“Speak to Bnai Yisrael and say to them the following: When a person from among you offers a sacrifice to Hashem, if it is an animal sacrifice, it should be taken from the cattle or the flocks of sheep or goats.” (VaYikra 1:2)
Much of Sefer VaYikra deals with the laws regulating
sacrifices. The idea of animal
sacrifice presents a challenge for many of us.
The Torah was given to us by Hashem as a revealed truth. It is designed to elevate humanity. Its mitzvot establish the highest standards
for human conduct. The Torah gives us
an advanced system of justice and jurisprudence. It describes standards of social responsibility and charity. The Torah derides superstition and
primitive religious attitudes. So, it
seems quite remarkable that a system devoted to the elevation of humanity above
paganism and primitivism endorses and requires animal sacrifice. How can we reconcile this
institutionalization of animal sacrifice with the progressive attitudes of the
Torah?
Generally, Maimonides is regarded as offering the
most compelling response to this issue.
His response is significant, not only in its treatment of this issue,
but also in its treatment of related issues.
Maimonides begins by stating an assumption that is fundamental to his approach
to understanding sacrifices. He
explains that the wisdom and intelligent design of Hashem is evident in the
complexity of the universe. This same
wisdom is manifest in Hashem’s providence over humanity and Bnai Yisrael. This means that Hashem considers human
nature in His interaction with humanity.
One element of human nature that Hashem considers is that human
behaviors and attitudes cannot be suddenly, radically altered.
Based on this assumption, Maimonides offers a novel
approach to explaining animal sacrifice.
He explains that Hashem’s objective in His relationship with Bnai
Yisrael was to develop the people into a nation devoted to His service. Hashem chose to not forsake sacrifice as one
of the forms of service. This was because
sacrifice was an established form of worship.
Abandonment of sacrifice as a form of worship would have represented a
radical change of attitudes and behaviors. In other words, in order to achieve
the goal of forming a nation devoted to Hashem, a concession was made to human
nature. The traditional, accepted form
of worship was preserved.
Maimonides continues with an amazing analogy. Imagine our reaction if Hashem were to tell
us to abandon prayer as a form of worship.
Instead, we are to serve Hashem through thought alone. We would not know how to serve Hashem
without some available mode of material expression. Sacrifice played an analogous role in the minds of Bnai Yisrael. Therefore, Hashem chose to not abandon it.
However, this created a dilemma. Sacrifice was associated with idolatry. Hashem had to reform sacrifice and strip it
of all idolatrous elements.
In order to reform sacrifice, it is highly
controlled and structured. This
intensive attention to detail assures that all elements of idolatry are removed
and not permitted to reenter sacrificial service.[1]
In essence, it seems that Maimonides acknowledges
that animal sacrifice does not represent an ideal form of worship. In fact, he seems to accept that this form
of worship is a remnant from more primitive times and cultures. Nonetheless, he argues that the Torah – in
recognition of the limitations of human nature – chose to preserve this ancient
form of worship.
Next, Maimonides discusses a related question. He
asks why Hashem did not merely require the ultimate level of service. Certainly, He can instill within us the
ability to meet this requirement!
Maimonides’ answer has two parts.
First, Maimonides shows that Hashem typically does
not resolve human shortcomings through altering human nature. For example, when Bnai Yisrael were brought
out of Egypt, Hashem did not lead them to the land of Israel by the most direct
route. This was because the nation was
not yet prepared to battle mighty nations.
Hashem did not alter the people’s nature. Instead, He accommodated it.
Second, Maimonides explains this practice of Hashem
on a deeper level. Although Hashem can
alter human nature, this is not His method of relating to Bnai Yisrael. Instead, He gave us the Torah and sent us
prophets to guide us and help us improve ourselves.
Finally, Maimonides assets that a careful study of
the Torah and the Prophets supports his thesis. He identifies various passages that support his explanation of
sacrifices. Maimonides also points out
that the offering of sacrifices is restricted.
They must be offered in the Bait HaMikdash and by Kohanim. Other forms of worship are not subject to as
many restrictions. For example, one can
pray virtually anywhere. No Kohen is
required to participate. This encourages
a de-emphasis of sacrifice and a reorientation to other, more meaningful, forms
of worship.[2]
Maimonides’ explanation of sacrifices provides a
compelling answer to a difficult question.
The Torah – the Written Law – describes the laws governing sacrifices in
great detail. The Written Law deals
with other important mitzvot much more concisely. For example, nowhere does the Written Law provide a detailed, or
even general description of teffilin.
Similarly, the Written Law does not precisely define the type of
activity that is prohibited on Shabbat.
The Written Law provides a general statement, and the details are
provided by the Oral Law. This same
pattern is followed in the Torah’s treatment of most other mitzvot. This is not the case in regard to
sacrifices. Sacrifices are described in
elaborate detail in the Written Law.
The only other area that receives the same meticulous treatment is the
design and structure of the Mishcan.
Why does the Torah treat these two areas in a manner that is starkly
inconsistent with its usual approach?
Maimonides’ thesis regarding sacrifices provides a response.
According to Maimonides, the Torah created its
system of sacrifices in response to two considerations. First, it would have been impossible to
develop a new religion that completely abandoned traditional, deeply rooted
forms of worship. So, sacrifices were
preserved within the Torah. Second, the
Torah was compelled to regulate and structure sacrifices in order to “sanitize”
them and strip them of any element of idolatry. But, it must be added that this structuring and regulating of
sacrifices did not just eliminate all elements of idolatry. These same detailed laws prevented the
restoration of idolatrous practices and traditions into the Torah’s system of
sacrifices. The Torah’s concession to
human nature in allowing sacrifices is a dangerous one. It allows an institution identified with
idolatry to continue to exist. It
responds to the danger that this institution might become corrupted and degenerate
back into idolatry through careful regulation.
The Torah deemed these regulations so important that it was unwilling to
relegate them to the Oral Law. These
regulations must be well known and their importance must be fully
appreciated. This is accomplished by
placing these laws in the Written Torah.
The same reasoning can be applied to explaining the Torah’s treatment of the Mishcan. The Mishcan is a place designated for worship of Hashem. As a place of worship, it also is subject to idolatrous influences. The same human tendencies that could lead to the corruption of sacrifices and their degeneration back into a form of idolatry could find expression in the structure and form of the Mishcan. In order to prevent the infiltration of idolatrous attitudes into the design of the Mishcan, its design is meticulously described in the Written Law.
“And its innards and its legs he should wash in
water. And the Kohen should burn the
entirety on the altar. It is an Olah, a
burnt offering, a sweet odor to Hashem.” (VaYikra 1:9)
Nachmanides raises a number of objections against
Maimonides’ position. Most of his
criticisms center on a single issue. He
argues that the Torah, in many ways, indicates that sacrifices are inherently
valuable and a fitting form of service to Hashem. Based on these criticisms, Nachmanides rejects Maimonides’
position.
Nachmanides cites a number of examples of the
Torah’s positive treatment of sacrifices. But, let us focus on one specific
example.
Nachmanides points out that in a number of places,
the Torah describes sacrifices in positive terms. One instance is in our pasuk.
The Torah refers to the Olah sacrifice as a sweet odor to Hashem. Nachmanides argues that if Maimonides is
correct, then the Torah should, at best, tolerate sacrifices. But, in our pasuk, the Torah is not neutral
in its treatment of sacrifices. On the
contrary, the Torah describes the Olah in a remarkably positive fashion.[3]
How might Maimonides explain our pasuk? In order to answer this question, an
important distinction must be made.
Although the Torah tells us the Avot and others offered sacrifices
before the revelation of the Torah, in these instances the Torah does not
generally describe these sacrifices in positive terms. The Torah’s treatment of the sacrifices
offered by the Avot is completely neutral in tone. Our pasuk marks a new treatment of sacrifices in which the Torah
describes a sacrifice as a sweet odor to Hashem. Why does the Torah suddenly change its tone in our parasha?
The answer to this question is fundamental to our
attitude towards the Torah and halacha.
Anyone who has seriously studied science is astounded by the eloquent
laws that govern the natural universe.
The wisdom and intelligence reflected in these laws is awe-inspiring. These laws are so wondrous because they are
the creation of Hashem and reflect His wisdom.
The system of halacha contained in the Torah is also the creation of
Hashem. He authored the laws that
govern natural phenomena and fashioned the Torah that is designed to guide
human behavior. Therefore, halacha
partakes of the same beauty and eloquence as the laws of nature. The wisdom and genius of halacha are also
awe-inspiring.
Before the revelation of the Torah, there was no
system of halacha to govern sacrificial service. Sacrifice became endowed with a system of halacha only when the
Torah was given. It is halacha that
converts the sacrifice into a sweet odor to Hashem. The Torah tells us that sacrifices were offered before the Torah
was given. But, the Torah does not
praise these sacrifices. They were not
expressions of halacha. In our parasha,
the Torah begins to reveal in detail the Torah’s system of sacrifice – a system
governed by the laws of the Torah.
These sacrifices – those authorized and governed by halacha – can be
referred to as a sweet odor to Hashem.
Let us now return to Maimonides’ position. It is true that Maimonides maintains that
the Torah includes a system of sacrifices in response to primitive practices
rooted in ancient cultures. But, it is
an error to assume that Maimonides maintains that the Torah’s system of
sacrifices is nothing more than a concession to primitivism. Maimonides recognizes that the wisdom
embodied in the halacha governing sacrifices is just as ingenious as the
halacha that guides other areas of endeavor.
The halacha transforms the sacrifices from a primitive religious
practice into a sophisticated and advanced form of worship. By virtue of this transformation, the
sacrifices are referred to as a sweet odor to Hashem.[4]
[1] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Moreh Nevuchim, volume 3, chapter 32.
[2] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Moreh Nevuchim, volume 3, chapter 32.
[3] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Nachman (Ramban / Nachmanides) Commentary on Sefer VaYikra 1:9.
[4] See Rav Meir Simcha of Dvinsk, Meshech
Chachmah on Sefer VaYikra, introduction.