"Guide For the
Perplexed"
Moses Maimonides
Translated by
Michael Friedlander, Ph.D.
Second edition revised throughout 1904
Note: This book was scanned and ocr'ed by Andrew Meit and David Reed.
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PART I.
II
On Genesis iii.5 III
On tabnit and temunah IV
On raah, hibbit and hamb V
On Exod. xxiv.10 VI
On ish and ishihah, ah and ahot VII
On yalad VIII
On makom IX
On kisse X
On 'alah, yarad XI
On yashah XII
On kam XIII
On 'amad XIV
On adam XVI
On Zur XVII
On Mishnah Hagigah ii.1 XVIII
On karab, naga', niggash, XIX
On male XX
On ram, nissa XXI
On 'abar XXII
On ba XXIII
On Yaza, sbub XXIV
On halak XXV
On shaken XXVI
On "The Torah speaketh the language of man" XXVII
On Targurn of Gen. xivi. 4 XXVIII
On regel XXIX
On 'azeb XXX
On akal XXXI,
XXXII On the Limit of Man's Intellect XXXIII
to XXXVI On the Study and the Teaching of Metaphysics XXXVII
On panim XXXVIII
On ahor XXXIX
On leb XL
On ruah XLI
On nefesh XLII
On hayyim-mavet XLIII
On kanaf XLIV
On 'ayin XLY
On shama' XLVI,
XLVII On the Attribution of Senses and Sensation, to God XLVIII
The Targum of shama' and raah XLIX
Figurative Expressions applied to Angels L
On Faith LI-LX
On Attributes LI
On the Necessity of Proving the Inadmissibility of Attributes in reference to
God LII
Classification of Attributes LIII
The Arguments of the Attrilltists LIV
On Exod. xxxiii. 13; xxxiv. 7. LV
On Attributes implying Corporeality, Emotion, Non-existence and Comparison LVI
On Attributes denoting Existence, Life, Power, Wisdom and Will LVII
On the Identity of the Essence of God and His Attributes LVIII
On the Negative Sense of the True Attributes of God LIX
On the Character of the Knowledge of God Consisting of Negations LX
On the Difference between Positive and Negative Attributes LXI
On the Names of God LXII
On the Divine Namea composed of Four, Twelve and Forty-two Letters LXIII
On Ehyeh, Yab, and Shaddai LXIV
On "The Name of the Lord," and" The Glory of God" LXV
On the phrase "God spake" LXVI
On Exod. xxxii. 16 LXVII
On shabat and nab LXVIII
On the Terms : The Intellectus, the Intelligens and the Intelligibile LXIX
On the Primal Cause LXX
On the attribute rokeb ba'arabor LXXI
The Origin of the Kalam LXXII
A Parallel between the Universe and Man. LXXIII
Twelve Propositions of the Kaldm LXXIV
Proofs of the Kalkm for the creatio ex nihilo LXXV
Proofs of the Kaldm for the Unity of God LXXVI
Proofs of the Kaldm for the Incorporeality of God |
PART II. I Philosophical proofs for
the Existence, Incorporeality, and Unity of the First Cause II On the Existence of
Intelligences or purely Spiritual Beings III The Author adopts the
Theory of Aristotle as least open to Objections IV The Spheres and the
Causes of their Motion V Agreement of the
Aristotelian Theory with the Teaching of Scripture VI What is meant by the
Scriptural Term "Angels" VII The Homonymity of the
term "Angel" VIII On the Music of the
Spheres IX On the Number of the
Heavenly Spheres X The Influence of the
Spheres upon the Earth manifesto itself in four different ways XI The Theory of
Eccentricity Preferable to that of Epicycles. XII On the Nature of the
Divine Influence and that of the Spheres XIII Three Different
Theories about the Beginning of the Universe XIV Seven Methods by which
the Philosophers sought to prove the Eternity of the Universe XV Aristotle does not
scientifically demonstrate his Theory XVI The Author refutes all
Objections to Creatio ex nihilo XVII The Laws of Nature
apply to Things Created, but do not regulate the Creative Act which produces
them XVIII Examinations of the
Proofs of Philosophers for the Eternity of the Universe XIX Design in Nature XX The Opinion of Aristotle
as regards Design in Nature XXI Explanation of the
Aristotelian Theory that the Universe is the necessary Result of the First
Cause XXII Objections to the Theory
of the Eternity of the Universe XXIII The Theory of Creatio
ex nihilo is preferable to that of the Eternity of the Universe XXIV Difficulty of
Comprehending the Nature and the Motion of the Spheres according to the
Theory of Aristotle XXV The Theory of Creation
is adopted because of its own XXVI Examination of a
passage from Pirke di-Rabbi Eliezer in reference to Creation XXVII The Theory of a
Future Destruction of the Universe is not part of the Religious Belief taught
in the Bible XXVIII Scriptural Teaching
is in favour of the Indestructibility of the Universe XXIX Explanation of
Scriptural Phrases implying the Destruction of Heaven and Earth XXX Philosophical
Interpretation of Genesis i.-iv. XXXI The Institution of the
Sabbath serves (1) to Teach the Theory of Creation, and (2) to promote Man's
Welfare XXXII Three Theories
concerning Prophecy XXXIII The Difference
between Moses and the other Israelites as regards the Revelation on Mount
Sinai XXXIV Explanation of Exodus
xxiii. 20 XXXV The Difference between
Moses and the other Prophets as regards the Miracles wrought by them XXXVI On the Mental,
Physical and Moral Faculties of the XXXVII On the Divine
Influence upon Man's Imaginative and Mental Faculties through the Active
Intellect XXXVIII Courage and
Intuition reach the highest degree of XXXIX Moses was the fittest
Prophet to Receive and Promulgate the Immutable Law, which succeeding Prophets
merely Taught and Expounded XL The Test of True
Prophecy XLI What is Meant by
"Vision" XLII Prophets Received
Direct Communication only in Dreams or Visions XLIII On the Allegories of
the Prophets XLIV On the Different Modes
in which Prophets Receive Divine Messages. XLV The Various Classes of
Prophets XLVI The Allegorical Acts
of Prophets formed Parts of Prophetic Visions. XLVII On the Figurative
Style of the Prophetic Writings XLVIII Scripture ascribes Phenomena directly produced by Natural Causes to God as the First Cause of all things |
PART III. I The "Four
Faces" are Human Faces with four different II The Hayyot and the
Ofannim Further Explanation of the
Hayyot and the Ofannim derived from Ezek. x. IV The rendering of Ofan by
Gilgal in the Targum of Jonathan . V The Vision of Ezekiel is
divided into three stages : (1) Hayyot (=the Spheres); (2) Ofannim (=Earthly
elements); and (3) the man above the Hayyot (=Intelligences) VI On the Difference
between the Vision of Ezekiel and that of Isaiah (vi.) VII The Different Ways in
which the Prophet perceived the Three Parts of the Mereabah (Chariot) VIII Man has the Power to
Control his Bodily Wants and Earthly Desires IX The Material Element in
Man Prevents him from Attaining Perfection X God is not the Creator of
Evil XI Man is the Cause of his
own Misfortunes XII Three Kinds of Evil :
(1) That caused by the Nature of Man; (2) Caused by Man to Man; (3) Caused by
Man to himself XIII The Universe has No
other Purpose than its own Existence XIV It is the Will of the
Creator that the Spheres regulate the Affairs of Mankind XV Impossible Things are
not ascribed to the Creator, but it in difficult to Prove the Impossibility
in each Individual Case XVI On God's Omniscience XVII Five Theories
concerning Providence XVIII Every Individual
Member of Mankind enjoys the Influence of Divine Providence in proportion to
his Intellectual Perfection XIX It is an ancient Error
to Assume that God takes no Notice of Man XX God's Knowledge is
Different from Man's Knowledge XXI The Creator's knowledge
of His Production is Perfect XXII Object of the Book of
job, and Explanation of the First Two XXIII Job and his Friends
Discuss the various Theories concerning Providence XXIV On Trials and
Temptations XXV The Actions of God are
Not Purposeless XXVI The Divine Precepts
Serve a certain Purpose XXVII The Object of the
Divine Precepts is to Secure the XXVIII This Object is
easily seen in some Precepts whilst in others it is only known after due
Reflection XXIX On the Sabeans or
Star-worshippers XXX It is one of the
Objects of the Law of Moses to Oppose Idolatry XXXI The Law Promotes the
Well-being of Man by teaching Truth, Morality and Social Conduct XXXII Why did God give Laws
to Oppose Idolatry instead of Uprooting it directly? XXXIII Another chief Object
of the Law is to Train Man in Mastering his Appetites and Desires XXXIV The Law is based on
the ordinary condition of man XXXV Division of the
Precepts into Fourteen Classes XXXVI First Class of
Precepts, to Know, Love and Fear God XXXVII Second Class, Laws
concerning Idolatry XXXVIII Third Class, Moral
Precepts XXXIX Fourth Class, Laws
relating to Charity XL Fifth Class,
Compensation for Injury and the Duty of XLI Sixth Class, Punishment
of the Sinner XLII Seventh Class, Equity
and Honesty XLIII Eighth Class, Sabbath
and Festivals XLIV Ninth Class, Prayer,
Ttejfllin, Zizit and Meenzah XLV Tenth Class, The
Temple, its Vessels and its Ministers XLVI Eleventh Class,
Sacrifices XLVII Twelfth Class,
Distinction between Clean and Unclean and on Purification XLVIII Thirteenth Class,
Dietary Laws XLIX Fourteenth Class,
Marriage Laws L On Scriptural Passages
with seemingly Purposeless Contents LI How God is worshipped by
a Perfect Man LII On the Fear of God LIII Explanation of Hesed
(Love), Mishpat (Judgment), and Zedakah (Righteousness) LIV On True Wisdom |
The first Edition of the English Translation of Maimonides Dainlat al-Hairin being exhausted without having fully supplied the demand, I prepared a second, revised edition of the Translation. In the new edition the three volumes of the first edition have been reduced to one volume by the elimination of the notes; besides Hebrew words and phrases have been eliminated or transliterated. By these changes the translator sought to produce a cheap edition in order to bring the work of Maimonides within the reach of all studcnts of Theology and Jewish Literature.
M. FRIEDLANDER. Jews College, July 1904.
PREFACE TO VOLUME ONE OF THE FIRST EDITION
IN compliance with a desire repeatedly expressed by the Committee of the Hebrew Literature Society, I have undertaken to translate Maimonides Dalalat al-Hairin, better known by the Hebrew title Moreh Nebuchim, and I offer the first instalment of my labours in the present volume. This contains--(1) A short Life of Maimonides, in which special attention is given to his alleged apostasy. (2) An analysis of the whole of the Moreh Nebuchim. (3) A translation of the First Part of this work from the Arabic, with explanatory and critical notes.
Parts of the Translation have been contributed by Mr. Joseph Abrahams, B.A., Ph.D., and Rev. H. Gollancz -- the Introduction by the former, and the first twenty--five chapters by the latter.
In conclusion I beg to tender my thanks to Rev. A. Loewy, Editor of the Publications of the Hebrew Literature Society, for his careful revision of my manuscript and proofs, and to Mr. A. Neubauer, M.A., for his kindness in supplying me with such information as I required.
M. FRIEDLANDER. ----------------------- THE LIFE OF MOSES MAIMONIDES
"BEFORE the sun of Eli had set the son of Samuel had risen." Before the voice of the prophets had ceased to guide the people, the Interpreters of the Law, the Doctors of the Talmud, had commenced their labours, and before the Academies of Sura and of Pumbadita were closed, centres of Jewish thought and learning were already flourishing in the far West. The circumstances which led to the transference of the head-quarters of Jewish learning from the East to the West in the tenth century are thus narrated in the Sefer ha-kabbalah of Rabbi Abraham ben David:
"After the death of Hezekiah, the head of the Academy and Prince of the Exile, the academies were closed and no new Geonim were appointed. But long before that time Heaven had willed that there should be a discontinuance of the pecuniary gifts which used to be sent from Palestine, North Africa and Europe. Heaven had also decreed that a ship sailing from Bari should be captured by Ibn Romahis, commander of the naval forces of Abd-er-rahman al-nasr. Four distinguished Rabbis were thus made prisoners -- Rabbi Hushiel, father of Rabbi Hananel, Rabbi Moses, father of Rabbi Hanok, Rabbi Shemarjahu, son of Rabbi Ellisanan, and a fourth whose name has not been recorded. They were engaged in a mission to collect subsidies in aid of the Academy in Sura. The captor sold them as slaves; Rabbi Tiushiel was carried to Kairuan, R. Shemarjahu was left in Alexandria, and R. Moses was brought to Cordova. These slaves were ransomed by their brethren and were soon placed in important positions. When Rabbi Moses was brought to Cordova, it was supposed that he was uneducated. In that city there was a synagogue known at that time by the name of Keneseet ha-midrash, and Rabbi Nathan, renowned for his great piety, was the head of the congregation. The members of the community used to hold meetings at which the Talmud was read and discussed. One day when Rabbi Nathan was expounding the Talmud and was unable to give a satisfactory explanation of the passage under discussion, Rabbi Moses promptly removed the difficulty and at the same time answered several questions whch were submitted to him. Thereupon R. Nathan thus addressed the assembly :--'I am no longer your leader; that stranger in sackcloth shall henceforth be my teacher, and you shall appoint him to be your chief.' The admiral, on hearing of the high attainments of his prisoner, desired to revoke the sale, but the king would not permit this retraction, being pleased to learn that his Jewish subjects were no longer dependent for their religious instruction on the schools in the East?
Henceforth the schools in the West asserted their independence, and even surpassed the parent institutions. The Caliphs, mostly opulent, gave every encouragement to philosophy and poetry; and, being generally liberal in sentiment, they enrertained kindly feelings towards their Jewish subjects. These were allowed to compete for the acquisition of wealth and honour on equal terms with their Mohammedan fellow-citizens. Philosophy and poetry were consequently cultivated by the Jews with the same zest as by the Arabs. Ibn Gabirol, Ibn Hasdai, Judah ha-levi, Hananel, Alfasi, the Ibn Ezras, and others who flourished in that period were the ornament of their age, and the pride of the Jews at all times. The same favourable condition was maintained during the reign of the Omeyades; but when the Moravides and the Almohades came into power, the horizon darkened once more, and misfortunes threatened to destroy the fruit of several centuries. Amidst this gloom there appeared a brilliant luminary which sent forth rays of light and comfort: this was Moses Maimonides.
Moses, the son of Maimon, was born at Cordova, on the 14th of Nisan, 4895 (March 30, 1135). Although the date of his birth has been recorded with the utmost accuracy, no trustworthy notice has been preserved concerning the early period of his life. But his entire career is a proof that he did not pass his youth in idleness; his education must have been in harmony with the hope of his parents, that one day he would, like his father and forefathers, hold the honourable office of Dayyan or Rabbi, and distinguish himself in theological learning. It is probable that the Bible and the Talmud formed the chief subjects of his study; but he unquestionably made the best use of the opportunities which Mohammedan Spain, and especially Cordova, afforded him for the acquisition of general knowledge. It is not mentioned in any of his writings who were his teachers ; his father, as it seems, was his principal guide and instructor in many branches of knowledge. David Conforte, in his historical work, Kore ha-dorot, states that Maimonides was the pupil of two eminent men, namely, Rabbi Joseph Ibn Migash and Ibn Roshd (Averroes); that by the former he was instructed in the Talmud, and by the latter in philosophy. This statement seems to be erroneous, as Maimonides was only a child at the time when Rabbi Joseph died, and already far advanced in years when he became acquainted with the writings of Ibn Roshd. The origin of this mistake, as regards Rabbi Joseph, can easily be traced. Maimonides in his Mishneh Tora, employs, in reference to R. Isaac Alfasi and R. Joseph, the expression "my teachers" (rabbotai), and this expression, by which he merely describes his indebtedness to their writings, has been taken in its literal meaning.
Whoever his teachers may have been, it is evident that he was well prepared by them for his future mission. At the age of twenty-three he entered upon his literary career with a treatise on the Jewish Calendar. It is unknown where this work was composed, whether in Spain or in Africa. The author merely states that he wrote it at the request of a friend, whom he, however, leaves unnamed. The subject was generally considered to be very abstruse, and to involve a thorough knowledge of mathematics. Maimonides must, therefore, even at this early period, have been regarded as a profound scholar by those who knew him. The treatise is of an elementary character.--It was probably about the same time that he wrote, in Arabic, an explanation of Logical terms, Millot higgayon, which Moses Ibn Tibbon translated into Hebrew.
The earlier period of his life does not seem to have been marked by any incident worth noticing. It may, however, be easily conceived that the later period of his life, which was replete with interesting incidents, engaged the exclusive attention of his biographers. So much is certain, that his youth was beset with trouble and anxiety ; the peaceful development of science and philosophy was disturbed by wars raging between Mohammedans and Christians, and also between the several Mohammedan sects. The Moravides, who had succeeded the Omeyades, were opposed to liberality and toleration ; but they were surpassed in cruelty and fanaticism by their successors. Cordova was taken by the Almohades in the year 1148, when Maimonides was about thirteen years old. The victories of the Almohades, first under the leadership of the Mahadi Ibn Tamurt, and then under Abd-almumen, were, according to all testimonies, attended by acts of excessive intolerance. Abd-al-mumen would not suffer in his dominions any other faith but the one which he himself confessed. Jews and Christians had the choice between Islam and emigration or a martyr's death. The Sefer kabbalah contains the following description of one of the persecutions which then occurred:
"After the death of R. Joseph ha-levi the study of the Torah was interrupted, although he left a son and a nephew, both of whom had under his tuition become profound scholars. 'The righteous man (R. Joseph) was taken away on account of the approaching evils. After the death of R. Joseph there came for the Jews a time of oppression and distress. They quitted their homes, ' Such as were for death, to death, and such as were for the sword, to the sword ; and such as were for the famine, to the famine, and such as were for the captivity, to the captivity' ; and--it might be added to the words of Jeremiah (xv. 2)-- 'such as were for apostasy, to apostasy.' All this happened through the sword of Ibn Tamurt, who, in 4902 (1142), determined to blot out the name of Israel, and actually left no trace of the Jews in any part of his empire."
Ibn Verga in his work on Jewish martyrdom, in Shebet Jehudah, gives the following account of events then happening:-- "In the year 4902 the armies of Ibn Tamurt made their appearance. A proclamation was issued that any one who refused to adopt Islam would be put to death, and his property would be confiscated. Thereupon the Jews assembled at the gate of the royal palace and implored the king for mercy. He answered -- 'It is because I have compassion on you, that I command you to become Muslemim; for I desire to save you from eternal punishment.' The Jews replied -- 'Our salvation depends on our observance of the Divine Law; you are the master of our bodies and of our property, but our souls will be judged by the King who gave them to us, and to whom they will return; whatever be our future fate, you, O king, will not be held responsible for it.' 'I do not desire to argue with you,' said the king; 'for I know you will argue according to your own religion. It is my absolute will that you either adopt my religion or be put to death. The Jews then proposed to emigrate, but the king would not allow his subjects to serve another king. In vain did the Jews implore the nobles to intercede in their behalf; the king remained inexorable. Thus many congregations forsook their religion; but within a month the king came to a sudden death ; the son, believing that his father had met with an untimely end as a punishment for his cruelty to the Jews, assured the involuntary converts that it would be indifferent to him what religion they professed. Hence many Jews returned at once to the religion of their fathers, while others hesitated for some time, from fear that the king meant to entrap the apparent converts." From such records it appears that during these calamities some of the Jews fled to foreign countries, some died as martyrs, and many others submitted for a time to outward conversion. Which course was followed by the family of Maimon ? Did they sacrifice personal comfort and safety to their religious conviction, or did they, on the contrary, for the sake of mere worldly considerations dissemble their faith and pretend that they completely submitted to the dictates of the tyrant ? An answer to this question presents itself in the following note which Maimonides has appended to his commentary on the Mishnah: "I have now finished this work in accordance with my promise, and I fervently beseech the Almighty to save us from error. If there be one who shall discover an inaccuracy in this Commentary or shall have a better explanation to offer, let my attention be directed unto it; and let me be exonerated by the fact that I have worked with far greater application than any one who writes for the sake of pay and profit, and that I have worked under the most trying circumstances. For Heaven had ordained that we be exiled, and we were therefore driven about from place to place; I was thus compelled to work at the Commentary while travelling by land, or crossing the sea. It might have sufficed to mention that during that time I, in addition, was engaged in other studies, but I preferred to give the above explanation in order to encourage those who wish to criticise or annotate the Commentary, and at the same time to account for the slow progress of this work. I, Moses, the son of Maimon, commenced it when I was twenty-three years old, and finished it in Egypt, at the age of thirty[-three] years, in the year 1479 Sel.(1168)."
The Sefer Haredim of R. Eleazar Askari of Safed contains the following statement of Maimonides:-- "On Sabbath evening, the 4th of Iyyar, 4925 (1165), I went on board; on the following Sabbath the waves threatened to destroy our lives. . . . On the 3rd of Sivan, I arrived safely at Acco, and was thus rescued from apostasy. . . . On Tuesday, the 4th of Marheshvan, 4926, I left Acco, arrived at Jerusalem after a journey beset with difficulties and with dangers, and prayed on the spot of the great and holy house on the 4th, 5th, and 6th of Marbeshvan. On Sunday, the 9th of that month, I left Jerusalem and visited the cave of Machpelah, in Hebron."
From these two statements it may be inferred that in times of persecution Maimonides and his family did not seek to protect their lives and property by dissimulation. They submitted to the troubles of exile in order that they might remain faithful to their religion. Carmoly, Geiger, Munk, and others are of opinion that the treatise of Maimonides on involuntary apostasy, as well as the accounts of some Mohammedan authors, contain strong evidence to show that there was a time when the family of Maimon publicly professed their belief in Mohammed. A critical examination of these documents compels us to reject their evidence as inadmissible. -- After a long period of trouble and anxiety, the family of Maimon arrived at Fostat, in Egypt, and settled there. David, the brother of Moses Maimonides, carried on a trade in precious stones, while Moses occupied himself with his studies and interested himself in the communal affairs of the Jews.
It appears that for some time Moses was supported by his brother, and when this brother died, he earned a living by practising as a physician; but he never sought or derived any benefit from his services to his community, or from his correspondence or from the works he wrote for the instruction of his brethren; the satisfaction of being of service to his fellow-creatures was for him a sufficient reward.
The first public act in which Maimonides appears to have taken a leading part was a decree promulgated by the Rabbinical authorities in Cairo in the year 1167. The decree begins as follows -- "In times gone by, when storms and tempests threatened us, we used to wander about from place to place but by the mercy of the Almighty we have now been enabled to find here a resting-place. On our arrival, we noticed to our great dismay that the learned were disunited; that none of them turned his attention to the needs of the congregation. We therefore felt it our duty to undertake the task of guiding the holy flock, of inquiring into the condition of the community, of "reconciling the hearts of the fathers to their children," and of correcting their corrupt ways. The injuries are great, but we may succeed in effecting a cure, and--in accordance with the words of the prophet-- I will seek the lost one, and that which has been cast out I will bring back, and the broken one I will cure' (Micah iv. 6). When we therefore resolved to take the management of the communal affairs into our hands, we discovered the existence of a serious evil in the midst of the community," etc.
lt was probably about that time that Maimon died. Letters of condolence were sent to his son Moses from all sides, both from Mohammedan and from Christian countries ; in some instances the letters were several months on their way before they reached their destination.
The interest which Maimonides now took in communal affairs did not prevent him from completing the great and arduous work, the Commentary on the Mishnah, which he had begun in Spain and continued during his wanderings in Africa. In this Commentary he proposed to give the quintessence of the Gemara, to expound the meaning of each dictum in the Mishnah, and to state which of the several opinions had received the sanction of the Talmudical authorities. His object in writing this work was to enable those who are not disposed to study the Gemara, to understand the Mishnah, and to facilitate the study of the Gemara for those who are willing to engage in it. The commentator generally adheres to the explanations given in the Gemara, and it is only in cases where the halakah, or practical law, is not affected, that he ventures to dissent. He acknowledges the benefit he derived from such works of his predecessors as the Halakot of Alfasi, and the writings of the Geonim, but afterwards he asserted that errors which were discovered in his works arose from his implicit reliance on those authorities. His originality is conspicuous in the Introduction and in the treatment of general principles, which in some instances precedes the exposition of an entire section or chapter, in others that of a single rule. The commentator is generally concise, except when occasion is afforded to treat of ethical and theological principles, or of a scientific subject, such as weights and measures, or mathematical and astronomical problems. Although exhortations to virtue and warnings against vice are found in all parts of his work, they are especially abundant in the Commentary on Abot, which is prefaced by a separate psychological treatise, called The Eight Chapters. The dictum "He who speaketh much commits a sin," elicited a lesson on the economy of speech; the explanation of 'olam ha-ba in the treatise Sanhedrin (xi. 1) led him to discuss the principles of faith, and to lay down the thirteen articles of the Jewish creed. The Commentary was written in Arabic, and was subsequently translated into Hebrew and into other languages. The estimation in which the Commentary was held may be inferred from the following fact: When the Jews in Italy became acquainted with its method and spirit, through a Hebrew translation of one of its parts, they sent to Spain in search of a complete Hebrew version of the Commentary. R. Simbah, who had been entrusted with the mission, found no copy extant, but he succeeded, through the influence of Rabbi Shelomoh ben Aderet, in causing a Hebrew translation of this important work to be prepared.-- In the Introduction, the author states that he has written a Commentary on the Babylonian Talmud treatise Hullin and on nearly three entire sections, viz., Moed, Nashim, and Nezikin. Of all these Commentaries only the one on Rosh ha-shanah is known.
In the year 1572 Maimonides wrote the Iggeret Teman, or Petab-tikvab ("Letter to the Jews in Yemen," or "Opening of hope") in response to a letter addressed to him by Rabbi Jacob al-Fayumi on the critical condition of the Jews in Yemen. Some of these Jews had been forced into apostasy others were made to believe that certain passages in the Bible alluded to the mission of Mohammed; others again had been misled by an impostor who pretended to be the Messiah. The character and style of Maimonides reply appear to have been adapted to the intellectual condition of the Jews in Yemen, for whom it was written. These probably read the Bible with Midrashic commentaries, and preferred the easy and attractive Agadah to the more earnest study of the Halakah. It is therefore not surprising that the letter contains remarks and interpretations which cannot be reconciled with the philosophical and logical method by which all the other works of Maimonides are distinguished. After a few complimentary words, in which the author modestly disputes the justice of the praises lavished upon him, he attempts to prove that the present sufferings of the Jews, together with the numerous instances of apostasy, were foretold by the prophets, especially by Daniel, and must not perplex the faithful. It must be borne in mind, he continues, that the attempts made in past times to do away with the Jewish religion, had invariably failed ; the same would be the fate of the present attempts ; for " religious persecutions are of but short duration." The arguments which profess to demonstrate that in certain Biblical passages allusion is made to Mohammed, are based on interpretations which are totally opposed to common sense. He urges that the Jews, faithfully adhering to their religion, should impress their children with the greatness of the Revelation on Mount Sinai, and of the miracles wrought through Moses; they also should remain firm in the belief that God will send the Messiah to deliver their nation, but they must abandon futile calculations of the Messianic period, and beware of impostors. Although there be signs which indicate the approach of the promised deliverance, and the times seem to be the period of the last and most cruel persecution mentioned in the visions of Daniel (xi. and xii.), the person in Yemen who pretends to be the Messiah is an impostor, and if care be not taken, he is sure to do mischief. Similar impostors in Cordova, France, and Africa, have deceived the multitude and brought great troubles upon the Jews.-- Yet, inconsistently with this sound advice the author gives a positive date of the Messianic time, on the basis of an old tradition; the inconsistency is so obvious that it is impossible to attribute this passage to Maimonides himself. It is probably spurious, and has, perhaps, been added by the translator. With the exception of the rhymed introduction, the letter was written in Arabic, "in order that all should be able to read and understand it"; for that purpose the author desires that copies should be made of it, and circulated among the Jews. Rabbi Nahum, of the Maghreb, translated the letter into Hebrew.
The success in the first great undertaking of explaining the Mishnah encouraged Maimonides to propose to himself another task of a still more ambitious character. In the Commentary on the Mishnah, it was his object that those who were unable to read the Gemara should be made acquainted with the results obtained by the Amoraim in the course of their discussions on the Mishnah. But the Mishnah, with the Commentary, was not such a code of laws as might easily be consulted in cases of emergency; only the initiated would be able to find the section, the chapter, and the paragraph in which the desired information could be found. The halakab had, besides, been further developed since the time when the Talmud was compiled. The changed state of things had suggested new questions ; these were discussed and settled by the Geonim, whose decisions, being contained in special letters or treatises, were not generally accessible. Maimonides therefore undertook to compile a complete code, which would contain, in the language and style of the Mishnah, and without discussion, the whole of the Written and the Oral Law, all the precepts recorded in the Talmud, Sifra, Sifre and Tosefta, and the decisions of the Geonim. According to the plan of the author, this work was to present a solution of every question touching the religious, moral, or social duties of the Jews. It was not in any way his object to discourage the study of the Talmud and the Midrash; he only sought to diffuse a knowledge of the Law amongst those who, through incapacity or other circumstances, were precluded from that study. In order to ensure the completeness of the code, the author drew up a list of the six hundred and thirteen precepts of the Pentateuch, divided them into fourteen groups, these again he subdivided, and thus showed how many positive and negative precepts were contained in each section of the Mishneh torah. The principles by which he was guided in this arrangement were laid down in a separate treatise, called Sefer ha-mizvot. Works of a similar kind, written by his predecessors, as the Halakot gedolot of R. Shimon Kahira, and the several Azbarot were, according to Maimonides, full of errors, because their authors had not adopted any proper method. But an examination of the rules laid down by Maimonides and of their application leads to the conclusion that his results were not less arbitrary; as has, in fact, been shown by the criticisms of Nahmanides. The Sefer ha-mizvot was written in Arabic, and thrice translated into Hebrew, namely, by Rabbi Abraham ben Hisdai, Rabbi Shelomoh ben Joseph ben Job, and Rabbi Moses Ibn Tibbon. Maimonides himself desired to translate the book into Hebrew, but to his disappointment he found no time.
This Sefer ha-mizvot was executed as a preparation for his principal work, the Mishneh Torah, or Yad ha-hazakah, which consists of an Introduction and fourteen Books. In the Introduction the author first describes the chain of tradition from Moses to the close of the Talmud, and then he explains his method in compiling the work. He distinguishes between the dicta found in the Talmud, Sifre, Sifra, or Tosefta, on the one hand, and the dicta of the Geonim on the other; the former were binding on all Jews, the latter only as far as their necessity and their utility or the authority of their propounders was recognized. Having once for all stated the sources from which he compiled his work, he did not deem it necessary to name in each case the authority for his opinion or the particular passage from which he derived his dictum. Any addition of references to each paragraph he probably considered useless to the uninformed and superfluous to the learned. At a later time he discovered his error, he being himself unable to find again the sources of some of his decisions. Rabbi Joseph Caro, in his commentary on the Mishneh Torah, termed Keseph Mishneb, remedied this deficiency. The Introduction is followed by the enumeration of the six hundred and thirteen precepts and a description of the plan of the work, its division into fourteen books, and the division of the latter into sections, chapters, and paragraphs.
According to the author, the Mishneh Torah is a mere compendium of the Talmud; but he found sufficient opportunities to display his real genius, his philosophical mind, and his ethical doctrines. For in stating what the traditional Law enjoined he had to exercise his own judgment, and to decide whether a certain dictum was meant to be taken literally or figuratively whether it was the final decision of a majority or the rejected opinion of a minority; whether it was part of the Oral Law or a precept founded on the scientific views of a particular author; and whether it was of universal application or was only intended for a special period or a special locality. The first Book, Sefer ha-madda', is the embodiment of his own ethical and theological theories, although he frequently refers to the Sayings of our Sages, and employs the phraseology of the Talmud. Similarly, the section on the Jewish Calendar, Hilkot ha-'ibur, may be considered as his original work. In each group of the halakot, its source, a certain passage of the Pentateuch, is first quoted, with its traditional interpretation, and then the detailed rules follow in systematic order. The Mishneh Torah was written by the author in pure Hebrew; when subsequently a friend asked him to translate it into Arabic, he said he would prefer to have his Arabic writings translated into Hebrew instead of the reverse. The style is an imitation of the Mishnah he did not choose, the author says, the philosophical style, because that would be unintelligible to the common reader; nor did he select the prophetic style, because that would not harmonize with the subject.
Ten years of hard work by day and by night were spent in the compilation of this code, which had originally been undertaken for "his own benefit, to save him in his advanced age the trouble and the necessity of consulting the Talmud on every occasion." Maimonides knew very well that his work would meet with the opposition of those whose ignorance it would expose, also of those who were incapable of comprehending it, and of those who were inclined to condemn every deviation from their own preconceived notions. But he had the satisfaction to learn that it was well received in most of the congregations of Israel, and that there was a general desire to possess and study it. This success confirmed him in his hope that at a later time, when all cause for jealousy would have disappeared, the Mishneh Torah would be received by all Jews as an authoritative code. This hope has not been realized. The genius, earnestness, and zeal of Maimonides are generally recognized; but there is no absolute acceptance of his dicta. The more he insisted on his infallibility, the more did the Rabbinical authorities examine his words and point out errors wherever they believed that they could discover any. It was not always from base motives, as contended by Maimonides and his followers, that his opinions were criticised and rejected. The language used by Rabbi Abraham ben David in his notes (hasagot) on the Mishneh Torah appears harsh and disrespectful, if read together with the text of the criticised passage, but it seems tame and mild if compared with expressions used now and then by Maimonides about men who happened to hold opinions differing from his own.
Maimonides received many complimentary letters, congratulating him upon his success; but likewise letters with criticisms and questions respecting individual balakot. In most cases he had no difficulty in defending his position. From the replies it must, however, be inferred that Maimonides made some corrections and additions, which were subsequently embodied in his work. The letters addressed to him on the Mishneh Torah and on other subjects were so numerous that he frequently complained of the time he had to spend in their perusal, and of the annoyance they caused him; but "he bore all this patiently, as he had learned in his youth to bear the yoke." He was not surprised that many misunderstood his words, for even the simple words of the Pentateuch, "the Lord is one," had met with the same fate. Some inferred from the fact that he treated fully of 'Olam ha-ba, "the future state of the soul," and neglected to expatiate on the resurrection of the dead, that he altogether rejected that principle of faith. They therefore asked Rabbi Samuel ha-levi of Bagdad to state his opinion; the Rabbi accordingly discussed the subject; but, according to Maimonides, he attempted to solve the problem in a very unsatisfactory manner. The latter thereupon likewise wrote a treatise "On the Resurrection of the Dead," in which he protested his adherence to this article of faith. He repeated the opinion he had stated in the Commentary on the Mishnah and in the Mishneh Torah, but "in more words; the same idea being reiterated in various forms, as the treatise was only intended for women and for the common multitude."
These theological studies engrossed his attention to a great extent, but it did not occupy him exclusively. In a letter addressed to R. Jonathan, of Lunel, he says: "Although from my birth the Torah was betrothed to me, and continues to be loved by me as the wife of my youth, in whose love I find a constant delight, strange women whom I at first took into my house as her handmaids have become her rivals and absorb a portion of my time." He devoted himself especially to the study of medicine, in which he distinguished himself to such a degree, according to Alkifti, that " the King of the Franks in Ascalon wanted to appoint him as his physician." Maimonides declined the honour. Alfadhel, the Vizier of Saladin king of Egypt, admired the genius of Maimonides, and bestowed upon him many distinctions. The name of Maimonides was entered on the roll of physicians, he received a pension, and was introduced to the court of Saladin. The method adopted in his professional practice he describes in a letter to his pupil, Ibn Aknin, as follows: "You know how difficult this profession is for a conscientious and exact person who only states what he can support by argument or authority." This method is more fully described in a treatise on hygiene, composed for Alfadhel, son of Saladin, who was suffering from a severe illness and had applied to Maimonides for advice. In a letter to Rabbi Samuel Ibn Tibbon he alludes to the amount of time spent in his medical practice, and says I reside in Egypt (or Fostat) ; the king resides in Cairo, which lies about two Sabbath-day journeys from the first-named place. My duties to the king are very heavy. I am obliged to visit him every day, early in the morning; and when he or any of his children or the inmates of his harem are indisposed, I dare not quit Cairo, but must stay during the greater part of the day in the palace. It also frequently happens that one or two of the royal officers fall sick, and then I have to attend them. As a rule, I go to Cairo very early in the day, and even if nothing unusual happens I do not return before the afternoon, when I am almost dying with hunger; but I find the antechambers filled with Jews and Gentiles, with nobles and common people, awaiting my return," etc.
Notwithstanding these heavy professional duties of court physician, Maimonides continued his theological studies. After having compiled a religious guide -- Mishneh Torah -- based on Revelation and Tradition, he found it necessary to prove that the principles there set forth were confirmed by philosophy. This task he accomplished in his Dalalat al-hairin, "The Guide for the Perplexed," of which an analysis will be given below. It was composed in Arabic, and written in Hebrew characters. Subsequently it was translated into Hebrew by Rabbi Samuel Ibn Tibbon, in the lifetime of Maimonides, who was consulted by the translator on all difficult passages. The congregation in Lunel, ignorant of Ibn Tibbon's undertaking, or desirous to possess the most correct translation of the Guide, addressed a very flattering letter to Maimonides, requesting him to translate the work into Hebrew. Maimonides replied that he could not do so, as he had not sufficient leisure for even more pressing work, and that a translation was being prepared by the ablest and fittest man, Rabbi Samuel Ibn Tibbon. A second translation was made later on by Jehudah Alharizi. The Guide delighted many, but it also met with much adverse criticism on account of the peculiar views held by Maimonides concerning angels, prophecy, and miracles, especially on account of his assertion that if the Aristotelian proof for the Eternity of the Universe had satisfied him, he would have found no difficulty in reconciling the Biblical account of the Creation with that doctrine. The controversy on the Guide continued long after the death of Maimonides to divide the community, and it is difficult to say how far the author's hope to effect a reconciliation between reason and revelation was realized. His disciple, Joseph Ibn Aknin, to whom the work was dedicated, and who was expected to derive from it the greatest benefit, appears to have been disappointed. His inability to reconcile the two antagonistsic elements of faith and science, he describes allegorically in the form of a letter addressed to Maimonides, in which the following passage occurs: "Speak, for I desire that you be justifled; if you can, answer me. Some time ago your beloved daughter, the beautiful and charming Kimah, obtained grace and favour in my sight, and I betrothed her unto me in faithfulness, and married her in accordance with the Law, in the presence of two trustworthy witnesses, viz., our master, Abd-allah and Ibn Roshd. But she soon became faithless to me; she could not have found fault with me, yet she left me and departed from my tent. She does no longer let me behold her pleasant countenance or hear her melodious voice. You have not rebuked or punished her, and perhaps you are the cause of this misconduct. Now, 'send the wife back to the man, for he is' -- or might become -- 'a prophet; he will pray for you that you may live, and also for her that she may be firm and steadfast. If, however, you do not send her back, the Lord will punish you. Therefore seek peace and pursue it; listen to what our Sages said: 'Blessed be he who restores to the owner his lost property'; for this blessing applies in a higher degree to him who restores to a man his virtuous wife, the crown of her husband." Maimonides replied in the same strain, and reproached his "son-in-law " that he falsely accused his wife of faithlessness after he had neglected her; but he restored him is wife with the advice to be more cautious in future. In another letter Maimonides exhorts Ibn Aknin to study his works, adding, "apply yourself to the study of the Law of Moses; do not neglect it, but, on the contrary, devote to it the best and the most of your time, and if you tell me that you do so, I am satisfied that you are on the right way to eternal bliss."
Of the letters written after the completion of the "Guide," the one addressed to the wise men of Marseilles (1194) is especially noteworthy. Maimonides was asked to give his opinion on astrology. He regretted in his reply that they were not yet in the possession of his Mishneh Torah; they would have found in it the answer to their question. According to his opinion, man should only believe what he can grasp with his intellectual faculties, or perceive by his senses, or what he can accept on trustworthy authority. Beyond this nothing should be believed. Astrological statements, not being founded on any of these three sources of knowledge, must be rejected. He had himself studied astrology, and was convinced that it was no science at all. If some dicta be found in the Talmud which appear to represent astrology as a true source of knowledge, these may either be referred to the rejected opinion of a small minority, or may have an allegorical meaning, but they are by no means forcible enough to set aside principles based on logical proof.
The debility of which Maimonidcs so frequently complained in his correspondence, gradually increased, and he died, in his seventieth year, on the 20th Tebeth, 4965 (1204). His death was the cause of great mourning to all Jews. In Fostat a mourning of three days was kept; in Jerusalem a fast was appointed; a portion of the tochahah (Lev. xxvi. or Deut. xxix.) was read, and also the history oI the capture of the Ark by the Phiistines (i Sam. iv.). His remains were brought to Tiberias. The general regard in which Maimonides was held, both by his contemporaries and by succeeding generations, has been expressed in the popular saying: "From Moses to Moses there was none like Moses."
THE MOREH NEBUCHIM LITERATURE
I.The Arabic Text.--The editio princeps, the only edition of the original text of the Guide (in Arabic, De1i1, or Dalalat a1-hatrin), was undertaken and executed by the late S. Munk. Its title is: Le Guide des Egaris, traite de Theologie et de Philosophic par Moite ben Maimon, publie pour la premiere fois dans l'original Arabe, et accompagne d'une traduction Francaise et di note: critiques, litteraires et explicatives, par S. Munk (Paris, 1850-1866). The plan was published, 1833, in Reflexions cur le culte des anciens Hebreux (La Bible, par S. Cahen, vol. iv.), with a specimen of two chapters of the Third Part. The text adopted has been selected from the several MSS. at his disposal with great care and judgment. Two Leyden MSS. (cod. 18 and 221), various MSS. of the Bibliothique Nationale (No. 760, very old; 761 and 758, written by R. Saadia Ibn Danan), and some MSS. of the Bodleian Library were consulted. In the notes which accompany the French translation, the various readings of the different MSS. are fully discussed. At the end of the third volume a list is added of "Variantes des Manuscrits Arabes et des deux Versions HebraIques."
The library of the British Museum possesses two copies of the Arabic text; the one Or. 5423 is complete, beautifully written, with explanatory notes in the margin and between the lines. The name of the copyist is not mentioned, nor the date when it has been written. The volume has in the beginning an incomplete index to the Scriptural passages referred to in the Guide, and at the end fragments of Psalm cxli. in Arabic and of astronomical tables.
The second copy of the Dalalat al-halirin is contained in the MS. Or. 2423, written in large Yemen Rabbinic characters. It is very fragmentary. The first fragment begins with the last paragraph of the introduction; there are a few marginal notes in Hebrew. In the Bodleian Library there are the following copies of the Dalalat alhalirin according to the Catal, of Hebr. MSS. by Dr. A. Neubauer:--
No. 1236. The text is preceded by Jehudah al-Charizi's index of the contents of the chapters, and by an index of Biblical quotstions. In the margin there are notes, containing omissions, by different hands, two in Arabic characters. The volume was written 1473.
No. 1237. The Arabic text, with a few marginal notes containing various readings the text is preceded by three Hebrew poems, beginning, De'i holek, Bi-sedeh tebunot; and Binu be-dat Mosheh. Fol. 212 contains a fragment of the book (III., xxix.).
No. 1238. Text with a few marginal notes.
No. 1239. The end of the work is wanting in this copy. The second part has forty-nine chapters, as the introduction to Part II. is counted as chapter i.; Part III. has fifty-six chapters, the introduction being counted as chapter i., and chapter xxiv. being divided into two chapters. The index of passages from the Pentatcuch follows the ordinary mode of counting the chapters of the Guide.
No. 1240. Arabic text transcribed in Arabic characters by Saadiah b. Levi Azankot for Prof. Golius in 1645.
No. 1245. First part of the Datalas al-hairis, written by Saadiah b. Mordecai b. Mosheh in the year 1431.
No. 1242 contains the same Part, but incomplete. Nos. 1243, 1244, 1245, and 1246 contain Part II. of the Arabic text, incomplete in No,. 1245 and 1246.
Nos. 1247, 1248, and 1249 have Part III.; it is incomplete in Nos. 1248 and 1249. No. 1249 was written 1291, and begins with III, viii. A fragment of the Arabic text, the end of Part III., is contained in No. 407, 2.
No. 2508 includes s fragment of the original (I. ii.-xxxii.), with a Hebrew interlinrary translation of some words and a few marginal notes. It is written in Yemen square characters, and is marked as "holy property of the Synagogue of Alsiani."
A fragment (I. i.) of a different recension from the printed is contained in 2422, 16. On the margin the Commentaries of Shein-tob and Ephodi are added in Arabic.
A copy of the Datalat is also contained in the Berlin Royal Library MS. Or. Qu., 579 (so; Cat. Steinschneider) ; it is defective in the beginning and at the end.
The Cairo Genizah at Cambridge contains two fragments (a) I.lxiv. and beginning of lxv ; (b) II. end of xxxii. and xxxiii. According to Dr. H. Hirschfeld, Jewish Quarterly Review (vol. xv. p. 677), they are in the handwriting of Maimonides.
The valuable collection of MSS. in the possession of Dr. M. Gaster includes a fragment of the Dalalat-al-hairin (Codcx 6o5). II. xiii--xv., beginning and end defective.
II. Translations, a. Hebrew.--As soon as European Jews heard of the existence of this work, they procured its translation into Hebrew. Two scholars, independently of each other, undertook the task: Samuel Ibn Tibbon and Jehudah al-Harizi. There is, besides, in the Moreh ha-moreh of Shemtob Paiquera an original translation of some portions of the Moreh. In the Sifte yeshenim (No. 112) a rhymed translation of the Dalalat by Rabbi Mattityahu Kartin is mentioned. Ibn Tibbon s version is very accurate; he sacrificed elegance of style to the desire of conscientiously reproducing the author's work, and did not even neglect a particle, however unimportant it may appear. Ibn Tibbon went in his anxiety to retain peculiarities of the original so far as to imitate its ambiguities, e.g., meziut (I. lviii.) is treated as a masculine noun, only in order to leave it doubtful whether a pronoun which follows agrees with meziut, "existence," or with nimza, "existing being," both occurring in the same sentence (Br. Mus. MS. Harl. 7586, marg. note by Ibn Tibbon). When he met with passages that offered any difficulty he consulted Maimonides. Harizi, on the other hand, was less conscientious aboot words and particles, but wrote in a superior style. Vox populi, however, decided in favour of the version of Ibn Tibbon, the rival of which became almost forgotten. Also Abraham, the son of Moses Maimooides, in Milbamoth ha-shem, describes Harizi's version as being inaccurate. Most of the modern translations were made from Ibn Tibbon's version. There are, therefore, MSS. of this version almost in every library containing collections of Hebrew books and MSS. It has the title Moreh-nebuchim. The British Museum has the following eight copies of Ibn Tibbon's version.:--
Harl. 7586 A. This codex was written in tlse year 1284, for Rabbi Shabbatai ben Rabbi Mattityshu. In the year 1340 it came into the possession of Jacob b. Shelomoh; his son Menabem sold it in the year 1378 to R. Mattityaho, son of R. Shabbatai, for fifty gold florins. It was again sold in the year 1461 by Yehiel ben Joab. There is, this peculiarity in the writing, that long words at the end of a line are divided, and written half on the one line, half on the next ; in words which are vocalized, patah is frequently found for kamez. There are numerous various readings in the margin. The text is preceded by a poem, written by Joseph Ibn Aknin, pupil of Maimonides, in praise of his master, and beginning Adon yizro. This poem is attributed to R. Yehudah ha-Levi (Luzzatto, in his Divan, Betulat-bat-Yehudah, p. 104). At the end the copyist adds an epigram, the translation of which is as follows:-- "The Moreh is finished--Praise to Him who formed and created everything--written for the instruction and benefit of the few whom the Lord calleth. Those who oppose the Moreh ought to be put to death ; but those who study and understand it deserve that Divine Glory rest upon them, and inspire them with a spirit from above."
Harl. 7586 B. This codex, much damaged in the beginning and at the end, contains the version of Ibn Tibbon, with marginal notes, consisting of words omitted in the text, and other corrections. The version is followed by the poems Karob meod, etc., and De'i bolek, etc.
Harl. 5507 contains the Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon, with the translator's preface and marginal notes, consisting of various readings and omissions from the text. The work of Maimonides is followed by Ibn Tibbon's Vocabulary (millot-zarot), Mesharet-masheb, 'Arugot ba-mezimmab, Millot biggayon, Ruah-hen, Alfarabi's Hatbalor, a Hebrew-Italian vocabulary of logical terms, and an explanation of koreh. The passage in Part I., chap. lxxi., which refers to Christianity, has been erased.
Harl. 5525 was the property of Shimshon Kohen Modon. The MS. begins with Harizi's Kavvanat ha-perakim ; then follows the text, with a few marginal notes of a later hand, mostly adverse criticisms and references to 'Arama's 'Akedab and the Biblical commentaries of Abarbanel. There is also a note in Latin. The text is followed by Ibn Tibbon's Vocabulary (Millor-zarot) and Masoret ba-pesukim (Index to the Biblical quotations in the Moreh). In a poem, beginning Moreh asben mennu derakav gabehu, the Moreh's compared to a musical instrument, which delights when played by one that understands music, but is spoiled when touched by an ignorant person.
Add. 27068 (Almanzi coil.). At the end the following remark is added : I, Samuel Ibn Tibbon, finished the translation of this work in the month of Tebet 4965 (1205). The text is preceded by the well-known epigrams, De'i bolek and Moreh -- nebuchim sa shelomi; the last page contains the epigram Karob meod. There are some notes in the margin, mostly referring to various readings.
Add. 14763. This codex, written 1273 at Viterbo, contains the preface of Harizi to isis translation of the Moreh and his index of contents, Ibn Tibbon's version with a few marginal notes of different hands, including some remarks of the translator, and the contents of the chapters. The codex contains besides the following treatises: Commentary of Maimonides on Abot ; Comm. of Maini. on Mishnah Sanhedrin x. i ; Letter of Maimonides on the Resurrection of the Dead ; Vocabulary of difficult words by Samuel Ibn Tibbon ; Maimonides' Letter to the wise men ot Marseilles ; his Letter to Rabbi Jonathan ; Keter-malkut, Mesbaret-mosheh, Ruah-hen, Otot ha-shamayim, translated from the Arabic by Samuel Ibn Tibbon ; Hathalot ha-nimzaot, of Alfarabi; Sefer ha-happuah, Mishle hamisbim ha-talmidim ; on the seven zones of the earth ; a fragment of a chronicle from the exile of Babylon down to the fourth year of the Emperor Nicepheros of Constantinople, and a poem, which begins asher yishal, and has the following sense:-- " If one asks the old and experienced for advice, you may expect his success in all he undertakes but if one consults the young, remember the fate of Rehoboam, son of Solomon."
Add. 4764. In addition to the Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon (from end of I. xxvii.) with a few marginal notes and index, the codex contains at the end of Part I. an Index of references made by the author to explanations given in preceding or succeeding chapters. At the end of the text the statement is added, that the translation was finished in the month of Tebet 968 (1208). The Moreh is followed by Ruah-hen, and Ibn Tibbon's Vocabulary of millot-zarot (incomplete), and is preceded by four poems in praise of the Moreh, beginning Shim'u nebone leb, Moreh nebucbim sa shelomi, De'il bolek and Nofet mahkim.
Bibl. Reg. 16 A, xi. This codex, written in Prov. curs, characters in the year 308, has in front a fragment of iii. i., then follows the poem of Meshullam, beginning Yehgs mezimmotai (Gratz Leket -- shoshannim, p. 1511), and other poems.
The following MS. copies of Ibn Tibbon's version are included in the Oxford Bodleian Library; the numbers refer to Dr. Neubauer's catalogue of the MSS. :--
1250. An index of the passages from the Bible referred to in the work, and an index of the contents precede the version. The marginal note, contain chiefly omissions.
1251. This codex was written in 1675. The marginal notes contain omissions and explanations.
1252. The marginal notes contain the translator's remarks on I. lxxiv. 4, and III. xlvii. The version is followed by Ibn Tibbon a vocabulary, and his additional remarks on the reasons for the commandments. The MS. was bought by Samuel ben Moses from a Christian after the pillage of Padua, where it had belonged to a Synagogue of foreigners (lo' azim) ; he gave it to a Synagogue of the same character at Mantua.
1253. The marginal notes include that of the translator on III. xlvii.
1254, I. Text with marginal note, containing omissions.
1255. The marginal notes include those of the translator on I. xlvi. and lxxiv. 5.
1256. The marginal notes contain various reading, notes relating to Harizi's, translation and the Arabic text; on fol. 80 there is a note in Latin. There are in this codex six epigrams concerning the Moreh.
1257. Text incomplete; with marginal notes.
Fragments of the Version are contained in the following codices: 2047,3, p.65; 2283, 8; 2309, 2, and 2336.
Among the MS. copies of the Moreh in the Bibl. Nat. in Paris, there is one that has been the property of R. Eliah Mizrahi, and another that had been in the hands of Azariah de Rossi (No. 685 and No. 69!); the Gunzburg Library (Paris) possesses a copy (No. 775), that was written 1452 by Samuel son of Isaac for Rabbi Moses de Leon, and Eliah del Medigo's copy of the Moreh is in the possession of Dr. Ginsburg (London); it contains six poems, beginning Moreh nebucbim sa; Emet marcb emet; Bi-lesbon esb; Mabba'aru; Kamu more shav.
The editio princeps of this version has no statement as to where and when it was printed, and is without pagination. According to Furst (Bibliogr.) it is printed before 1480. The copy in the British Museum has some MS. notes. Subsequent editions contain besides the Hebrew text the Commentaries of Shem-tob and Efodi, and the index of contents by Harizi (Venice, 1551, fol.) ; also the Comm. of Crescas and Vocabulary of Ibn Tibbon (Sabionetta, 1553, fol. ; Jessnitz, 1742, fol. etc.) ; the Commentaries of Narboni and S. Mairnon (Berlin, 1791) ; the commentaries of Efodi, Shem-tob, Crescas and Abarbanel (Warsaw, 1872, 4to); German translation and Hebrew Commentary (Biur) Part I. (Krotoschin, 1839, 8vo); German translation and notes, Part II. (Wien. 1864), Part III. (Frankfort-a-M., 1838).
The Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon (Part I. to ch. lxxii.) has been translated into Mishnaic Hebrew by M. Levin (Zolkiew, 1829, 4to).
There is only one MS. known of Harizi's version, viz., No. 682 of the Bibliothbque Nationale at Paris. It has been edited by L. Schlosberg, with notes. London, 1851 (Part I.), 1876 (II.), and 1879 (III.). The notes on Part I. were supplied by S. Scheyer.
The first Latin translation of the Moreh has been discovered by Dr. J. Perles among the Latin MSS. of the Munic Library, Catal. Cod. latinorum bibl. regiae Monacensis, tom. i, pars iii. pag. 208 (Kaish. 36 b), 1700 (7936 b). This version is almost identical with that edited by Augustinus Justinianus, Paris, 1520, and is based on Harizi's Hebrew version of the Moreh. The name of the translator is not mentioned. In the Commentary of Moses, son of Solomon, of Salerno, on the Moreh, a Latin translation is quoted, and the quotations agree with this version. It is called by this commentator ha 'atakat ha-nozrit ("the Christian translation"), and its author, ha-ma 'atik ha-nozer (lit. "the Christian translator"). Dr. Perles is, however, of opinion that these terms do not necessarily imply that a Christian has made this translation, as the word nozer may have been used here for "Latin." He thinks that it is the result of the combined efforts of Jewish and Christian scholars connected with the court of the German Emperor Frederic II., especially as in the thirteenth century several Jewish scholars distinguished themselves by translating Oriental works into Latin. See Gratz Monatschrift, 1875, Jan.-June, "Die in einer Munchener Handschrift aufgefundene erste lateinische Uebersetzung," etc., von Dr. J. Perles. The title has been variously rendered into Latin: Director neutrorum, directorium dubitantium, director neutrorum, nutantium or dubitantium; doctor perplexorum.
Gedaliah ibn Yahyah, in Shalshelet ba-kabbalah, mentions a Latin translation of the Moreh by Jacob Monteno: but nothing is known of it, unless it be the anonymous translation of the Munich MS., mentioned above. Augustinus Justinianus edited this version (Paris, 1520), with slight alterations and a great number of mistakes. Joseph Scaliger's opinion of this version is expressed in a letter to Casaubonus, as follows : Qui latine vertit, Hebraica, non Arabica, convertit, et quidem saepe hallucinatur, neque mentem Authoris assequitur. Magna seges mendorum est in Latino. Praeter illa quae ab inertia Interpretis peccata sunt accessit et inertia Librariorum aut Typographorum, e.g., prophethae pro philosophiae altitudo pro aptitudo; bonitatem pro brevitatem. (Buxtorf, Doctor Perplexorum, Praef.)
Johannes Buxtorfius, Fil., translated the Hebrew version of Ibn Tibbon into Latin (Basilem, 1629, 4to). In the Praeefatio ad Lectorem, the translator discusses the life and the works of Maimonides, and dwells especially on the merits and the fate of the Moreh-nebucbim. The preface is followed by a Hebrew poem of Rabbi Raphael Joseph of Treves, in praise of an edition of the Moreh containing the Commentaries of Efodi, Shem-tob, and Crescas.
Italian was the first living language into which the Moreh has been translated. This translation was made by Yedidyah ben Moses (Amadeo de Molse di Recanati), and dedicated by him to "divotissimo e divinissimo Signor mio il Signor Immanuel da Fano" (i.e., the Kabbalist Menahem Azarriah). The translator dictated it to his brother Eliah, who wrote it in Hebrew characters ; it was finished the 8th of February, 1583. The MS. copy is contained in the Royal Library at Berlin, MS. Or. Qu. 487 (M. Steinschneider Catal., etc.)--The Moreh has been translated into Italian a second time, and annotated by D. J. Maroni: Guida degli Smarriti, Firenze, 1870, fol.
The Moreh has been translated into German by R. Furstenthal (Part I,, Krotoschin, 1839), M. Stern (Part II., Wien, 1864), and S. Scheyer (Part III.. Frankfort-a.-M., 1838). The translation is based on Ibn Tibbon's Hebrew version. The chapters on the Divine Attributes have been translated into German, and fully discussed, by Dr. Kaufmann in his Geschichte der Attributenlehre (Gotha, 1877).
An excellent French translation, based on the Arabic original, has been supplied by the regenerator of the Guide, S. Munk. It was published together with the Arabic text (Paris, 1850-1866).
The Moreh has also been translated into the Hungarian language by Dr. Klein. The translation is accompanied by notes (Budapest, 1878-80).
The portion containing the reasons of the Commandments (Part III. ch. xxvi.--xlix.) has been translated into English by James Townley (London, 1827). The translation is preceded by an account on the life and works of Maimonides, and dissertations on various subjects ; among others, Talmudical and Rabbinical writings, the Originality of the Institutions of Moses, and Judicial astrology.
III. Commentaries.--It is but natural that in a philosophical work like the Moreh, the reader will meet with passages that at first thought seem unintelligible, and require further explanation, and this want has been supplied by the numerous commentators that devoted their attention to the study of the Moreh. Joseph Solomon del Medigo (1597) saw eighteen Commentaries. The four principal ones he characterizes thus (in imitation of the Hagadah for Passover) : Moses Narboni is rasha', has no piety, and reveals all the secrets of the Moreh. Shem-tob is hakam, wise," expounds and criticises ; Crescas is tam, "simple," explains the book in the style of the Rabbis; Epodi is sbe-eno yode'a lisbol, " does not understand to ask," he simply explains in short notes without criticism Miktababuz; ed. A. Geiger, Berlin, 1840, p. i8). The earliest annotations were made by the author himself on those passages, which the first translator of the Moreh was unable to comprehend. They are contained in a letter addressed to Samuel Ibn Tibbon, beginning, lefi siklo ycbuilal isb (Bodl Library, No. 2218, s. ; comp. The Guide, etc., I. 21, 343 ; II. 8, 99). Ibn Tibbon, the translator, likewise added a few notes, which are found in the margin of MSS. of the Hebrew version of the Moreh (on I. xlv. lxxiv. ; II. xxiv. ; and III. xlvii.--MSS. BodI. 1252, 1; 1253, 1255, 1257; Brit. Mus. Add. 14,763 and 27,068).
Both translators wrote explanations of the philosophical terms employed in the versions. Harizi wrote his vocabulary first, and Ibn Tibbon, in the introductory remarks, to Perush millot zarot ("Explanation of difficult words"), describes his rival's vocabulary as full of blunders. Ibn Tibbon's Perush is found almost in every copy of his version, both MS. and print; so also Harizi's index of the contents of the chapters of the Moreh (Kavvanat ha-perakim).
The following is an alphabetical list of Commentaries on the Moreh :--
Abarbanel (Don Isaak) wrote a Commentary on I. i.--lv.; II. xxxi.--xlv., and a separate book Shamayim-badasbim, "New Heavens," on II. xix., in which he fully discusses the question concerning Creatio ex nibilo. The opinion of Maimonides is not always accepted. Thus twenty-seven objections are raised against his interpretation of the first chapter of Ezekiel. These objections he wrote at Molin, in the house of R. Abraham Treves Zarfati. The Commentary is followed by a short essay (maamar) on the plan of the Moreh. The method adopted by Abarbanel in all his Commentaries, is also employed in this essay. A series of questions is put forth on the subject, and then the author sets about to answer them. M. J. Landau edited the Commentary without text, with a Preface, and with explanatory notes, called Moreh li-zealdakah (Prag. 1831; MS. BodI. 2385). In addition to these the same author wrote Tesbubat " Answers" to several questions asked by Rabbi Shsol ha-Cohen on topics discussed in the Moreh (Venice, 1754).
Abraham Abulajia wrote "Sodot ha-moreh," or Sitre-torah, a kabbalistic Commentary on the Moreh. He gives the expreaaion, [hebrew] (Paradise), for the number (177) of the chapters of the Moreh. MS. Nat. Bibi. 226, 3. Leipsic Libr. 232,4. MS. Bodl. 2360, contains a portion of Part III.
Buchner A. Ha-march li-zedakab (Warsaw, 1838). Commentary on "The Reasons of the Laws," March III. xxix.--xlix. The Commentary is preceded by an account of the life of Maimonides.
Comtino, Mordecai b. Eliezer, wrote a shart commentary on the Moreh (Dr. Ginsburg's collection of MSS. No. 1o). Narboni, who "spread light on dark passages in the Guide," is frequently quoted. Reference is also made to his own commentary on Ibn Ezra's Yesod--mara.
Creacas (Aaher b. Abraham), expresses in the Preface to his Commentary the conviction that he could not always comprehend the right sense of the words of Maimonides, for "there is no searching to his underatanding." He nevertheless thinks that his, explanations will help "the young" to study the Moreh with profit. A long poem in praise of Maimonides and his work precedes the Preface. His notes are short and clear, and in spite of his great respect of Maimonides, he now and then criticises and corrects him.
David Yailya is named by Joseph Del Medigo (Miktab-abaz ed. A. Geiger, Berlin, 1840; p. 18 , and note 76), as having written a Commentary on the Moreh.
David ben Yebudab Leon Rabbins wrote 'En ba-kore, MS. Bodl. 1263. He quotes in his Commentary among others 'Arama's 'Akedar yizhak. The Preface is written by Immanuel ben Raphael Ibn Meir, after the death of the author.
Efadi is the name of the Commentary written by Isaac ben Moses, who during the persecution of 1391 had passed as Christian under the name of Profiat Doran. He returned to Judaism, and wrote against Christianity the famous satire " Al tehee kaaboteka" ("Be not like your Fathers"), which misled Christizns to cite it as written in favour of Christianity. It is addressed to the apostate En Bonet Bon Giorno. The same author also wrote a grammatical work, Ma' aseb-efod. The name Efod (Hebrew), is explained as composed of the initials Amar Profiat Duran. His Commentary consists of short notes, esplanatory of the text. The brginning of this Commentary is contained in an Arabic translation in MS. Bodl. 2422, 16.
Epbraim Al-Naqavab in Sba'or Kebad ba-sbem (MS. BodI. 939,2 and 1258,2), answers some questions addressed to him concerning the Moreh. He quotes Hiadai's Or adonai.
Furstentbal, R., translator and commentator of the Mahzor, added a Biur, short explanatory notes, to his German translation of Part I. of the Morch (Krotoschin, 1839).
Gerahan, Mareb-derek, Commentary on Part 1. of the Moreh (MS. BodI. 1265).
Hillel b. Samuel b. Elazar of Verona explained the Introduction to Part II, (the 25 Propos.). S. H. Halberstam edited this Commentary together with Tagmute ha-nefemh of the same author, for the Society Mekize-nirdamim (Lyck, 1874).
Joseph ben Aba-mart b. Josepb, of Caspi (Argentiere), wrote three Commentaries on the Moreh. The first is contained in a Munich MS. (No. 263) ; and seems to have been recast by the author, and divided into two separate Commentaries: 'Ammude Kesef, and Maskiyot Keatf The former was to contain plain and ordinary explanation, whilst profound and mysterious matter was reserved for the second (Steinschn. Cat.). In II., chap. xlviii., Caspi finds fault with Maimonides that he dues not place the book of Job among the highest class of inspired writings, "its author being undoubtedly Moses." These Commentaries have been edited by T. Werblomer (Frankfort-a.-M., 1848). R. Kirchheim added a Hebrew introduction discussing the character of these commentaries, and describing the manuscripts from which these were copied ; a Biography of the author is added in German.
Josepb Giqatilia wrote notes on the Moreh, printed with "Questinnn of Shaul ha-kohen" (Venice, 1574. MS. Bodl.. 1911, 3).
Josepb b. Isaac ha-Levi's Gib'ar ha-Moreh is a short Commentary on portions of the Moreh, with notes by R. Yom-tub Heller, the author of Tosafar ram-sob (Prag., 1612).
Isaac Saranov wrote a commentary on Parts II. and IIII. of the Moreb (see Maimon Solomon p. xxi.).
Isaac ben Shem-tob ibn Shem-tob wrote a lengthy Commentary on the Moreh, Part I. (MS. Brit. Mus, Or. 1358). The object of the Commentary is to show that there is no contradiction between Maimonides and the Divine Law. He praises Maimonides as a true believer in Creatio ex nihilo, whilst Ibn Ezra and Gersonides assumed a prima materia, (Yozer, kadosb). Nachmanides is called ha-hasid ha-gadol, but is nevertheless blamed, together with Narboni and Zerahyals ba-Levi, for criticising Maimonides, instead of trying to explain startling utterances even in "a forced way" (bederek rabok) and Narboni, "in spite of his wisdom, frequently misunderstood the Moreh." At the end of each chapter a resume– (derush) of the contents of the chapter is given, and the lesson to be derived from it. The MS. is incomplete, chaps. xlvi.--xlviii. are missing.
Kauffmann, D, in his Geschichte der Atributenlebre, translated Part I. chap. L--lxiii. into German, and added critical and explanatory notes.
Kalonymos wrote a kind of introduction to the Moreh (Mesbaret Masbeb), in which he especially discusses the theory of Maimonides on Providence.
Leibnitz made extracts from Buxtorf's. Latin version of the Moreb, and added his own remarks, Observationes ad R. Mosen Maimoniden (Foucher de Careil, CA., La Philos opbie Fuive,1861).
Levin, M, wrote Allon-moreb as a kind of introduction to his retranslation of Tibbon's Hebrew version into the language of the Mishnah.
Maimon, Solomon, is the author of Gib' ha-moreb, a lengthy commentary on Book I. (Berlin, 1791). The author is fond of expatiating on topics of modern philosophy, to the introduction he gives a short history of philosophy. The commentary on Books II. and III. was written by Isaac Satanov.
Meir ben Jonah ha-mekunneb Ben-ibneor wrote a commentary on the Moreh in Fez 1560 (MS. Bodl. 1262).
Menahem Kara expounded the twenty-five propositions enumerated in the Introduction to Part II. of the Moreh (MS. BodI. 1649, 13).
Mordecai Yaffe, in his Or Yekarot or Pinnat Yikrat, one of his ten Lebushim, comments upon the theories contained in the Moreh.
Moses, son of Abraham Provencal, explains the passage in Part I. chap. lxxiii. Prop. 3, in which Maimonides refers to the difference between commensurable and incommensurable lines (MS. Bodl.. 2033, 8).
Moses, son of Febudab Nagari, made an index of the subjects treated 1n the Moreh, indicating in each case the chapters in which allusion is made to the subject. He did so, "in obedience to the advice of Maimonides, to consider the chapters in connected order" (Part I. p. 20). It has been printed together with the questions of Shaul ha-kohen (Venice, 1574).
Moses son of Solomon of Salerno, is one of the earliest expounders of the Moreh. He wrote his commentary on Parts I. and II., perhaps together with a Christian scholar. He quotes the opinion of "the Christian scholar with whom he worked together." Thus he names Petrus de Bernia and Nicolo di Giovenazzo. R. Jacob Anatoli, author of the Malmed ha-talmidim, is quoted as offering an explanation for the passage from Pirke di-rabbi Eliezer, which Mamnonides (II. chap. xxvi.) considers as strange and inexplicable (Part I., written 1439 ; MS. of Bet ha-midrash, London; Parts I.--II., MS. Bodl, 1261, written, 1547; MS. Petersburg, No. 82; Munich MS. 60 and 370).
Moses ha-kotan, son of Jebudab, son of Moses, wrote To'aliyoz pirke ha-maamar ("Lessons taught in the chapters of this work"). It is an index to the March (MS. Bodl. 1267).
Moses Leiden explained the 25 Prop. of the Introduction to Part II. (MS. Gunzburg, Paris).
Moses Narboni wrote a short commentary at Soria 1362. He freely criticizes Maimonides, and uses expressions like the following:-- "He went too far, may God pardon him" (II. viii.). Is. Euchel ed. Part I. (Berlin, 1791); J. Goldenthal, I. to III. (Wien, 1852). The Bodl. Libr. possesses several MS. copies of this commentary (Nos. 1260, 1264, 2, and 1266).
Munk, S., added to his French translation of the Moreh numerous critical and explanatory notes.
S.Sacb's (Ha-tehiyah, Berlin, 1850, p. 5) explains various passages of the Moreb, with a view of discovering the names of those who are attacked by Maimonides without being named.
Scheyer, S., added critical and explanatory notes to his German translation of the Moreh, Part 3, and to the Hebrew version of Harizi, Part I. He also wrote Das Psychologiscbe System des Maimonides, an Introduction to the Moreh (Frankf.-a-M., 1845).
Shem tab Ibn Palquera's Moreb ba-moreh consists of 3 parts :(1) a philosophical explanation of the Moreb, (2) a description of the contents of the chapters of the Moreb, Part I, i.--lvii. (Presburg, 1827) ; (3) Corrections of Ibn Tibbon's version. He wrote the book for himself, that in old age he might have a means of refreshing his memory. The study of science and philosophy is to be recommended, but only to those who have had a good training in "the fear of sin." Ibn Roshd (Averroes) is frequently quoted, and referred to as be-hakam ha-nizkar (the philosopher mentioned above).
Sbem-tob ben Joseph ben Sbem-tob had the commentary of Efodi before him, which he seems to have quoted frequently verbatim without naming him. In the preface he dwells on the merits of the Moreb as the just mediator between religion and philosophy. The commentary of Shem-tobh is profuse, and includes almost a paraphrase of the text. He apologises in conclusion for having written many superfluous notes and added explanation where no explanation was required ; his excuse is that he did not only intend to write a commentary (biur) but also a work complete in itself (hibbur). He often calls the reader's attention to things which are plain and clear.
Shem-tob Ibn Shem-tob, in Sefer ba-emunot (Ferrara, 1556), criticises some of the various theories discussed in the Moreh, and rejects them as heretic. His objections were examined by Moses Al-ashkar, and answered in Hasagot 'al mab sbe-katab Rabbi Sbem-tab neged ha-Rasnbam (Ferrara, 1556).
Salomon b. Febudab ha-nasi wrote in Germany Sitre-torah, a kabbalistic commentary on the Moreb, and dedicated it to his pupil Jacob b. Samuel (MS. Bet-ha-midrash, London).
Tabrizi. The twenty-five Propositions forming the introduction to Part 2, have been fully explained by Mohammed Abu-becr ben Mohammed al-tabrizi. His Arabic explanations have been translated by Isaac b. Nathan of Majorca into Hebrew (Ferraro, 1556). At the end the following eulogy is added :--The author of these Propositions is the chief whose sceptre is "wisdom" and whose throne is "understanding," the Israelite prince, that has benefited his nation and all those who love God, etc. Moses b. Maimon b. Ebed-elohim, the Israelite. . . . May God lead us to the truth. Amen !
Tishbi. In MS. Bodl. 2279, I, there are some marginal notes on Part III. which are signed Tishbi (Neub. Cat.).
Yahya Ibn Suleiman wrote in Arabic a Commentary on the Guide of the Perplexed. A fragment is contained in the Berlin MS. Or. Qu., 554, 2 (Steinschneider, Cat. No. 92).
Zerahyab is. Isaac ha-Levi. Commentary on the Moreh, I., i.--lxxi., and some other portions of the work. (See Maskir, 1861, p. 125).
MS. Bodl. 2360, 8, contains a letter of Jehudah b. Shelomoh on some passages of the Moreb, and Zerahyah's reply.
Anonymous Commentaries.--The MS. Brit. Mus. 1423 contains marginal and interlineary notes in Arabic. No author or date is given, nor is any other commentary referred to in the notes. The explanations given are mostly preceded by a question, and introduced by the phrase, "the answer is," in the same style as is employed in the Hebrew-Arabic Midrash, MS. Brit. Mus. Or. 2213. The Midrashic character is prominent in the notes. Thus the verse "Open, ye gates, that the righteous nation which keepeth the truth may enter in," is explained as meaning: Open, ye gates of wisdom, that human understanding that perceiveth truth may enter. The notes are numerous, especially in the first part, explaining almost every word; e.g., on "Rabbi": Why does Maimonides employ this title before the name of his pupil The answer is: either the word is not to be taken literally master"), but as a mere compliment, or it has been added by later copyisIs. Of a similar style seem to be the Arabic notes in the Berlin MS. Or. Oct. 258, 2, 8, so. (Cat. Steinschneider, No. 108.)--Anonymous marginal notes are met with almost in every MS. of the Moreh; e.g., Brit. Mos. Harl. 5525 ; Add. 14,763, 14,764; Bodl. 1264, I ; 2282, 10; 2423, 3 ; Munich MS., 239, 6.
The explanation of passages from the Pentateuch contained in the Moreh have been collected by D. Ottensoaaer, and given as an appendix (Morehderek) to Derek -sclulah (Pent. with Comm. etc., Furth, 1824).
IV. Controvercies.--The seemingly new ideas put forth by Maimonides in the Moreb and in the first section of his Mishneh-torah (Sefer ha-madda) soon produced a lively controversy as regards the merits of Maimonides theories. It was most perplexing to pious Talmudists to learn how Maimonides explained the anthropomorphisms employed in the Bible, the Midrashim and the Talmud, what he thought about the future state of our soul, and that he considered the study of philosophy as the highest degree of Divine worship, surpassing even the study of the Law and the practice of its precepts. The objections and attacks of Daniel of Damascus were easily silenced by a herem (excommunication) pronounced against him by the Rosh ha-golah Rabbi David. Stronger was the opposition that had its centre in Montpellier. Rabbi Solomon ben Abraham noticed with regret in his own community the fruit of the theories of Maimonides in the neglect of the study of the Law and of the practice of the Divine precepts. It happened to Moses Maimonides what in modern times happened to Moses Mendelssohn. Many so-called disciples and followers of the great master misunderstood or misinterpreted his teaching in support of their dereliction of Jewish law and Jewish practice, and thus brought disrepute on him in the eyes of their opponents. Thus it came that Rabbi Solomon and his disciples turned their wrath against the writings of Maimonides instead of combating the arguments of the pseudo-Maimonists. The latter even accused Solomon of having denounced the Moreh and the Sefer ha-madda to the Dominicans, who condemned these writings to the flames; when subsequently copies of the Talmud were burnt, and some of the followers of the Rabbi of Montpellier were subjected to cruel tortures, the Maimonists saw in this event a just punishment for offending Maimonides. (Letters of Hillel of Verona, Hemdab Genuzab, ed. H. Edelmann, p. 58 .sqq.).
Meir b. Todros ba-levi Abulafia wrote already during the lifetime of Maimonides to the wise men in Lunel about the heretic doctrines he discovered in the works of Maimonides. Ahron b. Meshullam and Shesheth Benvenisti defended Maimonides. About 1232 a correspondence opened between the Maimonists and the Anti-maimonists (Griitz, Gesch. d. J. vii. note I). The Grammarian David Kimhi wrote in defence of Maimonides three letters to Jehudah Alfachar, who answered each of them in the sense of Rabbi Solomon of Montpellier. Abraham b. Hisdai and Samuel b. Abraham Saportas on the side of the Maimonists, took part in the controversy. Meshullam b. Kalonymos b. Todros of Narbonne begged Alfachar to treat Kimhi with more consideration, whereupon Alfachar resolved to withdraw from the controversy. Nabmanides, though more on the side of Rabbi Solomon, wrote two letters of a conciliatory character, advising moderation on both sides. Representatives of the congregations of Saragossa, Huesca, Monzon, Kalatajud, and Lends signed declarations against R. Solomon. A herem was proclaimed from Lunel and Narbonne against the Anti-Maimonists. The son of Maimonides, Abraham, wrote a pamphlet Milbamot adonai, in defence of the writings of his father. The controversy raised about fifty years later by Abba Man Don Astruc and R. Solomon ben-Aderet of Barcelona, concerned the Moreh less directly. The question was of a more general character: Is the study of philosophy dangerous to the religious belief of young students? The letters written in this controversy are contained in Minbat-kenaot by Abba Mari Don Astruc (Presburg, 1838), and Kitab alrasail of Meir Abulafia ed. J. Brill (Paris, 1871). Yedaya Bedrasi took part in this controversy, and wrote Ketab hitnazlut in defence of the study of philosophy (Teshubot Rashba, Hanau, 1610, p. iii b.). The whole controversy ended in the victory of the Moreh and the other writings of Maimonides. Stray remarks are found in various works, some in praise and some in condemnation of Maimonides. A few instances may suffice. Rabbi Jacob Emden in his Mitpabat-sefarim (Lemberg, 1870, p. 56) believes that parts of the Moreh are spurious ; he even doubts whether any portion of it is the work of "Maimonides, the author of the Mishneh-torah, who was not capable of writing such heretic doctrines," S. D. Luzzato regards Maimonides with great reverence, but this does not prevent him from severely criticising his philosophical theories (Letters to S. Rappoport, No. 79, 83, 266, Iggeroth Shedal ed. E. Graber, Premys l, 1882), and from expressing his conviction that the saying "From Moses to Moses none rose like Moses," was as untrue as that suggested by Rappoport, "From Abraham to Abraham (Ibn-Ezra) none rose like Abraham." Rabbi Hirsch Chayyuth in Darke-Mosbeb (Zolkiew, 5840) examines the attacks made upon the writings of Maimonides, and tries to refute them, and to show that they can be reconciled with the teaching of the Talmud.
The Bodl. MS. 2240, 3a, contains a document signed by Josselman and other Rabbis, declaring that they accept the teaching of Maimonides as correct, with the exception of his theory about angels and sacrifices.
Numerous poems were written, both in admiration and in condemnation of the Moreh. Most of them precede or follow the Moreb in the printed editions and in the various MS. copies of the work. A few have been edited in Dibre-hakamim, pp. 75 and 86; in the Literaturblatt d. Or. I. 379, II. 26-27, IV. 748, and Leket-shoshannim by Dr. Gratz. In the Sammelband of the Mekize Nirdamim (1885) a collection of 69 of these poems is contained, edited and explained by Prof. Dr. A. Berliner. In imitation of the Moreh and with a view of displacing Maimonides work, the Karaite Ahron II. b. Eliah wrote a philosophical treatise, Ez-bayyim (Ed. F. Delitzseh. Leipzig, 1841).
Of the works that discuss the whole or part of the philosophical system of the Moreh the following are noteworthy:--
Bacher, W. Die Bibilexegese Moses Maimftni's, in the Jshreshericht der Landes Rabbinerschule zu Buda-Pest. 1896. Euler, M. Vorlesongen uber die judischen Philosophers des Mittelalters. Abtheil. II., Moses Maimonides (Wien, 1870).
Geiger, A. Das Judenthum u. seine Geschichte (Breslao, 1865), Zehnte Vorlesung Aben Ezra u. Maimonides.
Grltz, H. Geschichte d. Juden, VI. p. 363 sqq.
Joel, M. Religionsphilosophie des Moses b. Maimon (Breslau, 1859).
Joel,M. Albertus Magnus u. seim Vorhaltniss zu Maimonides (Bresisu, 1863).
Kaufmann, D. Geschichte der Attributenlehre, VII. Gotha, 1874.
Philippsohn, L. Die Philosophic des Maimonides. Predigt und Schul-Magazin, I. xviii.(Msgdeburg, 1834.)
Rosin, D. Die Ethik d. Maimonides (Breslsu, 1876).
Rubin, S. Spinoza u. Maimonides, ein Psychologisch-Philosophisches Antitheton (Wien, 1868).
Scheyer, S. Das psychologische System des Maimonides. Frankfort-a.-M., 1845.
Weiss, T. H. Beth-Talmud, I. x. p. 289.
David Yellin and Israel Abrahams, Mainsonides. ------------------- ANALYSIS OF THE GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED
IT is the object of this work "to afford a guide for the perplexed," i.e. "to thinkers whose studies have brought them into collision with religion" p. 9), "who have studied philosophy and have acquired sound knowledge, and who, while firm in religions matters, are perplexed and bewildered on account of she ambiguous and figurative expressions employed in the holy writings (p. 5). Joseph, the son of Jehudah Ibn Aknio, a disciple of Maimonides, is addressed by his teacher as an example of this kind of students. It was "for him and for those like him" that the treatise was composed, and to him this work is inscribed in the dedicatory letter with which the Introduction begins. Maimonides, having discovered that his disciple was sufficiently advanced for an exposition of the esoteric ideas in the books of the Prophets, commenced to give him such expositions "by way of hints." His disciple then begged him to give him further explanations, to treat of metaphysical themes, and to expound the system and the method of the Kalam, or Mohammedan Theology.1 In compliance with this request, Maimonides composed the Guide of the Perplexed. The reader has, therefore, to expect that the subjects mentioned in the disciple's request indicate the design and arrangement of the present work, and that the Guide consists of the following parts :-- 1. An exposition of the esoteric ideas (sodot) in the books of the Prophets. 2. A treatment of certain metaphysical problems. 3. An examination of the system and method of the Kalam. This, in fact, is a correct account of the contents of the book ; but in the second part of the Introduction, in which the theme of this work is defined, the author mentions only the first-named subject. He observes "My primary object is to explain certain terms occurring in the prophetic book. Of these some are homonymous, some figurative, and some hybrid terms." "This work has also a second object. It is designed to explain certain obscure figures which occur in the Prophets, and are not distinctly characterised as being figures" (p. 2). Yet from this observation it must not be inferred that Maimonides abandoned his original purpose ; for he examines the Kalam in the last chapters of the First Part (ch. lxx.--lxxvi.), and treats of certain metaphysical themes in the beginning of the Second Part (Introd. and ch. i.--xxv.). But in the passage quoted above he confines himself to a delineation of the maie object of this treatise, and advisedly leaves unmentioned the other two subjects, which, however important they may be, are here of subordinate interest. Nor did he consider it necessary to expatiate on these subjects ; he only wrote for the student, for whom a mere reference to works on philosophy and science was sufficient. We therefore meet now and then with such phrases as the following "This is folly discussed in works on metaphysics." By references of this kind the authur may have intended so create a taste for the study of philosophical works. But our observation only holds good with regard to the Aristotelian philosophy.
1 See infra, page 4., note i.
The writings of the Mutakallemim are never commended by him ; he states their opinions, and tells his disciple that he would not find any additional argument, even if he were to read all their voluminous works (p. 133). Maimonides was a zealous disciple of Aristotle, although the theory of the Kalam might seem to have been more congenial to Jewish thought and belief. The Kalam upheld the theory of God's Existence, Incorporeality, and Unity, together with the creatio ex nihilo. Maimonides nevertheless opposed the Kalam, and, anticipating the question, why preference should be given to the system of Aristotle, which included the theory of the Eternity of the Universe, a theory contrary to the fundamental teaching of the Scriptures, he exposed the weakness of the Kalam and its fallacies.
The exposition of Scriptural texts is divided by the author into two parts the first part treats of homonymous, figurative, and hybrid terms,2 employed in reference to God ; the second part relates to Biblical figures and allegories. These two parts do not closely follow each other ; they are separated by the examination of the Kalam, and the discussion of metaphysical problems. It seems that the author adopted this arrangement for the following reason first of all, he intended to establish the fact that the Biblical anthropomorphisms do not imply corporeality, and that the Divine Being of whom the Bible speaks could therefore be regarded as identical with the Primal Cause of the philosophers. Having established this principle, he discusses from a purely metaphysical point of view the properties of the Primal Cause and its relation to the universe. A solid foundation is thus established for the esoteric exposition of Scriptural passages. Before discussing metaphysical problems, which he treats in accordance with Aristotelian philosophy, he disposes of the Kalam, and demonstrates that its arguments are illogical and illusory.
The "Guide for the Perplexed" contains, therefore, an Introduction and the following four parts :--1. On homonymous, figurative, and hybrid terms, 2. On else Supreme Being and His relation to the universe, according to the Kalam. 3. On the Primal Cause and its relation to the universe, according to the philosophers. 4. Esoteric exposition of some portions of the Bible (sodot) a. Maaseb bereshith, or the history of the Creation (Genesis, ch. i-iv .) ; b. on Prophecy ; c. Maaseb mercabhah, or the description of the divine chariot (Ezekiel, ch. i.).
According to this plan, the work ends with the seventh chapter of the Third Part. The chapters which follow may be considered as an appendix ; they treat of the following theological themes the Existence of Evil, Omniscience and Providence, Temptations, Design in Nature, in the Law, and in the Biblical Narratives, and finally the true Worship of God.
In the Introduction to the "Guide," Maimonides (1) describes the object ot the work and the method he has followed ; (2) treats of similes ; (3) gives "directions for the study of the work" ; and (4.) discusses the usual causes of inconsistencies in authors.
1 (pp. 2--3). Inquiring into the root of the evil which the Guide was intended to remove, viz., the conflict between science and religion, the author perceived that in most cases it originated in a misinterpretation of the anthropomorphisms in Holy Writ. 'Ihe main difficulty is found in the ambiguity of the words employed by the prophets when speaking of the Divine Being; the question arises whether they are applied to the Deity and to other things in one and the same sense or equivocally ; in the latter case the author distinguishes between homonyms pure and simple, figures, and hybrid terms. In order to show that the Biblical anthropomorphisms do not imply the corporeality of the Deity, he seeks in each instance to demonstrate that the expression under examination is a perfect homonym denoting things which are totally
2 See infra page 5, note 4
distinct from each other, and whenever such a demonstration is impossible, he assumes that the expression is a hybrid term, that is, being employed in one instance figuratively and in another homonymously. His explanation of "form" (zelem) may serve as an illustration. According to his opinion, it invariably denotes "form" in the philosophical aeceptation of the term, viz., the complex of the essential properties of a thing. But to obviate objections he proposes an alternative view, to take zelem as a hybrid term that may be explained as a class noun denoting only things of the same class, or as a homonym employed for totally different things, viz., "form" in the philosophical sense, and "form " in the ordinary meaning of the word. Maimonides seems to have refrained from explaining anthropomorphisms as figurative expressions, lest by such interpretation he might implicitly admit the existence of a certain relation aod comparison between the Creator and His creatures.
Jewish philosophers before Maimonides enunciated and demonstrated the Unity and the Incorporeality of the Divine Being, and interpreted Scriptural metaphors on the principle that "the Law speaks in the language of man" but our author adopted a new and altogether original method. The Commentators, when treating of enthropomorphisms, generally contented themselves with the statement that the term under consideration must not be taken in its literal sense, or they paraphrased the passage in expressions which implied a lesser degree of corporeality. The Talmud, the Midrashim, and the Targumim abound in paraphrases of this kind. Saadiah in "Emunot ve-de'ot," Bahya in his "Hobot ha-lebabot," and Jehudah ha-levi in the "Cutari," insist on the necessity and the appropriateness of such interpretations. Saadiah enumerates ten terms which primarily denote organs of the human body, and are figuratively applied to God. To establish this point of view he cites numerous instances in which the terms in question are used in a figurative sense without being applied to God. Saadiah further shows that the Divine attributes are either qualifications of such of God's actions as are perceived by man, or they imply a negation. The correctness of this method was held to be so obvious that some authors found it necessary to apologize to the reader for introducing such well-known topics. From R. Abraham ban David's strictures on the Yad habazakah it is, however, evident that in the days of Maimonides persons were not wanting who defended the literal interpretation of certain anthropomorphisms. Maimonides, therefore, did not conent himself with the vague and general rule, "The Law speaks in the language of man," but sought carefully to define the meaning of each term when applied to God, and to identify it with some transcendental and metaphysical term. In pursuing this course he is sometimes forced to venture upon an interpretation which is much too far-fetched to commend itself even to the supposed philosophical reader. In such instances he generally adds a simple amid plaims explanation, and leaves it to the option of the reader to choose the one which appears to him preferable. The enumeration of the different meanings of a word is often, from a philological point of view, incomplete ; he introduces only such significations as serve his object. When treating of an imperfect homonym, the several significations of which are derived from one primary signification, he apparently follows a certain system which he does not employ in the interpretation of perfect homonyms. The homonymity of the term is not proved ; the author confines himself to the remark, "It is employed homonymously," even when the various meanings of a word might easily be traced to a common source.
2 (pag. 4-8). In addition to the explanation of homonyms Maimonides undertakes to interpret similes and allegories. At first it had been his intention to write two distinct works--Sefer ha-nebuab, "A Book on Prophecy," and Sefer ha-nebuab, "A Book of Reconciliation." In the former work he had intended to explain difficult passages of the Bible, and in the latter to expound such passages in the Midrash and the Talmud as seemed to be in conflict with common sense. With respect to the "Book of Reconciliation," he abandoned his plan, because he apprehended that neither the learned nor the unlearned would profit by it the one would find it superfluous, the other tedious. The subject of the "Book on Prophecy" is treated in the present work, and also strange passages that occasiooally occur in the Talmud and the Midrash are explained.
The treatment of the simile must vary according as the simile is compound or simple. In the first case, each part represents a separate idea and demands a separate interpretation ; in the other case, only one idea is represented, and it is not necessary to assign to each part a separate metaphorical meaning. This division the author illustrates by citing the dream of Jacob (Gen. xxviii. x a sqq.), and the description of the adulteress (Prov. vii. 6 sqq.). He gives no rule by which it might be ascertained to which of the two categories a simile belongs, and, like other Commentators, he seems to treat as essential those details of a simile for which he can offer an adequate interpretation. As a general principle, he warns against the confusion and the errors which arise when an attempt is made to expound every single detail of a simile. His own explanations are not intended to be exhaustive ; on the contrary, they are to consist of brief allusions to the idea represented by the simile, of mere suggestions, which the reader is expected to develop and to complete. The author thus aspires to follow in the wake of the Creator, whose works can only be understood after a long and persevering study. Yet it is possible that he derived his preference for a reserved and mysterious style from the example of ancient philosophers, who discussed metaphysical problems in figurative and enigmatic language. Like Ibn Ezra, who frequently concludes his exposition of a Biblical passage with the phrase, "Here a profound idea (sod) is hidden," Maimonides somewhat mysteriously remarks at the end of different chapters, "Note this," "Consider it well." In such phrases some Commentators fancied that they found references to metaphysical theories which the author was not willing fully to discuss. Whether this was the case or not, in having recourse to that method he was not, as some have suggested, actuated by fear of being charged with heresy. He expresses his opinion on the principal theological questions without reserve, and does not dread the searching inquiries of opponents ; for he boldly announces that their displeasure would not deter him from teaching the truth and guiding those who are able and willing to follow him, however few these might be. When, however, we examine the work itself, we are at a loss to discover to which parts the professed enigmatic method was applied. His theories concerning the Deity, the Divine attributes, angels, creatio ex nihilo, prophecy, and other subjects, are treated as fully as might be expected. It is true that a cloud of mysterious phrases enshrouds the interpretation of Ma'aseh beresbit (Gen.i--iii.) and Ma'asch mercabah (Ez. i.). But the significant words occurring in these portions are explained in the First Part of this work, and a full exposition is found in the Second and Third Parts. Nevertheless the statement that the exposition was never intended to be explicit occurs over and over again. The treatment of the first three chapters of Genesis concludes thus : "These remarks, together with what we have already observed on the subject, and what we may have to add, must suffice both for the object and for the reader we have in view" (II.xxx.).
In like manner, he declares, after the explanation of the first chapter of Ezekiel "I have given you here as many suggestions as maybe of service to you, if you will give them a further development. . . . Do not expect to hear from me anything more on this subject, for I have, though with some hesitation, gone as far in my explanation as I possibly could go" (III. vii.).
3 (pag. 8--9), In the next paragraph, headed, "Directions for the Study of this Work," he implores the reader not to be hasty with his Criticism, and to bear in mind that every sentence, indeed every word, had been fully considered before it was written down. Yet it might easily happen that the reader could not reconcile his own view with that of the author, and in such a case he is asked to ignore the disapproved chapter or section altogether. Such disapproval Maimonides attributes to a mere misconception on the part of the reader, a fate which awaits every work composed in a mystical style. In adopting this peculiar style, he intended to reduce to a minimum the violation of the rule laid down in the Mishnah (Hagigah ii. i), that metaphysics should not be taught publicly. The violation of this rule he justifies by citing the following two Mishnaic maxims: "It is time to do something in honour of the Lord" (Berakot ix. 5), and "Let all thy acts be guided by pure intentions" (Abot ii. i 7). Maimonides increased the mysteriousness of the treatise, by expressing his wish that the reader should abstain from expounding the work, lest he might spread in the name of the author opinions which the latter never held. But it does not occur to him that the views he enunciates might in themselves be erroneous. He is positive that his own theory is unexceptionally correct, that his esoteric interpretations of Scriptural texts are sound, and that those who differed from him--viz., the Mutakallemim on the one hand, and the unphilosophical Rabbis on the other-- are indefensibly wrong. In this respect other Jewish philosophers--e.g. Saadiah and Balhya--were far less positive ; they were conscious of their own fallibility, and invited the reader to make such corrections as might appear needful. Owing to this strong self-reliance of Maimonides, it is not to be expected that opponents would receive a fair and impartial judgment at his hands.
4 (pag. 9--11). The same self-reliance is noticeable in the next and concluding paragraph of the Introduction. Here he treats of the contradictions which are to be found in literary works, and he divides them with regard to their origin into seven classes. The first four classes comprise the apparent contradictions, which can be traced back to the employment of elliptical speech the other three classes comprise the real contradictions, and are due to carelessness and oversight, or they are intended to serve some special purpose. The Scriptures, the Talmud, and the Midrash abound in instances of apparent contradictions ; later works contain real contradictions, which escaped the notice of the writers. In the present treatise, however, there occur only such contradictions as are the result of intention and design.
PART I.
The homonymous expressions which are discussed in the First Part include-- (1) nouns and verbs used in reference to God, ch. i. to ch. xlix. ; (2) attributes of the Deity, ch. 1. to lx. ; (3) expressions commonly regarded as names of God, ch. lxi. to lxx. In the first section the following groups can be distinguished-- (a) expressions which denote form and figure, cii. i. to ch. vi. ; (b) space or relations of space, ch. viii. to ch. xxv. ; (c) parts of the animal body and their functions, ch. xxviii. to ch. xlix. Each of these groups includes chapters not connected with the main subject, but which serve as a help for the better understanding of previous or succeeding interpretations. Every word selected for discussion bears upon some Scriptural text which, according to the opinion of the author, has been misinterpreted. But such phrases as "the mouth of the Lord," and "the hand of the Lord," are not introduced, because their figurative meaning is too obvious to be misunderstood.
The lengthy digressions which are here and there interposed appear like outbursts of feeling and passion which the author could not repress. Yet they are "words fitly spoken in the right place" , for they gradually unfold the author's theory, and acquaint the reader with those general principles on which he founds the interpretations in the succeeding chapters. Moral reflections are of frequent occurrence, and demonstrate the intimate connexion between a virtuous life and the attainment of higher knowledge, in accordance with the maxim current long before Maimonides, and expressed in the Biblical words, "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (Ps. cxi. 10). No opportunity is lost to inculcate this lesson, he it in a passing remark or in an elaborate essay.
The discussion of the term "zelem" (cii. i.) afforded the first occasion for reflections of this kind. Man, "the image of God," is defined as a living and rational being, as though the moral faculties of man were not an essential element of his existence, and his power to discern between good and evil were the result of the first sin. According to Maimonides, the moral faculty would, us fact, not have been required, if man had remained a purely rational being. It is only through the senses that "the knowledge of good and evil" has become indispensable. The narrative of Adam's fall is, according to Maimonidcs, an allegory representing the relation which exists between sensation, moral faculty, and intellect. In this early part (ch. ii.), however, the author does not yet mention this theory ; on the contrary, every allusion to it is for the present studiously avoided, its full exposition being reserved for the Second Part.
The treatment of hazah "he beheld " (ch. vi), is followed by the advice that the student should not approach metaphysics otherwise than after a sound and thorough preparation, because a rash attempt to solve abstruse problems brings nothing but injury upon the inexperienced investigator. The author points to the "nobles of the children of Israel" (Exod. xxiv. s i), who, according to his interpretation, fell into this error, and received their deserved punishment. He gives additional force to these exhortations by citing a dictum of Aristotle to the same effect. In a like way he refers to the allegorical use of certain terms by Plato (ch. xvii.) in support of his interpretation of "zur" (lit., "rock") as denoting "Primal Cause."
The theory that nothing but a sound moral and intellectual training would entitle a student to engage in metaphysical speculations is again discussed in the digression which precedes the third group of homonyms (xxxi.--xxxvi.). Man's intellectual faculties, he argues, have this in common with his physical forces, that their sphere of action is limited, and they become inefficient whenever they are overstrained. This happens when a student approaches metaphysics without due preparation. Maimonides goes on to argue that the non-success of metaphysical studies is attributable to the following causes : the transcendental character of this discipline, the imperfect state of the student's knowledge, the persistent efforts which have to be made even in the preliminary studies, and finally the waste of energy and time owing to the physical demands of man. For these reasons the majority of persons are debarred from pursuing the study of metaphysics. Nevertheless, there are certain metaphysical truths which have to be communicated to all men, e.g., that God is One, and that He is incorporeal ; for to assume that God is corporeal, or that He has any properties, or to ascribe to Him any attributes, is a sin bordering on idolatry.
Another digression occurs as an appendix to the second group of homonyms (ch. xxvi.--xxvii.). Maimonides found that only a limited number of terms are applied to God in a figurative sense; and again, that in the "Targum" of Onkelos some of the figures are paraphrased, while other figures received a literal rendering. He therefore seeks to discover the principle which was applied both in the Sacred Text and in the translation, and he found it in the Talmudical dictum, "The Law speaketh the language of man." For this reason all figures are eschewed which, in their literal sense, would appear to the multitude as implying debasement or a blemish. Onkelos, who rigorously guards himself against using any term that might suggest corporification, gives a literal rendering of figurative terms when there is no cause for entertaining such an apprehension. Maimonides illustsatcs this rule by the mode in which Onkelos renders "yarad" (" he went down,"), when used in reference to God. It is generally paraphrased, but in one exceptional instance, occurring in Jacob's "visions of the night" (Gen. xlvi. i), it is translated literally ; in this instance the literal rendering does not lead to corporification ; because visions and dreams were generally regarded as mental operations, devoid of objective reality. Simple and clear as this explanation may be, we do not consider that it really explains the method of Onkelos. On the contrary, the translator paraphrased anthropomorphic terms, even when he found them in passages relating to dreams or visions; and indeed it is doubtful whether Maimonides could produce a single instance, in favour of his view. He was equally unsuccessful in his explanation of "hazah" "he saw" (ch. xlviii.). He says that when the object of the vision was derogatory, it was not brought into direct relation with the Deity; in such instances the verb is paraphrased, while in other instances the rendering is literal. Although Maimonides grants that the force of this observation is weakened by three exceptions, he does not doubt its correctness.
The next Section (ch. I. to ch. lix.) "On the Divine Attributes" begins with the explanation that "faith" consists in thought, not in mere utterance ; in conviction, not in mere profession. This explanation forms the basis for the subsequent discussion. The several arguments advanced by Maimonides against the employment of attributes are intended to show that those who assume the real existence of Divine attributes may possibly utter with their lips the creed of the Unity and the Incorporeality of God, but they cannot truly believe it. A demonstration of this fact would be needless, if the Attributists had not put forth their false theses and defended them with the utmost tenacity, though with the most absurd arguments.
After this explanation the author proceeds to discuss the impropriety of assigning attributes to God. The Attributists admit that God is the Primal Cause, One, incorporeal, free from emotion and privation, and that He is not comparable to any of His creatures, Maimonides therefore contends that any attributes which, either directly or indirectly, are in contradiction to this creed, should not be applied to God. By this rule he rejects four classes of attributes viz., those which include a definition, a partial definition, a quality, or a relation. The definition of a thing includes its efficient Cause ; and since God is the Primal Cause, He cannot be defined, or described by a partial definition. A quality, whether psychical, physical, emotional, or quantitative, is always regarded as something distinct from its substratum ; a thing which possesses any quality, consists, therefore, of that quality and a substratum, and should not be called one. All relations of time and space imply corporeality ; all relations between two objects are, to a certain degree, a comparison between these two objects. To employ any of these attributes in referencc to God would be as much as to declare that God is not the Primal Cause, that He is not One, that He is corporeal, or that He is comparable to His creatures.
There is only one class of attributes to which Maimonidcs makes no objection, viz, such as describe actions, and to this class belong all the Divine attributes which occur in the Scriptures. The "Thirteen Attributes" (shelosh esreh middot, Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7) serve as an illustration. They were communicated to Moses when he, as the chief of the Israelites, wished to know the way in which God governs the universe, in order that he himself in ruling the nation might follow it, and thereby promote their real well-being. On the whole, the opponents of Maimonides admit the correctness of this theory. Only a small number of attributes are the subject of dispute. The Scriptures unquestionably ascribe to God Existence, Life, Power, Wisdom, Unity, Eternity, and Will. The Attributists regard these as properties distinct from, but co-existing with, the Essence of God. With great acumen, and with equally great acerbity, Maimonides shows that their theory is irreconcilable with their belief in the Unity and the Ineorpureahity of God. He points out three different ways of interpreting these attributes :--1. They may be regarded as descriptive of the works of God, and as declaring that these possess such properties as, in works of man, would appear to be the result of the will, the power, and the wisdom of a living being. 2. The term "existing," "one," "wise," etc., are applied to God and to His creatures homonymously ; as attributes of God they coincide with His Essence ; as attributes of anything beside God they are distinct from the essence of the thing. 3. These terms do not describe a positive quality, but express a negation of its opposite. This third interpretation appears to have been preferred by the author ; he discusses it more fully than the two others. He observes that the knowledge of the incomprehensible Being is solely of a negative character, and he shows by simple and appropriate examples that an approximate knowledge of a thing can be attained by mere negations, that such knowledge increases with the number of these negations, and that an error in positive assertions is more injurious than an error in negative assertions. In describing the evils which arise from the application of positive attributes to God, he unsparingly censures the hymnologists, because he found them profuse in attributing positive epithets to the Deity. On the basis of his own theory he could easily have interpreted these epithets in the same way as he explains the Scriptural attributes of God. His severity may, however, be accounted for by the fact that the frequent recurrence of positive attributes in the literary composition of the Jews was the cause that the Muhammedans charged the Jews with entertaining false notions of the Deity.
The inquiry into the attributes is followed by a treatment of the names of God. It seems to have been beyond the design of the author to elucidate the etymology of each name, or to establish methodically its signification ; for he does not support his explanations by any proof. His sole aim is to show that the Scriptural names of God in their true meaning strictly harmonize with the philosophical conception of the Primal Cause. There are two things which have so be distinguished in the treatment of the Primal Cause the Primal Cause per se, and its relation to the Universe. The first is expressed by the tetragrammaton and its cognates, the second by the several attributes, especially by rokeb ba'arabot, "He who rideth on the 'arabot" (Ps. lxviii. 4)
The tetragrammaton exclusively expresses the essence of God, and therefore it is employed as a nomen preprium. In the mystery of this name, and others mentioned in she Talmud, as consisting of twelve and of forty-two letters, Maimonides finds no other secret than the solution of some metaphysical problems. The subject of these problems is not actually known, but the author supposes that it referred to the "absolute existence of the Deity." He discovers the same idea in ehyeh (Exod. iii. 14), in accordance with the explanation added in the Sacred Text : asher ehyeh, "that is, I am." In the course of this discussion he exposes the folly or sinfulness of those who pretend to work miracles by the aid of these and similar names.
With a view of preparing the way for his peculiar interpretation of rokeb ba'arabot, he explains a variety of Scriptural passages, and treats of several philosophical terms relative to the Supreme Being. Such expressions as "the word of God," "the work of God," "the work of His fingers," "He made," "He spake," must be taken in a figurative sense ; they merely represent God as the cause that some work has been produced, and that some person has acquired a certain knowledge. The passage, "And He rested on the seventh day" (Exod. xx. ii) is interpreted as follows : On the seventh Day the forces and laws were complete, which during the previous six days were in the state of being established for the preservation of the Universe. They were not to be increased or modified.
It seems that Maimonides introduced this figurative explanation with a view of showing that the Scriptural "God" does not differ from the "Primal Cause" or "Ever-active Intellect" of the philosophers. On the other hand, the latter do not reject the Unity of God, although they assume that the Primal Cause comprises the causa efficiens, the agens, and the causafinalis (or, the cause, the means, and the end) ; and that the Ever-active Intellect comprises the intelligens, the intellectus, and the intellectum (or, the thinking subject, the act or thought, and the object thought of) ; because in this case these apparently different elements are, in fact, identical. The Biblical term corresponding to "Primal Cause " is rokeb ba'arabot, "riding on 'arabot." Maimonides is at pains to prove that 'arabot denotes "the highest sphere," which causes the motion of all other spheres, and which thus brings about the natural course of production and destruction. By "the highest sphere " he does not understand a material sphere, but the immaterial world of intelligences and angels, "the seat of justice and judgment, stores of life, peace, and blessings, the seat of the souls of the righteous," etc. Rokeb ba'arabot, therefore, means He presides over the immaterial beings, He is the source of their powers, by which they move the spheres and regulate the course of nature. This theory is more fully developed in the Second Part.
The next section (chap. lxxi.--lxxvi.) treats of the Kalam. According to the author, the method of the Kalam is copied from the Christian Fathers, who applied it in the defence of their religious doctrines. The latter examined in their writings the views of the philosophers, ostensibly in search of truth, in reality, however, with the object of supporting their own dogmas. Subsequently Mohammedan theologians found in these works arguments which seemed to confirm the truth of their own religion ; they blindly adopted these arguments, and made no inquiry whence these had been derived. Maimonides rejects a priori the theories of the Mutakallemim, because they explain the phenomena in the universe in conformity with preconceived notions, instead of following the scientific method of the philosophers. Among the Jews, especially in the East and in Africa, there were also some who adopted the method of the Kalam ; in doing so they followed the Mu'tazilah (dissenting Mohammedans), not because they found it more correct than the Kalam of the Ashariyah (orthodox Mohammedans), hut because at the time when the Jews became acquainted with the Kalam it was only cultivated by the Mu'taziiah. The Jews in Spain, however, remained faithful to the Aristotelian philosophy.
The four principal dogmas upheld by the dominant religions were the creatio ex nihilo, the Existence of God, His Incorporeality, and His Unity. By the philosophers the creatio ex nibilo was rejected, but the Mutakallemim defended it, and founded upon it their proofs for the other three dogmas. Maimonides adopts the philosophical proofs for the Existence, Incorporeality, and Unity of God, because they must be admitted even by those who deny the creatio ex nihilo, the proofs being independent of this dogma. In order to show that the Mutakallemim are mistaken in ignoring the organization of the existing order of things, the author gives a minute description of the analogy between the Universe, or Kosmos, and man, the mikrokosmos (ch. lxxii.). This analogy is merely asserted, and the reader is advised either to find the proof by his own studies, or to accept the fact on the authority of the learned. The Kalam does not admit the existence of law, organization, and unity in the universe. Its adherents have, accordingly, no trustworthy criterion to determine whether a thing is possible or impossible. Everything that is conceivable by imagination is by them held as possible. The several parts of the universe are in no relation to each other ; they all consist of equal elements ; they are not composed of substance and properties, but of atoms and accidents the law of causality is ignored ; man's actions are not the result of will and design, but are mere accidents. Maimonides in enumerating and discussing the twelve fundamental propositions of the Kalam (ch. lxiii,), which embody these theories, had apparently no intention to give a complete and impartial account of the Kalam ; he solely aimed at exposing the weakness of a system which he regarded as founded not on a sound basis of positive facts, but on mere fiction ; not on the evidences of the senses and of reason, but on the illusions of imagination.
After having shown that the twelve fundamental propositions of the Kalam are utterly untenable, Maimonides finds no difficulty in demonstrating the insufficiency of the proofs advanced by the Mutakallemim in support of the above-named dogmas. Seven arguments are cited which the Mutakallemim employ in support of the creatio ex nihilo.3 The first argument is based on the atomic theory, viz., that the universe consists of equal atoms without inherent properties all variety and elsange observed in nature must therefore be attributed to an external force. Three arguments are supplied by the proposition that finite things of an infinite number cannot exist (Propos. xi.). Three other arguments derive their support from the following proposition (x.) Everything that can be imagined can have an actual existence. The present order of things is only one out of the many forms wlsich are possible, and exist through the fiat of a determining power.
The Unity of God is demonstrated by the Mutakallemim as follows : Two Gods would have been unable to produce the world; one would have impeded the work of the other. Maimonides points out that this might have been avoided by a suitable division of labour. Another argument is as follows The two Beings would have one element in common, and would differ in another each would thus Consist of two elements, and would not be God. Maimonides might have suggested that the argument moves in a circle, the unity of God being proved by assuming His unity. The following argument is altogether unintelligible : Both Gods are moved to action by will ; the will, being without a substratum, could not act simultaneously in two separate beings. The fallacy of the following argument is clear : The existence of one God is proved ; the existence of a second God is not proved, it would be possible; and as possibility is inapplicable to God, there does not exist a second God. The possibility of ascertaining the existence of God is here confounded with potentiality of existence. Again, if one God suffices, the second God is superfluous ; if one God is not sufficient, he is not perfect, and cannot be a deity. Maimonides objects that it would not he an imperfection in either deity to act exclusively within their respective provinces. As in the criticism of the first argument, Maimonides seems here to forget that the existence of separate provinces would require a superior determining Power, and the two Beings would not properly be called Gods.
1 Saaiah proves the existence of the Creator in the following way :--1. The Universe is limited, and therefore cannot possess an unlimited force, 2. All things are compounds the composition must he owing to some external cause, 3. Changes observed in all beings are effected by some external cause, 4. If time were infinite, it would be impossible to conceive the progress of time from the present moment so the future, or from the past to the present moment. (Emunot vede'ot, ch. i.).--Bahys founds his arguments on three propositions: --1. A thing cannot be its own maker, 2. The series of successive causes is finite. 3. Compounds owe their existence to an external force. His arguments are :--1. The Universe, even the elements, are compounds consisting of substance and form. 2. In the Universe plan and unity is discernible. ( Hobot halehsbot, ch. i.)
The weakest of all arguments are, according to Maimonides, those by which the Mutakallemim sought to support the doctrine of God's Incorporeality. If God were corporeal, He would consist of atoms, and would not be one; or He would be comparable to other beings but a comparison implies the existence of similar and of dissisnilar elesoents, and God would thus not be one. A corporeal God would be finite, and an external power would be required to define those limits.
PART II.
The Second Part includes the following sections:--1. Introduction; 2. Philosophical Proof of the Existence of One Incorporeal Primal Cause (ch. i.) ; 3. On the Spheres and she Intelligences (ii.--xii.) ; 4. On the theory of the Eternity of the Universe (xiii.--xxix.) ; 5. Exposition of Gen. i.--iv. (xxx., xxxi.) ; 6. On Prophecy (xxxii.--xlviii.).
The enumeration of twenty-six propositions, by the aid of which the philosophers prove the Existence, the Unity, and the Incorporeality of the Primal Cause, forms the introduction so the Second Part of this work. The propositions treat of the properties of the finite and the infinite (i--iii., x.--xii., xvi.), of change and motion (iv.-ix., xiii.-xviii.), and of the possible and she absolute or necessary (xx.-xxv.) ; they are simply enumerated, but are not demonstrated. Whasever the value of these Propositions may be, they were inadequate for their purpose, and the author is compelled to introduce auxiliary propositions to prove the existence of an infinite, incorporeal, and uncompounded Primal Cause. (Arguments I. and III.)
The first and she fourth arguments may be termed cosmological proofs. They are based on the hypothesis that the series of causes for every change is finite, and terminates in the Primal Cause. There is no essential difference in the two arguments in the first are discussed the causes of the motion of a moving object ; the fourth treats of the causes which bring about the transition of a thing from potentiality to reality. To prove that neither the spheres nor a force residing in them constitute the Primal Cause, the philosophers employed two propositions, of which the one asserts that the revolutions of the spheres are infinite, and the other denies the possibility that an infinite force should reside in a finite object. The distinction between she finite in space and the finite in time appears to have been ignored ; for it is not shown why a force infinite in time could not reside in a body finite in space. Moreover, those who, like Maimonides, reject the eternity of the universe, necessarily reject this proof, while those who hold that the universe is eternal do not admit that the spheres have ever been only potential, and passed from potentiality to actuality. The second argument is supported by the following supplementary proposition If two elements coexist in a state of combination, and one of these elements is to be found as the same time separate, in a free state, is it certain that the second element is likewise to be found by itself. Now, since things exist which combine in themselves motive power and mass moved by that power, and since mass is found by itself, motive power must also be found by itself independens of mass.
The third argument has a logical character: The universe is either eternal or temporal, or partly eternal and partly temporal. It cannot be eternal in all its parts, as many parts undergo destruction ; it is isot altogether temporal, because, if so, the universe could not be reproduced after being destroyed. The continned existence of the universe leads, therefore, to the conclusion that there is an immortal force, the Primal Cause, besides the transient world.
These arguments have this in common, that while proving the existence of a Primal Cause, they at the same time demonstrate the Unity, the Incorporeality, and time Eternity of that Cause. Special proofs are nevertheless superadded for each of these postulates, and on the whole they differ very little from those advanced by the Mohamnmedan Theologians.
This philosophical theory of the Primal Cause was adapted by Jewish scholars to the Biblical theory of the Creator. The universe is a living, organized being, of which the earth is the centre. Any changes on this earth are due to the revolutions of the spheres ; the lowest or innermost sphere, viz., the one nearest tn the centre, is the sphere of the moon ; the outermost or uppermost is "the all-encompassing sphere." Numerous spheres are interposed but Maimonides divides all the spheres into four groups, corresponding to the moon, the sun, the planets, and the fixed stars. This division is claimed by the author as his own discovery ; he believes that it stands in relation to the four causes of their motions, the four elements of the sublunary world, and the four classes of beings, viz., the mineral, the vegetable, the animal, and the rational. The spheres have souls, and are endowed with intellect ; their souls enable them to move freely, and the impulse to the motion is given by the intellect in conceiving the idea of the Absolute Intellect. Each sphere has an intellect peculiar to itself; the intellect attached to the sphere of the moon is called "the active intellect" (Sekel ha-po'el). In support of this theory numerous passages are cited both from Holy Writ and from post-Biblical Jewish literature. The angels (elohim, malakim) mentioned in the Bible are assumed to be identical with the intellects of the spheres ; they are free agents, and their volition invariably tends to that which is good and noble they emanate from the Primal Cause, and form a descending series of beings, ending with the active intellect. The transmission of power from one element to the other is called "emanation" (shefa'). This transmission is performed without the utterance of a sound ; if any voice is supposed to be heard, it is oniy an illusion, originating in the human imagination, which is the source of all evils (ch. xii.).
In accordance with this doctrine, Maimonides explains that the three men who appeared to Abraham, the angels whom Jacob saw ascend and descend the ladder, and all other angels seen by man, are nothing but the intellects of the spheres, four in number, which emanate from the Primal Cause (ch.. x). In his description of the spheres he, as usual, follows Aristotle. The spheres do not contain any of the four elements of the sublunary world, but consist of a quintessence, an entirely different element. Whilst things on this earth are transient, the beings which inhabit the spheres above are eternal. According to Aristotle, these spheres, as well as their intellects, coexist with the Primal Cause. Maimonides, faithful to the teaching of the Scriptures, here departs from his master, and holds that the spheres and the intellects had a beginning, and were brought into existence by the will of the Creator. He does not attempt to give a positive proof of his doctrine all he contends is that the theory of the creatio ex nihilo is, froiri a philosoplsieah point of view, not inferior to the doctrine which asserts the eternity of the universe, and that he can refute all objections advanced against his theory (ch. xiii.-- xxviii.).
He next enumerates and criticises the various theories respecting the origin of the Universe, viz. : A. God created the Universe out of nothing. B. God formed the Universe from an eternal substance. C. The Universe originating in the eternal Primal Cause is co-eternal.----It is not held necessary by the author to discuss the view of those who do not assume a Primal Cause, since the existence of such a cause has already been proved (ch. xiii.).
The objections raised to a creastis ex nihilo by its opponents are founded partly on the properties of Nature, and partly on those of the Primal Cause, They infer from the properties of Nature the following arguments : (1) The first moving force is eternal ; for if it had a beginning, another motion must have produced it, and then it would not be the First moving force. (2) If the formless matter be not eternal, it must have been produced out of another substance ; it would then have a certain form by which it might be distinguished from the primary substance, and then it would not formless. (3) The circular motion of the spheres does not involve the necessity of termination ; and anything that is without an end, must be without a beginning. (4) Anything brought to existence existed previously in potentia; something must therefore have pre-existed of which potential existence could be predicated. Some support for the theory of the eternity of the heavens has been derived from the general belief in the eternity of the heavens.-- The properties of the Primal Cause furnished the following arguments :--If it were assumed that the Universe was created from nothing, it would imply that the First Cause had changed from the condition of a potential Creator to that of an actual Creator, or that His will had undergone a change, or that He must be imperfect, because He produced a perishable work, or that He had been inactive during a certain period. All these contingencies would be contrary so a true conception of the First Cause (ch.xiv.).
Maimonides is of opinion that the arguments based on the properties of things in Nature are inadmissible, because the laws by which the Universe is regulated need not have been in force before the Universe was in existence. This refutation is styled by our author "a strong wall built round the Law, able to resist all attacks" (ch. xvii.). In a similar manner the author proceeds against the objections founded on the properties of the First Cause. Purely intellectual beings, he says, are not subject to the same laws as material bodies ; that which necessitates a change in the latter or in the will of man need not produce a change in immaterial beings. As so the belief that the heavens are inhabited by angels and deities, it has not its origin in the real existence of these supernatural beings; it was suggested to man by meditation on the apparent grandeur of heavenly phenomena (ch. xviii.).
Maimonides next proceeds to explain how, independently of the authority or Scripture, he has been led to adopt the belief in the creatio ex nihilo. Admitting that the great variety of the things in the sublunary world can be traced to those immusable laws which regulate the influence of the spheres on the beings below -- the variety in the spheres can only be explained as the result of God's free will. According to Aristotle -- the principal authority for the eternity of the Universe -- it is impossible that a simple being should, according to the laws of nature, be the cause of various and compound beings. Another reason for the rejection of the Eternity of the Universe may be found in the fact that the astronomer Ptolemy has proved the incorrectness of the view which Aristotle had of celestial spheres, although the system of that astronomer is likewise far from being perfect and final (ch, xxiv.). It is impossible to obtain a correct notion of the properties of the heavenly spheres; "the heaven, even the heavens, are the Lord's, but the earth hath He given to the children of man" (Ps. cxv. 16). The author, observing that the arguments against the creatio ex nihilo are untenable, adheres to his theory, which was taught by such prophets as Abraham and Moses. Although each Scriptural quotation could, by a figurative interpretation, be made to agree with the opposite theory, Maimonides declines to ignore the literal sense of a term, unless it be in opposition so well-established truths, as is the case with anthropomorphic expressions ; for the latter, if taken literally, would be contrary to the demonstrated truth of God's incorporeality (ch. xxv.). He is therefore surprised that the author of Pirke-di Rabbi Eliezer ventured to assume the eternity of matter, and he thinks it possible that Rabbi Eliezer carried the license of figurative speech too far. (Ch. xxvi.).
The theory of the creatio ex nihilo does not involve the belief that the Universe will at a future time be destroyed ; the Bible distinctly teaches the creation, but not the destruction of the world except in passages which are undoubtedly conceived in a metaphorical sense. On the contrary, respecting certain parts of the Universe it is clearly stated "He established them for ever." (Ps.cxlviii. 5.) The destruction of the Universe would be, as the creation has been, a direct act of the Divine will, and not the result of those immutable laws which govern the Universe. The Divine will would in that case set aside those laws, both in the initial and the final stages of the Universe. Within this interval, however, the laws remain undisturbed (ch. xxvii.). Apparent exceptions, the miracles, originate in these laws, although man is unable to perceive the causal relation. The Biblical account of the creation concludes with the statement that God rested on the seventh day, that is to say, He declared that the work was complete ; no new act of creation was to take place, and no new law was to be introduced. It is true that the second and the third chapters of Genesis appear to describe a new creation, that of Eve, and a new law, viz., that of man's mortality, but these chapters are explained as containing an allegorical representation of man's psychical and intellectual faculties, or a supplemental detail of the Contents of the first chapter. Maimonides seems to prefer the allegorical explanation which, as it seems, he had in view without expressly stating it, in his treatment of Adams sin and punishment. (Part I. ch. ii.) It is certainly inconsistent on the one hand to admit that at the pleasure of the Almighty the laws of nature may become inoperative, and that the whole Universe may become annihilated, and on the other hand to deny, that during the existence of the Universe, any of the natural laws ever have been or ever will be suspended. It seems that Maimonides could not conceive the idea that the work of the All-wise should be, as the Mutakallemim taught--without plan and system, or that the laws Once laid down should not be sufficient for all emergencies.
The account of the Creation given in the book of Genesis is explained by the author according to the following two rules : First its language is allegorical; and, Secondly, the terms employed are homomsyms. The words erez, mayim, ruah, and hoshek in the second verse (ch. i.), are homonyms and denote the four elements : earth, water, air, and fire; in other instances erez is the terrestrial globe, mayim is water or vopour, noah denotes wind, and botbek darkness: According to Maimonides, a summary of the first chapter may be given thus; God created the Universe by producing first the reshit the "beginning" Gen. i. s), or hathalah, i.e., the intellects which give to the spheres both existence and motion, and thus become the source of the existence of the entire Universe. At first this Universe consisted of a chaos of elements, but its form was successively developed by the influence of the spheres, and more directly by the action of light and darkness, the properties of which were fixed on the first day of the Creation. In the subsequent five days minerals, plants, animals, and the intellectual beings came into existence. The seventh day, on which the Universe was for the first time ruled by the same natural laws which still continue in operation, was distinguished as a day blessed arid sanctified by the Creator, who designed it to proclaim the creatio ex nihilo (Exod. xx. xi). The Israelites were moreover commanded to keep this Sabbath in commemoration of their departure from Egypt (Deut. v. ii), because during the period of the Egyptian bondage, they had not been permitted to rest on that day. In the history of the first sin of man, Adam, Eve, and the serpent represent the intellect, the body, and the imagination. In order to complete the imagery, Samael or Satan, mentioned in the Midrash in connexion with this account, is added as representing man's appetitive faculties. Imagination, the source of error, is directly aided by the appetitive faculty, and the two are intimately connected with the body, so which man generally gives paramount attention, and for the sake of which he indulges in sins; in the end, however, they subdue the intellect and weaken its power. Instead of obtaining pure and real knowledge, man forms false conceptions; in consequence, the body is subject to suffering, whilst the imagination, instead of being guided by the intellect and atsaining a higher development becomes debased and depraved. In the three sons of Adam, Kain, Abel, and Seth, Maimonides finds an allusion to the three elements in man : the vegetable, the animal, and the intellectual. First, the animal element (Abel) becomes extinct ; then the vegetable elements (Kaiss) are dissolved ; only the third element, the intellect (Seth), survives, and forms the basis of mankind (ch. xxx., xxxi.).
Maimonides having so far stated his opinion in explicit terms, it is difficult to understand what he had in view by the avowal that he could not disclose everything. It is unquestionably no easy matter to adapt each verse in the first chapters of Genesis to the foregoing allegory; but such an adaptation is, according to the author's own view (Part I., Introd., p. 19), not only unnecessary, but actually objectionable.
In the next section (xxxii.-xlviii.) Maimonides treats of Prophecy. He mentions the following three opinions :--1. Any person, irrespective of his physical or moral qualifications, may be summoned by the Almighty to the mission of a prophet. 2. Prophecy is the highest degree of mental development, and can only be attained by training and study. 3. The gift of prophecy depends on physical, moral, and mental training, combined with inspiration. The author adopts the lass-mentioned opinion. He defines prophecy as an emanation (shefa), which through the will of the Almighty descends from the Active Intellect so the intellect and the imagination of thoroughly qualified persons. The prophet is thus distinguished both from wise men whose intellect alone received the necessary impulse from the Active Intellect, and from diviners or dreamers, whose imagination alone has been influenced by the Active Intellect. Although it is assumed that the attainment of this prophetic faculty depends on God's will, this dependence is nothing else but the relation which all things bear to the Primal Cause ; for the Active Intellect acts in conformity with the laws established by the will of God ; it gives an impulse to the intellect of man, and, bringing to light those mental powers which lay dormant, it merely turns potential faculty into real action. These faculties can be perfected to such a degree as to enable man to apprehend the highest truths intuitively, without passing through all the stages of research required by ordinary persons. The same fact is noticed wish respect to imagination ; man sometimes forms faithful images of objects and events which cannot be traced to the ordinary channel of information, viz., impressions made on the senses. Since prophecy is the result of a natural process, it may appear surprising that, of the numerous men excelling in wisdom, so few became prophets. Maimonides accounts for this fact by assuming that the moral faculties of such men had not been duly trained. None of them had, in the author's opinion, gone through the moral discipline indispensable for the vocation of a prophet. Besides this, everything which obstructs mental improvement, misdirects the imagination or impairs the physical strength, and precludes man from attaining to the rank of prophet. Hence no prophecy was vouchsafed to Jacob during the period of his anxieties on account of his separation from Joseph. Nor did Moses receive a Divine message during the years which the Israelites, under Divine punishment, spent in the desert. On the other hand, music and song awakened the prophetic power (comp. a Kings iii. si), and "The spirit of prophecy alights only on him who is wise, strong, and rich" (Babyl. Talm. Shabbat, 922). Although the preparation for a prophetic mission, the pursuit of earnest and persevering study, as also the execution of the Divine dictates, required physical strength, yet in the moment when the prophecy was received the functions of the bodily organs were suspended. The intellect then acquired true knowledge, which presented itself to the prophet's imagination in forms peculiar to that faculty. Pure ideals are almost incomprehensible; man must translate them into language which he is accustomed to use, and he must adapt them to his own mode of thinking. In receiving prophecies and communicating them to others the exercise of the prophet's imagination was therefore as essential as that of his intellect, and Maimonides seems to apply to this imagination the term "angel," which is so frequently mentioned in the Bible as the medium of communication between the Supreme Being and the prophet.
Only Moses held his bodily functions under such control that even without their temporary suspension he was able to receive prophetic inspiration the interposition of the imagination was in his case not needed "God spoke to him mouth to mouth" (Num. xii. I). Moses differed so completely from other prophets that the term "prophet" could only have been applied to him and other men by way of homonymy.
The impulses descending from the Active intellect so man's intellect and to his imagination produce various effects, according to his physical, moral, and intellectual condition. Some men are thus endowed with extraordinary courage and with an ambition to perform great deeds, or they feel themselves impelled to appeal mightily to their fellowmen by means of exalted and pure language. Such men are filled with "the spirit of the Lord," or, "with the spirit of holiness." To this distinguished class belonged Jephthah, Samson, David, Solomon, and the authors of the Hagiographa. Though above the standard of ordinary men, they were not included in the rank of prophets. Maimonides divides the prophets into two groups, viz., those who receive inspiration in a dream and those who receive it in a vision. The first group includes the following five classes :--1. Those who see symbolic figures ; 2. Those who hear a voice addressing them without perceiving the speaker ; 3. Those who see a man and hear him addressing them ; 4. Those who see an angel addressing them ; 5. Those who see God and hear His voice. The other group is divided in a similar manner, but contains only the first four classes, for Maimonides considered it impossible that a prophet should see God in a vision. This classification is based on the various expressions employed in the Scriptures to describe the several prophecies.
When the Israelites received the Law at Mount Sinai, they distinctly heard the first two commandments, which include the doctrines of the Existence and the Unity of God ; of the other eight commandments, which enunciate moral, not metaphysical truths, they heard the mere "sound of words" ; and it was through the mouth of Moses that the Divine instruction was revealed to them. Maimonides defends this opinion by quotations from the Talmud and the Midrashim.
The theory that imagination was an essential element in prophecy is supported by the fact that figurative speech predominates in the prophetical writings, which abound in figures, hyperbolical expressions and allegories. The symbolical acts which are described in connexion with the visions of the prophets, such as the translation of Ezekiel from Babylon to Jerusalem (Ez. viii. 3), Isaiah's walking about naked and barefoot (Isa. xx. a), Jacob's wrestling with the angel (Gen. xxxii. 17 sqq.), and the speaking of Balaam's ass (Num. xxii.28), had no positive reality. The prophets, employing an elliptical style, frequently omitted to state that a Certain event related by them was part of a vision or a dream. In consequence of such elliptical speech events are described in the Bible as coming directly from God, although they simply are the effect of the ordinary laws of nature, and as such depend on the will of God. Such passages cannot be misunderstood when it is borne in mind that every event and every natural phenomenon can for its origin be traced to the Primal Cause. In this sense the prophets employ such phrases as the following "And I will command the clouds that they rain no rain upon it" (Isa. v. 6); "I have also called my mighty men" (ibid. xi. 3).
PART III.
This part contains the following six sections :--1. Exposition of the ma'aseh mercabah (Ez. i.), ch. i. vii. ; 2. On the nature and the origin of evil, ch. viii. xii. 3. On the object of the creation, ch. xiii.,-xv. ; 4. On Providence and Omniscience, ch. xvi.-xxv. ; 5. On the object of the Divine precepts (ta'ame ha-mizvot) and the historical portions of the Bible, ch. xxv.-xl. ; 6. A guide to the proper worship of God.
With great caution Maimonides approaches the explanation of the ma'aseh mercabah, the chariot which Ezekiel beheld in a vision (Ez. i.). The mysteries included in the description of the Divine chariot had been orally trasmitted from generation to generation, but in consequence of the dispersion of the Jews the chain of tradition was broken, and the knowledge of these mysteries had vanished. Whatever he knew of those mysteries he owed exclusively to his own intellectual faculties; he therefore could not reconcile himself to the idea that his knowledge should die with him. He committed his exposition of the ma'aseh mercabah and the ma'aseh bereshit to writing, bus did not divest it of its original mysterious character ; so that the explanation was fully intelligible to the initiated--that is to say, to the philosopher --but to the ordinary reader it was a mere paraphrase of the Biblical text.-- (Introduction.)
The first seven chapters are devoted to the exposition of the Divine chariot. According to Maimonides three distinct parts are to be noticed, each of which begins with the phrase, "And I saw." These parts correspond to the three parts of the Universe, the sublunary world, the spheres and the intelligences. First of all the prophet is made to behold the material world which consists of the earth and the spheres, and of these the spheres, as the more important, are noticed first. In the Second Part, in which the nature of the spheres is discussed, the author dwells with pride on his discovery that they can be divided into four groups. This discovery he now employs to show that the four "hayyot" (animals) represent the four divisions of the spheres. He points out that the terms which the prophet uses in the description of the hayyot are identical with terms applied to the properties of the spheres. For the four hayyot or "angels," or cherubim, (1) have human form ; (2) have human faces ; (3)possess characteristics of other animals ; (4) have human hands ; (5) their feet are straight and round (cylindrical) ; (6) their bodies are closely joined so each other ; (7) only their faces and their wings are separate ; (8) their substance is transparent and refulgent; (9) they move uniformly ; (10) each moves in its own direction ; (11) they run ; (12) swift as lightning they return towards their starting point ; and (13) they move in consequence of an extraneous impulse (ruah). In a similar manner the spheres are described :--(1) they possess the characteristics of man, viz., life and intellect ; (2) they consist like man of body and soul ; (3.) they are strong, mighty and swift, like the ox, the lion, and the eagle , (4.) they perform all manner of work as though they had hands ; (5) they are round, and are not divided into parts ; (6) no vacuum intervenes between one sphere and the other ; (7) they may be considered as one being, but in respect to the intellects, which are the causes of their existence and motion, they appear as four different beings ; (8) they are transparent and refulgent; (9) each sphere moves uniformly, (10) and according to its special laws ; (11) they revolve with great velocity ; (12) each point returns again so its previous position ; (13) they are self-moving, yet the impulse emanates from an external power.
In the second part of the vision the prophet saw the ofannim. These represent the four elements of the sublunary world. For the ofannim (1) are connected with the bayyot and with the earth ; (2) they have four faces, and are four separate beings, but interpenetrate each other "as though it were a wheel in the midst of a wheel" (Ez. 1. 16) ; (3) they are covered with eyes ; (4.) they are not self-moving ; (5) they are set in motion by the hayyot; (6) their motion is not circular but rectilinear. The same may almost be said of the four elements (1) they are in close Contact with the spheres, being encompassed by the sphere of the moon ; earth occupies the centre, water surrounds earth, air has its position between water and fire ; (2) this order is not invariably maintained ; the respective portions change and they become intermixed and combined with each other (3) though they are only four elements they form an infinite number of things; (4.) not being animated they do not move of their own accord ; (5) they are set in motion by the action of the spheres ; (6) when a portion is displaced it returmss in a straight line to its original position.
In the third vision Ezekiel saw a human form above thse hayyot. The figure was divided in the middle ; in the upper portion the prophet only noticed that it was hashmal, (mysterious) ; from the loins downwards there was "the vision of the likeness of the Divine Glory," and "the likeness of the throne." The world of Intelligences was represented by the figure ; these can only be perceived in as far as they influence the spheres, but their relation to the Creator is beyond human comprehension. The Creator himself is not represented in this vision.
The key to the whole vision Maimonides finds in the introductory words, "And the heavens were opened," and in the minute description of the place and the time of the revelation. When pondering on the grandeur of the spheres and their influences, which vary according to time and place, man begins to think of the existence of the Creator. At the conclusion of this exposition Maimonides declares that he will, in the subsequent chapters, refrain from giving further explanation of the ma'aseh mercahah. The foregoing summary, however, shows that the opinion of the author on this subject is fully stated, and it is indeed difficult to conceive what additional disclosures he could still have made.
The task which the author has proposed to himself in the Preface he now regarded as accomplished. He has discussed the method of the Kalam, the system of the philosophers, and his own theory concerning the relation between the Primal Cause and the Universe: he has explained the Biblical account of the creation, the nature of prophecy, and the mysteries in Ezekiel's vision. In the remaining portion of the work the author attempts to solve certain theological problems, as though he wished to obviate the following objections, which might be raised to his theory that there is a design throughout the creation, and that the entire Universe is subject to the law of causation :--What is the purpose of the evils which attend human life? For what purpose was the world created? In how far does Providence interfere with the natural course of events? Does God know and foresee man's actions ? To what end was the Divine Law revealed These problems are treated seriatim.
All evils, Maimonides holds, originate in the material element of man's existence. Those who are able to emancipate themselves from the tyranny of the body, and unconditionally so submit to the dictates of reason, are protected from many evils. Man should disregard the cravings of the body, avoid them as topics of conversation, and keep his thoughts far away from them ; convivial and erotic songs debase man's noblest gifts -- thought and speech. Matter is the partition separating man from the pure Intellects ; it is "the thickness of rhe cloud" which true knowledge has so traverse before it reaches man. In reality, evil is the mere negative of good "God saw all that He had made, and behold it was very good" (Gen. i. 3 ). Evil does not exist at all. When evils are mentioned in the Scriptures as the work of God, the Scriptural expressions must not be taken in their literal sense, There are three kinds of evils :-- 1. Evils necessitated by those laws of production and destruction by which the species are perpetuated. 2. Evils which men inflict on each other ; they are comparatively few, especially among civilized men. 3. Evils which man brings upon himself, and which comprise the majority of existing evils. The consideration of these three classes of evils leads to the conclusion that "the Lord is good to all, and his tender mercies are over all his works" (Ps. cxlv. 9).
The question, What is the object of the creation?, must be left unanswered. The creation is the result of the will of God. Also those who believe that the Universe is eternal must admit that they are unable to discover the purpose of the Universe. It would, however, not be illogical to asaume that the spheres have been created for the sake of man, notwithstanding the great dimensions of the former and the smallness of the latter. Still it must be conceded that, even if mankind were the main and central object of creation, there is no absolute interdependence between them ; for it is a matter of course that, under altered conditions, man could exist without the spheres. All teleological theories must therefore be confined within the limits of the Universe as it now exists. They are only admissible in the relation in which the several parts of the Universe stand to each other; but the purpose of the Universe as a whole cannot be accounted for. It is simply an emanation from the will of God.
Regarding the belief in Providence, Maimonides enumerates the following five opinions :--1. There is no Providence; everything is subject to chance 2. Only a part of the Universe is governed by Providence, viz., the spheres, the species, and such individual beings as possess the power of perpetuating their existence (e.g., the start) ; the rest--that is, the sublunary world--is left to mere chance. 3. Everthing is predetermined ; according to this theory, revealed Law is inconceivable. 4. Providence assigns its blessings to all creatures, according to their merits ; accordingly, all beings, even the lowest animals, if innocently injored or killed, receive compensation in a future life. 5. According to the Jewish belief all living beings are endowed with free-will ; God is just, and the destiny of man depends on his merits. Maimonides denies the existence of trials inflicted by Divine love, i.e. afflictions which befall man, not as punishments of sin, but as means to procure for him a reward in times to come. Maimonides also rejects the notion that God ordains special temptation. The Biblical account, according to which God tempts men, "to know what is in their hearts," must not be taken in its literal sense ; it merely states that God made the virtues of certain people known to their fellowmen in order that their good example should be followed. Of all creatures man alone enjoys the especial care of Providence because the acts of Providence are identical with certain influences (shefa') which the Active Intellect brings to bear upon the human intellect; their eflcct upon man varies according to his physical, moral, and intellectual condition ; irrational beings, however, cannot be affected by these influences. If we cannot in each individual case see how these principles are applied, it must be borne in mind that God's wisdom is far above that of man. The author seems to have felt that his theory has its weak points, for he introduces it as follows :--" My theory is not established by demonstrative proof ; it is based on the authority of the Bible, and it is less subject to refutation than any of the theories previously mentioned."
Providence implies Omniscience, and men who deny this, eo ipso, have no belief in Providence. Some are unable to reconcile the fate of man with Divine Justice, and are therefore of opinion that God takes no notice whatever of the events which occur on earth. Others believe that God, being an absolute Unity, cannot possess a knowledge of a multitude of things, or of things that do not yet exist, or the number of which is infinite. These objections, which arc based nn the nature of man's perception, are illogical, for God's knowledge cannot be compared to that of man ; it is identical with His essence. Even the Attributists, who assume that God's knowledge is different from His essence, hold that it is distinguished from man's knowledge in the following five points :-- 1. It is one, although it embraces a plurality. 2. It includes even such things as do not yet exist. 3. It includes things which are infinite in number. 4. It does not change when new objects of perception present themselves. 5. It does not determine the course of events. -- However difficult this theory may appear to human comprehension, it is in accordance with the words of Isaiah (lv. 8) "Your thoughts are not My thoughts, and your ways are not My ways." According to Maimonides, the difficulty is to be explained by the fact that God is the Creator of all things, and His knowledge of the things is not dependent on their existence ; while the knowledge of man is solely dependent on the objects which come under his cognition.
According to Maimonides, the book of Job illustrates the several views which have been mentioned above. Satan, that is, the material element in human existence, is described as the cause of Job's sufferings. Job at first believed that man's happiness depends on riches, health, and children ; being deprived of these sources of happiness, he conceived the notion that Providence is indifferent to the fate of mortal beings. After a careful study of natural phenomena, he rejected this opinion. Eliphaz held that all misfortunes of man serve as punishments of past sins. Bildad, the second friend of Job, admitted the existence of those afflictions which Divine love decrees in order that the patient sufferer may be fitted to receive a bountiful reward. Zophar, the third friend of Job, declared that the ways of God are beyond human comprehension ; there is but one explanation assignable to all Divine acts, namely: Such is His Will. Elihu gives a fuller development to this idea ; he says that such evils as befell Job may be remedied once or twice, but the course of nature is not altogether reversed. It is true that by prophecy a clearer insight into the ways of God can be obtained, but there are only few who arrive at that exalted intellectual degree, whilst the majority of men must content themselves with acquiring a knowledge of God through the study of nature. Such a study leads man to the conviction that his understanding cannot fathom the secrets of nature and the wisdom of Divine Providence.
The concluding section of the Third Part treats of the purpose of the Divine precepts. In the Pentateuch they are described as the means of acquiring wisdom, enduring happiness, and also bodily comfort (ch. xxxi.). Generally a distinction is made between "hukkim" ("statutes") and mishpatim ("judgments"). The object of the latter is, on the whole, known, but the hukkim are considered as tests of mans obedience ; no reason is given why they have been enacted. Maimonides rejects this distinction ; he states that all precepts are the result of wisdom and design, that all contribute to the welfare of mankind, although with regard to the hukkim this is less obvious. The author draws another line of distinction between the general principles and the details of rules. For the selection and the introduction of the latter there is but one reason, viz. "Such is the will of God."
The laws are intended to promote man's perfection ; they improve both his mental and his physical condition ; the former in so far as they lead him to the acquisition of true knowledge, the latter through the training of his moral and social faculties. Each law thus imparts knowledge, improves the moral condition of man, or conduces to the well-being of society. Many revealed laws help to enlighten man, and to correct false opinions. This object is not always clearly announced. God in His wisdom sometimes withheld from the knowledge of man the purpose of commandments and actions. There are other precepts which tend to restrain man's passions and desires. If the same end is occasionally attainable by other means, it must be remembered that the Divine laws are adapted to the ordinary mental and emotional state of man, and not to exceptional circumstances. In this work, as in the Yad ha-hazakah, Maimonides divides the laws of the Pentateuch into fourteen groups, and in each group he discusses the principal and the special object of the laws included in it.
In addition to the legislative contents, the Bible includes historical information ; and Maimonides, in briefly reviewing the Biblical narratives, shows that these are likewise intended to improve man's physical, moral, and intellectual condition. "It is not a vain thing for you" (Deut. xxxii. 47) and when it proves vain to anyone, it is his own fault.
In the final chapters the author describes the several degrees of human perfection, from the sinners who have turned from the right path to the best of men, who in all their thoughts and acts cling to the Most Perfect Being, who aspire after the greatest possible knowledge of God, and strive to serve their Maker in the practice of "loving-kindness, righteousness, and justice." This degree of human perfection can only be attained by those who never forget the presence of the Almighty, and remain firm in their fear and love of God. These servants of the Most High inherit the choicest of human blessings they are endowed with wisdom they are godlike beings. -------------------- INTRODUCTION
[Letter of the Author to his Pupil, R. Joseph Ibn Aknin.]
In the name of GOD, Lord of the Universe.
To R. Joseph (may God protect him!), son of R. Jehudah (may his repose be in Paradise !) :
My dear pupil, ever since you resolved to come to me, from a distant country, and to study under my direction, I thought highly of your thirst for knowledge, and your fondness for speculative pursuits, which found expression in your poems. I refer to the time when I received your writings in prose and verse from Alexandria. I was then not yet able to test your powers of apprehension, and I thought that your desire might possibly exceed your capacity. But when you had gone with me through a course of astronomy, after having completed the [other] elementary studies which are indispensable for the understanding of that science, 1 was still more gratified by the acuteness and the quickness of your apprehension. Observing your great fondness for mathematics, I let you study them more deeply, for I felt sure of your ultimate success. Afterwards, when I took you through a course of logic, 1 found that my great expectations of you were confirmed, and I considered you fit to receive from me an exposition of the esoteric ideas contained in the prophetic books, that you might understand them as they are understood by men of culture. When I commenced by way of hints, 1 noticed that you desired additional explanation, urging me to expound some metaphysical problems; to teach you the system of the Mutakallemim; to tell you whether their arguments were based on logical proof; and if not, what their method was. I perceived that you had acquired some knowledge in those matters from others, and that you were perplexed and bewildered; yet you sought to find out a solution to your difficulty. I urged you to desist from this pursuit, and enjoined you to continue your studies systematically; for my object was that the truth should present itself in connected order, and that you should not hit upon it by mere chance. Whilst you studied with me I never refused to explain difficult verses in the Bible or passages in rabbinical literature which we happened to meet. When, by the will of God, we parted, and you went your way, our discussions aroused in me a resolution which had long been dormant. Your absence has prompted me to compose this treatise for you and for those who are like you, however few they may be. I have divided it into chapters, each of which shall be sent to you as soon as it is completed. Farewell!"
[Prefatory Remarks.]
Cause me to know the way wherein I should walk, for I lift up my soul unto Thee." (Psalm cxliii. S.)
Unto you, 0 men, 1 call, and my voice is to the sons of men." (Prov. viii. 4)
Bow down thine ear and hear the words of the wise, and apply thine heart unto my knowledge." (Prov. xxii. 17.)
My primary object in this work is to explain certain words occurring in the prophetic books. Of these some are homonyms, and of their several meanings the ignorant choose the wrong ones; other terms which are employed in a figurative sense are erroneously taken by such persons in their primary signification. There are also hybrid terms, denoting things which are of the same class from one point of view and of a different class from another. It is not here intended to explain all these expressions to the unlettered or to mere tyros, a previous knowledge of Logic and Natural Philosophy being indispensable, or to those who confine their attention to the study of our holy Law, I mean the study of the canonical law alone; for the true knowledge of the Torah is the special aim of this and similar works.
The object of this treatise is to enlighten a religious man who has been trained to believe in the truth of our holy Law, who conscientiously fulfils his moral and religious duties, and at the same time has been successful in his philosophical studies. Human reason has attracted him to abide within its sphere; and he finds it difficult to accept as correct the teaching based on the literal interpretation of the Law, and especially that which he himself or others derived from those homonymous, metaphorical, or hybrid expressions. Hence he is lost in perplexity and anxiety. If he be guided solely by reason, and renounce his previous views which are based on those expressions, he would consider that he had rejected the fundamental principles of the Law; and even if he retains the opinions which were derived from those expressions, and if, instead of following his reason, he abandon its guidance altogether, it would still appear that his religious convictions had suffered loss and injury. For he would then be left with those errors which give rise to fear and anxiety, constant grief and great perplexity.
This work has also a second object in view. It seeks to explain certain obscure figures which occur in the Prophets, and are not distinctly characterized as being figures. Ignorant and superficial readers take them in a literal, not in a figurative sense. Even well informed persons are bewildered if they understand these passages in their literal signification, but they are entirely relieved of their perplexity when we explain the figure, or merely suggest that the terms are figurative. For this reason I have called this book Guide for the Perplexed.
I do not presume to think that this treatise settles every doubt in the minds of those who understand it, but I maintain that it settles the greater part of their difficulties. No intelligent man will require and expect that on introducing any subject 1 shall completely exhaust it; or that on commencing the exposition of a figure I shall fully explain all its parts. Such a course could not be followed by a teacher in a viva vote exposition, much less by an author in writing a book, without becoming a target for every foolish conceited person to discharge the arrows of folly at him. Some general principles bearing upon this point have been fully discussed in our works on the Talmud, and we have there called the attention of the reader to many themes of this kind. We also stated (Mishneh torah, I. ii. 12, and iv. 10) that the expression Ma'ase Bereshit (Account of the Creation) signified" Natural Science," and Ma'aseh Mercabah (" Description of the Chariot" ) Metaphysics, and we explained the force of the Rabbinical dictum," The Ma'aseh Mercabak must not be fully expounded even in the presence of a single student, unless he be wise and able to reason for himself, and even then you should merely acquaint him with the heads of the different sections of the subject. (Babyl. Talm. Hagigah, fol. II b). You must, therefore, not expect from me more than such heads. And even these have not been methodically and systematically arranged in this work, but have been, on the contrary, scattered, and are interspersed with other topics which we shall have occasion to explain. My object in adopting this arrangement is that the truths should be at one time apparent, and at another time concealed. Thus we shall not be in opposition to the Divine Will (from which it is wrong to deviate) which has withheld from the multitude the truths required for the knowledge of God, according to the words," The secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him" (Ps. xxv. 14).
Know that also in Natural Science there are topics which are not to be fully explained. Our Sages laid down the rule," The Ma'aseb Bereshith must not be expounded in the presence of two." If an author were to explain these principles in writing, it would be equal to expounding them unto thousands of men. For this reason the prophets treat these subjects in figures, and our Sages, imitating the method of Scripture, speak of them in metaphors and allegories; because there is a close affinity between these subjects and metaphysics, and indeed they form part of its mysteries. Do not imagine that these most difficult problems can be thoroughly understood by any one of us. This is not the case. At times the truth shines so brilliantly that we perceive it as clear as day. Our nature and habit then draw a veil over our perception, and we return to a darkness almost as dense as before. We are like those who, though beholding frequent flashes of lightning, still find themselves in the thickest darkness of the night. On some the lightning flashes in rapid succession, and they seem to be in continuous light, and their night is as clear as the day. This was the degree of prophetic excellence attained by (Moses) the greatest of prophets, to whom God said," But as for thee, stand thou here by Me" (Deut. v. 31), and of whom it is written" the skin of his face shone," etc. (Exod. xxxiv. 29). [Some perceive the prophetic flash at long intervals; this is the degree of most prophets.] By others only once during the whole night is a flash of lightning perceived. This is the case with those of whom we are informed," They prophesied, and did not prophesy again" (Num. xi. 25). There are some to whom the flashes of lightning appear with varying intervals; others are in the condition of men, whose darkness is illumined not by lightning, but by some kind of crystal or similar stone, or other substances that possess the property of shining during the night; and to them even this small amount of light is not continuous, but now it shines and now it vanishes, as if it were" the flame of the rotating sword."
The degrees in the perfection of men vary according to these distinctions. Concerning those who never beheld the light even for one day, but walk in continual darkness, it is written," They know not, neither will they understand; they walk on in darkness" (Ps. lxxxii. 5). Truth, in spite of all its powerful manifestations, is completely withheld from them, and the following words of Scripture may be applied to them," And now men see not the light which is bright in the skies" (job xxxvii. 21). They are the multitude of ordinary men: there is no need to notice them in this treatise.
You must know that if a person, who has attained a certain degree of perfection, wishes to impart to others, either orally or in writing, any portion of the knowledge which he has acquired of these subjects, he is utterly unable to be as systematic and explicit as he could be in a science of which the method is well known. The same difficulties which he encountered when investigating the subject for himself will attend him when endeavouring to instruct others: viz., at one time the explanation will appear lucid, at another time, obscure: this property of the subject appears to remain the same both to the advanced scholar and to the beginner. For this reason, great theological scholars gave instruction in all such matters only by means of metaphors and allegories. They frequently employed them in forms varying more or less essentially. In most cases they placed the lesson to be illustrated at the beginning, or in the middle, or at the end of the simile. When they could find no simile which from beginning to end corresponded to the idea which was to be illustrated, they divided the subject of the lesson, although in itself one whole, into different parts, and expressed each by a separate figure. Still more obscure are those instances in which one simile is employed to illustrate many subjects, the beginning of the simile representing one thing, the end another. Sometimes the whole metaphor may refer to two cognate subjects in the same branch of knowledge.
If we were to teach in these disciplines, without the use of parables and figures, we should be compelled to resort to expressions both profound and transcendental, and by no means more intelligible than metaphors and similes: as though the wise and learned were drawn into this course by the Divine Will, in the same way as they are compelled to follow the laws of nature in matters relating to the body. You are no doubt aware that the Almighty, desiring to lead us to perfection and to improve our state of society, has revealed to us laws which are to regulate our actions. These laws, however, presuppose an advanced state of intellectual culture. We must first form a conception of the Existence of the Creator according to our capabilities; that is, we must have a knowledge of Metaphysics. But this discipline can only be approached after the study of Physics: for the science of Physics borders on Metaphysics, and must even precede it in the course of our studies, as is clear to all who are familiar with these questions. Therefore the Almighty commenced Holy Writ with the description of the Creation, that is, with Physical Science; the subject being on the one hand most weighty and important, and on the other hand our means of fully comprehending those great problems being limited. He described those profound truths, which His Divine Wisdom found it necessary to communicate to us, in allegorical, figurative, and metaphorical language. Our Sages have said (Yemen Midrash on Gen. i. 1)," It is impossible to give a full account of the Creation to man. Therefore Scripture simply tells us, In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth" (Gen. i. 1). Thus they have suggested that this subject is a deep mystery, and in the words of Solomon," Far off and exceedingly deep, who can find it out ?" (Eccles. Vii. 24). It has been treated in metaphors in order that the uneducated may comprehend it according to the measure of their faculties and the feebleness of their apprehension, while educated persons may take it in a different sense. In our commentary on the Mishnah we stated our intention to explain difficult problems in the Book on Prophecy and in the Book of Harmony. In the latter we intended to examine all the passages in the Midrash which, if taken literally, appear to be inconsistent with truth and common sense, and must therefore be taken figuratively. Many years have elapsed since 1 first commenced those works. I had proceeded but a short way when 1 became dissatisfied with my original plan. For I observed that by expounding these passages by means of allegorical and mystical terms, we do not explain anything, but merely substitute one thing for another of the same nature, whilst in explaining them fully our efforts would displease most people; and my sole object in planning to write those books was to make the contents of Midrashirn and the exoteric lessons of the prophecies intelligible to everybody. We have further noticed that when an ill-informed Theologian reads these Midrashim, he will find no difficulty; for possessing no knowledge of the properties of things, he will not reject statements which involve impossibilities. When, however, a person who is both religious and well educated reads them, he cannot escape the following dilemma: either he takes them literally, and questions the abilities of the author and the soundness of his mind-doing thereby nothing which is opposed to the principles of our faith,-- or he will acquiesce in assuming that the passages in question have some secret meaning, and he will continue to hold the author in high estimation whether he understood the allegory or not. As regards prophecy in its various degrees and the different metaphors used in the prophetic books, we shall give in the present work an explanation, according to a different method. Guided by these considerations I have refrained from writing those two books as I had previously intended. In my larger work, the Mishnab Torah, I have contented myself with briefly stating the principles of our faith and its fundamental truths, together with such hints as approach a clear exposition. In this work, however, I address those who have studied philosophy and have acquired sound knowledge, and who while firm in religious matters are perplexed and bewildered on account of the ambiguous and figurative expressions employed in the holy writings. Some chapters may be found in this work which contain no reference whatever to homonyms. Such chapters will serve as an introduction to others: they will contain some reference to the signification of a homonym which 1 do not wish to mention in that place, or explain some figure: point out that a certain expression is a figure: treat of difficult passages generally misunderstood in consequence of the homonymy they include, or because the simile they contain is taken in place of that which it represents, and vice versa.
Having spoken of similes, I proceed to make the following remark :-The key to the understanding and to the full comprehension of all that the Prophets have said is found in the knowledge of the figures, their general ideas, and the meaning of each word they contain. You know the verse:
" I have also spoken in similes by the Prophets" (Hosea xii. 10): and also the verse," Put forth a riddle and speak a parable" (Ezek. xvii. 2). And because the Prophets continually employ figures, Ezekiel said," Does He not speak parables ?" (xxi. 5). Again, Solomon begins his book of Proverbs with the words," To understand a proverb and figurative speech, the words of the wise and their dark sayings" (Prov. i. 6): and we read in Midrash, Shir ha-shirim Rabba, i. 1):" To what were the words of the Law to be cornpared before the time of Solomon ? To a well the waters of which are at a great depth, and though cool and fresh, yet no man could drink of them. A clever man joined cord with cord, and rope with rope, and drew up and drank. So Solomon went from figure to figure, and from subject to subject, till he obtained the true sense of the Law." So far go the words of our Sages. I do not believe that any intelligent man thinks that" the words of the Law" mentioned here as requiring the application of figures in order to be understood, can refer to the rules for building tabernacles, for preparing the lulab, or for the four kinds of trustees. What is really meant is the apprehension of profound and difficult subjects, concerning which our Sages said," If a man loses in his house a sela, or a pearl, he can find it by lighting a taper worth only one issar. Thus the parables in themselves are of no great value, but through them the words of the holy Law are rendered intelligible." These likewise are the words of our Sages; consider well their statement, that the deeper sense of the words of the holy Law are pearls, and the literal acceptation of a figure is of no value in itself. They compare the hidden meaning included in the literal sense of the simile to a pearl lost in a dark room, which is full of furniture. It is certain that the pearl is in the room, but the man can neither see it nor know where it lies. It is just as if the pearl were no longer in his possession, for, as has been stated, it affords him no benefit whatever until he kindles a light. The same is the case with the comprehension of that which the simile represents. The wise king said," A word fitly spoken is like apples of gold in vessels of silver" (Prov. xxv. 11). Hear the explanation of what he said :-The word maskiyotb, the Hebrew equivalent for" vessels," denotes" filigree network" --i.e., things in which there are very small apertures, such as are frequently wrought by silversmiths. They are called in Hebrew maskiyyoth (lit." transpicuous," from the verb sakah," he saw," a root which occurs also in the Targum of Onkelos, Gen. xxvi. 8), because the eye penetrates through them. Thus Solomon meant to say," just as apples of gold in silver filigree with small apertures, so is a word fitly spoken."
See how beautifully the conditions of a good simile are described in this figure! It shows that in every word which has a double sense, a literal one and a figurative one, the plain meaning must be as valuable as silver, and the hidden meaning still more precious: so that the figurative meaning bears the same relation to the literal one as gold to silver. It is further necessary that the plain sense of the phrase shall give to those who consider it some notion of that which the figure represents. just as a golden apple overlaid with a network of silver, when seen at a distance, or looked at superficially, is mistaken for a silver apple, but when a keen-sighted person looks at the object well, he will find what is within, and see that the apple is gold. The same is the case with the figures employed by prophets. Taken literally, such expressions contain wisdom useful for many purposes, among others, for the amelioration of the condition of society; e.g., the Proverbs (of Solomon), and similar sayings in their literal sense. Their hidden meaning, however, is profound wisdom, conducive to the recognition of real truth.
Know that the figures employed by prophets are of two kinds : first, where every word which occurs in the simile represents a certain idea: and secondly, where the simile, as a whole, represents a general idea, but has a great many points which have no reference whatever to that idea: they are simply required to give to the simile its proper form and order, or better to conceal the idea: the simile is therefore continued as far as necessary, according to its literal sense. Consider this well.
An example of the first class of prophetic figures is to be found in Genesis:-"And, behold, a ladder set up on the earth, and the top of it reached to heaven; and, behold, the angels of God ascending and descending on it" (Gen. xxviii. 12). The word" ladder" refers to one idea:" set up on the earth" to another:" and the top of it reached to heaven" to a third: 4' angels of God" to a fourth:" ascending" to a fifth;" descending" to a sixth;" the Lord stood above it" (ver. 13) to a seventh. Every word in this figure introduces a fresh element into the idea represented by the figure.
An example of the second class of prophetic figures is found in Proverbs (vii. 6-26) :--" For at the window of my house I looked through my casement, and beheld among the simple ones; I discerned among the youths a young man void of understanding, passing through the street near her corner : and he went the way to her house, in the twilight, in the evening, in the black and dark night: and, behold, there met him a woman with the attire of a harlot, and subtil of heart. (She is loud and stubborn; her feet abide not in her house: now the is without, now in the streets, and lieth in wait in every corner.) So she caught him, and kissed him, and with an impudent face said unto him, I have peace offerings with me; this day have I paid my vows. Therefore came I forth to meet thee, diligently to seek thy face, and I have found thee. I have decked my bed with coverings of tapestry, with striped cloths of the yam of Egypt. I have perfumed my bed with myrrh, aloes, and cinnamon. Come, let us take our fill of love until the morning: let us solace ourselves with loves. For the goodman is not at home, he is gone a long journey: he hath taken a bag of money with him, and will come home at the day appointed. With her much fair speech she caused him to yield, with the flattering of her lips she forced him. He goeth after her straightway, as an ox goeth to the slaughter, or as fetters to the correction of a fool : till a dart strike through his liver: as a bird hasteth to the snare, and knoweth not that it is for his life. Hearken unto me now therefore, 0 ye children, and attend to the words of my mouth. Let not thine heart decline to her ways, go not astray in her paths. For she hath cast down many wounded: yea, many strong men have been slain by her."
The general principle expounded in all these verses is to abstain from excessive indulgence in bodily pleasures. The author compares the body, which is the source of all sensual pleasures, to a married woman who at the same time is a harlot. And this figure he has taken as the basis of his entire book. We shall hereafter show the wisdom of Solomon in comparing sensual pleasures to an adulterous harlot. We shall explain how aptly he concludes that work with the praises of a faithful wife who devotes herself to the welfare of her husband and of her household. All obstacles which prevent man from attaining his highest aim in life, all the deficiencies in the character of man, all his evil propensities, are to be traced to the body alone. This will be explained later on. The predominant idea running throughout the figure is, that man shall not be entirely guided by his animal, or material nature; for the material substance of man is identical with that of the brute creation.
An adequate explanation of the figure having been given, and its meaning having been shown, do not imagine that you will find in its application a corresponding element for each part of the figure; you must not ask what is meant by" I have peace offerings with me" (ver. 14): by" I have decked my bed with coverings of tapestry" (ver. 16): or what is added to the force of the figure by the observation" for the goodman is not at home" (ver. 19), and so on to the end of the chapter. For all this is merely to complete the illustration of the metaphor in its literal meaning. The circumstances described here are such as are common to adulterers. Such conversations take place between all adulterous persons. You must well understand what I have said, for it is a principle of the utmost importance with respect to those things which I intend to expound. If you observe in one of the chapters that I explained the meaning of a certain figure, and pointed out to you its general scope, do not trouble yourself further in order to find an interpretation of each separate portion, for that would lead you to one of the two following erroneous courses: either you will miss the sense included in the metaphor, or you will be induced to explain certain things which require no explanation, and which are not introduced for that purpose. Through this unnecessary trouble you may fall into the great error which besets most modern sects in their foolish writings and discussions: they all endeavour to find some hidden meaning in expressions which were never uttered by the author in that sense. Your object should be to discover inmost of the figures the general idea which the author wishes to express. In some instances it will be sufficient if you understand from my remarks that a certain expression contains a figure, although I may offer no further comment. For when you know that it is not to be taken literally, you will understand at once to what subject it refers. My statement that it is a figurative expression will, as it were, remove the screen from between the object and the observer.
Directions for the Study of this Work.
If you desire to grasp all that is contained in this book so that nothing shall escape your notice, consider the chapters in connected order. In studying each chapter, do not content yourself with comprehending its principal subject, but attend to every term mentioned therein, although it may seem to have no connection with the principal subject. For what I have written in this work was not the suggestion of the moment: it is the result of deep study and great application. Care has been taken that nothing that appeared doubtful should be left unexplained. Nothing of what is mentioned is out of place, every remark will be found to illustrate the subject-matter of the respective chapter. Do not read superficially, lest you do me an injury, and derive no benefit for yourself. You must study thoroughly and read continually; for you will then find the solution of those important problems of religion, which are a source of anxiety to all intelligent men. I adjure any reader of my book, in the name of the Most High, not to add any explanation even to a single word: nor to explain to another any portion of it except such passages as have been fully treated of by previous theological authorities: he must not teach others anything that he has learnt from my work alone, and that has not been hitherto discussed by any of our authorities. The reader must, moreover, beware of raising objections to any of my statements, because it is very probable that he may understand my words to mean the exact opposite to what 1 intended to say. He will injure me, while I endeavoured to benefit him." He will requite me evil for good." Let the reader make a careful study of this work; and if his doubt be removed on even one point, let him praise his Maker and rest contented with the knowledge he has acquired. But if he derive from it no benefit whatever, he may consider the book as if it had never been written. Should he notice any opinions with which he does not agree, let him endeavour to find a suitable explanation, even if it seem far-fetched, in order that he may judge me charitably. Such a duty we owe to every one. We owe it especially to our scholars and theologians, who endeavour to teach us what is the truth according to the best of their ability. I feel assured that those of my readers who have not studied philosophy, will still derive profit from many a chapter. But the thinker whose studies have brought him into collision with religion, will, as I have already mentioned, derive much benefit from every chapter. How greatly will he rejoice! How agreeably will my words strike his ears! Those, however, whose minds are confused with false notions and perverse methods, who regard their misleading studies as sciences, and imagine themselves philosophers, though they have no knowledge that could truly be termed science, will object to many chapters, and will find in them many insuperable difficulties, because they do not understand their meaning, and because I expose therein the absurdity of their perverse notions, which constitute their riches and peculiar treasure," stored up for their ruin." God knows that 1 hesitated very much before writing on the subjects contained in this work, since they are profound mysteries: they are topics which, since the time of our captivity have not been treated by any of our scholars as far as we possess their writings; how then shall I now make a beginning and discuss them ? But I rely on two precedents : first, to similar cases our Sages applied the verse," It is time to do something in honour of the Lord: for they have made void thy law" (Ps. cxix. 126). Secondly, they have said," Let all thy acts be guided by pure intentions." On these two principles I relied while composing some parts of this work. Lastly, when I have a difficult subject before me-when I find the road narrow, and can see no other way of teaching a well established truth except by pleasing one intelligent man and displeasing ten thousand fools-I prefer to address myself to the one man, and to take no notice whatever of the condemnation of the multitude; I prefer to extricate that intelligent man from his embarrassment and show him the cause of his perplexity, so that he may attain perfection and be at peace.
[ON METHOD]
THERE are seven causes of inconsistencies and contradictions to be met with in a literary work. The first cause arises from the fact that the author collects the opinions of various men, each differing from the other, but neglects to mention the name of the author of any particular opinion. In such a work contradictions or inconsistencies must occur, since any two statements may belong to two different authors. Second cause: The author holds at first one opinion which he subsequently rejects: in his work., however, both his original and altered views are retained. Third cause: The passages in question are not all to be taken literally: some only are to be understood in their literal sense, while in others figurative language is employed, which includes another meaning besides the literal one : or, in the apparently inconsistent passages, figurative language is employed which, if taken literally, would seem to be contradictories or contraries. Fourth cause : The premises are not identical in both statements, but for certain reasons they are not fully stated in these passages: or two propositions with different subjects which are expressed by the same term without having the difference in meaning pointed out, occur in two passages. The contradiction is therefore only apparent, but there is no contradiction in reality. The fifth cause is traceable to the use of a certain method adopted in teaching and expounding profound problems. Namely, a difficult and obscure theorem must sometimes be mentioned and assumed as known, for the illustration of some elementary and intelligible subject which must be taught beforehand the commencement being always made with the easier thing. The teacher must therefore facilitate, in any manner which he can devise, the explanation of those theorems, which have to be assumed as known, and he must content himself with giving a general though somewhat inaccurate notion on the subject. It is, for the present, explained according to the capacity of the students, that they may comprehend it as far as they are required to understand the subject. Later on, the same subject is thoroughly treated and fully developed in its right place. Sixth cause : The contradiction is not apparent, and only becomes evident through a series of premises. The larger the number of premises necessary to prove the contradiction between the two conclusions, the greater is the chance that it will escape detection, and that the author will not perceive his own inconsistency. Only when from each conclusion, by means of suitable premises, an inference is made, and from the enunciation thus inferred, by means of proper arguments, other conclusions are formed, and after that process has been repeated many times, then it becomes clear that the original conclusions are contradictories or contraries. Even able writers are liable to overlook such inconsistencies. If, however, the contradiction between the original statements can at once be discovered, and the author, while writing the second, does not think of the first, he evinces a greater deficiency, and his words deserve no notice whatever. Seventh cause: Itis sometimes necessary to introduce such metaphysical matter as may partly be disclosed, but must partly be concealed: while, therefore, on one occasion the object which the author has in view may demand that the metaphysical problem be treated as solved in one way, it may be convenient on another occasion to treat it as solved in the opposite way. The author must endeavour, by concealing the fact as much as possible, to prevent the uneducated reader from perceiving the contradiction.
Inconsistencies occurring in the Mishnah and Boraitot are traceable to the first cause. You meet frequently in the Gemara with passages like the following : --" Does not the beginning of the passage contradict the end ? No: the beginning is the dictum of a certain Rabbi: the end that of an other" : or" Rabbi (Jehudah ha-Nasi) approved of the opinion of a certain rabbi in one case and gave it therefore anonymously, and having accepted that of another rabbi in the other case he introduced that view without naming the authority" : or" Who is the author of this anonymous dictum ? Rabbi A."" Who is the author of that paragraph in the Mishnah? Rabbi B." Instances of this kind are innumerable.
Apparent contradictions or differences occurring in the Gemara may be traced to the first cause and to the second, as e.g.," In this particular case he agrees with this rabbi or" He agrees with him in one point, but differs from him in another" or" These two dicta are the opinions of two Amoraim, who differ as regards the statement made by a certain rabbi." These are examples of contradictions traceable to the first cause. The following are instances which may be traced to the second cause." Rabba altered his opinion on that point" : it then becomes necessary to consider which of the two opinions came second. Again," In the first recension of the Talmud by Rabbi Ashi, he made one assertion, and in the second a different one."
The inconsistencies and contradictions met with in some passages of the prophetic books, if taken literally, are all traceable to the third or fourth cause, and it is exclusively in reference to this subject that I wrote the present Introduction. You know that the following expression frequently occurs," One verse says this, another that," showing the contradiction, and explaining that either some premise is wanting or the subject is altered. Comp." Solomon, it is not sufficient that thy words contradict thy father: they are themselves inconsistent, etc." Many similar instances occur in the writings of our Sages. The passages in the prophetical books which our Sages have explained, mostly refer to religious or moral precepts. Our desire, however, is to discuss such passages as contain apparent contradictions in regard to the principles of our faith. I shall explain some of them in various chapters of the present work: for this subject also belongs to the secrets of the Torah. Contradictions traceable to the seventh cause occurring in the prophetical works require special investigation: and no one should express his opinion on that matter by reasoning and arguing without weighing the matter well in his mind.
Inconsistencies in the writings of true philosophers are traceable to the fifth cause. Contradictions occurring in the writings of most authors and commentators, such as are not included in the above-mentioned works, are due to the sixth cause. Many examples of this class of contradictions are found in the Midrash and the Agada: hence the saying," We must not raise questions concerning the contradictions met with in the Agada." You may also notice in them contradictions due to the seventh cause. Any inconsistency discovered in the present work will be found to arise in consequence of the fifth cause or the seventh. Notice this, consider its truth, and remember it well, lest you misunderstand some of the chapters in this book.
Having concluded these introductory remarks I proceed to examine those expressions, to the true meaning of which, as apparent from the context, it is necessary to direct your attention. This book will then be a key admitting to places the gates of which would otherwise be closed. When the gates are opened and men enter, their souls will enjoy repose, their eyes will be gratified, and even their bodies, after all toil and labour, will be refreshed.
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" Open ye the gates, that the righteous nation which keepeth the truth may enter in."-(Isa. xxvi. 2.)
PART ONE
CHAPTER I
Some have been of opinion that by the Hebrew zelem, the shape and figure of a thing is to be understood, and this explanation led men to believe in the corporeality [of the Divine Being]: for they thought that the words" Let us make man in our ,relem" (Gen.i. 26), implied that God had the form of a human being, i.e., that He had figure and shape, and that, consequently, He was corporeal. They adhered faithfully to this view, and thought that if they were to relinquish it they would eo ipso reject the truth of the Bible : and further, if they did not conceive God as having a body possessed of face and limbs, similar to their own in appearance, they would have to deny even the existence of God. The sole difference which they admitted, was that He excelled in greatness and splendour, and that His substance was not flesh and blood. Thus far went their conception of the greatness and glory of God. The incorporeality of the Divine Being, and His unity, in the true sense of the word-for there is no real unity without incorporeality-will be fully proved in the course of the present treatise. (Part ll., ch. i.) In this chapter it is our sole intention to explain the meaning of the words zelem and demut. 1 hold that the Hebrew equivalent of" form" in the ordinary acceptation of the word, viz., the figure and shape of a thing, is tor. Thus we find" [And Joseph was] beautiful in toar ('form'), and beautiful in appearance" (Gen. xxxix. 6):" What form (toar) is he of ?" (I Sam. xxviii. 14):" As the form (toar) of the children of a king" (judges viii. 18). It is also applied to form produced by human labour, as" He marketh its form (toar) with a line,"" and he marketh its form (toar) with the compass" (Isa. xliv. 13). This term is not at all applicable to God. The term zelem, on the other hand, signifies the specific form, viz., that which constitutes the essence of a thing, whereby the thing is what it is; the reality of a thing in so far as it is that particular being. In man the" form" is that constituent which gives him human perception: and on account of this intellectual perception the term zelem is employed in the sentences" In the :pelem of God he created him" (Gen. i. 27). It is therefore rightly said," Thou despisest their zelem" (PS. lxiii. 20): the" contempt 11 can only concern the soulthe specific form of man, not the properties and shape of his body. 1 am also of opinion that the reason why this term is used for" idols" may be found in the circumstance that they are worshipped on account of some idea represented by them, not on account of their figure and shape. For the same reason the term is used in the expression," the forms (zalme) of your emerods" (I Sam. vi. 5), for the chief object was the removal of the injury caused by the emerods, not a change of their shape. As, however, it must be admitted that the term zelem is employed in these two cases, viz." the images of the emerods" and" the idols" on account of the external shape, the term zelem is either a homonym or a hybrid term, and would denote both the specific form and the outward shape, and similar properties relating to the dimensions and the shape of material bodies; and in the phrase" Let us make man in our zelem" (Gen. i. 26), the term signifies" the specific form" of man, viz., his intellectual perception, and does not refer to his" figure" or" shape." Thus we have shown the difference between zelem and toar, and explained the meaning of zelem.
Demut is derived from the verb damah," he is like." This term likewise denotes agreement with regard to some abstract relation: comp." I am like a pelican of the wilderness" (Ps. cii. 7): the author does not compare himself to the pelican in point of wings and feathers, but in point of sadness." Nor any tree in the garden of God was like unto him in beauty" (Ezek. 8): the comparison refers to the idea of beauty." Their poison is like the poison of a serpent" (Ps. lviii. 5):" He is like unto a lion" (Ps. xvii. 12): the resemblance indicated in these passages does not refer to the figure and shape, but to some abstract idea. In the same manner is used" the likeness of the throne" (Ezek. i. 26); the comparison is made with regard to greatness and glory, not, as many believe, with regard to its square form, its breadth, or the length of its legs : this explanation applies also to the phrase" the likeness of the hayyot (" living creatures," Ezek. i. 13).
As man's distinction consists in a property which no other creature on earth possesses, viz., intellectual perception, in the exercise of which he does not employ his senses, nor move his hand or his foot, this perception has been compared-though only apparently, not in truth-to the Divine perception, which requires no corporeal organ. On this account, i.e., on account of the Divine intellect with which man has been endowed, he is said to have been made in the form and likeness of the Almighty, but far from it be the notion that the Supreme Being is corporeal, having a material form.
CHAPTER II
Some years ago a learned man asked me a question of great importance; the problem and the solution which we gave in our reply deserve the closest attention. Before, however, entering upon this problem and its solution I must premise that every Hebrew knows that the term Elohim is a homonym, and denotes God, angels, judges, and the rulers of countries, and that Onkelos the proselyte explained it in the true and correct manner by taking Elohim in the sentence," and ye shall be like Elohim" (Gen. iii. 5) in the lastmentioned meaning, and rendering the sentence" and ye shall be like princes." Having pointed out the homonymity of the term" Elohim" we return to the question under consideration." It would at first sight," said the objector," appear from Scripture that man was originally intended to be perfectly equal to the rest of the animal creation, which is not endowed with intellect, reason, or power of distinguishing between good and evil: but that Adarn's disobedience to the command of God procured him that great perfection which is the Peculiarity of man, viz., the power of distinguishing between good and evil-the noblest of all the faculties of our nature, the essential characteristic of the human race. It thus appears strange that the punishment for rebelliousness should be the means of elevating man to a pinnacle of perfection to which he had not attained previously. This is equivalent to saying that a certain man was rebellious and extremely wicked, wherefore his nature was changed for the better, and he was made to shine as a star in the heavens." Such was the purport and subject of the question, though not in the exact words of the inquirer. Now mark our reply, which was as follows:-" You appear to have studied the matter superficially, and nevertheless you imagine that you can understand a book which has been the guide of past and present generations, when you for a moment withdraw from your lusts and appetites, and glance over its contents as if you were reading a historical work or some poetical composition. Collect your thoughts and examine the matter carefully, for it is not to be understood as you at first sight think, but as you will find after due deliberation; namely, the intellect which was granted to man as the highest endowment, was bestowed on him before his disobedience. With reference to this gift the Bible states that 46 man was created in the form and likeness of God." On account of this gift of intellect man was addressed by God, and received His commandments, as it is said:" And the Lord God commanded Adam" (Gen. ii. 16) -- for no commandments are given to the brute creation or to those who are devoid of understanding. Through the intellect man distinguishes between the true and the false. This faculty Adam possessed perfectly and completely. The right and the wrong are terms employed in the science of apparent truths (morals), not in that of necessary truths, as, e.g, it is not correct to say, in reference to the proposition" the heavens are spherical," it is" good" or to declare the assertion that" the earth is flat" to be" bad" : but we say of the one it is true, of the other it is false. Similarly our language expresses the idea of true and false by the terms emet and sheker, of the morally right and the morally wrong, by tob and ra'. Thus it is the function of the intellect to discriminate between the true and the false -- a distinction which is applicable to all objects of intellectual perception. When Adam was yet in a state of innocence, and was guided solely by reflection and reason -- on account of which it is said:" Thou hast made him (man) little lower than the angels" (Ps. viii. 6) -- he was not at all able to follow or to understand the principles of apparent truths; the most manifest impropriety, viz., to appear in a state of nudity, was nothing unbecoming according to his idea: he could not comprehend why it should be so. After man's disobedience, however, when he began to give way to desires which had their source in his imagination and to the gratification of his bodily appetites, as it is said," And the wife saw that the tree was good for food and delightful to the eyes" (Gen. iii. 6), he was punished by the loss of part of that intellectual faculty which he had previously possessed. He therefore transgressed a command with which he had been charged on the score of his reason; and having obtained a knowledge of the apparent truths, he was wholly absorbed in the study of what is proper and what improper. Then he fully understood the magnitude of the loss he had sustained, what he had forfeited, and in what situation he was thereby placed. Hence we read," And ye shall be like elohim, knowing good and evil," and not" knowing" or" discerning the true and the false" : while in necessary truths we can only apply the words" true and. false," not" good and evil." Further observe the passage," And the eyes of both were opened, and they knew they were naked" (Gen. iii. 7) : it is not said," And the eyes of both were opened, and they saw" : for what the man had seen previously and what he saw after this circumstance was precisely the same: there had been no blindness which was now removed, but he received a new faculty whereby he found things wrong which previously he had not regarded as wrong. Besides, you must know that the Hebrew word pakah used in this passage is exclusively employed in the figurative sense of receiving new sources of knowledge, not in that of regaining the sense of sight. Comp.," God opened her eyes" (Gen. xxi. ig)." Then shall the eyes of the blind be opened" (Isaiah xxxviii. 8)." Open ears, he heareth not" (ibid. Xlii. 20), similar in sense to the verse," Which have eyes to see, and see not" (Ezek. xii. 2). When, however, Scripture says of Adam," He changed his face (panav) and thou sentest him forth" Job xiv. 20), it must be understood in the following way: On account of the change of his original aim he was sent away. For panim, the Hebrew equivalent of face, is derived from the verb panah," he turned," and signifies also" aim," because man generally turns his face towards the thing he desires. In accordance with this interpretation, our text suggests that Adam, as he altered his intention and directed his thoughts to the acquisition of what he was forbidden, he was banished from Paradise: this was his punishment; it was measure for measure. At first he had the privilege of tasting pleasure and happiness, and of enjoying repose and security; but as his appetites grew stronger, and he followed his desires and impulses, (as we have already stated above), and partook of the food he was forbidden to taste, he was deprived of everything, was doomed to subsist on the meanest kind of food, such as he never tasted before, and this even only after exertion and labour, as it is said," Thorns and thistles shall grow up for thee" (Gen. iii. 18)," By the sweat of thy brow," etc., and in explanation of this the text continues," And the Lord God drove him from the Garden of Eden, to till the ground whence he was taken." He was now with respect to food and many other requirements brought to the level of the lower animals: comp.," Thou shalt eat the grass of the field" (Gen. iii. 18). Reflecting on his condition, the Psalmist says," Adam unable to dwell in dignity, was brought to the level of the dumb beast" (Ps. xlix. 13)." May the Almighty be praised, whose design and wisdom cannot be fathomed."
CHAPTER III
IT might be thought that the Hebrew words temunah and tabnit have one and the same meaning, but this is not the case. Tabnit, derived from the verb banah (he built), signifies the build and construction of a thing-that is to say, its figure, whether square, round, triangular, or of any other shape. Comp." the pattern (tabnit) of the Tabernacle and the pattern (tabnit) of all its vessels" (Exod. xxv. 9):" according to the pattern (tabnit) which thou wast shown upon the mount" (Exod. xxv, 40):" the form of any bird" (Deut. iv. 17):" the form (tabnit) of a hand" (Ezek. viii. 3):" the pattern (tabnit) of the porch" (I Chron. xxviii. 11). In all these quotations it is the shape which is referred to. Therefore the Hebrew language never employs the word tabnit in speaking of the qualities of God Almighty.
The term temunah, on the other hand, is used in the Bible in three different senses. It signifies, first, the outlines of things which are perceived by our bodily senses, i.e., their shape and form; as, e.g.," And ye make an image the form (temunat) of some likeness" (Dent. iv. 16):" for ye saw no likeness" (temunah) (Dent. iv. 15). Secondly, the forms of our imagination, i.e., the impressions retained in imagination when the objects have ceased to affect our senses. In this sense it is used in the passage which begins" In thoughts from the visions of the night" (job iv. 13), and which concludes" it remained but I could not recognize its sight, only an image -temunah was before my eyes," i.e., an image which presented itself to my sight during sleep. Thirdly, the true form of an object, which is perceived only by the intellect : and it is in this third signification that the term is applied to God. The words" And the similitude of the Lord shall he behold" (Num. xii. 8) therefore mean" he shall comprehend the true essence of the Lord."
CHAPTER IV
THE three verbs raah, hibbit, and hazab, which denote" he perceived with the eye," are also used figuratively in the sense of intellectual perception. As regards the first of these verbs this is well known, e.g., And he looked (va-yar) and behold a well in the field" (Gen. XXiX. 2) here it signifies ocular perception:" yea, my heart has seen (raah) much of wisdom and of knowledge" (Eccles. i. 16): in this passage it refers to the intellectual perception.
In this figurative sense the verb is to be understood, when applied to God e.g.," I saw (raiti) the Lord" (I Kings xxii. 19):" And the Lord appeared (va-yera) unto him (Gen. xviii. 1):" And God saw (va-yar) that it was good" (Gen. i. 10)" I beseech thee, show me (harem) thy glory" (Exod. xxxiii. 18):" And they saw (va-yiru) the God of Israel" (Exod. xxiv. 10). All these instances refer to intellectual perception, and by no means to perception with the eye as in its literal meaning : for, on the one hand, the eye can only perceive a corporeal object, and in connection with it certain accidents, as colour, shape, etc.: and, on the other hand, God does not perceive by means of a corporeal organ, as will be explained.
In the same manner the Hebrew hibbit signifies" he viewed with the eye; comp." Look (tabbit) not behind thee" (Gen. xix. 17): But his wife looked (va-tabbet) back from him" (Gen. xix. 26):" And if one look (venibbat) unto the land" (Isa. V. 30): and figuratively," to view and observe" with the intellect," to contemplate" a thing till it be understood. In this sense the verb is used in passages like the following:" He hath not beheld (hibbit) iniquity in Jacob" (Num. xxiii. 21): for" iniquity" cannot be seen with the eye. The words," And they looked (ve-hibbitu) after Moses" (Exod. xxxiii. 8) -- in addition to the literal understanding of the phrasewere explained by our Sages in a figurative sense. According to them, these words mean that the Israelites examined and criticised the actions and sayings of Moses. Compare also" Contemplate (habbet), I pray thee, the heaven" (Gen.xv.5); for this took place in a prophetic vision. This verb, when applied to God, is employed in this figurative sense; e.g., 46 to look (mehabbit) upon God" (Exod. iii. 6)" And the similitude of the Lord shall he behold" (yabbit) (Num. xii. 8): And thou canst not look (habbet) on iniquity" (Hab. i. 13).
The same explanation applies to hazah. It denotes to view with the eye, as:" And let our eye look (ve-tahaz) upon Zion" (Mic. iv. 11): and also figuratively, to perceive mentally :" which he saw (hazah) concerning Judah and Jerusalem" (Isa. i. 1):" The word of the Lord came unto Abraham in a vision" (mahazeh) (Gen. xv. 1): in this sense hazab is used in the phrase," Also they saw (va-yehezu) God" (Exod. xxiv. 11). Note this well.
CHAPTER V
WHEN the chief of philosophers (Aristotle) was about to inquire into some very profound subjects, and to establish his theory by proofs, he commenced his treatise with an apology, and requested the reader to attribute the author's inquiries not to presumption, vanity, egotism, or arrogance, as though he were interfering with things of which he had no knowledge, but rather to his zeal and his desire to discover and establish true doctrines, as far as lay in human power. We take the same position, and think that a man, when he commences to speculate, ought not to embark at once on a subject so vast and important; he should previously adapt himself to the study of the several branches of science and knowledge, should most thoroughly refine his moral character and subdue his passions and desires, the offspring of his imagination; when, in addition, he has obtained a knowledge of the true fundamental propositions, a comprehension of the several methods of inference and proof, and the capacity of guarding against fallacies, then he may approach the investigation of this subject. He must, however, not decide any question by the first idea that suggests itself to his mind, or at once direct his thoughts and force them to obtain a knowledge of the Creator, but he must wait modestly and patiently, and advance step by step.
In this sense we must understand the words" And Moses hid his face, for he was afraid to look upon God" (Exod. iii. 6), though retaining also the literal meaning of the passage, that Moses was afraid to gaze at the light which appeared to his eye; but it must on no account be assumed that the Being which is exalted far above every imperfection can be perceived by the eye. This act of Moses was highly commended by God, who bestowed on him a well deserved portion of His goodness, as it is said:" And the similitude of the Lord shall he behold" (Num. xii. 8). This, say our Sages, was the reward for having previously hidden his face, lest he should gaze at the Eternal. (Talm. B. Berakot Fa.)
But" the nobles of the Children of Israel" were impetuous, and allowed their thoughts to go unrestrained: what they perceived was but imperfect. Therefore it is said of them," And they saw the God of Israel, and there was under his feet," etc. (Exod. xxiv. 10): and not merely," and they saw the God of Israel" : the purpose of the whole passage is to criticize their act of seeing and not to describe it. They are blamed for the nature of their perception, which was to a certain extent corporeal -- a result which necessarily followed, from the fact that they ventured too far before being perfectly prepared. They deserved to perish, but at the intercession of Moses this fate was averted by God for the time. They were afterwards burnt at Taberah, except Nadab and Abihu, who were burnt in the Tabernacle of the congregation, according to what is stated by authentic tradition. (Midr. Rabba ad locum.)
If such was the case with them, how much more is it incumbent on us who are inferior, and on those who are below us, to persevere in perfecting our knowledge of the elements, and in rightly understanding the preliminaries which purify the mind from the defilement of error: then we may enter the holy and divine camp in order to gaze : as the Bible says," And let the priests also, which come near to the Lord, sanctify themselves, lest the Lord break forth upon them" (Exod. XiX. 22). Solomon, also, has cautioned all who endeavour to attain this high degree of knowledge in the following figurative terms," Keep thy foot when thou goest to the house of God" (Eccles. iv. 17).
I will now return to complete what I commenced to explain. The nobles of the Children of Israel, besides erring in their perception, were, through this cause, also misled in their actions: for in consequence of their confused perception, they gave way to bodily cravings. This is meant by the words," Also they saw God and did eat and drink" (Exod. xxiv. 11). The principal part of that passage, viz.," And there was under his feet as it were a paved work of a sapphire stone" (Exod. xxiv. 10), will be further explained in the course of the present treatise (ch. xxviii.). All we here intend to say is, that wherever in a similar connection any one of the three verbs mentioned above occurs, it has reference to intellectual perception, not to the sensation of sight by the eye: for God is not a being to be perceived by the eye.
It will do no harm, however, if those who are unable to comprehend what we here endeavour to explain should refer all the words in question to sensuous perception, to seeing lights created [for the purpose], angels, or similar beings.
CHAPTER VI
THE two Hebrew nouns ish and ishshah were originally employed to designate the" male and female" of human beings, but were afterwards applied to the" male and female" of the other species of the animal creation. For instance, we read," Of every clean beast thou shalt take to thee by sevens," ish ve-ishto (Gen. Vii. 2), in the same sense as ish ve-ishshah," male and female." The term zakar u-nekebah was afterwards applied to anything designed and prepared for union with another object Thus we read," The five curtains shall be coupled together, one (ishshah) to the other" (ahotah) (Exod. xxvi. 3).
It will easily be seen that the Hebrew equivalents for" brother and sister" are likewise treated as homonyms, and used, in a figurative sense, like ish and ishshah.
CHAPTER VII
IT is well known that the verb yalad means" to bear,"" they have born (ve-yaledu) him children" (Deut. xxi. 15). The word was next used in a figurative sense with reference to various objects in nature, meaning," to create," e.g." before the mountains were created" (yulladu) (Ps. xc. 2): also," to produce," in reference to that which the earth causes to come forth as if by birth, e.g.," He will cause her to bear (holidah) and bring forth" (Isa. Iv. 10). The verb further denotes," to bring forth," said of changes in the process of time, as though they were things which were born, e.g.," for thou knowest not what a day may bring forth" (yeled) (Prov. xxvii. 1). Another figurative use of the word is its application to the formation of thoughts and ideas, or of opinions resulting from them: comp." and brought forth (ve-yalad) falsehood" (Ps. vii. 14): also," and they please themselves in the children (yalde) of strangers" (Isa. ii. 6), i.e.," they delight in the opinions of strangers." Jonathan the son of Uzziel paraphrases this pass-age, they walk in the customs of other nations."
A man who has instructed another in any subject, and has improved his knowledge, may in like manner be regarded as the parent of the person taught, because he is the author of that knowledge: and thus the pupils of the prophets are called" sons of the prophets," as I shall explain when treating of the homonymity of ben (son). In this figurative sense, the verb yalad (to bear) is employed when it is said of Adam," And Adam lived an hundred and thirty years, and begat (va-yoled) a son in his own likeness, in his form" (Gen. V. 3). As regards the words," the form of Adam, and his likeness," we have already stated (ch. i.) their meaning. Those sons of Adam who were born before that time were not human in the true sense of the word, they had not" the form of man." With reference to Seth who had been instructed, enlightened and brought to human perfection, it could rightly be said," he (Adam) begat a son in his likeness, in his form." It is acknowledged that a man who does not possess this" form" (the nature of which has just been explained) is not human, but a mere animal in human shape and form. Yet such a creature has the power of causing harm and injury, a power which does not belong to other creatures. For those gifts of intelligence and judgment with which he has been endowed for the purpose of acquiring perfection, but which he has failed to apply to their proper aim, are used by him for wicked and mischievous ends; he begets evil things, as though he merely resembled man, or simulated his outward appearance. Such was the condition of those sons of Adam who preceded Seth. In reference to this subject the Midrash says:" During the 130 years when Adam was under rebuke he begat spirits, i.e., demons; when, however, he was again restored to divine favour" he begat in his likeness, in his form." This is the sense of the passage," Adam lived one hundred and thirty years, and he begat in his likeness, in his form" (Gen. v. 3).
CHAPTER VIII
ORIGINALLY the Hebrew term makom (place) applied both to a particular spot and to space in general subsequently it received a wider signification and denoted" position," or degree," as regards the perfection of man in certain things. We say, e.g., this man occupies a certain place in such and such a subject. In this sense this term, as is well known, is frequently used by authors, e.g.," He fills his ancestors' place (makom) in point of wisdom and piety" :" the dispute still remains in its place" (makom), i.e., in statu quo [ante]. In the verse," Blessed be the glory of the Lord from His place" (mekomo) (Ezek. iii. 12), makom has this figurative meaning, and the verse may be paraphrased" Blessed be the Lord according to the exalted nature of His existence," and wherever makom is applied to God, it expresses the same idea, namely, the distinguished position of His existence, to which nothing is equal or comparable, as will be shown below (chap. Ivi.).
It should be observed that when we treat in this work of any homonym, we do not desire you to confine yourself to that which is stated in that particular chapter: but we open for you a portal and direct your attention to those significations of the word which are suited to our purpose, though they may not be complete from a philological point of view. You should examine the prophetical books and other works composed by men of science, notice the meaning of every word which occurs in them, and take homonyms in that sense which is in harmony with the context. What 1 say in a particular passage is a key for the comprehension of all similar passages. For example, we have explained here makom in the sentence" Blessed be the glory of the Lord from His place" (mekomo): but you must understand that the word makom has the same signification in the passage" Behold, a place (makom) is with me" (Exod. xxxiii. 26), viz., a certain degree of contemplation and intellectual intuition (not of ocular inspection), in addition to its literal meanling" a place," viz., the mountain which was pointed out to Moses for seclusion and for the attainment of perfection.
CHAPTER IX
THE original meaning of the word kisse," throne," requires no comment. Since men of greatness and authority, as, e.g., kings, use the throne as a seat, and" the throne" thus indicates the rank, dignity, and position of the person for whom it is made, the Sanctuary has been styled" the throne," inasmuch as it likewise indicates the superiority of I-Em who manifests Himself, and causes His light and glory to dwell therein. Comp." A glorious throne on high from the beginning is the place of our sanctuary" (Jer. xvii.12). For the same reason the heavens are called" throne," for to the mind of him who observes them with intelligence they suggest the Omnipotence of the Being which has called them into existence, regulates their motions, and governs the sublunary world by their beneficial influence: as we read," Thus saith the Lord, The heavens are my throne and the earth my footstool" (Isa. 1xvi. 1); i.e., they testify to my Existence, my Essence, and my Omnipotence, as the throne testifies to the greatness of him who is worthy to occupy it.
This is the idea which true believers should entertain; not, however, that the Omnipotent, Supreme God is supported by any material object; for God is incorporeal, as we shall prove further on; how, then, can He be said to occupy any space, or rest on a body ? The fact which I wish to point out is this : every place distinguished by the Almighty, and chosen to receive His light and splendour, as, for instance, the Sanctuary or the Heavens, is termed" throne" : and, taken in a wider sense, as in the passage" For my hand is upon the throne of God" (Exod. xvii. 16)," the throne" denotes here the Essence and Greatness of God. These, however (the Essence and Greatness of God) need not be considered as something separate from the God Himself or as part of the Creation, so that God would appear to have existed both without the throne, and with the throne: such a belief would be undoubtedly heretical. It is distinctly stated," Thou, 0 Lord, remainest for ever; Thy throne from generation to generation" (Lam. v. 19). By" Thy throne" we must, therefore, understand something inseparable from God. On that account, both here and in all similar passages. the word" throne" denotes God's Greatness and Essence, which are inseparable from His Being.
Our opinion will be further elucidated in the course of this Treatise.
CHAPTER X
WE have already remarked that when we treat in this work of homonyms, we have not the intention to exhaust the meanings of a word (for this is not a philological treatise): we shall mention no other significations but those which bear on our subject. We shall thus proceed in our treatment of the terms alah and yarad.
These two words, alah," he went up," and yarad, 'I he went down," are Hebrew terms used in the sense of ascending and descending. When a body moves from a higher to a lower place, the verb yarad," to go down." is used; when it moves from a lower to a higher place, alah," to go up," is applied. These two verbs were afterwards employed with regard to greatness and power. When a man falls from his high position, we say" he has come down," and when he rises in station" he has gone up." Thus the Almighty says," The stranger that is within thee shall get up above thee very high, and thou shalt come down very low" (Deut. xxviii. 43). Again," The Lord thy God will set thee on high ('elyon) above all nations of the earth" (Deut. xxviii. 1) :" And the Lord magnified Solomon exceedingly" (lema'alah) (I Chron. XXiX. 25). The Sages often employ these expressions, as:" In holy matters men must ascend (ma'alin) and not descend (moridin)." The two words are also applied to intellectual processes, namely, when we reflect on something beneath ourselves we are said to go down, and when our attention is raised to a subject above us we are said to rise.
Now, we occupy a lowly position, both in space and rank in comparison with the heavenly sphere, and the Almighty is Most High not in space, but with respect to absolute existence, greatness and power. When it pleased the Almighty to grant to a human being a certain degree of wisdom or prophetic inspiration, the divine communication thus made to the prophet and the entrance of the Divine Presence into a certain place is termed (yeridah)," descending," while the termination of the prophetic communication or the departure of the divine glory from a place is called aliyah," ascending."
The expressions" to go up" and" to go down," when used in reference to God, must be interpreted in this sense. Again, when, in accordance with the divine will, some misfortune befalls a nation or a region of the earth, and when the biblical account of that misfortune is preceded by the statement that the Almighty visited the actions of the people, and that He punished them accordingly, then the prophetic author employs the term 11 to descend" : for man is so low and insignificant that his actions would not be visited and would not bring punishment on him, were it not for the divine will: as is clearly stated in the Bible, with regard to this idea," What is man that thou shouldst remember him, and the son of man that thou shouldst visit him" (PS. viii. 5).
The design of the Deity to punish man is, therefore, introduced by the verb" to descend" : comp. Go to, let us go down and there confound their language" (Gen. xi. 7)" And the Lord came down to see" (Gen. xi. 5):" I will go down now and see" (Gen. xviii. 21). All these instances convey the idea that man here below is going to be punished.
More numerous, however, are the instances of the first case, viz., in which these verbs are used in connection with the revelation of the word and of the glory of God, e.g.," And I will come down and talk with thee there" (Num. xi. 17):" And the Lord came down upon Mount Sinai (Exod. xix. 20):" The Lord will come down in the sight of all the people (Exod. xix. 11):" And God went up from him" (Gen. xxxv. 13):" And God went up from Abraham" (Gen. XVii. 22). When, on the other hand, it says," And Moses went up unto God" (Exod. xix. 3), it must be taken in the third signification of these verbs, in addition to its literal meaning that Moses also ascended to the top of the mount, upon which a certain material light (the manifestation of God's glory) was visible; but we must not imagine that the Supreme Being occupies a place to which we can ascend, or from which we can descend. He is far from what the ignorant imagine.
CHAPTER XI
THE primary meaning of the Hebrew yashab is" he was seated," as" Now Eli the priest sat (yashab) upon a seat" (I Sam. i. 9): but, since a person can best remain motionless and at rest when sitting, the term was applied to everything that is permanent and unchanging; thus, in the promise that Jerusalem should remain constantly and permanently in an exalted condition, it is stated," She will rise and sit in her place" (Zech. xiv.10): further," He maketh the woman who was childless to sit as a joyful mother of children" (Ps. cxiii. 9): i.e., He makes her happy condition to be permanent and enduring.
When applied to God, the verb is to be taken in that latter sense:" Thou 0 Lord, remainest (tesheb) for ever" (Lam. v. 19):" 0 thou who sittest (ba-yoshebt) in the heavens" (Ps. cxxiii. 1):" He who sitteth in the heavens" (ii. 4), i.e., He who is everlasting, constant, and in no way subject to change; immutable in His Essence, and as He consists of nought but His Essence, He is mutable in no way whatever; not mutable in His relation to other things: for there is no relation whatever existing between Him and any other being, as will be explained below, and therefore no change as regard; such relations can take place in Him. Hence He is immutable in every respect, as He expressly declares," I, the Lord, do not change" (Mal. iii. 6): i.e., in Me there is not any change whatever. This idea is expressed by the term yashab when referring to God.
The verb, when employed of God, is frequently complemented by" the Heavens," inasmuch as the heavens are without change or mutation, that is to say, they do not individually change, as the individual beings on earth, by transition from existence into non-existence.
The verb is also employed in descriptions of God's relation (the term" relation" is here used as a homonym) to existing species of evanescent things: for those species are as constant, well organized, and unvarying as the individuals of the heavenly hosts. Thus we find," Who sitteth over the circle of the earth" (Isa. xl. 22), Who remains constantly and unremittingly over the sphere of the earth; that is to say, over the things that come into existence within that sphere.
Again," The Lord sitteth upon the flood" (Ps. xxix. 10), i.e., despite the change and variation of earthly objects, no change takes place with respect to God's relation (to the earth): His relation to each of the things which come into existence and perish again is stable and constant, for it concerns only the existing species and not the individuals. It should therefore be borne in mind, that whenever the term" sitting" is applied to God, it is used in this sense.
CHAPTER XII
THE term kam (he rose) is a homonym. In one of its significations it is the opposite of" to sit," as" He did not rise (kam) nor move for him" (Esth. v. 9). It further denotes the confirmation and verification of a thing, e.g, :" Tjie Lord will verify (yakem) His promise" (I Sam. i. 23):" The field of Ephron was made sure (va-yakom) as the property of Abraham" (Gen. xxiii. 17)." The house that is in the walled city shall be established (ve-kam)" (Lev. xxv. 30):" And the kingdom of Israel shall be firmly established (ve-kamah) in thy hand" (I Sam. xxiv. 20). It is always in this sense that the verb is employed with reference to the Almighty; as" Now shall I rise (akum), saith the Lord" (Ps. xii. 7), which is the same as saying," Now shall I verify my word and my dispensation for good or evil."" Thou shalt arise (takum) and have mercy upon Zion" (Ps. cii. 13), which means : Thou wilt establish what thou hast promised, viz., that thou wouldst pity Zion.
Generally a person who resolves to set about a matter, accompanies his resolve by rising, hence the verb is employed to express" to resolve" to do a certain thing; as," That my son hath stirred up my servant against me" (I Sam. xxii. 8). The word is figuratively used to signify the execution of a divine decree against a people sentenced to extermination, as" And I win rise against the house of Jeroboam" (Amos vii. 9):" but he win arise against the house of the evildoers" (Isa. XXXi. 2). Possibly in Psalm xii. 7 the verb has this latter sense, as also in Psalm cii. 13, namely: Thou wilt rise up against her enemies.
There are many passages to be interpreted in this manner, but in no way should it be understood that He rises or sits-far be such a notion 1 Our Sages expressed this idea in the formula," In the world above there is neither sitting nor standing ('amidah)" : for the two verbs 'amad and kam are synonyms [and what is said about the former is also applicable to the latter]. CHAPTER XIII
THE term amad (he stood) is a homonym signifying in the first instance" to stand upright," as" When he stood (be-'omdo) before Pharaoh" (Gen. xli. 46):" Though Moses and Samuel stood (ya'amod)" (Jer. xv. 1):" He stood by them" (Gen. xviii. 8). It further denotes" cessation and interruption," as" but they stood still ('amedu) and answered no more" (job xxxii. 16):" and she ceased (va-ta'amod) to bear" (Gen. xxix. 35). Next it signifies" to be enduring and lasting," as," that they may continue (yo'amedu) many days" (jer. xxxii. 14):" Then shalt thou be able to endure ('amod)" (Exod. xviii. 23):" His taste remained ('amad) in him" (Jer. xlviii. 11), i.e., it has continued and remained in existence without any change:" His righteousness standeth for ever" (Ps. cxi. 3), i.e., it is permanent and everlasting. The verb applied to God must be understood in this latter sense, as in Zechariah xiv. 4, And his feet shall stand (ve-'amedu) in that day upon the Mount of Olives (Zech. xiv. 4)," His causes, i.e., the events of which He is the cause, will remain efficient," etc. This will be further elucidated when we speak of the meaning of regel (foot). (Vide infra, chap. xxviii.) In the same sense is this verb employed in Deuteronomy v. 28," But as for thee, stand thou here by me," and Deuteronomy v. 5," I stood between the Lord and you."
CHAPTER XIV
THE homonymous term adam is in the first place the name of the first man, being, as Scripture indicates, derived from adamah," earth." Next, it means" mankind," as" My spirit shall not strive with man (adam)" (Gen. vi. 3). Again" Who knoweth the spirit of the children of man (adam)" (Eccles. iii. 21):" so that a man ( adam) has no pre-eminence above a beast" (Eccles. iii. 19). Adam. signifies also" the multitude ... .. the lower classes" as opposed to those distinguished from the rest, as" Both low (bene adam) and high (bene ish)" (Ps. xlix. 3).
It is in this third signification that it occurs in the verses," The sons of the higher order (Elohim) saw the daughters of the lower order (adam)" (Gen. vi. 2): and" Forsooth! as the humble man (adam) you shall die" (Ps. lxxxii. 7).
CHAPTER XV
ALTHOUGH the two roots nazab and yazab are distinct, yet their meaning is, as you know, identical in all their various forms.
The verb has several meanings: in some instances it signifies" to stand or" to place oneself," as" And his sister stood (va-tetazzab) afar off" (Exod. ii. 4):" The kings of the earth set themselves" (yiyazzebu) (PS. ii. 2):" They came out and stood" (nizzabim) (Num. xvi. 27). In other instances it denotes continuance and permanence, as," Thy word is established (nizzab) in Heaven" (Ps. cxix. 89), i.e., it remains for ever.
Whenever this term is applied to God it must be understood in the latter sense, as," And, behold, the Lord stood (nizzab) upon it" (Gen. xxviii. 13), i.e., appeared as eternal and everlasting" upon it," namely, upon the ladder, the upper end of which reached to heaven, while the lower end touched the earth. This ladder all may climb up who wish to do so, and they must ultimately attain to a knowledge of Him who is above the summit of the ladder, because He remains upon it permanently. It must be well understood that the term" upon it" is employed by me in harmony with this metaphor." Angels of God" who were going up represent the prophets. That the term" angel" was applied to prophets may clearly be seen in the following passages:" He sent an angel" (Num. xx. 16):" And an angel of the Lord came up from Gilgal to Bochim" (judges ii.1). How suggestive, too, is the expression" ascending and descending on it"! The ascent is mentioned before the descent, inasmuch as the" ascending" and arriving at a certain height of the ladder precedes the" descending," i.e., the application of the knowledge acquired in the ascent for the training and instruction of mankind. This application is termed" descent," in accordance with our explanation of the term yarad (chapter x.).
To return to our subject. The phrase" stood upon it" indicates the permanence and constancy of God, and does not imply the idea of physical position. This is also the sense of the phrase" Thou shalt stand upon the rock" (Exod. xxxiii. 21). It is therefore clear that nizzab and amad are identical in this figurative signification. Comp." Behold, I will stand ('omed) before thee there upon the rock in Horeb" (Exod. xvii. 6).
CHAPTER XVI
THE word zur (rock) is a homonym. First, it denotes rock," as" And thou shalt smite the rock" (zur) (Exod. xvii. 6). Then, hard stone," like the flint, e.g.," Knives of stone" (zurim) (josh. V. 2). It is next employed to signify the quarry from which the stones are hewn; comp." Look unto the rock (zur) whence ye are hewn" (Isa. li. 1). From this latter meaning of the term another figurative notion was subsequently derived, viz.," the root and origin" of all things. It is on this account that after the words" Look to the rock whence ye are hewn," the Prophet continues," Look unto Abraham your father," from which we evidently may infer that the words" Abraham your father" serve to explain" the rock whence ye are hewn" : and that the Prophet meant to say," Walk in his ways, put faith in his instruction, and conduct yourselves according to the rule of his life ! for the properties contained in the quarry should be found again in those things which are formed and hewn out of it."
It is in the latter sense that the Almighty is called" rock," He being the origin and the causa efficiens of all things besides Himself. Thus we read," He is the Rock, His work is perfect" (Deut. xxxii. 4):" Of the Rock that begat thee thou art unmindful" (Dent. xxxii. 18):" Their Rock had sold them 11 (-xi- 30):" There is no rock like our God" (I Sam. ii. 2):" The Rock of Eternity" (Isa. xxvi. 4). Again," And thou shalt stand upon the Rock" (Exod. xxxiii. 21), i.e., Be firm and steadfast in the conviction that God is the source of all things, for this will lead you towards the knowledge of the Divine Being. We have shown (chap. viii.) that the words" Behold, a place is with me" (Exod. xxxiii. 21) contain the same idea.
CHAPTER XVII
Do not imagine that only Metaphysics should be taught with reserve to the common people and to the uninitiated: for the same is also the case with the greater part of Natural Science. In this sense we have repeatedly made use of the expression of the Sages," Do not expound the chapter on the Creation in the presence of two" [vide Introd. page 2]. This principle was not peculiar to our Sages: ancient philosophers and scholars of other nations were likewise wont to treat of the principia rerum obscurely, and to use figurative language in discussing such subjects. Thus Plato and his predecessors called Substance the female, and Form the male. (You are aware that the principia of all existing transient things are three, viz., Substance, Form, and Absence of a particular form; the last-named principle is always inherent in the substance, for otherwise the substance would be incapable of receiving a new form: and it is from this point of view that absence [of a particular form) is included among the principia. As soon, then, as a substance has received a certain form, the privation of that form, namely, of that which has just been received, has ceased, and is replaced by the privation of another form, and so on with all possible forms, as is explained in treatises on natural philosophy.) -- Now, if those philosophers who have nothing to fear from a lucid explanation of these metaphysical subjects still were in the habit of discussing them in figures and metaphors, how much more should we, having the interest of religion at heart, refrain from elucidating to the mass any subject that is beyond their comprehension, or that might be taken in a sense directly opposite to the one intended. This also deserves attention.
CHAPTER XVIII
THE three words karab," to come near," naga'," to touch," and nagash," to approach," sometimes signify" contact" or" nearness in space," sometimes the approach of man's knowledge to an object, as if it resembled the physical approach of one body to another. As to the use of karab in the first meaning, viz., to draw near a certain spot, comp." As he drew near (karab) the camp" (Exod. xxxii. 19);" And Pharaoh drew near (hikrib) (Exod. xiv. 10). Naga, in the first sense, viz., expressing the contact of two bodies, occurs in" And she cast it (va-tagga') at his feet" (Exod. iv. 25):" He caused it to touch (va-yagga') my mouth" (Isa. vi. 7). And nagash in the first sense, viz., to approach or move towards another person, is found, e.g., in" And Judah drew near (va-yiggash) unto him" (Gen. xliv. 1).
The second meaning of these three words is" approach by means of knowledge," or" contact by comprehension," not in reference to space. As to naga' in this second sense, comp." for her judgment reacheth (naga') unto heaven" (Jer. li. 9). An instance of karab being used in this meaning is contained in the following passage," And the cause that is too hard for you, bring (takribun) it unto me" (Deut. i. 17): this is equivalent to saying," Ye shall make it known unto me." The verb karab (in the Hiphil) is thus employed in the sense of giving information concerning a thing. The verb nagash is used figuratively in the phrase," And Abraham drew near (vayiggash), and said" (Gen. xviii. 23): this took place in a prophetic vision and in a trance, as will be explained (Part I. chap. xxi., and Part II. chap. xli.; also in" Forasmuch as this people draw near (niggash) me with their mouths and with their lips" (Isa. xxix. 13). Wherever a word denoting approach or contact is employed in the prophetic writings to describe a certain relation between the Almighty and any created being, it has to be understood in this latter sense [viz., to approach mentally]. For, as will be proved in this treatise (II. chap. iv.), the Supreme is incorporeal, and consequently He does not approach or draw near a thing, nor can aught approach or touch Him; for when a being is without corporeality, it cannot occupy space, and all idea of approach, contact, distance, conjunction, separation, touch, or proximity is inapplicable to such a being.
There can be no doubt respecting the verses" The Lord is nigh (karob) unto all them that call upon him" (Ps. cxlv. 18):" They take delight in approaching (kirbat) to God" (Isa. lviii. 2):" The nearness (kirbat) of God is pleasant to Me" (PS. Ixxii. 28): all such phrases intimate a spiritual approach, i.e., the attainment of some knowledge, not, however, approach in space. Thus also" who hath God so nigh (kerobim) unto him" (Dent. iv. 7):" Draw thou near (kerab) and hear" (Dent. V. 27):" And Moses alone shall draw near (ve-niggash) the Lord; but they shall not come nigh (yiggashu)" (Exod. xxiv. 2).
If, however, you wish to take the words" And Moses shall draw near" to mean that he shall draw near a certain place in the mountain, whereon the Divine Light shone, or, in the words of the Bible," where the glory of the Lord abode," you may do so, provided you do not lose sight of the truth that there is no difference whether a person stand at the centre of the earth or at the highest point of the ninth sphere, if this were possible: he is no further away from God in the one case, or nearer to Him in the other; those only approach Him who obtain a knowledge of Him; while those who remain ignorant of Him recede from Him. In this approach towards, or recession from God there are numerous grades one above the other, and 1 shall further elucidate, in one of the subsequent chapters of the Treatise (I. chap. lx., and II. chap. xxxvi.) what constitutes the difference in our perception of God.
In the passage," Touch (ga') the mountains, and they shall smoke
(Ps. cxliv. 5), the verb" touch" is used in a figurative sense, viz.," Let thy word touch them." So also the words," Touch thou him himself" (job ii. 5), have the same meaning as" Bring thy infliction upon him." In a similar manner must this verb, in whatever form it may be employed be interpreted in each place, according to the context: for in some cases it denotes contact of two material objects, in others knowledge and comprehension of a thing, as if he who now comprehends anything which he had not comprehended previously had thereby approached a subject which had been distant from him. This point is of considerable importance.
CHAPTER XIX
THE term male is a homonym which denotes that one substance enters another, and fills it, as" And she filled (va-temalle) her pitcher" (Gen. xxiv. 16):" An omer-full (melo) for each" (Exod. xvi. 32), and many other instances. Next, it signifies the expiration or completion of a fixed period of time, as" And when her days to be delivered were fulfilled (va-yimleu)" (Gen. XXV. 24):" And forty days were completed (va-yimleu) for him" (Gen. 1. It further denotes attainment of the highest degree of excellency, as Full (male) with the blessing of the Lord" (Dent. xxxiii. 23)
Them hath he filled (mille) with wisdom of heart" (Exod. xxxv. 35) He was filled (va-yimmale) with wisdom, and understanding, and cunning" (I Kings vii. 14). In this sense it is said" The whole earth is full (melo) of his glory" (Isa. vi. 4)," All the earth gives evidence of his perfection," i.e. leads to a knowledge of it. Thus also" The glory of the Lord filled (male) the tabernacle" (Exod. xl. 34): and, in fact, every application of the word to God must be interpreted in this manner; and not that He has a body occupying space. If, on the other hand, you prefer to think that in this passage by" the glory of the Lord," a certain light created for the purpose is to be understood, that such light is always termed" glory," and that such light" filled the tabernacle," we have no objection.
CHAPTER XX
THE word ram (high) is a homonym, denoting elevation in space, and elevation in dignity, i.e., greatness, honour, and power. It has the first meaning in" And the ark was lifted up (va-tarom) above the earth" (Gen. vii. 17): and the latter meaning in" I have exalted (harimoti) one chosen out of the people" (Ps. lxxxix. 20;" Forasmuch as I have exalted (harimoti) thee from amongst the dust" (I Kings xvi. 2):" Forasmuch as I exalted (harimott) thee from among the people" (I Kings xiv. 7).
Whenever this term is employed in reference to God, it must be taken in the second sense :" Be thou exalted (rumah), 0 God, above the heavens" (Ps. lvii.12). In the same manner does the root nasa (to Eft up) denote both elevation in space and elevation in rank and dignity. In the former sense it occurs in And they lifted up (va-yisseu) their corn upon their asses" (Gen. xlii. 26) and there are many instances like this in which this verb has the meaning to carry,"" to move" from place to place: for this implies elevation in space. In the second sense we have" And his kingdom shall be exalted" (ve-tinnase) (Num. xxiv. 7):" And he bare them, and carried them" (va-yenasseem) (Isa. Ixiii. 9):" Wherefore do ye exalt yourselves" (titnasseu) (Num. xvi. 3).
Every form of this verb when applied to God has this latter sense -- e.g.," Lift up thyself (hinnase), thou judge of the earth" (PS. XCiV. 2):" Thus saith the High (ram) and Exalted (nisia) One" (Isa. Ivii. 15) -- denoting elevation in rank, quality, and power, and not elevation in space.
You may be surprised that I employ the expression," elevation in rank, quality, and power," and you may say," How can you assert that several distinct expressions denote the same thing ?" It will be explained later on (chap. 1. seqq.) that those who possess a true knowledge of God do not consider that He possesses many attributes, but believe that these various attributes which describe His Might, Greatness, Power, Perfection, Goodness, etc., are identical, denoting His Essence, and not anything extraneous to His Essence. 1 shall devote special chapters to the Names and Attributes of
God; our intention here is solely to show that" high and exalted" in the passage quoted denote elevation in rank, not in space.
CHAPTER XXI
IN its primary signification the Hebrew 'abar," to pass," refers to the motion of a body in space, and is chiefly applied to living creatures moving at some distance in a straight line, e.g.," And He passed over ('abar) before them" (Gen. xxxiii- 3):" Pass ('abor) before the people" (Exod. xvii. 5). Instances of this kind are numerous. The verb was next applied to the passage of sound through air, as" And they caused a sound to pass (va-ya'abiru) through out the camp" (Exod. xxxvi. 6):" That I hear the Lord's people spreading the report" (ma'abirim) (I Sam. ii. 24).
Figuratively it denoted the appearance of the Light and the Divine Presence (Shechinah) which the prophets perceived in their prophetic visions, as it is said," And behold a smoking furnace, and a burning lamp that passed ('abar) between those pieces" (Gen. xv. 17). This took place in a prophetic vision, for the narrative commences," And a deep sleep fell upon Abram." The verb has this latter meaning in Exodus xii. 12," And I shall pass (ve-abartz) through the land of Egypt" (denoting" I shall reveal myself," etc.), and in all similar phrases.
The verb is next employed to express that a person has gone too far, and transgressed the usual limit, in the performance of some act, as" And as a man who is drinking wine has passed ('abarv) the proper limit" (Jer. xxiii. 9).
It is also used figuratively to denote: to abandon one aim, and turn to a different aim and object, e.g.," He shot an arrow, causing it to miss the aim (leba'abiro)" (I Sam. xx. 36). This is the sense, it appears to me, of this verb in" And the Lord passed by (va-ya'abor) before his face (Exod. xxxiv. 6). 1 take" his face" to mean" the face of God: our Teachers likewise interpreted" his face" as being identical with" the face of God." And, although this is found in the midst of Agadic interpretations which would be out of place in this our work, yet it is some support of our view, that the pronoun" his" is employed in this passage as a substitute for" God's" -and the whole passage could in my opinion be explained as follows: Moses sought to attain to a certain perception which is called" the perception of the Divine face," a term occurring in the phrase" My face cannot be seen" : but God vouchsafed to him a perception of a lower degree, viz., the one called," the seeing of the back," in the words," And thou shalt see my back" (Exod. xxxiii. 23). We have mentioned this subject in our work Mishneh Torah. Accordingly, it is stated in the above-mentioned passage that the Lord withheld from Moses that perception which is termed" the seeing of the Divine face," and substituted for it another gift, viz., the knowledge of the acts attributed to God, which, as I shall explain (chap. liv.) are considered to be different and separate attributes of the Supreme. In asserting that God withheld from Moses (the higher knowledge) I mean to say that this knowledge was unattainable, that by its nature it was inaccessible to Moses: for man, whilst able to gain perfection by applying his reasoning faculties to the attainment of what is within the reach of his intellect, either weakens his reason or loses it altogether as soon as he ventures to seek a higher degree of knowledgeas I shall elucidate in one of the chapters of this work-unless he be granted a special aid from heaven, as is described in the words," And I will cover thee with my hand until I pass by" (Exod. xxxiii. 23)
Onkelos, in translating this verse, adopts the same method which he applies to the explanation of similar passages, viz., every expression implying corporeality or corporal properties, when referring to God, he explains by assuming an ellipsis of a nomen regens before" God," thus connecting the expression (of corporeality) with another word which is supplied, and which governs the genitive" God" : e.g.," And behold the Lord stood upon it" (Gen. xxviii. 13), he explains," The glory of the Lord stood arrayed above it." Again," The Lord watch between me and thee" (Gen. xxxi. 49), he paraphrases," The word of the Lord shall watch." This is his ordinary method in explaining Scripture. He applies it also to Exod. xxxiv. 6, which he paraphrases," The Lord caused his Presence to pass before his face and called." According to this rendering the thing which passed was unquestionably some physical object, the pronoun" his" refers to Moses, and the phrase 'al panav is identical with lefanav," before him." Comp." So went the present over before him" ('al panav) (Gen. xxxii. 22). This is likewise an appropriate and satisfactory explanation: and I can adduce still further support for the opinion of Onkelos from the words" while my glory passeth by" (ba'abor) (Exod. xxxiii. 22), which expressly state that the passing object was something ascribed to God, not God Himself: and of this Divine glory it is also said," until I pass by," and" And the Lord passed by before him."
Should it, however, be considered necessary to assume here an ellipsis, according to the method of Onkelos, who supplies in some instances the term 44 the Glory," in others" the Word," and in others" the Divine Presence," as the context may require in each particular case, we may also supply here the word" voice," and explain the passage," And a voice from the Lord passed before him and called." We have already shown that the verb abar," he passed," can be applied to the voice, as in" And they caused a voice to pass through the camp" (Exod. xxxvi. 6). According to this explanation, it was the voice which called. No objection can be raised to applying the verb kara (he called) to kol (voice), for a similar phrase occurs in the Bible in reference to God's commands to Moses," He heard the voice speaking unto him" : and, in the same manner as it can be said" the voice spoke," we may also say" the voice called" : indeed, we can even support this application of the verbs" to say," and" to call," to" the voice," by parallel passages, as" A voice saith 'Cry,' and it says' What shall I cry ? '" (Isa. xl. 6). According to this view, the meaning of the passage under discussion would be:" A voice of God passed before him and called, 'Eternal, Eternal, Allpowerful, All-merciful, and All-gracious!" ' (The word Eternal is repeated; it is in the vocative, for the Eternal is the one who is called. Comp. Moses, Moses! Abraham, Abraham!) This, again, is a very appropriate explanation of the text.
You will surely not find it strange that this subject, so profound and difficult, should bear various interpretations; for it will not impair the force of the argument with which we are here concerned. Either explanation may be adopted: you may take that grand scene altogether as a prophetic vision, and the whole occurrence as a mental operation, and consider that what Moses sought, what was withheld from him, and what he attained, were things perceived by the intellect without the use of the senses (as we have explained above): or you may assume that in addition there was a certain ocular perception of a material object, the sight of which would assist intellectual perception. The latter is the view of Onkelos, unless he assumes that in this instance the ocular perception was likewise a prophetic vision, as was the case with" a smoking furnace and a burning lamp that passed between those pieces" (Gen. xv. 17), mentioned in the history of Abraham. You may also assume that in addition there was a perception of sound, and that there was a voice which passed before him, and was undoubtedly something material. You may choose either of these opinions, for our sole intention and purpose is to guard you against the belief that the phrase" and the Lord passed," is analogous to" pass before the people" (Exod. xvii. 5), for God, being incorporeal, cannot be said to move, and consequently the verb" to pass" cannot with propriety be applied to Him in its primary signification.
CHAPTER XXII
IN Hebrew, the verb bo signifies" to come" as applied to a living being, i.e., its arrival at a certain place, or approach to a certain person, as" Thy brother came (ba) with subtilty" (Gen. xxvii. 35). It next denotes (with regard to a living being)" to enter" a certain place, e.g.," And when Joseph came (va-yabo) into the house" (Gen. Aiii. 26):" When ye come (ta-bou) into the land" (Exod. Xii. 25). The term was also employed metaphorically in the sense of to come" applied to a certain event, that is, to something incorporeal, as When thy sayings come to pass (yabo)" (judg. xiii. 17):" Of that which will come (yabou) over thee" (Isa. xlvii. 13). Nay, it is even applied to privatives, e.g.," Yet evil came (va-yabo)" (job iii. 26):" And darkness came (va-yabo)" Now, since the word has been applied to incorporeal things, it has also been used in reference to God-to the fulfilment of His word, or to the manifestation of His Presence (the Shechinah). In this figurative sense it is said," Lo, 1 come (ba) unto thee in a thick cloud" (Exod. xix. 9):" For the Lord the God of Israel cometh (ba) through it" (Ezek. XliV. 2). In these and all similar passages, the coming of the Shechinah is meant, but the words," And the Lord my God shall come (u-ba)" (Zech. xiv. 5) are identical with" His word will come," that is to say, the promises which He made through the Prophets will be fulfilled; therefore Scripture adds" all the holy ones that are with thee," that is to say," The word of the Lord my God will be performed, which has been spoken by all the holy ones who are with thee, who address the Israelites."
CHAPTER XXIII
Yaza (" he came out" ) is the opposite of ba (" he came in" ). The term yaza is applied to the motion of a body from a place in which it had previously rested, to another place (whether the body be a living being or not), e.g.," And when they were gone out (yazeu) if the city" (Gen. xliv. 4):" If fire break out (teze)" (Exod. xxii. .5). It was then figuratively employed to denote the appearance of something incorporeal, as," The word went out (yaza) of the king's mouth" (Esth. vii. 8):" When this deed of the queen shall come abroad (yeze) unto all women" (Esth. i. 17), that is to say," the report will spread." Again," For out of Zion shall go forth (teze) the Law" (Isa. ii. 3): further," The sun had risen (yaza) upon the earth" (Gen. xix. 23), i.e., its light became visible.
In this figurative sense we must take every expression of coming out when applied to the Almighty, e.g.," Behold, the Lord cometh out (yoze) of his place" (Isa. XXVi. 2 1), i.e.," The word of God, which until now has been in secret, cometh out, and will become manifest," i.e., something will come into being which had not existed before: for everything new emanating from God is ascribed to His word. Comp." By the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth" (PS. xxxiii. 6). This is a simile taken from the conduct of kings, who employ the word as the means of carrying their will into effect. God, however, requires no instrument wherewith to operate in order to perform anything; the effect is produced solely by His will alone. He does not employ any kind of speech, as will be explained further on (chap. Iv.).
The verb" to come out" is thus employed to designate the manifestation of a certain work of God, as we noticed in our interpretation of the phrase," Behold, the Lord cometh out of his place." In a similar manner the term shub," to return," has been figuratively employed to denote the discontinuance of a certain act according to the will of God, as in" I will go and return to my place" (Hosea v. 15): that is to say, the Divine presence (Shechinah) which had been in our midst departed from us, the consequence of which has been the absence of Divine protection from amongst us. Thus the Prophet foretelling misfortune says," And 1 will hide my face from them, and they shall be devoured" (Deut. xxxi. 17): for, when man is deprived of Divine protection he is exposed to all dangers, and becomes the butt of all fortuitous circumstances: his fortune and misfortune then depend on chance. Alas! how terrible a threat ! -- This is the idea contained in the words," I will go and return to my place" (Hos. v. 15).
CHAPTER XXIV
THE term halak is likewise one of the words which denote movements performed by living beings, as in" And Jacob went (halak) on his way" (Gen. xxxii. I), and in many other instances. The verb" to go" was next employed in describing movements of objects less solid than the bodies of living beings, comp." And the waters were going on (halok) decreasing" (Gen. viii. 5):" And the fire went along (va-tibalak) upon the ground" (Exod. ix. 23). Then it was employed to express the spreading and manifestation of something incorporeal, comp." The voice thereof shall go like a serpent" (Jer. XIVi. 22): again," The voice of the Lord God walking in the garden" (Gen. iii. 8). It is" the voice that is qualified by" walking."
Whenever the word" to go" is used in reference to God, it must be taken in this figurative sense, i.e., it applies to incorporeal things, and signifies either the manifestation of something incorporeal, or the withdrawal of the Divine protection, an act corresponding in lifeless beings to the removal of a thin., in living beings to the departure of a living being," walking." The withdrawal of God's protection is called in the Bible" the hiding of God's countenance, as in Deuteronomy xxxi. 18," As for me, I will hide my countenance." On the same ground it has been designated" going away," or moving away from a thing. comp." I will depart and return to my place" (Hos. v. 15). But in the passage," And the anger of the Lord was kindled against them, and he went" (Num. xii. g), the two meanings of the verb are combined. viz., the withdrawal of the Divine protection, expressed by" and he went," and the revelation, manifestation, and appearance of something namely, of the anger which went forth and reached them, in consequence of which Miriam became" leprous, white as snow." The expression 11 to walk" was further applied to conduct, which concerns only the inner life, and which requires no bodily motion, as in the following passages," And thou shalt walk in his ways (Deut. xxviii. 9):" Ye shall walk after the Lord your God" (Deut. xiii. 5) Come ye, and let us walk in the light of the Lord." (Isa. ii. 5).
CHAPTER XXV
THE Hebrew shakan, as is well known, signifies" to dwell," as, And he was dwelling (shoken) in the plains of Mamre" (Gen. xiv. 13): And it came to pass, when Israel dwelt (bishekon)" (Gen. XXXV. 22). This is the most common meaning of the word. But" dwelling in a ]Flace" consists in the continued stay in a place, general or special; when a living being dwells long in a place, we say that it stays in that place, although it unquestionably moves about in it, comp." And he was staying in the plains of Mamre" (Gen. xiv. 13), and," And it came to pass, when Israel stayed" (Gen. XXM 22).
The term was next applied metaphorically to inanimate objects, i.e., to everything which has settled and remains fixed on one object, although the object on which the thing remains is not a place, and the thing itself is not a living being; for instance," Let a cloud dwell upon it [the day]" (job iii. 5): there is no doubt that the cloud is not a living being, and that the day is not a corporeal thing, but a division of time.
In this sense the term is employed in reference to God, that is to Say, to denote the continuance of His Divine Presence (Shechinah) or of His Providence in some place where the Divine Presence manifested itself constantly, or in some object which was constantly protected by Providence. Comp." And the glory of the Lord abode" (Exod. xxiv. 16):" And I will dwell among the children of Israel" (Exod. xxix. 45):" And for the goodwill of him that dwelt in the bush" (Deut. xxxiii. 16). Whenever the term is applied to the Almighty, it must be taken consistently with the context in the sense either as referring to the Presence of His Shechinah (i.e., of His light that was created for the purpose) in a certain place, or of the continuance of His Providence protecting a certain object.
CHAPTER XXVI
You, no doubt, know the Talmudical saying, which includes initself all the various kinds of interpretation connected with oursubject. It runs thus :" The Torah speaks according to the languageof man," that is to say, expressions, which can easily becomprehended and understood by all, are applied to the Creator.Hence the description of God by attributes implying corporeality,in order to express His existence: because the multitude of peopledo not easily conceive existence unless in connection with a body,and that which is not a body nor connected with a body has forthem no existence. Whatever we regard as a state of perfection, islikewise attributed to God, as expressing that He is perfect in everyrespect, and that no imperfection or deficiency whatever is foundin Him. But there is not attributed to God anything which themultitude consider a defect or want; thus He is never representedas eating, drinking, sleeping, being ill, using violence, and the like.Whatever, on the other hand, is commonly regarded as a state ofperfection is attributed to Him, although it is only a state ofperfection in relation to ourselves; for in relation to God, what weconsider to be a state of perfection, is in truth the highest degree ofimperfection. If, however, men were to think that those humanperfections were absent in God, they would consider Him asimperfect.
You are aware that locomotion is one of the distinguishingcharacteristics of living beings, and is indispensable for them intheir progress towards perfection. As they require food and drinkto supply animal waste, so they require locomotion, in order toapproach that which is good for them and in harmony with theirnature, and to escape from what is injurious and contrary to theirnature. It makes, in fact, no difference whether we ascribe to Godeating and drinking or locomotion; but according to human modesof expression, that is to say, according to common notions, eatingand drinking would be an imperfection in God, while motionwould not, in spite of the fact that the necessity of locomotion isthe result of some want. Furthermore, it has been clearly proved,that everything which moves is corporeal and divisible; it will beshown below that God is incorporeal and that He can have nolocomotion; nor can rest be ascribed to Him; for rest can only beapplied to that which also moves. All expressions, however, whichimply the various modes of movement in living beings, areemployed with regard to God in the manner we have described andin the same way as life is ascribed to Him: although motion is anaccident pertaining to living beings, and there is no doubt that,without corporeality, expressions like the following could not beimagined :" to descend, to ascend, to walk, to place, to stand, tosurround, to sit, to dwell, to depart, to enter, to pass, etc.
It would have been superfluous thus to dilate on this subject, wereit not for the mass of the people, who are accustomed to suchideas. It has been necessary to expatiate on the subject, as we haveattempted, for the benefit of those who are anxious to acquireperfection, to remove from them such notions as have grown upwith them from the days of youth.
CHAPTER XXVII
ONKELOS the Proselyte, who was thoroughly acquainted with theHebrew and Chaldaic languages, made it his task to oppose thebelief in God's corporeality. Accordingly, any expressionemployed in the Pentateuch in reference to God, and in any wayimplying corporeality, he paraphrases inconsonance with thecontext. All expressions denoting any mode of motion, areexplained by Him to mean the appearance or manifestation of acertain light that had been created [for the occasion], i.e., theShekhinah (Divine Presence), or Providence. Thus he paraphrases"the Lord will come down" (Exod. xix. 11)," The Lord willmanifest Himself" ;" And God came down" (xvi. 20)," And Godmanifested Himself" : and does not say" And God came down" :" Iwill go down now and see" (Gen. xviii. 21), he paraphrases," Iwill manifest myself now and see." This is his rendering [of theverb yarad," he went down," when used in reference to God]throughout his version, with the exception of the followingpassage," I will go down (ered) with thee into Egypt" (Gen. xlvi.4), which he renders literally. A remarkable proof of this greatman's talents, the excellence of his version, and the correctness ofhis interpretation ! By this version he discloses to us an importantprinciple as regards prophecy.
This narrative begins:" And God spake unto Israel in the visions ofthe night, and said, Jacob, Jacob, etc. And He said, I am God, etc.,I will go down with thee into Egypt" (Gen. XlVi. 2,3)- Seeing thatthe whole narrative is introduced as a vision of the night, Onkelosdid not hesitate to translate literally the words addressed to Jacobin the nocturnal vision, and thus gave a faithful account of theoccurrence. For the passage in question contains a statement ofwhat Jacob was told, not what actually took place, as is the case inthe words," And the Lord came down upon Mount Sinai" (Exod.xix. 20). Here we have an account of what actually occurred in thephysical world; the verb Varad is therefore paraphrased" Hemanifested Himself," and entirely detached from the idea ofmotion. Accounts of what happened in the imagination of man, Imean of what he was told, are not altered. A most remarkabledistinction !
Hence you may infer that there is a great difference between acommunication, designated as having been made in a dream, or avision of the night, and a vision or a manifestation simplyintroduced with phrases like" And the word of the Lord came untome, saying And the Lord spake unto me, saying."
According to my opinion, it is also possible that Onkelosunderstood Elohim in the above passage to signify" angel," andthat for this reason he did not hesitate to translate literally," I willgo down with thee to Egypt." Do not think it strange that Onkelosshould have believed the Elohim, who said to Jacob," I am God,the God of thy father" (ib. 3), to be an angel, for this sentence can,in the same form, also have been spoken by an angel. Thus Jacobsays," And the angel of God spake unto me in a dream, saying,Jacob. And I said, Here am 1," etc. (Gen. xxxi. 11): and concludesthe report of the angel's words to him in the following way," I amthe God of Bethel, where thou anointedst the pillar, and wherethou vowedst a vow unto me" (ib. 13), although there is no doubtthat Jacob vowed to God, not to the angel. It is the usual practiceof prophets to relate words addressed to them by an angel in thename of God, as though God Himself had spoken to them. Suchpassages are all to be explained by supplying the nomen regens,and by considering them as identical with" I am the messenger ofthe God of thy father,"" I am the messenger of God who appearedto thee in Bethel," and the like. Prophecy with its various degrees,and the nature of angels, will be fully discussed in the sequel, inaccordance with the object of this treatise (II. chap. xiv.).
CHAPTER XXVIII
THE term regel is homonymous, signifying, in the first place, thefoot of a living being; comp." Foot for foot (Exod. XXi. 24). Nextit denotes an object which follows another: comp. And all thepeople that follow thee" Oit. that are at thy feet) (ib. xi. 18).Another signification of the word is cc cause"; comp." And theLord hath blessed thee, I being the cause" (leragli) (Gen. xxx. 30),i.e., for my sake; for that which exists for the sake of another thinghas the latter for Its final cause. Examples of the term used in thissense are numerous. It has that meaning in Genesis xxxiii. 14,"Because (leregel) of the cattle that goeth before me, and because(leregel) of the children."
Consequently, the Hebrew text, of which the literal rendering is:"And his feet shall stand in that day upon the Mount of Olives"(Zech. xiv. 4) can be explained in the following way:" And thethings caused by him (raglav) on that day upon the Mount ofOlives, that is to say, the wonders which will then be seen, and ofwhich God will be the Cause or the Maker, will remainpermanently." To this explanation does Jonathan son of Uzielincline in paraphrasing the passage," And he will appear in hismight on that day upon the Mount of Olives. He generallyexpresses terms denoting those parts of the body by which contactand motion are effected, by" his might" [when referring to God],because all such expressions denote acts done by His Will.
In the passage (Exod. xxiv. 10, lit.," And there was under his feet,like the action of the whiteness of a sapphire stone" ), Onkelos, asyou know, in his version, considers the word (raglav)" his feet" asa figurative expression and a substitute for" throne" : the words"under his feet" he therefore paraphrases," And under the throne ofhis glory." Consider this well, and you will observe with wonderhow Onkelos keeps free from the idea of the corporeality of God,and from everything that leads thereto, even in the remotestdegree. For he does not say," and under His throne" : the directrelation of the throne to God, implied in the literal sense of thephrase" His throne," would necessarily suggest the idea that Godis supported by a material object, and thus lead directly to thecorporeality of God: he therefore refers the throne to His glory,i.e., to the Shekhinah, which is a light created for the purpose.
Similarly he paraphrases the words," For my hand I lift up to thethrone of God" (Exod. xvii. 16)," An oath has been uttered byGod, whose Shekhinah is upon the throne of his glory." Thisprinciple found also expression in the popular phrase," the Throneof the Glory."
We have already gone too far away from the subject of thischapter, and touched upon things which will be discussed in otherchapters; we will now return to our present theme. You areacquainted with the version of Onkelos [of the passage quoted]. Hecontents himself with excluding from his version all expressions ofcorporeality in reference to God, and does not show us what they(the nobles of the children of Israel Exod. xxiv. 10) perceived, orwhat is meant by that figure. In all similar instances Onkelos alsoabstains from entering into such questions, and only endeavours toexclude every expression implying corporeality; for theincorporeality of God is a demonstrative truth and anindispensable element in our faith; he could decidedly state all thatwas necessary in that respect. The interpretation of a simile is adoubtful thing: it may possibly have that meaning, but it may alsorefer to something else. It contains besides very profound matter,the understanding of which is not a fundamental element in ourfaith, and the comprehension of which is not easy for the commonpeople. Onkelos, therefore, did not enter at all into this subject.
We, however, remaining faithful to our task in this treatise, findourselves compelled to give our' explanation. According to ouropinion" under his feet" (raglav) denotes" under that of which Heis the cause,"" that which exists through Hirn," as we have alreadystated. They (the nobles of the children of Israel) thereforecomprehended the real nature of the materia prima, whichemanated from Him, and of whose existence He is the only cause.Consider well the phrase," like the action of the whiteness of thesapphire stone." If the colour were the point of comparison, thewords," as the whiteness of the sapphire stone" would havesufficed; but the addition of" like the action" was necessary,because matter, as such, is, as you are well aware, always receptiveand passive, active only by some accident. On the other hand,form, as such, is always active, and only passive by some accident,as is explained in works on Physics. This explains the addition of"like the action" in reference to the materia prima. The expression"the whiteness of the sapphire" refers to the transparency, not tothe white colour: for" the whiteness" of the sapphire is not awhite colour, but the property of being transparent. Things,however, which are transparent, have no colour of their own, as isproved in works on Physics: for if they had a colour they would notpermit all the colours to pass through them nor would they receivecolours: it is only when the transparent object is totally colourless,that it is able to receive successively all the colours. In this respectit (the whiteness of the sapphire) is like the materia prima, whichas such is entirely formless, and thus receives all the forms oneafter the other. What they (the nobles of the children of Israel)perceived was therefore the materia prima, whose relation to Godis distinctly mentioned, because it is the source of those of hiscreatures which are subject to genesis and destruction, and hasbeen created by him. This subject also will be treated later onmore fully.
Observe that you must have recourse to an explanation of thiskind, even when adopting the rendering of Onkelos," And underthe throne of His glory" ; for in fact the materia prima is also underthe heavens, which are called" throne of God," as we haveremarked above. I should not have thought of this unusualinterpretation, or hit on this argument were it not for an utteranceof R. Eliezer ben Hyrcanus, which will be discussed in one of theparts of this treatise (II. chap. xxvi.). The primary object of everyintelligent person must be to deny the corporeality of God, and tobelieve that all those perceptions (described in the above passage)were of a spiritual not of a material character. Note this andconsider it well. CHAPTER XXIX
THE term 'ezeb is homonymous, denoting, in the first place, painand trembling; comp." In sorrow (be-'ezeb) thou shalt bring forthchildren" (Gen. iii. 16). Next it denotes anger; comp." And hisfather had not made him angry ('azabo) at any time" (I Kings i.6):" for he was angry (ne'ezab) for the sake of David" (I Sam. xx.34). The term signifies also provocation: comp." They rebelled,and vexed ('izzebu) his holy spirit" (Isa. lxiii. 10):" and provoked(ya'azibahu) him in the desert" (Ps. lxxviii. 4o);" If there be anyway of provocation ('ozeb) in me" (ib. cxxxix. 24) Every day theyrebel (ye'azzebu) against my words" (ib. Ivi. 6).
In Genesis vi. 6 the word has either the second or the thirdsignification. In the first case, the sense of the Hebrew va-yit'azzebel libbo is God was angry with them on account of the wickednessof their deeds" as to the words" to his heart" used here, and alsoin the history of Noah (ib. viii. 21) 1 will here explain what theymean. With regard to man, we use the expression" he said tohimself," or" he said in his heart," in reference to a subject whichhe did not utter or communicate to any other person. Similarly thephrase" And God said in his heart," is used in reference to an actwhich God decreed without mentioning it to any prophet at thetime the event took place according to the will of God. And afigure of this kind is admissible, since" the Torah speaketh inaccordance with the language of man" (supra c. xxvi.). This isplain and dear. In the Pentateuch no distinct mention is made of amessage sent to the wicked generation of the flood, cautioning orthreatening them with death; therefore, it is said concerning them,that God was angry with them in His heart; likewise when Hedecreed that no flood should happen again, He did not tell aprophet to communicate it to others, and for that reason the words"in his heart" are added.
Taking the verb in the third signification, we explain the passagethus:" And man rebelled against God's will concerning him" : forleb (heart) also signifies" will," as we shall explain when treatingof the homonymity of leb (heart).
CHAPTER XXX
IN its primary meaning akal (to eat) is used in the sense of takingfood by animals: this needs no illustration. It was afterwardsobserved that eating includes two processes-- (1) the loss of thefood, i.e., the destruction of its form, which first takes place; (2)the growth of animals, the preservation of their strength and theirexistence, and the support of all the forces of their body, caused bythe food they take.
The consideration of the first process led to the figurative use ofthe verb in the sense of" consuming," destroying" : hence itincludes all modes of depriving a thing of its form comp." And theland of your enemies shall destroy (lit. eat) you" (Lev. xxvi. 38):" A land that destroyeth (lit. eateth) the inhabitants thereof" (Num.xiii. 32):" Ye shall be destroyed (lit. eaten) with the sword" (Isa. i.6):" Shall the sword destroy (lit. eat)" (2 Sam. ii. 26):" And thefire of the Lord burnt among them, and destroyed (lit. ate) themthat were in the uttermost parts of the camp" (Num. xi. 1):" (God)is a destroying (lit. eating) fire" (Deut. iv. 24), that is, He destroysthose who rebel against Him, as the fire destroys everything thatcomes within its reach. Instances of this kind are very frequent.
With reference to the second effect of the act of eating, the verb"to eat is figuratively used in the sense of" acquiring wisdom ... ..learning"; in short, for all intellectual perceptions. These preservethe human form (intellect) constantly in the most perfect manner,in the same way as food preserves the body in its best condition.Comp." Come ye, buy and eat" (Isa. lv. I):" Hearken diligentlyunto me, and eat ye that which is good" (ib. 2):" It is not good toeat much honey" (Prov. XXV. 27):" My son, eat thou honey,because it is good, and the honeycomb, which is sweet to thy taste;so shall the knowledge of wisdom be unto thy soul" (ib. xxiv. 13,14).
This figurative use of the verb" to eat" in the sense of" acquiringwisdom" is frequently met with in the Talmud, e.g., Come, eat fatmeat at Raba's (Baba Bathra 22a); comp." All expressions ofeating' and ' drinking' found in this book (of Proverbs) refer towisdom," or, according to another reading," to the Law" (Koh.rabba on Eccl. iii. 13) - Wisdom has also been frequently called"water," e.g.," Ho, every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters"(Isa. Iv. 1).
The figurative meaning of these expressions has been so generaland common, that it was almost considered as its primitivesignification, and led to the employment" of hunger" and" thirst"in the sense of" absence of wisdom and intelligence" : comp." Iwill send a famine in the land, not a famine of bread, nor a thirstfor water, but of hearing the words of the Lord" ;" My soulthirsteth for God, for the living God" (Ps. xlii. 3). Instances of thiskind occur frequently. The words," With joy shall ye draw waterout of the wells of salvation" (Isa. Xii. 3), are paraphrased byJonathan son of Uzziel thus :" You will joyfully receive newinstruction from the chosen of the righteous." Consider how heexplains" water" to indicate" the wisdom which will thenspread," and" the wells" (ma'ayene) as being identical with" theeyes of the congregation" (Num. XV. 24), in the sense of" thechiefs," or" the wise." By the phrase," from the chosen of therighteous," he expresses his belief that righteousness is truesalvation. You now see how he gives to every word in this versesome signification referring to wisdom and study. This should bewell considered.
CHAPTER XXXI
KNOW that for the human mind there are certain objects ofperception which are within the scope of its nature and capacity;on the other hand, there are, amongst things Aich actually exist,certain objects which the mind can in no way and by no meansgrasp : the gates of perception are dosed against it. Further, thereare things of which the mind understands one part, but remainsignorant of the other; and when man is able to comprehend certainthings, it does not follow that he must be able to comprehendeverything. This also applies to the senses : they are able toperceive things, but not at every distance: and all other power; ofthe body are limited in a similar way. A man can, e.g., carry twokikkar, but he cannot carry ten kikkar. How individuals of thesame species surpass each other in these sensations and in otherbodily faculties is universally known, but there is a limit to them,and their power cannot extend to every distance or to every degree.
All this is applicable to the intellectual faculties of man. There is aconsiderable difference between one person and another as regardsthese faculties, as is well known to philosophers. While one mancan discover a certain thing by himself, another is never able tounderstand it, even if taught by means of all possible expressionsand metaphors, and during a long period; his mind can in no waygrasp it, his capacity is insufficient for it. This distinction is notunlimited. A boundary is undoubtedly set to the human mindwhich it cannot pass. There are things (beyond that boundary)which are acknowledged to be inaccessible to humanunderstanding, and man does not show any desire to comprehendthem, being aware that such knowledge is impossible, and thatthere are no means of overcoming the difficulty: e.g., we do notknow the number of stars in heaven, whether the number is even orodd; we do not know the number of animals, minerals, or plants,and the like. There are other things, however, which man verymuch desires to know, and strenuous efforts to examine and toinvestigate them have been made by thinkers of all classes, and atall times. They differ and disagree, and constantly raise newdoubts with regard to them, because their minds are bent oncomprehending such things, that is to say, they are moved bydesire
and every one of them believes that he has discovered the wayleading to a true knowledge of the thing, although human reason isentirely unable to demonstrate the fact by convincingevidence.-For a proposition which can be proved by evidence isnot subject to dispute, denial, or rejection: none but the ignorantwould contradict it, and such contradiction is called" denial of ademonstrated proof." Thus you find men who deny the sphericalform of the earth, or the circular form of the line in which the starsmove, and the like: such men are not considered in this treatise.This confusion prevails mostly in metaphysical subjects, less inproblems relating to physics, and is entirely absent from the exactsciences. Alexander Aphrodisius said that there are three causeswhich prevent men from discovering the exact truth : first,arrogance and vainglory; secondly, the subtlety, depth, anddifficulty of any subject which is being examined; thirdly,ignorance and want of capacity to comprehend what might becomprehended. These causes are enumerated by Alexander. At thepresent time there is a fourth cause not mentioned by him, becauseit did not then prevail, namely, habit and training. We naturallylike what we have been accustomed to, and are attracted towardsit. This may be observed amongst villagers; though they rarelyenjoy the benefit of a douche or bath, and have few enjoyments,and pass a life of privation, they dislike town life and do not desireits pleasures, preferring the inferior things to which they areaccustomed, to the better things to which they are strangers; itwould give them no satisfaction to live in palaces, to be clothed insilk, and to indulge in baths, ointments, and perfumes.
The same is the case with those opinions of man to which he hasbeen accustomed from his youth; he likes them, defends them, andshuns the opposite views. This is likewise one of the causes whichprevent men from finding truth, and which make them cling totheir habitual opinions. Such is, e.g., the case with the vulgarnotions with respect to the corporeality of God, and many othermetaphysical questions, as we shall explain. It is the result of longfamiliarity with passages of the Bible, which they are accustomedto respect and to receive as true, and the literal sense of whichimplies the corporeality of God and other false notions; in truth,however, these words were employed as figures and metaphors forreasons to be mentioned below. Do not imagine that what we havesaid of the insufficiency of our understanding and of its limitedextent is an assertion founded only on the Bible: for philosopherslikewise assert the same, and perfectly understand it,- withouthaving regard to any religion or opinion. It is a fact which is onlydoubted by those who ignore things fully proved. This chapter isintended as an introduction to the next.
CHAPTER XXXII
You must consider, when reading this treatise, that mentalperception, because connected with matter, is subject to conditionssimilar to those to which physical perception is subject. That is tosay, if your eye looks around, you can perceive all that is withinthe range of your vision: if, however, you overstrain your eye,exerting it too much by attempting to see an object which is toodistant for your eye, or to examine writings or engravings toosmall for your sight, and forcing it to obtain a correct perception ofthem, you will not only weaken your sight with regard to thatspecial object, but also for those things which you otherwise areable to perceive: your eye will have become too weak to perceivewhat you were able to see before you exerted yourself andexceeded the limits of your vision.
The same is the case with the speculative faculties of one whodevotes himself to the study of any science. If a person studies toomuch and exhausts his reflective powers, he will be confused, andwill not be able to apprehend even that which had been within thepower of his apprehension. For the powers of the body are all alikein this respect.
The mental perceptions are not exempt from a similar condition. Ifyou admit the doubt, and do not persuade yourself to believe thatthere is a proof for things which cannot be demonstrated, or to tryat once to reject and positively to deny an assertion the opposite ofwhich has never been proved, or attempt to perceive things whichare beyond your perception, then you have attained the highestdegree of human perfection, then you are like R. Akibha, who" inpeace entered [the study of these theological problems], and cameout in peace." If, on the other hand, you attempt to exceed the limitof your intellectual power, or at once to reject things as impossiblewhich have never been proved to be impossible, or which are infact possible, though their possibility be very remote, then you willbe like Elisha Aber; you will not only fail to become perfect, butyou will become exceedingly imperfect. Ideas founded on mereimagination will prevail over you, you will incline toward defects,and toward base and degraded habits, on account of the confusionwhich troubles the mind, and of the dimness of its light, just asweakness of sight causes invalids to see many kinds of unrealimages, especially when they have looked for a long time atdazzling or at very minute objects.
Respecting this it has been said," Hast thou found honey ? eat somuch as is sufficient for thee, lest thou be filled therewith, andvomit it" (Prov. xxv. 16). Our Sages also applied this verse toElisha Aber, How excellent is this simile! In comparing knowledgeto food (as we observed in chap. xxx.), the author of Proverbsmentions the sweetest food, namely, honey, which has the furtherproperty of irritating the stomach, and of causing sickness. He thusfully describes the nature of knowledge. Though great, excellent,noble and perfect, it is injurious if not kept within bounds or notguarded properly; it is like honey which gives nourishment and ispleasant, when eaten in moderation, but is totally thrown awaywhen eaten immoderately. Therefore, it is not said" lest thou befilled and loathe it," but" lest thou vomit it." The same idea isexpressed in the words," It is not good to eat much honey" (Prov.XM 27): and in the words," Neither make thyself over-wise: whyshouldst thou destroy thyself ?" (Eccles. vii. 16); comp." Keep thyfoot when thou goest to the house of God" (ibid. v. 1). The samesubject is alluded to in the words of David," Neither do I exercisemyself in great matters, or in things too high for me" (PS. =XL 2),and in the sayings of our Sages:" Do not inquire into things whichare too difficult for thee, do not search what is hidden from thee:study what you are allowed to study, and do not occupy thyselfwith mysteries." They meant to say, Let thy mind only attemptthings which are within human perception; for the study of thingswhich lie beyond man's comprehension is extremely injurious, ashas been already stated. This lesson is also contained in theTalmudical passage, which begins," He who considers fourthings," etc., and concludes," He who does not regard the honourof his Creator" : here also is given the advice which we havealready mentioned, viz., that man should not rashly engage inspeculation with false conceptions, and when he is in doubt aboutanything, or unable to find a proof for the object of his inquiry, hemust not at once abandon, reject and deny it; he must modestlykeep back, and from regard to the honour of his Creator, hesitate[from uttering an opinion) and pause. This has already beenexplained.
It was not the object of the Prophets and our Sages in theseutterances to close the gate of investigation entirely, and to preventthe mind from comprehending what is within its reach, as isimagined by simple and idle people, whom it suits better to putforth their ignorance and incapacity as wisdom and perfection, andto regard the distinction and wisdom of others as irreligion andimperfection, thus taking darkness for light and light for darkness.The whole object of the Prophets and the Sages was to declare thata limit is set to human reason where it must halt. Do not criticisethe words used in this chapter and in others in reference to themind, for we only intended to give some idea of the subject inview, not to describe the essence of the intellect: for other chaptershave been dedicated to this subject.
CHAPTER XXXIII
You must know that it is very injurious to begin with this branchof philosophy, viz., Metaphysics: or to explain [at first] the senseof the similes occurring in prophecies, and interpret the metaphorswhich are employed in historical accounts and which abound inthe writings of the Prophets. On the contrary, it is necessary toinitiate the young and to instruct the less intelligent according totheir comprehension: those who appear to be talented and to havecapacity for the higher method of study, i.e., that based on proofand on true logical argument, should be gradually advancedtowards perfection, either by tuition or by self-instruction. He,however, who begins with Metaphysics, will not only becomeconfused in matters of religion, but will fall into completeinfidelity. I compare such a person to an infant fed with wheatenbread, meat and wine; it will undoubtedly die, not because suchfood is naturally unfit for the human body, but because of theweakness of the child, who is unable to digest the food, and cannotderive benefit from it. The same is the case with the true principlesof science. They were presented in enigmas, dad in riddles, andtaught by an wise men in the most mysterious way that could bedevised, not because they contain some secret evil, or are contraryto the fundamental principles of the Law (as fools think who areonly philosophers in their own eyes), but because of the incapacityof man to comprehend them at the beginning of his studies: onlyslight allusions have been made to them to serve for the guidanceof those who are capable of understanding them. These scienceswere, therefore, called Mysteries (sodoth), and Secrets of the Law(sitre torah), as we shall explain.
This also is the reason why" the Torah speaks the language ofman," as we have explained, for it is the object of the Torah toserve as a guide for the instruction of the young, of women, and ofthe common people; and as all of them are incapable tocomprehend the true sense of the words, tradition was consideredsufficient to convey all truths which were to be established; and asregards ideals, only such remarks were made as would leadtowards a knowledge of their existence, though not to acomprehension of their true essence. When a man attains toperfection, and arrives at a knowledge of the" Secrets of the Law,"either through the assistance of a teacher or by self-instruction,being led by the understanding of one part to the study of the other,he will belong to those who faithfully believe in the trueprinciples, either because of conclusive proof, where proof ispossible, or by forcible arguments, where argument is admissible;he will have a true notion of those things which he previouslyreceived in similes and metaphors, and he will fully understandtheir sense. We have frequently mentioned in this treatise theprinciple of our Sages" not to discuss the Ma'aseh Mercabah evenin the presence of one pupil, except he be wise and intelligent; andthen only the headings of the chapters are to be given to him." Wemust, therefore, begin with teaching these subjects according tothe capacity of the pupil, and on two conditions, first, that he bewise, i.e., that he should have successfully gone through thepreliminary studies, and secondly that he be intelligent, talented,clear-headed, and of quick perception, that is, have a mind of hisown" (mebin midda'ato), as our Sages termed it.
I will now proceed to explain the reasons why we should notinstruct the multitude in pure metaphysics, or begin withdescribing to them the true essence of things, or with showingthem that a thing must be as it is, and cannot be otherwise. Thiswill form the subject of the next chapter; and I proceed to say
CHAPTER XXXIV
THERE are five reasons why instruction should not begin withMetaphysics, but should at first be restricted to pointing out whatis fitted for notice and what may be made manifest to themultitude.
First Reason -- The subject itself is difficult, subtle and profound,"Far off and exceeding deep, who can find it out ?" (Eccles. vii.24). The following words of job may be applied to it:" Whencethen cometh wisdom ? and where is the place of understanding ?"(job xxviii. 20). Instruction should not begin with abstruse anddifficult subjects. In one of the similes contained in the Bible,wisdom is compared to water, and amongst other interpretationsgiven by our Sages of this simile, occurs the following: He whocan swim may bring up pearls from the depth of the sea, he who isunable to swim will be drowned, therefore only such persons ashave had proper instruction should expose themselves to the risk.
Second Reason --The intelligence of man is at first insufficient; forhe is not endowed with perfection at the beginning, but at firstpossesses perfection only in potentia, not in fact. Thus it is said,"And man is born a wild ass" (job xi. 12). If a man possesses acertain faculty in potentia, it does not follow that it must becomein him a reality. He may possibly remain deficient either onaccount of some obstacle, or from want of training in practiceswhich would turn the possibility into a reality. Thus it is distinctlystated in the Bible," Not many are wise" (ib., xxxii. 9): also ourSages say," I noticed how few were those who attained to a higherdegree of perfection" (B. T. Succah 45a). There are many thingswhich obstruct the path to perfection, and which keep man awayfrom it. Where can he find sufficient preparation and leisure tolearn all that is necessary in order to develop that perfection whichhe has in potentia ?
Third Reason. -- The preparatory studies are of long duration, andman, in his natural desire to reach the goal, finds them frequentlytoo wearisome, and does not wish to be troubled by them. Beconvinced that, if man were able to reach the end withoutpreparatory studies, such studies would not be preparatory buttiresome and utterly superfluous. Suppose you awaken any person,even the most simple, as if from sleep, and you say to him, Do younot desire to know what the heavens are, what is their number andtheir form; what beings are contained in them; what the angels are;how the creation of the whole world took place; what is itspurpose, and what is the relation of its various parts to each other;what is the nature of the soul; how it enters the body; whether ithas an independent existence, and if so, how it can existindependently of the body; by what means and to what purpose,and similar problems. He would undoubtedly say" Yes," and showa natural desire for the true knowledge of these things; but he winwish to satisfy that desire and to attain to that knowledge bylistening to a few words from you. Ask him to interrupt his usualpursuits for a week, till he learn all this, he would not do it, andwould be satisfied and contented with imaginary and misleadingnotions; he would refuse to believe that there is anything whichrequires preparatory studies and persevering research.
You, however, know how all these subjects are connectedtogether; for there is nothing else in existence but God and Hisworks, the latter including all existing things besides Him: we canonly obtain a knowledge of I-Em through His works; His worksgive evidence of His existence, and show what must be assumedconcerning Him, that is to say, what must be attributed to Himeither affirmatively or negatively. It is thus necessary to examineall things according to their essence, to infer from every speciessuch true and well established propositions as may assist us in thesolution of metaphysical problems. Again, many propositionsbased on the nature of numbers and the properties of geometricalfigures, are useful in examining things which must be negatived inreference to God, and these negations will lead us to furtherinferences. You will certainly not doubt the necessity of studyingastronomy and physics, if you are desirous of comprehending therelation between the world and Providence as it is in reality, andnot according to imagination. There are also many subjects ofspeculation, which, though not preparing the way for metaphysics,help to train the reasoning power, enabling it to understand thenature of a proof, and to test truth by characteristics essential to it.They remove the confusion arising in the minds of most thinkers,who confound accidental with essential properties, and likewisethe wrong opinions resulting therefrom. We may add, thatalthough they do not form the basis for metaphysical research, theyassist in forming a correct notion of these things, and are certainlyuseful in many other things connected with that discipline.Consequently he who wishes to attain to human perfection, musttherefore first study Logic, next the various branches ofMathematics in their proper order, then Physics, and lastlyMetaphysics. We find that many who have advanced to a certainpoint in the study of these disciplines become weary, and stop: thatothers, who are endowed with sufficient capacity, are interruptedin their studies by death, which surprises them while still engagedwith the preliminary course. Now, if no knowledge whatever hadbeen given,' to us by means of tradition, and if we had not beenbrought to the belief in a thing through the medium of similes, wewould have been bound to form a perfect notion of things withtheir essential characteristics, and to believe only what we couldprove: a goal which could only be attained by long preparation. Insuch a case most people would die, without having known whetherthere was a God or not, much less that certain things must beasserted about Him, and other things denied as defects. From sucha fate not even" one of a city or two of a family" (jer. iii. 14)would have escaped.
As regards the privileged few," the remnant whom the Lord calls"(Joel iii. 5), they only attain the perfection at which they aim afterdue preparatory labour. The necessity of such a preparation and theneed of such a training for the acquisition of real knowledge, hasbeen plainly stated by King Solomon in the following words:" Ifthe iron be blunt, and he do not whet the edge, then must he put tomore strength: and it is profitable to prepare for wisdom" (Eccles.x. 10):" Hear counsel, and receive instruction, that thou mayest bewise in thy latter end" (Prov. XiX. 20).
There is still another urgent reason why the preliminary disciplinesshould be studied and understood. During the study many doubtspresent themselves, and the difficulties, or the objections raisedagainst certain assertions, are soon understood, just as thedemolition of a building is easier than its erection: while, on theother hand, it is impossible to prove an assertion, or to remove anydoubts, without having recourse to several propositions taken fromthese preliminary studies. He who approaches metaphysicalproblems without proper preparation is like a person who journeystowards a certain place, and on the road falls into a deep pit, out ofwhich he cannot rise, and he must perish there: if he had not goneforth, but had remained at home, it would have been better forhim.
Solomon has expatiated in the book of Proverbs on sluggards andtheir indolence, by which he figuratively refers to indolence in thesearch after wisdom. He thus speaks of a man who desires to knowthe final results, but does not exert himself to understand thepreliminary disciplines which lead to them, doing nothing else butdesire." The desire of the slothful killeth him; for his hands refuseto labour. He coveteth greedily all the day long: but the righteousgiveth, and spareth not" (PrOV. XXi. 25, 26): that is to say, if thedesire killeth the slothful, it is because he neglects to seek thething which might satisfy his desire, he does nothing but desire,and hopes to obtain a thing without using the means to reach it. Itwould be better for him were he without that desire. Observe howthe end of the simile throws light on its beginning. It concludeswith the words" but the righteous giveth, and spareth not" : theantithesis of" righteous" and" slothful" can only be justified onthe basis of our interpretation. Solomon thus indicates that 0 sucha man is righteous who gives to everything its due portion; that isto say, who gives to the study of a thing the whole time requiredfor it, and does not devote any part of that time to another purpose.The passage may therefore be paraphrased thus : And the righteousman devotes his ways to wisdom, and does not withhold any ofthem." Comp." Give not thy strength unto women" (Prov. xxxi.3).
The majority of scholars, that is to say, the most famous inscience, are afflicted with this failing, viz., that of hurrying at onceto the final results, and of speaking about them, without treating ofthe preliminary disciplines. Led by folly or ambition to disregardthose preparatory studies, for the attainment of which they areeither incapable or too idle, some scholars endeavour to prove thatthese are injurious or superfluous. On reflection the truth willbecome obvious.
The Fourth Reason is taken from the physical constitution of man.It has been proved that moral conduct is a preparation forintellectual progress, and that only a man whose character is pure,calm and steadfast, can attain to intellectual perfection: that is,acquire correct conceptions. Many men are naturally so constitutedthat all perfection is impossible: e.g., he whose heart is very warmand is himself very powerful, is sure to be passionate, though hetries to counteract that disposition by training; he whose testiclesare warm, humid, and vigorous, and the organs connectedtherewith are surcharged, will not easily refrain from sin, even ifhe makes great efforts to restrain himself. You also find persons ofgreat levity and rashness, whose excited manners and wild gesturesprove that their constituttion is in disorder, and their temperamentso bad that it cannot be cured. Such persons can never attain toperfection: it is utterly useless to occupy oneself with them on sucha subject [as Metaphysics]. For this science is, as you know,different from the science of Medicine and of Geometry, and, fromthe reason already mentioned, it is not every person who is capableof approaching it. It is impossible for a man to study it successfullywithout moral preparation; he must acquire the highest degree ofuprightness and integrity," for the froward is an abomination tothe Lord, but His secret is with the righteous" (Prov. iii. 32).Therefore it was considered inadvisable to teach it to young men;nay, it is impossible for them to comprehend it, on account of theheat of their blood and the flame of youth, which confuses theirminds: that heat, which causes all the disorder, must firstdisappear; they must have become moderate and settled, humble intheir hearts, and subdued in their temperament; only then will theybe able to arrive at the highest degree of the perception of God,i.e., the study of Metaphysics, which is called Ma'aseh MercabahComp. The Lord is nigh unto them that are of a broken heart" (Ps.xxxiv. 18)" I dwell in the high and lofty place, with him also thatis of a contrite and humble spirit: to revive the spirit of thehumble, and to revive the heart of the contrite ones" (Isa. lvii. 15).
Therefore the rule," the headings of the sections may be confidedto him," is further restricted in the Talmud, in the following way:The headings of the sections must only be handed down to anAb-bet-din (President of the Court), whose heart is full of care,i.e., in whom wisdom is united with humility, meekness, and agreat dread of sin. It is further stated there :" The secrets of theLaw can only be communicated to a counsellor, scholar, and goodorator." These qualities can only be acquired if the physicalconstitution of the student favour their development. You certainlyknow that some persons, though exceedingly able, are very weakin giving counsel, while others are ready with proper counsel andgood advice in social and political matters. A person so endowedis called" counsellor" and may be unable to comprehend purelyabstract notions, even such as are similar to common sense. He isunacquainted with them, and has no talent whatever for them; weapply to him the words :" Wherefore is there a price in the hand ofa fool to get wisdom, seeing he hath no heart to it ?" (Prov. xvii.16). Others are intelligent and naturally clear-sighted, able toconvey complicated ideas in concise and well chosen language, --such a person is called" a good orator," but he has not beenengaged in the pursuit of science, or has not acquired anyknowledge of it. Those who have actually acquired a knowledge ofthe sciences, are called" wise in arts" (or" scholars" ): theHebrew term for" wise in arts" -- hakam harashim -has beenexplained in the Talmud as implying, that when such a manspeaks, all become, as t were, speechless.
Now, consider how, in the writings of the Rabbis, the admission ofa person into discourses on metaphysics is made dependent ondistinction in social qualities, and study of philosophy, as well ason the possession of clearsightedness, intelligence, eloquence, andability to communicate things by slight allusions. If a personsatisfies these requirements, the secrets of the Law are confided tohim. In the same place we also read the following passage :-R.Jochanan said to R. Elasar," Come, I will teach you Ma'asehMercabah." The reply was," I am not yet old," or in other words, Ihave not yet become old, I still perceive in myself the hot bloodand the rashness of youth. You learn from this that, in addition tothe above-named good qualities, a certain age is also required.How, then, could any person speak on these metaphysical themesin the presence of ordinary people, of children, and of women!
Fifth Reason. -- Man is disturbed in his intellectual occupation bythe necessity of looking after the material wants of the body,especially if the necessity of providing for wife and children besuperadded: much more so if he seeks superfluities in addition tohis ordinary wants, for by custom and bad habits these become apowerful motive. Even the perfect man to whom we have referred,if too busy with these necessary things, much more so if busy withunnecessary things, and filled with a great desire for them-mustweaken or altogether lose his desire for study, to which he winapply himself with interruption, lassitude, and want of attention.He will not attain to that for which he is fitted by his abilities, orhe will acquire imperfect knowledge, a confused mass of true andfalse ideas. For these reasons it was proper that the study ofMetaphysics should have been exclusively cultivated by privilegedpersons, and not entrusted to the common people. It is not for thebeginner, and he should abstain from it, as the little child has toabstain from taking solid food and from carrying heavy weights.
CHAPTER XXXV
Do not think that what we have laid down in the precedingchapters on the
importance, obscurity, and difficulty of the subject,and its unsuitableness for
communication to ordinary persons,includes the doctrine of God's incorporeality
and His exemptionfrom all affections
This suffices for the guidance of children and of ordinary personswho must believe that there is a Being existing, perfect,incorporeal, not inherent in a body as a force in it-God, who isabove all kinds of deficiency, above A affections. But the questionconcerning the attributes of God, their inadmissibility, and themeaning of those attributes which are ascribed to Him; concerningthe Creation, His Providence, in providing for everything;concerning His will, His perception, His knowledge of everything;concerning prophecy and its various degrees: concerning themeaning of His names which imply the idea of unity, though theyare more than one; all these things are very difficult problems, thetrue" Secrets of the Law" the" secrets" mentioned so frequentlyin the books of the Prophets, and in the words of our Teachers, thesubjects of which we should only mention the headings of thechapters, as we have already stated, and only in the presence of aperson satisfying the above-named conditions.
That God is incorporeal, that He cannot be compared with Hiscreatures, that He is not subject to external influence; these arethings which must be explained to every one according to hiscapacity, and they must be taught by way of tradition to childrenand women, to the stupid and ignorant, as they are taught that Godis One, that He is eternal, and that He alone is to be worshipped.Without incorporeality there is no unity, for a corporeal thing is inthe first case not simple, but composed of matter and form whichare two separate things by definition, and secondly, as it hasextension it is also divisible. When persons have received thisdoctrine, and have been trained in this belief, and are inconsequence at a loss to reconcile it with the writings of theProphets, the meaning of the latter must be made dear andexplained to them by pointing out the homonymity and thefigurative application of certain terms discussed in this part of thework. Their belief in the unity of God and in the words of theProphets will then be a true and perfect belief.
Those who are not sufficiently intelligent to comprehend the trueinterpretation of these passages in the Bible, or to understand thatthe same term admits of two different interpretations, may simplybe told that the scriptural passage is clearly understood by thewise, but that they should content themselves with knowing thatGod is incorporeal, that He is never subject to external influence,as passivity implies a change, while God is entirely free from allchange, that He cannot be compared to anything besides Himself,that no definition includes Him together with any other being, thatthe words of the Prophets are true, and that difficulties met withmay be explained on this principle. This may suffice for that classof persons, and it is not proper to leave them in the belief that Godis corporeal, or that He has any of the properties of materialobjects, just as there is no need to leave them in the belief that Goddoes not exist, that there are more Gods than one, or that any otherbeing may be worshipped.
CHAPTER XXXVI
I SHALL explain to you, when speaking on the attributes of God,in what sense we can say that a particular thing pleases Him, orexcites His anger and His wrath, and in reference to certainpersons that God was pleased with them, was angry with them, orwas in wrath against them. This is not the subject of the presentchapter; I intend to explain in it what I am now going to say. Youmust know, that in examining the Law and the books of theProphets, you will not find the expressions" burning anger," "provocation," or" jealousy" applied to God except in reference toidolatry; and that none but the idolater called" enemy .. ..adversary," or" hater of the Lord." Comp." And ye serve othergods,. and then the Lord's wrath will be kindled against you"(Dent. xi. 16, 17) Lest the anger of the Lord thy God be kindledagainst thee." etc. (ib. vi. 15):" To provoke him to anger throughthe work of your hands" (ib. xrxi. 29):" They have moved me tojealousy with that which is not God; they have provoked me toanger with their vanities" (ib. xxxii. 21):" For the Lord thy God isa jealous God" (ib. vi. 15):" Why have they provoked me to angerwith their graven images, and with strange vanities ?" (Jer. viii.19):" Because of the provoking of his sons and of his daughters"(Dent. xxxii. 19):" For a fire is kindled in mine anger" (ib. 22):"The Lord will take vengeance on His adversaries, and he reservethwrath for his enemies" (Nah. i. 2):" And repayeth them that hateHim" (Deut. vii. 10):" Until He hath driven out His enemies frombefore Him (Num. xxxii. 2 1):" Which the Lord thy God hateth"(Deut. XVi. 22): For every abomination to the Lord, which Hehateth, have they done unto their gods" (ib. xii. P). Instances likethese are innumerable; and if you examine all the examples metwith in the holy writings, you will find that they confirm our view.
The Prophets in their writings laid special stress on this, because itconcerns errors in reference to God, i.e., it concerns idolatry. For ifany one believes that, e.g., Zaid is standing, while in fact he issitting, he does not deviate from truth so much as one whobelieves that fire is under the air, or that water is under the earth,or that the earth is a plane, or things similar to these. The latterdoes not deviate so much from truth as one who believes that thesun consists of fire, or that the heavens form a hemisphere, andsimilar things: in the third instance the deviation from truth is lessthan the deviation of a man who believes that angels cat and drink,and the like. The latter again deviates less from truth than one whobelieves that something besides God is to be worshipped; forignorance and error concerning a great thing, i.e., a thing whichhas a high position in the universe, are of greater importance thanthose which refer to a thing which occupies a lower place:-by"error" 1 mean the belief that a thing is different from what it reallyis: by" ignorance," the want of knowledge respecting things theknowledge of which can be obtained.
If a person does not know the measure of the cone, or thesphericity of the sun, it is not so important as not to know whetherGod exists, or whether the world exists without a God; and if aman assumes that the cone is half (of the cylinder), or that the sunis a circle, it is not so injurious as to believe that God is more thanOne. You must know that idolaters when worshipping idols do notbelieve that there is no God besides them: and no idolater ever didassume that any image made of metal, stone, or wood has createdthe heavens and the earth, and still governs them. Idolatry isfounded on the idea that a particular form represents the agentbetween God and His creatures. This is plainly said in passageslike the following:" Who would not fear thee, 0 king of nations ?"(Jer. x. 7)" And in every place incense is offered unto my name"(Mal. i. 11): by my name" allusion is made to the Being which iscalled by them [i.e., the idolaters]" the First Cause." We havealready explained this in our larger work (Misbneb Torah, I. OnIdolatry, chap. i.), and none of our co-religionists can doubt it.
The infidels, however, though believing in the existence of theCreator, attack the exclusive prerogative of God, namely, theservice and worship which was commanded, in order that thebelief of the people in His existence should be firmly established,in the words," And you shall serve the Lord," etc. (Exod. xxiii.25). By transferring that prerogative to other beings, they cause thepeople, who only notice the rites, without comprehending theirmeaning or the true character of the being which is worshipped, torenounce their belief in the existence of God. They were thereforepunished with death: comp." Thou shalt save alive nothing thatbreatheth" (Deut. xx. 16). The object of this commandment, as isdistinctly stated, is to extirpate that false opinion, in order thatother men should not be corrupted by it any more: in the words ofthe Bible" that they teach you not," etc. (ib. is). They are called"enemies,"" foes ... .. adversaries" : by worshipping idols they aresaid to provoke God to jealousy, anger, and wrath. How great,then,muut be the offence of him who has a wrong opinion of GodHimself, and believes Him to be different from what He truly is,i.e., assumes that He does not exist, that He consists of twoelements, that He is corporeal, that He is subject to externalinfluence, or ascribes to Him any defect whatever. Such a person isundoubtedly worse than he who worships idols in the belief thatthey, as agents, can do good or evil.
Therefore bear in mind that by the belief in the corporeality or inanything connected with corporeality, you would provoke God tojealousy and wrath, kindle His fire and anger, become His foe, Hisenemy, and His adversary in a higher degree than by the worshipof idols. If you think that there is an excuse for those who believein the corporeality of God on the ground of their training, theirignorance or their defective comprehension, you must make thesame concession to the worshippers of idols: their worship is dueto ignorance, or to early training," they continue in the custom oftheir fathers." (T.B. Hullin, 13a) You will perhaps say that theliteral interpretation of the Bible causes men to fall into that doubt,but you must know that idolaters were likewise brought to theirbelief by false imaginations and ideas. There is no excusewhatever for those who, being unable to think for themselves, donot accept [the doctrine of the incorporeality of God] from the truephilosophers. I do not consider those men as infidels who areunable to prove the incorporeality, but I hold those to be so Whodo not believe it, especially when they see that Onkelos andJonathan avoid [in reference to God] expressions implyingcorporeality as much as possible. This is all I intended to say inthis chapter.
CHAPTER XXXVII
THE Hebrew term panim (face) is homonymous: most of itsvarious meanings have a figurative character. It denotes in the firstplace the face of a living being: comp." And all laces are turnedinto paleness" (Jer. xxx. 6):" Wherefore are your laces so sad(Gen. xl. 7). In this sense the term occurs frequently.
The next meaning of the word is" anger"; comp." And her anger(paneha) was gone" (I Sam. i. 18). Accordingly, the term isfrequently used in reference to God in the sense of anger andwrath; comp." The anger (pene) of the Lord hath divided them(Lam. iv. 16) The anger (pene) of the Lord is against them that doevil (Ps. xxxiv. 17) Mine anger (Panai) shall go and I will give theerest" (Exod. xxxiii. 14): Then will I set mine anger" (panai) (Lev.xx. 3): there are many other instances.
Another meaning of the word is" the presence and existence of aperson comp." He died in the presence (pene) [i.e., in the lifetime]of all his brethren" (Gen. xxv. is):" And in the presence (pene) ofall the people I will be glorified" (Lev. x. 3):" He will surely cursethee in thy very presence" (paneka) (job i. 11). In the same sensethe word is used in the following passage," And the Lord spakeunto Moses face to face," i.e., both being present, without anyintervening medium between them. Comp." Come, let us look oneanother in the face" (2 Kings xiv. 8): and also" The Lord talkedwith you face to face" (Deut. v. 4): instead of which we read moreplainly in another place," Ye heard the voice of the words, but sawno similitude: only ye heard a voice" (ib. iv. 12). The hearing ofthe voice without seeing any similitude is termed" face to face."Similarly do the words," And the Lord spake unto Moses face toface" correspond to" There he heard the voice of one speakingunto him" (Num. vii. 89), in the description of God's speaking toMoses. Thus it will be clear to you that the perception of theDivine voice without the intervention of an angel is expressed by" face to face." In the same sense the word panim must beunderstood in" And my face (panai) shall not be seen" (Exod.xxxiii. 23) i.e., my true existence, as it is, cannot becomprehended.
The word panim is also used in Hebrew as an adverb of place, inthe sense of" before," or" between the hands." In this sense it isfrequently employed in reference to God: so also in the passage,"And my face (panai) shall not be seen," according to Onkelos, whorenders it," And those before me shall not be seen." He finds herean allusion to the fact, that there are also higher created beings ofsuch superiority that their true nature cannot be perceived by man:viz., the ideals, separate intellects, which in their relation to Godare described as being constantly before Him, or between Hishands, i.e., as enjoying uninterruptedly the closest attention ofDivine Providence. He, i.e., Onkelos, considers that the thingswhich are described as completely perceptible are those beingswhich, as regards existence, are inferior to the ideals, viz.,substance and form: in reference to which we are told," And thoushalt see that which is behind me" (ibid.), i.e., beings, from which,as it were, I turn away, and which I leave behind me. This figure isto represent the utter remoteness of such beings from the Deity.You shall later on (chap. liv.) hear my explanation of what Moses,our teacher, asked for.
The word is also used as an adverb of time, meaning" before."Comp. In former time (le-phanim) in Israel" (Ruth !v. 7):" Of old(le-phanim) hast Thou laid the foundation of the earth" (PS. Cii.25).
Another signification of the word is" attention and regard."Comp." Thou shalt not have regard (pene) to the poor (Lev. xx.15):" And a person receiving attention (panim)" (Isa. iii. 3): Whodoes not show regard (panim)," etc. (Deut. x. 17, etc.). The wordpanim (face) has a similar signification in the blessing," The Lordturn his face to thee" (i.e., The Lord let his providence accompanythee)," and give thee peace."
CHAPTER XXXVIII
THE Hebrew term ahor is a homonym. It is a noun, signifying"back Comp." Behind (ahare) the tabernacle" (Exod. xxvi. 12) Thespear came out behind him (ahroav)" (2 Sam. ii. 23).
It is next used in reference to time, signifying" after" :" neitherafter him (aharav) arose there any like him" (2 Kings xxiii. 25)"After (ahar) these things" (Gen. xv. 1). In this sense the wordoccurs frequently.
The term includes also the idea of following a thing and ofconforming with the moral principles of some other being. Comp."Ye shall walk after (ahare) the Lord, your God" (Dent. xiii. 5):"They shall walk after (ahare) the Lord" (Hos. xi. 10), i.e., followHis will, walk in the way of His actions, and imitate His virtues:"He walked after (ahare) the commandment" (ib. v.11). In thissense the word occurs in Exod us XXXiii. 20," And thou shalt seemy back" (ahorai): thou shalt perceive that which follows me, issimilar to me, and is the result of my will, i.e., all things created byme, as will be explained in the course of this treatise.
CHAPTER XXXIX
THE Hebrew leb (heart) is a homonymous noun, signifying thatorgan which is the source of life to all beings possessing a heart.Comp." And thrust them through the heart of Absalom" (I Sam.xviii. 14).
This organ being in the middle of the body, the word has beenfiguratively applied to express" the middle part of a thing."Comp." unto the midst (leb) of heaven" (Deut. iv.11):" the midst(labbath) of fire" (Exod. iii. 2).
It further denotes" thought." Comp." Went not mine heart withthee ?" (2 Kings V. 26), i.e., I was with thee in my thought when acertain event happened. Similarly must be explained," And that yeseek not after your own heart" (Num. xv, 39), i.e., after your ownthoughts: Whose heart (i.e., whose thought), turneth away this day"(Deut. xxix. is).
The word further signifies" counsel." Comp." All the rest of Israelwere of one heart (i.e., had one plan) to make David king" (IChron. xii. 38):" but fools die for want of heart," i.e., of counsel;" My heart (i.e., my counsel) shall not turn away from this so long asI live" (job xxvii. 6): for this sentence is preceded by the words,My righteousness I hold fast, and will not let it go" : and thenfollows, my heart shall never turn away from this." -- As regardsthe expression yeheraf, I think that it may be compared with thesame verb in the form nehrefet," a handmaid betrothed (nehrefet)to a man" (Lev. XiX. 20), where nehefeth is similar in meaning tothe Arabic munharifat," turning away," and signifies" turning fromthe state of slavery to that of marriage."
Leh (heart) denotes also" will" : comp." And I shall give youpastors according to my will (libbi)" (Jer. iii. 15)," Is thine heartright as my heart is ?" (2 Kings x. 15), i.e., is thy will right as mywill is ? In this sense the word has been figuratively applied toGod. Comp." That shall do according to that which is in mineheart and in my soul" (I Sam. ii. 35), i.e., according to My will;"And mine eyes and mine heart (i.e., My providence and My will)shall be there perpetually" (I Kings ix. 3).
The word is also used in the sense of" understanding." Comp." Forvain man will be endowed with a heart" Uob xi. 12), i.e., will bewise;" A wise man's heart is at his right hand" (Eccles. X. 2), i.e.,his understanding is engaged in perfect thoughts, the highestproblems. Instances of this kind are numerous. It is in this sense,namely, that of understanding, that the word is used wheneverfiguratively applied to God; but exceptionally it is also used in thesense of" will." It must, in each passage, be explained inaccordance with the context. Also, in the following and similarpassages, it signifies" understanding" :" Consider it in thine heart" (Deut. iv. 39):" And none considereth in his heart" (Isa. xliv. 19).Thus, also," Yet the Lord hath not given you an heart to perceive,"is identical in its meaning with" Unto thee it was shown that thoumightest know" (Deut. iv. 35).
As to the passage," And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with allthine heart" (Ib. vi. 5), 1 explain" with all thine heart" to mean"with all the powers of thine heart," that is, with all the powers ofthe body, for they all have their origin in the heart: and the sense ofthe entire passage is : make the knowledge of God the aim of allthy actions, as we have stated in our Commentary on the Mishnah(Aboth, Eight Chapters, v.), and in our Mishneh Torah, yesodehatorah, chap. ii. 2.
CHAPTER XL
Ruab is a homonym, signifying" air," that is, one of the fourelements. Comp." And the air of God moved (Gen. i. 2).
It denotes also," wind." Comp. And the east wind (ruah) broughtthe locusts" (Exod. x. 13):" west wind" (ruah) (ib. 19). In thissense the word occurs frequently.Next, it signifies" breath." Comp." A breath (ruah) that passethaway, and does not come again" (PS. lxxviii. 39) wherein is thebreath (ruah) of life" (Gen. vii. 15).
It signifies also that which remains of mar after his death, and isnot subject to destruction. Comp." And the spirit (ruah) shallreturn unto God who gave it" (Eccles. xii. 7).
Another signification of this word is" the divine inspiration of theprophets whereby they prophesy" -as we shall explain, whenspeaking on prophecy, as far as it is opportune to discuss thissubject in a treatise like this.Comp." And I will take of the spirit(ruah) which is upon thee, and will put it upon them" (Num. xi.17)" And it came to pass, when the spirit (ruah) rested upon them"(ib. 25): The spirit (ruah) of the Lord spake by me (2 Sam. xxiii.2). The term is frequently used in this sense.
The meaning of" intention ... .. will," is likewise contained in theword ruah. Comp." A fool uttereth all his spirit" (ruah) (Prov.xxix.11), i.e., his intention and will:" And the spirit (ruah) ofEgypt shall fail in the midst thereof, and I will destroy the counselthereof" (Isa. xix. 3), i.e., her intentions will be frustrated, and herplans will be obscured;" Who has comprehended the spirit (ruah)of the Lord, or who is familiar with his counsel that he may tell us?" (Isa. xl. 13), i.e., Who knows the order fixed by His will, orperceives the system of His Providence in the existing world, thathe may tell us ? as we shall explain in the chapters in which weshall speak on Providence.
Thus the Hebrew ruah when used in reference to God, hasgenerally the fifth signification: sometimes, however, as explainedabove, the last signification, viz.," will." The meaning of the wordin each individual case is therefore to be determined by thecontext.
CHAPTER XLI
THE Hebrew nefesh (soul) is a homonymous noun, signifying thevitality which is common to all living, sentient beings. E.g."wherein there is a living soul" (nefesh) (Gen. i. 30). It denotes alsoblood," as in" Thou shalt not eat the blood (nefesh) with the meat" (Dent. xii. 23). Another signification of the term is" reason," thatis, the distinguishing characteristic of man, as in" As the Lordliveth that made us this soul" (Jer. xxxviii. 16). It denotes also thepart of man that remains after his death (nefesh, soul) comp." Butthe soul (nefesh) of my lord shall be bound in the bundle of life (ISam. XXV. 29). Lastly, it denotes" will" ; comp." To bind hisprinces at his will" (be-nafsho) (PS. CV. 22): Thou wilt not deliverme unto the will (be-nefesh) of my enemies" (Ps. xli. 3): andaccording to my opinion, it has this meaning also in the followingpassages," If it be your will (nafshekem) that I should bury mydead" (Gen. xxiii. 8):" Though Moses and Samuel stood beforeme, yet my will (nafshi) could not be toward this people" (Jer. xv.1), that is, I had no pleasure in them, I did not wish to preservethem. When nefesh is used in reference to God, it has the meaning(swill," as we have already explained with reference to thepassage," That shall do according to that which is in my will(bi-lebabi) and in mine intention (be-nafsht)" (I Sam. ii. 35).Simiiarly we explain the phrase," And his will (nafsho) to troubleIsrael ceased" (Judg. x. 16). Jonathan, the son of Uzziel [in theTargum of the Prophets], did not translate this passage, because heunderstood nafshi to have the first signification, and finding,therefore, in these words sensation ascribed to God, he omittedthem from his translation. If, however, nefesh be here taken in thelast signification, the sentence can well be explained. For in thepassage which precedes, it is stated that Providence abandoned theIsraelites, and left them on the brink of death: then they cried andprayed for help, but in vain. When, however, they had thoroughlyrepented, when their misery had increased, and their enemy hadhad power over them, He showed mercy to them, and His will tocontinue their trouble and misery ceased. Note it well, for it isremarkable. The preposition ba in this passage has the force of thepreposition min (" from" or 11 of" ): and ba'amal is identical withme'amal. Grammarians give many instances of this use of thepreposition ba :" And that which remaineth of (ba) the flesh and of(ba) the bread" (Lev. viii. 32):" If there remains but few of (ba)the years" (ib. xxv. 52):" Of (ba) the strangers and of (ba) thoseborn in the land" (Exod. xii. 19).
CHAPTER XLII
Hai (" living" ) signifies a sentient organism (lit." growing" and"having sensation" ), comp." Every moving thing that liveth" (Gen.ix. 3): it also denotes recovery from a severe illness :" And wasrecovered (va-yehi) of his sickness" (Isa. xxxviii. 0' ): 11 In thecamp till they recovered" (hayotam) (josh. v. 8):" quick, raw (bat)flesh" (Lev. xiii. 10).
Mavet signifies" death" and" severe illness," as in" His heartdied (va-yamot) within him, and he became as a stone" (I Sam.xxv. 37), that is, his illness was severe. For this reason it is statedconcerning the son of the woman of Zarephath," And his sicknesswas so sore, that there was no breath left in him" (I Kings xvii.17). The simple expression va-yamoth would have given the ideathat he was very ill, near death, like Nabal when he heard what hadtaken place.
Some of the Andalusian authors say that his breath was suspended,so that no breathing could be perceived at all, as sometimes aninvalid is seized with a fainting fit or an attack of asphyxia, and itcannot be discovered whether he is alive or dead: in this conditionthe patient may remain a day or two.
The term hai has also been employed in reference to theacquisition of wisdom. Comp." So shall they be life (hayyim) untothy soul" (Prov. iii. 22):" For whoso findeth me findeth life" (ib.viii. 35):" For they are life (hayyim) to those that find them" (ib.iv. 22). Such instances are numerous. In accordance with thismetaphor, true principles are called life, and corrupt principlesdeath. Thus the Almighty says," See, I have set before thee thisday life and good and death and evil" (Dent. xxx. 15), showingthat" life" and" good,"" death" and" evil," are identical, andthen He explains these terms. In the same way I understand Hiswords," That ye may live" (ib. v. 33), in accordance with thetraditional interpretation of" That it may be well with thee" [scil.in the life to come] (ib. xxii. 7). In consequence of the frequent useof this figure in our language our Sages said," The righteous evenin death are called living, while the wicked even in life are calleddead." (Talm. B. Berakkoth, P. 78). Note this well.
CHAPTER XLIII
THE Hebrew kanaf is a homonym; most of its meanings aremetaphorical. Its primary signification is" wing of a flyingcreature," e.g.," Any winged (kanaf) fowl that flieth in the air"(Deut. iv. 17).
The term was next applied figuratively to the wings or comers ofgarments comp." upon the four corners (kanfoth) of thy vesture"(ib. xxii. 12).
It was also used to denote the ends of the inhabited part of theearth, and the corners that are most distant from our habitation.Comp." That it might take hold of the ends (kanfoth) of the earth"(job xxxviii. 13):" From the uttermost part (kenaf) of the earthhave we heard songs" (Isa. xxiv. 16).
Ibn Ganab (in his Book of Hebrew Roots) says that kenaf is used inthe sense of" concealing," in analogy with the Arabic kanaftualshaian," I have hidden something," and accordingly explains,Isaiah xxx. 20," And thy teacher will no longer be hidden orconcealed." It is a good explanation, and I think that kenaf has thesame meaning in Deuteronomy xxiii. 1," He shall not take awaythe cover (kenaf) of his father" : also in," Spread, therefore, thycover (kenafeka) over thine handmaid" (Ruth iii. 9). In this sense, Ithink, the word is figuratively applied to God and to angels (forangels are not corporeal, according to my opinion, as I shallexplain). Ruth ii. 12 must therefore be translated" Under whoseprotection (kenafav) thou art come to trust" : and wherever theword occurs in reference to angels, it means concealment. Youhave surely noticed the words of Isaiah (Isa. Vi. 2)," With twainhe covered his face, and with twain he covered his feet." Theirmeaning is this: The cause of his (the angel's) existence is hiddenand concealed; this is meant by the covering of the face. Thethings of which he (the angel) is the cause, and which are called"his feet" (as I stated in speaking of the homonym regel, arelikewise concealed: for the actions of the intelligences are notseen, and their ways are, except after long study, not understood,on account of two reasons -- the one of which is contained in theirown properties, the other in ourselves: that is to say, because ourperception is imperfect and the ideals are difficult to be fullycomprehended. As regards the phrase" and with twain he flieth," Ishall explain in a special chapter (x1ix.) why flight has beenattributed to angels.
CHAPTER XLIV
THE Hebrew ayin is a homonym, signifying" fountain" ; e.g.," Bya fountain (,en) of water" (Gen. xvi. 7). It next denotes" eye" :comp. ('ayin)" Eye for eye" (Exod. xxi. 24). Another meaning ofthe word is" providence," as it is said concerning Jeremiah," Takehim and direct thine attention (eneka) to him" (Jer. xxxix. 12). Inthis figurative sense it is to be understood when used in referenceto God; e.g.," And my providence and my pleasure shall be thereperpetually" (I Kings ix. 3), as we have already explained (page140):" The eyes ('ene), i.e., the Providence of the Lord thy God,are always upon it" (Deut. xi. 12):" They are the eyes ('ene) of theLord, which run to and fro through the whole earth" (Zech. iv. 10),i.e., His providence is extended over everything that is on earth, aswill be explained in the chapters in which we shall treat ofProvidence. When, however, the word" eye" is connected withthe verb" to see," (raah or hazah) as in" Open thine eyes, and see"(I Kings xix. 16):" His eyes behold" (Ps. xi. 4), the phrase denotesperception of the mind, not that of the senses: for every sensationis a passive state, as is well known to you, and God is active, neverpassive, as will be explained by me.
CHAPTER XLV
Shama, is used homonymously. It signifies" to hear," and also" toobey." As regards the first signification, comp." Neither let it beheard out of thy mouth" (Exod. xxiii. 13):" And the fame thereofwas heard in Pharaoh's house" (Gen. xlv. 26). Instances of thiskind are numerous.
Equally frequent are the instances of this verb being used in thesense of" to obey" :" And they hearkened (shame,#) not untoMoses" (Exod. vi. 9)." If they obey (yishme'u) and serve him (jobxxxvi. 11):" Shall we then hearken (nishma') unto you" (Neh. xiii.27) Whosoever will not hearken (yishma') unto thy words" (josh. i.18).
The verb also signifies" to know" (" to understand" ), comp." Anation whose tongue, i.e., its language, thou shalt not understand"(tishma') (Deut. xxviii. 49). The verb shama', used in reference toGod, must be taken in the sense of perceiving, which is part of thethird signification, whenever, according to the literal interpretationof the passage, it appears to have the first meaning: comp." Andthe Lord heard it" (Num. xi. 1):" For that He heareth yourmurmurings" (Exod. xvi. 7). In all such passages mentalperception is meant. When, however, according to the literalinterpretation the verb appears to have the second signification, itimplies that God responded to the prayer of man and fulfilled hiswish, or did not respond and did not fulfil his wish:" I will surelyhear his cry" (Exod. xxii. 23):" I will hear, for I am gracious" (ib.27):" Bow down thine ear, and hear" (2 Kings xix. 16):" But theLord would not hearken to your voice, nor give ear unto you"(Deut. i. 45):" Yea, when ye make many prayers, I will not hear"(Isa. i. 15):" For I will not hear thee 11 (Jer. vii. 16). There aremany instances in which shama' has this sense.
Remarks will now be presented to you on these metaphors andsimiles, which will quench your thirst, and explain to you all theirmeanings without leaving a doubt.
CHAPTER XLVI
WE have already stated, in one of the chapters of this treatise, thatthere is a great difference between bringing to view the existenceof a thing and demonstrating its true essence. We can lead othersto notice the existence of an object by pointing to its accidents,actions, or even most remote relations to other objects: e.g., if youwish to describe the king of a country to one of his subjects whodoes not know him, you can give a description and an account ofhis existence in many ways. You will either say to him, the tallman with a fair complexion and grey hair is the king, thusdescribing him by his accidents; or you will say, the king is theperson round whom are seen a great multitude of men on horseand on foot, and soldiers with drawn swords, over whose headbanners are waving, and before whom trumpets are sounded; or itis the person living in the palace in a particular region of a certaincountry: or it is the person who ordered the building of that wall,or the construction of that bridge: or by some other similar actsand things relating to him. His existence can be demonstrated in astill more indirect way, e.g., if you are asked whether this land hasa king, you will undoubtedly answer in the affirmative." Whatproof have you ?" " The fact that this banker here, a weak and littleperson, stands before this large mass of gold pieces, and that poorman, tall and strong, who stands before him asking in vain foralms of the weight of a carob-grain, is rebuked and is compelled togo away by the mere force of words: for had he not feared theking, he would, without hesitation, have killed the banker, orpushed him away and taken as much of the money as he could."Consequently, this is a proof that this country has a ruler and hisexistence is proved by the well-regulated affairs of the country, onaccount of which the king is respected and the punishmentsdecreed by him are feared. In this whole example nothing ismentioned that indicated his characteristics, and his essentialproperties, by virtue of which he is king. The same is the case withthe information concerning the Creator given to the ordinaryclasses of men in all prophetical books and in the Law. For it wasfound necessary to teach all of them that God exists, and that He isin every respect the most perfect Being, that is to say, He exists notonly in the sense in which the earth and the heavens exist, but Heexists and possesses life, wisdom, power, activity, and all otherproperties which our belief in His existence must include, as willbe shown below. That God exists was therefore shown to ordinarymen by means of similes taken from physical bodies; that He isliving, by a simile taken from motion, because ordinary menconsider only the body as fully, truly, and undoubtedly existing;that which is connected with a body but is itself not a body,although believed to exist, has a lower degree of existence onaccount of its dependence on the body for existence. That,however, which is neither itself a body, nor a force within a body,is not existent according to man's first notions, and is above allexcluded from the range of imagination. In the same mannermotion is considered by the ordinary man as identical with life;what cannot move voluntarily from place to place has no life,although motion is not part of the definition of life, but an accidentconnected with it. The perception by the senses, especially byhearing and seeing, is best known to us; we have no idea or notionof any other mode of communication between the soul of oneperson and that of another than by means of speaking, i.e., by thesound produced by lips, tongue, and the other organs of speech.When, therefore, we are to be informed that God has a knowledgeof things, and that communication is made by Him to the Prophetswho convey it to us, they represent Him to us as seeing andhearing, i.e., as perceiving and knowing those things which can beseen and heard. They represent Him to us as speaking, i.e., thatcommunications from Him reach the Prophets; that is to beunderstood by the term" prophecy," as will be fully explained.God is described as working, because we do not know any othermode of producing a thing except by direct touch. He is said tohave a soul in the sense that He is living, because all living beingsare generally supposed to have a soul; although the term soul is, ashas been shown, a homonym.
Again, since we perform all these actions only by means ofcorporeal organs, we figuratively ascribe to God the organs oflocomotion, as feet, and their soles; organs of hearing, seeing, andsmelling, as ear, eye, and nose; organs and substance of speech, asmouth, tongue, and sound; organs for the performance of work, ashand, its fingers, its palm, and the arm. In short, these organs ofthe body are figuratively ascribed to God, who is above allimperfection, to express that He performs certain acts: and theseacts are figuratively ascribed to Him to express that He possessescertain perfections different from those acts themselves. E.g., wesay that He has eyes, ears, hands, a mouth, a tongue, to expressthat He sees, hears, acts, and speaks: but seeing and hearing areattributed to Him to indicate simply that He perceives. You thusfind in Hebrew instances in which the perception of the one senseis named instead of the other; thus," See the word of the Lord"(Jer. ii, 31), in the same meaning as" Hear the word of the Lord,"for the sense of the phrase is," Perceive what He says" : similarlythe phrase," See the smell of my son" (Gen. xxvii. 27) has thesame meaning as" Smell the smell of my son," for it relates to theperception of the smell. In the same way are used the words," Andall the people saw the thunders and the lightnings" (Exod. xx. 15),although the passage also contains the description of a propheticalvision, as is well known and understood among our people. Actionand speech are likewise figuratively applied to God, to express thata certain influence has emanated from Him, as win be explained(chap. lxv and chap. lxvi.). The physical organs which areattributed to God in the writings of the Prophets are either organsof locomotion, indicating life: organs of sensation, indicatingperception: organs of touch, indicating action: or organs of speech,indicating the divine inspiration of the Prophets, as will beexplained.
The object of all these indications is to establish in our minds thenotion of the existence of a living being, the Maker of everything,who also possesses a knowledge of the things which He has made.We shall explain, when we come to speak of the inadmissibility ofDivine attributes, that all these various attributes convey but onenotion, viz., that of the essence of God. The sole object of thischapter is to explain in what sense physical organs are ascribed tothe Most Perfect Being, namely, that they are mere indications ofthe actions generally performed by means of these organs. Suchactions being perfections respecting ourselves, are predicated ofGod, because we wish to express that He is most perfect in everyrespect, as we remarked above in explaining the Rabbinicalphrase," The language of the Torah is like the language of man."Instances of organs of locomotion being applied to the Creatoroccur as follows :-" My footstool" (Isa. 1xvi. 1):" the place of thesoles of my feet (Ezek. xliii. 7). For examples of organs of touchapplied to God, comp. the hand of the Lord" (Exod. ix. 3):" withthe finger of God" (ib. xxxi. 18):" the work of thy fingers" (Ps.viii. 4)," And thou hast laid thine hand upon me" (ib. cxxxix. 5):"The arm of the Lord" (Isa. liii. 1):" Thy right hand, 0 Lord" (Exod.xv. 6). In instances like the following, organs of speech areattributed to God :" The mouth of the Lord has spoken" (Isa. i.20):" And He would open His lips against thee" (Job xi. 5):" Thevoice of the Lord is powerful" (Ps. xxix. 4):" And his tongue as adevouring fire" (Isa. XXX. 27). Organs of sensation are attributedto God in instances like the following :" His eyes behold, Hiseyelids try" (Ps. xi. 4):" The eyes of the Lord which run to andfro" (Zech. iv. 10):" Bow down thine car unto me, and hear" (2Kings xix. 16):" You have kindled a fire in my nostril" (Jer. xvii.5). Of the inner parts of the human body only the heart isfiguratively applied to God, because" heart" is a homonym, anddenotes also" intellect" : it is besides the source of animal life. Inphrases like" my bowels are troubled for him" (Jer. XXXi. 20):"The sounding of thy bowels" (Isa. Ixiii. 15), the term" bowels" isused in the sense of" heart" : for the term" bowels" is used bothin a general and in a specific meaning; it denotes specifically"bowels," but more generally it can be used as the name of anyinner organ, including" heart." The correctness of this argumentcan be proved by the phrase" And thy law is within my bowels"(Ps. xl. g), which is identical with" And thy law is within myheart." For that reason the prophet employed in this verse thephrase 11 my bowels are troubled" (and 11 the sounding of thybowels" ): the verb hamah is in fact used more frequently inconnection with" heart," than with any other organ; comp." Myheart maketh a noise (homeh) in me" (Jer. iv. 19). Similarly, theshoulder is never used as a figure in reference to God, because it isknown as a mere instrument of transport, and also comes intoclose contact with the thing which it carries. With far greaterreason the organs of nutrition are never attributed to God: they areat once recognized as signs of imperfection. In fact all organs, boththe external and the internal, are employed in the various actionsof the soul: some, as e.g., all inner organs, are the means ofpreserving the individual for a certain time: others, as the organs ofgeneration, are the means of preserving the species; others are themeans of improving the condition of man and bringing his actionsto perfection, as the hands, the feet, and the eyes, all of which tendto render motion, action, and perception more perfect. Animatebeings require motion in order to be able to approach that which isconducive to their welfare, and to move away from the opposite:they require the senses in order to be able to discern what isinjurious to them and what is beneficial. In addition, man requiresvarious kinds of handiwork, to prepare his food, clothing, anddwelling; and he is compelled by his physical constitution toperform such work, namely, to prepare what is good for him. Somekinds of work also occur among certain animals, as far as suchwork is required by those animals. I do not believe that any mancan doubt the correctness of the assertion that the Creator is not inneed of anything for the continuance of His existence, or for theimprovement of His condition. Therefore, God has no organs, or,what is the same, He is not corporeal; His actions areaccomplished by His Essence, not by any organ, and asundoubtedly physical forces are connected with the organs, Hedoes not possess any such forces, that is to say, He has, besides HisEssence, nothing that could be the cause of His action, Hisknowledge, or His will, for attributes are nothing but forces undera different name. It is not my intention to discuss the question inthis chapter. Our Sages laid down a general principle, by which theliteral sense of the physical attributes of God mentioned by theprophets is rejected; a principle which evidently shows that ourSages were far from the belief in the corporeality of God, and thatthey did not think any person capable of misunderstanding it, orentertaining any doubt about it. For that reason they employ in theTalmud and the Midrashim phrases similar to those contained inthe prophecies, without any circumlocution; they knew that therecould not be any doubt about their metaphorical character, or anydanger whatever of their being misunderstood; and that all suchexpressions would be understood as figurative [language],employed to communicate to the intellect the notion of Hisexistence. Now, it was well known that in figurative language Godis compared to a king who commands, cautions, punishes, andrewards, his subjects, and whose servants and attendants publishhis orders, so that they might be acted upon, and they also executewhatever he wishes. Thus the Sages adopted that figure, used itfrequently, and introduced such speech, consent, and refusal of aking, and other usual acts of kings, as became necessary by thatfigure. In all these instances they were sure that no doubt orconfusion would arise from it. The general principle alluded toabove is contained in the following saying of our Sages, mentionedin Bereshith Rabba (c. xxvii.)," Great was the power of theProphets; they compared the creature to its Creator; comp. 'Andover the resemblance of the throne was a resemblance like theappearance of man '" (Ezek. i. 26). They have thus plainly statedthat all those images which the Prophets perceived, i.e. inprophetic visions, are images created by God. This is perfectlycorrect; for every image in our imagination has been created. Howpregnant is the expression," Great is their boldness!" Theyindicated by it, that they themselves found it very remarkable; forwhenever they perceived a word or act difficult to explain, orapparently objectionable, they used that phrase: e.g., a certainRabbi has performed the act (of" hali ah" ) with a slipper, aloneand by night. Another Rabbi, thereupon exclaimed How great ishis boldness to have followed the opinion of the minority." TheChaldee phrase rab gubreh in the original of the latter quotation,and the Hebrew gadol koho in that of the former quotation, havethe same meaning, viz., Great is the power of (or the boldness of).Hence, in the preceding quotation, the sense is, How remarkable isthe language which the Prophets were obliged to use when theyspeak of God the Creator in terms signifying properties of beingscreated by Him. This deserves attention. Our Sages have thusstated in distinct and plain terms that they are far from believing inthe corporeality of God; and in the figures and forms seen in aprophetical vision, though belonging to created beings, theProphets, to use the words of our Sages," compared the creature toits Creator." If, however, after these explanations, any one wishesout of malice to cavil at them, and to find fault with them, thoughtheir method is neither comprehended nor understood by him, theSages o.b.m. will sustain no injury by it.
CHAPTER XLVII
WE have already stated several times that the prophetic booksnever attribute to God anything which ordinary men consider adefect, or which they cannot in their imagination combine with theidea of the Almighty, although such terms may not otherwise bedifferent from those which were employed as metaphors inrelation to Goa. Indeed all things which are attributed to God areconsidered in some way to be perfection, or can at least beimagined [as appertaining to Him].
We must now show why, according to this principle, the senses ofhearing, sight and smell, are attributed to God, but not those oftaste and touch. He is equally elevated above the use of all the fivesenses: they are all defective as regards perception, even for thosewho have no other source of knowledge: because they are passive,receive impressions from without, and are subject to interruptionsand sufferings, as much as the other organs of the body. By savingthat God sees, we mean to state that He perceives visible things:"he hears" is identical with saying" He perceives audible things" :in the same way we might say," He tastes and He touches," in thesense of" He perceives objects which man perceives by means oftaste and touch." For, as regards perception, the senses areidentical: if we deny the existence of one sensation in God, wemust deny that of all other sensations, i.e., the perceptions of thefive senses: and if we attribute the existence of one sensation toHim, i.e., the perception appertaining to one of the senses, we mustattribute all the five sensations. Nevertheless, we find in HolyWrit," And God saw" (Gen. vi. 5):" And God heard" (Num. xi. 1):"And God smelt" (Gen. Viii. 2 1): but we do not meet with theexpressions," And God tasted,"" And God touched." According toour opinion the reason of this is to be found in the idea, which hasa firm hold in the minds of all men, that Goddoesnotcome intocontact with a body in the same manner as one body comes intocontact with another, since He is not even seen by the eye. Whilethese two senses, namely, taste and touch, only act when in closecontact with the object, by sight, hearing, and smell, even distantobjects are perceived. These, therefore, were considered by themultitude appropriate expressions [to be figuratively applied toGod]. Besides, the object in figuratively applying the sensations toHim, could only have been to express that He perceives ouractions: but hearing and sight are sufficient for that, namely, forthe perception of what a man does or says. Thus our Sages, amongother admonitions, gave the following advice and warning:" Knowwhat is above thee, a seeing eye, and a hearing ear." (MishnahAbot, ii.1.)
You, however, know that, strictly speaking, the condition of all thesensations is the same, that the same argument which is employedagainst the existence of touch and taste in God, may be usedagainst sight, hearing, and smell; for they all are materialperceptions and impressions which are subject to change. There isonly this difference, that the former, touch and taste, are at oncerecognized as deficiencies, while the others are considered asperfections. In a similar manner the defect of the imagination iseasily seen, less easily that of thinking and reasoning. Imagination(ra'ayon) therefore, was never employed as a figure in speaking ofGod, while thought and reason are figuratively ascribed to Him.Comp." The thoughts which the Lord thought" (Jer. XEX. 20):"And with his understanding he stretched out the heavens" (ib. x.12). The inner senses were thus treated in the same way as theexternal; some are figuratively applied to God, some not. All thisis according to the language of man; he ascribes to God what heconsiders a perfection, and does not ascribe to Him what heconsiders a defect. In truth, however, no real attribute, implying anaddition to His essence, can be applied to Him, as will be proved.
CHAPTER XLVIII
WHENEVER in the Pentateuch the term" to hear" is applied toGod, Onkelos, the Proselyte, does not translate it literally, butparaphrases it, merely expressing that a certain speech reachedHim, i.e., He perceived it, or that He accepted it or did not accept,when it refers to supplication and prayer as its object. The words"God heard" are therefore paraphrased by him regularly either," Itwas heard before the Lord," or" He accepted" when employed inreference to supplication and prayer; [e.g.]" I will. surely accept,"lit. I will surely hear" (Exod. XXii. 22). This principle is followedby Onkelos in his translation of the Pentateuch without anyexception. But as regards the verb" to see," (raah), his renderingsvary in a remarkable manner, and I was unable to discern hisprinciple or method. In some instances he translates literally," andGod saw" : in others he paraphrases" it was revealed before theLord." The use of the phrase va-haza adonai by Onkelos issufficient evidence that the term haza in Chaldee is homonymous,and that it denotes mental perception as well as the sensation ofsight. This being the case, I am surprised that, in some instancesavoiding the literal rendering, he substituted for it" And it wasrevealed before the Lord." When I, however, examined the variousreadings in the version of Onkelos, which 1 either saw myself orheard from others during the time of my studies, 1 found that theterm" to see" when connected with wrong, injury, or violence,was paraphrased," It was manifest before
was manifest before the Lord."
There is no doubt that the term haza in Chaldee denotes completeapprehension and reception of the object in the state in which ithas been perceived. When Onkelos, therefore, found the verb" tosee" connected with the object" wrong," he did not render itliterally, but paraphrased it," It was revealed before the Lord."Now, I noticed that in all instances of the Pentateuch where seeingis ascribed to God, he translated it literally, except those instanceswhich I will mention to you :" For my affliction was revealedbefore the Lord" (Gen. xxix. 32):" For all that Laban doeth untothee is revealed before me" (ib. xxxi. 12):-although the firstperson in the sentence refers to the angel [and not to God],Onkelos does not ascribe to him that perception which impliescomplete comprehension of the object, because the object is"iniquity" -" The oppression of the children of Israel was known tothe Lord" (Exod. ii. 25):" The oppression of my people was surelyknown to me" (ib. iii. 7):" The affliction is known to me" (ib. 9):"Their oppression is known to me" (ib. iv. 31):" This people isknown to me" (ib. xxxii. 9), i.e., their rebellion is known tomecomp. the Targurn of the passage," And God saw the childrenof Israel (ib. ii. 25), which is equal to" He saw their affliction andtheir trouble" " And it was known to the Lord, and he abhorredthem" (Dent. xxxii. 19):" It was known to him that their powerwas gone" (ib. 36): in this instance the object of the perception islikewise the wrong done to the Israelites, and the increasing powerof the enemy. In all these examples Onkelos is consistent,following the maxim expressed in the words," Thou canst not lookon iniquity" (Hab. i. 13): wherefore he renders the verb" to see,"when referring to oppression or rebellion, It is revealed beforehim, etc. This appropriate and satisfactory explanation, thecorrectness of which 1 do not doubt, is weakened by threepassages, in which, according to this view, I expected to find theverb" to see" paraphrased" to be revealed before him," but foundinstead the literal rendering" to see in the various copies of theTargum. The following are the three passages" And God saw thatthe wickedness of man was great upon the earth (Gen. vi. 6)" Andthe Lord saw the earth, and behold it was corrupt (ib. vi. 12): andGod saw that Leah was hated" (ib. xxx. 3). It appears to me that inthese passages there is a mistake, which has crept into the copiesof the Targum, since we do not possess the Targum in the originalmanuscript of Onkelos, for in that case we should have assumedthat he had a satisfactory explanation of it.
In rendering Genesis xxii. 8," the lamb is known to the Lord," heeither wished to indicate that the Lord was not expected to seekand to bring it, or he considered it inappropriate, in Chaldee toconnect the divine perception with one of the lower animals.
However, the various copies of the Targum must be carefullyexamined with regard to this point, and if you still find thosepassages the same as I quoted them, I cannot explain what hemeant.
CHAPTER XLIX
THE angels are likewise incorporeal: they are intelligenceswithout matter, but they are nevertheless created beings, and Godcreated them, as will be explained below. In Bereshith Rabbah (onGen. iii. 24) we read the following remark of our Sages:" Theangel is called 'the flame of the sword which turned every way'(Gen. iii. 24), in accordance with the words, 'His ministers aflaming fire ' (Ps. civ. 4): the attribute, which turned every way ' isadded, because angels are changeable in form they appear at onetime as males, at another as females; now as spirits; now asangels." By this remark they clearly stated that angels areincorporeal, and have no permanent bodily form independent ofthe mind [of him who perceives them], they exist entirely inprophetic vision, and depend on the action of the imaginativepower, as will be explained when speaking on the true meaning ofprophecy. As to the words" at another time as females," whichimply that the Prophets in prophetical vision perceived angels alsoin the form of women, they refer to the vision of Zechariah (v. 9),"And, behold, there came out two women, and the wind was in theirwings." You know very well how difficult it is for men to form anotion of anything immaterial, and entirely devoid of corporeality,except after considerable training : it is especially difficult forthose who do not distinguish between objects of the intellect andobjects of the imagination, and depend mostly on the mereimaginative power. They believe that all imagined things exist orat least have the possibility of existing: but that which cannot beimagined does not exist, and cannot exist. For persons of thisclass-and the majority of thinkers belong to it-cannot arrive at thetrue solution of any question, or at the explanation of anythingdoubtful. On account of this difficulty the prophetic books containexpressions which, taken literally, imply that angels are corporeal,moving about, endowed with human form, receiving commands ofGod, obeying His word and performing whatever He wishes,according to His command. All this only serves to lead to thebelief that angels exist, and are alive and perfect, in the same wayas we have explained in reference to God. If the figurativerepresentation of angels were limited to this, their true essencewould be believed to be the same as the essence of God, since, inreference to the Creator expressions are likewise employed, whichliterally imply that He is corporeal, living, moving and endowedwith human form. In order, therefore, to give to the mind of menthe idea that the existence of angels is lower than the existence ofGod, certain forms of lower animals were introduced in thedescription of angels. It was thereby shown, that the existence ofGod is more perfect than that of angels, as much as man is moreperfect than the lower animals. Nevertheless no organ of the brutecreation was attributed to the angels except wings. Without wingsthe act of flying appears as impossible as that of walking withoutlegs: for these two modes of motion can only be imagined inconnection with these organs. The motion of flying has beenchosen as a symbol to represent that angels possess life, because itis the most perfect and most sublime movement of the brutecreation. Men consider this motion a perfection to such an extentthat they themselves wish to be able to fly, in order to escapeeasily what is injurious, and to obtain quickly what is useful,though it be at a distance. For this reason this motion has beenattributed to the angels.
There is besides another reason. The bird in its flight is sometimesvisible, sometimes withdrawn from our sight; one moment near tous, and in the next far off: and these are exactly the circumstanceswhich we must associate with the idea of angels, as will beexplained below. This imaginary perfection, the motion of flight,being the exclusive property of the brute creation, has never beenattributed to God. You must not be misled by the passage," And herode upon a cherub, and he did fly" (Ps. xviii. 10), for it is thecherub that did fly, and the simile only serves to denote the rapidarrival of that which is referred to in that passage. Comp. :"Behold, the Lord rideth upon a swift cloud, and shall come intoEgypt" (Isa. xix. 1): that is, the punishment alluded to will comedown quickly upon Egypt. Nor should expressions like" the faceof an ox,"" the face of a lion,"" the face of an eagle ... .. the soleof the foot of a calf," found in the prophecies of Ezekiel (i. 10 and7) mislead you: for all these are explained in a different manner, asyou will learn later, and besides, the prophet only describes theanimals (havyot). The subject will be explained (III. 1.), though bymere hints, as far as necessary, for directing your attention to thetrue interpretation.
The motion of flying, frequently mentioned in the Bible,necessitates, according to our imagination, the existence of wings:wings are therefore given to the angels as symbols expressive oftheir existence, not of their true essence. You must also bear inmind that whenever a thing moves very quickly, it is said to fly, asthat term implies great velocity of motion. Comp." As the eagleflieth" (Deut. xxviii- 49). The eagle flies and moves with greatervelocity than any other bird, and therefore it is introduced in thissimile. Furthermore, the wings are the organs [lit. causes] of flight;hence the number of the wings of angels in the prophetic visioncorresponds to the number of the causes which set a thing inmotion, but this does not belong to the theme of this chapter.(Comp. Il. iv. and x.)
CHAPTER L
WHEN reading my present treatise, bear in mind that by" faith"we do not understand merely that which is uttered with the lips,but also that which is apprehended by the soul, the conviction thatthe object [of belief] is exactly as it is apprehended. If, as regardsreal or supposed truths, you content yourself with giving utteranceto them in words, without apprehending them or believing in them,especially if you do not seek real truth, you have a very easy taskas, in fact, you will find many ignorant people professing articlesof faith without connecting any idea with them.
If, however, you have a desire to rise to a higher state, viz., that ofreflection, and truly to hold the conviction that God is One andpossesses true unity, without admitting plurality or divisibility inany sense whatever, you must understand that God has no essentialattribute in any form or in any sense whatever, and that therejection of corporeality implies the rejection of essentialattributes. Those who believe that God is One, and that He hasmany attributes, declare the unity with their lips, and assumeplurality in their thoughts. This is like the doctrine of theChristians, who say that He is one and He is three, and that thethree are one. Of the same character is the doctrine of those whosay that God is One, but that He has many attributes; and that Hewith His attributes is One, although they deny corporeality andaffirm His most absolute freedom from matter; as if our objectwere to seek forms of expression, not subjects of belief. For beliefis only possible after the apprehension of a thing; it consists in theconviction that the thing apprehended has its existence beyond themind [in reality] exactly as it is conceived in the mind. If inaddition to this we are convinced that the thing cannot be differentin any way from what we believe it to be, and that no reasonableargument can be found for the rejection of the belief or for theadmission of any deviation from it, then the belief is true.Renounce desires and habits, follow your reason, and study what Iam going to say in the chapters which follow on the rejection ofthe attributes; you will then be fully convinced of what we havesaid: you will be of those who truly conceive the Unity of God, notof those who utter it with their lips without thought, like men ofwhom it has been said," Thou art near in their mouth, and far fromtheir reins" (Jer. Xii. 2). It is right that a man should belong to thatclass of men who have a conception of truth and understand it,though they do not speak of it. Thus the pious are advised andaddressed," Commune with your own heart upon your bed and bestill. Selah." (Ps. iv. S.)
CHAPTER LI
THERE are many things whose existence is manifest and obvious;some of these are innate notions or objects of sensation, others arenearly so: and in fact they would require no proof if man had beenleft in his primitive state. Such are the existence of motion, ofman's free will, of phases of production and destruction, and of thenatural properties perceived by the senses, e.g., the heat of fire, thecoldness of water, and many other similar things. False notions,however, may be spread either by a person labouring under error,or by one who has some particular end in view, and whoestablishes theories contrary to the real nature of things, bydenying the existence of things perceived by the senses, or byaffirming the existence of what does not exist. Philosophers arethus required to establish by proof things which are selfevident,and to disprove the existence of things which only exist in man'simagination. Thus Aristotle gives a proof for the existence ofmotion, because it had been denied: he disproves the reality ofatoms, because it had been asserted.
To the same class belongs the rejection of essential attributes inreference
to God. For it is a self-evident truth that the attribute isnot inherent in the
object to which it is ascribed, but it issuperadded to its essence, and is
consequently an accident: if theattribute denoted the essence [
Some thinkers have gone so far as to say that the attributes of Godare neither His essence nor anything extraneous to His essence.This is like the assertion of some theorists, that the ideals, i.e., theuniversalia, are neither existing nor non-existent, and like theviews of others, that the atom does not fill a definite place, butkeeps an atom of space occupied; that man has no freedom ofaction at all, but has acquirement. Such things are only said: theyexist only in words, not in thought, much less in reality. But as youknow, and as all know who do not delude themselves, thesetheories are preserved by a multitude of words, by misleadingsimiles sustained by declamation and invective, and by numerousmethods borrowed both from dialectics and sophistry. If afteruttering them and supporting them by such words, a man were toexamine for himself his own belief on this subject, he would seenothing but confusion and stupidity in an endeavour to prove theexistence of things which do not exist, or to find a mean betweentwo opposites that have no mean. Or is there a mean betweenexistence and non-existence, or between the identity andnon-identity of two things ? But, as we said, to such absurditiesmen were forced by the great licence given to the imagination, andby the fact that every existing material thing is necessarilyimagined as a certain substance possessing several attributes; fornothing has ever been found that consists of one simple substancewithout any attribute. Guided by such imaginations, men thoughtthat God was also composed of many different elements, viz., ofHis essence and of the attributes superadded to His essence.Following up this comparison, some believed that God wascorporeal, and that He possessed attributes: others, abandoning thistheory, denied the corporeality, but retained the attributes. Theadherence to the literal sense of the text of Holy'Writ is the sourceof all this error, as I shall show in some of the chapters devoted tothis theme.
CHAPTER LII
EVERY description of an object by an affirmative attribute, whichincludes the assertion that an object is of a certain kind, must bemade in one of the following five ways :
First. The object is described by its definition, as e.g., man isdescribed as a being that lives and has reason: such a description,containing the true essence of the object, is, as we have alreadyshown, nothing else but the explanation of a name. All agree thatthis kind of description cannot be given of God: for there are noprevious causes to His existence, by which He could be defined:and on that account it is a well-known principle, received by allthe philosophers, who are precise in their statements, that nodefinition can be given of God.
Secondly. An object is described by part of its definition, as when,e.g., man is described as a living being or as a rational being. Thiskind of description includes the necessary connection [of the twoideas]: for when we say that every man is rational we mean by itthat every being which has the characteristics of man must alsohave reason. All agree that this kind of description is inappropriatein reference to God: for if we were to speak of a portion of Hisessence, we should consider His essence to be a compound. Theinappropriateness of this kind of description in reference to God isthe same as that of the preceding kind.
Thirdly. An object is described by something different from itstrue essence, by something that does not complement or establishthe essence of the object. The description, therefore, relates to aquality: but quality, in its most general sense, is an accident. If Godcould be described in this way, He would be the substratum ofaccidents: a sufficient reason for rejecting the idea that Hepossesses quality, since it diverges from the true conception of Hisessence. It is surprising how those who admit the application ofattributes to God can reject, in reference to Him, comparison andqualification. For when they say" He cannot be qualified," theycan only mean that He possesses no quality; and yet every positiveessential attribute of an object either constitutes its essence, -- andin that case it is identical with the essence, -- or it contains aquality of the object.
There are, as you know, four kinds of quality; I will give youinstances of attributes of each kind, in order to show you that thisclass of attributes cannot possibly be applied to God. (a) A man isdescribed by any of his intellectual or moral qualities, or by any ofthe dispositions appertaining to him as an animate being, when,e.g., we speak of a person who is a carpenter, or who shrinks fromsin, or who is ill. It makes no difference whether we say. acarpenter, or a sage, or a physician: by all these we representcertain physical dispositions: nor does it make any differencewhether we say ' sinfearing" or" merciful." Every trade, everyprofession, and every settled habit of man are certain physicaldispositions. All this is clear to those who have occupiedthemselves with the study of Logic. (b) A thing is described bysome physical quality it possesses, or by the absence of the Same,e.g., as being soft or hard. It makes no difference whether we say"soft or hard," or" strong or weak" : in both cases we speak ofphysical conditions. (c) A man is described by his passivequalities, or by his emotions: we speak, e.g., of a person who ispassionate, irritable, timid, merciful, without implying that theseconditions have become permanent. The description of a thing byits colour, taste, heat, cold, dryness, and moisture, belongs also tothis class of attributes. (d) A thing is described by any of itsqualities resulting from quantity as such; we speak, e.g. of a thingwhich is long, short, curved, straight, etc.
Consider all these and similar attributes, and you will find thatthey cannot be employed in reference to God. He is not amagnitude that any quality resulting from quantity as such couldbe possessed by Him; He is not affected by external influences,and therefore does not possess any quality resulting from emotion.He is not subject to physical conditions, and therefore does notpossess strength or similar qualities; He is not an animate being,that He should have a certain disposition of the soul, or acquirecertain properties, as meekness, modesty, etc., or be in a state towhich animate beings as such are subject, as, e.g., in that of healthor of illness. Hence it follows that no attribute coming under thehead of quality in its widest sense, can be predicated of God.Consequently, these three classes of attributes, describing theessence of a thing, or part of the essence, or a quality of it, areclearly inadmissible in reference to God, for they implycomposition, which, as we shall prove, is out of question asregards the Creator. We say, with regard to this latter point, thatHe is absolutely One.
Fourthly. A thing is described by its -relation to another thing, e.g.,to time, to space, or to a different individual: thus we say, Zaid, thefather of A, or the partner of B, or who dwells at a certain place, orwho lived at a stated time. This kind of attribute does notnecessarily imply plurality or change in the essence of the objectdescribed; for the same Zaid, to whom reference is made, is thepartner of Amru, the father of Becr, the master of Khalid, thefriend of Zaid, dwells in a certain house, and was born in a certainyear. Such relations are not the essence of a thing, nor are they sointimately connected with it as qualities. At first thought, it wouldseem that they may be employed in reference to God, but aftercareful and thorough consideration we are convinced of theirinadmissibility. It is quite clear that there is no relation betweenGod and time or space. For time is an accident connected withmotion, in so far as the latter includes the relation of anteriorityand posteriority, and is expressed by number, as is explained inbooks devoted to this subject; and since motion is one of theconditions to which only material bodies are subject, and God isimmaterial, there can be no relation between Him and time.Similarly there is no relation between Him and space. But what wehave to investigate and to examine is this : whether some realrelation exists between God and any of the substances created byHim, by which He could be described ? That there is no correlationbetween Him and any of His creatures can easily be seen: for thecharacteristic of two objects correlative to each other is theequality of their reciprocal relation. Now, as God has absoluteexistence, while all other beings have only possible existence, aswe shall show, there consequently cannot be any correlation[between God and His creatures]. That a certain kind of relationdoes exist between them is by some considered possible, butwrongly. It is impossible to imagine a relation between intellectand sight, although, as we believe, the same kind of existence iscommon to both: how, then, could a relation be imagined betweenany creature and God, who has nothing in common with any otherbeing; for even the term existence is applied to Him and otherthings, according to our opinion, only by way of pure homonymity.Consequently there is no relation whatever between Him and anyother being. For whenever we speak of a relation between twothings, these belong to the same kind; but when two things belongto different kinds though of the same class, there is no relationbetween them. We therefore do not say, this red compared withthat green, is more, or less, or equally intense, although bothbelong to the same class -- colour: when they belong to twodifferent classes, there does not appear to exist any relationbetween them, not even to a man of ordinary Intellect, althoughthe two things belong to the same category: e.g., between ahundred cubits and the heat of pepper there is no relation, the onebeing a quality, the other a quantity; or between wisdom andsweetness, between meekness and bitterness, although all thesecome under the head of quality in its more general signification.How, then, could there be any relation between God and Hiscreatures, considering the important difference between them inrespect to true existence, the greatest of all differences. Besides, ifany relation existed between them, God would be subject to theaccident of relation; and although that would not be an accident tothe essence of God, it would still be, to some extent, a kind ofaccident. You would, therefore, be wrong if you appliedaffirmative attributes in their literal sense to God, though theycontained only relations: these, however, are the most appropriateof all attributes, to be employed, in a less strict sense, in referenceto God, because they do not imply that a plurality of eternal thingsexists, or that any change takes place in the essence of God, whenthose things change to which God is in relation.
Fifthly. A thing is described by its actions: I do not mean by" itsactions" the inherent capacity for a certain work, as is expressedin" carpenter ... .. painter," or" smith" -for these belong to theclass of qualities which have been mentioned above-but I mean theaction the latter has performed-we speak, e.g., of Zaid, who madethis door, built that wall, wove that garment. This kind ofattributes is separate from the essences of the thing described, and,therefore, appropriate to be employed in describing the Creator,especially since we know that these different actions do not implythat different elements must be contained in the substance of theagent, by which the different actions are produced, as will beexplained. On the contrary, all the actions of God emanate fromHis essence, not from any extraneous thing superadded to Hisessence, as we have shown.
What we have explained in the present chapter is this: that God isone in every respect, containing no plurality or any elementsuperadded to His essence : and that the many attributes ofdifferent significations applied in Scripture to God, originate in themultitude of His actions, not in a plurality existing in His essence,and are partly employed with the object of conveying to us somenotion of His perfection, in accordance with what we considerperfection, as has been explained by us. The possibility of onesimple substance excluding plurality, though accomplishingdifferent actions, will be illustrated by examples in the nextchapter.
CHAPTER LIII
THE circumstance which caused men to believe in the existence ofdivine attributes is similar to that which caused others to believe inthe corporeality of God. The latter have not arrived at that beliefby speculation, but by following the literal sense of certainpassages in the Bible. The same is the case with the attributes:when in the books of the Prophets and of the Law, God isdescribed by attributes, such passages are taken in their literalsense, and it is then believed that God possesses attributes: as if Hewere to be exalted above corporeality, and not above thingsconnected with corporeality, i.e., the accidents, I mean Psychicaldispositions, all of which are qualities [and connected withcorporeality]. Every attribute which the followers of this doctrineassume to be essential to the Creator, you will find to express,although they do not distinctly say so, a quality similar to thosewhich they are accustomed to notice in the bodies of all livingbeings. We apply to all such passages the principle," The Torahspeaketh in the language of man," and say that the object of allthese terms is to describe God as the most perfect being, not aspossessing those qualities which are only perfections in relation tocreated living beings. Many of the attributes express different actsof God, but that difference does not necessitate any difference asregards Him from whom the acts proceed. This fact, viz., that fromone agency different effects may result, although that agency hasnot free will, and much more so if it has free will, I will illustrateby an instance taken from our own sphere. Fire melts certain thingsand makes others hard, it boils and burns, it bleaches and blackens.If we described the fire as bleaching, blackening, burning, boiling,hardening and melting, we should be correct, and yet he who doesnot know the nature of fire, would think that it included sixdifferent elements, one by which it blackens, another by which itbleaches, a third by which it boils, a fourth by which it consumes,a fifth by which it melts, a sixth by which it hardens things-actionswhich are opposed to one another, and of which each has itspeculiar property. He, however, who knows the nature of fire, willknow that by virtue of one quality in action, namely, by heat, itproduces all these effects. If this is the case with that which isdone by nature, how much more is it the case with regard to beingsthat act by free will, and still more with regard to God, who isabove all description. If we, therefore, perceive in God certainrelations of various kinds-for wisdom in us is different frompower, and power from will-it does by no means follow thatdifferent elements are really contained in Him, that He containsone element by which He knows, another by which He wills, andanother by which He exercises power, as is, in fact, thesignification of the attributes of God] according to the Attributists.Some of them express it plainly, and enumerate the attributes aselements added to the essence. Others, however, are more reservedwith regard to this matter, but indicate their opinion, though theydo not express it in distinct and intelligible words. Thus, e.g., someof them say:" God is omnipotent by His essence, wise by Hisessence, living by His essence, and endowed with a will by Hisessence." (I will mention to you, as an instance, man's reason,which being one faculty and implying no plurality, enables him toknow many arts and sciences: by the same faculty man is able tosow, to do carpenter's work, to weave, to build, to study, to acquirea knowledge of geometry, and to govern a state. These various actsresulting from one simple faculty, which involves no plurality, arevery numerous; their number, that is, the number of the actionsoriginating in man's reason, is almost infinite. It is thereforeintelligible how in reference to God, those different actions can becaused by one simple substance, that does not include any pluralityor any additional element. The attributes found in Holy Scriptureare either qualifications of His actions, without any reference toHis essence, or indicate absolute perfection, but do not imply thatthe essence of God is a compound of various elements.) For in notadmitting the term" compound," they do not reject the idea of acompound when they admit a substance with attributes.
There still remains one difficulty which led them to that error, andwhich I am now going to mention. Those who assert the existenceof the attributes do not found their opinion on the variety of God'sactions: they say it is true that one substance can be the source ofvarious effects, but His essential attributes cannot be qualificationsof His actions, because it is impossible to imagine that the Creatorcreated Himself. They vary with regard to the so-called essentialattributes -- I mean as regards their number-according to the text ofthe Scripture which each of them follows. 1 will enumerate thoseon which all agree, and the knowledge of which they believe thatthey have derived from reasoning, not from some words of theProphets, namely, the following four :-life, power, wisdom, andwill. They believe that these are four different things, and suchperfections as cannot possibly be absent from the Creator, and thatthese cannot be qualifications of His actions. This is their opinion.But you must know that wisdom and life in reference to God arenot different from each other: for in every being that is consciousof itself, life and wisdom are the same thing, that is to say, if bywisdom we understand the consciousness of self. Besides, thesubject and the object of that consciousness are undoubtedlyidentical [as regards God]: for according to our opinion, He is notcomposed of an element that apprehends, and another that doesnot apprehend; He is not like man, who is a combination of aconscious soul and an unconscious body. If, therefore, by"wisdom" we mean the faculty of self-consciousness, wisdom andlife are one and the same thing. They, however, do not speak ofwisdom in this sense, but of His power to apprehend His creatures.There is also no doubt that power and will do not exist in God inreference to Himself: for He cannot have power or will as regardsHimself: we cannot imagine such a thing. They take theseattributes as different relations between God and His creatures,signifying that He has power in creating things, will in giving tothings existence as He desires, and wisdom in knowing what Hecreated. Consequently, these attributes do not refer to the essenceof God, but express relations between Him and His creatures.
Therefore we, who truly believe in the Unity of God, declare, thatas we do not believe that some element is included in His essenceby which He created the heavens, another by which He created the[four] elements, a third by which He created the ideals, in the sameway we reject the idea that His essence contains an element bywhich He has power, another element by which He has will, and athird by which He has a knowledge of His creatures. On thecontrary, He is a simple essence, without any additional elementwhatever; He created the universe, and knows it, but not by anyextraneous force. There is no difference whether these variousattributes refer to His actions or to relations between Him and Hisworks; in fact, these relations, as we have also shown, exist only inthe thoughts of men. This is what we must believe concerning theattributes occurring in the books of the Prophets: some may also betaken as expressive of the perfection of God by way of comparisonwith what we consider as perfections in us, as we shall explain.
CHAPTER LIV
THE wisest man, our Teacher Moses, asked two things of God,and received a reply respecting both. The one thing he asked was,that God should let him know His true essence: the other, which infact he asked first, that God should let him know His attributes. Inanswer to both these petitions God promised that He would let himknow all His attributes, and that these were nothing but Hisactions. He also told him that His true essence could not beperceived, and pointed out a method by which he could obtain theutmost knowledge of God possible for man to acquire. Theknowledge obtained by Moses has not been possessed by anyhuman being before him or after him. His petition to know theattributes of God is contained in the following words:" Show menow thy way, that 1 may know thee, that I may find grace in thysight" (Exod. xxxiii. 13). Consider how many excellent ideasfound expression in the words." Show me thy way, that I mayknow thee." We learn from them that God is known by Hisattributes, for Moses believed that he knew Him, when he wasshown the way of God. The words" That I may find grace in thysight," imply that he who knows God finds grace in His eyes. Notonly is he acceptable and welcome to God who fasts and prays, buteveryone who knows Him. He who has no knowledge of God is theobject of His wrath and displeasure. The pleasure and thedispleasure of God, the approach to Him and the withdrawal fromHim are proportional to the amount of man's knowledge orignorance concerning the Creator. We have already gone too faraway from our subject, let us now return to it.
Moses prayed to God to grant him knowledge of His attributes, andalso pardon for His people; when the latter had been granted, hecontinued to pray for the knowledge of God's essence in thewords," Show me thy glory" (ib. 18), and then received,respecting his first request," Show me thy way," the followingfavourable reply," I will make all my goodness to pass beforethee" (ib. 19): as regards the second request, however, he wastold," Thou canst not see my face" (ib. 20). The words" all mygoodness" imply that God promised to show him the wholecreation, concerning which it has been stated," And God saweverything that he had made, and, behold, it was very good" (Gen.i. 31); when I say" to show him the whole creation," I mean toimply that God promised to make him comprehend the nature ofall things, their relation to each other, and the way they aregoverned by God both in reference to the universe as a whole andto each creature in particular. This knowledge is referred to whenwe are told of Moses," he is firmly established in all mine house"(Num. xii. 7): that is," his knowledge of all the creatures in Myuniverse is correct and firmly established" : for false opinions arenot firmly established. Consequently the knowledge of the worksof God is the knowledge of His attributes, by which He can beknown. The fact that God promised Moses to give him aknowledge of His works, may be inferred from the circumstancethat God taught him such attributes as refer exclusively to Hisworks, viz.," merciful and gracious, longsuffering and abundant ingoodness," etc., (Exod. xxxiv. 6). It is therefore clear that the wayswhich Moses wished to know, and which God taught him, are theactions emanating from God. Our Sages call them middot(qualities), and speak of the thirteen middoth of God (Talm. B.Rosh ha-shanah, P. 17b): they used the term also in reference toman; comp." there are four different middoth (characters) amongthose who go to the house of learning" ;" There are four differentmiddoth (characters) among those who give charity" (MishnahAbot, v. 13, 14). They do not mean to say that God really possessesmiddot (qualities), but that He performs actions similar to such ofour actions as originate in certain qualities, i.e., in certainpsychical dispositions not that God has really such dispositions.Although Moses was shown all His goodness," i.e., all His works,only the thirteen middot are mentioned, because they include thoseacts of God which refer to the creation and the government ofmankind, and to know these acts was the principal object of theprayer of Moses. This is shown by the conclusion of his prayer,"that I may know thee, that I may find grace in thy sight, andconsider that this nation is thy people" (Exod. xxxiii. 16), that isto say, the people whom I have to rule by certain acts in theperformance of which I must be guided by Thy own acts ingoverning them. We have thus shown that" the ways" used in theBible, and" middot" used in the Mishnah, are identical, denotingthe acts emanating from God in reference to the universe.
Whenever any one of His actions is perceived by us, we ascribe toGod that emotion which is the source of the act when performedby ourselves, and call Him by an epithet which is formed from theverb expressing that emotion. We see, e.g., how well He providesfor the life of the embryo of living beings; how He endows withcertain faculties both the embryo itself and those who have to rearit after its birth, in order that it may be protected from death anddestruction, guarded against all harm, and assisted in theperformance of all that is required [for its development]. Similaracts, when performed by us, are due to a certain emotion andtenderness called mercy and pity. God is, therefore, said to bemerciful: e.g.," Like as a father is merciful to his children, so theLord is merciful to them that fear Him" (Ps. ciii- 13):" And I willspare them, as a man spareth (yahamol) his own son that servethhim" (Mal. iii. I7). Such instances do not imply that God isinfluenced by a feeling of mercy, but that acts similar to thosewhich a father performs for his son, out of pity, mercy and realaffection, emanate from God solely for the benefit of His piousmen, and are by no means the result of any impression or change --[produced in God]. -- When we give something to a person whohas no claim upon us, we perform an act of grace; e.g.," Grantthem graciously unto us" Uudges XXi. 22). [The same term isused in reference to God, e.g.]" which God hath graciously given"(Gen. xxxiii. 5):" Because God hath dealt graciously with me" (ib.11). Instances of this kind are numerous. God creates and guidesbeings who have no claim upon Him to be created and guided byHim; He is therefore called gracious (hannun) -- His actionstowards mankind also include great calamities, which overtakeindividuals and bring death to them, or affect whole families andeven entire regions, spread death, destroy generation aftergeneration, and spare nothing whatsoever. Hence there occurinundations, earthquakes, destructive storms, expeditions of onenation against the other for the sake of destroying it with the swordand blotting out its memory, and many other evils of the samekind. Whenever such evils are caused by us to any person, theyoriginate in great anger, violent jealousy, or a desire for revenge.God is therefore called, because of these acts, jealous ... ..revengeful,"" wrathful," and" keeping anger" (Nah. i. 2) that is tosay, He performs acts similar to those which, when performed byus, originate in certain psychical dispositions, in jealousy, desirefor retaliation, revenge, or anger: they are in accordance with theguilt of those who are to be punished, and not the result of anyemotion: for He is above all defect ! The same is the case with alldivine acts: though resembling those acts which emanate from ourpassions and psychical dispositions, they are not due to anythingsuperadded to His essence. -- The governor of a country, if he is aprophet, should conform to these attributes. Acts [of punishment]must be performed by him moderately and in accordance withjustice, not merely as an outlet of his passion. He must not letloose his anger, nor allow his passion to overcome him: for allpassions are bad, and they must be guarded against as far as it liesin man's power. At times and towards some persons he must bemerciful and gracious, not only from motives of mercy andcompassion, but according to their merits: at other times andtowards other persons he must evince anger, revenge, and wrath inproportion to their guilt, but not from motives of passion. He mustbe able to condemn a person to death by fire without anger,passion, or loathing against him, and must exclusively be guidedby what he perceives of the guilt of the person, and by a sense ofthe great benefit which a large number will derive from such asentence. You have, no doubt, noticed in the Torah how thecommandment to annihilate the seven nations, and" to save alivenothing that breatheth" (Deut. xx. 16) is followed immediately bythe words," That they teach you not to do after all theirabominations, which they have done unto their gods: so should yousin against the Lord your God" (ib. 18): that is to say, you shall notthink that this commandment implies an act of cruelty or ofretaliation; it is an act demanded by the tendency of man toremove everything that might turn him away from the right path,and to dear away all obstacles in the road to perfection, that is, tothe knowledge of God. Nevertheless, acts of mercy, pardon, pity,and grace should more frequently be performed by the governor ofa country than acts of punishment: seeing that all the thirteenmiddoth of God are attributes of mercy with only one exception,namely," visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children"(Exod. xxxiv. 7): for the meaning of the preceding attribute (in theoriginal ve-nakkeh lo yenakkeh) is" and he will not utterlydestroy" : (and not" He will by no means clear the guilty" ):comp." And she will be utterly destroyed (venikketah), she shallsit upon the ground" (Isa. iii. 26). When it is said that God isvisiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, this refersexclusively to the sin of idolatry, and to no other sin. That this isthe case may be inferred from what is said in the tencommandments," upon the third and fourth generation of myenemies" (Exod. xx. 5), none except idolaters being called"enemy" : comp. also" every abomination to the Lord, which hehateth" (Deut. xii. 31). It was, however, considered sufficient toextend the punishment to the fourth generation, because the fourthgeneration is the utmost a man can see of his posterity: and when,therefore, the idolaters of a place are destroyed, the old manworshipping idols is killed, his son, his grandson, and hisgreat-grandson, that is, the fourth generation. By the mention ofthis attribute we are, as it were, told that His commandments,undoubtedly in harmony with His acts, include the death even ofthe little children of idolaters because of the sin of their fathersand grandfathers. This principle we find frequently applied in theLaw, as, e.g., we read concerning the city that has been led astrayto idolatry," destroy it utterly, and all that is therein" (Deut. xiii.15). All this has been ordained in order that every vestige of thatwhich would lead to great injury should he blotted out, as we haveexplained.
We have gone too far away from the subject of this chapter, but wehave shown why it has been considered sufficient to mention onlythese (thirteen) out of all His acts: namely, because they arerequired for the good government of a country; for the chief aim ofman should be to make himself, as far as possible, similar to God :that is to say, to make his acts similar to the acts of God, or as ourSages expressed it in explaining the verse," Ye shall be holy"(Lev. xxi. 2):" He is gracious, so be you also gracious: He ismerciful, so be you also merciful."
The principal object of this chapter was to show that all attributesascribed to God are attributes of His acts, and do not imply thatGod has any qualities.
CHAPTER LV
WE have already, on several occasions, shown in this treatise thateverything that implies corporeality or passiveness, is to benegatived in reference to God, for all passiveness implies change:and the agent producing that state is undoubtedly different fromthe object affected by it: and if God could be affected in any waywhatever, another being beside Him would act on Him and causechange in Him. All kinds of non-existence must likewise benegatived in reference to Him: no perfection whatever cantherefore be imagined to be at one time absent from Him, and atanother present in Him: for if this were the case, He would [at acertain time] only be potentially perfect. Potentiality alwaysimplies non-existence, and when anything has to pass frompotentiality into reality, another thing that exists in reality isrequired to effect that transition. Hence it follows that allperfections must really exist in God, and none of them must in anyway be a mere potentiality. Another thing likewise to be denied inreference to God, is similarity to any existing being. This has beengenerally accepted, and is also mentioned in the books of theProphets: e.g.," To whom, then, will you liken me ?" (Isa. Xl.25):" To whom, then, will you liken God ?" (ib. 18):" There isnone like unto Thee" (Jer. x. 6). Instances of this kind arefrequent. In short, it is necessary to demonstrate by proof thatnothing can be predicated of God that implies any of the followingfour things: corporeality, emotion or change, nonexistence, -- e.g.,that something would be potential at one time and real atanother-and similarity with any of His creatures. In this respect ourknowledge of God is aided by the study of Natural Science. For hewho is ignorant of the latter cannot understand the defect impliedin emotions, the difference between potentiality and reality, thenon-existence implied in all potentiality, the inferiority of a thingthat exists in potentia to that which moves in order to cause itstransition from potentiality into reality, and the inferiority of thatwhich moves for this purpose compared with its condition whenthe transition has been effected. He who knows these things, butwithout their proofs, does not know the details which logicallyresult from these general propositions: and therefore he cannotprove that God exists, or that the [four] things mentioned aboveare inadmissible in reference to God.
Having premised these remarks, I shall explain in the next chapterthe error of those who believe that God has essential attributes:those who have some knowledge of Logic and Natural Sciencewill understand it.
CHAPTER LVI
SIMILARITY is based on a certain relation between two things: ifbetween two things no relation can be found, there can be nosimilarity between them, and there is no relation between twothings that have no similarity to each other; e.g., we do not say thisheat is similar to that colour, or this voice is similar to thatsweetness. This is self-evident. Since the existence of a relationbetween God and man, or between Him and other beings has beendenied, similarity must likewise be denied. You must know thattwo things of the same kind -- i.e., whose essential properties arethe same, and which are distinguished from each other bygreatness and smallness, strength and weakness, etc. -- arenecessarily similar, though different in this one way; e.g., a grainof mustard and the sphere of the fixed stars are similar as regardsthe three dimensions, although the one is exceedingly great, theother exceedingly small, the property of having [three] dimensionsis the same in both: or the heat of wax melted by the sun and theheat of the element of fire, are similar as regards heat: although theheat is exceedingly great in the one case, and exceedingly small inthe other, the existence of that quality (heat) is the same in both.Thus those who believe in the presence of essential attributes inGod, viz., Existence, Life, Power, Wisdom, and Will, should knowthat these attributes, when applied to God, have not the samemeaning as when applied to us, and that the difference does notonly consist in magnitude, or in the degree of perfection, stability,and durability. It cannot be said, as they practically believe, thatHis existence is only more stable, His life more permanent, Hispower greater, His wisdom more perfect, and His will moregeneral than ours, and that the same definition applies to both.This is in no way admissible, for the expression" more than" isused in comparing two things as regards a certain attributepredicated of both of them in exactly the same sense, andconsequently implies similarity [between God and His creatures].When they ascribe to God essential attributes, these so-calledessential attributes should not have any similarity to the attributesof other things, and should according to their own opinion not beincluded in one of the same definition, just as there is no similaritybetween the essence of God and that of other beings. They do notfollow this principle, for they hold that one definition may includethem, and that, nevertheless, there is no similarity between them.Those who are familiar with the meaning of similarity willcertainly understand that the term existence, when applied to Godand to other beings, is perfectly homonymous. In like manner, theterms Wisdom, Power, Will, and Life are applied to God and toother beings by way of perfect homonymity, admitting of nocomparison whatever. Nor must you think that these attributes areemployed as hybrid terms; for hybrid terms are such as are appliedto two things which have a similarity to each other in respect to acertain property which is in both of them an accident, not anessential, constituent element. The attributes of God, however, arenot considered as accidental by any intelligent person, while allattributes applied to man are accidents, according to theMutakallemim. I am therefore at a loss to see how they can findany similarity [between the attributes of God and those of man]:how their definitions can be identical, and their significations thesame ! This is a decisive proof that there is, in no way or sense,anything common to the attributes predicated of God, and thoseused in reference to ourselves: they have only the same names, andnothing else is common to them. Such being the case, it is notproper to believe, on account of the use of the same attributes, thatthere is in God something additional to His essence, in the sameway as attributes are joined to our essence. This is most importantfor those who understand it. Keep it in memory, and study itthoroughly in order to be well prepared for that which I am goingto explain to you.
CHAPTER LVII
ON attributes; remarks more recondite than the preceding. It isknown that existence is an accident appertaining to all things, andtherefore an element superadded to their essence. This mustevidently be the case as regards everything the existence of whichis due to some cause: its existence is an element superadded to itsessence. But as regards a being whose existence is not due to anycause-God alone is that being, for His existence, as we have said,is absolute-existence and essence are perfectly identical; He is nota substance to which existence is joined as an accident, as anadditional element. His existence is always absolute, and has neverbeen a new element or an accident in Him. Consequently Godexists without possessing the attribute of existence. Similarly Helives, without possessing the attribute of life; knows, withoutpossessing the attribute of knowledge; is omnipotent withoutpossessing the attribute of omnipotence; is wise, withoutpossessing the attribute of wisdom: all this reduces itself to oneand the same entity; there is no plurality in Him, as will be shown.It is further necessary to consider that unity and plurality areaccidents supervening to an object according as it consists of manyelements or of one. This is fully explained in the book calledMetaphysics. In the same way as number is not the substance ofthe things numbered, so is unity not the substance of the thingwhich has the attribute of unity, for unity and plurality areaccidents belonging to the category of discrete quantity, andsupervening to such objects as are capable of receiving them.
To that being, however, which has truly simple, absolute existence,and in which composition is inconceivable, the accident of unity isas inadmissible as the accident of plurality; that is to say, God'sunity is not an element superadded, but He is One withoutpossessing the attribute of unity. The investigation of this subject,which is almost too subtle for our understanding, must not bebased on current expressions employed in describing it, for theseyou know that something is in the house, but not exactly what, youask what is in that house, and you are told, not a plant nor amineral. You have thereby obtained some special knowledge ofthe thing; you have learnt that it is a living being, although you donot yet know what kind of a living being it is. The negativeattributes have this in common with the positive, that theynecessarily circumscribe the object to some extent, although suchcircumscription consists only in the exclusion of what otherwisewould not be excluded. In the following point, however, thenegative attributes are distinguished from the positive. Thepositive attributes, although not peculiar to one thing, describe aportion of what we desire to know, either some part of its essenceor some of its accidents: the negative attributes, on the other hand,do not, as regards the essence of the thing which we desire toknow, in any way tell us what it is, except it be indirectly, as hasbeen shown in the instance given by us.
After this introduction, I would observe that, -- as has already beenshown -God's existence is absolute, that it includes nocomposition, as will be proved, and that we comprehend only thefact that He exists, not His essence. Consequently it is a falseassumption to hold that He has any positive attribute: for He doesnot possess existence in addition to His essence: it therefore cannotbe said that the one may be described as an attribute [of the other];much less has He [in addition to His existence] a compoundessence, consisting of two constituent elements to which theattribute could refer: still less has He accidents, which could bedescribed by an attribute. Hence it is clear that He has no positiveattribute whatever. The negative attributes, however, are thosewhich are necessary to direct the mind to the truths which we mustbelieve concerning God; for, on the one hand, they do not implyany plurality, and, on the other, they convey to man the highestpossible knowledge of God; e.g., it has been established by proofthat some being must exist besides those things which can beperceived by the senses, or apprehended by the mind; when we sayof this being, that it exists, we mean that its non-existence isimpossible. We then perceive that such a being is not, for instance,like the four elements, which are inanimate, and we therefore saythat it is living, expressing thereby that it is not dead. We call sucha being incorporeal, because we notice that it is unlike theheavens, which are living, but material. Seeing that it is alsodifferent from the intellect, which, though incorporeal and living,owes its existence to some cause, we say it is the first, expressingthereby that its existence is not due to any cause. We furthernotice, that the existence, that is the essence, of this being is notlimited to its own existence: many existences emanate from it, andits influence is not like that of the fire in producing heat, or that ofthe sun in sending forth light, but consists in constantly givingthem stability and order by well-established rule, as we shall show:we say, on that account, it has power, wisdom, and will, i.e., it isnot feeble or ignorant, or hasty, and does not abandon its creatures:when we say that it is not feeble, we mean that its existence iscapable of producing the existence of many other things: by sayingthat it is not ignorant, we mean" it perceives" or" it lives," -- foreverything that perceives is living-by saying" it is not hasty, anddoes not abandon its creatures," we mean that all these creaturespreserve a certain order and arrangement: they are not left tothemselves; they are not produced aimlessly, but whatevercondition they receive from that being is given with design andintention. We thus learn that there is no other being like unto God,and we say that He is One, i.e., there are not more Gods than one.
It has thus been shown that every attribute predicated of God eitherdenotes the quality of an action, or-when the attribute is intendedto convey some idea of the Divine Being itself, and not of Hisactions-the negation of the opposite. Even these negative attributesmust not be formed and applied to God, except in the way inwhich, as you know, sometimes an attribute is negatived inreference to a thing, although that attribute can naturally never beapplied to it in the same sense, as, e.g., we say," This wall doesnot see." Those who read the present work are aware that,notwithstanding all the efforts of the mind, we can obtain noknowledge of the essence of the heavens -- a revolving substancewhich has been measured by us in spans and cubits, and examinedeven as regards the proportions of the several spheres to each otherand respecting most of their motions-although we know that theymust consist of matter and form; but the matter not being the sameas sublunary matter, we can only describe the heavens in termsexpressing negative properties, but not in terms denoting positivequalities. Thus we say that the heavens are not light, not heavy, notpassive and therefore not subject to impressions, and that they donot possess the sensations of taste and smell: or we use similarnegative attributes. All this we do, because we do not know theirsubstance. What, then, can be the result of our efforts, when we tryto obtain a knowledge of a Being that is free from substance, thatis most simple, whose existence is absolute, and not due to anycause, to whose perfect essence nothing can be superadded, andwhose perfection consists, as we have shown, in the absence of alldefects. All we understand is the fact that He exists, that He is aBeing to whom none of His creatures is similar, who has nothingin common with them, who does not include plurality, who isnever too feeble to produce other beings, and whose relation to theuniverse is that of a steersman to a boat: and even this is not a realrelation, a real simile, but serves only to convey to us the idea thatGod rules the universe: that is, that He gives it duration, andpreserves its necessary arrangement. This subject will be treatedmore fully. Praised be He! In the contemplation of His essence, ourcomprehension and knowledge prove insufficient; in theexamination of His works, how they necessarily result from Hiswill, our knowledge proves to be ignorance, and in the endeavourto extol Him in words, all our efforts in speech are mere weaknessand failure
CHAPTER LIX
THE following question might perhaps be asked : Since there is nopossibility of obtaining a knowledge of the true essence of God,and since it has also been proved that the only thing that man canapprehend of Him is the fact that He exists, and that all positiveattributes are inadmissible, as has been shown , what is thedifference among those who have obtained a knowledge of God ?Must not the knowledge obtained by our teacher Moses, and bySolomon, be the same as that obtained by any one of the lowestclass of philosophers, since there can be no addition to thisknowledge ? But, on the other hand, it is generally accepted amongtheologians and also among philosophers, that there can be a greatdifference between two persons as regards the knowledge of Godobtained by them. Know that this is really the case, that those whohave obtained a knowledge of God differ greatly from each other;for in the same way as by each additional attribute an object ismore specified, and is brought nearer to the true apprehension ofthe observer, so by each additional negative attribute you advancetoward the knowledge of God, and you are nearer to it than he whodoes not negative, in reference to God ' those qualities which youare convinced by proof must be negatived. There may thus be aman who after having earnestly devoted many years to the pursuitof one science, and to the true understanding of its principles, tillhe is fully convinced of its truths, has obtained as the sole result ofthis study the conviction that a certain quality must be negatived inreference to God, and the capacity of demonstrating that it isimpossible to apply it to Him. Superficial thinkers will have noproof for this, will doubtfully ask, Is that thing existing in theCreator, or not ? And those who are deprived of sight willpositively ascribe it to God, although it has been clearly shown thatHe does not possess it. E.g., while I show that God is incorporeal,another doubts and is not certain whether He is corporeal orincorporeal: others even positively declare that He is corporeal,and appear before the Lord with that belief. Now see how great thedifference is between these three men: the first is undoubtedlynearest to the Almighty; the second is remote, and the third stillmore distant from Him. If there be a fourth person who holdshimself convinced by proof that emotions are impossible in God,while the first who rejects the corporeality, is not convinced of thatimpossibility, that fourth person is undoubtedly nearer theknowledge of God than the first, and go on, so that a person who,convinced by proof, negatives a number of things in reference toGod, which according to our belief may possibly be in Him oremanate from Him, is undoubtedly a more perfect man than weare, and would surpass us still more if we positively believed thesethings to be properties of God. It will now be clear to you, thatevery time you establish by proof the negation of a thing inreference to God, you become more perfect, while with everyadditional positive assertion you follow your imagination andrecede from the true knowledge of God. Only by such ways mustwe approach the knowledge of God, and by such researches andstudies as would show us the inapplicability of what isinadmissible as regards the Creator, not by such methods as wouldprove the necessity of ascribing to Him anything extraneous to Hisessence, or asserting that He has a certain perfection, when we findit to be a perfection in relation to us. The perfections are all tosome extent acquired properties, and a property which must beacquired does not exist in everything capable of making suchacquisition.
You must bear in mind, that by affirming anything of God, you areremoved from Him in two respects; first, whatever you affirm, isonly a perfection in relation to us: secondly, He does not possessanything superadded to this essence: His essence includes all Hisperfections, as we have shown. Since it is a well-known fact thateven that knowledge of God which is accessible to man cannot beattained except by negations, and that negations do not convey atrue idea of the being to which they refer, all people, both of pastind present generations, declared that God cannot be the object ofhuman comprehension, that none but Himself comprehends whatHe is, and that our knowledge consists in knowing that we areunable truly to comprehend Him. All philosophers say," He hasoverpowered us by His grace, and is invisible to us through theintensity of His light," like the sun which cannot be perceived byeyes which are too weak to bear its rays. Much more has been saidon this topic, but it is useless to repeat it here. The idea is bestexpressed in the book of Psalms," Silence is praise to Thee" Q^2). It is a very expressive remark on this subject: for whatever weutter with the intention of extolling and of praising Him, containssomething that cannot be applied to God, and includes derogatoryexpressions: it is therefore more becoming to be silent, and to becontent with intellectual reflection, as has been recommended bymen of the highest culture, in the words" Commune with yourown heart upon your bed, and be still" (Ps. iv. 4). You must surelyknow the following celebrated passage in the Talmud-would thatall passages in the Talmud were like that! -- although it is knownto you, I quote it literally, as I wish to point out to you the ideascontained in it :" A certain person, reading prayers in the presenceof Rabbi Haninah, said, 'God, the great, the valiant and thetremendous, the powerful, the strong, and the mighty.' -- The rabbisaid to him, Have you finished all the praises of your Master ? Thethree epithets, ' God, the great, the valiant and the tremendous,' weshould not have applied to God, had Moses not mentioned them inthe Law, and had not the men of the Great Synagogue comeforward subsequently and established their use in the prayer: andyou say all this ! Let this be illustrated by a parable. There wasonce an earthly king, possessing millions of gold coin; he waspraised for owning millions of silver coin: was this not reallydispraise to him ?" Thus far the opinion of the pious rabbi.Consider, first, how repulsive and annoying the accumulation ofall these positive attributes was to him; next, how he showed that,if we had only to follow our reason, we should never' havecomposed these prayers, and we should not have uttered any ofthem. It has, however, become necessary to address men in wordsthat should leave some idea in their minds, and, in accordancewith the saying of our Sages," The Torah speaks in the languageof men," the Creator has been described to us in terms of our ownperfections; but we should not on that account have uttered anyother than the three above-mentioned attributes, and we should nothave used them as names of God except when meeting with themin reading the Law. Subsequently, the men of the GreatSynagogue, who were prophets, introduced these expressions alsointo the prayer, but we should not on that account use [in ourprayers] any other attributes of God. The principal lesson to bederived from this passage is that there are two reasons for ouremploying those phrases in our prayers : first, they occur in thePentateuch; secondly, the Prophets introduced them into theprayer. Were it not for the first reason, we should never haveuttered them; and were it not for the second reason, we should nothave copied them from the Pentateuch to recite them in ourprayers: how then could we approve of the use of those numerousattributes! You also learn from this that we ought not to mentionand employ ill our prayers all the attributes we find applied to Godin the books of the Prophetq: for he does not say," Were it not thatMoses, our Teacher, said them, we should not have been able touse them" : but he adds another condition-" and had not the men ofthe Great Synagogue come forward and established their use in theprayer," because only for that reason are we allowed to use them inour prayers. We cannot approve of what those foolish persons dowho are extravagant in praise, fluent and prolix in the prayers theycompose, and in the hymns they make in the desire to approach theCreator. They describe God in attributes which would be anoffence if applied to a human being; for those persons have noknowledge of these great and important principles, which are notaccessible to the ordinary intelligence of man. Treating the Creatoras a familiar object, they describe Him and speak of Him in anyexpressions they think proper; they eloquently continue to praiseHim in that manner, and believe that they can thereby influenceHim and produce an effect on Him. If they find some phrase suitedto their object in the words of the Prophets they are still moreinclined to consider that they are free to make use of suchtexts-which should at least be explained-to employ them in theirliteral sense, to derive new expressions from them, to form fromthem numerous variations, and to found whole compositions onthem. This license is frequently met with in the compositions ofthe singers, preachers, and others who imagine themselves to beable to compose a poem. Such authors write things which partlyare real heresy, partly contain such folly and absurdity that theynaturally cause those who hear them to laugh, but also to feelgrieved at the thought that such things can be uttered in referenceto God. Were it not that 1 pitied the authors for their defects. anddid not wish to injure them, I should have cited some passages toshow you their mistakes; besides, the fault of their compositions isobvious to all intelligent persons. You must consider it, and thinkthus : If slander and libel is a great sin, how much greater is the sinof those who speak with looseness of tongue in reference to God,and describe Him by attributes which are far below Him; and Ideclare that they not only commit an ordinary sin, butunconsciously at least incur the guilt of profanity and blasphemy.This applies both to the multitude that listens to such prayers, andto the foolish man that recites them. Men, however, whounderstand the fault of such compositions, and, nevertheless, recitethem, may be classed, according to my opinion, among those towhom the following words are applied:" And the children of Israelused words that were not right against the Lord their God" (2Kings xvii. 9): and" utter error against the Lord" (Isa. =ii. 6). Ifyou are of those who regard the honour of their Creator, do notlisten in any way to them, much less utter what they say, and stillless compose such prayers. knowing how great is the offence ofone who hurls aspersions against the Supreme Being. There is nonecessity at all for you to use positive attributes of God with theview of magnifying Him in your thoughts, or to go beyond thelimits which the men of the Great Synagogue have introduced inthe prayers and in the blessings, for this is sufficient for allpurposes, and even more than Sufficient, as Rabbi Haninah said.Other attributes, such as occur in the books of the Prophets, maybe uttered when we meet with them in reading those books; but w