

Converts are not members of their former gentile families, based on “Converts are as newborns”. Yet, a convert cannot wed his mother...unless she too converts. How is this paradox explained?



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## Weekly Parsha

# Re'eh

RABBI BERNARD FOX

“And you should collect all its spoil into the midst of its open square, and burn with fire the city and all its spoil, completely, for Hashem, your G-d. And it shall be a heap of destruction forever, never to be rebuilt. And

(continued on next page)

# SEXUAL LAWS II

*Psychological Health—Not Taboo*

RABBI MOSHE BEN-CHAIM

Last week we discussed the quite interesting reason behind primary sexual prohibitions for Noachides...and what is equally true for Jews, since they are based on human psychology. God created only one human design.

We might have assumed our immediate family members – specifically parents – are forbidden sexual partners based on some “taboo”. But Judaism has no taboos...only sensible laws and principles. And to our surprise, we learned that the Torah prohibited our parents, as a direct response to Adam’s satisfaction with Eve, “created

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(Re'eh cont. from pg. 1)

## Weekly Parsha

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**nothing that is doomed to destruction shall cling to your hand, so that the Lord may return from His fierce wrath, and grant you compassion, and be compassionate with you, and multiply you, as He swore to your forefathers.”** (Devarim 13:17-18.)

Maimonides explains that each of the taryag mitzvot – the 613 commandments – is distinct. Therefore, although a prohibition or obligation may be reiterated a number of times in the Torah, it is only regarded as a single commandment among the 613 mitzvot. In other words, the activities or behaviors that are required or prohibited by each commandment are unique; multiple commandments do not reiterate – either requiring or prohibiting – the same activity or behavior.[1]

Nonetheless, it is possible for a person to violate multiple commandments with a single action.[2] For example, if a person cooks meat with milk on Shabbat, he violates two mitzvot. He violates the mitzvah prohibiting melachah – creative activity – on Shabbat. One of the activities defined as melachah is cooking. The person also violates the mitzvah prohibiting the cooking together of meat and milk. The person only performed a single act. However, this activity is prohibited by two distinct commandments. Therefore, both mitzvot are violated.

This example does not contradict Maimonides' rule regarding mitzvot. The mitzvah prohibiting the performance of melachah on Shabbat is certainly distinct from the mitzvah prohibiting cooking together milk and meat. In our example a single act was performed; however, different characteristics within this action generate the multiple violations. One characteristic of the action is that it is a melachah. The second characteristic is that meat and milk are cooked together.

Maimonides' basic principle is intuitively reasonable. We would expect the 613 mitzvot to be distinct from one another. However, Maimonides extends and applies his principle in ways that are not self-evident. The Torah prohibits the consumption of various species. Among these species are those defined as sheretz. The exact definition of this category requires an extensive discussion. For this discussion, we will loosely describe the term to refer to insects. Different mitzvot prohibit flying insects, crawling insects and various other general categories of insects. However, there is no specific mitzvah that prohibits aquatic insects. Instead, there is a general mitzvah that states that all insects are prohibited. Maimonides explains that this mitzvah prohibits consumption of aquatic insects.[3]

Maimonides raises a question. If a person

consumes a flying insect, how many mitzvot does the person violate? It would seem that the person violates two mitzvot: the mitzvah prohibiting consumption of flying insects and general prohibition against consumption of insects. However, Maimonides explains that this is not the correct conclusion. His explanation is somewhat vague. It seems he maintains that the person only violates the mitzvah against consumption of flying insects. The general mitzvah against consuming insects is not violated. The general commandment only prohibits the consumption of aquatic insects. Maimonides acknowledges that this general commandment does not make a specific reference to aquatic insects and these aquatic insects are only included in this mitzvah because the commandment legislates a general commandment against the consumption of insects. Nonetheless, he seems to maintain that any insects that are prohibited by another mitzvah are not prohibited by the general commandment.[4]



Why does the general commandment not include all insects? It is a general statement prohibiting all insects! Why does Maimonides insist that this general mitzvah is only applicable to aquatic insects? Maimonides explains that his position is an expression and application of the principle outlined above. Each mitzvah is unique. Furthermore, the particular and specific characteristics of any activity can only be prohibited by a single commandment. Flying insects are prohibited by a specific mitzvah. It is not possible for these insects to also be prohibited by the general prohibition against the consumption of insects. If these insects were prohibited by the general mitzvah, then the specific characteristics of the organism would be prohibited by multiple mitzvot. This is a violation of the principle outlined above.[5] In short, Maimonides position has two aspects. First, each mitzvah is distinct and unique. Second, the specific characteristics, or properties, of any object or activity can only be a prohibited by a single mitzvah.

In our parasha we encounter an instance in which Maimonides seems to violate this principle. The passages above describe the laws of an *air ha' nidachat*. This is a city in which the inhabitants have adopted idolatry. The guilty inhabitants of the city are executed and the city and its contents are destroyed. Furthermore, the Torah prohibits anyone from taking anything from this city. Nothing may be rescued from destruction. Maimonides explains that the prohibition against taking anything from the city is a mitzvah. Specifically, it is violated if a person derives benefit from any object in the city that is required to be destroyed.[6] Maimonides explains that this prohibi-

(continued on next page)

tion is not limited to the objects in an eir ha'nidachat. It extends to any object associated with idolatry that is required to be destroyed. For example, the Torah commands us to destroy trees associated with idolatry. If a person uses the wood of such a tree for cooking this mitzvah is violated.[7]

**“And you should not bring an abomination into your house, lest you be are to be destroyed like it, but you shall utterly detest it, and you shall utterly abhor it; for it is to be destroyed.”** (Devarim 7:26)

The above passages are found in last week's parasha – Parshat Ekev. The parasha discusses the mitzvah to destroy objects associated with idolatry. The passage above communicates a prohibition against deriving benefit from these objects. Is this prohibition a separate mitzvah or is it included in the mitzvah prohibiting a person from deriving benefit from an eir ha'nidachat and other objects associated with idolatry? We would assume that Maimonides would respond that there is a mitzvah that prohibits deriving benefit from an object from an eir ha'nidachat. This mitzvah also includes a prohibition against deriving benefit from any object associated with idolatry. Therefore, there cannot be a second commandment that specifically prohibits deriving benefit from an object associated with idolatry. The second mitzvah would not be unique. It would prohibit an activity already the subject of another mitzvah. Nonetheless, Maimonides asserts that there is a second mitzvah. He explains that our parasha communicates a mitzvah prohibiting deriving benefit from an object of an eir ha'nidachat. He extends this mitzvah to include any object associated with idolatry. But, he also maintains that the above passages from Parshat Ekev communicate a second mitzvah that prohibits deriving benefit from an object associated with idolatry.[8]

Various commentaries on Maimonides deal with this issue. They argue that the two commandments are really very different. The commandment in our parasha does prohibit benefit. According to these commentaries, the mitzvah in Parshat Ekev does not prohibit benefit. It prohibits bringing an object associated with idolatry into one's home.[9] However, there is no clear indication in Maimonides' writings that he accepts this distinction. Furthermore, his treatment of these two mitzvot in his code of law – Mishne Torah – clearly indicates that he regards both mitzvot as prohibitions against deriving benefit from these objects.[10]

In order to understand Maimonides' position, it is necessary to further consider his treatment of these two mitzvot: the mitzvah prohibiting benefiting from the objects of an eir ha'nidachat or other objects associated with idolatry, and the mitzvah prohibiting benefiting from objects associated with idolatry. In his Mishne Torah Maimonides explains that we are obligated to completely destroy the eir ha'nidachat and all of the property of the city. He immediately

follows this statement with a delineation of the mitzvah to not benefit from the objects of an eir ha'nidachat.[11] It seems from this context that according to Maimonides, the mitzvah prohibiting benefiting from these objects is an extension of the obligation to destroy the city and its contents. By taking the object and benefiting from it, the object is rescued from destruction. The requirement to completely destroy the city and its contents is abrogated. Although the mitzvah is not violated until the person benefits from the object, the fundamental element of the mitzvah is to not interfere with the destruction of the city and its contents. Similarly, this mitzvah extends to all objects that are associated with idolatry. The Torah requires us to destroy these objects. Taking these objects and benefiting from them is an abrogation of the requirement to destroy them. This understanding to the mitzvah is conforms to the simple message of the passages in which it is outlined.

In his Sefer HaMitzvot, Maimonides discusses the mitzvah requiring us to destroy all objects associated with idolatry. It is important to note that after describing the mitzvah Maimonides adds that rather than benefiting from these objects we are required to reject and regard as abominations all objects associated with idolatry.[12] Apparently, Maimonides adds this comment in order to explain the fundamental concept underlying the commandment. We are prohibited from benefiting from objects associated with idolatry because we should regard these objects with disgust. If we benefit from the object, we fail to demonstrate the proper and required attitude towards idolatry. This interpretation of the mitzvah is apparent in the above passage.

In short, although these two mitzvot – the mitzvah prohibiting benefiting from the objects of an eir

ha'nidachat or other objects associated with idolatry and the mitzvah prohibiting benefiting from objects associated with idolatry – prohibit the physical identical activity. However, the mitzvot focus on different halachic characteristics within the activity. The mitzvah prohibiting benefiting from the contents of an eir ha'nidachat is a prohibition against interfering with the requirement to destroy the city and its contents. The mitzvah prohibiting benefiting from objects associated with idolatry is an expression of the requirement to adopt an attitude of disgust with idolatry. Therefore, Maimonides' treatment of these two prohibitions as separate mitzvot is not inconsistent with his general principle. ■

[1] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Sefer HaMitzvot, Principle 9.

[2] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Mishne Torah, Hilchot Shegagot 4.

[3] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Sefer HaMitzvot, Mitzvat Lo Ta'aseh 179.

[4] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Sefer HaMitzvot, Mitzvat Lo Ta'aseh 179.

[5] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Sefer HaMitzvot, Mitzvat Lo Ta'aseh 179.

[6] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Sefer HaMitzvot, Mitzvat Lo Ta'aseh 24.

[7] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Sefer HaMitzvot, Mitzvat Lo Ta'aseh 25.

[8] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Sefer HaMitzvot, Mitzvat Lo Ta'aseh 25.

[9] Rabbaynu Yitzchak DeLeon, Meggilat Esther, Commentary on Maimonides' Sefer Hamitzvot, Principle 9.

[10] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Mishne Torah, Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 4:7, 7:2.

[11] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Mishne Torah, Hilchot Avodat Kochavim 4:6-7.

[12] Rabbaynu Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam / Maimonides) Sefer HaMitzvot, Mitzvat Lo Ta'aseh 25.

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
## Sexuality

from his flesh and bones". We then wondered why this satisfaction demands that all future husbands abandon their parents: "And God built that side which He took from Adam into a woman and He brought her to Adam. And Adam said, 'This time, bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh; to this one will be called woman [isha] for from man [ish] was this taken.' Therefore, man will abandon his father and mother and cleave unto his wife, and they shall be one flesh." (Gen. 2:21-24)

We then deduced that if man remains subjugated to parents, this would hamper the next stage of life where man expresses the unique satisfaction found only in a mate. Just as Adam felt responsible for Eve – as she was made from him – this applies today as well. Although our wives are not made from our bodies, nonetheless, we identify with our wives, and enjoy a feeling of responsibility for their well-being. By God's plan, man is the breadwinner; "By the sweat of your brow you will eat bread" was said to man, not woman.

This independent role of responsibility is contrary to the 'dependent' role of son. Therefore, man must abandon the dependent son role, and take a leadership role when seeking a wife. We mentioned the Talmudic statement that it is the man who chases down a wife: indicating man's dominance in this relationship. We now understand why abandonment of parents is a prerequisite for married life. And we finally arrive at the reason for the prohibition of sexual relations with parents: marriage to parents is the opposite of 'abandoning' the parent. So in fact, there is no taboo on parents. There is nothing inherently wrong with that union. It is merely due to man's need to identify with and feel responsible for a mate, and also God's demand that man populate the world, that makes abandoning the parent a necessity. Once again, the Talmud praised one who dreamt of intercourse with his mother or sister, as there is nothing inherently wrong with that act, as opposed to murder or stealing.

As we studied further, we learned that even those with whom our parents married are prohibited, such as a stepmother. Even our father's sister is prohibited as a sexual partner, since one who seeks his stepmother or aunt is expressing the inability to separate from his father. Why else would he select such partners, when so many other potential partners are available? The Torah actually isolates the error in many cases, and in connection with one's aunt, the Torah's ridicule is "she is your father's kin". Meaning, one seeking marriage with his aunt is really seeking his father:



expressing that he has not escaped the dependent role of son.

When ridiculing the union between one and his granddaughter, the Torah calls this "your own nakedness". What is this strange ridicule? And what about the glaring omission of wedding one's very daughter? Why is daughter not mentioned in the prohibited partners?

It appears that the Torah is seeking to open our eyes with these ridicules, as all of God's Torah instructions isolate the core issues in life. God knows quite well which aspect of our psyches is at work when we deviate from Torah laws, and He knows how to describe the problem with precision. And the problem with one who weds his granddaughter is that he misunderstands the purpose of marriage.

Marriage is to populate the world, so that other members of mankind may have partners, with whom they can do the same. (This is why we are commanded to create at least one male and one female. In this manner, we populate the world with the genders necessary for others to do the same.) By marrying one's own offspring, he is not relating to his partner to 'reproduce', since this partner, his granddaughter, IS his reproduction! For this reason,

the ridicule of "it is your nakedness" is precise: his granddaughter is the result of his nakedness, or sexual act. She is to be his offspring, and not his partner for begetting offspring. Perhaps no mention needs to be made concerning relations with one's daughter, since this is an even more clear case relating to offspring improperly. Rav Hai Gaon taught that the truth that there exists a God is not a command. Why not? I believe it is the same reason: God's existence is so obvious; any command to recognize Him would belittle the obvious nature of His existence. Similarly, daughter is not expressly stated in the Torah verses to teach how obvious this prohibition is. (However, the Talmud does not leave this open-ended, and teaches the means of derivation that prohibits one's daughter.)

We admire the Torah that does not avoid addressing any issue, regardless of the disturbing nature; be it sexual relations with one's mother or daughter. "Truths" are God's goal, so the Torah discusses them honestly. Similarly, King Solomon – one of the wisest men ever – openly discussed this issue.

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Sexuality

On a related note, Maimonides records a fascinating law. (Laws of Sexual Prohibitions, 14:11)

A Noachide may not marry his mother. Now, if he converts to Judaism, the principle of "One who converts is akin to a newborn" renders his mother as truly unrelated to him. But Maimonides stops short of saying she is permitted to her son. He says, "no kin exists", and implying something else does exist: sexual prohibition. In his next law, he continues this case stating that if his mother also converts, "there is no sexual prohibition at all". So only when both mother and son convert, are they permitted to each other. The question is this: why in the first case is the sexual prohibition on his mother still intact, if "One who converts is akin to a newborn"? As a convert, and a newborn, his mother should be permissible, since previous family ties have been severed. She is no longer his "mother", in a very literal sense! What more is achieved when the mother 'also' converts? I believe the answer lies in the distinction between two different types of sexual prohibitions.

Before we answer, we must be reminded of a distinction we made last week. There are two types of sexual prohibitions: 1) those that are borne out of family relationships (shi-are), like mothers, sisters and daughters; and 2) those created by sexual activity (ervah), such as one's stepmother. If you study Parshas Acharei Mos, you will see God's words vary from "shi-are" to "ervah", depending on the sexual partner.

Now, what is the reason for the prohibition on one's mother? It is 'primarily' their relationship as son and mother. However, some sexual relationships are not prohibited based on family ties, like one's stepmother. This woman has no relation to the son. It is only through sexual relations of his father – an act – that this woman now became prohibited. To sum up, a woman can be prohibited to a man either because they are family members, or because another family member married this woman...like the stepmother case. Let's return to our question.

Why is the convert's mother still prohibited until she converts as well? Although the son converted, and is "akin to a newborn" there still exists some prohibition. But from where: she is no longer his mother! The answer is as follows...

As Maimonides teaches, once the son converts, there is no longer any kinship...but Maimonides did not say she is permitted. Why? Because this woman is also one with whom his father slept. So even though all family ties are severed once he converts, this is only in connection with "familial" relations: the first type mentioned above. The converted son is no longer part of his former family; she is no longer his "mother". This alone would permit him to his former mother. However,

we said that there exists another type of prohibited partner: one prohibited due to sexual relations. And this is not due to current family relationships. Therefore, even though he converted, his conversion does not abrogate the "historical event" of his father sleeping with this woman. His leaving his family via conversion does not sever this second prohibition: his father's "wife". Therefore, his former mother is also prohibited to him due to a second reason: his father slept with this woman. This is not a family issue, but a prohibition generated from an event. And events are not erased due to his conversion. Conversion affects family issues alone. Similarly, his conversion does not mean he is no longer a musician, since the two are unrelated. His conversion is equally unrelated to

events. Therefore, this converted son, whose former mother is yet gentile, may not marry her, since she is not only his mother, but also his father's wife. Conversion removes her status as "mother", but not her status as his father's wife. However, once she converts, she too is "as one newly born" and loses all relationship to his father. The two may now marry. (However, the Rabbis prohibited this union, lest it be said that one who comes to a more sanctified religion, is permitted to more people sexually, i.e., his mother).

With Maimonides' writings, we gain insight into God's Torah brilliance, and His precise formulations. ■

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# Dead Mens' gods

Full victory over the Canaanites will not come, Moses tells the people, when they defeat the defending armies on the battlefield. The ultimate battle will not be fought until afterward (12:30-31). "Watch yourself lest you become drawn to them after they have been destroyed before you, and lest you seek out their gods, saying, 'How did these nations worship their gods? I, too, will do the same.' You shall not do so to God your Lord, for everything that is an abomination to God, that He hates, they have done for their gods; for they have even burned their sons and daughters in the fire for their gods."

These verses reveal the great seductive power of idolatry. Consider the situation. The Jewish people have just conquered the land. With God's help, they have destroyed the indigenous defenders and completely exposed the impotence of their gods. God's power is manifest; the pagan's imaginary deities are discredited. Incredibly, at this moment of Jewish triumph, the Torah warns the victors not to be drawn to the gods of the vanquished. Why would they be drawn to these dead men's gods or find their cults attractive? What is at the root of this strange seductive power?

In actuality, idolatry is much more apt to arise out of the psychological needs of idol worshippers than from an intellectual mistake. Idolatry allows its adherents to create and observe, in the guise of a religion, a system of rituals and practices that satisfy their primitive urges and address their insecurities. Even when these pagan religions call upon their adherents to make sacrifices, there is a simultaneous satisfaction of deep primitive urges. Often this attraction is so subtle that the worshippers, unaccustomed to self-examination, are unaware of its insidious nature.



*Baal, one of the most widely worshiped gods in ancient Canaan, was associated with fertility and rain. His cult spread to other people in the ancient Near East, including the Egyptians, Babylonians, and Assyrians. This statue of Baal dates from the 1300s B.C.*

The Jewish people entering the Holy Land, although victorious on the battlefield, would not be immune to the drives and character flaws that draw people to idolatry. It was quite possible they would turn in that direction as they contended with the psychological pressures of their daily lives. However, having no direct experience with idolatrous cults, they might be intrigued by the vestiges of the destroyed cults all around them, sensing their psychological appeal. And they would ask, "How did these nations worship their gods? I, too, will do the same." The Torah forbids them to do this and warns them (12:31) that, in the end, such practices can even lead their followers to throw their children into the fire.

Ironically, the practice of child immolation, from a psychological perspective, reflects selfishness rather than altruistically intended, though misguided, religious fervor. The practitioners may tell themselves they are sacrificing their beloved children selflessly, but the exact opposite is true. These supposedly religious people are tremendously narcissistic, full of undeflected self-love. Attached to the physical reality and fearful of their own mortality, they are prepared to make the penultimate sacrifice of a relatively expendable part of themselves, namely their children, in order to protect that which is most important, namely themselves. ■

**RABBI DR. MICHAEL BERNSTEIN**

*Taken from  
"Windows to the Soul"*

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What is

# Emunas Chachamim?



MATT SCHNEEWEISS

The Baraisa in Avos 6:6 lists the 48 qualities through which the Torah is acquired. #23 is emunas chachamim – “faith in the Sages.” We must answer two questions: What is emunas chachamim, and what makes emunas chachamim essential to the acquisition of Torah?

There are those who believe that emunas chachamim refers to blind faith in the words of the Sages - that we must believe what the Sages say, in spite of what our minds tell us. This notion of emunas chachamim is incorrect for a simple reason: **it is impossible to have blind faith in the words of the Sages.** To those who object, I ask one question: "How do you know what the Sages mean?" In order to have blind faith in a statement of the Sages, one must have some understanding of what that statement means; that understanding must ultimately come from one's own mind. Even if a person relies on his teacher's interpretation, he must still rely on his own understanding of his teacher (not to mention that his teacher had to rely on his understanding of the Sages, and so on).

Rather, **emunas chachamim is the conviction that the Sages are chachamim** – that they reached the highest levels of abstract thinking and intellectual perfection; that they did not make casual statements, but only spoke or wrote after due contemplation and deliberation; that their ideas are not expressions of personal taste, psychological biases, or societal values, but are the products of rigorous intellectual analysis; that their words contain deep concepts and cannot be grasped through a superficial reading, but only after much thought, effort, and training; that they were humble, intellectually honest, and would

never say or write anything for egotistical reasons; that they were aware of the facts in front of them as well as the other conceptual possibilities, and nevertheless concluded as they did because they had a conviction in mind's ability to grasp the truth.

A person who learns the words of the Sages with these assumptions has emunas chachamim.

Does this idea of emunas chachamim imply the Sages were always correct? No. The Sages were human, and even the greatest humans occasionally make mistakes. But this idea of emunas chachamim entails that if we see what appears to be a mistake or a nonsensical statement in the words of the Sages, there is a high probability that it is due to a deficiency in our own minds rather than in theirs. In such a scenario, we should think into their words with all of our resources to come up with a rational explanation. If we are correct, wonderful; if we are incorrect, then at least we will end up with a good idea, even if it wasn't what the Sages intended (needless to say, to the extent that we are in doubt as to whether our interpretation truly reflects the ideas of Sages, we ought to proceed with caution).

Does this idea of emunas chachamim mean that we cannot form our own opinion, siding with one Sage over the other? No. It is natural for the mind to favor one position over the other. But we should be intellectually honest and ask ourselves, "Do I favor this position because it appeals to my intellectual intuition, or because it appeals to my emotions?" Even if we are fairly certain that we are being drawn by our intellectual intuition, we must know how much weight to attribute to it - based on our years and experience in learning - and we

should know when it is appropriate to suspend judgment until we reach the position where we are truly able to judge.

Does this in any way relieve us of the burden of thinking with our own minds? No. If anything, emunas chachamim forces us to work harder - to go beyond our first impressions, gut interpretations, and intellectual and emotional prejudices, and to learn from the words of the Sages themselves, rather than using the words of the Sages as a platform to say our own ideas and confirm our preconceived notions.

By now it should be clear why emunas chachamim is essential to the acquisition of Torah. A person who lacks emunas chachamim (or a person who thinks that emunas chachamim refers to blind faith) will never advance beyond his own, limited way of thinking, and will miss out on the opportunity we have to learn from the greatest intellects who have walked the earth.

Emunas chachamim not only enables us to gain from the ideas of the Sages, but by subordinating our untrained and underdeveloped minds to their superior intuition - all while continuing to think critically and independently - we are sure to improve and perfect our intellectual faculties as well. ■

*Matt Schneeweiss authors the blog  
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*My nephew, a Marine,  
Yehoshua Aharon  
ben Ephraim Fishel*

*will be stationed in Iraq starting  
mid-August for 8 months.*

*We ask you to have him in your tefilos  
for a safe mission and return. -Doug*

## **American Man to save Israeli Solider How you can partake in this Mitzvah**

This summer a 19 year-old Israeli Solider will get a new lease on life due to a selfless gift from Yosef Chiger, of Harrisburg Pennsylvania. Ayelet Katz, of Moshav Be'er Tuvia had been stationed in Tel Nof Air Force Base, where she worked as an assistant to the head of human resources, until she was forced to leave the IDF because of kidney failure and begin fulltime dialysis. Often Israelis in need of kidney transplants wait for years because of the shortage of organs; however with the help of the Halachic Organ Donor Society (HODS) Ayelet will be fortunate to receive an altruistic donation that will allow her to resume a healthy life in a matter of months. Chiger, married and the father of a five-year old daughter, will be traveling to Israel to donate his kidney and thereby giving Ayelet the ability to resume a full and healthy life. It was especially significant to Chiger that she is an Israeli and a solider, and that the transplant means that she will have a long productive life ahead of her.

The transplant is being facilitated by the Halachic Organ Donor Society, which facilitates altruistic kidney donations and educates Jews about organ donation and halacha.

HODS is raising \$15,000 to bring Chiger and his family to Israel. Contributions can sent to the HOD Society at 49 West 45th Street, 10th Floor, New York, NY or via their website at [www.hods.org](http://www.hods.org).