MEZUZA

Protective Amulet or Religious Symbol?

MARTIN L. GORDON
MEZUZAH: PROTECTIVE AMULET OR RELIGIOUS SYMBOL?

Among those ideas enjoying wide circulation in the religious community, and an ominous popularity, is the conception of mezuzah as a protective device. Assigning mechanistic potency to the Biblical inscription appearing on the face of the parchment, as well as to the Divine name Shaddai on the outer side, this view imputes inherent defensive power to the very object of mezuzah per se, claiming for it deterrent effect against evil. Thus, the mitsvah appeals as a pressing practical expedient, addressed to the individual’s concern for his personal physical security and that of his family. When taken to its extreme, this perspective calls for being “bodek mezuzot” (examining the condition of the inscription) in the wake of tragedy, suggesting that the unfortunate circumstances might be attributable to the inoperative defenses of an invalid mezuzah.

This perception of mezuzah has been widely popularized during the past several years in the literature of the Lubavitcher movement, particularly since the terrorist attack at Ma’alot in 1974, and more recently since Entebbe. One particular Chabad brochure, circulated in the wake of Ma’alot, calls upon Jews to marshal their spiritual “defenses,” depicting specific mitsvot—and mezuzah is prominent among them—as “helmets,” which “military strategy” advises (a battlefield analogy which is more than figurative). Following the rescue at Entebbe, and a discourse by the Lubavitcher Rebbe in which the protective view was articulated in learned formulation, a student branch of the movement distributed a flyer suggesting that the ordeal of the hostages may be linked to the collective ineffectivity of their mezuzot.
A kosher mezuzah on your door posts not only makes your house an abode for G-dliness, but is also your security measure even after you have left home for the day. And since all Jews are one large body, it increases the security of the entire Jewish nation. Due to the fact that most of the mezuzot in the homes of hostages, upon examination, were found to be defective, improperly placed or not on every door post, all Jews should check their mezuzot immediately.\(^8\)

The protective perception of mezuzah is formulated in the mystical literature of the medieval period. It appears in works such as Sefer Raziel, associated with the thirteenth century ideology of German Hasidism; in the Zohar, the major work of the Kabbalah; and accedes to widespread influence via the sixteenth century teaching of the Ari with its strong anti-demonic elements.\(^6\) But it is our purpose to examine whether this doctrine is consistent with the ideology of Chazal, as incorporated in tannaitic and amoraic literature. Our objective is to determine whether the protective view may not, indeed, constitute a radical departure from classic rabbinic thinking.

I. THE ISSUE DEFINED

When we refer to the protective view of mezuzah, whose controversiality we shall explore, we have in mind the belief in a mechanistic potency inherent within the mezuzah as an object—its parshiyot (scriptural passages) or the name Shaddai inscribed upon it. Such a view is unique to a particular tendency in religious thought of a magical-mystical orientation, which depicts mezuzah as a screen against shedim (malevolent spirits).\(^6\) Our intention is not, of course, to question the protective benefits granted by Divine providence as a reward for the observance of mitsvat mezuzah, a fundamental traditional conception, applicable to the observance of mitsvot generally. Such reward, however, is not an effect generated by the mitsvah-object as such, nor by the shem (the Divine name) inscribed upon it, but a personal response of God acknowledging the merit of the mekayyem ha-mitsvah (the executor of the precept), whose religious commitment is reflected in his fulfillment of the commandment. An ongoing contemplation of the inscription affixed to the doorpost fosters a profound relationship with God, with its attendant provi-
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dential dividends. Nor do we question the psychological effect of mitzvot as deterrent of sin. Certainly one's regular contact with the mezuzah at his door contributes to a sustained religious consciousness, enhancing the prospect of virtuous behavior. At issue is the ascription of an occult potency to the mezuzah, which acts, allegedly, to shield a man against physical harm, a particular mystical conception, attributing protective power to the heftsa shel mitsvah (mitsvah-object) per se.

II. SOURCES

Biblical Passages

Mitsvah mezuzah appears in two Biblical passages. The context of the first of these passages (Deuteronomy 6:4-9) clearly points to an instructional role for the mitsvah, no protective function is in any way suggested. Calling upon the Israelite to devote his attention to the Divine unity and the love of God—“And these words which I command thee this day shall be upon thy heart”—the parshah formulates several practices intended to facilitate that end:

And thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children, and shalt talk of them when thou sittest in thy house, and when thou walkest by the way . . . And thou shalt bind them for a sign upon thy hand, and they shall be for frontlets between thine eyes. And thou shalt write them upon the doorposts of thy house . . .

The function of mezuzah, together with that of tefillin, is to arouse the religious consciousness, just as diligently teaching “these words” to one's children and regularly talking of them will serve to intensify and perpetuate one's commitment.

In fact, the affirmation of the unity principle (Shema Yisrael . . .), which opens the parshah, and the command to “love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might”—whatever the sacrifice, as Rabbi Akiva's martyrdom demonstrated—would preclude a concern for one's physical security, even as a passing thought, in the process of implementing mitsvah mezuzah. The mezuzah is to be posted,
just as the tefillin are to be worn, as an expression of an exclusively spiritual sense of purpose. In this light, recourse to mezuzah as a device for self-protection is a distortion of its fundamental purpose.

But even where material reward is linked with mezuzah—in the second passage (Deuteronomy 11:13-21)—as a benefit of, if not reward for, the mitsvah ("... that your days may be multiplied, and the days of your children ..."),9 such recompense is a gesture of God's beneficent hand ("I will give the rain of your land in its season ... And I will give grass in thy fields ..."). The mezuzah itself does not generate any benefit by the mere virtue of being positioned strategically at the doorway. Add to this the plain sense of the parshah, according to which long years are promised not specifically for mitsvat mezuzah, but for an all-embracing commitment to the totality of the Divine commandments.

In fact, the Torah implicitly rejects the notion that Divine names are possessed of inherent power,10 a strikingly unique position when viewed against the background of the literatures of the ancient world. Among the ancients, divine names were considered a source of supernatural power, which, if activated by the skilled magical practitioner, could control and coerce even the gods themselves, who were thought to be reliant for their strength on these secret name formulae.11 The Torah, on the other hand, in its formulation of the monotheistic ideal, denies any such doctrine. God Himself is the exclusive source of all power, and His name(s) is in no way possessed of independent potency. Divine names merely designate God and serve to convey to the worshipper a sense of His closeness.12

A rejection of the doctrine of magical name-power was, in fact, communicated by God to Moses at the Burning Bush, according to several scholars.13 Having been asked to redeem the people, Moses puts the question to God:

Behold, when I come unto the children of Israel, and shall say unto them: The God of your fathers hath sent me unto you; and they shall say to me: What is His name? What shall I say unto them? (Exodus 3:13)
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We have here an allusion on Moses' part to Egyptian name-magic, under whose influence the people had been enslaved. They will ask to know the name of their God, in order to tap its potency for theurgic use. To which God responds: "I shall be [present] as I shall be [present]" (ibid. 3:14). Let Israel know that I am no pagan deity, whose power is deftly drawn from the mystery of his name. I am a personal God, Who will be dynamically available to them and responsive to them in every crisis, out of a concerned awareness of their plight. Ironically, then, the protective notion, which imputes power to the mezuzah inscription itself, blunts one of the most distinctive features of the Torah's theological posture in its battle with ancient mythology.

Tannaitic and Amoraic Sources

The protective perception of mezuzah does not appear in the tannaitic midrashim. In the Sifrei (Deuteronomy 6:9), mezuzah, together with tefillin and tsitsit, serve to foster the bond between God and Israel. Out of His love for Israel, God has "encompassed them with mitzvot," which serve the people as perpetual reminders of that love. God is particularly responsive to Israel, when she expresses her devotion to Him through these mitzvot, as reflected in a parable depicting Israel as a queen, "desirable" unto the king when adorned with her "jewelry."

The Mekhila is emphatic in denying any protective interpretation in an analogous case—the blood sprinkled on the Israelite doorposts the night of the Exodus. Noting that God had instructed, "And the blood shall be for you as a sign" (Exodus 12:13), the Mekhilta (ad loc.) explicates the Divine intent: "As a sign for you, not as a sign for Me." Clearly, explains R. Ishmael, God, before Whom all is revealed, did not require blood at the entrances in order to distinguish the Israelite homes on that wrathful night. Rather, the sprinkling of the blood was an act expressive of obedience to the Divine command, a meritorious gesture, in reward for which "I shall appear," says God, "and have compassion for you" (Mekhilta, Exodus 12:13, 23).

The Mekhilta (Exodus 12:23), in fact, compares the two cases—the blood on the doorposts and the parshiyot of our
mezuzah—in terms typical of classic rabbinic reasoning, measuring the respective weight of each as a mitsvah, not as an apotropaic rite. Raising the issue of Jewish suffering, the Mekhilta poses a question: Why is it that destruction never penetrated the Israelite homes in Egypt, which were sprinkled with blood (a lesser mitsvah, since it was applicable only on that single occasion, only at night and not in future generations), while suffering does befall Jewish homes through the ages, which are adorned with mezuzah (a greater mitsvah, since it comprises ten Divine names, is applicable through both day and night and for all generations)? Now, if the intent of the Mekhilta had been to weigh respective strengths of deflective power, rather than degrees of importance as a mitsvah, there would have been no significance to the frequency or infrequency with which each ritual applies. Clearly, there would be no reason for the blood on the doorposts on the night of the Exodus to have been considered relatively any less potent by virtue of its inapplicability on any other occasion; or, conversely, for mezuzah to be considered any more potent at a given moment by virtue of its regularity. It is obvious that both mezuzah and dam (the blood) are being evaluated by the Mekhilta for their respective importance as Divine commands—or religious experiences, if you will. The greater frequency of mezuzah, its perpetuity as a mitsvah ledorot—even its incorporation of ten Divine names with their inspirational and instructional value—reflect a mitsvah deemed more vital and impactful in terms of drawing the Jew closer to God. No protective function is at all involved.

Particularly in its solution to the question—why Jewish suffering in the face of mitsvah mezuzah?—the Mekhilta makes clear that the fortunes of Israel are, after all, in no way tied to some special power of the mezuzah:

What is the cause? Our sins, as it is said: "But your sins have separated between you and your God" (Isaiah 59:2).

Mezuzah is effective as is any mitsvah only when its observance is indicative of a general devotion to the service of God. No particular mitsvah-act or mitsvah-object can generate a pro-
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tective effect, when a man is unworthy of Divine beneficence. And when he is worthy, it is God Who will protect him as a gesture of His personal concern. Thus the Mekhilta text depicts the circumstances in which evil is rendered impotent as attributable not to some inherent effect of the mezuzah itself or its Divine names, but, as the Biblical phrase itself would suggest, to a free act of the Divine will: “He would not permit the mashhit . . .” (Exodus 12:23).20

Nor do talmudic sources lend support to the protective view. One particular baraita (Menahot 43b), quoted as the theme of mezuzah by virtually all post-talmudic works dealing with the mitsvah, defines its effect exclusively in terms of moral restraint:

R. Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Anyone who has tefillin upon his head and tefillin on his arm, tsitsit on his garment and a mezuzah at his entrance has a strong reinforcement against sin.21

A passage appearing in the Jerusalem Talmud (Pe’ah 1:1) might seem to suggest, at first blush, the protective potency of mezuzah. The account is related of Artavan, Parthian king (probably the V),22 who sent “Rabbenu ha-Kadosh” (ostensibly R. Judah ha-Nasi) a priceless jewel, requesting an item of comparable value in return. Rebbi, reciprocating, sent Artavan a mezuzah, to which the king reacted with disbelief: “The item I sent you was of immeasurable worth, and you send me something worth a pittance?” To this Rebbi replied:

Neither the things you nor I might desire [material wealth] are comparable to it [the mezuzah]; and, furthermore, what you have sent me requires my protection, whereas what I have sent you protects you, even while you sleep.23

A surface reading of the above account could suggest the protective view; but this is not the case. The point Rebbi was expressing was not the mysterious potency of a religious inscription—though to a pagan king this might have been the superficial sense; rather, the enlightening spiritual effect of the words of Torah, represented by and articulated within the passages of the mezuzah,24 as well as their providential dividends when
adopted as the guide of one's life. This is confirmed by the verse cited by Rebbi at the conclusion of his response—"When thou walkest it shall lead thee, when thou liest down it shall watch over thee..." (Proverbs 6:22)—a passage which lauds the merit of wisdom or Torah study,24 as is clear from the context of the sugya, establishing the superiority of such study even over the practice of mitsvot.25 Rebbi was far from any attempt at selling the mechanistic potency of a specific ma'aseh mitsvah or heftsah shel mitsvah. He was projecting the Torah, generally, as the key to an entire corpus of redemptive values.26

The protective view of mezuzah is suggested in one talmudic passage (Menahot 33b), but as the non-normative position. The context is a statement of Rava to the effect that a mezuzah should be affixed to the doorpost within a handbreadth of the entrance. Two explanations are offered in the Talmud for this requirement:

Rabbanan say: That he encounter the mezuzah (the mitsvah) with immediacy. R. Hanina of Sura says: That [the mezuzah] protect [the entire house].

R. Hanina of Sura (sixth generation amorah) explains the first-handbreadth principle in terms of the security of the home, whose interior is, apparently, maximally embraced by the power of the mezuzah, when it is positioned at the very threshold. Rabbanan, however, the collective majority, do not subscribe to this interpretation. For them, Rava’s consideration is an enthusiasm for mitsvot, expressed in a desire to encounter the mezuzah with greatest immediacy as one enters the home. The predominant interpretation, then, implicitly denies any notion of a protective force generated by mezuzah.27

The rejection of R. Hanina of Sura’s rigidly apotropaic (or mechanistically protective) position, on the part of the mesader ha-sugya (the talmudic editor of the passage), may, indeed, be inferred from a statement cited (ibid.) in immediate sequence to the Suran view:

Consider how the manner of mortal men is such that a king...
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dwells within [his palace], while his servants guard him from without. Not so the manner of the Holy One Blessed Be He, Whose servants dwell within [their homes], while He guards them from without. As it is said: “The Lord guards thee...” (Psalm 121:5).

Unlike the view of R. Hanina of Sura, this passage, quoted in the name of R. Hanina b. Hama, a student of R. Judah ha-Nasi, formulates a providential position, identifying the source of protection as God Himself, Whose presence is only symbolized by the mezuzah. (In fact, title to the Divine protection is not associated by R. Hanina b. Hama with the specific fulfillment of mitsvat mezuzah per se, nor with the performance of any one particular mitzvah, for that matter, but with an all-inclusive commitment to the service of God, as suggested by his reference to the Lord’s “servants,” who dwell within.) By quoting R. Hanina b. Hama at this point, the mesader ha-sugyah appears to have intended, in effect, to override the mechanistic view of R. Hanina of Sura, either by replacing it with the more acceptable providential position or by redefining it innocuously in providential terms (contrary, of course, to R. Hanina of Sura’s own intent).

Another talmudic passage (Avodah Zarah 11a) places the identical statement of R. Hanina b. Hama on the tongue of Onkeles the Proselyte. Onkeles is depicted as having succeeded in making Jews of successive troops of Roman soldiers sent to seize him following his conversion. In the final such encounter, the soldiers are attracted by the mezuzah on the doorpost, upon which Onkeles had placed his hand. Inquiring as to its significance, they are moved to conversion by his statement of God’s protective concern for Israel. Here too no prophylactic power is attributed to the mezuzah-object as such. In fact, it is clear, as well, from Onkeles’ earlier exchange with the troops that God Himself is the subject of discussion. Onkeles cites the Biblical passage depicting how God walked before Israel in the desert, “with a pillar of fire to give them light” (Exodus 13:21), which he contrasts with the distant air of a mortal king, who would never serve his people with any such gesture unbecoming his station. Be it His illumination of their way in the desert or His protection of their homes, God is a personally interested Guard-
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ian of Israel, Whose concern is articulated in the inscription on the doorpost, a personal God, responsive to all who place their trust in Him.31

We have cited several sugyot to demonstrate that any surface impression suggesting the protective view of mezuzah does not stand up under investigation. There are, furthermore, several sugyot which implicitly exclude the protective notion. The case is cited (Yoma 11a) of an examiner of mezuzot, who was apprehended by the Roman quaestor while inspecting the mezuzot posted at the gates of the city of Sepphoris. The Talmud, noting that the authorities leveled a costly fine upon him, is disturbed by the issue of Divine justice, pointing to the principle of R. Eleazar, “Those engaged in a mission of mitsvah are immune to injury.” Now, were mezuzah considered endowed with a distinctive, mechanistically-protective power, the Talmud would surely have pursued the issue in those terms, rather than confining its inquiry to the general providential principle of R. Eleazar.

Similarly, the talmudic criteria determining the schedule for examining a mezuzah (to insure that the inscription remains intact) betray indifference toward any notion of protection from evil as the function of the mitsvah. The mezuzah of an individual is to be inspected twice in seven years, and that of a community, twice in fifty years (ibid.). The rationale underlying these time intervals is based on a projection that the inscription is not likely to become altered in the interim, and therefore a hezkat kashrut (presumption of legitimacy) is established. Now, had the Talmud subscribed to the magical-mystical perception of mezuzah as an anti-demonic device, whose mysterious potency requires a flawless inscription,32 it surely would not have relied on the probabilities implicit in hazakah, but would have required a regular scrutiny of the parchment to guarantee the fact of a valid mezuzah.

The twice-in-fifty-years examination period prescribed for a public mezuzah (ibid.), as interpreted by several rishonim, is particularly irreconcilable with any protective notion. These commentators explain that no more frequent inspection schedule could have been realistically imposed on a community, because
its members tend, individually, to shirk public responsibility.\textsuperscript{33} Now, were demonic incursions of concern, no such reasoning would have prevailed. Certainly, a concern for self-protection would have been expected to elicit the diligent participation of all. Clearly, the potency of the mezuzah inscription was not maintained by Chazal. A hezkat kashrut, the halakhic presumption of the integrity of the text, was deemed sufficient.

Similarly indicative of a lack of concern on the part of talmudic tradition for any protective role served by mezuzah are the several instances where a residence or particular rooms are absolved of the mitsvah because of structural or functional technicality. A severely arched doorway, for example, requires no mezuzah (Eruvin 11b, Yoma 11b); nor does a rented dwelling (outside of Eretz Yisrael) or hotel lodging, prior to thirty days (Menahot 44a). Add to this the predominant view amongst the rishonim to the effect that even following thirty days the obligation of the tenant, who does not own the residence, is only mide-rabbanan (rabbinic).\textsuperscript{34} Certainly, had the halakhah perceived mezuzah as anti-demonic, the structure of the doorway would have been irrelevant in determining hiyyuv mezuzah; and a tenant too would have been obligated to affix one, or would at least have been advised to do so in the name of "sakkanah" (danger).\textsuperscript{35} It is first the mystically-oriented legal literature following the period of the rishonim that introduces the suggestion that the tenant affix his mezuzah prior to thirty days for purposes of protection from "mazikin" (injurious spirits)—a recommendation which precipitates considerable controversy, raising the issue whether such a procedure might not, in fact, be inconsistent with particular halakhic norms.\textsuperscript{36}

The non-protective perception of mezuzah is reflected, as well, in a baraita (Menahot 32b), describing a pious practice of the house of Monobaz, ruler of Adiabene, who had converted to Judaism. During its travels, the royal entourage would carry with it a mezuzah, affixed to a staff, which would be set up in the doorway of any inn in which they might be lodging overnight. Although a transient residence is absolved of mezuzah, this practice was undertaken, explains the baraita, "zekher li-mezuzah" (as a remembrance of mezuzah), a devout effort to
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...peteute the mitsvah even when not actually operative. Clear-
ly, were mezuzah perceived as endowed with an amulet-like
potency, the baraita would have pointed to the motive of she-
mirah, a protective concern.

The Mishnah (Kelim 17:16) makes reference to the practice
of encasing a mezuzah within a staff, which Tosefot Yom Tov
(seventeenth century commentary to the Mishnah) suggests was
carried about in the belief that the procedure was "a mitsvah
and self-protective." The explanation, however, of the mefor-
eshei ha-Mishnah, generally, such as R. Samson of Sens, Rosh
and Bertinoro, omits any such interpretation. Consistent with
the larger context of the Mishnah, which deals with illicit, de-
ceptive practices, these commentators explain the purpose of the
mezuzah, in this case, as a camouflage for contraband (such
as jewelry) concealed within the staff. Thus, no inference of
a protective motive may legitimately be drawn. Indeed, even
Tosefot Yom Tov's reading of the Mishnaic text, differenti-
ating the reference to mezuzah from the list of deceptive prac-
tices, does not compel a protective interpretation, since the
staff might have been carried about simply zekker li-mezuzah,
as in the case of the house of Monobaz, above. Finally, even
if we were to account for the practice, as Tosefot Yom Tov
suggests, in terms of the protective motive, this would not con-
firm the procedure as a normative one. R. David Hayyim Corin-
aldi (eighteenth century, Italy) already observes, in reaction
to the suggestion of Tosefot Yom Tov: "If there were such per-
sons (carrying mezuzah about for self-protection) they were fools,
comparable to those of whom Rambam wrote ..."

We have demonstrated, then, that the Talmud nowhere (with
the exception of one late view, overridden by the sugyah) as-
cribes prophylactic power to the mezuzah as such. Any protec-
tive benefits connected with mezuzah are manifestations of
Divine providence, reward for the execution of the mitsvah and
the contemplation of the principles contained in its inscription.
In fact, the Divine promise of long years, with which mitsvah
mezuzah is associated in immediate sequence in Deuteronomy
11:20-21, is linked by the Sifre (as well as one talmudic view) in more fundamental connection with the study of Torah
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(ibid. 11:19), the previous referent, which is, after all, one of the principal values inscribed on the parchment. In an even broader sense, the promise of long life actually refers, in terms of the literal sense of the text, to the entire parshah (from verse 13), and its benefits are granted for an all-embracing commitment to the Divine law, the classic rabbinic principle of kabbalat ol mitzvot.

Until this point, we have dealt with the implications of fulfilling the mitzvah of mezuzah, which, we have shown, is not depicted at all, either in the Torah or in the mainstream thought of Chazal, as a mechanistically-effective deterrent against evil. But the converse is also true. A failure to fulfill the mitzvah is nowhere said to expose a man defenselessly to affliction. The consequences of omitting mezuzah are framed in providential terms, as a possible forfeiture of the Divine promise of extended years. For even in terms of Divine providence, the Talmud indicates no substantive punishment for the failure to post a mezuzah, unless a consistently deliberate circumvention or negation of the mitzvah is intended. The obligation of mezuzah involves, by halakhic definition, a kiyum aseh (a positive performance), not an issur aseh (a culpable violation). Thus, the suggestion, according to one talmudic view, that the death of children may be attributable to dereliction with respect to mezuzah (Shabbat 32b) is not to be taken in simplistically literal terms. No abrupt, punitive shortening of life is intended. Meiri notes that it is a pedagogic method of Chazal to magnify the consequences of spiritual or moral laxity, in short, jolting statements, for maximum impact. R. Hillel Herz (seventeenth century, Poland) observes that a normal life span cannot be precluded for one who has omitted mezuzah, since there is no legitimate logical inference from the promise of arikhat yamim (extension of days) to kitsur yamim (diminution of days). The only valid inference is a retention of the life span as originally designed ("lo yirbu ve-lo yitkatsru"). Thus Meiri's further observation—which is borne out by the context and tone of the talmudic discussion (ad loc.)—that even in its most severe sense, any such punishment referred to in the sugyah applies to a defiant, categorical rejection of mezuzah in
principle, not to a case of laxity, and certainly not to a case of inadvertent error. Be that as it may, the issue is the quality of one’s relationship with God, expressed in and fostered by a mitsvah such as mezuzah—not the operational condition of the mezuzah as a security device.

It is against this background that we must evaluate a passage in Targum Yerushalmi I (Pseudo-Jonathan), linking a soldier’s failure to have fulfilled mitsvat mezuzah with threatening consequences on the battlefield. In translation of Deuteronomy 20:5, the Targum reads:

Who is the man who has built a new house, but has not affixed to it a mezuzah thereby completing it, let him go and return to his house, lest he incur guilt thereby and die in battle, and another man complete it.

As we have already noted, talmudic principle denies Divine punishment for the omission of a positive command, unless a consistently deliberate rejection of the mitsvah is intended. So that unless this Targum passage presumes such a negative motive, its position is inconsistent with our talmudic norm. Indeed, the very substance of the Targum’s rendering of these several verses is, in fact, in conflict with the tannaic as well as amoraic tradition, according to which the three categories of persons excused from the battlefield depart not because of any sin they have incurred, but because of the special nature of their personal circumstances, warranting deferment from combat. Be that as it may, the severe implications of an unaffixed mezuzah are depicted even in this passage in providential terms, as retribution by God for an unfulfilled obligation, not in terms of any protective potency within the mezuzah-object.

Ominous implications are suggested for a missing mezuzah by an opinion of Tosafot in its exposition of a particular baraita (Bava Metzia 102a); but a formidable geonic consensus implicitly rejects this interpretation. The baraita in question prescribes that upon vacating a premises, one should not remove the mezuzot (considering that another party will be taking up residence there). The basis for this rule, argues Tosafot, is apotropaic: “Since injurious spirits enter a house lacking a mezuzah,
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removing it is tantamount to injuring those who will live in the	house." For R. Aha Ba'al ha-She'ilot and R. Hai Gaon, how-
ever, the baraita entertained no such considerations. To their
mind the issue is a much more sober one—a concern for bizay-
yon mitsvah; it is deemed an affront to a functioning mitsvah-
object that its service be prematurely terminated. Thus, R. Aha
and R. Hai reason, if the mezuzah will be immediately installed
(hence, put back into service) in his new residence, the vacating
party is entitled to remove it. There is, therefore, no compelling
evidence for the protective position from this talmudic passage.

Nor is the protective function of mezuzah a valid inference
from the following baraita:

If he hangs [the mezuzah] on a staff [against the doorway], or places
it behind the doorway, it is a danger and no mitsvah (Menahot 32b).

Rashi accounts for the “danger” in terms of injurious spirits,
which are free to attack a house whose mezuzah is not affixed
within the doorway as halakhically required. R. Tam, how-
ever, criticizes Rashi’s understanding of the baraita, from a
textual point of view, suggesting instead that the danger is a
practical one—a mezuzah projecting in so awkward a position,
as in either of the two cases described, is likely to cause a head
injury to anyone passing through the entrance. R. Tam’s re-
jection of Rashi’s view is upheld, in the literature of the me-
dieval period, by the Ashkenazic halakhic consensus.

We have established, then, that an examination of the classic
literature of Chazal—tannaitic and amoraic material—yields no
sound basis for the protective conception of mezuzah. With the
exception of the overridden view of R. Hanina of Sura, the sources
are either oblivious of any such notion, or implicitly deny the
doctrine. No inherent potency is ascribed to the parshiyot
(scriptural passages) of the mezuzah, not to mention the Di-
vine name Shaddai, whose appearance on the outer side of the
parchment is not even recorded as talmudic practice. The in-
scription of this name, which mystical sources consider critical
for the efficacy of the protective function, emerged, in fact, no
earlier than the geonic period, and is referred to in the litera-
ture of the rishonim as a custom rather than a normative re-
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quirement. Even those halakhic works—dating no earlier than the end of the thirteenth century—which record the mnemonic interpretation of Shaddai as Shomer Dirat (later, Daltot) Yisrael (Guardian of the Dwelling Place of the Israelite), take it simply as a designation of God and attribute to it no potency. Thus, the function of mitsvot mezuza remained, during the talmudic period, an expression of commitment to and reliance upon God, a profound inner posture, in response to which the providential Divine hand promises its personally protective favor.

III EVALUATION

The protective view is rooted, of course, in a belief in shedim (malevolent spirits), a popular phenomenon in the talmudic period. However, even where they may have shared the common belief in the demonic, the rabbis of the Talmud never permitted the function of mitsvot to be interpreted in these terms. Chazal clearly separated the realm of religion from that of the occult. They never considered the phenomenon of shedim a theological category, to be countered by the allegedly anti-demonic potency of mitsvot. The belief in evil spirits—a universal tendency amongst the intelligentsia as well as the masses, prior to the modern age—was a speculative attempt (not specifically Jewish) to come to terms with the severe realities of the human condition, such as illness, physical injury, mental derangement, death (phenomena which the modern mind understands in clearer terms as attributable to disease-producing microorganisms, human negligence, psycho-emotional strain, the natural aging process). Whatever procedures were prescribed by the empirical method in an effort to counter the feared demonic threat, such as the inscription of amulets and the pronouncement of incantations, mitsvot were not among them. Mezuza was never seen by Chazal as an apotropaic ritual, any more than the contemporary rabbinic mind would view it as a potent defense against epidemic contagia or as an anti-terrorist device. The Jew today, like his talmudic predecessor, affixes a mezuza to his doorpost, as he fulfills mitsvot generally, to express his
commitment to God, Who responds to the sincerity of that commitment with a promise of personal protective concern over his life. It is this providential response, originating in God, not in the mitsvah-object, that constitutes the source of our security—sustaining the physician’s skilled therapeutic effort, supporting Israel’s deft counter-guerrilla initiative, and intervening directly when human agency offers no hope. Thus, whether the nature of the threat be described as a “shad” or a virus, a “mazik” or a flesh-and-blood terrorist, it is the Divine hand, of whose favor one has been deemed worthy, coupled with competent human initiative, that thwarts its designs. Never did the classic rabbinic tradition consider the mezuzah inscription itself a source of protection.

A serious ideological difficulty plagues the protective view—namely, its corrosive implications for the quality of the God-man relationship. While the material experiences of our lives involve us in an impersonal cause-and-effect nexus—the inexorable necessity of natural law, the spiritual dimension of life transcends mechanical causation. The promise of religious experience must never be confused with the programmed effects of an automated security system. Certainly, mitsvot mezuzah has its formal requirements—sirtut, otiyyot ke-tsuratan, hekef gevil, etc. (conditions intended to insure the quality of the inscription). But once properly constituted as a mitsva shel mitsvah (mitsvah-object), the mezuzah functions not as a self-sufficient apparatus, but as a vehicle of religious inspiration. Indeed, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The otiyyot (letters), the shemot (Divine names), the parshiyot of the mezuzah are components of a conceptual system, communicating the fundamentals of Judaism—“amitah shel Torah,”66 which thrusts the Jew, who ponders its content,67 beyond his earthly circumstance into regions of spiritual encounter. Once rendezvous has been achieved, the booster vehicle is no longer consequential. The dynamic center of the mitsvah is not in the object (the mezuzah), but in the subject (the Jew), who has been inspired. The benefits accruing from mezuzah are measured not in terms of the potency of its letters as such, but in terms of the potency of the spirit which the letters have, hopefully, cultivated. And
it is, indeed, in the depth of the spiritual relationship—and only in that relationship—that the source of protection ultimately lies. Having encountered God, the Jew, to the degree that he has drawn meaning from the mezuzah, will be under the protective grace of His hashgahah (Divine providence). The trouble with perceiving mezuzah as a protective device is that it replaces the depth quality of the religious experience with a technical gesture, where the anticipated response comes not from a personally-concerned, omnipotent Ribbono shel Olam, Who acknowledges the inner commitment of the individual who has posted it, but from a mechanized instrument, which allegedly generates a defensive screen—for whom it may concern—provided, of course, it's in good working order!

One may argue that one element does not preclude the other, that the mezuzah itself yields a direct protective effect, in addition to its primary function of fostering a relationship with God. Indeed, are there not many mitsvot that provide material benefit? But this argument is not tenable. There is, to be sure, a category of mitsvot which produce direct material benefit—mitsvot such as ma'akeh (Deuteronomy 22:8), lo ta'amod al dam re'ekha (Leviticus 19:8), tsedakah (Leviticus 25:35-36; Deuteronomy 15:7-8), etc. But such mitsvot, rooted in a concern for safety, a sense of social responsibility, achieve their practical ends by marshalling man's natural capacities—his technical skill (to erect a secure parapet), his reservoir of moral courage (to save his fellow from death), his financial resources (to assist a needy neighbor)—in a dynamic human initiative. But the alleged power of mezuzah to provide material security does not tap the resourcefulness of the human initiative. It appeals rather to the sense of the occult in man, encouraging a passive reliance on supposed mysterious forces latent in the inscription, rather than a responsible practical concern for realistic safety standards. (The reflex reaction of being “bodek mezuzot,” examining the condition of the inscription in the wake of misfortune, such as illness or accident, can have the subtle effect of distracting the individual from sufficient attention to the contributory human factors underlying his circumstance.) The halakhic concern for physical protection would require, in the
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interest of a secure home, measures such as the installation of a dependable lock on one’s door, a reliable burglar alarm system, etc.—just as it prescribes the removal of a faulty ladder or vicious dog from one’s premises—\textsuperscript{92}—not the inscription of a shem (Divine name).

To claim that mezuzah functions in the same way as a secure door lock or a potent medicine—a kind of “super-teva”—is begging the question. Talmudic thought does not subscribe to the occult principle, according to which shemot and mitsvot generate a set of mysterious mechanistic forces.\textsuperscript{73} Chazal speak of mitsvot channeling existing natural forces toward moral or spiritual ends, be they forces such as those of social responsibility, moral courage or technical know-how, noted above, or the forces of spiritual communion, which characterize the dynamics of the ritual mitsvot. Indeed, it is exclusively as a spiritual force that mitsvot such as mezuzah function, fostering a relationship between the Jew and God. Thus the parable cited earlier, depicting Israel as a queen, “desirable” unto her king when adorned with her “jewelry” (mezuzah, tefillin, tsitsit)—\textsuperscript{74}—a relationship which yields an intensified religio-moral sensitivity, providing, as we have seen, “a strong reinforcement against sin.”\textsuperscript{75}

Clearly, mezuzah, together with tefillin and tsitsit, and mitsvot such as tefillah (prayer) and keriat shema, comprise initiatives of a spiritual nature, whose purpose is to elevate man beyond the short-range concern for his immediate material circumstance to a transcendent relationship with God, with its attendant enhancement of his consciousness of sin. Mezuzah is concerned with the quality of Jewish life, not its security. To claim, then, that the Divine inscription, which directs the attention of the Jew to God, is possessed of its own potency, generating protective benefits, perverts a spiritual instrumentality into a cultic charm.\textsuperscript{76} It is precisely this type of conception which R. Samson Rafael Hirsch attacks in his Nineteen Letters, when he criticizes the kabbalistic position for its perception of mitsvot as a “magical mechanism,” a means of “influencing or resisting theological worlds and anti-worlds.”\textsuperscript{77} A belief in the potency of the shem fits into neither of the two classic categories of mitsvah initiative we have referred to. It fosters neither the resourceful
practical effort toward physical security, nor the profoundly spiritual bond with God.

The point is that the only legitimate criterion by which the efficacy of mitsvat mezuzah should be measured is the depth relationship with God that it has inspired. While the technical accuracy of the inscription is important, to be sure, nonetheless, the consequences of a pesul (a disqualification) cannot be of such ominous proportions as the protective view would have us believe. The essence of the issue is this. If a Jew has affixed a mezuzah to his doorpost, thus—as far as he knows—having fulfilled the mitsvah, but unbeknown to him one of the letters is actually pesulah (invalid), or eventually becomes pesulah, by what perception of the man-God relationship can it be said that he is rendered defenseless thereby against the incursion of evil? Even in purely halakhic terms, if the parchment had been carefully checked before it was posted, the mezuzah would enjoy a hezkat kashrut (a presumption of legitimacy), requiring reexamination only twice in seven years. But even if the parchment had not originally been checked, so that no hazakah was legitimately established, and the inscription was, in fact, faulty from the outset, the most that can be said is that the mitsvah has been unfulfilled; but such a circumstance is not classified as a sin—the obligation of mezuzah involves, by halakhic definition, a kiyum aseh, not an issur aseh, as we have seen—nor is Divine punishment indicated, except where the omission reflects a conscious, consistently deliberate effort to circumvent or negate the mitsvah. Thus, to contend that despite the honest intentions of the dweller and his freedom from culpability, he is, nonetheless, in a precarious state by virtue of inoperative defenses is to distort the religious concept into a form of magic.

It is one thing to fault a man who has failed to establish the legitimacy of the inscription for laxity, and adjudge his relationship with God diminished to the degree that he was negligent in seeing the mitsvah through properly (and yet, even on this count he may be innocent, having relied on some unreputable dealer); indeed, a heftsa shel mitzvah deserves and requires scrutiny in its production. But it is quite another to declare him defenseless by virtue of the technical deficiency, and then to
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compound the issue by suggesting the most dire consequences for his inadvertency, when the true theological yardstick should be the depth quality of his shemirat mitsvot (religious observance) generally, and his overall relationship with God. Bedikat levavot (an examination of hearts)—not bedikat mezuzot—is the classic Jewish response to the vicissitudes of life.

NOTES

1. In kabbalistic doctrine, all mitzvot were eventually assigned a mechanistic function as programmed elicitors of Divine forces; but mezuzah served a special apotropaic function in pre-kabbalistic mystical teaching. See below, note 5.

2. "The Five-Point Mitzvah Campaign," distributed by Mitzvah Campaign Headquarters, Lubavitch Youth Organization, 770 Eastern Parkway, Brooklyn, N. Y.

3. Published in Likkutei Sichot (Ekev, 5736).

4. "Jews and Miracles," Lubavitch Student Organization, Morristown, N. J. (When taken to its popular extreme, the bedikat mezuzah notion correlates specific physical disabilities with particular words on the helaf [parchment] which are said to be pesulot.) Similarly, Aryeh Kaplan, in an article entitled "Kuto Shel Yud—The Point of a Yud," The Jewish Observer (Tishrei 5736—Sept. 1975), published by Agudath Israel: "Whenever recurrent tragedy occurs in a house, our sages have prescribed a careful inspection of its mezuzot" (p. 29). Also reflective of the mechanistic protective view is a short story feature by Basya Lenchevsky, "Moshe's Secret," appearing in Olomeinu (Tammuz 5735—June 1975), the day school magazine published by Torah Umesorah, in which a severe storm levels all the tents at a religious summer camp, except for the one to which a mezuzah had been affixed; even though, as the author concedes, a temporary dwelling—the camp stay was three weeks—requires no mezuzah.

5. In a separate study, being prepared for publication, we treat the concept of mezuzah as it is developed in the mystical and kabbalistic literature of the medieval period.

6. The development of the apotropaic (or mechanistically protective) conception in kabbalistic sources is much more complex, involving the dynamics of celestial sefirah activity set into motion by the mezuzah. In a pre-kabbalistic work such as Sefer Raziel, on the other hand, the apotropaic function is a simpler, direct effect of the Shaddai inscription. See previous note.

7. Berakhot 61b. R. Akiva, at the moment of martyrdom, saw in his supreme sacrifice the ultimate fulfilment of the biblical command to love God "with all thy soul"—"even to the point of His taking thy soul."
8. Of course, this is not the fundamental issue. One could argue that granted, self-protection should not be one’s motive in performing the mitzvah, but that nonetheless such protection, deriving from the mezuzah, is a by-product of the mitzvah. However, in the following paragraph of the text, we indicate that even as a post facto benefit, shemirah as a potency within the mezuzah has no basis in the Torah.

9. This is precisely the thrust of Rambam’s critique of the protective view of mezuzah: “For . . . they have treated a major mitzvah, namely the [affirmation of the] unity of the name of the Holy One Blessed Be He . . . as if it were an amulet for their personal advantage . . .” (Hilkhot Mezuzah 5:4). His criticism is not confined to mezuzot featuring angelic and magical interpolations, but applies equally to a protective perception of the standard mezuzah (see Haggahot Maimuniyyot, Hilkhot Tefillin, 1:7).

9a. According to one talmudic view, the promise of long years relates specifically to mitzvot mezuzah with which it is linked in immediate sequence. But this view is not unanimous. See discussion below in the body of our paper.

10. In a study to be published shortly, this writer demonstrates that the rabbinic mainstream during the talmudic period rejected the notion of Divine-name potency. The limited number of talmudic aggadot and midrashic passages reflecting such a doctrine are shown to be overridden by the rabbinic consensus.


12. The posture of the devotee in relation to God is altered by a belief in the power of the Divine name. The religionist who relies on an omnipotent personal God assumes a stance of humility before the Ultimate Source of power and grace, while the practitioner of rites involving the potency of the name assumes an assertive, self-assured posture, as a resourceful manipulator of Divine power! These conflicting orientations actually represent the conceptual distinction between mysticism and magic, the one cultivating a mood of surrender, the other fostering the dynamics of control. See E. Underhill, Mysticism (New York: Noonday, 1955), pp. 70-71.


14. Similarly, in the literature of the Hellenistic period, mezuzah bears no apotropaic interpretation. In the Letter of Aristeas, 158, the parshiyot of mezuzah serve as a “reminder” of the existence of God, Who Himself is “Ruler and Guardian” (157). In Josephus’ Antiquities, “the principal blessings . . . received from God” are to be inscribed as a “remembrance” upon the doors (IV, 8:13). Note also Philo’s formulation of the function of the inscription—that the people may “keep in perpetual memory what they should say and do, careful alike to do and to allow no injustice . . .” (The Special Laws, IV, 27, trans. by F. H. Colson, in Philo [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964], Vol. VIII, p. 97).

15. See also Menahot 43b. Parallels to the “encompassment” passage of the Sifrei are found in Tosefta Berakhot, concluding citation (7:22), and at the close
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of TJ Berakhot 9:5.
16. See also U. Cassuto, Perush al Sefer Shemot (English: A Commentary on the Book of Exodus), 12:5, 7, where, similarly, the apotropaic, cultic function of the blood is denied.
17. Although the previous derashah ("As a sign for you, not as a sign for Me") is not cited in the name of R. Ishmael, and, in fact, R. Ishmael (if the Mekhilta's derashah to Exodus 12:7 in the name of R. Simon is actually his—see Meir Ish Shalom edition, p. 6a, note 3, and Malhim on this derashah, no. 34) may have held that the blood did serve to elicit a response from God ("[the blood] appearing to Me, not to others"), nonetheless, the underlying thrust is the same—the blood is not apotropaic or deflective. The nature of God's response to the blood is, as R. Ishmael explicates it in the passage we have cited in our text, an acknowledgment of Israel's obedience, reflected in the sprinkling of the blood.
18. The designation and sacrifice of the korban pesah, whose blood was sprinkled on the doorposts was critical for establishing Israel's worthiness for redemption (see Mekhilta, Exodus 12:6). R. Ishmael also links the worthiness of Israel tooked Yitzhak (the binding of Isaac), whose sacrificial theme was symbolized, as well, by the blood on the doorposts (see Mekhilta, Exodus 12:13, 23). Similarly, later in the Mekhilta (Exodus 14:29), Israel's anticipated commitment to Torah and her exercise of tefillah (Yalkut: tefillah)—as well as her prospective fulfillment of mezuzah and tefillah—represent her "merit" before God, entitling her to safe passage through the Red Sea. No mechanistic effect is involved.
19. R. Ishmael interprets the terms "u-fasahti" (Exodus 12:13) and "u-fasah" (ibid. 12:23) as connoting compassion (see Mekhilta to these verses).
20. The anti-demonic role of mezuzah appears to be suggested in Targum Shir ha-Shirim (8:5), a post-talmudic source. However, even here the apotropaic tendency is qualified by the introduction of the providential principle. The demonic forces, maintains the Targum, "have no permission" to afflict, when tefillah and mezuzah are in place—a phrase which shifts the sense of the passage toward a personal Divine judgment in acknowledgment of the merit of the mekoyyem ha-mitsuah. In contrast, the unadulterated apotropaic notion is expressed in a Zohar Hadash passage, where the malakh hamashi-hit is deflected by the Shad-dai inscription, even though Providence has granted permission for attack (Zohar Hadash, ed. Ashlag, [London, 5730] p. 102, n. 457).
21. The reference to the saving angel, in the supportive verse (Psalm 34:8) quoted by the baraita, depicts the power of the mitsuah in a psychological sense, as channeling the individual away from sin. See Sefer ha-Eshkol, ed. Auerbach (Halberstadt, 1869), II, p. 80: "For each and every mitsuah is like an angel, protecting him from sin." (The latter explanatory statement does not appear, however, in the Albeck edition of the Eshkol [Jerusalem, 5695], I, p. 202.) Rambam (Hilkhot Mitzvot 6:13) and Semag (Aish #3, developing the same theme, describe the mitsuah as "matzirin" (reminders) of one's religious commitment. The Talmud (Menahot 44a), in a passage following the citation of the baraita, cor-
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robator of the restraining power of mitzvot, recounts the story of a man, who, at the point of committing zniut, was confronted by the strands of his tiisit.

22. See observations of M. Mirkin, Beresheit Rabbah, Vol. 2 (Tel Aviv, 1971), pp. 63-64 ("Artavan ... ").

23. Note a Yelammedenu passage, quoted in Yalkut 11:979, where an analogous contrast is formulated between idols of silver and gold, which require the protection of their worshippers, and God, Who protects us while we are asleep in our homes.

The Rebbi-Artavan account also appears in Beresheit Rabbah 35:3. See also Yalkut (Deut. 8:1, Prov. 934), where the account appears, but without the clause, "even while you sleep." (On the significance of this clause, see n. 25, below.)

In the She'iltot (Ekev, 145), the story is related, with the unexpected addition of a sequel in which a shed possesses Artavan's daughter. No therapy avails until his posting of the mezuzah succeeds in banishing the spirit. This sequel appears in neither the talmudic or midrashic versions noted, nor in any other post-talmudic work quoting the account. The linguistic character of the segment, composed as it is in Hebrew, is obviously different from the Aramaic in which the body of the account is formulated.

Louis Ginzberg suggests that the author of the She'iltot, R. Aha himself, drew the shed-segment, an admittedly distinct component, from a Babylonian aggadic source, since it is reminiscent of the account depicting R. Simeon b. Yoḥai's healing of a demonically-possessed princess (recounted briefly in Me'ilah 17b)—though there is, he would grant, no textual affinity between the formulation of the two narratives (see Ginzberg, Geonica, I, pp. 82-83). But Ginzberg fails to consider that even if the general theme of demoniac possession has its parallel in this old aggadic tradition, the remedial recourse to mezuzah—a distinctly novel feature of the She'iltot segment—does not. Nor, as our study demonstrates, is there any evidence that the apotropaic function of mezuzah, generally, was developed earlier than the close of the talmudic period. So that there are, in reality, no grounds for identifying the She'iltot segment as having been drawn from the hoary Babylonian aggadah. To the contrary, considering the evidence we marshal below (re: Bava Metzia 102a) pointing to the non-apotropaic view of mezuzah held by R. Aha Ba'el ha-She'iltot, this segment is undoubtedly a later interpolation.

R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes suggests that the shed-segment might have been a part of the original source during the talmudic period, but was expunged from the final talmudic text prior to hatimat ha-Talmud, because it was found objectionable; the She'iltot, though, preserved the original text (see Mevo ha-Talmud, Ch. 31). However, as we have indicated, it is our view that there is no basis for an early dating of this segment.

24. Thus R. Tam (Tosafot, Gittin 6b) explains the talmudic term, "amitah shel Torah" (Megillah 16b), as a reference to mezuzah, since it contains in its inscription the fundamental theological principle of kabbalat ol malkhat shemayim. See also Tosafot, Sotah 17b and Menahot 32b.

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25. It is in the identical sense that the verse is taken in Sotah 21a. (In fact, Rebba’s comment, “even while you sleep,” probably alludes to the time of death, the figurative sense of “when thou liest down,” at which time one’s lifetime study of Torah will provide him with merit before the heavenly tribunal. The verse is so interpreted in Sotah, ad loc., and Bereshit Rabbah 35:2, as well as Sifrei, Deuteronomy 6:7.) But even if the verse be taken as referring to mitzot me’usiyyot, as well as to Torah study, as it is in Avot 6:9, its point is to laud the enlightenment of Torah and its disciplinary impact. It certainly has no reference to some mysterious, physically-protective force latent in a mitzvah-object.

26. This sense of the account is reflected, as well, in a passage in Midrash Devarim Rabbah (ed. Liebermann, 2d ed., p. 71), where a consciousness of the content of the parshiyot is emphasized as central to mitzot mezuzah. Citing Proverbs 8:34, where wisdom depicts the blessed man as hearkening to her, “watching daily at my gates, waiting at the posts of my doors,” the Midrash observes: “If you have fulfilled the precept of reading the Shema, of which it is written, ‘When thou liest down and when thou risest up, as thou sittest in thy house, the Torah will speak in thy defense in the Future World.’ Explains R. Aha b. Simon: ‘She will argue for your merit.’

A conceptual interpretation of the account (in medieval rationalist terms) is developed by R. Abba Mari ben Joseph, late thirteenth-early fourteenth century leader of the so-called anti-rationalist forces in the Provence. In his Minhat Kena’ot (Pressburg, 1838), p. 11, he explains that the objective of R. Judah ha-Nasi was to urge Artavan to contemplate the primary philosophic truths, the existence of God and His unity, principles recorded in the mezuzah, which even a non-Jew is obligated to grasp in compliance with the Noahide law enjoining idolatry. This knowledge, R. Abba Mari explains, would procure for him the necessary providential protection. (R. Abba Mari, clearly no obscurantist as he was portrayed by scholars of the last generation, appreciated the primacy of a philosophic apprehension of God. He attacked only the excesses of rationalism, which had led to a denial altogether of the literal sense of Biblical narrative and law.)

27. Similarly, in Shabbat 22a, where the first handbreadth principle is cited in association with mitzot ner Hanukkah, the sense of the sugya suggests that purely halakhic considerations are involved. Specifically, the sugya prohibits the placement of ner Hanukkah, if it is positioned outside the doorway, more than a handbreadth away from the entrance, where it would not be identified with the particular home whose proprietor had kindled it (see Rashi, ad loc.). The conclusion of the sugya, stipulating that mezuzah and ner Hanukkah function as a corporate set of mitzot at the doorway, “ner Hanukkah at the left, mezuzah at the right,” suggests that the positioning of either mitzvah-object is based not on any apotropaic concern, but on experiential religious considerations; namely, that one be embraced by mitzot as he enters the home. For there is certainly no intimation anywhere in the Talmud that ner Hanukkah functions apotropaically.

With respect to the talmudic passage in Berakhot 23b, pointing to shemirah
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in connection with tefillin (depicting two sages who would carry their tefillin with them into the bet ha-kishe for protective reasons), the critical term "nin-teran" (netar, to guard) appears not to be indigenous to the sugyah. The Munich manuscript omits it, while in other sources (see Dikdukei Soferim, Berakah, p. 115, n. 70), including the texts of Rif and Piskei Rid, the reading is altogether different—"to natreah" (atrah, to trouble). According to the latter reading, the sense of the sugyah is that R. Johanan and R. Nahman would not trouble their students to care for their tefillin while they were indisposed. Rashi, however, interprets the passage in terms of our reading—"nin-teran" (third person, feminine, plural: "they will guard"), taking it apotropaically; namely, the tefillin "will protect me from the mazikin." (Rashi, indeed, is one of a minority of rishonim who interpret mezuzah apotropaically) Talmidei R. Jonah, though, in exposition of a similar reading—"lin-teran" (see also Dikdukei Soferim, ad loc.), quotes "yesh meforeshin," who explain the passage as an affirmation by each of the sages that he will protect his tefillin (rather than any notion of the tefillin protecting their owner!).

28. This sense of the ma'amor is reflected, as well, in the Devarim Rabbah passage cited in note 26. Rather than use the term "mezuzah" to connote the inscription which might be considered to be guarding the house, the Midrash refers to "mezuzah" in its scriptural sense, as the doorpost, protected by God. See also earlier note 23, where a Yelamdenu passage depicts God as our Protector while we sleep in our homes.

29. See the Devarim Rabbah passage cited in note 26, where an overall consciousness of one's commitment to God, as depicted in the parshiyot, is critical to mitzvat mezuzah.

30. These two possible interpretations of the function served by R. Hanina b. Hama's statement, within the sugyah, are reflected in the literature of the rishonim. One group of rishonim omits the Suran view altogether, indicating their understanding of the sugyah as having rejected it. These rishonim, as a general rule, do not quote R. Hanina b. Hama's ma'amor, since their elimination of the Suran view accomplishes the objective of his providential statement (see Semag, Mordecai). A second group of rishonim, citing the Suran view along with the view of Rabbanan, immediately quotes R. Hanina b. Hama, in order to dissolve the mechanistically protective sense of the Suran position. These rishonim understand the thrust of the sugyah as intending to redefine or remold the Suran view into a symbolic statement; so that one could subscribe to the Suran statement without its rigorous apotropaic sense. The first-handbreadth requirement would no longer be deemed a critical factor in a protectively-potent procedure (as R. Hanina of Sura had originally intended) but simply a fitting, though in no way vital, symbol of God's personal protection, which, after all, does embrace the entire home (see Rif, Rosh). It is a minority stance in the literature of the rishonim which reverses the thrust of the sugyah, and attempts to interpret R. Hanina b. Hama's statement as consistent with the rigid, apotropaic sense of R. Hanina of Sura's ma'amor. (This is the position of the Tur, whose radical formulation thrust the apotropaic position to prominence.)

31. R. Moses ha-Kohen of Lunel (Ramakh), contemporary of Rambam and
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commentator on his Mishneh Torah, understands the Onkelos account as supporting the notion of a protective mezuzah-object, which would be in contradiction. Ramak observes, to Rambam's critique of such a conception (see n. 9, above). He therefore suggests, in order to vindicate Rambam's position, that Onkelos' remarks were polemical, intended to "lend esteem to Israel," but were not expressive of systematic rabbinic thinking (see Kesef Mishneh, Hilkhhot Mezuza 5:4). It is possible to explain the Onkelos account as we have, as perceiving mezuzah symbolically (representative of God's personal protection), and yet to suggest, in line with Ramak's point, that Onkelos' symbolic explanation could not help but be understood by non-abstracting pagans as depicting the protective effect of the object itself. Significantly, Ramak is unconcerned with the apotropaic implications of R. Hanina of Sura's position, undoubtedly because, as we have indicated, the sugyeh overrides this view.

32. The severe implications of a defective inscription, according to kabbalistic doctrine, will be treated in a separate study (see above, note 5).

33. See Rashi, ad loc.; Nimukei Yosef on Alfus, Hilkhot Mezuza; and Mordekhai, Halakhot Ketanot, 960. In Sefer ha-Eshkol, ed. Auerbach, II, p. 79, R. Hai Gaon is cited as offering a contrary rationale: namely, a community mezuzah does not require as great a frequency of bedikah, because the public is regularly more careful in protecting it from conditions that might cause corrosion. In Tosafot Yeshanim, Yoma 11a, a third rationale is offered. The frequent examination of a public mezuzah is dangerous, exposing the bedek to a greater likelihood of apprehension by the alien authorities, as, in fact, transpired at the gates of the city of Sepphoris, in the account cited above in our text.

34. See Tosafot, Menahot 44a, second and concluding view, and Tosafot, Avodah Zarah 21a; also Shitah Mekubetset, Baba Metzia 101b, in name of Rosh and Rivva, the latter citing this position as that of R.

35. Tosafot, Menahot 44a, in its opening view, does invoke shemira as the basis for its position that the tenant's obligation after thirty days is midah-ora'. However, even for this view of Tosafot (which is later superseded by its second and concluding position), the shemira argument cannot obligate the tenant prior to thirty days.

36. See Sedei Hemed, Vol. 4, p. 242, where the view of R. Eleazar Rokeah (eighteenth century, Amsterdam), is cited, advising the procedure ("Let him not delay in affixing it, out of concern for the mezuzah"). One issue raised by this practice is the halakhic legitimacy of a mezuzah fixed in place prematurely, with the related issue of ta'aseh ve-lo min he-assui, the ante facto construction of a heftsah shel mitsaah (see Minhat Hinuhi, Va-Eitanah). The pronouncement of the berakah in such a case is also at issue, with both the pre-thirty-day and post-thirty-day options fraught with halakhic complication. See Sedei Hemed, 4, pp. 239-42.

The pitfalls involved in any attempt at reconciling the apotropaic notion with the norms of the halakhah are reflected in Sefat Emet on Shai. The comment is first made that a transient residence (an inn), by virtue of the fact that it is halakhically absolved of mezuzah, is thereby immune to demonic attack, and, therefore, requires no protection (perush on Menahot 32b). Yet in a subse-
quent observation (Menahot 41a), Sefat Emet argues with inconsistency that the reason why rented quarters in Eretz Yisrael—for whose security we are especially concerned—had to be made subject to hisyov mezuzah immediately (even prior to thirty days, unlike residences huts In-aretz) was in order to assure that they be protected against an apparently indiscriminate demonic threat!  

37. Commentary to Mishnah, ad loc.  
38. See their respective commentaries to Mishnah, ad loc.  
38a. Based on Rambam, Hilkhot Ketin 2:2.  
40. Accordingly, one talmudic view, Shabbat 32b (see also Masekhet Kallah, Vilna Shas, 51a, second column), associates this reward specifically with mezuzah. But as we indicate below in note 43, the larger referents—limmud Torah and habbalat ol mitzvot at large—are not excluded.  
41. Sifrei, Deuteronomy 11:19; cited also by Rashi in paraphrase.  
42. Shabbat 32b.  
43. See I. Heinemann, Darkhe ha-Aggadah (Jerusalem, 5714), p. 136. Certainly, Chazal, in their midrashic association of proximate verses, did not intend to exclude the larger context of the peshaṭ.  
44. So that certainly the ideal fulfillment of mitzvot mezuzah is in a study of and commitment to the content of the entire parshah. See above, note 20.  
45. This is the sense of the talmudic sugyah (Menahot 41a) analyzing a dialogue between Rav Ketina and an angel who had threatened him with punishment for failing to fulfill mitzvot tsitsit. The Talmud’s conclusion is that Rav Ketina was subject to punishment for consistently circumventing mitzvot tsitsit, that is by intentionally, with regularity, donning garments that do not require tsitsit.  
46. To dwell in a house requiring mezuzah, and yet to fail to affix one, would be comparable to actually wearing a garment requiring tsitsit without attaching them, clearly a more direct disregard for the mitzvah than the circumstances of Rav Ketina’s omission, yet, as is clear from Tosafot (ad loc.), punishment even in such a case would be applicable only if the negation of the mitzvah involved a consistent resistance to its fulfillment.  
47. Similarly, the aggadic depiction (Pesahim 113b) of the man who does not observe tefillin, tsitsit and mezuzah as “excommunicated by Heaven” (“as if excommunicated by Heaven,” a variant reading) is taken by Tosafot as referring to a situation where he possesses but does not fulfill them, or where, as in the case of tsitsit (see R. Akiva Eger, Gilyon ha-Shas, ad loc.), he consistently avoids, as did Rav Ketina, creating conditions that would require tsitsit.  
48. With regard to the talmudic passage (Rosh ha-Shanah 17a) identifying poshe’ei yisrael be-gut’an (who suffer severely after death) as “karkaṭa de-lo manah tefillin” (those upon whose heads tefillin is not placed), the reading of our talmudic text supports R. Tam’s interpretation (ad loc., upheld by Rosh, as well, ad loc.) to the effect that this classification applies only “when the mitzvah
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is despicable in his eyes." Thus, a recent exhortative article in *The Jewish Observer* (referred to in n. 4, above) is misleading when it asserts, categorically, that the donning "through neglect" of tefillin that are *pesulot* renders a man "poshe'a yisrael be-gtfo" (p. 30). It is true that R. Hananel, Rif and Rambam, according to their reading of the talmudic text, define *karkafta* as one who has never fulfilled the *mitsvah*, which might imply that even without disparagement of the *mitsvah* one is condemned, whatever the extenuating circumstances, for his failure ever to have donned tefillin. But this implication does not necessarily follow. The comment of Ran on Rif (ad loc.) would suggest that the latter's position is not inconsistent with the fundamental thrust of R. Tam's view; namely, *karkafta* would apply only if the lifetime failure to fulfill the *mitsvah* was associated with an element of conscious rejection. (Be that as it may, the application of the principle of *karkafta* by R. Hananel, Rif and Rambam appears to be limited to tefillin. It is only Ran, whose interpretation of the principle is, at any rate, a more liberal one, as we have seen, who extends its application as a broader category to other *mitsvot ashri*.)

46. See *Mordecai*, *Halakhot Ketanot*, 944. *Mordecai* cites this position in the name of R. Isaac of Dampierre (Ri), with respect to both *mezuzah* and *tissit*. See n. 79, below.

47. See also reference to *Massekhet Kallah* in n. 40, above.

48. See opening comment of *Tosafot*, *Kiddushin* 54a ("Gavra"), referring to the type of derashah formulated in this sugya (Shabbat 32b) as "*asmakhta,*" a derashah which does not claim for itself methodological rigor.

With few exceptions, the rishonim, in their *sifrei mitzvah* and compilations of *hilkhot mezuzah*, omit the talmudic reference to the death of children, formulating instead only the positive implications (*arihhat yamim*) of the observance of the *mitsvah*.

49. Meiri, *Beit ha-Behirah*, *Shabbat*, comment on 32a-33b.

50. *Beit Hillel to Shulhan Arukh*, *Yoreh De'ah*, 185:1. R. Herz points to the implicit rejection by another talmudic sugya of any inference from *arihhat yamim* to *kitsur yamim*—the sugyot of *tenai halul* (*Kiddushin* 61a-62a). In its treatment of *Genesis* 4:7, *Leviticus* 26:3 and *Isaiah* 1:19, exhortative scriptural passages similar to Deuteronomy 11:21, the Talmud indicates that neither for R. Meir, who altogether denies the legitimacy of any inference from a conditional statement, nor R. Hanina ben Gamaliel, who permits it, may an inference of punitive loss be drawn. Even for the latter position, only a forfeiture of the promise may be inferred.

It is of course true that the *Sifrei* (Deuteronomy 11:19) with respect to *limmud Torah*, draws the inference of *kitsur yamim*, but in an exhortative context such as this, phrases of this type are not necessarily to be taken in a rigorous sense. *Kitsur yamim* may very well refer to a "shortening" of the life span in terms of its *additional* potential segment, which has now been forfeited. Note also that the *Sifrei*, in the course of its development of the theme, employs the reference to death not as a prescription of punishment, but as an evaluative description in hyperbolic terms of the worthlessness of a life without *Torah*:

"If he [the father] does not speak the holy tongue to him [his son], nor teach..."
him Torah, it is as if he were worthy of burying him." Similarly, the Tosefta Hagigah 1:2 says of a son whose father would fail to train him in the performance of mitsvot, as well as Shema, Torah and the holy tongue, "it is as if he were worthy of not having been born."

Rashi, citing the Sifrei in paraphrase, records the phrase "lo yirbu" in place of "yiktseru," while in Exodus 20:12 (with reference to kibbud av va-em), he, like the Meilila, uses the term "yiktserun." However, in his commentary to Hullin 110b, in explication of the principle of mitsvot asheh she-mattan shekharah be-tsidah, he states that in its promise of long years for kibbud av va-em, the Torah implicitly advises a son that if he does not fulfill the mitsvah his punishment will be that he "will not acquire this reward," clearly indicating Rashi's preference for the "lo yirbu" position.

51. This is indicated in Meiri's reference to "perikat ol ha-mitsuah" (ad loc.).

52. R. David Zvi Hoffmann takes note of the non-normative character of this Targum passage when he observes that in verse 6 the Targum prescribes the redemption of the fruit of the vine from the priest. According to talmudic tradition the priest has no such role (see D. Z. Hoffmann, Commentary to Deuteronomy 20:6 and Leviticus 19:24, 25). Nor, in fact, is the redemption of the fruit an absolute obligation. According to talmudic tradition, the fruit of the fourth year is to be eaten in Jerusalem; except that the farmer is permitted the option (considering the difficulty of transporting a large supply of goods) of exchanging the fruit for its value in money, which he would then take to Jerusalem for the purchase of items to be consumed in the city (see Rambam, Hilkhot Ma'aser Sheni ve-Neta Revi'i, 9:1, 2, 4:1).

53. R. Akiva denies entirely that a fear of the consequences of sin is grounds for exemption from battle (Mishnah, Sotah 8:5; Sifrei to Deuteronomy 20:8), a position adopted by Rambam in his Mishneh Torah (Hilkhot Melakhim, Ch. 7). But even R. Jose ha-Gelili and R. Jose, who excuse the sinner from the battlefield on the basis of Deuteronomy 20:8 (Mishnah, Sotah, ad loc., and talmudic discussion, Sotah 44b), do not interpret the three categories of Deuteronomy 20:5-7 as indicative of sin. To the contrary, R. Jose ha-Gelili maintains (Mishnah, Sotah, ad loc.) that it is precisely because these three categories of persons return home without any intimation of sin that they effectively serve as a face-saving device for the sinner, who can leave under these pretenses.

54. The grounds for this deferment are variously interpreted: The degree of personal tragedy that would be involved were a man to die in the course of fulfilling a milestone in his life (see Rashi, Deuteronomy 20:5, and D. Z. Hoffmann's position, Commentary to Deuteronomy 20:5, p. 398); his psychological incapacity for stamina on the battlefield, considering his emotional tie to a yet-unfulfilled enterprise (see Ibn Ezra, Ramban, ad loc.); the dictates of social wisdom, recommending that the primary initiatives of civilian life (consolidation of home, vineyard and marriage) be protected, in the interest of encouraging settlement of the land (see comment of Ish-Shalom to Sifrei, Piska 192 ["... that the cities of Israel not lie desolate."]); n. 1, p. 110a; cf. Malbim, Sifrei, 101).

55. This is evident from the Targum's rendering of the following two verses (Deuteronomy 20:6, 7), where, similarly, a failure to have fulfilled a particular
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mitzvah—the redemption of the fruit of one’s vine and the consummation in marriage of his betrothal—incur guilt.

56. Thus, even in its rendering of Deuteronomy 11:20-21, the Targum introduces no apotropaic theme.

57. Tosafot, Bava Metzia 101b; see also Haggahot Shitah Mekubetset (#24) to Tosafot, Menahot 41b. In Tosafot, Shabbat 22a, the apotropaic interpretation is cited alongside an opposing view, which supports the geonic understanding of the baraita.

58. See She’iltot, Shelah, 125; Sefer ha-Eshkol, ed. Auerbach, II, p. 78; Ritva, standard editions, Bava Metzia 102a. (With reference to She’iltot, see above, n. 23.) The apotropaic position of Tosafot Bava Metzia, on the other hand, which sees in the situation a very real danger, brooks no compromise, and insists that under no circumstances may the mezusot be removed.

The baraita, in reinforcement of its stipulation that the mezusot remain in place, recounts the ominous story of a man who violated the principle and suffered the loss of his family. The apotropaic view claims support for its position in this account. Since the vacating party was unconcerned for the welfare of the entering family, the members of his own family suffer accordingly (see Ritva, standard editions, ad loc.). No such interpretation, of course, could be given the story by R. Aha or R. Hai, since they see no endangerment of life in the circumstance of an absent mezuzah. As a literal punishment, such a calamity would certainly seem far out of proportion to the nature of the transgression as they define it. While they offer no alternate explanation of the account, they would probably take it as a figurative reflection on the nature of the violation: perhaps, the sudden loss of a viable family points, as a pedagogic parallel, to the abrupt termination of a functioning mitzvah, an indiscretion of which the vacating party was guilty. (See the comment of M. Mirkin, Bereshit Rabbah, Vol. 4 [Tel Aviv, 1972], p. 34 [85:3], where he explains a parallel ma’amar accordingly: “Anyone who begins a mitzvah but does not complete it will bury his wife and children.”) Such supportive stories represent a particular genre of talmudic passage, designed to create exhortative impact. Like the sugyah in Shabbat 32b, this reference need not be taken literally as the prescription of a definitive punishment. (See passage cited in n. 50, above, where burial is invoked not as a threat of an actual punishment, but in order to depict in hyperbolic terms the worthlessness of an unspiritual existence.)


Rashi invokes the apotropaic element in his explanation of another sugyah, as well, involving the principle of hovat ha-dar, which obliges the tenant—rather than the landlord—to affix a mezuzah to the dwelling (Pesahim 4a). The rishonim, generally, account for the tenant's obligation (be it mide-rabanan or mide-oraita) in sober halakhic terms, on the basis of his functional residence on the premises, in contrast to the landlord, who is not actually present. Rashi, however, accompanies the functional explanation with the additional apotropaic consideration: “for it protects him.” Not only do the preponderance of rishonim ignore Rashi's apotropaic interpretation of this sugyah, but even among the
limited number who introduce a “protective” element, the apotropaic principle is not necessarily implied. R. Jonathan ha-Kohen of Lunel (twelfth century Provencal), for example, defines the hovat ha-dar rule in terms of shemirah, but is quick to explain that his reference is to the statement of R. Hanina b. Hama, who sees the mezuzah as a symbol of God’s protection (see Shitah Mekubetset, Bava Metzia 101b). Rishonim will at times speak of the party who is “protected by the mezuzah” not in a rigorous mechanistic sense, but merely as an identification of the individual with whom the mezuzah is halakhically associated.

60. Tosafot, ad loc. In Megillah 24b, where a “rounded” (elliptical) tefillin shel rosh is termed similarly by the Mishnah, “a danger and no mitzvah,” Rashi offers the practical explanation, lest it penetrate the skull. R. Tam, on the other hand (Tosafot, ad loc.), describes the danger in terms of being unprotected by the mitzvah, since a rounded bayit is invalid. However, R. Tam’s reference to the protection of the mitzvah is framed in providential rather than apotropaic terms—alluding to the merit of the mekayyem ha-mitzvah before God, not to any potency of the mitzvah-object. Thus, R. Tam draws the analogy to Eliyahu Ba’al Kenafayim (Shabbat 49a), for whom a “miracle” (an act of God) was wrought when the tefillin he had removed from his head, as he was fleeing the Roman quaestor, was transformed into an innocent dove upon inspection.

61. The Tosafot in Menahot 32b, which cites R. Tam’s view with its critique of Rashi’s position, is part of a compilation of R. Samson of Sens, from whom all succeeding generations drew, and upon whose authority they relied. See E. Urbach, Ba’alei ha-Tosafot (Jerusalem, 1955), pp. 232, 512-514, and Sefer Terumat ha-Deshen, Teshuah 19, to which he refers. Like Tosafot, Rosh (Halakhot Ketanot, 8) and Mordecai (Halakhot Ketanot, 961) conclude their citation of Rashi’s view with R. Tam’s critique.

62. See Shem Tov b. Abraham Ibn Gaon, Migdal Oz, Hilkhot Mezuzah 5:4. Rambam is able to come to terms with this post-talmudic addition to the kelaf only because it is confined to the outer side of the scroll (ad loc.).

63. See, for example, Semag, Aseh #23; Rosh, Hilkhot Mezuzah, 18; Mordecai, Halakhot Ketanot, 990. Mordecai also cites a reference to the Shaddai inscription in the geonic work, Halakhot Gedolot, which he discusses in a non-normative context (961).

64. The earliest record of this mnemonic interpretation appears in Kol Bo (Ch. 90), as well as in Orhot Hayyim, ed. M. Schlesinger (Berlin, 1902), II, p. 192, a Provencal work of R. Aaron ha-Kohen of Lunel (end of 13th—beginning of 14th century). Kol Bo too was probably his work, the first edition or first draft of Orhot Hayyim.

65. In fact, in both Kol Bo and Orhot Hayyim, Rambam’s critique of those who interpret mezuzah as a self-protective device is cited. See n. 9, above.

The inscription on the outer side of the kelaf of the letters, Kowu Benokhaas Kowu, corresponding to the letters of YHWH Elohenu YHWH, which they follow in alphabetical succession and which they face back-to-back on the kelaf, is also a post-talmudic development. It is found in the 13th century German Hasidic component of the mystical Sefer Raziel (Amsterdam, 1701), 8b, as well as in French and German halakhic works of the period. See Makor Vitry, ed.
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by S. Hurwitz (Jerusalem, 5723), p. 649; Semag, ad loc.; Rosh, loc. cit.; and Mordecai, 969. A French-German phenomenon, not practiced originally in Spain (see Rosh, 18, and R. Jeroham, Toledot Adam ve-Hawah (Venice, 5313), Vol. I, p. 179c), it was not known to Rambam. While for Sefer Raziel this inscription, like the shem Shaddai, is of critical apotropaic importance, for the rishonim who cite it (see n. 63) it is only a custom of no documented rationale.

65a. The anti-satanic interpretation of mitsvot developed by the medieval Kab-balah will be treated in a separate study (see above, note 5).

66. See above, note 5.


68. Chazal speak of the sekhut (merit) of the mitsvah performance, which yields protective benefits for the nekveyem ha-mitsvah (Sotah 21a). Merit is, of course, a qualitative term, reflecting the status of the individual before God. No mechanistic effect of the mitsvah-object or mitsvah-act is intended. In fact, the Talmud (ad loc.) questions the duration even of sekhut ha-mitsvah, once the experience of the mitsvah is over. Once a mitsvah has been executed, in this case the mezuzah having been affixed to the doorpost, and the individual is no longer consciously involved in the mitsvah, the protective merit of the act is no longer in effect, according to the plain sense of the bavaita and the view of Ravina, the concluding amorac position cited in the sugyah. Perpetual protective merit is earned only through a consistent, deep-seated identification with the root of the religious system—the study of Torah (such as an ongoing contemplation of the contents of the mezuzah inscription) or a devoted commitment to the limmud Torah of others. (See Taz, Yoreh De'ah, 285:1, who concedes that the claim of a perpetual shevirah deriving from the technical act of having posted a mezuzah ["even when a man is doing nothing but sleeping in his bed"] is inconsistent with the principle developed in the above sugyah.)

69. It is true that according to the more complex kabbalistic view of mezuzah (as distinct from the simpler pre-kabbalistic occult view), which sees the mitsvah as a microcosm of Divine sefirot from which it derives its power, an element of kavanah is called for, which relates the earthly act of affixing the mezuzah to its Divine root above. Nonetheless, this kavanah plays a primarily technical role, functioning to activate the impersonal sefirot forces inextricably linked with the mezuzah-object, rather than a pietistic role, which would transcend the mitsvah and bring the Jew into personal association with God Himself. See note 5, above.

70. Of course there is a dynamic activism involved in the world of the mystic. The ba'al shem (master of the name) is a powerful figure in his manipulation of supernatural forces. The kabbalists taught that man's execution of ritual acts can influence the forces of the Divine personality. Nonetheless, such a channeling of man's activist thrust toward purely spiritual initiatives tends to remove him from the concrete realities of the material world, with the resultant neglect of practical measures; hence the passivity to which we refer.

71. One is reminded of Rambam's attack on the fatalistic belief in astrology, a key element in ancient idolatry (Letter on Astrology to the Sages of Provence), where he attributes the destruction of the First Temple to the failure of the
people to undertake the normal recourse of effective military training in anticipa-
tion of confronting their enemy. A belief in the occult tends to blunt normal,
necessary human initiatives.

73. Efraim Urbach in Emunot ve-De'ot Chatal discusses the absence in talmud-
ic thought of any mystical magical perception of mitzvot (pp. 322-324). The kab-
balists, from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries on, introduced a radical tran-
sformation into the interpretation of mitzvot, investing religious acts and religious
objects with enormous cosmic potency, the capacity to affect even the activity
of the Divine personality (see note 5, above).
75. Baraita, Menahot 43b.
76. See n. 9, above.
77. The Nineteen Letters (New York, 1950), ed. Jacob Breuer, based on trans-
lation of Bernard Drachman, Letter 18, p. 122. R. Hirsch's point here is cited
78. Yoma 11a; see our earlier discussion.
79. See n. 46, above, where the position of Rl is cited. The dweller remains,
of course, under a perpetual obligation to affix the mezuzah, and, in this sense,
is said to be "transgressing" (over) the mitzvah all the while he delays its ful-
filment; but he has, nevertheless, committed no sin—the house is not forbidden
(eino asur) to dwell in. It is in terms of this concept that the "transgression"
of "two positive commands" for failing to post a mezuzah (Menahot 44a) is to
be understood; not a substantive violation, but the omission of an obligation.
80. See earlier discussion, and n. 45.
81. See n. 58, above, and related discussion in body of paper.