only distinguished from his fellow-men by being a prophetsent by the moon; he accordingly called men to the worship of themoon, and he wrote several works on agriculture. The Sabeansfurther relate that Noah was an agriculturist, and that he was notpleased with the worship of idols; they blame him for that, and saythat he did not worship any image. In their writings we meet evenwith the statement that Noah was rebuked and imprisoned becausehe worshipped God, and with many other accounts about him. TheSabeans contend that Seth differed from his father Adam, asregards the worship of the moon. They manufactured ridiculousstories, which prove that their authors were very deficient inknowledge, that they were by no means philosophers, but on thecontrary were extremely ignorant persons. Adam, they say, left thetorrid zone near India and entered the region of Babylon, bringingwith him wonderful things, such as a golden tree, that wasgrowing, and had leaves and branches: a stone tree of the samekind, and a fresh leaf of a tree proof against fire. He related thatthere was a tree which could shelter ten thousand men, although ithad only the height of a man; two leaves he brought with him,each of which was sufficient to cover two men. Of these stories theSabeans have a wonderful abundance. I am surprised that personswho think that the Universe is eternal, can yet believe in thesethings which nature cannot produce, as is known to every studentof Natural Science. They only mention Adam, and relate the abovestories about him, in order to support their theory of the Eternity ofthe Universe; from this theory they then derive the doctrine thatthe stars and the spheres are deities. When [Abraham] the" Pillarof the World" appeared, he became convinced that there is aspiritual Divine Being, which is not a body, nor a force residing ina body, but is the author of the spheres and the stars: and he sawthe absurdity of the tales in which he had been brought up. Hetherefore began to attack the belief of the Sabeans, to expose thefalsehood of their opinions, and to proclaim publicly in oppositionto them," the name of the Lord, the God of the Universe" (Gen.xxi. 33), which proclamation included at the same time theExistence of God, and the Creation of the Universe by God.
In accordance with the Sabean theories images were erected to thestars, golden images to the sun, images of silver to the moon, andthey attributed the metals and the climates to the influence of theplanets, saying that a certain planet is the god of a certain zone.They built temples, placed in them images, and assumed that thestars sent forth their influence upon these images, which arethereby enabled (to speak) to understand, to comprehend, toinspire human beings, and to tell them what is useful to them.They apply the same to trees which fall to the lot of these stars.When, namely, a certain tree, which is peculiar to a certain star, isdedicated to the name of this star, and certain things are done forthe tree and to the tree, the spiritual force of that star whichinfluences that tree, inspires men, and speaks to them when theyare asleep. All this is written in their works, to which 1 will callyour attention. It applies to the" prophets of Baal," and the"prophets of Asherah," mentioned in Scripture, in whose hearts theSabean theories had taken root, who forsook God, and called,"Baal, hear us" (I Kings xviii. 26): because these theories were thengeneral, ignorance had spread, and the madness with which peopleadhered to this kind of imaginations had increased in the world.When such opinions were adopted among the Israelites, they hadobservers of clouds, enchanters, witches, charmers, consulters withfamiliar spirits, wizards, and necromancers.
We have shown in our large work, Mishneh-torah (Hilkot,'Abodab-zarah, i. 3), that Abraharn was the first that opposed thesetheories by arguments and by soft and persuasive speech. Heinduced these people, by showing kindness to them, to serve God.Afterwards came the chief of the prophets, and completed thework by the commandment to slay those unbelievers, to blot outtheir name, and to uproot them from the land of the living. Comp."Ye shall destroy their altars," etc. (Exod. xxxiv. 13). He forbade usto follow their ways; he said," Ye shall not walk in the manners ofthe heathen" , etc. (Lev. XX. 23). You know from the repeateddeclarations in the Law that the principal purpose of the wholeLaw was the removal and utter destruction of idolatry, and all thatis connected therewith, even its name, and everything that mightlead to any such practices, e.g., acting as a consulter with familiarspirits, or as a wizard, passing children through the fire, divining,observing the clouds, enchanting, charming, or inquiring of thedead. The law prohibits us to imitate the heathen in any of thesedeeds, and a fortiori to adopt them entirely. It is distinctly said inthe Law that everything which idolaters consider as service to theirgods, and a means of approaching them, is rejected and despisedby God; comp." for every abomination to the Lord, which hehateth, have they done unto their gods" (Dent. xii. 3 1). In thebooks which 1 shall name to you later on, it is stated that oncertain occasions they offered to the sun, their greatest god, sevenbeetles, and seven mice, and seven bats. This alone suffices toshow how disgusting their practice must be to human nature. Thusall precepts cautioning against idolatry, or against that which isconnected therewith, leads to it, or is related to it, are evidentlyuseful. They all tend to save us from the evil doctrines that depriveus of everything useful for the acquisition of the twofoldperfection of man, by leading to those absurd practices in whichour fathers and ancestors have been brought up. Comp." AndJoshua said unto all the people, Thus saith the Lord God of Israel,your fathers dwelt on the other side of the river in old time, evenTerah, the father of Abraham, and the father of Nahor, and theyserved other gods" (josh. xidv. 2). It is in reference to these[idolatrous ideas] that the true prophets exclaim," They walkedafter [vain] things, which do not profit."
How great is the usefulness of every precept that delivers us fromthis great error, and leads us back to the true faith : that God, theCreator of all things, rules the Universe: that He must be served,loved, and feared, and not those imaginary deities. According tothis faith we approach the true God, and obtain His favour withouthaving recourse to burdensome means: for nothing else is requiredbut to love and fear Him: this is the aim in serving God, as will beshown. Comp." And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy Godrequire of thee but to fear the Lord" ? etc. (Deut. x. 12). 1 shallcomplete this subject later on: now let us return to the theme [ofthis chapter].
I say that my knowledge of the belief, practice, and worship of theSabeans has given me an insight into many of the divine precepts,and has led me to know their reason. You will confirm it when Ishall give the reason of commandments which are seeminglypurposeless. I will mention to you the works from which you maylearn all that 1 know of the religion and the opinions of theSabeans; you will thereby obtain a true knowledge of my theory asregards the purpose of the divine precepts.
The great book on this subject is the book On the NabateasAgriadture, translated by Ibn Walishiya. In a succeeding chapter Ishall explain why the Sabeans had their religious doctrines writtenin a work on agriculture. The book is full of the absurdities ofidolatrous people, and with those things to which the minds of themultitude easily turn and adhere [perseveringly]; it speaks oftalismans, the means of directing the influence [of the stars]:witchcraft, spirits, and demons that dwell in the wilderness. Thereoccur also in this book great absurdities, which are ridiculous inthe eyes of intelligent people. They were intended as a criticismand an attack on the evident miracles by which all people learntthat there exists a God who is judge over all people. Comp." Thatthou mayest know how that the earth is the Lord's" (Exod. ix. 29)," That 1 am the Lord in the midst of the earth (ibid. viii. 18).
The book describes things as having been mentioned by Adam, inhis book; a tree which is found in India, and has the peculiaritythat any branch taken from it and thrown to the ground creepsalong and moves like serpents; it also mentions a tree which in itsroot resembles a human being, utters a loud sound, and speaks aword or words; a plant is mentioned which has this peculiarity,that g leaf of it put on the neck of a person conceals that personfrom the sight of men, and enables him to enter or leave a placewithout being seen, and if any part of it is burnt in open air a noiseand terrible sounds are heard whilst the smoke ascends. Numerousfables of this kind are introduced in the description of the wondersof plants and the properties of agriculture. This leads the author toargue against the [true] miracles, and to say that they were theresult of artifice.
Among other fables we read there that the plant althea, one of theAsherot, which they made, as I told you, stood in Nineveh twelvethousand years. This tree had once a quarrel with the mandragora,which wanted to take the place of the former. The person who hadbeen inspired by this tree ceased to receive inspiration: when aftersome time the prophetical power had returned to him, he was toldby the althea that the latter had been engaged in a dispute with themandragora. He was then commanded to write to the magiciansthat they should decide whether the althea or the mandragora wasbetter and more effective in witchcraft. It is a long story, and youmay learn from it, when you read it, the opinions and the wisdomof the men of that time. Such were in those days of darkness thewise men of Babel, to whom reference is made in Scripture, andsuch were the beliefs in which they were trained. And were it notthat the theory of the Existence of God is at present generallyaccepted, our days would now have been darker than those days,though in other respects. I return now to my subject.
In that book the following story is also related : One of theidolatrous prophets, named Tammuz, called upon the king toworship the seven planets and the twelve constellations of theZodiac: whereupon the king killed him in a dreadful manner. Thenight of his death the images from all parts of the land cametogether in the temple of Babylon which was devoted to the imageof the Sun, the great golden image. This image, which wassuspended between heaven and earth, came down into the midst ofthe temple, and surrounded by all other images commenced tomourn for Tammuz, and to relate what had befallen him. All otherimages cried and mourned the whole night; at dawn they flewaway and returned to their temples in every corner of the earth.Hence the regular custom arose for the women to weep, lament,mourn, and cry for Tammuz on the first day of the month ofTammuz.
Consider what opinions people had in these days. The legend ofTammuz is very old among the Sabeans. This book will disclose toyou most of the perverse ideas and practices of the Sabeans,including their feasts. But you must be careful and must not bemisled to think that we have real incidents in the life of Adam, orof any other person, or any real fact in the stories which they relateabout Adam, the serpent, the tree of knowledge of good and evil,and the allusion to the garment of Adam which he had not beenaccustomed to wear. A little consideration will lay open thefalsehood of all these accounts; it will show that they have beeninvented in imitation of the Pentateuch when it became knownamong the nations. The account of the Creation was heard, and itwas taken entirely in its literal sense. They have done this in orderthat the ignorant may hear it, and be persuaded to assume theEternity of the Universe, and to believe that the Scriptural accountcontained facts which happened in the manner as has beenassumed by the Sabeans.
It is by no means necessary to point this out to men like you. Youhave acquired sufficient knowledge to keep your mind free fromthe absurdities of the Kasdim, Chaldeans, and Sabeans, who arebare of every true science. But I wish to exhort you that you shouldcaution others, for ordinary people are very much inclined tobelieve these fables.
To the same class of books we count the book Istimachis,attributed to Aristotle, who can by no means have been its author;also the books on Talismans, such as the book of Tomtom; thebook al-Sarb: the book on the degrees of the sphere and theconstellations rising with each degree: a book on Talismansattributed to Aristotle, a book ascribed to Hermes, a book of theSabean Isbak in defence of the Sabean religion, and his large workon Sabean customs, details of their religion, ceremonies, festivals,offerings, prayers and other things relating to their faith.
All these books which I have mentioned are works on idolatrytranslated into Arabic; there is no doubt that they form a verysmall portion in comparison to that which has not been translated,and that which is no longer extant, but has been lost in the courseof time. But those works which are at present extant, include mostof the opinions of the Sabeans and their practices, which are tosome degree still in vogue in the world.
They describe how temples are built and images of metal andstone placed in them, altars erected and sacrifices and variouskinds of food are offered thereon, festivals celebrated, meetingsheld in the temples for prayer and other kinds of service: how theyselect certain very distinguished places and call them temples ofIntellectual Images (or Forms); how they make images 44 on thehigh mountains" (Dent. xii. 2), rear asherot, erect pillars, and domany other things which you can learn from the books mentionedby us. The knowledge of these theories and practices is of greatimportance in explaining the reasons of the precepts. For it is theprincipal object of the Law and the axis round which it turns, toblot out these opinions from man's heart and make the existence ofidolatry impossible. As regards the former Scripture says:" Lestyour heart be persuaded," etc. (Deut. xi. 16)," whose heart turnethaway to-day," etc. (ibid. xxix. 17). The actual abolition of idolatryis expressed in the following passage -" Ye shall destroy theiraltars, and burn their groves in fire" (Dent. vii. 5)," and ye shalldestroy their name," etc. (xii. 3). These two things are frequentlyrepeated; they form the principal and first object of the whole Law,as our Sages distinctly told us in their traditional explanation of thewords" all that God commanded you by the hand of Moses"(Num. xv. 25); for they say," Hence we learn that those whofollow idolatry deny as it were their adhesion to the whole Law,and those who reject idolatry follow as it were the whole Law."(B.T. Kidd, 4oa.) Note it.
CHAPTER XXX
ON examining these old and foolish doctrines we find that it wasmost generally believed by the people that by the worship of starsthe earth will become inhabited, and the ground fertilized. Thewise, pious, and sinfearing men among them reproved the peopleand taught them that agriculture, on which the preservation ofmankind depended, would become perfect and satisfy man'swishes, when he worshipped the sun and the stars. If manprovoked these beings by his rebelliousness, the towns wouldbecome empty and waste. In the above-named books it is statedthat Mars was angry with Pands, that form now) deserts andwastes, and in consequence of that anger they were deprived ofwater and trees, and have become the habitation of demons. Tillersof the ground and husbandmen are praised in those books, becausethey are engaged with the cultivation of the land in accordancewith the will and desire of the stars. The idolaters also held cattlein esteem on account of their use in agriculture, and went even sofar as to say, that it is not allowed to slay them, because theycombine in themselves strength and willingness to do the work ofman in tilling the ground. The oxen, notwithstanding their greatstrength, do this, and submit to man, because it is the will of Godthat they should be employed in agriculture. When these viewsbecame generally known, idolatry was connected with agriculture,because the latter is indispensable for the maintenance of man, andof most animals. The idolatrous priests then preached to the peoplewho met in the temples, and taught them that by certain religiousacts, rain would come down, the trees of the field would yield theirfruit, and the land would be fertile and inhabited. See what is saidin the Nabatean Agriculture in the chapter on vineyards. Thefollowing words of the Sabeans are quoted there :" All ancientwise men advised, and prophets likewise commanded and enjoinedto play before the images on certain instruments during thefestivals. They also said-and what they said is truethat the deitiesare pleased with it, and reward those who do it. They promise,indeed, very great reward for these things; e.g., length of life,protection from illness, exemption from great bodily deformities,plenty of the produce of the earth, and of the fruits of the trees."These are the words of the Sabeans. When these ideas spread, andwere considered as true, God, in His great mercy for us, intendedto remove this error from our minds, and to protect our bodiesfrom trouble; and therefore desired us to discontinue the practiceof these useless actions. He gave us His Law through Moses, ourteacher, who told us in the name of God, that the worship of starsand other corporeal beings would effect that rain would cease, theland be waste, and would not produce anything, and the fruit of thetrees would wither; calamities would befall the people, theirbodies would be deformed, and life would be shortened. These arethe contents of" the words of the covenant which God made"(Dent. xxviii. 6-9). It is frequently expressed in all parts ofScripture, that the worship of the stars would be followed byabsence of rain, devastation of the land, bad times, diseases, andshortness of life. But abandonment of that worship, and the returnto the service of God, would be the cause of the presence of rain,fertility of the ground, good times, health and length of life. ThusScripture teaches, in order that man should abandon idolatry, thereverse of that which idolatrous priests preached to the people, for,as has been shown by us, the principal object of the Law is toremove this doctrine, and to destroy its traces.
CHAPTER XXXI
THERE are persons who find it difficult to give a reason for any ofthe commandments, and consider it right to assume that thecommandments and prohibitions have no rational basis whatever.They are led to adopt this theory by a certain disease in their soul,the existence of which they perceive, but which they are unable todiscuss or to describe. For they imagine that these precepts, if theywere useful in any respect, and were commanded because of theirusefulness, would seem to originate in the thought and reason ofsome intelligent being. But as things which are not objects ofreason and serve no purpose, they would undoubtedly be attributedto God, because no thought of man could have produced them.According to the theory of those weak-minded persons, man ismore perfect than his Creator. For what man says or does has acertain object, whilst the actions of God are different; Hecommands us to do what is of no use to us, and forbids us to dowhat is harmless. Far be this ! On the contrary, the sole object ofthe Law is to benefit us. Thus we explained the Scripturalpassage," for our good always, that He might preserve us alive, asit is this day" (Deut. vi. 24). Again," which shall hear all thosestatutes (hukkim), and say, surely this great nation is a wise andunderstanding people" (ibid. iv. 6). He thus says that even everyone of these" statutes" convinces all nations of the wisdom andunderstanding it includes. But if no reason could be found forthese statutes, if they produced no advantage and removed no evil,why then should he who believes in them and follows them bewise, reasonable, and so excellent as to raise the admiration of allnations ? But the truth is undoubtedly as we have said, that everyone of the six hundred and thirteen precepts serves to inculcatesome truth, to remove some erroneous opinion, to establish properrelations in society, to diminish evil, to train in good manners or towarn against bad habits. All this depends on three things: opinions:morals, and social conduct. We do not count words, becauseprecepts, whether positive or negative, if they relate to speech,belong to those precepts which regulate our social conduct, or tothose which spread truth, or to those which teach morals. Thusthese three principles suffice for assigning a reason for every oneof the Divine commandments.
CHAPTER XXXII
ON considering the Divine acts, or the processes of Nature, we getan insight into the prudence and wisdom of God as displayed in thecreation of animals, with the gradual development of themovements of their limbs and the relative positions of the latter,and we perceive also His wisdom and plan in the successive andgradual development of the whole condition of each individual.The gradual development of the animals' movements and therelative position of the limbs may be illustrated by the brain. Thefront part is very soft, the back part is a little hard, the spinalmarrow is still harder, and the farther it extends the harder itbecomes. The nerves are the organs of sensation and motion. Somenerves are only required for sensation, or for slight movements, as,e.g., the movement of the eyelids or of the jaws; these nervesoriginate in the brain. The nerves which are required for themovements of the limbs come from the spinal marrow. But nerves,even those that come directly from the spinal cord, are too soft toset the joints in motion; therefore God made the followingarrangement: the nerves branch out into fibres which are coveredwith flesh, and become muscles: the nerves that come forth at theextremities of the muscles and have already commenced to harden,and to combine with hard pieces of ligaments, are the sinewswhich are joined and attached to the limbs. By this gradualdevelopment the nerves are enabled to set the limbs in motion. Iquote this one instance because it is the most evident of thewonders described in the book On the use of the limbs: but the useof the limbs is clearly perceived by all who examine them with asharp eye. In a similar manner did God provide for each individualanimal of the class of mammalia. When such an animal is born itis extremely tender, and cannot be fed with dry food. Thereforebreasts were provided which yield milk, and the young can be fedwith moist food which corresponds to the condition of the limbs ofthe animal, until the latter have gradually become dry and hard.
Many precepts in our Law are the result of a similar courseadopted by the same Supreme Being. It is, namely, impossible togo suddenly from one extreme to the other: it is thereforeaccording to the nature of man impossible for him suddenly todiscontinue everything to which he has been accustomed. NowGod sent Moses to make [the Israelites] a kingdom of priests and aholy nation (Exod. xix. 6) by means of the knowledge of God.Comp." Unto thee it was showed that thou mightest know that theLord is God (Dent. iv. 35):" Know therefore this day, and considerit in thine heart, that the Lord is God" (ibid. v. 39). The Israeliteswere commanded to devote themselves to His service; comp." andto serve him with all your heart" (ibid. xi. 13):" and you shallserve the Lord your God" (Exod. xxiii. 25);" and ye shall servehim" (Dent. xiii. 5). But the custom which was in those daysgeneral among all men, and the general mode of worship in whichthe Israelites were brought up, consisted in sacrificing animals inthose temples which contained certain images, to bow down tothose images, and to bum incense before them; religious andascetic persons were in those days the persons that were devoted tothe service in the temples erected to the stars, as has beenexplained by us. It was in accordance with the wisdom and plan ofGod, as displayed in the whole Creation, that He did not commandus to give up and to discontinue all these manners of service; for toobey such a commandment it would have been contrary to thenature of man, who generally cleaves to that to which he is used; itwould in those days have made the same impression as a prophetwould make at present if he called us to the service of God andtold us in His name, that we should not pray to Him, not fast, notseek His help in time of trouble; that we should serve Him inthought, and not by any action. For this reason God allowed thesekinds of service to continue; He transferred to His service thatwhich had formerly served as a worship of created beings, and ofthings imaginary and unreal, and commanded us to serve Him inthe same manner; viz., to build unto Him a temple; comp." Andthey shall make unto me a sanctuary" (Exod. xxv. 8): to have thealtar erected to His name; comp." An altar of earth thou shaltmake unto me" (ibid. XX. 2 1): to offer the sacrifices to Him;comp." If any man of you bring an offering unto the Lord" (Lev. i.2), to bow down to Elim. and to bum incense before Him. He hasforbidden to do any of these things to any other being; comp." Hewho sacrificeth unto any God, save the Lord only, he shall beutterly destroyed * (Exod. xxii. 19):" For thou shalt bow down tono other God" (ibid. xxxiv. 14). He selected priests for the servicein the temple; comp." And they shall minister unto me in thepriest's office" (ibid. xxviii. 41). He made it obligatory that certaingifts, called the gifts of the Levites and the priests, should beassigned to them for their maintenance while they are engaged inthe service of the temple and its sacrifices. By this Divine plan itwas effected that the traces of idolatry were blotted out, and thetruly great principle of our faith, the Existence and Unity of God,was firmly established; this result was thus obtained withoutdeterring or confusing the minds of the people by the abolition ofthe service to which they were accustomed and which alone wasfamiliar to them. I know that you will at first thought reject thisidea and find it strange: you will put the following question to mein your heart : How can we suppose that Divine commandments,prohibitions, and important acts, which are fully explained, and forwhich certain seasons are fixed, should not have been commandedfor their own sake, but only for the sake of some other thing: as ifthey were only the means which He employed for His primaryobject ? What prevented Him from making His primary object adirect commandment to us, and to give us the capacity of obeyingit ? Those precepts which in your opinion are only the means andnot the object would then have been unnecessary. Hear my answer,which win cure your heart of this disease and will show you thetruth of that which I have pointed out to you. There occurs in theLaw a passage which contains exactly the same idea; it is thefollowing :" God led them not through the way of the land of thePhilistines, although that was near; for God said, Lest peradventurethe people repent when they see war, and they return to Egypt; butGod led the people about, through the way of the wilderness of theRed Sea," etc. (Exod. xiii. 17). Here God led the people about,away from the direct road which He originally intended, becauseHe feared they might meet on that way with hardships too great fortheir ordinary strength; He took them by another road in order toobtain thereby His original object. In the same manner Godrefrained from prescribing what the people by their naturaldisposition would be incapable of obeying, and gave theabove-mentioned commandments as a means of securing His chiefobject, viz., to spread a knowledge of Him [among the people],and to cause them to reject idolatry. It is contrary to man's naturethat he should suddenly abandon all the different kinds of Divineservice and the different customs in which he has been brought up,and which have been so general, that they were considered as amatter of course; it would be just as if a person trained to work asa slave with mortar and bricks, or similar things, should interrupthis work, clean his hands, and at once fight with real giants. It wasthe result of God's wisdom that the Israelites were led about in thewilderness till they acquired courage. For it is a well-known factthat travelling in the wilderness, and privation of bodilyenjoyments, such as bathing, produce courage, whilst the reverse isthe source of faint-heartedness: besides, another generation roseduring the wanderings that had not been accustomed todegradation and slavery. All the travelling in the wilderness wasregulated by Divine commands through Moses; comp." At thecommandment of the Lord they rested, and at the commandmentof the Lord they journeyed; they kept the charge of the Lord andthe commandment of the Lord by the hand of Moses" (Num. ix.23). In the same way the portion of the Law under discussion is theresult of divine wisdom, according to which people are allowed tocontinue the kind of worship to which they have been accustomed,in order that they might acquire the true faith, which is the chiefobject [of God's commandments]. You ask, What could haveprevented God from commanding us directly, that which is thechief object, and from giving us the capacity of obeying it ? Thiswould lead to a second question, What prevented God fromleading the Israelites through the way of the land of the Philistines,and endowing them with strength for fighting ? The leading aboutby a pillar of cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night would thennot have been necessary. A third question would then be asked inreference to the good promised as reward for the keeping of thecommandments, and the evil foretold as a punishment for sins. It isthe following question: As it is the chief object and purpose of Godthat we should believe in the Law, and act according to that whichis written therein, why has He not given us the capacity ofcontinually believing in it, and following its guidance, instead ofholding out to us reward for obedience, and punishment fordisobedience, or of actually giving all the predicted reward andpunishment ? For [the promises and the threats] are but the meansof leading to this chief object. What prevented Him from givingus, as part of our nature, the will to do that which He desires us todo, and to abandon the kind of worship which He rejects ? There isone general answer to these three questions, and to all questions ofthe same character: it is this : Although in every one of the signs[related in Scripture] the natural property of some individual beingis changed, the nature of man is never changed by God by way ofmiracle. It is in accordance with this important principle that Godsaid," 0 that there were such an heart in them, that they would fearme," etc. (Dent. v. 26). It is also for this reason that He distinctlystated the commandments and the prohibitions, the reward and thepunishment. This principle as regards miracles has been frequentlyexplained by us in our works: I do not say this because I believethat it is difficult for God to change the nature of every individualperson; on the contrary, it is possible, and it is in His power,according to the principles taught in Scripture; but it has neverbeen His will to do it, and it never will be. If it were part of Hiswill to change [at His desire] the nature of any person, the missionof prophets and the giving of the Law would have been altogethersuperfluous.
I now return to my theme. As the sacrificial service is not theprimary object [of the commandments about sacrifice], whilstsupplications, Prayerss and similar kinds of worship are nearer tothe primary object, and indispensable for obtaining it, a greatdifference was made in the Law between these two kinds ofservice. The one kind, which consists in offering sacrifices,although the sacrifices are offered to the name of God, has notbeen made obligatory for us to the same extent as it had beenbefore. We were not commanded to sacrifice in every place, and inevery time, or to build a temple in every place, or to permit anyone who desires to become priest and to sacrifice. On the contrary,all this is prohibited unto us. Only one temple has been appointed," in the place which the Lord shall choose" (Deut. xii. 26): in noother place is it allowed to sacrifice: comp." Take heed to thyself,that thou offer not thy burnt-offerings in every place that thouseest" (ibid. v. 13); and only the members of a particular familywere allowed to officiate as priests. All these restrictions served tolimit this kind of worship, and keep it within those bounds withinwhich God did not think it necessary to abolish sacrificial servicealtogether. But prayer and supplication can be offered everywhereand by every person. The same is the case with the commandmentof zizit (Num. xy. 38); mezuzah (Dent. vi. 9; xi. 20); tefillin (Exod.xiii. 9, 16): and similar kinds of divine service.
Because of this principle which I explained to you, the Prophets intheir books are frequently found to rebuke their fellow-men forbeing over-zealous and exerting themselves too much in bringingsacrifices: the prophets thus distinctly declared that the object ofthe sacrifices is not very essential, and that God does not requirethem. Samuel therefore said," Hath the Lord as great delight inburnt-offerings and sacrifices as in obeying the voice of the Lord"(I Sam. xv. 22) ? Isaiah exclaimed," To what purpose is themultitude of your sacrifices unto me ? saith the Lord" (Isa. i. 11):Jeremiah declared:" For I spake not unto your fathers, norcommanded them in the day that I brought them out of the land ofEgypt, concerning burnt-offering or sacrifices. But this thingcommanded I them, saying, Obey my, voice, and
I will be your God, and ye shall be my people" (Jer. vii. 22, 23).This passage has been found difficult in the opinion of all thosewhose words .1 read or heard; they ask, How can Jeremiah say thatGod did not command us about burnt-offering and sacrifice, seeingso many precepts refer to sacrifice ? The sense of the passageagrees with what I explained to you. Jeremiah says [in the name ofGod) the primary object of the precepts is this, Know me, andserve no other being;" I will be your God, and ye shall be mypeople" (Lev. xxvi. 12). But the commandment that sacrificesshall be brought and that the temple shall be visited has for itsobject the success of that principle among you; and for its sake Ihave transferred these modes of worship to my name; idolatryshall thereby be utterly destroyed, and Jewish faith firmlyestablished. You, however, have ignored this object, and takenhold of that which is only the means of obtaining it; you havedoubted my existence," ye have denied the Lord, and said he isnot" (Jer. v. 12): ye served idols;" burnt incense unto Baal, andwalked after other gods whom ye know not. And come and standbefore me in this house" (ibid. vii. 9-10); i.e., you do not gobeyond attending the temple of the Lord, and offering sacrifices:but this is not the chief object.-- I have another way of explainingthis passage with exactly the same result. For it is distinctly statedin Scripture, and handed down by tradition, that the firstcommandments communicated to us did not include any law at anabout burnt-offering and sacrifice. You must not see any difficultyin the Passover which was commanded in Egypt; there was aparticular and evident reason for that, as will be explained by me(chap. xlvi.). Besides it was revealed in the land of Egypt; whilstthe laws to which Jeremiah alludes in the above passage are thosewhich were revealed after the departure from Egypt. For thisreason it is distinctly added," in the day that I brought them outfrom the land of Egypt." The first commandment after thedeparture from Egypt was given at Marah, in the following words," If thou wilt diligently hearken to the voice of the Lord thy God,and wilt do that which is right in His sight, and wilt give ear to Hiscommandments" (Exod. xv. 26)." There he made for them astatute and an ordinance, and there he proved them" (ibid. ver.25). According to the true traditional explanation, Sabbath andcivil laws were revealed at Marah:" statute" alludes to Sabbath,and" ordinance" to civil laws, which are the means of removinginjustice. The chief object of the Law, as has been shown by us, isthe teaching of truths; to which the truth of the creatio ex nihilobelongs. It is known that the object of the law of Sabbath is toconfirm and to establish this principle, as we have shown in thistreatise (Part. II. chap. xxxi.). In addition to the teaching of truthsthe Law aims at the removal of injustice from mankind. We havethus proved that the first laws do not refer to burnt-offering andsacrifice, which are of secondary importance. The same ideawhich is contained in the above passage from Jeremiah is alsoexpressed in the Psalms, where the people are rebuked that theyignore the chief object, and make no distinction between chief andsubsidiary lessons. The Psalmist says:" Hear, 0 my people, and Iwill speak; 0 Israel, and I will testify against thee : I am God, eventhy God. I will not reprove thee for thy sacrifices or thyburnt-offerings, they have been continually before me. I will takeno bullock out of thy house, nor he-goats out of thy folds" (Ps. 1.29).-- Wherever this subject is mentioned, this is its meaning.Consider it well, and reflect on it.
CHAPTER XXXIII
IT is also the object of the perfect Law to make man reject,despise, and reduce his desires as much as is in his power. Heshould only give way to them when absolutely necessary. It is wellknown that it is intemperance in eating, drinking, and sexualintercourse that people mostly rave and indulge in; and these verythings counteract the ulterior perfection of man, impede at thesame time the development of his first perfection, and generallydisturb the social order of the country and the economy of thefamily. For by following entirely the guidance of lust, in themanner of fools, man loses his intellectual energy, injures hisbody, and perishes before his natural time; sighs and caresmultiply; there is an increase of envy, hatred, and warfare for thepurpose of taking what another possesses. The cause of all this isthe circumstance that the ignorant considers physical enjoyment asan object to be sought for its own sake. God in His wisdom hastherefore given us such commandments as would counteract thatobject, and prevent us altogether from directing our attention to it,and has debarred us from everything that leads only to excessivedesire and lust. This is an important thing included in the objectsof our Law. See how the Law commanded to slay a person fromwhose conduct it is evident that he will go too far in seeking theenjoyment of eating and drinking. I mean" the rebellious andstubborn son" ; he is described as" a glutton and a drunkard"(Deut. xxi. 20). The Law commands to stone him and to removehim from society lest he grow up in this character, and kill many,and injure the condition of good men by his great lust.
Politeness is another virtue promoted by the Law. Man shall listento the words of his neighbour; he shall not be obstinate, but shallyield to the wish of his fellow-men, respond to their appeal, actaccording to their desire, and do what they like. Thus the Lawcommands," Circumcise therefore the foreskin of your heart, andbe no more stiff-necked" (peut. x. 16):" Take heed and hearken"(ibid. xxvii. g)." If you be willing and obedient" (Isa. i. 19). Thosewho listen [to the words of others] and accept as much as is rightare represented as saying," We will hear and do" (Deut. V. 24), orin a figurative style," Draw me, we will run after thee" (Song i. 4).
The Law is also intended to give its followers purity and holiness;by teaching them to suppress sensuality, to guard against it and toreduce it to a minimum, as will be explained by us. For when Godcommanded [Moses] to sanctify the people for the receiving of theLaw, and said," Sanctify them to-day and to-morrow" (Exod. xix.10), Moses [in obedience to this command] said to the people,"Come not at your wives" (ibid. ver. 15). Here it is clearly statedthat sanctification consists in absence of sensuality. But abstinencefrom drinking wine is also called holiness: in reference to theNazarite it is therefore said," He shall be holy" (Num. vi. 5).According to Siphra the words," sanctify yourselves and be yeholy" (Lev. xx. 7), refer to the sanctification effected byperforming the divine commands. As the obedience to suchprecepts as have been mentioned above is called by the Lawsanctification and purification, so is defilement applied to thetransgression of these precepts and the performance of disgracefulacts, as will be shown. Cleanliness in dress and body by washingand removing sweat and dirt is included among the various objectsof the Law, but only if connected with purity of action, and with aheart free from low principles and bad habits. It would beextremely bad for man to content himself with a purity obtained bywashing and cleanliness in dress, and to be at the same timevoluptuous and unrestrained in food and lust. These are describedby Isaiah as follows:" They that sanctify themselves and purifythemselves in the gardens, but continue their sinful life, when they,are in the innermost [of their houses], eating swine's flesh, and theabomination, and the mouse" (Isa. 1xvi. 17) : that is to say, theypurify and sanctify themselves outwardly as much as is exposed tothe sight of the people, and when they are alone in their chambersand the inner parts of their houses, they continue theirrebelliousness and disobedience, and indulge in partaking offorbidden food, such as (the flesh of] swine, worms, and mice. Theprophet alludes perhaps in the phrase" behind one tree in themidst" to indulgence in forbidden lust. The sense of the passage istherefore this: They appear outwardly clean, but their heart is bentupon their desires and bodily enjoyments, and this is contrary tothe spirit of the Law. For the chief object of the Law is to [teachman to] diminish his desires, and to cleanse his outer appearanceafter he has purified his heart. Those who wash their body andcleanse their garments whilst they remain dirty by bad actions andprinciples, are described by Solomon as" a generation that arepure in their own eyes, and yet are not washed from theirfilthiness; a generation, oh how lofty are their eyes!" etc. (Prov.xxx. 12-13). Consider well the principles which we mentioned inthis chapter as the final causes of the Law: for there are manyprecepts, for which you will be unable to give a reason unless youpossess a knowledge of these principles, as will be explainedfurther on.
CHAPTER XXXIV
IT is also important to note that the Law does not take into accountexceptional circumstances; it is not based on conditions whichrarely occur. Whatever the Law teaches, whether it be of anintellectual, a moral, or a practical character, is founded on thatwhich is the rule and not on that which is the exception: it ignoresthe injury that might be caused to a single person through a certainmaxim or a certain divine precept. For the Law is a divineinstitution, and [in order to understand its operation] we mustconsider how in Nature the various forces produce benefits whichare general, but in some solitary cases they cause also injury. Thisis clear from what has been said by ourselves as well as by others.We must consequently not be surprised when we find that theobject of the Law does not fully appear in every individual; theremust naturally be people who are not perfected by the instructionof the Law, just as there are beings which do not receive from thespecific forms in Nature all that they require. For all this comesfrom one God, is the result of one act;" they are all given from oneshepherd" (Eccles. xii. 11). It is impossible to be otherwise; andwe have already explained (chap. xv.) that that which is impossiblealways remains impossible and never changes. From thisconsideration it also follows that the laws cannot like medicinevary according to the different conditions of persons and times;whilst the cure of a person depends on his particular constitution atthe particular time, the divine guidance contained in the Law mustbe certain and general, although it may be effective in some casesand ineffective in others. If the Law depended on the varyingconditions of man, it would be imperfect in its totality, eachprecept being left indefinite. For this reason it would not be rightto make the fundamental principles of the Law dependent on acertain time or a certain place; on the contrary, the statutes and thejudgments must be definite, unconditional and general, inaccordance with the divine words:" As for the congregation, oneordinance shall be for you and for the stranger" (Num. xv. 15):they are intended, as has been stated before, for all persons and forall times.
After having Premised these introductory remarks I will nowproceed to the exposition of that which I intended to explain
CHAPTER XXXV
IN accordance with this intention I find it convenient to divide allprecepts into fourteen classes.
The first class comprises those precepts which form fundamentalprinciples, such as we have enumerated in Hilkot yesode ha-torah.Repentance and fasts belong also to this class, as will be shown.
The second class comprises the precepts which are connected withthe prohibition of idolatry, and which have been described by us inHilkot a'bodah-zarah. The laws concerning garments of linen andwool, concerning the fruit of trees in the first three years after theyhave been planted, and concerning divers seeds in a vineyard, arelikewise contained in this class. The object of these precepts is toestablish certain true principles and to perpetuate them among thepeople.
The third class is formed by commandments which are connectedwith the improvement of the moral condition [of mankind]; theseare mentioned in Hilket de'ot. It is known that by a good moralstate those social relations, which are indispensable for thewell-being of mankind, are brought to perfection.
The fourth class includes precepts relating to charity, loans, gifts,and the like, e.g., the rules respecting" valuations," (scil., of thingsdevoted to sacred purposes, Lev. xxvii. 1-27);" things devoted"(ibid. ver. 28); laws concerning loans and servants, and all the lawsenumerated in the section Zera'im, except the rules of" mixtures"and" the fruit of trees in the first three years." The object of theseprecepts is dear; their benefit concerns an people by turns; for hewho is rich to-day may one day be poor -- either he himself or hisdescendants; and he who is now poor, he himself or his son may berich to-morrow.
The fifth class contains those precepts which relate to theprevention of wrong and violence; they are included in our book inthe section Nezikin. Their beneficial character is evident.
The sixth class is formed of precepts respecting fines, e.g., thelaws on theft and robbery, on false witnesses, and most of the lawscontained in the section Sholetim belong to this class. Theirbenefit is apparent; for if sinners and robbers were not punished,injury would not be prevented at all: and persons scheming evilwould not become rarer. They are wrong who suppose that itwould be an act of mercy to abandon the laws of compensation forinjuries: on the contrary, it would be perfect cruelty and injury tothe social state of the country. It is an act of mercy that Godcommanded" judges and officers thou shalt appoint to thee in allthy gates" (Dent. xvi. 118).
The seventh class comprises those laws which regulate thebusiness transactions of men with each other; e.g., laws aboutloans, hire, trust, buying, selling, and the like; the rules aboutinheritance belong to this class. We have described these preceptsin the sections Kinyan and Mishpatim. The object of theseprecepts is evident, for monetary transactions are necessary for thepeoples of all countries, and it is impossible to have thesetransactions without a proper standard of equity and without usefulregulations.
The eighth class includes those precepts which relate to certaindays, as Sabbaths and holydays: they are enumerated in the sectionZentannim. The Law states dearly the reason and object of each ofthese precepts: they are to serve as a means for establishing acertain principle among us, or securing bodily recreation, oreffecting both things at the same time, as will be shown by me.
The ninth class comprises the general laws concerning religiousrites and ceremonies, e.g., laws concerning prayers, the reading ofShema', and the other rules given in the section Jhabah, with theexception of the law concerning circumcision. The object of theselaws is apparent; they all prescribe actions which firmly establishthe love of God in our minds, as also the right belief concerningHim and His attributes.
The tenth class is formed of precepts which relate to theSanctuary, its vessels, and its ministers: they are contained in thesection 'Abodah. The object of these precepts has already beenmentioned by us (supra, chap. xxxii.).
The eleventh class includes those precepts which relate toSacrifices. Most of these laws we have mentioned in the sections'Abodah and Korbanot. We have already shown the general use ofthe sacrificial laws, and their necessity in ancient time.
The twelfth class comprises the laws concerning things uncleanand dean. The general object of these laws is, as will be explainedby me, to discourage people from [frequently] entering theSanctuary; in order that their minds be impressed with thegreatness of the Sanctuary, and approach it with respect andreverence.
The thirteenth class includes the precepts concerning forbiddenfood and the like; we have given them in Hilkot maakalot asurot;the laws about vows and temperance belong also to this class. Theobject of all these laws is to restrain the growth of desire, theindulgence in seeking that which is pleasant, and the disposition toconsider the appetite for eating and drinking as the end [of man'sexistence]. We have explained this in our Commentary on theMishnah, in the Introduction (chap. iv.) to The Sayings of theFathers.
The fourteenth class comprises the precepts concerning forbiddensexual intercourse; they are given in the section Nashim and Hilkotissure-biah. The laws concerning the intermixture of cattle belongto this class. The object of these precepts is likewise to diminishsexual intercourse, to restrain as much as possible indulgence inlust, and [to teach.] that this enjoyment is not, as foolish peoplethink, the final cause of man's existence. We have explained this inour Commentary on The Sayings of the Fathers (Introd., chap.viii.). The laws about circumcision belong to this class.
As is well known, the precepts are also divided into two classes,viz., precepts concerning the relation between man and God, andprecepts concerning the relation between man and man. Of theclasses into which we divide the precepts and which we haveenumerated, the fifth, sixth, and seventh, and part of the third,include laws concerning the relation of man to man. The otherclasses contain the laws about the relation of man to God, i.e.,positive or negative precepts, which tend to improve the moral orintellectual condition of mankind, or to regulate such of eachman's actions which [directly] only concern him and lead him toperfection. For these are called laws concerning man's relation toGod, although in reality they lead to results which concern also hisfellow-men; because these results become only apparent after along series of intermediate links, and from a general point of view;whilst directly these laws are not intended to prevent man frominjuring his fellow-man. Note this.
Having described the laws of these classes, 1 will now againconsider the precepts of each class, and explain the reason and useof those which are believed to be useless or unreasonable, with theexception of a few, the object of which I have not yetcomprehended.
CHAPTER XXXVI
THE reason of all precepts of the first class, viz., of the principlesenumerated by us in the Hilkot yesode ha-torah, is obvious.Consider them one by one, and you will find that the lesson whichevery one of them contains is correct and demonstrable. It is alsoevident that the precepts which exhort and command us to learnand to teach are useful; for without wisdom there cannot be anygood act or any true knowledge. The law which prescribes tohonour the teachers of the Law is likewise useful; for if they werenot considered by the people as great and honourable men, theywould not be followed as guides in their principles and actions.The Law demands also that we be humble and modest [in theirpresence]." Thou shalt rise up before the hoary head" (Lev. xix.32). This class includes also the commandment to swear by thename of God and the prohibition of swearing falsely or in vain.The reason for all these precepts is evident; they aim at theglorification of God: they prescribe acts which lead to the belief inGod's greatness. Likewise the commandment to cry to God in timeof trouble," to blow an alarm with the trumpets" (Num. x. 9),belongs to this class. We are told to offer up prayers to God, inorder to establish firmly the true principle that God takes notice ofour ways, that He can make them successful if we worship Him, ordisastrous if we disobey Him, that [success and failure] are not theresult of chance or accident. In this sense we must understand thepassage," If ye walk with me by chance" (bekeri, Lev. xxvi. 21):i.e., if I bring troubles upon you for punishment, and you considerthem as mere accidents, I will again send you some of theseaccidents as you call them, but of a more serious and troublesomecharacter. This is expressed in the words:" If ye walk with me bychance : then I will walk with you also in the fury of chance" (ibid.vers. 27, 28). For the belief of the people that their troubles aremere accidents causes them to continue in their evil principles andtheir wrong actions, and prevents them from abandoning their evilways. Comp." Thou hast stricken them, but they have not grieved" (ler. v. 3). For this reason God commanded us to pray to Him, toentreat Him, and to cry before Him in time of trouble. It is clearthat repentance is likewise included in this class: that is to say, it isone of those principles which are an indispensable element in thecreed of the followers of the Law. For it is impossible for man tobe entirely free from error and sin; he either does not know theopinion which he has to choose, or he adopts a principle, not for itsown merits, but in order to gratify his desire or passion. If we wereconvinced that we could never make our crooked ways straight, weshould for ever continue in our errors, and perhaps add other sinsto them since we did not see that any remedy was left to us. Butthe belief in the effect of repentance causes us to improve, toreturn to the best of the ways, and to become more perfect than wewere before we sinned. For this reason many things are prescribedfor the promotion of this very useful principle: e.g., confessionsand sacrifices for sins committed unknowingly, and in some caseseven for sins committed intentionally, and fasts, and that which iscommon to all cases of repentance from sin, the resolve todiscontinue sinning. For that is the aim of this principle. Of allthese precepts the use is obvious.
CHAPTER XXXVII
THE precepts of the second class are those which we haveenumerated in the section" On idolatry." It is doubtless that theyall tend to save man from the error of idolatry and the evilpractices connected with it: e.g., observing the times, enchantment,witchcraft, incantation, consulting with familiar spirits, and thelike. When you read the books which I mentioned to you. you willfind that witchcraft, which will be described to you, is part of thecustoms of the Sabeans, Kasdim, Chaldeans, and to a higherdegree of the Egyptians and Canaanites. They caused others tobelieve, or they themselves believed, that by means of these artsthey would perform wonderful things in reference to an individualperson, or to the inhabitants of a whole country, although noanalogy and no reasoning can discover any relation between theseperformances of the witches and the promised result. Thus they arecareful to collect certain plants at a particular time, and to take adefinite number of certain objects. There are many thingscomprised by witchcraft; they may be divided into three classes :first, witchcraft connected with objects in Nature, viz., plants,animals, or minerals. Secondly, witchcraft dependent for itsperformance on a certain time; and thirdly, witchcraft dependenton the performance of certain acts of man, such as dancing,clapping, laughing, jumping with one leg, lying on the ground withthe face upward, burning a thing, fumigating with a certainmaterial, or speaking intelligible or unintelligible words. These arethe various kinds of witchcraft. In some cases all these variousperformances are required. Thus the witches sometimes order: takea leaf of a certain plant, when the moon is seen in a certain degree[of the Zodiac] in the east point or in one of the other cardinalpoints [of the horizon], also a certain quantity of the horn, thesweat, the hair and the blood of a certain animal when the sun is,e.g., in the middle of the sky, or in some other definite place; and aportion of a certain mineral or minerals, melted at a certainconjunction of sun and moon, and at a definite position of thestars; speak then, and say certain words, and fumigate with thoseleaves or similar ones to that molten image, and such and such athing will happen. In other instances of witchcraft it is assumedthat one of the above performances suffices. In most cases thecondition is added that women must perform these actions. Thus itis stated in reference to the means of obtaining rain, that tenvirgins dressed with diadems and red garments should dance, pusheach other, moving backwards and forwards, and make signs to thesun: the result of this long process was believed [by the idolaters]to be a downpour of rain.
It is further stated that if four women lay on their back, with theirfeet spread and lifted up, said certain words and did certain thingswhilst in this disgraceful position, hail would discontinue comingdown in that place. The number of these stupid and mad things isgreat; in all of them without exception women are required to bethe agent. Witchcraft is intimately connected with astrology; thosethat practise it assign each plant, animal, or mineral to a certainstar, and believe that the above processes of witchcraft aredifferent forms of worship offered to that star, which is pleasedwith that act, word, or offering of incense, and fulfils their wishes.
After this remark, which you will understand when you have readsuch of their works as are at present extant, and have beenmentioned by me, hear what I will tell you. It is the object andcentre of the whole Law to abolish idolatry and utterly uproot it,and to overthrow the opinion that any of the stars could interferefor good or evil in human matters, because it leads to the worshipof stars. It was therefore necessary to slay all witches as beingundoubtedly idolaters, because every witch is an idolater: they onlyhave their own strange ways of worship, which are different fromthe common mode of worship offered to those deities. But in allperformances of witchcraft it is laid down as a rule that womenshould be employed in the chief operation; and therefore the Lawsays," Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live" (Exod. xxii. 17).Another reason is the natural reluctance of people to slay women.This is also the cause why in the law of idolatry it is said" man orwoman" (Deut. XVii. 2), and again repeated a second time," theman or the woman" (ibid. ver. 5)-- a phrase which does not occurin the law about the breaking of Sabbath, or in any other law; forgreat sympathy is naturally shown to women. Now the witchesbelieved that they produced a certain result by their witchcraft;that they were able through the above-mentioned actions to drivesuch dangerous animals as lions, serpents, and the like out of thecities, and to remove various kinds of damage from the products ofthe earth. Thus they imagine that they are able by certain acts toprevent hail from coming down, and by certain other acts to killthe worms in the vineyards, whereby the latter are protected frominjury: in fact, the killing of the worms in vineyards, and othersuperstitions mentioned in the Nabatean Agriculture, are fullydescribed by the Sabeans. They likewise imagine that they knowcertain acts by which they can prevent the dropping of leaves fromthe trees and the untimely falling of their fruit. On account of theseideas, which were general in those days, the Law declares in" thewords of the covenant" as follows: The same idolatry andsuperstitious performances which, in your belief, keep certainmisfortunes far from you, will cause those very misfortunes tobefall you." I will also send wild beasts among you" (Lev. xxvi.22)," 1 will also send the teeth of wild beasts upon them, with thepoison of those that creep in dust" (Deut. xxxii. 24)." The fruit ofthy land, and all thy labours, shall a nation, which thou knowestnot, eat up" (ibid. xxviii. 33)." Thou shalt plant vineyards anddress them, but shalt neither drink of the wine nor gather thegrapes, etc. Thou shalt have olive trees throughout all thy coasts,but thou shalt not anoint thyself with the oil 11 (Dent. xxviii. 39,40). In short, in spite of the schemes of idolaters to support andfirmly establish their doctrine, and to make people believe that byidolatry certain misfortunes could be averted and certain benefitsgained, worship of idols will, on the contrary, as is stated in" thewords of the covenant," prevent the advantages and bring thetroubles. The reader will now understand why, of all kinds ofcurses and blessings, those mentioned in" the words of thecovenant" have been selected by the Law, and particularly pointedout. Note also the greatness of the benefit [of these laws).
In order that we may keep far from all kinds of witchcraft, we arewarned not to adopt any of the practices of the idolaters, even suchas are connected with agriculture, the keeping of cattle, andsimilar work. [The Law prohibits] everything that the idolaters,according to their doctrine, and contrary to reason, consider asbeing useful and acting in the manner of certain mysterious forces.Comp." Neither shall ye walk in their ordinances" (Lev. xviii. 3)." And ye shall not walk in the manners of the nation which I cast outbefore you" (ibid. xx. 23). Our Sages call such acts" the ways ofthe Amorite" : they are kinds of witchcraft, because they are notarrived at by reason, but are similar to the performances ofwitchcraft, which is necessarily connected with the influences ofthe stars; thus [" the manners of the nations" ] lead people to extol,worship, and praise the stare. Our Sages say distinctly," whateveris used as medicine" does not come under the law of" the ways ofthe Amorite" : tor they hold that only such cures as arerecommended by reason are permitted, and other cures areprohibited. When, therefore, the dictum was quoted: a tree thatcasts off its fruit may be laden with stone or dyed with red colour,the following objection was raised: The loading of the tree withstones may be justified on the plea that it serves to weaken thestrength of the tree, but why should it be permitted to dye the treewith red colour ? This question shows that the dyeing of the treewith red colour, and all similar things which are not explained byanalogy from nature, are prohibited as" ways of the Amorite!' Forthe same reason our Sages said," The uterus of animals whichhave been selected for the Sanctuary must be buried; it must not besuspended from a tree, and not buried in the cross-road, becausethis is one of ' the ways of the Amorite." Hence you may learn howto treat similar cases. It is not inconsistent that a nail of thegallows and the tooth of a fox have been permitted to be used ascures: for these things have been considered in those days as factsestablished by experiment. They served as cures, in the samemanner as the hanging of the peony over a person subject toepileptic fits, or the application of a dog's refuse to the swellings ofthe throat, and of the vapours of vinegar and marcasite to theswelling of hard tumours. For the Law permits as medicineeverything that has been verified by experiment, although it cannotbe explained by analogy. The above-named cures are permitted inthe same way as the application of purgatives. Learn, reader, thesenoteworthy lessons from this my work, and keep them;" for theyare a diadem of grace for thy head" (prov. iv.).
We have explained in our large work that it is prohibited to roundthe corners of the head, and to mar the corners of the beard,because it was the custom of idolatrous priests. For the samereason, the wearing of garments made of linen and wool isprohibited: the heathen priests adorned themselves with garmentscontaining vegetable and animal material, whilst they held in theirhand a seal made of a mineral. This you find written in theirbooks. The same is also the reason of the precept," The womanshall not wear that which pertaineth unto a man" (Dent. xxii. 5).You find it in the book Torntom, that a male person should wearcoloured woman's dress when he stands before Venus, and afemale, when standing before Mars, should wear a buckler andother armour. I think that this precept has also another reason;namely, that the interchange of dress creates lust and leads toimmorality.
It is easily understood why it is prohibited to derive any benefitwhatever from an idol. For sometimes a person buys it with theintention to break it, but keeps it, and it becomes a snare to him.Even if he broke it, recast it, and sold it to a heathen, he must notuse the money which he received in exchange for the idol: becausepeople frequently mistake accidental circumstances for essentialcauses: thus most people say of a certain person that he hasbecome rich and wealthy after having dwelt in a certain house, orbought a certain animal or vessel; and that these things were ablessing to him. In the same way a person may be successful andmake a good profit on the business in which he employed themoney received for the idol; he might then think that the idol wasthe cause of his success, and that the blessing of the moneyreceived for it brought him the profit; he would then believe in theidol: a belief which is just the reverse of the chief object of theLaw, as is clearly seen in every word of it. For this same reason,we are forbidden to turn to our use the covering of the idol, itsofferings and vessels. We are thus guarded against the idea [ofascribing our success to idols]. In those days the belief in the starswas very strong; it was generally assumed that life and death, goodand evil, depended on the stars. The Law employed thereforestrong means, as covenant, witnesses, great oaths, and theabovementioned [blessings and] curses, in order to overthrow thatbelief. We are thus commanded to abstain from taking any portionof the idol, and deriving any benefit from it: and God tells us thatif money received for idols be mixed with any person's property, itwill bring loss and ruin to that property. This warning is containedin the words :" Neither shalt thou bring an abomination into thinehouse, lest thou be a cursed thing like it" (Deut. vii. 26). Howmuch more wrong must it he to believe that there is a blessing inidols. When you examine all the precepts that relate to idolatry,you will find that their reason is obvious, and that they serve tomake us abandon this evil belief, and keep at the greatest possibledistance from it.
We must also point out that originators of false, baseless, anduseless principles scheme and plan for the firm establishment oftheir faith; and tell their fellow-men that a certain plague willbefall those who will not perform the act by which that faith issupported and confirmed for ever; this plague may one dayaccidentally befall a person, who will then direct his attention tothe performance of that act, and adopt idolatry. It being wellknown that people are naturally most in fear and dread of the lossof their property and their children, the worshippers of fire spreadthe tale, that if any one did not pass his son and daughter throughthe fire, he will lose his children by death. There is no doubt thaton account of this absurd menace every one at once obeyed, out ofpity and sympathy for the child; especially as it was a trifling and alight thing that was demanded, in passing the child over the fire.We must further take into account that the care of young childrenis intrusted to women, who are generally weak-minded, and readyto believe everything, as is well known. The Law makes, therefore,an earnest stand against this practice, and uses in reference to itstronger terms than in any other kind of idolatry; namely," hedefileth my sanctuary, and profaneth my holy name" (Ley. M 3).The true prophet then declares in the name of God that the very actwhich is performed for the purpose of keeping the child alive, willbring death upon him who performs it, and destruction upon hisseed. Comp." And 1 will set my face against that man and againsthis family," etc. (ibid. xx. 5). Know that traces of this practicehave survived even to the present day, because it was widespreadin the world. You can see how midwives take a young childwrapped in its swaddling-clothes, and after having placed incenseof a disagreeable smell on the fire, swing the child in the smokeover that fire. This is certainly a kind of passing children throughthe fire, and we must not do it. Reflect on the evil cunning of theauthor of this doctrine; how people continued to adhere to thisdoctrine, and how, in spite of the opposition of the Law duringthousands of years, its name is not blotted out, and its traces arestill in existence.
Idolaters have acted similarly in reference to property. They madeit a law that a certain tree, the asherab, should be worshipped ' andthat of its fruit one part should be offered, and the rest consumedin the temple of the idol: this is stated in the regulationsconcerning the asherah. In the same manner, they made it a rule,that the first-fruit of every fruit-tree should be partly offered as asacrifice and partly consumed in the idol's temple. It was also awidespread belief that if the first-fruit of any tree was not treatedin this manner, the tree would dry up, its fruit would be cast off, itsincrease would be diminished, or some disease would come overit; just as they spread the belief that every child, that was notpassed through the fire, must die. People in their anxiety for theirproperty obeyed also this precept unhesitatingly. The Law, inopposition to this doctrine, commanded us to burn the produce offruit-trees the first three years: for some trees bear fruit after oneyear, whilst some begin to yield fruit after two, and others afterthree years. The law is based upon the nature of trees grown in anordinary way, namely, in one of the three well-known methods :planting, propagation, and inoculation (neti'ab, habrakah, andharcabah). The Law does not take notice of the case that a kernelor stone is sown: for the ordinances of the Law are based on theusual condition of things, and as a rule a young tree in Palestinebears fruit for the first time not later than the third year after it hasbeen planted. According to the divine promise, the waste anddestruction of this first-fruit of the tree will be followed by yearsof plenty of fruit: for it is said," that it may increase unto you thefruit thereof" (Lev. xix. 25). The fruit of the fourth year we arecommanded to eat before God, instead of [the heathen custom of]eating orlab," the fruit of the preceding years," in the temples ofthe idols, as has been described by us.
It is further mentioned in the Nabatean Agriculture that the ancientidolaters caused certain things named in that work to rot, waitedtill the sun stood in a certain degree [of the ecliptic], and then theyperformed many acts of witchcraft. They believed that thatsubstance should be kept ready by every one, and when a fruit-treeis planted, a portion of that rotten substance should be scatteredround the tree or under it: the tree would then grow quicker andproduce more fruit than is generally the case. They say that thisprocess is very extraordinary; it acts like a talisman, and is moreefficient than any kind of witchcraft in accelerating theproductiveness of fruit-trees. 1 have already shown and explainedto you how the Law opposes all kinds of witchcraft. The Law,therefore, prohibits us to use the fruit yielded by a tree in the firstthree years after it has been planted, so that there should be noopportunity for accelerating, according to their imagination, theproductiveness of any tree. After three years most fruit-trees inPalestine yield fruit by the ordinary course of nature, without theapplication of those magical performances which were verygeneral in those days. Note this remarkable fact.
Another belief which was very common in those days, andsurvived the Sabeans, is this : When a tree is grafted into anotherin the time of a certain conjunction of sun and moon, and isfumigated with certain substances whilst a formula is uttered, thattree will produce a thing that will be found exceedingly useful.More general than anything mentioned by the heathen writers wasthe ceremony of grafting an olive branch upon a citron tree, asdescribeding the beginning of the Nabatean Agriculture. I am ofopinion that the book of medicines which Hezekiah put away (B:T. Pes. 56a) was undoubtedly of this kind. They also said thatwhen one species is grafted upon another, the branch which is tobe grafted must be in the hand of a beautiful damsel, whilst a maleperson has disgraceful and unnatural sexual intercourse with her:during that intercourse the woman grafts the branch into the tree.There is no doubt that this ceremony was general, and that nobodyrefused to perform it, especially as the pleasure of love was addedto the (supposed) future results of the grafting. The Law, therefore,prohibits us to mix different species together, i.e., to graft one treeinto another, because we, must keep away from the opinions ofidolaters and the abominations of their unnatural sexualintercourse. In order to guard against the grafting of trees, we areforbidden to sow any two kinds of seed together or near eachother. When you study the traditional explanation of this precept,you will find that the prohibition of grafting, the principal elementin this commandment, holds good for all countries, and ispunishable by forty stripes: but the sowing of seeds one near theother is only prohibited in Palestine. In the Nabatean Agriculture itis further distinctly stated that it was the custom of the people inthose days to sow barley and stones of grapes together, in thebelief that the vineyard could only prosper in this way. Thereforethe Law prohibits us to use seed that has grown in a vineyard, andcommands us to bum both the barley and the produce of thevineyard. For the practices of the heathen, which they consideredas of a magic and talismanic character, even if not containing anyidolatrous element, are prohibited, as we have stated above (p.334) in reference to the dictum of our Sages," We must not hangupon a tree the foetus of an animal belonging to the Sanctuary."The Law prohibits all heathen customs, called by our Sages" theways of the Amorite," because they are connected with idolatry.On considering the customs of the heathen in their worship, youwill find that in certain kinds of worship they turn toward stars, inothers to the two great luminaries: frequently they choose the riseof signs in the Zodiac for sowing and fumigating; and as to thecircuits made by those who plant or sow, some complete fivecircles, corresponding to the five planets, with the exclusion of thetwo luminaries: others go seven times round, according to thenumber of the planets, when including sun and moon. Theybelieve that all these practices are magic charms of greatefficiency in agriculture. Thus those practices lead to the worshipof stars: and therefore all practices of those nations have beenprohibited, in the words, Ye shall not walk in the manners of thenation which I cast out before you (Lev. xx. 23). Those practiceswhich were more general and common, or were distinctlyconnected with idolatry, are particularly pointed out as prohibited;e.g., eating the fruit of a tree during the first three years,intermixing of species and the mixed species sown in a vineyard. Iam surprised as the dictum of Rabbi Joshiyah, which has beenadopted as legally binding, in reference to the mixed seed in avineyard, viz., that the law is only transgressed when wheat,barley, and the stone of a grape are sown simultaneously. He mustundoubtedly have seen the source of that kind of the ways of theAmorite. It must now be dear to you, and no room can be left forany doubt, that the prohibition of wearing garments of wool andlinen, of using the fruit of a tree in the first three years, and ofmixing divers species, are directed against idolatry, and that theprohibition against adopting heathen manners serves to removeanything which leads to idolatry, as has been shown by us.
CHAPTER XXXVIII
THE precepts of the third class are identical with those which wehave enumerated in Hilkot de'ot. Their use is evident; they arerules concerning moral conduct by which the social relations ofmen are regulated. This is sufficiently dear, and I need not dwelllong on it. Know that some precepts prescribe certain acts whichare considered as arbitrary decrees without any purpose, but arenevertheless the means of acquiring some moral principle. Weshall explain every one of them in its proper place. But of all thoseprecepts which are mentioned in Hilkot dew, it is distinctly statedthat their object is to inculcate good moral principles. CHAPTERXXXIX
THE precepts in the fourth class include the laws which in ourwork are contained in the section Zera'im, excepting the laws onthe mixture of species: the rules about things to be" valued" andthings" devoted" (Hilkot 'erekin va-haramim), and thoseconcerning lender and borrower (Hilkot malveh ve-loveh) andslaves (Hilkot 'abadim). When you examine these precepts youwill dearly see the use of every one of them: they teach us to havesympathy with the poor and infirm, to assist the needy in variousways: not to hurt the feelings of those who are in want, and not tovex those who are in a helpless condition (viz., the widow, theorphan, and the like]. The purpose of the laws concerning theportions which are to be given to the poor is likewise obvious; thereason of the laws concerning the heave-offerings and the tithe isdistinctly stated :" for he hath no portion and inheritance withthee" (Deut. XiV. 29). You certainly know that the Levites had noportion, because their whole tribe was to be exclusively engaged inthe service of God and the study of the Law. They shall not plowor cut the corn, but shall only minister to God." They shall teachJacob thy judgments and Israel thy law: they shall put incensebefore thee" (Deut. xxxiii. 10). In the Law we meet frequentlywith the phrase," the Levite, the stranger, and the orphan and thewidow" : for the Levite is reckoned among the poor because hehad no property. The second tithe was commanded to be spent onfood in Jerusalem: in this way the owner was compelled to givepart of it away as charity. As he was not able to use it otherwisethan by way of eating and drinking, he must have easily beeninduced to give it gradually away. This rule brought multitudestogether in one place, and strengthened the bond of love andbrotherhood among the children of men. The law concerning thefruit of a tree in its fourth year has some relation to idolatrouscustoms, as has been stated by us (chap. xxxvii.), and is connectedwith the law concerning the fruit of a tree in its first three years.But it has in addition the same object as the law concerning theheave-offering (Deur. xviii. 4), the dough-offering (hallah) (Num.xv. 20), the first-fruit (Exod. xxiii. 19), and the first of the shearing(Deut. xviii. 4). For the first of everything is to be devoted to theLord; and by doing so man accustoms himself to be liberal, and tolimit his appetite for eating and his desire for property. The sameis the reason why the priest took the shoulder, the two cheeks, andthe maw (Deut. xviii. 3); the cheek being the first part of the bodyof animals, the right shoulder the first of the extremities of thebody, and the maw the first of all inwards.
The reciting of a certain portion of the Law when the first-fruitsare brought to the temple, tends also to create humility. For he whobrings the first-fruits takes the basket upon his shoulders andproclaims the kindness and goodness of God. This ceremonyteaches man that it is essential in the service of God to rememberthe times of trouble and the history of past distress, in days ofcomfort. The Law lays stress on this duty in several places: comp."And thou shalt remember that thou hast been a slave," etc. (Deut.v. 15). For it is to be feared that those who become great in richesand comfort might, as is generally the case, fall into the vices ofinsolence and haughtiness, and abandon all good principles.Comp." Lest thou eat and be full, etc., and thine heart be lifted upand thou forget the Lord" (ibid. Viii. 12-14):" And Jeshurunwaxed fat and kicked" (ibid. xxx. 15). On account of this fear theLaw commanded us to read each year a certain portion before theLord and His glory, when we offer the first-fruit. You know howmuch the Law insists that we shall always remember the plaguesthat have befallen the Egyptians; comp." That thou mayestremember the day when thou camest forth out of the land of Egyptall the days of thy life" (ibid. xvi. 3):" That thou mayest tell in theears of thy son what things I have wrought in Egypt" (Exod. x. 2).Such a law was necessary in order to perpetuate the memory of thedeparture from Egypt; because such events verify prophecy and thedoctrine of reward and punishment. The benefit of everycommandment that serves to keep certain miracles inremembrance, or to perpetuate true faith, is therefore obvious.
In reference to the law concerning the first-born of man and cattleit Is distinctly said," And it came to pass, when Pharaoh wouldhardly let us go, that the Lord slew all the first-born in the land ofEgypt, etc., therefore I sacrifice to the Lord," etc. (Exod. xiii. 15).But it can easily be explained why only cattle, sheep, and asses arementioned in this law; these are kept as domestic animals, and arefound in most places, especially in Palestine, where the Israeliteswere shepherds, they, their fathers, and forefathers: comp." Thyservants are shepherds, both we and also our fathers" (Gen. xlvii.3). Horses and camels, however, are not wanted by shepherds, andare not found in all places; thus in the booty of Midian (Num.xxxi.) no other animals are mentioned but oxen, sheep, and asses.But asses alone are indispensable to all people, especially to thosewho are engaged in the field or in the forest. Thus Jacob says," Ihave oxen and asses" (Gen. xxxii. 5). Camels and horses are notpossessed by many people, but only by a few, and are only foundin a few places. The law that the first-born of an ass was to have itsneck broken [in case it is not redeemed], will only ensure theredemption of the ass. It has, therefore, been said that the act ofredeeming the ass is to be preferred to that of breaking its neck.
As to the precepts enumerated in the laws concerning the year ofrelease and the jubilee (Hilkot shemittah ve-yohel) some of themimply sympathy with our fellow-men, and promote the well-beingof mankind; for in reference to these Precepts it is stated in theLaw," That the poor of thy people may eat" (Exod. xxiii. 11): andbesides, the land will also increase its produce and improve whenit remains fallow for some time. Other precepts of this classprescribe kindness to servants and to the poor, by renouncing anclaims to debts [in the year of release] and relieving the slaves oftheir bondage [in the seventh year]. There are some precepts in thisclass that serve to secure for the people a permanent source ofmaintenance and support by providing that the land should remainthe permanent property of its owners, and that it could not besold." And the land shall not be sold for ever" (Lev. XXV. 23). Inthis way the property of a person remains intact for him and hisheirs, and he can only enjoy the produce thereof. I have thusexplained the reason of all precepts contained in our work in theSection Zera'im, with the exception of the laws concerning theintermixture of different species of beasts the reason of which willbe given (chap. xlix.).
In the same manner we find that all the precepts comprised in" thelaws on valuations," and on" things devoted" are based on theprinciple of charity: some of them prescribe what should be givento the priests: others tell us what must be devoted to the repairs ofthe temple. The practice of all these things accustoms man to actliberally and to spend money unhesitatingly to the glory of God.For it is in the nature of man to strive to gain money and toincrease it: and his great desire to add to his wealth and honour isthe chief source of misery for man. Also the precepts contained in"the laws concerning the relation between lender and borrower"(Hilkot malveh veloveh) will be found, on being carefullyexamined, to be nothing but commands to be lenient, merciful andkind to the needy, not to deprive them of the use of anythingindispensable in the preparation of food." No man shall take thenether or the upper millstone to pledge: for he taketh a man's lifeto pledge" (Deut. xxiv. 6).
The precepts contained in" the laws concerning slaves" (Hilkot'abadim), likewise prescribe only acts of pity, mercy and kindnessto the poor. It is an act of mercy to give liberty to a Canaaniteservant for the loss of one of his limbs (Exod. XXi. 26, 27), inorder that he should not suffer from slavery and illness at the sametime. The law applies even to the case that a tooth of a slave hasbeen knocked out, much more to the mutilation of other limbs. Hecould only be corrected with a rod or reed or the like, as we havestated in Mishneh-torah. Besides, if the master strikes the slave toohard and kills him, he is punished with death as for ordinarymurder. Mercy is also the object of the law," Thou shalt notdeliver unto his master the servant that is escaped from his master"(Deut. xxiii. 15): but it teaches besides a very useful lesson,namely, that we must always practise this virtue, help and protectthose who seek our help, and not deliver them unto those fromwhom they flee; and it is not sufficient to give assistance to thosewho are in need of our help: we must look after their interests, bekind to them, and not hurt their feeling by words. Thus the Lawsays:" He shall dwell with thee, even among you, in that placewhich he shall choose in one of thy gates, where it liketh him best:thou shalt not vex him" (ibid. ver. 16). This we owe to the lowestamong men, to the slave; how much more must we do our duty tothe freeborn, when they seek our assistance ? But, on the otherhand, when sinners and evildoers seek our help, it must not begranted; no mercy must be shown to them, and the course ofjustice must not be interfered with, even if they claim theprotection of that which is noblest and highest: for" Thou shalttake him from mine altar that he may die" (Exod. xxi. 14). Here aperson comes to seek the help of God, and claims the protection ofthat which is devoted to his name; God, however, does not helphim, and commands that he be delivered up to the prosecutor, fromwhom he fled. Much less need any one of us help or pity hisfellow-men [under such circumstances]: because mercy on sinnersis cruelty to all creatures. These are undoubtedly the right waysdesignated" righteous statutes and judgments" (Deut. iv. 8), anddifferent from the ways of the fools, who consider a personpraiseworthy when he helps and protects his fellow-men, withoutdiscriminating between the oppressor and the oppressed. This iswell known from their words and songs.
The reason and usefulness of every precept of this class has thusbeen clearly demonstrated.
CHAPTER XL
THE precepts of the filth class, enumerated in the Section--" OnDamages" (Sepber nezikin), aim at the removal of wrong and theprevention of injury. As we are strongly recommended to preventdamage, we are responsible for every damage caused by ourproperty or through our work in so far as it is in our power to takecare and to guard it from becoming injurious. We are, therefore,responsible for all damage caused by our cattle; we must guardthem. The same is the case with fire and pits; they are made byman, and he can be careful that they do not cause damage. I winpoint out the equity of the various laws in this respect. Nocompensation is enforced for damage caused by the mouth or thefoot of an animal in a public thoroughfare; because this cannot beguarded against, and the damage caused there is not very large.Those who place their things in a public place are themselvesguilty of neglect, and expose their property to injury. Butcompensation is given for damage caused to the property of aperson in his own field by the tooth or the foot of an animal. It isdifferent in the case of damage caused by the horn of animals orthe like. The animal can be guarded everywhere land preventedfrom causing injury], whilst those who pass public thoroughfarescannot sufficiently take care against accidents of this kind. In thiscase the law is the same for all places: but there is a differencewhether the owner of the animal has been warned concerning it ornot (mu'ad or tam). If the animal has not been in the habit ofcausing damage, the owner need only pay half the damage; butdamage caused by an animal which has been in the habit of doingso, and has been known as savage, must be paid in full. Thecompensation for a slave is uniformly estimated at half the valuefixed for a free man. For in the law concerning the valuation ofman you find the highest valuation at sixty shekels, whilst themoney to be paid for a slave is fixed at thirty shekels silver. Thekilling of an animal that has killed a human being (Exod. xxi. 28,29) is not a punishment to the animal, as the dissenters insinuateagainst us, but it is a fine imposed on the owner of that animal. Forthe same reason the use of its flesh is prohibited. The owner of ananimal will, therefore, take the greatest possible care in guardingit: he will know that if any person is killed by the animal, whetherthat person be grown up or young, free or in bondage, he forfeits atleast the animal; and in case he has already received a warningconcerning it, he will have to pay a ransom in addition to the lossof the animal. This is also the reason why a beast is killed that hasbeen used by a human being for an immoral purpose (Ley. xx. 15,16): its owner will be more careful as regards his beast, will guardit, and never lose sight of it, just as he watches his household: forpeople fear the loss of their property as much as that of their ownlife: some even more, but most people hold both in the sameestimation. Comp." and to take us for bondmen, and our asses"(Gen. xliii. 18).
This class includes also the duty of killing him who pursuesanother person; that is to say, if a person is about to commit acrime we may prevent it by killing him. Only in two cases is thispermitted: viz., when a person runs after another in order tomurder him, or in order to commit fornication: because in thesetwo cases the crime, once committed; cannot be remedied. In thecase of other sins, punished with death by the court of law, such asidolatry and profanation of the Sabbath, by which the sinner doesno harm to another person, and which concern only his ownprinciples, no person may be killed for the mere intention, if hehas not carried it out.
It is known that desire is denounced because it leads to coveting,and the latter is prohibited because it leads to robbery, as has beensaid by our Sages.
The object of the law of restoring lost property to its owner (Deut.xxii. 1-3) is obvious. In the first instance, it is in itself a goodfeature in man's character. Secondly, its benefit is mutual: for if aperson does not return the lost property of his fellow-man, nobodywill restore to him what he may lose, just as those who do nothonour their parents cannot expect to be honoured by theirchildren.
A person who killed another person unknowingly must go intoexile (Exod. xii. 13: Num. xxxv. 11-28): because the anger of" theavenger of the blood" (Num. xxxv. 19) cools down while thecause of the mischief is out of sight. The chance of returning fromthe exile depends on the death of [the high-priest], the mosthonoured of men, and the friend of all Israel. By his death therelative of the slain person becomes reconciled (ibid. ver. 25): forit is a natural phenomenon that we find consolation in ourmisfortune when the same misfortune or a greater one has befallenanother person. Amongst us no death causes more grief than thatof the high-priest.
The beneficial character of the law concerning" the breaking ofthe neck of a heifer" (Dent. xii. 1-8) is evident. For it is the citythat is nearest to the slain person that brings the heifer, and in mostcases the murderer comes from that place. The elders of the placecall upon God as their witness, according to the interpretation ofour Sages, that they have always kept the roads in good condition,have protected them, and have directed every one that asked hisway; that the person has not been killed because they were carelessin these general provisions, and they do not know who has slainhim. As a rule the investigation, the procession of the elders, themeasuring, and the taking of the heifer, make people talk about it,and by making the event public, the murderer may be found out,and he who knows of him, or has heard of him, or has discoveredhim by any due, will now name the person that is the murderer,and as soon as a man, or even a woman or handmaid, rises up andnames a certain person as having committed the murder, the heiferis not killed. It is well known that it is considered great wickednessand guilt on the part of a person who knows the murderer, and issilent about him whilst the elders call upon God as witness thatthey know nothing about the murderer. Even a woman will,therefore, communicate whatever knowledge she has of him.When the murderer is discovered, the benefit of the law isapparent. If the court of justice cannot sentence him to death, theking may find him guilty, who has the power to sentence to deathon circumstantial evidence; and if the ling does not put him todeath, the avenger of blood may scheme and plan his death, and atlast kill him. We have thus shown the use of the law concerningthe breaking of the neck of the heifer in discovering the murdererForce is added to the law by the rule that the place in which theneck of the heifer is broken should never be cultivated or sown.The owner of the land will therefore use all means in his power tosearch and to find the murderer, in order that the heifer be notkilled and his land be not made useless to him.
CHAPTER XLI
THE precepts of the sixth class comprise the different ways ofpunishing the sinner. Their general usefulness is known and hasalso been mentioned by us. I will here describe them one by oneand point out their nature in detail.
The punishment of him who sins against his neighbour consists inthe general rule that there shall be done unto him exactly as he hasdone : if he injured any one personally, he must suffer personally;if he damaged the property of his neighbour, he shall be punishedby loss of property. But the person whose property has beendamaged should be ready to resign his claim totally or partly. Onlyto the murderer we must not be lenient because of the greatness ofhis crime; and no ransom must be accepted of him." And the landcannot be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein but by theblood of him that shed it" (Num. xxxi. 33). Hence even if themurdered person continued to live after the attack for an hour orfor days, Was able to speak and possessed completeconsciousness, and if he himself said," Pardon my murderer, Ihave pardoned and forgiven him," he must not be obeyed. We musttake life for life, and estimate equally the life of a child and that ofa grown-up person, of a slave and of a freeman, of a wise man andof a fool. For there is no greater sin than this. And he whomutilated a limb of his neighbour, must himself lose a limb." Ashe hath caused a blemish in a man, so shall it be done to himagain" (Lev. xxiv. 20). You must not raise an objection from ourpractice of imposing a fine in such cases. For we have proposed toourselves to give here the reason for the precepts mentioned in theLaw, and not for that which is stated in the Talmud. I have,however, an explanation for the interpretation given in theTalmud, but it will be communicated viva voce. Injuries thatcannot be reproduced exactly in another person, are compensatedfor by payment;" only he shall pay for the loss of his time, andshall cause him to be thoroughly healed" (Exod. xxi. 19). If anyone damaged the property of another, he must lose exactly asmuch of his own property:" whom the judges shall condemn heshall pay double unto his neighbour" (Exod. xxii. 8); namely, herestores that which he has taken, and adds just as much [to it] ofhis own property. It is right that the more frequent transgressionsand sins are, and the greater the probability of their beingcommitted, the more severe must their punishment be, in order todeter people from committing them; but sins which are of rareoccurrence require a less severe punishment. For this reason onewho stole a sheep had to pay twice as much as for other goods, i.e.,four times the value of the stolen object: but this is only the casewhen he has disposed of it by sale or slaughter (Exod. xxi. 37). Asa rule, the sheep remained always in the fields, and could thereforenot be watched so carefully as things kept in town. The thief of asheep used therefore to sell it quickly before the theft becameknown, or to slaughter it and thereby change its appearance. Assuch theft happened frequently, the punishment was severe. Thecompensation for a stolen ox is still greater by one-fourth, becausethe theft is easily carried out. The sheep keep together when theyfeed, and can be watched by the shepherd, so that theft when it iscommitted can only take place by night. But oxen when feedingare very widely scattered, as is also mentioned in the NabateanAgriculture, and a shepherd cannot watch them properly; theft ofoxen is therefore a more frequent occurrence.
The law concerning false witnesses (Deut. xix. 19) prescribes thatthey shall suffer exactly the same loss which they intended toinflict upon another. If they intended to bring a sentence of deathagainst a person, they are killed: if they aimed at the punishment ofstripes, they receive stripes: and if they desire to make a personpay money, they are sentenced to pay exactly the same sum. Theobject of all these laws is to make the punishment equal to thecrime: and it is also on this account that the judgments are"righteous" (Dent. iv. 8). A robber with violence is not ordered topay anything as fine (Lev. V. 24): the additional fifth part (of thevalue of the robbed goods) is only an atonement-offering for hisperjury. The reason of this rule is to be found in the rareoccurrence of robbery: theft is committed more frequently thanrobbery, for theft can be committed everywhere; robbery is notpossible in towns, except with difficulty; besides, the thief takesthings exposed as well as things hidden away; robbery applies onlyto things exposed: against robbery we can guard and defendourselves: we cannot do so against theft: again, the robber isknown, can be sought, and forced to return that which he hasrobbed, whilst the thief is not known. On account of all thesecircumstances the law fines the thief and not the robber.
Preliminary Remark.--Whether the punishment is great or small,the pain inflicted intense or less intense, depends on the followingfour conditions.
1. The greatness of the sin. Actions that cause great harm arepunished severely, whilst actions that cause little harm arepunished less severely.
2. The frequency of the crime. A crime that is frequentlycommitted must be put down by severe punishment; crimes of rareoccurrence may be suppressed by a lenient punishment consideringthat they are rarely committed.
3. The amount of temptation. Only fear of a severe punishmentrestrains us from actions for which there exists a great temptation,either because we have a great desire for these actions, or areaccustomed to them, or feel unhappy without them.
4. The facility of doing the thing secretly, and unseen andunnoticed. From such acts we are deterred only by the fear of agreat and terrible punishment.
After this preliminary remark, I say that the precepts of the Lawmay be divided into the following four classes with respect to thepunishment for their transgression :-- (1) Precepts whosetransgression is followed by sentence of death pronounced by acourt of law. (?,) Precepts whose transgression is punished withexcision, such transgression being held to be a very great sin. (3)In some cases the transgression is punished by stripes administeredwith a strap (such transgression not being considered a grievoussin, as it concerns only a simple prohibition); or by" death byHeaven." (4) Precepts the transgression of which is not punished[even] by stripes. Prohibitions of this kind are all those thatinvolve no act. But there are the following exceptions : [First],Swearing falsely, because it is gross neglect of man's duty, whoought to bear constantly in mind the greatness of God. [Secondly],Changing an animal devoted to the sanctuary for another (Lev.xxvii. 10), because this change leads to contemning sacrificesdevoted to the name of God. [Thirdly], Cursing a person by thename of God (ibid. xix. 14); because many dread the effect of acurse more than bodily harm. The transgression of other negativecommandments that involve no act causes little harm, and cannotalways be avoided, as it consists in mere words: moreover, man'sback would be inflicted with stripes an the year round if he were tobe punished with stripes for each transgression of this kind.Besides, previous warning is impossible in this case. There is alsowisdom in the number of stripes: for although the number of theirmaximum is given, there is no fixed number how many are to beapplied to each person; each man receives only as many stripes ashe can bear, but not more than forty (Dent. xxv. 3), even if he bestrong enough for a hundred.
The" death by the court of law" is not inflicted for thetransgression of any of the dietary laws: because in such a case nogreat harm is done, and the temptation of man to transgress theselaws is not so great as the temptation to the enjoyment of sexualintercourse. In some of the dietary laws the punishment isexcision. This is the case with the prohibition of eating blood (Lev.xvii. 26). For in ancient days people were very eager and anxiousto eat blood as a kind of idolatrous ceremony, as is explained inthe book Tomtom, and therefore the prohibition of eating blood ismade very stringent. Excision is also the punishment for eating fat;because people enjoy it, and because it was distinguished andsanctified by its use in the offerings. The eating of leavened breadon Passover (Exod. xii. 15), and breaking the fast on the Day ofAtonement (Lev. xxiii. 29), are likewise punished with excision :[first] on account of the great discomfort which the obedience tothe law causes in these cases: [secondly] on account of theprinciples of faith which the laws of Passover and of the Day ofAtonement inculcate: they confirm fundamental principles of theLaw, viz., the belief in the wonderful departure [of Israel] fromEgypt, and in the effect of repentance, according to the words," Foron this day will he forgive you" (Lev. xvi. 3 1). just as in the caseof eating fat, so is excision also announced as a punishment whena person eats that which is left [of a sacrifice beyond its limitedtime], or partakes of a sacrifice which has been made abominable;or when an unclean person eats of holy things (ibid. vii. 16-21).The object of this severity is to increase the estimation of theoffering in the eyes of the people, as has been shown.
Death by the court of law is decreed in important cases: when faithis undermined, or a great crime is committed, viz., idolatry, incest,murder, or actions that lead to these crimes. It is further decreedfor breaking the Sabbath (Exod. xxxi. 15): because the keeping ofSabbath is a confirmation of our belief in the Creation; a falseprophet and a rebellious elder are put to death on account of themischief which they cause; he who strikes his father or his motheris killed on account of his great audacity, and because heundermines the constitution of the family, which is the foundationof the state. A rebellious and disobedient son is put to death (Dent.Md. 18 seg.) on account of what he might become, because he willlikely be a murderer; he who steals a human being is killed,because he is also prepared to kill him whom he steals (Exod. xxi.16). Likewise he who is found breaking into a house is preparedfor murder (ibid. xxii. 1), as our Sages stated. These three, therebellious and disobedient son, he who steals and sells a humanbeing, and he who breaks into a house, become murderers in thecourse of time, as is well known. Capital punishment is onlydecreed for these serious crimes, and in no other case. Not allforbidden sexual intercourse is visited with the penalty of death,but only in those cases in which the criminal act can easily bedone, is of frequent occurrence, is base and disgraceful, and of atempting character; otherwise excision is the punishment.Likewise not all kinds of idolatry are capital crimes, but only theprincipal acts of idolatry, such as praying to an idol, prophesyingin its name, passing a child through the fire, consulting withfamiliar spirits, and acting as a wizard or witch.
As punishments and judgments are evidently indispensable, it wasnecessary to appoint judges throughout the country in every town;witnesses must be heard; and a king is required whom all fear andrespect, who is able to restrain the people by various means, andwho can strengthen and support the authority of the judges.Although I have shown the reason of an the laws contained in" theSection of judges" (Seler Sholetim), I find it necessary, inaccordance with the object of this treatise, to explain a few ofthese laws, e.g., the laws concerning a rebellious elder.
God knew that the judgments of the Law will always require anextension in some cases and curtailment in others, according to thevariety of places, events, and circumstances. He thereforecautioned against such increase and diminution, and commanded,"Thou shalt not add thereto nor diminish from it" (Dent. xiii. 1): forconstant changes would tend to disturb the whole system of theLaw, and would lead people to believe that the Law is not ofDivine origin. But permission is at the same time given to the wisemen, i.e., the great court (Synhedrion) of every generation to makefences round the judgments of the Law for their protection, and tointroduce bye-laws (fences) in order to ensure the keeping of theLaw. Such fences once erected remain in force for ever. TheMishnah therefore teaches:" And make a fence round the Law"(Abot i. 1). In the same manner they have the power temporarily todispense with some religious act prescribed in the Law, or to allowthat which is forbidden, if exceptional circumstances and eventsrequire it; but none of the laws can be abrogated permanently, ashas been explained by us in the Introduction to the Commentary onthe Mishnah in treating of temporary legislation. By this methodthe Law will remain perpetually the same, and will yet admit at alltimes and under an circumstances such temporary modifications asare indispensable. If every scholar had the power to make suchmodification,%, the multitude of disputes and differences ofopinion would have produced an injurious effect. Therefore it wascommanded that of the Sages only the great Synhedrion, and noneelse, should have this power; and whoever would oppose theirdecision should be killed. For if any critic were allowed to disputethe decision of the Synhedrion, the object of this law would not beattained: it would be useless.
Transgressions may be divided into four classes, viz.-- (1)involuntary transgressions, (2) sins committed in ignorance, (3)sins clone knowingly, and (4) sins done spitefully. He who sinsinvoluntarily is, according to the distinct declaration of the Law,exempt from punishment, and free from all blame; comp." Untothe damsel thou shalt do nothing; there is in the damsel no sinworthy of death" (Deut. xxii. 26). If a person sins in ignorance, heis blamable: for if he had been more considerate and careful, hewould not have erred. Although he is not punished, his sin must beatoned for, and for this reason he brings a sin-offering. The Lawdistinguishes in this respect between a private person and a king, ahigh-priest or Teacher of Halakah. Hence we conclude that aperson who acts wrongly, or who teaches wrongly, guided by hisown reasoning -except in the case of the great Synhedrion or thehigh-priest -- is treated as mezid (as one who sins knowingly), anddoes not belong to the category of shogegim (of those who sin byerror). A rebellious elder is therefore put to death, although heacted and taught according to his view. But the great Synhedrionmust teach according to its opinion, and if the opinion is wrong,the sin is considered as due to error. In reference to such a case theLaw says," And if the whole congregation of Israel err," etc. (Lev.iv. 13). It is On this principle that our Sages say," The error inlearning amounts to intentional sin" (Abot iv. 13): he who hasstudied insufficiently, and teaches and acts according to hisdefective knowledge, is to be considered as if he sinnedknowingly. For if a person eats of the fat of the kidneys in thebelief that it is the fat of the rump, his error is not so grave as theerror of him who, eating of the fat of the kidneys, knows that it isthat fat, but is ignorant of the fact that it is prohibited. The latterbrings a sin-offering although he is almost an intentionaltransgressor. But this is only the case as far as he acts according tohis knowledge: but if he decides a religious question [wrongly], heis undoubtedly an intentional sinner. The Law admits the plea oferror in a religious decision only in the case of the greatSynhedrion.
He who has sinned knowingly must pay the penalty prescribed inthe Law; he is put to death or receives stripes, or-for transgressionof prohibitions not punishable by stripes-other corporalpunishment, or pays a fine. There are some sins for which thepunishment is the same, whether they have been committedknowingly or unknowingly; because they are frequent, and areeasily done, consisting only in the utterance of words, andinvolving no action besides: e.g., false swearing by witnesses, orby trustees. Intercourse with a betrothed handmaid is likewise easyand frequent; she is exposed unprotected, being in reality neitherhandmaid nor a free person, nor a married woman, according tothe traditional interpretation of this precept.
If a person sins presumptuously, so that in sinning he showsimpudence and seeks publicity, if he does not sin only to satisfy hisappetite, if he does what is prohibited by the Law, not onlybecause of his evil inclinations, but in order to oppose and resistthe Law, he" reproacheth the Lord" (Num. xv. 30), and mustundoubtedly be put to death. None will act in such a manner butsuch as have conceived the idea to act contrary to the Law.According to the traditional interpretation, therefore, the abovepassage speaks of an idolater who opposes the fundamentalprinciples of the Law; for no one worships a star unless he believes[-contrary to the teachings of Scripture-] that the star is eternal, aswe have frequently stated in our work. I think that the samepunishment [viz., sentence of death] applies to every sin whichinvolves the rejection of the Law, or opposition to it. Even if anIsraelite eats meat [boiled] in milk, or wears garments of wool andlinen, or rounds the corners of his head, out of spite against theLaw, in order to show dearly that he does not believe in its truth, Iapply to him the words," he reproacheth the Lord," and [I am ofopinion] that he must suffer death as an unbeliever, though not fora punishment, but in the same manner as the inhabitants of a" citymisled to idolatry" are slain for their unbelief, and not by way ofpunishment for crime; wherefore their property is destroyed byfire, and is not given to their heirs, as is the case with the propertyof other criminals condemned to death. According to my opinion,all the members of an Israelitish community which has insolentlyand presumptuously transgressed any of the divine precepts, mustbe put to death. This is proved by the history of" the sons ofReuben and the sons of Gad" (josh. xxii.), against whom thewhole congregation of Israel decided to make war. When warningwas given to the supposed offenders, it was explained to them thatthey had relinquished their faith, because by agreeing to transgressone particular law they rejected the truth of the whole Law. Forthey were addressed as follows :" What trespass is this that yehave committed against the God of Israel, to turn away this dayfrom following the Lord ?" (josh. xxii. 16): and they replied:" TheLord knoweth, etc., if it be in rebellion, or if in transgressionagainst the Lord," etc. (ibid. 27). Take well notice of theseprinciples in respect to punishments.
The Section on judges includes also the commandment to blot outthe memory of Amalek (Deut. xxv. 17-19). In the same way as oneindividual person is punished, so must also a whole family or awhole nation be punished, in order that other families shall hear itand be afraid, and not accustom themselves to practise mischief.For they will say, we may suffer in the same way as those peoplehave suffered; and if there be found among them a wicked,mischievous man, who cares neither for the evil he brings uponhimself nor for that which he causes to others, he will not find inhis family any one ready to help him in his evil designs. AsAmalek was the first to attack Israel with the sword (Exod. xvii.8-16), it was commanded to blot out his name by means of thesword; whilst Ammon and Moab, who have not been friendlysimply from meanness, and have caused them injury by cunning,were only punished by exclusion from intermarriage with theIsraelites, and from their friendship. All these things which Godhas commanded as a punishment are not excessive nor inadequate,but, as is distinctly stated, according to the fault" (Deut. XXV. 2).
This section contains also the law concerning preparing" a placewithout the camp," and" having a paddle upon the weapon" (Dent.xxiii. 12, 13). As I have told you, it is one of the objects of the Lawto train Israel to cleanliness: that they should keep free from dirtand filth, and that men should not be degraded to the condition ofcattle. Another object of this law is to confirm by thesepreparations the belief of the warriors that God dwells in theirmidst. The reason of the law is therefore stated thus :" For theLord thy God walketh in the midst of thy camp" (ibid. ver. 14).The mention of this reason gave occasion to add another lesson:" That he see no unclean thing in thee and turn away from thee" (ibid.). These words warn and caution us against the usualinclination of soldiers to fornication, when they are away fromtheir homes a long time. God therefore commanded us to docertain things which remind us that He is in our midst; we willthereby be saved from those evil practices: as it is said," and thycamp shall be holy, that he see no unclean thing in thee" (ibid.).Even those who are unclean by pollution were compelled to stopoutside the camp till the evening, and" then he shall come into thecamp again." It win thus be confirmed in the heart of every one ofthe Israelites that their camp must be like a sanctuary of the Lord,and it must not be like the camps of the heathen, whose sole objectis corruption and sin; who only seek to cause injury to others andto take their property; whilst our object is to lead mankind to theservice of God, and to a good social order. I have told you alreadythat I only propose to give here such reasons as are apparent fromthe text of the Law.
To the same class belongs also the law concerning" the marriageof a captive woman" (Deut. xxi. 10 seg.). There is a well-knownsaying of our Sages:" This law is only a concession to humanweakness." This law contains, nevertheless, even for the noblerclass of people, some moral lessons to which I will call yourattention. For although the soldier may be overcome by his desirewhich he is unable to suppress or to restrain, he must take theobject of his lust to a private place," into the inner of his house"(Dent. xxi. 12), and he is not permitted to force her in the camp.Similarly our Sages say, that he may not cohabit with her a secondtime before she leaves off her mourning, and is at ease about hertroubles. She must not be prevented from mourning and crying,and she must be permitted to abstain from bathing, in accordancewith the words," and she Shan weep for her father and for hermother" (ibid.): for mourners find comfort in crying and inexcitement till, the body has not sufficient strength to bear theinner emotions; in the same manner as happy persons find rest invarious kinds of play. Thus the Lord is merciful to her and givesher permission to continue her mourning and weeping till she isworn out. You know certainly that he married her as a heathen,and that during the thirty days she openly keeps her religion andeven continues her idolatrous practices: no interference with herfaith was allowed during that time; and after all that she could notbe sold, nor treated as a handmaid, if she could not be induced toaccept the statutes of the Law. Thus the Law does not ignore thecohabitation of the Israelite with the captive woman, although itinvolved disobedience to God to some extent, having taken placewhen she was still a heathen. The Law prescribes:" Thou shalt notmake merchandise of her, because thou hast humbled her" (ibid.14). We have thus shown the moral lessons contained in theselaws, and we have explained the reason of every precept of thissection.
CHAPTER XLII
THE precepts of the seventh class are the civil laws enumerated inthe Section on judgments, and part of the Section on Property. Theobject of these precepts is obvious. They define the ways of equityin the various transactions which must take place between manand man. Those that are engaged in such transactions mustmutually promote each other's interests: neither of the parties muststrive to increase only his own profit, and that he alone shouldenjoy the whole benefit of the transaction. In the first place, noovercharge is permitted: only the ordinary and known rate of profitmay be taken. The law fixes the limits of profits within which thetransaction is valid. Even imposition in mere words [where nomaterial harm is inflicted] is forbidden, as is well known. Nextcomes the law of the four kinds of bailees: the fairness of the lawis evident. If one keeps the property of his neighbour for nothing,without deriving therefrom any benefit for himself, and is onlyobliging his neighbour, he is free from all responsibility, and if anyinjury is done to the property, the owner alone must bear the loss.He who borrows a thing keeps it only for his own advantage,whilst the owner lends it to him to oblige him; he is thereforeresponsible for everything; any loss in the property must be borneby the borrower. If one takes wages for keeping the property orpays for using it, he as well as the owner profit thereby; the lossesmust therefore be divided between them. It is done in this manner;the bailee pays for any loss caused through want of care, namely,when the property is stolen or lost; for this happens only when thebailee does not take sufficient precaution. The owner, on the otherhand, bears such losses as cannot be prevented; namely, if byaccident the animal falls and breaks its limbs, or is carried away byarmed men as booty, or if it dies. The Law further ordains mercifulconduct towards hired workmen because of their poverty. Theirwages should be paid without delay, and they must not be wrongedin any of their rights: they must receive their pay according to theirwork. Another instance of kindness to workmen is this : accordingto the regulations of this law, workmen, and even animals, must bepermitted to partake of the food in the preparation of which theyhave been engaged. The laws which relate to property include lawsconcerning inheritance. They are based on the sound principle thatman must not" withhold good from those to whom it is due"(Prov. iii. 27), and when he is about to die, he must not conceiveill-will against his heirs, by squandering his property, but leave itto the one who has the greatest claim on it, that is, to him who ishis nearest relation," unto his kinsman that is next to him of hisfamily" (Num. xxvii. 11). It is clearly stated that the son has thefirst claim, then comes the daughter, then the brother, and then thefather's brothers, as is well known. The father must leave the rightof the first-born to his eldest son, because his love for this soncame first: he must not be guided by his inclination. He may notmake the son of the beloved firstborn before the son of the hated(Deut. xxi. 16). Thus our highly equitable Law preserves andstrengthens the virtue of respecting all kinsmen, and doing wellunto them, as the prophet says:" He that is cruel troubleth his ownflesh" (Prov. xi. 17). The Law correctly says," Thou shalt openthine hand wide unto thy brother, unto thy poor" (Dent. xv. 11).Our Sages bestow much praise upon him who is kind to hisrelatives, and him who marries the daughter of his sister. The Lawhas taught us how far we have to extend this principle of favouringthose who are near to us, and of treating kindly every one withwhom we have some relationship, even if he offended or wrongedus; even if he is very bad, we must have some consideration forhim. Thus the Law says:" Thou shalt not abhor an Edomite, for heis thy brother" (ibid. xxifi. 7). Again, if we find a person introuble, whose assistance we have once enjoyed, or of whom wehave received some benefit, even if that person has subsequentlydone evil to us, we must bear in mind his previous [good] conduct.Thus the Law tells us :" Thou shalt not abhor an Egyptian, becausethou wast a stranger in his land" (ibid.), although the Egyptianshave subsequently oppressed us very much, as is well-known. Seehow many moral lessons we have derived from these precepts. Thelast two precepts do not belong to the seventh class: but thediscussion of the preference due to relatives as regards inheritanceled us to speak of the Egyptians and the Edornites.
CHAPTER XLIII
THE precepts of the eighth class are enumerated in" the Sectionon Seasons" (Seler zemannim). With a few exceptions, thereasons for all of them are stated in the Law. The object of Sabbathis obvious, and requires no explanation. The rest it affords to manis known: one-seventh of the life of every man, whether small orgreat, passes thus in comfort, and in rest from trouble and exertion.This the Sabbath effects in addition to the perpetuation andconfirmation of the grand doctrine of the Creation. The object ofthe Fast of Atonement is evident. The Fast creates the sense ofrepentance: it is the same day on which the chief of all prophetscame down [from Mount Sinai] with the second tables, andannounced to the people the divine pardon of their great sin: theday was therefore appointed for ever as a day devoted torepentance and true worship of God. For this reason all materialenjoyment, all trouble and care for the body, are interdicted, nowork may be done; the day must be spent in confession; ever- oneshall confess his sins and abandon them.
Other holy days are appointed for rejoicing and for such pleasantgathering as people generally need. They also promote the goodfeeling that men should have to each other in their social andpolitical relations. The appointment of the special days for suchpurposes has its cause. The reason for the Passover is well known.It is kept seven days, because the period of seven days is the unitof time intermediate between a day and a month. It is also knownhow great is the importance of this period in Nature, and in manyreligious duties. For the Law always follows Nature, and in somerespects brings it to perfection: for Nature is not capable ofdesigning and thinking, whilst the Law is the result of the wisdomand guidance of God, who is the author of the intellect of allrational beings. This, however, is not the theme of the presentchapter: let us return to our subject.
The Feast of Weeks is the anniversary of the Revelation on MountSinai. In order to raise the importance of this day, we count thedays that pass since the preceding festival, just as one who expectshis most intimate friend on a certain day counts the days and eventhe hours. This is the reason why we count the days that pass sincethe offering of the Omer, between the anniversary of our departurefrom Egypt and the anniversary of the Lawgiving. The latter wasthe aim and object of the exodus from Egypt, and thus God said," Ibrought you unto myself" (Exod. xix. 4). As that great revelationtook place only on one day, so we keep its anniversary only oneday: but if the eating of unleavened bread on Passover were onlycommanded for one day, we should not have noticed it, and itsobject would not have been manifest. For it frequently happensthat we take the same kind of food for two or three days. But byour continuing for a whole period [of seven days] to eatunleavened bread, its object becomes clear and evident.
New-Year is likewise kept for one day; for it is a day ofrepentance, on which we are stirred up from our forgetfulness. Forthis reason the shofar is blown on this day, as we have shown inMishneh-torah. The day is, as it were, a preparation for and anintroduction to the day of the Fast, as is obvious from the nationaltradition about the days between New-Year and the Day ofAtonement.
The Feast of Tabernacles, which is a feast of rejoicing andgladness, is kept seven days, in order that the idea of the festivalmay be more noticeable. The reason why it is kept in the autumn isstated in the Law," When thou hast gathered in thy labours out ofthe field" (Exod. xxiii. 16): that is to say, when you rest and arefree from pressing labours. Aristotle, in the ninth book of hisEthics, mentions this as a general custom among the nations. Hesays:" In ancient times the sacrifices and assemblies of the peopletook place after the ingathering of the corn and the fruit, as if thesacrifices were offered on account of the harvest." Another reasonis this-in this season it is possible to dwell in tabernacles, as thereis neither great heat nor troublesome rain.
The two festivals, Passover and the Feast of Tabernacles, implyalso the teaching of certain truths and certain moral lessons.Passover teaches us to remember the miracles which God wroughtin Egypt, and to perpetuate their memory; the Feast of Tabernaclesreminds us of the miracles wrought in the wilderness. The morallessons derived from these feasts is this: man ought to rememberhis evil days in his days of prosperity. He win thereby be inducedto thank God repeatedly, to lead a modest and humble life. We eat,therefore, unleavened bread and bitter herbs on Passover inmemory of what has happened unto us, and leave (on Succoth] ourhouses in order to dwell in tabernacles, as inhabitants of deserts dothat are in want of comfort. We shall thereby remember that thishas once been our condition; [comp.]" I made the children ofIsrael to dwell in booths" (Lev. xxiii. 43): although we dwell nowin elegant houses, in the best and most fertile land, by the kindnessof God, and because of His promises to our forefathers, Abraham,Isaac, and Jacob, who were perfect in their opinions and in theirconduct. This idea is likewise an important element in ourreligion; that whatever good we have received and ever willreceive of God, is owing to the merits of the Patriarchs, who" keptthe way of the Lord to do justice and judgment" (Gen. xviii. 19).We join to the Feast of Tabernacles the Feast of the Eighth Day, inorder to complete our rejoicings, which cannot be perfect inbooths, but in comfortable and well-built houses. As regards thefour species [the branches of the palm tree, the citron, the myrtle,and the willows of the brook] our Sages gave a reason for their useby way of Agadic interpretation, the method of which is wellknown to those who are acquainted with the style of our Sages.They use the text of the Bible only as a kind of poetical language[for their own ideas], and do not intend thereby to give aninterpretation of the text. As to the value of these Midrasbicinterpretations, we. meet with two different opinions. For somethink that the Midrash contains the real explanation of the text,whilst others, finding that it cannot be reconciled with the wordsquoted, reject and ridicule it. The former struggle and fight toprove and to confirm such interpretations according to theiropinion, and to keep them as the real meaning of the text; theyconsider them in the same light as traditional laws. Neither of thetwo classes understood it, that our Sages employ biblical textsmerely as poetical expressions, the meaning of which is clear toevery reasonable reader. This style was general in ancient days; alladopted it in the same way as poets [adopt a certain style]. OurSages say, in reference to the words," and a paddle (yated) thoushalt have upon thy weapon" [azeneka, Dent. xxiii. 14]: Do notread azeneka," thy weapon," but ozneka," thy ear?' You are thustold, that if you hear a person uttering something disgraceful, putyour fingers into your ears. Now, I wonder whether those ignorantpersons [who take the Midrashic interpretations literally] believethat the author of this saying gave it as the true interpretation ofthe text quoted, and as the meaning of this precept: that in truthyated," the paddle," is used for" the finger," and azeneka denotes"thy ear?' I cannot think that any person whose intellect is soundcan admit this. The author employed the text as a beautifulpoetical phrase, in teaching an excellent moral lesson, namely this:It is as bad to listen to bad language as it is to use it. This lesson ispoetically connected with the above text. In the same sense youmust understand the phrase," Do not read so, but so," wherever itoccurs in the Midrash. I have departed from my subject, but it wasfor the purpose of making a remark useful to every intellectualmember of the Rabbanites. I now return to our theme. I believethat the four species are a symbolical expression of our rejoicingthat the Israelites changed the wilderness," no place of seed, or offigs, or of vines, or of pomegranates, or of water to drink" (Num.xx. 5), with a country full of fruit-trees and rivers. In order toremember this we take the fruit which is the most pleasant of thefruit of the land, branches which smell best, most beautiful leaves,and also the best of herbs, i.e., the willows of the brook. Thesefour kinds have also those three purposes : First, they wereplentiful in those days in Palestine, so that every one could easilyget them. Secondly, they have a good appearance, they are green;some of them, viz., the citron and the myrtle, are also excellent asregards their smell, the branches of the palm-tree and the willowhaving neither good nor bad smell. Thirdly, they keep fresh andgreen for seven days, which is not the case with peaches,pomegranates, asparagus, nuts, and the like.
CHAPTER XLIV
THE precepts of the ninth class are those enumerated in theSection on Love. Their reason is obvious. The actions prescribedby them serve to remind us continually of God, and of our duty tofear and to love Him, to keep all His commandments, and tobelieve concerning God that which every religious person mustbelieve. This class includes the laws of Prayer, Reading of Shema,Grace, and duties connected with these, Blessing of the priests,Tefillin, Mezuzah, Zizit, acquiring a scroll of the Law, and readingin it at certain times. The performance of all these preceptsinculcates into our heart useful lessons. All this is clear, and afurther explanation is superfluous, as being a mere repetition andnothing else.
CHAPTER XLV
THE precepts of the tenth class are those enumerated in the lawson the Temple (Hilkot be.- ha-behirah), the laws on the vessels ofthe temple and on the ministers in the temple [Hilkot keleha-mikdash veba-'obedim bo]. The use of these precepts we havestated in general terms. It is known that idolaters selected thehighest possible places on high mountains where to build theirtemples and to place their images. Therefore Abraham, our father,chose Mount Moriah, being the highest mount in that country, andproclaimed there the Unity of God. He selected the west of themount as the place toward which he turned during his prayers,because [he thought that] the most holy place was in the West; thisis the meaning of the saving of our Sages," The Shekinah" (theGlory of God) is in the West" (IJ. T. Baba B 25a); and it isdistinctly stated in the Talmud Yoma that our father Abrahamchose the west side, the place where the Most Holy was built. Ibelieve that he did so because it was then a general rite to worshipthe sun as a deity. Undoubtedly all people turned then to the East[worshipping the Sun]. Abraham turned therefore on MountMoriah to the West, that is, the site of the Sanctuary, and turnedhis back toward the sun; and the Israelites, when they abandonedtheir God and returned to the early bad principles, stood" withtheir backs toward the Temple of the Lord and their faces towardthe East, and they worshipped the sun toward the East" (Ezek. viii.16). Note this strange fact. I do not doubt that the spot whichAbraham chose in his prophetical spirit, was known to Moses ourTeacher, and to others: for Abraham commanded his children thaton this place a house of worship should be built. Thus the Targumsays distinctly," And Abraham worshipped and prayed there inthat place, and said before God, 'Here shall coming generationsworship the Lord '" (Gen. xxii. 14). For three practical reasons thename of the place is not distinctly stated in the Law, but indicatedin the phrase" To the place which the Lord will choose" (Dent.xii. 11, etc.). First, if the nations had learnt that this place was tobe the centre of the highest religious truths, they would occupy it,or fight about it most perseveringly. Secondly, those who werethen in possession of it might destroy and ruin the place with alltheir might. Thirdly, and chiefly, every one of the twelve tribeswould desire to have this place in its borders and under its control;this would lead to divisions and discord, such as were caused bythe desire for the priesthood. Therefore it was commanded that theTemple should not be built before the election of a king whowould order its erection, and thus remove the cause of discord. Wehave explained this in the Section on judges (ch. xli.).
It is known that the heathen in those days built temples to stars,and set up in those temples the image which they agreed upon toworship; because it was in some relation to a certain star or to aportion of one of the spheres. We were, therefore, commanded tobuild a temple to the name of God, and to place therein the arkwith two tables of stone, on which there were written thecommandments" I am the Lord," etc., and" Thou shalt have noother God before me," etc. Naturally the fundamental belief inprophecy precedes the belief in the Law, for without the belief inprophecy there can be no belief in the Law. But a prophet onlyreceives divine inspiration through the agency of an angel. Comp."The angel of the Lord called" (Gen. xxii. 15):" The angel of theLord said unto her" (ibid. xvi. 11): and other innumerableinstances. Even Moses our Teacher received his first prophecythrough an angel." And an angel of the Lord appeared to him inthe flame of fire" (Exod. iii.). It is therefore dear that the belief inthe existence of angels precedes the belief in prophecy, and thelatter precedes the belief in the Law. The Sabeans, in theirignorance of the existence of God, believed that the spheres withtheir stars were beings without beginning and without end, that theimages and certain trees, the Asherot, derived certain powers fromthe spheres, that they inspired the prophets, spoke to them invisions, and told them what was good and what bad. I haveexplained their theory when speaking of the prophets of theAshera. But when the wise men discovered and proved that therewas a Being, neither itself corporeal nor residing as a force in acorporeal body, viz., the true, one God, and that there existedbesides other purely incorporeal beings which God endowed withHis goodness and His light, namely, the angels, and that thesebeings are not included in the sphere and its stars, it becameevident that it was these angels and not the images or Asherot thatcharged the prophets. From the preceding remarks it is clear thatthe belief in the existence of angels is connected with the belief inthe Existence of God; and the belief in God and angels leads to thebelief in Prophecy and in the truth of the Law. In order to firmlyestablish this creed, God commanded [the Israelites] to make overthe ark the form of two angels. The belief in the existence ofangels is thus inculcated into the minds of the people, and thisbelief is in importance next to the belief in God's Existence; itleads us to believe in Prophecy and in the Law, and opposesidolatry. If there had only been one figure of a cherub, the peoplewould have been misled and would have mistaken it for God'simage which was to be worshipped, in the fashion of the heathen;or they might have assumed that the angel [represented by thefigure] was also a deity, and would thus have adopted a Dualism.By making two cherubim and distinctly declaring" the Lord is ourGod, the Lord is One," Moses dearly proclaimed the theory of theexistence of a number of angels; he left no room for the error ofconsidering those figures as deities, since [he declared that) God isone, and that He is the Creator of the angels, who are more thanone.
A candlestick was then put in front of the curtain, as a sign ofhonour and distinction for the Temple. For a chamber in which acontinual light burns, hidden behind a curtain, makes a greatimpression on man, and the Law lays great stress on our holdingthe Sanctuary in great estimation and regard, and that at the sightof it we should be filled with humility, mercy, and softheartedness.This is expressed in the words," And ye shall reverence mysanctuary" (Lev. xix. 30), and in order to give these words moreweight, they are closely joined to the command to keep theSabbath.
The use of the altar for incense and the altar for burnt-offering andtheir vessels is obvious; but I do not know the object of the tablewith the bread upon it continually, and up to this day I have notbeen able to assign any reason to this commandment
The commandment that the stones of the altar shall not be hewnand that no iron tool shall be lifted up upon them (Deut. xxvii. 5),has been explained by our Sages as follows : It is not right that thetool that shortens man's life should be lifted up upon that whichgives length of life. As an Agadic explanation this is good: but thereal reason is this : the heathen used to build their altars with hewnstones: we ought not to imitate them. For this reason we have tomake an altar of earth:" Thou shalt make unto me an altar ofearth" (Exod. XX. 24): if it should be impossible to dispensealtogether with stones, they must not be hewn, but employed intheir natural state. Thus the Law also prohibits from worshippingover painted stones (Lev. xxvi. 1), or from planting any tree nearthe altar of the Lord (Dent. XVi. 21). The object of all thesecommandments is the same, namely, that we shall not employ inthe worship of God anything which the heathen employed in theworship of their idols. In general terms this is repeated in thefollowing passage:" Take heed, that thou inquire not after theirgods, saying, How did these nations serve their gods ? even so willI do likewise" (Dent. xii. 30) , the Israelites shall not do this,because-as is expressly added-" every abomination unto the Lord,which he hateth, have they done unto their gods."
The mode of worshipping Peor, then very general among theheathen, consisted in uncovering the nakedness. The priests weretherefore commanded to make breeches for themselves to covertheir nakedness during the service, and, besides, no steps were tolead up to the altar," that thy nakedness be not discoveredthereon" (Exod. XX. 23)
The Sanctuary was constantly guarded and surrounded [by Levites]as a mark of respect and honour: and at the same time the layman,the unclean, and mourners, were prevented from entering theSanctuary, as will be explained. Among other things that tend todisplay the greatness and the glory of the Temple and to inspire uswith awe, is the rule that none shall approach it in a state ofdrunkenness or uncleanness, or in a disorderly state, i.e., the hairundressed and the garments rent; and that every one who officiatedas priest should first wash his hands and his feet.
In order to raise the estimation of the Temple, those whoministered therein received great honour: and the priests andLevites were therefore distinguished from the rest. It wascommanded that the priests should be clothed properly withbeautiful and good garments," holy garments for glory and forbeauty" (Exod. xxviii. 2). A priest that had a blemish was notallowed to officiate; and not only those that had a blemish wereexcluded from the service, but also-according to the Talmudicinterpretation of this precept-those that had an abnormalappearance; for the multitude does not estimate man by his trueform but by the perfection of his bodily limbs and the beauty of hisgarments, and the 'temple was to be held in great reverence by all.
The Levites did not sacrifice; they were not considered as beingagents in the atonement of sins, for it was only the priest who wascommanded cc to make atonement for him" (Lev. iv. 26) and" tomake atonement for her" (Lev. xii. 8). The duty of the Levites wasthe performance of vocal music; and a Levite became thereforedisabled for service when he lost his voice. The object of thesinging is to produce certain emotions; this object can only beattained by pleasing sounds and melodies accompanied by music,as was always the case in the Temple.
Again, the priests, even when fit for service, and actuallyofficiating in the Temple, were not allowed to sit down, or enter itwhenever they liked; the Most Holy was only entered by thehigh-priest four times on the Day of Atonement, and on no otheroccasion. The object of all these rules was to raise the estimationof the Sanctuary in the eyes of the people.
Since many beasts were daily slaughtered in the holy place, theflesh cut in pieces and the entrails and the legs burnt and washed,the smell of the place would undoubtedly have been like the smellof slaughter-houses, if nothing had been done to counteract it.They were therefore commanded to burn incense there twice everyclay, in the morning and in the evening (Exod. xxx. 7, 8), in orderto give the place and the garments of those who officiated there apleasant odour. There is a well-known saying of our Sages," InJericho they could smell the incense" [burnt in the Temple]. Thisprovision likewise tended to support the dignity of the Temple. Ifthere had not been a good smell, let alone if there had been astench, it would have produced in the minds of the people thereverse of respect; for our heart generally feels elevated in thepresence of good odour, and is attracted by it, but it abhors andavoids bad smell.
The anointing oil (Exod. xxx. 22-33) served a double purpose: togive the anointed object a good odour, and to produce theimpression that it was something great, holy, and distinguished,and better than other objects of the same species; it made nodifference whether that object was a human being, a garment, or avessel. All this aimed at producing due respect towards theSanctuary, and indirectly fear of God. When a person enters theTemple, certain emotions are produced in him; and obstinatehearts are softened and humbled. These plans and indirect meanswere devised by the Law, to soften and humble man's heart atentering the holy place, in order that he might entrust himself tothe sure guidance of God's commandments. This is distinctly saidin the Law:" And thou shalt eat before the Lord thy God, in theplace which he shall choose to place his name there, the tithe ofthy corn, of thy wine, and of thine oil, and the firstlings, of thyherds and of thy flocks: that thou mayest learn to fear the Lord thyGod always" (Dent. xiv. 23). The object of all these ceremonies isnow clear. The reason why we are not allowecl to prepare [forcommon use) the anointing oil and the incense (ibid. ver. 32, 38) isobvious; for when the odour [of the oil and incense] is perceivedonly in the Sanctuary, the desired effect is great: besides [if it wereallowed for every one to prepare the anointing oil], people mightanoint themselves therewith and imagine themselvesdistinguished; much disorder and dissension would then follow.
It is clear that when the ark was carried on the shoulder, and wasnot put on a waggon, it was done out of respect towards it, andalso to prevent its being damaged in its form and shape; even thestaves were not moved out of the rings, for this reason. In orderthat the form of the ephod and the breastplate should not bespoiled, they were never separated. The garments were alsoentirely woven and not cut, in order not to spoil the work of theweaving.
Those that ministered in the Temple were strictly prohibited tointerfere with each other's work; for if in public duties and offices,each one would not have assigned to him his particular task,general carelessness and neglect would soon be noticed.
It is evident that the object of giving different degrees of sanctityto the different places, to the Temple mount, the place between thetwo walls, to the Hall of women, to the Hall, and so on up to theMost Holy, was to raise the respect and reverence of the Temple inthe heart of every one that approached it.
We have thus described the reason of all precepts of this class.
CHAPTER XLVI
THE precepts of the eleventh class are enumerated in the Sectionon Divine Service (Sefer 'abodah) and the Section on Sacrifices(Seler ha-korbanot). We have described their use in general terms(chap. xxxii.). I will now proceed to give the reason of eachprecept separately.
Scripture tells us, according to the Version of Onkelos, that theEgyptians worshipped Aries, and therefore abstained from killingsheep, and held shepherds in contempt. Comp." Behold we shallsacrifice the abomination of the Egyptians," etc. (Exod. viii. 26):"For every shepherd is an abomination to the Egyptians" (Gen. Avi.34). Some sects among the Sabeans worshipped demons, andimagined that these assumed the form of goats, and called themtherefore" goats" This worship was widespread. Comp." Andthey shall no more offer their sacrifices unto demons, after whomthey have gone a whoring" (Lev. xvii. 7). For this reason thosesects abstained from eating goats' flesh. Most idolaters objected tokilling cattle, holding this species of animals in great estimation.Therefore the people of Hodu [Indians] up to this day do notslaughter cattle even in those countries where other animals areslaughtered. In order to eradicate these false principles, the Lawcommands us to offer sacrifices only of these three kinds :" Yeshall bring your offering of the cattle [viz.], of the herd and of theflock" (Lev. i. 2). Thus the very act which is considered by theheathen as the greatest crime, is the means of approaching God,and obtaining His pardon for our sins. In this manner, evilprinciples, the diseases of the human soul, are cured by otherprinciples which are diametrically opposite.
This is also the reason why we were commanded to kill a lamb onPassover, and to sprinkle the blood thereof outside on the gates.We had to free ourselves of evil doctrines and to proclaim theopposite, viz., that the very act which was then considered as beingthe cause of death would be the cause of deliverance from death.Comp." And the Lord will pass over the door, and will not sufferthe destroyer to come unto your houses to suite you" (Exod. idi.23). Thus they were rewarded for performing openly a serviceevery part of which was objected to by the idolaters.
To the above reason for the exclusive selection of the three kindsof animals for sacrifices, we may add the following, namely, thatthese species are animals which can be got very easily, contrary tothe practice of idolaters that sacrifice lions, bears, and wild beasts,as is stated in the book Tonitom. As, however, many could notafford to offer a beast, the Law commanded that birds also shouldbe sacrificed, but only of those species which are found abundantlyin Palestine, are suitable, and can easily be obtained, namely,turtledoves and pigeons. Those who are too poor to offer a bird,may bring bread of any of the kinds then in use : baked in the oven,baked in a pan, or in a frying-pan. If the baking of the bread is toomuch trouble for a person, he may bring flour. All this concernsonly those who desire to sacrifice; for we are distinctly told thatthe omission of the sacrificial service on our part will not bereckoned to us a sin:" If thou shalt forbear to vow, it shall be nosin in thee" (Deut. xxiii. 22). The idolaters did not offer any otherbread but leavened, and chose sweet things for their sacrifices,which they seasoned with honey, as is fully described in the bookswhich I named before: but salt is not mentioned in any of theirsacrifices. Our Law therefore forbade us to offer leaven or honey,and commanded us to have salt in every sacrifice :" With all thineofferings thou shalt offer salt" (Lev. ii. 13). It is further ordainedthat the offerings must all be perfect and in the best condition, inorder that no one should slight the offering or treat with contemptthat which is offered to God's name:" Offer it now unto thygovernor; will he be pleased with thee ?" (Mal. i. 8). This is thereason why no animal could be brought that was not yet seven daysold (Lev. Xxii. 26): it is imperfect and contemptible, like anuntimely birth. Because of their degraded character it wasprohibited to bring" the hire of a harlot and the price of a dog"(Dent. xxiii. 18) into the Sanctuary. In order to bring the offeringin the beat condition, we choose the old of the turtle-doves and theyoung of the pigeons, the old pigeons being less agreeable. Theoblation must likewise be mingled with oil, and must be of fineflour (Lev. ii. 1), for in this condition it is good and pleasant.Frankincense is prescribed (ibid.) because its fumes are good inplaces filled with the odour of burnt flesh. The burnt-offering wasflayed (Lev. i. 16), and its inwards and legs, although they wereentirely burnt, had to be previously washed (ibid. ver. 9), in orderthat due respect should be shown to the sacrifice, and it should notappear despicable and contemptible. This object is constantly keptin view, and is often taught," Ye say, The table of the Lord ispolluted; and the fruit thereof, even his meat, is contemptible"(Mal. i. 12). For the same reason no body uncircumcised, orunclean (Lev. xxii. 4), was allowed to partake of any offering; norcould any offering be eaten that had become unclean (Lev. vii. 19),or was left till after a certain time (ibid. vii. 15-17), or concerningwhich an illegal intention had been conceived; and it had also tobe consumed in a particular place. Of the burnt-offering, which isentirely devoted to God, nothing at all was eaten. Those sacrificeswhich are brought for a sin, viz., sin-offering and guilt-offering,must be eaten within the court of the Sanctuary ('azarah), and onlyon the day of their slaughtering and the night following, whilstpeace-offerings, which are next in sanctity, being sacrifices of thesecond degree, may be eaten in the whole of Jerusalem, on the daythey have been offered and on the following clay, but not later.After that time the sacrifices would become spoiled, and be unfitfor food.
In order that we may respect the sacrifices and all that is devotedto the name of God, we are told that whosoever takes part of a holything for common use has committed a trespass, must bring asin-offering, and restore what he has taken with an addition of thefifth part of its value, although he may have committed thetrespass in ignorance. For the same reason animals reserved forholy purposes must not be employed in work: nor is the shearing ofsuch animals permitted (Dent. xv. 19). The law concerning thechange of a sacrifice must be considered as a preventive; for if itwere permitted to substitute a good animal for a bad one, peoplewould substitute a bad animal for a good one, and say that it wasbetter than the original; it was therefore the rule that, if any suchchange had taken place, both the" original sacrifice and theexchange thereof should be holy" (Lev. xxvii. 9). When a personredeems a thing devoted by him to the Sanctuary, he must likewiseadd onefifth (Lev. xxvii. 13, 15): the reason for this is plain. Manis usually selfish, and is naturally inclined to keep and save hisproperty. He would therefore not take the necessary trouble in theinterest of the Sanctuary: he would not expose his propertysufficiently to the sight of the valuer, and its true value would notbe fixed. Therefore the owner had to add one-fifth, whilst astranger paid only the exact value. These rules were laid down inorder that people should not despise that with which the name ofGod is connected, and which serves as a means of approachingGod. The oblation of the priest was entirely burnt (Lev. vi. 16),because the priest offered up his oblation by himself, and if hewere to offer it, and at the same time to eat it, it would appear as ifhe had not performed any service. For nothing was offered uponthe altar of the ordinary oblations of any person except thefrankincense and a handful of the flour or cake; and if, in additionto the fact that the offering was small, he who offered it werehimself to eat it, nothing of a sacrificial service would be noticed.It is therefore entirely burnt (Lev. vi. 16).
The reason of the particular laws concerning the Passover lamb isdear. It was eaten roasted by fire (Exod. xii. 8-9) in one house, andwithout breaking the bones thereof (ibid. ver. 46). In the same wayas the Israelites were commanded to eat unleavened bread,because they could prepare it hastily, so they were commanded, forthe sake of haste, to roast the lamb, because there was notsufficient time to boil it, or to prepare other food; even the delaycaused by breaking the bones and to extract their marrow wasprohibited the one principle is laid down for all these rules," Yeshall eat it in haste (Exod. xii. 11). But when haste is necessary thebones cannot be broken, nor parts of it sent from house to house;for the company could not wait with their meal till he returned.Such things would lead to laxity and delay, whilst the object ofthese rules was to make a show of the hurry and haste, in order thatnone should be too late to leave Egypt with the main body of thepeople, and be thus exposed to the attacks and the evil [designs ofthe enemy]. These temporary commandments were then madepermanent, in order that we may remember what was done in thosedays." And thou shalt keep this ordinance in his season from yearto year" (Exod. xiii. 10). Each Passover lamb was only eaten bythose who had previously agreed to consume it together, in orderthat people should be anxious to procure it, and should not rely onfriends, relations, or on chance, without themselves taking anytrouble about it before Passover. The reason of the prohibition thatthe uncircumcised should not eat of it (Exod. xii. 48) is explainedby our Sages as follows :-The Israelites neglected circumcisionduring their long stay in Egypt, in order to make themselves appearlike the Egyptians. When God gave them the commandment of thePassover, and ordered that no one should kill the Passover lambunless he, his sons, and all the male persons in his household werecircumcised, that only" then he could come near and keep it"(ibid. xii. 48), all performed this commandment, and the numberof the circumcised being large the blood of the Passover and thatof the circumcision flowed together. The Prophet Ezekiel (xvi. 6),referring to this event, says," When I saw thee sprinkled with thineown blood I said unto thee, Live because of thy [two kinds of ]blood," i.e., because of the blood of the Passover and that of thecircumcision.
Although blood was very unclean in the eyes of the Sabeans, theynevertheless partook of it, because they thought it was the food ofthe spirits: by eating it man has something in common with thespirits, which join him and tell him future events, according to thenotion which people generally have of spirits. There were,however, people who objected to eating blood, as a thing naturallydisliked by man; they killed a beast, received the blood in a vesselor in a pot, and ate of the flesh of that beast, whilst sitting roundthe blood. They imagined that in this manner the spirits wouldcome to partake of the blood which was their food, whilst theidolaters were eating the flesh: that love, brotherhood, andfriendship with the spirits were established, because they dinedwith the latter at one place and at the same time: that the spiritswould appear to them in dreams, inform them of coming events,and be favourable to them. Such ideas people liked and acceptedin those days; they were general, and their correctness was notdoubted by any one of the common people. The Law, which isperfect in the eyes of those who know it, and seeks to curemankind of these lasting diseases, forbade the eating of blood, andemphasized the prohibition exactly in the same terms as itemphasizes idolatry :" I will set my face against that soul thateateth blood" (Lev. xvii. 10). The same language is employed inreference to him" who giveth of his seed unto Molech" :" then Iwill set my face against that man" (ibid. xx. 5). There is, besidesidolatry and eating blood, no other sin in reference to which thesewords are used. For the eating of blood leads to a kind of idolatry,to the worship of spirits. Our Law declared the blood as pure, andmade it the means of purifying other objects by its touch." Andthou shalt take of the blood . . . and sprinkle it upon Aaron, andupon his garments, and upon his sons, and upon the garments ofhis sons with him. And he shall be hallowed, and his garments, andhis sons," etc. (Exod. xxix. 21). Furthermore, the blood wassprinkled upon the altar, and in the whole service it was insistedupon pouring it out, and not upon collecting it. Comp." And heshall pour out all the blood at the bottom of the altar" (Lev. iv.18):" And the blood of thy sacrifices shall be poured out upon thealtar of the Lord thy God" (Deut. Zii. 27). Also the blood of thosebeasts that were killed for common use, and not for sacrifices,must be poured out," Thou shalt pour it upon the earth as water"(ibid. ver. 24). We are not allowed to gather and have a meal roundthe blood," You shall not cat round the blood" (Lev. xix. 26). Asthe Israelites were inclined to continue their rebellious conduct, tofollow the doctrines in which they had been brought up, and whichwere then general, and to assemble round the blood in order to eatthere and to meet the spirits, God forbade the Israelites to eatordinary meat during their stay in the wilderness: they could onlypartake of the meat of peace-offerings. The reason of this preceptis distinctly stated, viz., that the blood shall be poured out upon thealtar, and the people do not assemble round about. Comp." To theend that the children of Israel may bring their sacrifices, whichthey offer in the open field, even that they may bring them unto theLord. . . . And the priest shall sprinkle the blood upon the altar, . . .and they shall no more offer their sacrifices unto the spirits" (Lev.xvii. 5-7). Now there remained to provide for the slaughtering ofthe beasts of the field and birds, because those beasts were neversacrificed, and birds did never serve as peace-offerings (Lev. iii.).The commandment was therefore given that whenever a beast or abird that may be eaten is killed, the blood thereof must be coveredwith earth (Lev. xvii. 13), in order that the people should notassemble round the blood for the purpose of eating there. Theobject was thus fully gained to break the connexion between thesefools and their spirits. This belief flourished about the time of ourTeacher Moses. People were attracted and misled by it. We find itin the Song of Moses (Deut. xxxii.) :" They sacrificed unto spirits,not to God" (ibid. 17). According to the explanation of our Sages,the words lo eloha imply the following idea: They have not onlynot left off worshipping things in existence; they even worshipimaginary things. This is expressed in Sifri as follows:" It is notenough for them to worship the sun, the moon, the stars; they evenworship their babuah. The word babuah signifies" shadow." Let usnow return to our subject. The prohibition of slaughtering cattlefor common use applied only to the wilderness, because as regardsthe" spirits" it was then the general belief that they dwelt indeserts, that there they spoke and were visible, whilst in towns andin cultivated land they did not appear. In accordance with thisbelief those inhabitants of a town who wanted to perform any ofthose stupid practices, left the town and went to woods and wasteplaces. The use of cattle for common food was therefore allowedwhen the Israelites entered Palestine. Besides, there were greathopes that the disease would become weakened, and the followersof the doctrines would decrease. Furthermore, it was almostimpossible that every one who wanted to eat meat should come toJerusalem. For these reasons the above restriction was limited tothe stay of the Israelites in the wilderness.
The greater the sin which a person had committed, the lower wasthe species from which the sin-offering was brought. The offeringfor worshipping idols in ignorance was only a she-goat, whilst forother sins an ordinary person brought either a ewe-lamb or ashe-goat (Lev. iv. 27-35), the females bring, as a rule, in everyspecies, inferior to the males. There is no greater sin than idolatry,and also no inferior species than a she-goat. The offering of a kingfor sins committed ignorantly was a he-goat (ibid. vers. 22-26), asa mark of distinction. The high priest and the Synhedrion, whoonly gave a wrong decision in ignorance, but have not actuallycommitted a sin, brought a bull for their sin-offering (ibid. ver.3-21), or a he-goat, when the decision referred to idolatry (Num.xv. 27-26). The sins for which guilt-offerings were brought werenot as bad as transgressions that required a sin-offering. Theguilt-offering was therefore a ram, or a lamb, so that the species aswell as the sex were superior in this latter case, for theguiltoffering was a male sheep. For the same reason we see theburnt-offering, which was entirely burnt upon the altar, wasselected from the superior sex; for only male animals wereadmitted as burnt-offerings. It is in accordance with the sameprinciple that luxury and incense were absent from the oblations ofa sinner (Lev. v.11), and of a sotah, ie., a woman suspected ofadultery (Num. v. 15). In these cases the oil and the frankincensewere not added: this luxury was absent, because the persons thatbrought the oblation were not good and proper in their deeds, andthey are, as it were, to be reminded by their offerings that theyought to repent; as if they were told," Your offering is without anyornamental addition on account of the wickedness of your deeds."As the sotah acted more disgracefully than any person who sins inignorance, her offering consisted of the lowest kind, viz., of barleyflour (ibid.). Thus the reasons of all these particular laws are wellconnected, and show that the precepts are wonderful in theirsignificance.
Our Sages say that the offering for the eighth day of dedicationwas" a calf, a young bullock, for a sin-offering" (Lev. xi. 2), inorder to atone for the sin of the Israelites in making a golden calf.The sin-offering, which was brought on the Day of Atonement(ibid. xvi. 3), was likewise explained as being an atonement forthat sin. From this argument of our Sages I deduce that he-goatswere always brought as sin-offerings, by individual persons andalso by the whole congregation, viz., on the Festivals, New-moon,Day of Atonement, and for idolatry, because most of thetransgressions and sins of the Israelites were sacrifices to spirits(se'irim, lit., goats), as is clearly stated," They shall no more offertheir sacrifices unto spirits" (Lev. xvii. 7). Our Sages, however,explained the fact that goats were always the sin-offerings of thecongregation, as an allusion to the sin of the whole congregation ofIsrael: for in the account of the selling of the pious Joseph weread," And they killed a kid of the goats" (Gen. xxxvii. 31). Donot consider this as a weak argument; for it is the object of allthese ceremonies to impress on the mind of every sinner andtransgressor the necessity of continually remembering andmentioning his sins. Thus the Psalmist says," And my sin is everbefore me" (Ps. li. 3). The above-mentioned sin-offerings furthershow us that when we commit a sin, we, our children, and thechildren of our children, require atonement for that sin by somekind of service analogous to the sin committed. If a person hassinned in respect to property he must liberally spend his propertyin the service of God; if he indulged in sinful bodily enjoyments hemust weary his body and trouble it by a service of privation andfasting, and rising early before daybreak. If he went astray inrespect to his moral conduct he must oppose his failings bykeeping to the opposite extreme, as we have pointed out inMishneh-torah Hilkot Deot (chap. ii.) et passim. If his intellectualfaculties have been concerned in the sin, if he has believedsomething false on account of the insufficiency of his intellect, andhis neglect of research and proper study, he must remedy his faultby turning his thoughts entirely away from worldly affairs, anddirecting them exclusively to intellectual exercise, and by carefullyreflecting on that which ought to form the subject of his belief.Comp." And my heart hath been secretly enticed, but my handtouched my mouth" (job xxxi. 27). These words expressfiguratively the lesson that we should pause and stop at that whichappears doubtful, as has been pointed out by us in the beginning ofthis treatise. The same we notice in the case of Aaron. He had hisshare in the sin of the golden calf, and therefore a bullock and acalf were brought by him and his successors as an offering.Similarly, the sin connected with a kid of goats was atoned for by akid of goats. When this theory has been well established in theminds of the people, they must certainly be led by it to considerdisobedience to God as a disgraceful thing. Every one will then becareful that he should not sin, and require a protracted andburdensome atonement; he will be afraid he might not be able tocomplete it, and will therefore altogether abstain from sinning, andavoid it. This object [of the laws under discussion] is very dear,and note it likewise.
I will here call your attention to a very remarkable thing, althoughit does not seem at first thought to belong to our subject. It is onlythe goat brought on New-moon as a sin-offering that the law calls"a sin-offering unto the Lord" (Num. xxviii. 15). The sin-offeringsbrought on the three festivals (ibid. vers. 22, 30; xxix. 5, 11, etc.)are not called so, nor are any other sin-offerings. The reasonthereof is, according to my opinion, undoubtedly this: Theadditional offerings brought by the congregation at certain periodswere all burnt-offerings: only" one kid of goats to make anatonement" was offered on every one of these exceptional days.The latter was eaten [by the priests], whilst the burnt-offeringswere entirely consumed by fire, and are called" an offering madeby fire unto the Lord." The phrases" a sin-offering unto the Lord"and" a peace-offering unto the Lord" do not occur in the law,because these were eaten by man; but even those sin-offerings thatwere entirely burnt (Lev. iv. 12, 21) cannot be called cc an offeringmade by fire unto the Lord," as will be explained in the course ofthis chapter. It is therefore impossible that the goats which areeaten [by the priests], and are not entirely burnt, should be called"sin-offerings unto the Lord." But as it was found that the kidoffered on New-moon might be mistaken as an offering brought tothe moon, in the manner of the Egyptians, who sacrificed to themoon on the days of New-moon, it was distinctly stated that thisgoat is offered in obedience to God's command, and not in honourof the moon. This fear did not apply to the sin-offerings on theFestivals, nor to any other sin-offering, because they were notoffered on the days of New-moon, or on any other day marked outby Nature, but on such days as were selected by the Divine Will.Not so the days of New-moon: they are not fixed by the Law [butby Nature]. On the New-moon the idolaters sacrificed to the moon,in the same manner as they sacrificed to the sun when it rose andset in certain particular degrees. This is described in the works[mentioned above]. On this account the extraordinary phrase" Asin-offering unto the Lord" is exceptionally introduced inreference to the goat brought on New-moon, in order to removethe idolatrous ideas that were still lingering in the sorely diseasedhearts. Note this exception likewise. A sin-offering which isbrought in the hope to atone for one or more great sins, as, e.g., thesin-offering [of the Syrthedrion or the high-priest] for a sincommitted in ignorance, and the like, are not burnt upon the altar,but without the camp; upon the altar only the burnt-offering, andthe like, are burnt, wherefore it was called the altar of theburnt-offering. The burning of the holocaust, and of every"memorial," is called" a sweet savour unto the Lord" : and so itundoubtedly is, since it serves to remove idolatrous doctrines fromour hearts, as we have shown. But the burning of thesesin-offerings is a symbol that the sin [for which the offering isbrought] is utterly removed and destroyed, like the body that isbeing burnt: of the sinful seed no trace shall remain, as no trace isleft of the sin-offering, which is entirely destroyed by fire: thesmoke thereof is not" a sweet savour unto the Lord," but, on thecontrary, a smoke despised and abhorred. For this reason theburning took place without the camp. Similarly we notice that theoblations of a sotah is called" an offering of memorial, bringinginiquity to remembrance" (Num. v. 15): it is not a pleasing thing[to the Lord]. The goat [of the Day of Atonement] that was sent[into the wilderness] (Ley. xvi. 20, seq.) served as an atonementfor all serious transgressions more than any other sin-offering ofthe congregation. As it thus seemed to carry off all sins, it was notaccepted as an ordinary sacrifice to be slaughtered, burnt, or evenbrought near the Sanctuary; it was removed as far as possible, andsent forth into a waste, uncultivated, uninhabited land. There is nodoubt that sins cannot be carried like a burden, and taken off theshoulder of one being to be laid on that of another being. But theseceremonies are of a symbolic character, and serve to impress menwith a certain idea, and to induce them to repent; as if to say, wehave freed ourselves of our previous deeds, have cast them behindour backs, and removed them from us as far as possible.
As regards the offering of wine (Num. xv. 5, seq.), I am at a loss tofind a reason why God commanded it, since idolaters brought wineas an offering. But though I am unable to give a reason, anotherperson suggested the following one: Meat is the best nourishmentfor the appetitive faculty, the source of which is the liver; winesupports best the vital faculty, whose centre is the heart: music ismost agreeable to the psychic faculty, the source of which is in thebrain. Each one of our faculties approaches God with that which itlikes best. Thus the sacrifice consists of meat, wine, and music.
The use of keeping festivals is plain. Man derives benefit fromsuch assemblies : the emotions produced renew the attachment toreligion: they lead to friendly and social intercourse among thepeople. This is especially the object of the commandment to gatherthe people together on the Feast of Tabernacles, as is plainlystated:" that they may hear, and that they may learn and fear theLord" (Deut. xxxi. 12). The same is the object of the rule that themoney for the second tithe must be spent by all in one place (ibid.xiv. 22-26), as we have explained (chap. xxxix. p. 184). The fruitof trees in their fourth year, and the tithe of the cattle, had to bebrought to Jerusalem. There would therefore be in Jerusalem themeat of the tithes, the wine of the fruit of the fourth year, and themoney of the second tithe. Plenty of food would always be foundthere. Nothing of the above things could be sold; nothing could beset aside for another year; the Law orders that they should bebrought" year by year" (Deut. xiv. 22): the owner was thuscompelled to spend part of them in charity. As regards theFestivals it is especially enjoined :" And thou shalt rejoice in thyfeast, thou, and thy son, and thy daughter, and thy man-servant,and thy maid-servant, and the Levite, the stranger, and thefatherless, and the widow" (ibid. xvi. 14). We have thus explainedthe reason of every law belonging to this class, and even manydetails of the laws.
CHAPTER XLVII
THE precepts of the twelfth class are those which we haveenumerated in the section on" Purity" (Sefer tohorah). Althoughwe have mentioned their use in general, we will here offer anadditional explanation, and [first] fully discuss the object of thewhole class, and then show the reason of each singlecommandment, as far as we have been able to discover it. 1maintain that the Law which was revealed to Moses, our Teacher,and which is called by his name, aims at facilitating the serviceand lessening the burden, and if a person complains that certainprecepts cause him pain and great trouble, he cannot have thoughtof the habits and doctrines that were general in those days. Let himconsider the difference between a man burning his own son inserving his god, and our burning a pigeon to the service of ourGod. Scripture relates, for even their sons and their daughters theyburn in the fire to their gods (Dent. Idi. 31). This was the way inwhich the heathen worshipped their gods, and instead of such asacrifice we have the burning of a pigeon or a handful of flour inour worship. In accordance with this fact, the Israelites, whendisobedient, were rebuked by God as follows:" 0 My people, whathave I done unto thee ? and wherein have I wearied thee ? Testifyagainst me" (Mic. vi. 3). Again," Have I been a wilderness untoIsrael ? a land of darkness ? Wherefore say my people, We aremiserable; we will come no more unto thee" (jer. ii. 3 1): that is tosay, Through which of the commandments has the Law becomeburdensome to the Israelites, that they renounce it ? In the samemanner God asks the people," What iniquity have your fathersfound in me, that they are gone far from me ?" etc. (ibid. ii. 5). Allthese passages express one and the same idea.
This is the great principle which you must never lose sight of.After having stated this principle, I repeat that the object of theSanctuary was to create in the hearts of those who enter it certainfeelings of awe and reverence, in accordance with the command,"You shall reverence my sanctuary" (Lev. xix. 30). But when wecontinually see an object, however sublime it may be, our regardfor that object will be lessened, and the impression we havereceived of it will be weakened. Our Sages, considering this fact,said that we should not enter the Temple whenever we liked, andpointed to the words:" Make thy foot rare in the house of thyfriend" (Prov. xxv. 17). For this reason the unclean were notallowed to enter the Sanctuary, although there are so many kindsof uncleanliness, that [at a time] only a few people are dean. Foreven if a person does not touch a beast that died of its own accord(Lev. ld. 27), he can scarcely avoid touching one of the eight kindsof creeping animals (ibid. 29, seq.), the dead bodies of which wefind at all times in houses, in food and drink, and upon which wefrequently tread wherever we walk; and, if he avoids touchingthese, he may touch a woman in her separation (ibid. xv. 18), or amale or female that have a running issue (ibid. ver. 1, seq. and 25,seq.), or a leper (ibid. xiii. 46), or their bed (ibid. xv. 5). Escapingthese, he may become unclean by cohabitation with his wife, or bypollution (ibid. 15), and even when he has cleansed himself fromany of these kinds of uncleanliness, he cannot enter the Sanctuarytill after sunset; but not being enabled to enter the Sanctuary atnight time, although he is clean after sunset, as may be inferredfrom Middot and Tamid, he is again, during the night, subject tobecoming unclean either by cohabiting with his wife or by someother source of uncleanliness, and may rise in the morning in thesame condition as the day before. All this serves to keep peopleaway from the Sanctuary, and to prevent them from entering itwhenever they liked. Our Sages, as is well known, said," Even adean person may not enter the
Sanctuary for the purpose of performing divine service, unless hetakes previously a bath." By such acts the reverence [for theSanctuary] will continue, the right impression will be producedwhich leads man, as is intended, to humility.
The easier the diffusion of uncleanliness is, the more difficult andthe more retarded is its purification. Most easily is uncleanlinesscommunicated by the dead body to those who are under the sameroof, especially to relatives. The purification can only becompleted by means of the ashes of the red heifer, however scarceit may be, and only in seven days (Num. xix. 11). The uncleannesscaused by a woman having running issue or during her separationis more frequent than that caused by contact with unclean objects:seven days are therefore required for their purification (Lev. xv.19, 28), whilst those that touch them are only unclean one day(ibid. vii. 18). Males or females that are unclean through runningissue, and a woman after childbirth, must in addition bring asacrifice, because their uncleanness occurs less frequently thanthat of women in their separation. All these cases of uncleanliness,viz., running issue of males or females, menstruations, leprosy,dead bodies of human beings, carcases of beasts and creepingthings, and issue of semen, are sources of dirt and filth. We havethus shown that the above precepts are very useful in manyrespects. First, they keep us at a distance from dirty and filthyobjects: secondly, they guard the Sanctuary; thirdly, they payregard to an established custom (for the Sabeans submitted to verytroublesome restrictions when unclean, as you will soon hear):fourthly, they lightened that burden for us; for we are not impededthrough these laws in our ordinary occupations by the distinctionthe Law makes between that which is unclean and that which isdean. For this distinction applies only in reference to the Sanctuaryand the holy objects connected with it: it does not apply to othercases." She shall touch no hallowed thing, nor come into theSanctuary" (Lev. xii. 4). Other persons [that do not intend to enterthe Sanctuary or touch any holy thing], are not guilty of any sin ifthey remain unclean as long as they like, and eat, according totheir pleasure, ordinary food that has been in contact with uncleanthings. But the practice of the Sabeans, even at present general inthe East, among the few still left of the Magi, was to keep amenstruous woman in a house by herself, to burn that upon whichshe treads, and to consider as unclean every one that speaks withher: even if a wind passed over her and a clean person, the latterwas unclean in the eyes of the Sabeans. See the difference betweenthis practice and our rule, that" whatever services a wife generallydoes to her husband, she may do to him in her separation" : onlycohabitation is prohibited during the days of her uncleanness.Another custom among the Sabeans, which is still widespread, isthis : whatever is separated from the body, as hair, nail, or blood, isunclean; every barber is therefore unclean in their estimation,because he touches blood and hair; whenever a person passes arazor over his skin he must take a bath in running water. Suchburdensome practices were numerous among the Sabeans, whilstwe apply the laws that distinguish between the unclean and thedean only with regard to hallowed things and to the Sanctuary. Thedivine words," And ye shall sanctify yourselves, and ye shall beholy" (Lev. xi. 44), do not refer to these laws at an. According toSifra, they refer to sanctity by obedience to God's commandments.The same interpretation is given in Sifra of the words," Ye shallbe holy," i.e. obedient to His commandments (xix. 2). Hence thetransgression of commandments is also called uncleanliness ordefilement. This term is especially used of the chief and principalcrimes, which are idolatry, adultery, and murder. In reference toidolatry it is said," He hath given of his seed unto Molech to defilemy sanctuary, and to profane my holy name" (ibid. xx. 3). Inreference to adultery we read," Defile not ye yourselves in any ofthese things" (ibid. xviii. 24), and Defile not the land" (Num.xxxv. 34) in reference to murder. It is therefore clear that the term"defilement" [or uncleanliness] is used homonymously of threethings : 1. Of man's violation and transgression of that which he iscommanded as regards his actions and his opinions. 2. Of dirt andfilth: comp." Her filthiness in her skirts" (Lam. i. 9). 3. Of theabovenamed imaginary defilement such as touching and carryingcertain objects, or being with them under the same roof. Inreference to the third kind, our Sages said, The words of the Laware not subject to becoming unclean (B. T. Ber. 224). In the samemanner the term" holiness" is used homonymously of three thingscorresponding to the three kinds of uncleanness. As uncleannesscaused by a dead body could only be removed after seven days, bymeans of the ashes of the red heifer, and the priests had constantlyoccasion to enter the Sanctuary, the Law exceptionally forbidsthem to defile themselves by a dead body (Lev. xxi. 1), except incases where defilement is necessary, and the contrary would beunnatural. For it would be unnatural to abstain from approachingthe dead body of a parent, child, or brother. As it was verynecessary that the high-priest should always be in the Sanctuary, inaccordance with the Divine command," And it shall always be onhis forehead" (Exod. xxviii. 38), he was not permitted to defilehimself by any dead body whatever, even of the above-namedrelatives (Lev. xxi. 10-12). Women were not engaged in sacrificialservice; the above law consequently does not apply to women; it isaddressed to" the sons of Aaron," and not to" the daughters ofAaron." It was, however, impossible to assume that none of theIsraelites made a mistake, by entering the Sanctuary, or eatinghallowed things in a state of uncleanliness. It was even possiblethat there were persons who did this knowingly, since there arewicked people who commit knowingly even the greatest crimes;for this reason certain sacrifices were commanded as an atonementfor the defilement of the Sanctuary and its hallowed things. Theywere of different kinds; some of them atoned for defilementcaused ignorantly, others for defilement caused knowingly. Forthis purpose were brought the goats on the Festivals and theNew-moon days (Num. xxviii. 15, 27, etc.), and the goat sent awayon the Day of Atonement (Lev. xvi. 16), as is explained in its place(Mishnah Shebnot, i. 4). These sacrifices serve to prevent thosewho defiled the Sanctuary of the Lord knowingly from thinkingthat they had not done a great wrong; they should know that theyobtained atonement by the sacrifice of the goat, as the Law says," That they die not in their uncleanness" (Lev. xv. 31):" That Aaronmay bear the iniquity of the holy things" (Exod. xxviii. 38). Thisidea is frequently repeated.
The uncleanness through leprosy we have already explained. OurSages have also dearly stated the meaning thereof. All agree thatleprosy is a punishment for slander. The disease begins in thewalls of the houses (Lev. xiv. 33, seq.). If the sinner repents, theobject is attained: if he remains in his disobedience, the diseaseaffects his bed and house furniture: if he still continues to sin, theleprosy attacks his own garments, and then his body. This is amiracle received in our nation by tradition, in the same manner asthe effect of the trial of a faithless wife (Num. v. ii, seq). The goodeffect of this belief is evident. Leprosy is besides a contagiousdisease, and people almost naturally abhor it, and keep away fromit. The purification was effected by cedar-wood, hyssop, scarletthread, and two birds (Lev. xiv. 4); their reason is stated in variousMidrashic sayings, but the explanation does not agree with ourtheory. I do not know at present the reason of any of these things;nor why cedar-wood, hyssop, and scarlet were used in the sacrificeof the red heifer (Num. xix. 6): nor why a bundle of hyssop wascommanded for the sprinkling of the blood of the Passover-lamb(Exod. Xii. 22). 1 cannot find any principle upon which to foundan explanation why these particular things have been chosen.
The red heifer is called a sin-offering, because it effects thepurification of persons that have become unclean through the deadbody of a human being, and enables them to enter the Sanctuary[and to eat of hallowed things]. The idea taught by this law is this :Those who have defiled themselves would never be allowed toenter the Sanctuary, or to partake of holy things, were it not for thesacrifice of the red heifer, by which this sin is removed; in thesame manner as the plate [which the high-priest wears on hisforehead] atones for uncleanness, and as a similar object isattained by the goats that are burnt. For this reason those wereunclean who were engaged in the sacrifice of the heifer or thegoats which were burnt, and even their garments were unclean.The same was the law in the case of the goat that was sent away[on the Day of Atonement]; for it was believed that it madeunclean those who touched it, because it carried off so many sins.
We have now mentioned the reasons for those commandments ofthis class, for which we were able to give a satisfactory reasonaccording to our view.
CHAPTER XLVIII
THE precepts of the thirteenth class are those which we haveenumerated in the" Laws concerning forbidden food" (Hilkotmaakalot asurot)," Laws concerning killing animals for food"(Hilkot shehitah), and" Laws concerning vows and Nazaritism"(Hilkot nedarim u-nezirot). We have fully and very explicitlydiscussed the object of this class in this treatise, and in ourCommentary on the Sayings of the Fathers. We will here add a fewremarks in reviewing the single commandments which arementioned there.
I maintain that the food which is forbidden by the Law isunwholesome. There is nothing among the forbidden kinds of foodwhose injurious character is doubted, except pork (Lev. id. 7), andfat (ibid. vii. 23). But also in these cases the doubt is not justified.For pork contains more moisture than necessary [for human food],and too much of superfluous matter. The principal reason why theLaw forbids swine's flesh is to be found in the circumstance that itshabits and its food are very dirty and loathsome. It has alreadybeen pointed out how emphatically the Law enjoins the removal ofthe sight of loathsome objects, even in the field and in the camp;how much more objectionable is such a sight in towns. But if itwere allowed to eat swine's flesh, the streets and houses would bemore dirty than any cesspool, as may be seen at present in thecountry of the Franks. A saying of our Sages declares:" The mouthof a swine is as dirty as dung itself" (B.T. Ber. 25a).
The fat of the intestines makes us full, interrupts our digestion, andproduces cold and thick blood; it is more fit for fuel [than forhuman food].
Blood (Lev. xvii. 12), and nebelah, i.e., the flesh of an animal thatdied of itself (Deut. xiv. 21), are indigestible, and injurious asfood: Trejah, an animal in a diseased state (Exod. xxii. 30), is onthe way of becoming a nebelah.
The characteristics given in the Law (Lev. xi., and Dent. xiv.) ofthe permitted animals, viz., chewing the cud and divided hoofs forcattle, and fins and scales for fish, are in themselves neither thecause of the permission when they are present, nor of theprohibition when they are absent; but merely signs by which therecommended species of animals can be discerned from those thatare forbidden.
The reason why the sinew that shrank is prohibited is stated in theLaw (Gen. xxxii. 33).
It is prohibited to cut off a limb of a living animal and eat it,because such act would produce cruelty, and develop it: besides,the heathen kings used to do it: it was also a kind of idolatrousworship to cut off a certain limb of a living animal and to eat it.
Meat boiled in milk is undoubtedly gross food, and makesoverfull; but I think that most probably it is also prohibitedbecause it is somehow connected with idolatry, forming perhapspart of the service. or being used on some festival of the heathen. Ifind a support for this view in the circumstance that the Lawmentions the prohibition twice after the commandment givenconcerning the festivals" Three times in the year all thy malesshall appear before the Lord God" (Exod. xxiii. 17, and xxxiv. 73),as if to say," When you come before me on your festivals, do notseethe your food in the manner as the heathen used to do." This Iconsider as the best reason for the prohibition: but as far as I haveseen the books on Sabean rites, nothing is mentioned of thiscustom.
The commandment concerning the killing of animals is necessary,because the natural food of man consists of vegetables and of theflesh of animals: the best meat is that of animals permitted to beused as food. No doctor has any doubts about this. Since,therefore, the desire of procuring good food necessitates theslaying of animals, the Law enjoins that the death of the animalshould be the easiest. It is not allowed to torment the animal bycutting the throat in a clumsy manner, by poleaxing, or by cuttingoff a limb whilst the animal is alive.
It is also prohibited to kill an animal with its young on the sameday (Lev. xxii. 28), in order that people should be restrained andprevented from killing the two together in such a manner that theyoung is slain in the sight of the mother; for the pain of theanimals under such circumstances is very great. There is nodifference in this case between the pain of man and the pain ofother living beings, since the love and tenderness of the mother forher young ones is not produced by reasoning, but by imagination,and this faculty exists not only in man but in most living beings.This law applies only to ox and lamb, because of the domesticanimals used as food these alone are permitted to us, and in thesecases the mother recognises her young.
The same reason applies to the law which enjoins that we shouldlet the mother fly away when we take the young. The eggs overwhich the bird sits, and the young that are in need of their mother,are generally unfit for food, and when the mother is sent away shedoes not see the taking of her young ones, and does not feel anypain. In most cases, however, this commandment will cause manto leave the whole nest untouched, because [the young or theeggs], which he is allowed to take, are, as a rule, unfit for food. Ifthe Law provides that such grief should not be caused to cattle orbirch, how much more careful must we be that we should notcause grief to our fellowmen. When in the Talmud (Ber. p. 33b)those are blamed who use in their prayer the phrase," Thy mercyextendeth to young birds," it is the expression of the one of the twoopinions mentioned by us, namely, that the precepts of the Lawhave no other reason but the Divine will. We follow the otheropinion.
The reason why we cover the blood when we kill animals, and whywe do it only when we kill dean beasts and clean birds, has alreadybeen explained by us (supra, chap. xlvi., p. 362).
In addition to the things prohibited by the Law, we are alsocommanded to observe the prohibitions enjoined by our own vows(Num. xxx.). If we say, This bread or this meat is forbidden for us,we are not allowed to partake of that food. The object of thatprecept is to train us in temperance, that we should be able tocontrol our appetites for eating and drinking. Our Sages sayaccordingly," Vows are a fence for abstinence." As women areeasily provoked to anger, owing to their greater excitability and theweakness of their mind, their oaths, if entirely under their owncontrol, would cause great grief, quarrel, and disorder in thefamily; one kind of food would be allowed for the husband, andforbidden for the wife: another kind forbidden for the daughter,and allowed for the mother. Therefore the Law gives the father ofthe family control over the vows of those dependent on him. Awoman that is independent, and not under the authority of a chiefof the family, is, as regards vows, subject to the same laws as men;I mean a woman that has no husband, or that has no father, or thatis of age, i.e., twelve years and six months.
The object of Nazaritism (Num. vi.) is obvious. It keeps away fromwine that has ruined people in ardent and modern times." Manystrong men have been slain by it" (Prov. xxvii. 26)." But they alsohave erred through wine. . . . the priest and the prophet" (Isa.xxviii. 7). In the law about the Nazarite we notice even theprohibition," he shall eat nothing that is made of the vine tree"(Num. vi. 4), as an additional precaution, implying the lesson thatman must take of wine only as much as is absolutely necessary.For he who abstains from drinking it is called" holy" : his sanctityis made equal to that of the high-priest, in not being allowed todefile himself even to his father, to his mother, and the like. Thishonour is given him because he abstains from wine.
CHAPTER XLIX
THE precepts of the fourteenth class are those which weenumerated in the Section on Women, the Laws concerningforbidden sexual intercourse, and cross-breeding of cattle (Selernashim, Hilkot issure biah ve-kalee behemah). The law concerningcircumcision belongs also to this class. The general purpose ofthese precepts has already been described by us. We will nowproceed to explain them singly.
It is well known that man requires friends all his lifetime. Aristotleexplains this in the ninth book of his Nilcomachean Ethics. Whenman is in good health and prosperous, he enjoys the company ofhis friends; in time of trouble he is in need of them; in old age,when his body is weak, he is assisted by them. This love is morefrequent and more intense between parents and children, andamong [other] relations. Perfect love, brotherhood, and mutualassistance is only found among those near to each other byrelationship. The members of a family united by common descentfrom the same grandfather, or even from some more distantancestor, have towards each other a certain feeling of love, helpeach other, and sympathize with each other. To effect this is one ofthe chief purposes of the Law. Professional harlots were thereforenot tolerated in Israel (Deut. xxiii. 18), because their existencewould disturb the above relationship between man and man. Theirchildren are strangers to everybody; no one knows to what familythey belong; nor does any person recognize them as relatives. Andthis is the greatest misfortune that can befall any child or father.Another important object in prohibiting prostitution is to restrainexcessive and continual lust: for lust increases with the variety ofits objects. The sight of that to which a person has beenaccustomed for a long time does not produce such an ardent desirefor its enjoyment as is produced by objects new in form andcharacter. Another effect of this prohibition is the removal of acause for strife: for if the prohibition did not exist, several personsmight by chance come to one woman, and would naturally quarrelwith each other; they would in many cases kill one another, or theywould kill the woman. This is known to have occurred in days ofold," And they assembled themselves by troops in a harlot'shouse" (Jer. v. 7). In order to prevent these great evils, and toeffect the great boon that all men should know their relationship toeach other, prostitutes (Deut. xxiii. 17) were not tolerated, andsexual intercourse was only permitted when man has chosen acertain female, and married her openly; for if it sufficed merely tochoose her, many a person would bring a prostitute into his houseat a certain time agreed upon between them, and say that she washis wife. Therefore it is commanded to perform the act ofengagement by which he declares that he has chosen her to takeher for his wife, and then to go through the public ceremony ofmarriage. Comp." And Boaz took ten men," etc. (Ruth iv. 2). Itmay happen that husband and wife do not agree, live without loveand peace, and do not enjoy the benefit of a home; in that case heis permitted to send her away. If he had been allowed to divorceher by a mere word, or by turning her out of his house, the wifewould wait for some negligence [on the part of the husband], andthen come out and say that she was divorced; or having committedadultery, she and the adulterer would contend that she had thenbeen divorced. Therefore the law is that divorce can only takeplace by means of a document which can serve as evidence," Heshall write her a bill of divorcement" (Deut. xxiv. 1). There arefrequently occasions for suspicion of adultery and doubtsconcerning the conduct of the wife. Laws concerning a wifesuspected of adultery (sotah) are therefore prescribed (Num. v.):the effect of which is that the wife, out of fear of the" bitterwaters," is most careful to prevent any ill-feeling on the part of herhusband against her. Even of those that felt quite innocent and safemost were rather willing to lose all their property than to submit tothe prescribed treatment: even death was preferred to the publicdisgrace of uncovering the head, undoing the hair, rending thegarments and exposing the heart, and being led round through theSanctuary in the presence of all, of women and men, and also inthe presence of the members of the Synhedrion. The fear of thistrial keeps away great diseases that ruin the home comfort.
As every maiden expects to be married, her seducer therefore isonly ordered to marry her: for he is undoubtedly the fittest husbandfor her. He will better heal her wound and redeem her characterthan any other husband. If, however, he is rejected by her or herfather, he must give the dowry (Exod. xxii. 15). If he uses violencehe has to submit to the additional punishment," he may not put heraway all his days" (Dent. xxii. 29).
The reason of the law concerning marrying the deceased brother'swife is stated in the Bible (Dent. xxv. 5). It was a custom in forcebefore the Law was given, and the Law perpetuated it. Theceremony of halizah (ibid. 6, seq.)," taking off the shoe," has beenintroduced, because in those days it was considered disgraceful togo through that ceremony, and in order to avoid the disgrace, aperson might perhaps be induced to marry his deceased brother'swife. This is evident from the words of the Law:" So shall it bedone unto that man that will not build up his brother's house. Andhis name shall be called in Israel, The house of him that hath hisshoe loosed" (Dent. xxv. 9). In the action of Judah we mayperhaps notice an example of a noble conduct, and uprightness injudgment. He said:" Let her take it to her, lest we be shamed:behold, I sent this kid, and thou hast not found her" (Gen. xxxviii.23). For before the Lawgiving, the intercourse with a harlot was aslawful as cohabitation of husband and wife since the Lawgiving; itwas perfectly permitted, nobody considered it wrong. The hirewhich was in those days paid to the harlot in accordance with aprevious agreement, corresponds to the ketubah which in our claysthe husband pays to his wife when he divorces her. It is a justclaim on the part of the wife, and the husband is bound to pay it.The words of Judah," Let her take it to her, lest we be shamed,"etc., show that conversation about sexual intercourse, even of thatwhich is permitted, brings shame upon us; it is proper to be silentabout it, to keep it secret, even if the silence would lead to loss ofmoney. In this sense Judah said: It is better for us to lose property,and to let her keep what she has, than to make our affair public byinquiring after her, and bring still more shame upon us. This is thelesson, as regards conduct, to be derived from this incident. As tothe uprightness to be learned therefrom, it is contained in thewords of Judah when he wanted to show that he had not robbedher, that he has not in the least departed from his agreement withher. For he said," Behold, I sent this kid, and thou hast not foundher." The kid was probably very good, therefore he points to it,saying," this kid." This is the uprightness which he had inheritedfrom Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob : that man must not depart fromhis given word, nor deviate from what he agreed upon; but he mustgive to others all that is due to them. It makes no differencewhether he holds a portion of his neighbour's property as a loan ora trust, or whether he is in any other way his neighbour's debtor,owing him wages or the like.
The sum which the husband settles upon his wife (ketubah) is to betreated in the same way as the wages of a hired servant. There isno difference whether a master withholds the wages of a hiredservant, or deprives his wife of that which is due to her; whether amaster wrongs a hired servant, and brings charges against him withthe intention to send him away without payment, or a husbandtreats his wife in a manner that would enable him to send her awaywithout the payment of the promised sum.
The equity of the statutes and judgments of the Law in this regardmay be noticed in the treatment of a person accused of spreadingan evil report about his wife (Dent. xxii. 13, seq). There is nodoubt that the man that did this is bad, does not love his wife, andis not pleased with her. If he desired to divorce her in a regularmanner, there is nothing to prevent him, but he would be bound togive her what is due unto her; but instead of this," he givesoccasion of speech against her" (ibid. xxii. 14), in order to get ridof his wife without paying anything; he slanders her, and uttersfalsehood in order to keep in his possession the fifty shekels ofsilver, the dowry fixed in the Law for maidens, which he is obligedto pay unto her. He is therefore sentenced to pay one hundredshekels of silver, in accordance with the principle," Whom thejudges shall condemn, he shall pay double unto his neighbour"(Exod. xxii. 9). The Law is also analogous to that about falsewitnesses, which we have explained above (chap. xli. p. 195). Forhe intended to cheat her of her fifty shekels of silver, he musttherefore [add fifty, and] pay her a hundred shekels. This is hispunishment for withholding from her her due, and endeavouring tokeep it. But in so far as he degraded her, and spread the rumourthat she was guilty of misconduct, he was also degraded, andreceived stripes, as is implied in the words," and they shallchastise him" (Dent. xxii. 15). But he sinned besides in clinging tolust, and seeking only that which gave pleasure to him: he wastherefore punished by being compelled to keep his wife always,"he may not put her away all his days" (ibid. 19): for he has beenbrought to all this only because he may have found her ugly. Thusare these bad habits cured when they are treated according to thedivine Law; the ways of equity are never lost sight of; they areobvious and discernible in every precept of the Law by those whoconsider it well. See how, according to the Law, the slanderer ofhis wife, who only intended to withhold from her what he is boundto give her, is treated in the same manner as a thief who has stolenthe property of his neighbour; and the false witness (Dent. xix. 16,seq.) who schemes to injure, although the injury was in reality notinflicted, is punished like those who have actually caused injuryand wrong, viz., like the thief and the slanderer. The three kinds ofsinners are tried and judged by one and the same law. See howwonderful are the divine laws, and admire His wonderful deeds.Scripture says:" The Rock, His work is perfect; for all His waysare judgment" (Deut. xxxii. 4), i.e., as His works are most perfect,so are His laws most equitable; but our mind is too limited tocomprehend the perfection of all His works, or the equity of all Hislaws: and as we are able to comprehend some of His wonderfulworks in the organs of living beings and the motions of thespheres, so we understand also the equity of some of His laws; thatwhich is unknown to us of both of them is far more than thatwhich is known to us. I will now return to the theme of the presentchapter.
The law about forbidden sexual intercourse seeks in all its parts toinculcate the lesson that we ought to limit sexual intercoursealtogether, hold it in contempt, and only desire it very rarely. Theprohibition of pederasty (Lev. xviii. 22) and carnal intercoursewith beasts (ibid. 73) is very clear. If in the natural way the act istoo base to be performed except when needed, how much morebase is it if performed in an unnatural manner, and only for thesake of pleasure.
The female relatives whom a man may not marry are alike in thisrespectthat as a rule they are constantly together with him in hishouse: they would easily listen to him, and do what he desires;they are near at hand, and he would have no difficulty in procuringthem. No judge could blame him if found in their company. If tothese relatives the same law applied as to all other unmarriedwomen, if we were allowed to marry any of them, and were onlyprecluded from sexual intercourse with them without marriage,most people would constantly have become guilty of misconductwith them. But as they are entirely forbidden to us, and sexualintercourse with them is most emphatically denounced unto us as acapital crime, or a sin punishable with extinction (karet), and asthere is no means of ever legalizing such intercourse, there isreason to expect that people will not seek it, and win not think ofit. That the persons included in that prohibition are, as we havestated, at hand and easily accessible, is evident. For as a rule, themother of the wife, the grandmother, the daughter, thegranddaughter, and the sister-in-law, are mostly with her; thehusband meets them always when he goes out, when he comes in,and when he is at his work. The wife stays also frequently in thehouse of her husband's brother, father, or son. It is also well knownthat we are often in the company of our sisters, our aunts, and thewife of our uncle, and are frequently brought Up together withthem. These are all the relatives which we must not marry. This isone of the reasons why intermarriage with a near relative isforbidden. But according to my opinion the prohibition servesanother object, namely, to inculcate chastity into our hearts.Licence between the root and the branch, between a man and hismother, or his daughter, is outrageous. The intercourse betweenroot and branch is forbidden, and it makes no difference whetherthe male element is the root or the branch, or both root and branchcombine in the intercourse with a third person, so that the sameindividual cohabits with the root and with the branch. On thisaccount it is prohibited to marry a woman and her mother, the wifeof the father or of the son; for in all these cases there is theintercourse between one and the same person on the one side androot and branch on the other.
The law concerning brothers is like the law concerning root andbranch. The sister is forbidden, and so is also the sister of the wifeand the wife of the brother; because in the latter cases two personswho are considered like root and branch, cohabit with the sameperson. But in these prohibitions brothers and sisters are partlyconsidered as root and branch and partly as one body; the sister ofthe mother is therefore like the mother, and the sister of the fatherlike the father, and both are prohibited: and since the daughter ofthe parent's brother or sister is not included in the number ofprohibited relatives, so may we also marry the daughter of thebrother or the sister. The apparent anomaly, that the brother of thefather may marry a woman that has been the wife of his brother'sson, whilst the nephew must not marry a woman that has been thewife of his father's brother, can be explained according to theabove-mentioned first reason. For the nephew is frequently in thehouse of his uncle, and his conduct towards the wife of his uncle isthe same as that towards his brother's wife. The uncle, however, isnot so frequent in the house of his nephew, and he is consequentlyless intimate with the wife of his nephew; whilst in the case offather and son, the familiarity of the father with hisdaughter-in-law is the same as that of the son with the wife of hisfather, and therefore the law and punishment is the same for both[father and son]. The reason why it is prohibited to cohabit with amenstruous woman (Lev. xviii. 19) or with another man's wife(ibid. 20), is obvious, and requires no further explanation.
It is well known that we must not indulge in any sensualenjoyment whatever with the persons included in the aboveprohibitions: we must not even look at them if we intend to derivepleasure therefrom. We have explained this in" the laws aboutforbidden sexual intercourse" (Hilkot issure biah, xxi. 1-2), andshown that according to the Law we must not even engage ourthoughts with the act of cohabitation (ibid. 19) or irritate the organof generation; and when we find ourselves unintentionally in astate of irritation, we must turn our mind to other thoughts, andreflect on some other thing till we are relieved. Our Sages (B.T.Kidd 30b), in their moral lessons, which give perfection to thevirtuous, say as follows:" My son, if that monster meets you, dragit to the house of study. It will melt if it is of iron; it will break inpieces if it is of stone : as is said in Scripture, ' Is not my word likea fire ? saith the Lord, and like a hammer that breaketh the rock inpieces ? '" (Jer. xxiii. 29). The author of this saying thus exhortshis son to go to the house of study when he finds his organ ofgeneration in an irritated state. By reading, disputing, asking, andlistening to questions, the irritation win certainly cease. See howproperly the term monster is employed, for that irritation is indeedlike a monster. Not only religion teaches this lesson, thephilosophers teach the same. I have already quoted verbatim thewords of Aristotle. He says:" The sense of touch which is adisgrace to us, leads us to indulge in eating and sensuality," etc. Hecalls people degraded who seek carnal pleasures and devotethemselves to gastronomy: he denounces in extenso their low andobjectionable conduct, and ridicules them. This passage occurs inhis Ethics and in his Rhetoric.
In accordance with this excellent principle, which we ought strictlyto follow, our Sages teach us that we ought not to look at beasts orbirds in the moment of their copulation. According to my opinion,this is the reason why the cross-breeding of cattle is prohibited(Lev. xix. 19). It is a fact that animals of different species do notcopulate together, unless by force. It is well known that the lowclass of breeders of mules are regularly engaged in this work. OurLaw objected to it that any Israelite should degrade himself bydoing these things, which require so much vulgarity andindecency, and doing that which religion forbids us even tomention, how much more to witness or to practise, except whennecessary. Crossbreeding, however, is not necessary. I think thatthe prohibition to bring together two species in any kind of work,as included in the words," Thou shalt not plow with an ox and anass together" (Deut. xxii. 10), is only a preventive against theintercourse of two species. For if it were allowed to join suchtogether in any work, we might sometimes also cause theirintercourse. That this is the reason of the commandment is provedby the fact that it applies to other animals besides ox and ass; it isprohibited to plow not only with ox and ass together, but with anytwo kinds. But Scripture mentions as an instance that which is ofregular occurrence.
As regards circumcision, I think that one of its objects is to limitsexual intercourse, and to weaken the organ of generation as far aspossible, and thus cause man to be moderate. Some people believethat circumcision is to remove a defect in man's formation; butevery one can easily reply: How can products of nature bedeficient so as to require external completion, especially as the useof the fore-skin to that organ is evident. This commandment hasnot been enjoined as a complement to a deficient physicalcreation, but as a means for perfecting man's moral shortcomings.The bodily injury caused to that organ is exactly that which isdesired; it does not interrupt any vital function, nor does it destroythe power of generation. Circumcision simply counteractsexcessive lust; for there is no doubt that circumcision weakens thepower of sexual excitement, and sometimes lessens the naturalenjoyment: the organ necessarily becomes weak when it losesblood and is deprived of its covering from the beginning. OurSages (Beresh. Rabba, c. 80) say distinctly: It is hard for a woman,with whom an uncircumcised had sexual intercourse, to separatefrom him. This is, as I believe, the best reason for thecommandment concerning circumcision. And who was the first toperform this commandment? Abraham, our father! of whom it iswell known how he feared sin; it is described by our Sages inreference to the words," Behold, now I know that thou art a fairwoman to look upon" (Gen. xii. 11).
There is, however, another important object in this commandment.It gives to all members of the same faith, i.e., to all believers in theUnity of God, a common bodily sign, so that it is impossible forany one that is a stranger, to say that he belongs to them. Forsometimes people say so for the purpose of obtaining someadvantage, or in order to make some attack upon the Jews. No one,however, should circumcise himself or his son for any other reasonbut pure faith; for circumcision is not like an incision on the leg, ora burning in the arm, but a very difficult operation. It is also a factthat there is much mutual love and assistance among people thatare united by the same sign when they consider it as [the symbolof] a covenant. Circumcision is likewise the [symbol of the]covenant which Abraham made in connexion with the belief inGod's Unity. So also every one that is circumcised enters thecovenant of Abraham to believe in the unity of God, in accordancewith the words of the Law," To be a God unto thee, and to thyseed after thee" (Gen. xvii. 7). This purpose of the circumcision isas important as the first, and perhaps more important.
This law can only be kept and perpetuated in its perfection, ifcircumcision is performed when the child is very young, and thisfor three good reasons. First, if the operation were postponed tillthe boy had grown up, he would perhaps not submit to it.Secondly, the young child has not much pain, because the skin istender, and the imagination weak: for grown-up persons are indread and fear of things which they imagine as coming, some timebefore these actually occur. Thirdly, when a child is very young,the parents do not think much of him: because the image of thechild, that leads the parents to love him, has not yet taken a firmroot in their minds. That image becomes stronger by the continualsight; it grows with the development of the child, and later on theimage begins again to decrease and to vanish. The parents' love fora new-born child is not so great as it is when the child is one yearold; and when one year old, it is less loved by them than when sixyears old. The feeling and love of the father for the child wouldhave led him to neglect the law if he were allowed to wait two orthree years, whilst shortly after birth the image is very weak in themind of the parent, especially of the father who is responsible forthe execution of this commandment. The circumcision must takeplace on the eighth day (Lev. xii. 3), because all living beings areafter birth, within the first seven days, very weak and exceedinglytender, as if they were still in the womb of their mother; not untilthe eighth day can they be counted among those that enjoy thelight of the world. That this is also the case with beasts may beinferred from the words of Scripture:" Seven days shall it be underthe dam" (Lev. XXii. 27), as if it had no vitality before the end ofthat period. In the same manner man is circumcised after thecompletion of seven days. The period has been fixed, and has notbeen left to everybody's judgment.
The precepts of this class include also the lesson that we must notinjure in any way the organs of generation in living beings (ibid.xxii. 24). The lesson is based on the principle of" righteous statutesand judgments" (Dent. iv. 8): we must keep in everything thegolden mean; we must not be excessive in love, but must notsuppress it entirely; for the Law commands," Be fruitful, andmultiply" (Gen. i. 22). The organ is weakened by circumcision,but not destroyed by the operation. The natural faculty is left infull force, but is guarded against excess. It is prohibited for anIsraelite" that is wounded in the stones, or hath his privy membercut off" (Dent. xxiii. 2), to marry an Israelitish woman: becausethe sexual intercourse is of no use and of no purpose; and thatmarriage would be a source of ruin to her, and to him who wouldclaim her. This is very dear.
In order to create a horror of illicit marriages, a bastard was notallowed to marry an Israelitish woman (ibid. xxiii. 3): the adultererand the adulteress were thus taught that by their act they bringupon their seed irreparable injury. In every language and in everynation the issue of licentious conduct has a bad name; the Lawtherefore raises the name of the Israelites by keeping them freefrom the admixture of bastards. The priests, who have a highersanctity, are not allowed to marry a harlot, or a woman that isdivorced from her husband, or that is profane (Lev. xxi 7): thehigh-priest, the noblest of the priests, must not marry even awidow, or a woman that has had sexual intercourse of any kind(ibid. xxi. 14). Of all these laws the reason is obvious. If bastardswere prohibited to marry any member of the congregation of theLord, how much more rigidly had slaves and handmaids to beexcluded. The reason of the prohibition of inter-marriage withother nations is stated in the Law:" And thou take of theirdaughters unto thy sons, and their daughters go a whoring aftertheir gods, and make thy sons go a whoring after their gods"(Exod. xxxiv. 16).
Most of the" statutes" (hukkim), the reason of which is unknownto us serve as a fence against idolatry. That I cannot explain somedetails of the above laws or show their use is owing to the fact thatwhat we hear from others is not so dear as that which we see withour own eyes. Thus my knowledge of the Sabean doctrines, whichI derived from books, is not as complete as the knowledge of thosewho have witnessed the public practice of those idolatrouscustoms, especially as they have been out of practice and entirelyextinct since two thousand years. If we knew all the particulars ofthe Sabean worship, and were informed of all the details of thosedoctrines, we would dearly see the reason and wisdom of everydetail in the sacrificial service, in the laws concerning things thatare unclean, and in other laws, the object of which I am unable tostate. I have no doubt that all these laws served to blot out wrongprinciples from man's heart, and to exterminate the practiceswhich are useless, and merely a waste of time in vain andpurposeless things. Those principles have turned the mind of thepeople away from intellectual research and useful actions. Ourprophets therefore describe the ways of the idolaters as follows:"(They go) after vain things which cannot profit nor deliver; forthey are vain" (I Sam. xii. 21):" Surely our fathers have inheritedlies, vanity and things wherein there is no profit" (Jer. xvi. 19).Consider how great the evil consequences of idolatry are, and saywhether we ought with all our power to oppose it or not! Most ofthe precepts serve, as has been stated by us, as a mere fenceagainst those doctrines [of idolatry], and relieve man from thegreat and heavy burdens, from the pains and inflictions whichformed part of the worship of idols. Every positive or negativeprecept, the reason of which is unknown to thee, take as a remedyagainst some of those diseases with which we are unacquainted atpresent, thank God. This should be the belief of educated men whoknow the true meaning of the following divine dictum:" I said notunto the seed of jacob, Seek me in vain" (Isa. xlv. 19).
I have now mentioned all the commandments of these fourteenclassses one by one, and pointed out the reason of each of them,with the exception of a few for which I was unable to give thereason, and of some details of less importance; but implicitly wehave given the reason even of these, and every intelligent readerwill easily find it.
The reasons of the Precepts are now complete.
CHAPTER L
THERE are in the Law portions which include deep wisdom, buthave been misunderstood by many persons.; they require,therefore, an explanation. I mean the narratives contained in theLaw which many consider as being of no use whatever; e.g., thelist of the various families descended from Noah, with their namesand their territories (Gen. x.): the sons of Seir the Horite (ibid.xxxvi. 20-30): the kings that reigned in Edom (ibid. 31, seq.): andthe like. There is a saying of our Sages (B.T. Sanh. 99b) that thewicked king Manasse frequently held disgraceful meetings for thesole purpose of criticising such passages of the Law." He heldmeetings and made blasphemous observations on Scripture,saying, Had Moses nothing else to write than, And the sister ofLotan was Timna" (Gen. xxxvi. 22) ? With reference to suchpassages, I will first give a general principle, and then discussthem seriatim, as I have done in the exposition of the reasons ofthe precepts.
Every narrative in the Law serves a certain purpose in connexionwith religious teaching. It either helps to establish a principle offaith, or to regulate our actions, and to prevent wrong and injusticeamong men; and I will show this in each case.
It is one of the fundamental principles of the Law that the Universehas been created ex nihilo, and that of the human race, oneindividual being, Adam, was created. As the time which elapsedfrom Adam to Moses was not more than about two thousand fivehundred years, people would have doubted the truth of thatstatement if no other information had been added, seeing that thehuman race was spread over all parts of the earth in differentfamilies and with different languages, very unlike the one to theother. In order to remove this doubt the Law gives the genealogy ofthe nations (Gen. v. and x.), and the manner how they branched offfrom a common root. It names those of them who were wellknown, and tells who their fathers were, how long and where theylived. It describes also the cause that led to the dispersion of menover all parts of the earth, and to the formation of their differentlanguages, after they had lived for a long time in one place, andspoken one language (ibid. xi.), as would be natural fordescendants of one person. The accounts of the flood (ibid.vi.-viii.) and of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah (ibid.xix.), serve as an illustration of the doctrine that" Verily there is areward for the righteous; verily He is a God that judgeth in theearth" (Ps. lviii. 12).
The narration of the war among the nine kings (ibid. xiv.) showshow, by means of a miracle, Abraham, with a few undisciplinedmen, defeated four mighty kings. It illustrates at the same timehow Abraham sympathized with his relative, who had beenbrought up in the same faith, and how he exposed himself to thedangers of warfare in order to save him. We further learn from thisnarrative how contented and satisfied Abraham was, thinking littleof property, and very much of good deeds; he said," I will not takefrom a thread even to a shoe-latchet" (Gen. xiv. 23)
The list of the families of Seir and their genealogy is given it theLaw (ibid. xxxvi. 20-36), because of one particular commandment.For God distinctly commanded the Israelites concerning Amalek toblot out his name (Dent. xxv. 17-19). Amalek was the son ofEliphas and Timna, the sister of Lotan (ibid. xxxvi. 12). The othersons of Esau were not included in this commandment. But Esauwas by marriage connected with the Seirites, as is distinctly statedin Scripture: and Seirites were therefore his children: he reignedover them; his seed was mixed with the seed of Seir, andultimately all the countries and families of Seir were called afterthe sons of Esau who were the predominant family, and theyassumed more particularly the name Amalekites, because thesewere the strongest in that family. If the genealogy of these familiesof Seir had not been described in full they would all have beenkilled, contrary to the plain words of the commandment. For thisreason the Seirite families are fully described, as if to say, thepeople that live in Seir and in the kingdom of Amalek are not allAmalekites: they are the descendants of some other man, and arecalled Amalekites because the mother of Amalek was of theirtribe. The justice of God thus prevented the destruction of an[innocent] people that lived in the midst of another people[doomed to extirpation]: for the decree was only pronouncedagainst the seed of Amalek. The reason of this decree has alreadybeen stated by us (p. 205)
The kings that have reigned in the land of Edom are enumerated(Gen xxxvi. 51, seq.) on account of the law," Thou mayst not set astranger over thee, which is not thy brother 11 (Deut. xvii. 15). Forof these kings none was an Edomite; wherefore each king isdescribed by his native land; one king from this place, anotherking from that place. Now I think that it was then well known howthese kings that reigned in Edorn conducted themselves, what theydid, and how they humiliated and oppressed the sons of Esau. ThusGod reminded the Israelites of the fate of the Edomites, as ifsaying unto them, Look unto your brothers, the sons of Esau,whose kings were so and so, and whose deeds are well known.[Learn therefrom] that no nation ever chose a foreigner as kingwithout inflicting thereby some great or small injury upon thecountry. In short, what I remarked in reference to our ignorance ofthe Sabean worship, applies also to the history of those clays. If thereligious rules of the Sabeans and the events of those days wereknown to us, we should be able to see plainly the reason for mostof the things mentioned in the Pentateuch.
It is also necessary to note the following observations. The viewwe take of things described by others is different from the view wetake of things seen by Us as eye-witnesses. For that which we seecontains many details which are essential, and must be fullydescribed. The reader of the description believes that it containssuperfluous matter, or useless repetition, but if he had witnessedthe event of which he reads, he would see the necessity of everypart of the description. When we therefore notice narratives in theTorah, which are in no connexion with any of the commandments,we are inclined to think that they are entirely superfluous, or toolengthy, or contain repetitions; but this is only because we do notsee the particular incidents which make those narrativesnoteworthy. Of this kind is the enumeration of the stations [of theIsraelites in the wilderness] (Num. xxxiii.). At first sight it appearsto be entirely useless; but in order to obviate such a notionScripture says," And Moses wrote their goings out according totheir journeys by the commandment of the Lord" (ibid. ver. 2). Itwas indeed most necessary that these should be written. Formiracles are only convincing to those who witnessed them; whilstcoming generations, who know them only from the account givenby others, may consider them as untrue. But miracles cannotcontinue and last for all generations; it is even inconceivable [thatthey should be permanent]. Now the greatest of the miraclesdescribed in the Law is the stay of the Israelites in the wildernessfor forty years, with a daily supply of manna. This wilderness, asdescribed in Scripture, consisted of places" wherein were fieryserpents and scorpions, and drought, where there was no water"(Deut. viii. 115): places very remote from cultivated land, andnaturally not adapted for the habitation of man," It is no place ofseed, or of figs, or of vines, or of pomegranates, neither is thereany water to drink" (Num. xx. 5):" A land that no man passedthrough, and where no man dwelt" (Jer. ii. 6). [In reference to thestay of the Israelites in the wilderness], Scripture relates," Ye havenot eaten bread, neither have ye drunk wine or strong drink" (Deut.xix. 5). All these miracles were wonderful, public, and witnessedby the people. But God knew that in future people might doubt thecorrectness of the account of these miracles. in the same manneras they doubt the accuracy of other narratives; they might thinkthat the Israelites stayed in the wilderness in a place not far frominhabited land, where it was possible for man to live [in theordinary way]; that it was like those deserts in which Arabs live atpresent; or that they dwelt in such places in which they couldplow, sow, and reap, or live on some vegetable that was growingthere; or that manna came always down in those places as anordinary natural product; or that there were wells of water in thoseplaces. In order to remove all these doubts and to firmly establishthe accuracy of the account of these miracles, Scriptureenumerates all the stations, so that coming generations may seethem, and learn the greatness of the miracle which enabled humanbeings to live in those places forty years.
For this very reason Joshua cursed him who would ever build upJericho (josh. vi. 26): the effect of the miracle was to remain forever, so that any one who would see the wall sunk in the groundwould understand that it was not in the condition of a buildingpulled down by human hands, but sunk through a miracle. In asimilar manner the words," At the commandment of the Lord thechildren of Israel journeyed, and at the commandment of the Lordthey pitched" (Num. ix. 18), would suffice as a simple statementof facts; and the reader might at first sight consider as unnecessaryadditions all the details which follow, viz.," And when the cloudtarried long. . .
And so it was when the cloud was a few days. . . . Or whether itwere two days," etc. (ibid. ix. 19-22). But I will show you thereason why all these details are added. For they serve to confirmthe account, and to contradict the opinion of the nations, both ofancient and modern times, that the Israelites lost their way, and didnot know where to go; that" they were entangled in the land"(Exod. xiv. 3): wherefore the Arabs unto this day call that desertAl-tih," the desert of going astray," imagining that the Israeliteserred about, and did not know the way. Scripture, therefore, dearlystates and emphatically declares that it was by God's commandthat the journeyings were irregular, that the Israelites returned tothe same places several times, and that the duration of the stay wasdifferent in each station; whilst the stay in one place continued foreighteen years, in another place it lasted one day, and in anotherone night. There was no going astray, but the journey wasregulated by" the rising of the pillar of cloud" (Num. ix. 17).Therefore all these details are given. Scripture dearly states thatthe way was near, known, and in good condition; I mean the wayfrom Horeb, whither they came intentionally, according to thecommand of God," Ye shall serve God upon this mountain"(Exod. ii. 12), to Kadesh-barnea, the beginning of inhabited land,as Scripture says," Behold, we are now in Kadesh, a city in theuttermost of thy border" (Num. xx. 16). That way was a journey ofeleven days; comp." Eleven days' journey from Horeb, by the wayof mount Seir, unto Kadesh-barnea" (Deut. i. 3). In such a journeyit is impossible to err about for forty years: but Scripture states thecause of the delay.
In like manner there is a good reason for every passage the objectof which we cannot see. We must always apply the words of ourSages:" It is not a vain thing for you" (Deut. xxxii. 47), and if itseems vain, it seems your fault.
CHAPTER LI
THE present chapter does not contain any additional matter thathas not been treated in the [previous] chapters of this treatise. It isa kind of conclusion, and at the same time it will explain in whatmanner those worship God who have obtained a true knowledgeconcerning God; it will direct them how to come to that worship,which is the highest aim man can attain, and show how Godprotects them in this world till they are removed to eternal life.
I will begin the subject of this chapter with a simile. A king is inhis palace, and all his subjects are partly in the country, and partlyabroad. Of the former, some have their backs turned towards theking's palace, and their faces in another direction; and some aredesirous and zealous to go to the palace, seeking" to inquire in histemple," and to minister before him, but have not yet seen even theface of the wall of the house. Of those that desire to go to thepalace, some reach it, and go round about in search of the entrancegate; others have passed through the gate, and walk about in theante-chamber; and others have succeeded in entering into the innerpart of the palace, and being in the same room with the king in theroyal palace. But even the latter do not immediately on enteringthe palace see the king, or speak to him; for, after having enteredthe inner part of the palace, another effort is required before theycan stand before the king-at a distance, or close by -- hear hiswords, or speak to him. I will now explain the simile which I havemade. The people who are abroad are all those that have noreligion, neither one based on speculation nor one received bytradition. Such are the extreme Turks that wander about in thenorth, the Kushites who live in the south, and those in our countrywho are like these. I consider these as irrational beings, and not ashuman beings; they are below mankind, but above monkeys, sincethey have the form and shape of man, and a mental faculty abovethat of the monkey.
Those who are in the country, but have their backs turned towardsthe king's palace, are those who possess religion, belief, andthought, but happen to hold false doctrines, which they eitheradopted in consequence of great mistakes made in their ownspeculations, or received from others who misled them. Because ofthese doctrines they recede more and more from the royal palacethe more they seem to proceed. These are worse than the firstclass, and under certain circumstances it may become necessary today them, and to extirpate their doctrines, in order that othersshould not be misled.
Those who desire to arrive at the palace, and to enter it, but havenever yet seen it, are the mass of religious people: the multitudethat observe the divine commandments, but are ignorant. Thosewho arrive at the palace, but go round about it, are those whodevote themselves exclusively to the study of the practical law:they believe traditionally in true principles of faith, and learn thepractical worship of God, but are not trained in philosophicaltreatment of the principles of the Law, and do not endeavour toestablish the truth of their faith by proof. Those who undertake toinvestigate the principles of religion, have come into theante-chamber: and there is no doubt that these can also be dividedinto different grades. But those who have succeeded in finding aproof for everything that can be proved, who have a trueknowledge of God, so far as a true knowledge can be attained, andare near the truth, wherever an approach to the truth is possible,they have reached the goal, and are in the palace in which the kinglives.
My son, so long as you are engaged in studying the MathematicalSciences and Logic, you belong to those who go round about thepalace in search of the gate. Thus our Sages figuratively use thephrase:" Ben-zoma is still outside." When you understand Physics,you have entered the hall; and when, after completing the study ofNatural Philosophy, you master Metaphysics, you have entered theinnermost court, and are with the king in the same palace. Youhave attained the degree of the wise men, who include men ofdifferent grades of perfection. There are some who direct all theirmind toward the attainment of perfection in Metaphysics, devotethemselves entirely to God, exclude from their thought every otherthing, and employ all their intellectual faculties in the study of theUniverse, in order to derive therefrom a proof for the existence ofGod, and to learn in every possible way how God rules all things;they form the class of those who have entered the palace, namely,the class of prophets. One of these has attained so muchknowledge, and has concentrated his thoughts to such an extent inthe idea of God, that it could be said of him," And he was with theLord forty days," etc. (Exod. xxxiv. 28); during that holycommunion he could ask Him, answer Him, speak to Him, and beaddressed by Him, enjoying beatitude in that which he hadobtained to such a degree that" he did neither eat bread nor drinkwater" (ibid.); his intellectual energy was so predominant that allcoarser functions of the body, especially those connected with thesense of touch, were in abeyance. Some prophets are only able tosee, and of these some approach near and see, whilst others seefrom a distance : comp." The Lord hath appeared from far untome" (Jer. xxxi, 3). We have already spoken of the various degreesof prophets; we will therefore return to the subject of this chapter,and exhort those who have attained a knowledge of God, toconcentrate all their thoughts in God. This is the worship peculiarto those who have acquired a knowledge of the highest truths; andthe more they reflect on Him, and think of Him, the more are theyengaged in His worship. Those, however, who think of God, andfrequently mention His name, without any correct notion of Him,but merely following some imagination, or some theory receivedfrom another person, are, in my opinion, like those who remainoutside the palace and distant from it. They do not mention thename of God in truth, nor do they reflect on it. That which theyimagine and mention does not correspond to any being inexistence: it is a thing invented by their imagination, as has beenshown by us in our discussion on the Divine Attributes (Part 1.chap. 1.). The true worship of God is only possible when correctnotions of Him have previously been conceived. When you havearrived by way of intellectual research at a knowledge of God andHis works, then commence to devote yourselves to Him, try toapproach Him and strengthen the intellect, which is the link thatjoins you to Him. Thus Scripture says," Unto thee it was showed,that thou mightest know that the Lord He is God" (Dent. iv. 35);"Knowtherefore this day, and consider it in thine heart, that theLord He is God" (ibid. 36):" Know ye that the Lord is God" (Ps.c. 3). Thus the Law distinctly states that the highest kind ofworship to which we refer in this chapter, is only possible after theacquisition of the knowledge of God. For it is said," To love theLord your God, and to serve Him with all your heart and with allyour soul" (Deut. xi. 13), and, as we have shown several times,man's love of God is identical with His knowledge of Him. TheDivine service enjoined in these words must, accordingly, bepreceded by the love of God. Our Sages have pointed out to us thatit is a service in the heart, which explanation I understand to meanthis: man concentrates all his thoughts on the First Intellect, and isabsorbed in these thoughts as much as possible. David thereforecommands his son Solomon these two things, and exhorts himearnestly to do them: to acquire a true knowledge of God, and tobe earnest in His service after that knowledge has been acquired.For he says," And thou, Solomon my son, know thou the God ofthy father, and serve him with a perfect heart ... if thou seek him,he will be found of thee; but if thou forsake him, he will cast theeoff for ever" (1 Chron. xxviii. 9). The exhortation refers to, theintellectual conceptions, not to the imaginations: for the latter arenot called" knowledge," but" that which cometh into your mind"(Ezek. xx. 32). It has thus been shown that it must be man's aim,after having acquired the knowledge of God, to deliver himself upto Him, and to have his heart constantly filled with longing afterHim. He accomplishes this generally by seclusion and retirement.Every pious man should therefore seek retirement and seclusion,and should only in case of necessity associate with others.
Note.-- I have shown you that the intellect which emanates fromGod unto us is the link that joins us to God. You have it in yourpower to strengthen that bond, if you choose to do so, or to weakenit gradually, till it breaks if you prefer this. It will only becomestrong when you employ it in the love of God, and seek that love: itwill be weakened when you direct your thoughts to other things.You must know that even if you were the wisest man in respect tothe true knowledge of God, you break the bond between you andGod whenever you turn entirely your thoughts to the necessaryfood or any necessary business; you are then not with God, and Heis not with you: for that relation between you and Him is actuallyinterrupted in those moments. The pious were therefore particularto restrict the time in which they could not meditate upon the nameof God, and cautioned others about it, saying," Let not your mindsbe vacant from reflections upon God." In the same sense did Davidsay," I have set the Lord always before me; because he is at myright hand, I shall not be moved" (Ps. xvi. 8): i.e., I do not turn mythoughts away from God; He is like my right hand, which I do notforget even for a moment on account of the ease of its motions,and therefore I shall not be moved, I shall not fail.
We must bear in mind that all such religious acts as reading theLaw, praying, and the performance of other precepts, serveexclusively as the means of causing us to occupy and fill our mindwith the precepts of God, and free it from worldly business; for weare thus, as it were, in communication with God, and undisturbedby any other thing. If we, however, pray with the motion of ourlips, and our face toward the wall, but at the same time think ofour business; if we read the Law with our tongue, whilst our heartis occupied with the building of our house, and we do not think ofwhat we are reading; if we perform the commandments only withour limbs, we are like those who are engaged in digging in theground, or hewing wood in the forest, without reflecting on thenature of those acts, or by whom they are commanded, or what istheir object. We must not imagine that [in this way] we attain thehighest perfection; on the contrary, we are then like those inreference to whom Scripture says," Thou art near in their mouth,and far from their reins" (Jer. xii. 2).
I will now commence to show you the way how to educate andtrain yourselves in order to attain that great perfection.
The first thing you must do is this : Turn your thoughts away fromeverything while you read Shema. or during the Tefillat, and donot content yourself with being devout when you read the firstverse of Shema, or the first paragraph of the prayer. When youhave successfully practised this for many years, try in reading theLaw or listening to it, to have all your heart and all your thoughtoccupied with understanding what you read or hear. After sometime when you have mastered this, accustom yourself to have yourmind free from all other thoughts when you read any portion of theother books of the prophets, or when you say any blessing; and tohave your attention directed exclusively to the perception and theunderstanding of what you utter. When you have succeeded inproperly performing these acts of divine service, and you haveyour thought, during their performance, entirely abstracted fromworldly affairs, take then care that your thought be not disturbedby thinking of your wants or of superfluous things. In short, thinkof worldly matters when you eat, drink, bathe, talk with your wifeand little children, or when you converse with other people. Thesetimes, which are frequent and long, I think must suffice to you forreflecting on everything that is necessary as regards business,household, and health. But when you are engaged in theperformance of religious duties, have your mind exclusivelydirected to what you are doing.
When you are alone by yourself, when you are awake on yourcouch, be careful to meditate in such precious moments on nothingbut the intellectual worship of God, viz., to approach Him and tominister before Him in the true manner which I have described toyou-not in hollow emotions. This I consider as the highestperfection wise men can attain by the above training.
When we have acquired a true knowledge of God, and rejoice inthat knowledge in such a manner, that whilst speaking with others,or attending to our bodily wants, our mind is all that time withGod; when we are with our heart constantly near God, even whilstour body is in the society of men: when we are in that state whichthe Song on the relation between God and man poeticallydescribes in the following words:" I sleep, but my heart waketh: itis the voice of my beloved that knocketh" (Song v. 2) :-then wehave attained not only the height of ordinary prophets, but ofMoses, our Teacher, of whom Scripture relates :" And Mosesalone shall come near before the Lord 11 (ibid. xxxiv. 28):" But asfor thee, stand thou here by me" (Dent. V. 28). The meaning ofthese verses has been explained by us.
The Patriarchs likewise attained this degree of perfection; theyapproached God in such a manner that with them the name of Godbecame known in the world. Thus we read in Scripture:" The Godof Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.... This is Myname for ever" (Exod. iii. 15). Their mind was so identified withthe knowledge of God, that He made a lasting covenant with eachof them :" Then will I remember my covenant with Jacob," etc.(Lev. xxvi. 42). For it is known from statements made in Scripturethat these four, viz., the Patriarchs and Moses, had their mindsexclusively filled with the name of God, that is, with Hisknowledge and love; and that in the same measure was DivineProvidence attached to them and their descendants. When wetherefore find them also, engaged in ruling others, in increasingtheir property, and endeavouring to obtain possession of wealthand honour, we see in this fact a proof that when they wereoccupied in these things, only their bodily limbs were at work,whilst their heart and mind never moved away from the name ofGod. I think these four reached that high degree of perfection intheir relation to God, and enjoyed the continual presence of DivineProvidence, even in their endeavours to increase their property,feeding the flock, toiling in the field, or managing the house, onlybecause in all these things their end and aim was to approach Godas much as possible. It was the chief aim of their whole life tocreate a people that should know and worship God. Comp." For Iknow him, that he will command his children and his householdafter him" (Gen. xviii. 19). The object of all their labours was topublish the Unity of God in the world, and to induce people to loveHim; and it was on this account that they succeeded in reachingthat high degree; for even those [worldly] affairs were for them aperfect worship of God. But a person Eke myself must not imaginethat he is able to lead men up to this degree of perfection It is onlythe next degree to it that can be attained by means of theabove-mentioned training. And let us pray to God and beseechHim that He clear and remove from our way everything that formsan obstruction and a partition between us and Him, although mostof these obstacles are our own creation, as has several times beenshown in this treatise. Comp." Your iniquities have separatedbetween you and your God" (Isa. lix. 2).
An excellent idea presents itself here to me, which may serve toremove many doubts, and may help to solve many difficultproblems in metaphysics. We have already stated in the chapterswhich treat of Divine Providence, that Providence watches overevery rational being according to the amount of intellect whichthat being possesses. Those who are perfect in their perception ofGod, whose mind is never separated from Him, enjoy always theinfluence of Providence. But those who, perfect in their knowledgeof God, turn their mind sometimes away from God, enjoy thepresence of Divine Providence only when they meditate on God;when their thoughts are engaged in other matters, divineProvidence departs from them. The absence of Providence in thiscase is not like its absence in the case of those who do not reflecton God at all: it is in this case less intense, because when a personperfect in his knowledge [of God] is busy with worldly matters, hehas not knowledge in actuality, but only knowledge in potentiality[though ready to become actual]. This person is then like a trainedscribe when he is not writing. Those who have no knowledge ofGod are like those who are in constant darkness and have neverseen light. We have explained in this sense the words:" Thewicked shall be silent in darkness" (I Sam. ii. g), whilst those whopossess the knowledge of God, and have their thoughts entirelydirected to that knowledge, are, as it were, always in brightsunshine; and those who have the knowledge, but are at timesengaged in other themes, have then as it were a cloudy day: the sundoes not shine for them on account of the cloud that intervenesbetween them and God.
Hence it appears to me that it is only in times of such neglect thatsome of the ordinary evils befall a prophet or a perfect and piousman: and the intensity of the evil is proportional to the duration ofthose moments, or to the character of the things that thus occupytheir mind. Such being the case, the great difficulty is removedthat led philosophers to assert that Providence does not extend toevery individual, and that man is like any other living being in thisrespect, viz., the argument based on the fact that good and piousmen are afflicted with great evils. We have thus explained thisdifficult question even in accordance with the philosophers' ownprinciples. Divine Providence is constantly watching over thosewho have obtained that blessing which is prepared for those whoendeavour to obtain it. If man frees his thoughts from worldlymatters, obtains a knowledge of God in the right way, and rejoicesin that knowledge, it is impossible that any kind of evil shouldbefall him while he is with God, and God with him. When he doesnot meditate on God, when he is separated from God, then God isalso separated from him; then he is exposed to any evil that mightbefall him; for it is only that intellectual link with God that securesthe presence of Providence and protection from evil accidents.Hence it may occur that the perfect man is at times not happy,whilst no evil befalls those who are imperfect; in these cases whathappens to them is due to chance. This principle I find alsoexpressed in the Law. Comp." And I will hide my face them, andthey shall be devoured, and many evils and troubles shall betallthem: so that they will say in that day, Are not these evils comeupon us, because our God is not among us ?" (Dent. xxxi. 17). It isdear that we ourselves are the cause of this hiding of the face, andthat the screen that separates us from God is of our own creation.This is the meaning of the words:" And I will surely hide my facein that day, for all the evils which they shall have wrought" (ibid.ver. 18). There is undoubtedly no difference in this regard betweenone single person and a whole community. It is now clearlyestablished that the cause of our being exposed to chance, andabandoned to destruction like cattle, is to be found in ourseparation from God. Those who have their God dwelling in theirhearts, are not touched by any evil whatever. For God says:" Fearthou not, for I am with thee; be not dismayed, for I am thy God"(Isa. xli. 10)." When thou passest through the waters, I will be withthee; and through the rivers, they shall not overflow thee" (ibid.xlii. 2). For if we prepare ourselves, and attain the influence of theDivine Intellect, Providence is joined to us, and we are guardedagainst all evils. Comp." The Lord is on my side; I will not fear;what can man do unto me ?" (Ps. cxviii. 6)." Acquaint nowthyself with him, and be at peace" (job XXiL 2 1); i.e., turn untoHim, and you will be safe from all evil.
Consider the Psalm on mishaps, and see how the author describesthat great Providence, the protection and defence from all mishapsthat concern the body, both from those that are common to allpeople, and those that concern only one certain individual; fromthose that are due to the laws of Nature, and those that are causedby our fellow-men. The Psalmist says :" Surely he will deliverthee from the snare of the fowler, and from the noisomepestilence. He shall cover thee with his feathers, and under hiswings shalt thou trust: His truth shall be thy shield and buckler.Thou shalt not be afraid for the terror by night; nor for the arrowthat flieth by day" (Ps. xci. 3-5). The author then relates how Godprotects us from the troubles caused by men, saying, If you happento meet on your way with an army fighting with drawn swords,killing thousands at your left hand and myriads at your right hand,you will not suffer any harm; you will behold and see how Godjudges and punishes the wicked that are being slain, whilst youremain unhurt." A thousand shall fall at thy side, and ten thousandat thy right hand; but it shall not come nigh thee. Only with thineeyes shalt thou behold and see the reward of the wicked" (ibid.vers. 7, 8). The author then continues his description of the divinedefence and shelter, and shows the cause of this great protection,saying that such a man is well guarded" Because he hath set hislove upon me, therefore will I deliver him: I will set him on high,because he hath known my name" (ibid. ver. 14). We have shownin previous chapters that by the" knowledge of God's name," theknowledge of God is meant. The above passage may therefore beparaphrased as follows:" This man is well guarded, because hehath known me, and then (bi cbashak) loved me." You know thedifference between the two Hebrew terms that signify" to love,"ahab and hasbak. When a man's love is so intense that his thoughtis exclusively engaged with the object of his love, it is expressed inHebrew by the term hashak.
The philosophers have already explained how the bodily forces ofman in his youth prevent the development of moral principles. In agreater measure this is the case as regards the purity of thoughtwhich man attains through the perfection of those ideas that leadhim to an intense love of God. Man can by no means attain this solong as his bodily humours are hot. The more the forces of hisbody are weakened, and the fire of passion quenched, in the samemeasure does man's intellect increase in strength and light; hisknowledge becomes purer, and he is happy with his knowledge.When this perfect man is stricken in age and is near death, hisknowledge mightily increases, his joy in that knowledge growsgreater, and his love for the object of his knowledge more intense,and it is in this great delight that the soul separates from the body.To this state our Sages referred, when in reference to the death ofMoses, Aaron, and Miriam, they said that death was in these threecases nothing but a kiss. They say thus: We learn from the words,"And Moses the servant of the Lord died there in the land of Moabby the mouth of the Lord" (Deut. xxxiv. 5), that his death was akiss. The same expression is used of Aaron:" And Aaron the priestwent up into Mount Hor . . . by the mouth of the Lord, and diedthere" (Num. xxxiii. 38) Our Sages said that the same was thecase with Miriam; but the phrase" by the mouth of the Lord" isnot employed, because it was not considered appropriate to usethese words in the description of her death as she was a female.The meaning of this saying is that these three died in the midst ofthe pleasure derived from the knowledge of God and their greatlove for Him. When our Sages figuratively call the knowledge ofGod united with intense love for Him a kiss, they follow thewell-known poetical diction," Let him kiss me with the kisses ofhis mouth" (Song i. 2). This kind of death, which in truth isdeliverance from death, has been ascribed by our Sages to nonebut to Moses, Aaron, and Miriam. The other prophets and piousmen are beneath that degree: but their knowledge of God isstrengthened when death approaches. Of them Scripture says," Thyrighteousness shall go before thee; the glory of the Lord shall bethy reward" (Isa. lviii. 8). The intellect of these men remains thenconstantly in the same condition, since the obstacle is removedthat at times has intervened between the intellect and the object ofits action: it continues for ever in that great delight, which is notlike bodily pleasure. We have explained this in our work, andothers have explained it before us.
Try to understand this chapter, endeavour with all your might tospend more and more time in communion with God, or in theattempt to approach Him; and to reduce the hours which you spendin other occupations, and during which you are not striving tocome nearer unto Him. This instruction suffices for the object ofthis treatise.
CHAPTER LII
WE do not sit, move, and occupy ourselves when we are alone andat home, in the same manner as we do in the presence of a greatking; we speak and open our mouth as we please when we are withthe people of our own household and with our relatives, but not sowhen we are in a royal assembly. If we therefore desire to attainhuman perfection, and to be truly men of God, we must awakefrom our sleep, and bear in mind that the great king that is over us,and is always joined to us, is greater than any earthly king, greaterthan David and Solomon. The king that cleaves to us and embracesus is the Intellect that influences us, and forms the link between usand God. We perceive God by means of that light that He sendsdown unto us, wherefore the Psalmist says," In Thy light shall wesee light" (Ps. xxxvi. g): so God looks down upon us through thatsame light, and is always with us beholding and watching us onaccount of this light." Can any hide himself in secret places that Ishall not see him ?" (Jer. xxiii. 24). Note this particularly.
When the perfect bear this in mind, they will be filled with fear ofGod, humility, and piety, with true, not apparent, reverence andrespect of God, in such a manner that their conduct, even whenalone with their wives or in the bath, will be as modest as they arein public intercourse with other people. Thus it is related of ourrenowned Sages that even in their sexual intercourse with theirwives they behaved with great modesty. They also said," Who ismodest ? He whose conduct in the dark night is the same as in theday." You know also how much they warned us not to walkproudly, since" the fulness of the whole earth is His glory" (Isa.vi. 3). They thought that by these rules the above-mentioned ideawill be firmly established in the hearts of men, viz., that we arealways before God, and it is in the presence of His glory that we goto and fro. The great men among our Sages would not uncovertheir heads because they believed that God's glory was round themand over them; for the same reason they spoke little. In ourCommentary on the Sayings of the Fathers (chap. i. 17) we havefully explained how we have to restrict our speech. Comp." ForGod is in heaven and thou upon earth, therefore let thy words befew" (Eccles. v. i).
What I have here pointed out to you is the object of all ourreligious acts. For by [carrying out] all the details of the prescribedpractices, and repeating them continually, some few pious menmay attain human perfection. They will be filled with respect andreverence towards God; and bearing in mind who is with them,they will perform their duty. God declares in plain words that it isthe object of all religious acts to produce in man fear of God andobedience to His word-the state of mind which we havedemonstrated in this chapter for those who desire to know thetruth, as being our duty to seek. Comp." If thou wilt not observe todo all the words of this law that are written in this book, that thoumayest fear this glorious and fearful name, the Lord thy God"(Dent. xrvffi. 58). Consider how clearly it is stated here that theonly object and aim of" all the words of this law" is to [makeman] fear" the glorious and fearful name?' That this end isattained by certain acts we learn likewise from the phraseemployed in this verse:" If thou wilt not observe to do . . . thatthou mayest fear?' For this phrase clearly shows that fear of God isinculcated [into our hearts] when we act in accordance with thepositive and the negative precepts. But the truths which the Lawteaches us-the knowledge of God's Existence and Unitycreate in uslove of God, as we have shown repeatedly. You know howfrequently the Law exhorts us to love God. Comp." And thou shaltlove the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul,and with all thy might 11 (Deut. vi. 5). The two objects, love andfear of God, are acquired by two different means. The love is theresult of the truths taught in the Law, including the true knowledgeof the Existence of God; whilst fear of God is produced by thepractices prescribed in the Law. Note this explanation.
CHAPTER LIII
Tnis chapter treats of the meaning of three terms which we findnecessary to explain, viz., hesed (" loving kindness" ), mishpat ("judgment" ), and zedakah (" righteousness" ).
In our Commentary on the Sayings of the Fathers (chap. v. 7) wehave explained the expression hesed as denoting an excess [insome moral quality]. It is especially used of extraordinarykindness. Loving-kindness is practised in two ways: first, we showkindness to those who have no claim whatever upon us; secondly,we are kind to those to whom it is due, in a greater measure than isdue to them. In the inspired writings the term hesed occurs mostlyin the sense of showing kindness to those who have no claim to itwhatever. For this reason the term hesod is employed to expressthe good bestowed upon us by God :" I will mention theloving-kindness of the Lord" (Isa. lxiii. 7). On this account, thevery act of the creation is an act of God's loving-kindness." I havesaid, The Universe is built up in loving-kindness" (Ps. lxxxix. 3):i.e., the building up of the Universe is an act of loving-kindness.Also, in the enumeration of God's attributes, Scripture says:" Andabundant in loving-kindness" (Exod. xxxiv. 6).
The term zedakah is derived from zedek," righteousness": itdenotes the act of giving every one his due, and of showingkindness to every being according as it deserves. In Scripture,however, the expression zedakah is not used in the first sense, anddoes not apply to the payment of what we owe to others. When wetherefore give the hired labourer his wages, or pay a debt, we donot perform an act of zedakah. But we do perform an act ofzedakah when we fulfil those duties towards our fellow-men whichour moral conscience imposes upon us: e.g., when we heal thewound of the sufferer. Thus Scripture says, in reference to thereturning of the pledge [to the poor debtor]:" And it shall bezedakah (righteousness) unto thee" (Deut. xxiv. 11). When wewalk in the way of virtue we act righteously towards ourintellectual faculty, and pay what is due unto it; and because everyvirtue is thus zedakah, Scripture applies the term to the virtue offaith in God. Comp." And he believed in the Lord, and heaccounted it to him as righteousness" (Gen. xv. 6):" And it shallbe our righteousness" (Dent. vi. 25).
The noun mishpat," judgment," denotes the act of deciding upon acertain action in accordance with justice which may demand eithermercy or punishment.
We have thus shown that zesed denotes pure charity; zedakahkindness, prompted by a certain moral conscience in man, andbeing a means of attaining perfection for his soul, whilst mishpatmay in some cases find expression in revenge, in other cases inmercy.
In discussing the impropriety of admitting attributes of God (PartL, chap. liii., seq.), we stated that the divine attributes which occurin Scripture are attributes of His actions; thus He is called hasid,"kind," because He created the Universe; zaddik," righteous," onaccount of His mercy with the weak, in providing for every livingbeing according to its powers; and shofet," judge," on account ofthe relative good and the great relative evils that are decreed byGod's justice as directed by His wisdom. These three names occurin the Pentateuch:" Shall not the judge (shofet) of all the earth,"etc. (Gen. xviii. 25):" Righteous (Xaddik) and upright is he" (Dent.xxxii. 4):" Abundant in loving-kindness" (hesed, Exod. xxxiv. 6).
We intended in explaining these three terms to prepare the readerfor the next chapter.
CHAPTER LIV
THE term hokmah (" wisdom" ) in Hebrew is used of fourdifferent things
(1) It denotes the knowledge of those truths which lead to theknowledge of God. Comp." But where shall wisdom be found ?"(job xxviii. 12):" If thou seekest her like silver" (Prov. ii. 4). Theword occurs frequently in this sense.
(2) The expression hokmah denotes also knowledge of anyworkmanship. Comp." And every wise-hearted among you shallcome and make all that the Lord hath commanded" (Exod. xxxv.10);" And all the women that were wise-hearted did spin" (ibid.ver. 25).
(3) It is also used of the acquisition of moral principles. Comp."And teach his senators wisdom" (Ps. cv. 22):" With the ancient iswisdom" (job xii. 12): for it is chiefly the disposition for acquiringmoral principles that is developed by old age alone.
(4) It implies, lastly, the notion of cunning and subtlety; comp."Come on, let us deal wisely with them" (Exod. i. 10). In the samesense the term is used in the following passages :" And fetchedthence a wise woman" (2 Sam. xiv. 2):" They are wise to do evil"(Jer. iv. 22). It is possible that the Hebrew hokmah (" wisdom" )expresses the idea of cunning and planning, which may serve inone case as a means of acquiring intellectual perfection, or goodmoral principles; but may in another case produce skill inworkmanship, or even be employed in establishing bad opinionsand principles. The attribute hakam (" wise') is therefore given to aperson that possesses great intellectual faculties, or good moralprinciples, or skill in art: but also to persons cunning in evil deedsand principles.
According to this explanation, a person that has a true knowledgeof the whole Law is called wise in a double sense: he is wisebecause the Law instructs him in the highest truths, and secondly,because it teaches him good morals. But as the truths contained inthe Law are taught by way of tradition, not by a philosophicalmethod, the knowledge of the Law, and the acquisition of truewisdom, are treated in the books of the Prophets and in the wordsof our Sages as two different things; real wisdom demonstrates byproof those truths which Scripture teaches us by way of tradition.It is to this kind of wisdom, which proves the truth of the Law, thatScripture refers when it extols wisdom, and speaks of the highvalue of this perfection, and of the consequent paucity of mencapable of acquiring it, in sayings like these:" Not many are wise"(job xxxii. 9):" But where shall wisdom be found" (ibid. xxviii.12) ? In the writings of our Sages we notice likewise manypassages in which distinction is made between knowledge of theLaw and wisdom. They say of Moses, our Teacher, that he wasFather in the knowledge of the Law, in wisdom and in prophecy.When Scripture says of Solomon," And he was wiser than allmen" (I Kings v. 11), our Sages add," but not greater than Moses": and the phrase," than all men," is explained to mean," than allmen of his generation" : for this reason [only]" Heman, Chalcol,and Darda, the sons of Mahol," the renowned wise men of thattime, are named. Our Sages further say, that man has first to renderaccount concerning his knowledge of the Law, then concerning theacquisition of wisdom, and at last concerning the lessons derivedby logical conclusions from the Law, i.e., the lessons concerninghis actions. This is also the right order: we must first learn thetruths by tradition, after this we must be taught how to prove them,and then investigate the actions that help to improve man's ways.The idea that man will have to render account concerning thesethree things in the order described, is expressed by our Sages in thefollowing passage:" When man comes to the trial, he is firstasked, 'Hast thou fixed certain seasons for the study of the Law ?Hast thou been engaged in the acquisition of wisdom ? Hast thouderived from one thing another thing?"' This proves that our Sagesdistinguished between the knowledge of the Law on the one hand,and wisdom on the other, as the means of proving the lessonstaught in the Law by correct reasoning.
Hear now what I have to say after having given the aboveexplanation. The ancient and the modem philosophers have shownthat man can acquire four kinds of perfection. The first kind, thelowest, in the acquisition of which people spend their days, isperfection as regards property; the possession of money, garments,furniture, servants, land, and the like; the possession of the title ofa great king belongs to this class. There is no close connexionbetween this possession and its possessor; it is a perfectlyimaginary relation when on account of the great advantage aperson derives from these possessions, he says, This is my house,this is my servant, this is my money, and these are my hosts andarmies. For when he examines himself he will find that all thesethings are external, and their qualities are entirely independent ofthe possessor. When, therefore, that relation ceases, he that hasbeen a great king may one morning find that there is no differencebetween him and the lowest person, and yet no change has takenplace in the things which were ascribed to him. The philosophershave shown that he whose sole aim in all his exertions andendeavours is the possession of this kind of perfection, only seeksperfectly imaginary and transient things; and even if these remainhis property all his lifetime, they do not give him any perfection.
The second kind is more closely related to man's body than thefirst. It includes the perfection of the shape, constitution, and-formof mans body; the utmost evenness of temperaments, and theproper order and strength of his limbs. This kind of perfectionmust likewise be excluded from forming our chief aim; because itis a perfection of the body, and man does not possess it as man, butas a living being: he has this property besides in common with thelowest animal; and even if a person possesses the greatest possiblestrength, he could not be as strong as a mule, much less can he beas strong as a lion or an elephant; he, therefore, can at the utmosthave strength that might enable him to carry a heavy burden, orbreak a thick substance, or do similar things, in which there is nogreat profit for the body. The soul derives no profit whatever fromthis kind of perfection.
The third kind of perfection is more closely connected with manhimself than the second perfection. It includes moral perfection,the highest degree of excellency in man's character. Most of theprecepts aim at producing this perfection; but even this kind isonly a preparation for another perfection, and is not sought for itsown sake. For all moral principles concern the relation of man tohis neighbour; the perfection of man's moral principles is, as itwere, given to man for the benefit of mankind. Imagine a personbeing alone, and having no connexion whatever with any otherperson, all his good moral principles are at rest, they are notrequired, and give man no perfection whatever. These principlesare only necessary and useful when man comes in contact withothers.
The fourth kind of perfection is the true perfection of man: thepossession of the highest , intellectual faculties: the possession ofsuch notions which lead to true metaphysical opinions as regardsGod. With this perfection man has obtained his final object; itgives him true human perfection; it remains to him alone; it giveshim immortality, and on its account he is called man. Examine thefirst three kinds of perfection, you will find that, if you possessthem, they are not your property, but the property of others;according to the ordinary view, however, they belong to you and toothers. But the last kind of perfection is exclusively yours; no oneelse owns any part of it," They shall be only thine own, and notstrangers' with thee" (Prov. v. 17). Your aim must therefore be toattain this [fourth] perfection that is exclusively yours, and youought not to continue to work and weary yourself for that whichbelongs to others, whilst neglecting your soul till it has lost entirelyits original purity through the dominion of the bodily powers overit. The same idea is expressed in the beginning of those poems,which allegorically represent the state of our soul." My mother'schildren were angry with me; they made me the keeper of thevineyards; but mine own vineyard have I not kept" (Song i. 6).Also the following passage refers to the same subject," Lest thougive thine honour unto others, and thy years unto the cruel" (Prov.v. g).
The prophets have likewise explained unto us these things, andhave expressed the same opinion on them as the philosophers.They say distinctly that perfection in property, in health, or incharacter, is not a perfection worthy to be sought as a cause ofpride and glory for us: that the knowledge of God, i.e., truewisdom, is the only perfection which we should seek, and in whichwe should glorify ourselves. Jeremiah, referring to these four kindsof perfection, says:" Thus saith the Lord, Let not the wise manglory in his wisdom, neither let the mighty man glory in his might,let not the rich man glory in his riches; but let him that gloriethglory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth me" (jer. ix. 22,23). See how the prophet arranged them according to theirestimation in the eyes of the multitude. The rich man occupies thefirst rank; next is the mighty man; and then the wise man; that is,the man of good moral principles: for in the eyes of the multitude,who are addressed in these words, he is likewise a great man. Thisis the reason why the three classes are enumerated in this order.
Our Sages have likewise derived from this passage theabove-mentioned lessons, and stated the same theory that has beenexplained in this chapter, viz., that the simple term hokmah, as arule, denotes the highest aim of man, the knowledge of God; thatthose properties which man acquires, makes his peculiar treasure,and considers as his perfection, in reality do not include anyperfection: and that the religious acts prescribed in the Law, viz.,the various kinds of worship and the moral principles whichbenefit all people in their social intercourse with each other, do notconstitute the ultimate aim of man, nor can they be compared to it,for they are but preparations leading to it. Hear the opinion of ourSages on this subject in their own words. The passage occurs inBereskit Rabba, and runs thus," In one place Scripture says, 'Andall things that are desirable (hafazim) are not to be compared toher' (Prov. viii. 11); and in another place, 'And all things that thoudesirest (hafazeha) are not to be compared unto her '" (ibid. iii.15). By" things that are desirable" the performance of Divineprecepts and good deeds is to be understood, whilst" things thatthou desirest" refer to precious stones and pearls. Both-things thatare desirable, and things that thou desirest -- cannot be comparedto wisdom, but" in this let him that glorieth glory, that heunderstandeth and knoweth me." Consider how concise this sayingis, and how perfect its author; how nothing is here omitted of allthat we have put forth after lengthy explanations and preliminaryremarks.
Having stated the sublime ideas contained in that Scripturalpassage, and quoted the explanation of our Sages, we will nowcomplete what the remainder of that passage teaches us. Theprophet does not content himself with explaining that theknowledge of God is the highest kind of perfection: for if this onlyhad been his intention, he would have said," But in this let himwho glorieth glory, that he understandeth and knoweth me," andwould have stopped there; or he would have said," that heunderstandeth and knoweth me that I am One," or," that I have notany likeness," or," that there is none like me," or a similar phrase.He says, however, that man can only glory in the knowledge ofGod and in the knowledge of His ways and attributes, which areHis actions, as we have shown (Part 1. liv.) in expounding thepassage," Show me now thy ways" (Exod. xxxviii. 13). We arethus told in this passage that the Divine acts which ought to beknown, and ought to serve as a guide for our actions, are, hesed,"loving-kindness," mishpat," judgment," and zedakah,"righteousness." Another very important lesson is taught by theadditional phrase," in the earth." It implies a fundamentalprinciple of the Law: it rejects the theory of those who boldlyassert that God's providence does not extend below the sphere ofthe moon, and that the earth with its contents is abandoned, that"the Lord hath forsaken the earth" (Ez. viii. 12). It teaches, as hasbeen taught by the greatest of all wise men in the words," Theearth is the Lord's" (Exod. ix. 29), that His providence extends tothe earth in accordance with its nature, in the same manner as itcontrols the heavens in accordance with their nature. This isexpressed in the words," That I am the Lord which exerciseloving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness in the earth." Theprophet thus, in conclusion, says," For in these things I delight,saith the Lord," i.e., My object [in saying this) is that you shallpractise loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness in the earth.In a similar manner we have shown (Part I. liv.) that the object ofthe enumeration of God's thirteen attributes is the lesson that weshould acquire similar attributes and act accordingly. The object ofthe above passage is therefore to declare, that the perfection, inwhich man can truly glory, is attained by him when he hasacquired-as far as this is possible for man-the knowledge of God,the knowledge of His Providence, and of the manner in which itinfluences His creatures in their production and continuedexistence. Having acquired this knowledge he will then bedetermined always to seek loving-kindness, judgment, andrighteousness, and thus to imitate the ways of God. We haveexplained this many times in this treatise.
This is all that I thought proper to discuss in this treatise, andwhich I considered useful for men like you. I hope that, by the helpof God, you will, after due reflection, comprehend all the thingswhich I have treated here. May He grant us and all Israel with us toattain what He promised us," Then the eyes of the blind shall beopened, and the ears of the deaf shall be unstopped" (Isa. xxxv.5):" The people that walked in darkness have seen a great light;they that dwell in the shadow of death upon them hath the lightshined" (ibid. ix. 1).
God is near to all who call Him, if they call Him in truth, and turnto Him. He is found by every one who seeks Him, if he alwaysgoes towards Him, and never goes astray.
AMEN.
END.