Rabbi Israel Chait

Preface

Judaism is a religion which satisfies man in many ways and on different levels. It is the purpose of these essays to show how Judaism appeals to the intellectual and creative part of mans nature. If I have overemphasized the rational element in Judaism it is because I have found this element so often overlooked. It is my intent to bring into sharp relief the unique character of Judaism in this regard.

Talmudic Judaism

Jewish religious and cultural life has through the centuries been rooted in the Talmud. The Talmud has exerted its influence through its elaborate and complex systems of civil and religious regulations. This influence has extended beyond the practical religious sphere and has engendered a particular intellectual attitude among the people. It has further been responsible for establishing among its close adherents an appreciation of a very special type of religious thought. But what exactly is Talmud? To begin with, the Talmud is described as the Oral Law. The sages of the Talmud maintained that together with the Bible, Moses received a very elaborate body of knowledge whose purpose was to render the Biblical injunctions intelligible. This latter work was not permitted to be committed to writing. Only one consideration could override this prohibition, and that is the danger of losing the body of knowledge itself. Accordingly, Talmudic scholars have convened at different times to issue permits for committing to writing various parts of the Oral Law that were considered endangered. It is interesting to note, however, that while its substance has been put into writing, the Talmuds unique methodology has remained oral, being transmitted verbally from one group of scholars to another. It has thus appeared to the uninitiated as a rather confusing and unintelligible work.

It is the purpose of this paper to shed some light on the basic tenets of Talmudic reasoning so that its integral role in the scheme of Judaic thought be appreciated even by those who are not necessarily Talmudic scholars.

The most prominent difficulty one encounters in approaching Talmud, and by far the greatest obstacle to its comprehension stems from a failure to grasp the basic nature of its analysis. This failure is a natural result of attempting to construe Talmud through the framework of common religious notions, rather than searching to discover its own specific principles. Contemporary religious ideas are wholly irreconcilable with the basic method of Talmudic investigation. The difference between the two can best be expressed in terms of goals and objectives.

From time immemorial the value of a religious performance has rested in its ability to endow the faithful with a certain religio-emotional experience. Let us take Christianity for example. To the Christian the overriding concern is to engender certain religio-emotional states and experiences. Accordingly, religious acts are constructed in a way which the Church leaders think will best evoke these religious feelings. When approaching Talmud one expects to find the same criterion at work. Rather than realize that his expectations are not to be fulfilled, the would-be investigator tries to make the Talmud conform to his own preconceived notions. A typical example of this approach can be taken from Max I. Dimonts book, Jews, God, and history. In it Dimont attempts to give a demonstration of what a Talmudic responsa is:

Let us illustrate how the Responsa worked with an example from life today. Let us suppose that the yeshivas of Babylon still exist and that a Jewish community in suburban St. Louis has asked one of them to solve the vexing problem of the automobile, the suburb, and the synagogue. This is the dilemma. The Torah forbids work on the Sabbath. In 1900 AD a yeshiva court ruled that driving a car is work. Now, many years later, the suburbs have developed. The synagogue no longer is a few blocks away, but miles out in the country, and the distance is too formidable to walk. The congregation is faced with the prospect of an empty synagogue or committing the sin of driving to the place of worship. What should be done?

The question is turned over to the yeshiva and the problem placed on the docket. When the case comes up, the yeshiva court will begin a hearing much as the Supreme Court reviews a case. The argument might go something like this: Certainly God did not intend to have empty synagogues, nor to have His commandments broken. But who said that driving to the synagogue was work? Certainly not God or Moses. To force the aged to walk for miles in the hot sun or in the cold of winter is a peril to health. Attending services should be contemplated with joy, not with fear and trembling. Did not the sages say that he who takes upon himself a duty that is not specifically required is an ignoramus? And furthermore, did not Rabbi Judah ben Ezekiel, back in the third century, say that he who would order his entire life according to strict and literal interpretation of Scripture is a fool?

The yeshiva court would then begin a search for precedents, just as lawyers arguing a brief before the Supreme Court would search for precedents favorable to their case. After due deliberation, the court might decide that in their opinion the court back in 1900 had erred, and that driving a car to the synagogue is not work but pleasure, much in the same way that the United States Supreme Court in the 1890s held that equal but separate facilities for Negroes was constitutional, but in the 1950s reversed itself, holding that it was unconstitutional . Once a verdict is reached, it is sent to the other yeshivas, where similar hearings are held and a joint agreement disseminated through the Responsa to every Jewish community.

In fact, no such Talmudic responsa worthy of the name has ever been written.

What are the Talmudists criteria for decision-making and how does his approach differ from the foregoing? An illustration from the world of physics may help clarify this point. Let us take the problem of falling bodies and compare two approaches. We notice that when we release an object from our hands it falls to the ground. What is the explanation of this phenomenon? There are two distinct paths we may follow. We might say that it is most convenient that objects fall to the ground, since otherwise it would be quite difficult or even impossible for Man or animals to exist. Floating objects would get in our way and Man would have to invent methods of securing the objects he desired and preventing those he didnt from invading his premises. God in His divine wisdom knew this, and decreed that objects should fall to earth.

We might, however, give a different analysis of the situation. We might say that we observe bodies fall to earth. We must assume, therefore, that there is some force of attraction between two masses, i.e., gravity. The reason why we dont notice the earth move towards the body is that there is so much more earth than body.

The first approach is concerned with understanding the why of the situation, i.e., why bodies fall to earth. The second, on the other hand, is concerned only with the what of the situation, i.e., what is it that is responsible for the falling of bodies. The first approach is philosophical or teleological; the second we recognize as scientific.

Now while modern Man recognizes the validity of the what approach when it comes to understanding the physical world, when it comes to religion he thinks only in terms of the why. Here at last, he feels, his curiosity of the why of things should be satisfied. It is precisely on this point that the Talmudist differs. The farthest thing from the Talmudists mind is an attempt to ascertain Gods will. Such an attempt would be considered presumptuous and as absurd to him, as it would be to the physicist to explain gravity by introducing Gods will. Such considerations are philosophical and not within the realm of Talmudic analysis.

How does the Talmudist resolve his problems if he cannot base his decisions on any inner divine intuition? He uses the same faculty the physicist uses in understanding the universe - his intellect. Just as the scientist studies nature, makes observations, and then proceeds to draw universal laws from these observations; so the Talmudist studies the data of the written and Oral Law, draws his universals from them, and then proceeds to utilize these principles in the resolution of his problems. Just as a scientist tests his theories against experimental data so. too, the Talmudist tests his theories by checking their results against Talmudic data from other areas that may be effected directly or indirectly.

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